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mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military science fiction | David Drake wrote stories about future mercenaries, including the Hammer's Slammers series (1979), which follows the career of a future mercenary tank regiment. Drake's series which "helped initiate a fashion for sf about mercenaries", including The Warrior's Apprentice (1986) by Lois McMaster Bujold.
A twist was introduced in Harry Turtledove's Worldwar series depicting an alternate history in which WWII is disrupted by extraterrestrials invading Earth in 1942, forcing humans to stop fighting each other and unite against this common enemy. Turtledove depicts the tactics and strategy of this new course of the war in detail, showing how American, British, Soviet, and German soldiers and Jewish guerrillas (some of them historical figures) deal with this extraordinary new situation, as well as providing a not unsympathetic detailed point of view of individual invader warriors. In the war situation posited by Turtledove, the invaders have superior arms, but the gap is not too wide for the humans to bridge. For example, the invaders have more advanced tanks, but the German Wehrmacht's tank crews facing them – a major theme in the series – are more skilled and far more experienced.
The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction lists three notable women authors of MSF: Lois McMaster Bujold; Elizabeth Moon (particularly her Familias Regnant stories such as Hunting Party (1993)), and Karen Traviss.
Political themes: Several authors have presented stories with political messages of varying types as major or minor themes of their works.
David Drake has often written of the horrors and futility of war. He has said, in the afterwords of several of his Hammer's Slammers books (1979 and later), that one of his reasons for writing is to educate those people who have not experienced war, but who might have to make the decision to start or endorse a war (as policymakers or as voters) about what war is really like, and what the powers and limits of the military as an instrument of policy are.
David Weber has said:
For me, military science fiction is science fiction which is written about a military situation with a fundamental understanding of how military lifestyles and characters differ from civilian lifestyles and characters. It is science fiction which attempts to realistically portray the military within a science-fiction context. It is not 'bug shoots'. It is about human beings, and members of other species, caught up in warfare and carnage. It isn't an excuse for simplistic solutions to problems.
Practical applications by military: In 1980 and 1981, two science fiction authors inspired President Ronald Reagan's vision for a Strategic Defense Initiative in which satellites would be set up to shoot at nuclear missiles. The two authors were Larry Niven, the author of the Ringworld series, and Jerry Pournelle. Along with like-minded colleagues, they formed a committee to lobby the United States on space issues and influence Reagan's space policies. Pournelle advocated a "robust, technocratic military state". In addition to Pournelle's science fiction writing, he wrote a "paper for the Air Force on stability's role in national security".
President Reagan read the space advice that Niven, Pournelle, and their colleagues prepared, which influenced Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. "Niven and Pournelle saw an opportunity to shape the great void in their political image, and Reagan viewed space as yet another tool to defend America against the communist superpower...". Science fiction authors such as Arthur C. Clarke and Isaac Asimov criticized the Strategic Defense Initiative.
After the 9/11 terrorism attacks, a group of sci-fi authors called Sigma, including Pournelle and Niven, advised the "Department of Homeland Security on technological strategies for defeating terrorist threats."
In 2021, Worldcrunch reported that the French military has hired fiction writers to develop futuristic warfare scenarios, including situations that the military cannot directly study for "ethical reasons, such as Autonomous Lethality Weapon Systems (ALWS), or augmented humans." The French military says the authors are asked to imagine warfare situations that "destabilize us, scare us, blame, or even beat us", in order to provide the army with a "fresh set of practice scenarios". Military planners use the science fiction authors' scenarios to "prepare for previously unthought of situations", "boos[t] creativity" and help the military become "more resourceful."
The German military is also using science fiction to help its military but in its approach, they do not hire science fiction writers to develop scenarios. Instead, they "use existing science fiction" to help the army "predict the "world's next potential conflict."
The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) hired two science fiction writers to pen short stories about "what the wars of tomorrow will look like."
The MOD hired Peter Warren Singer and August Cole to write eight short stories about threats from "emerging technologies" including "artificial intelligence (AI), data modeling, drone swarms, quantum computing and human enhancement" in a battlefield context.
The MOD hired sci-fi writers because they have a "unique ability to imagine the unimaginable." As well, both authors know about "security subjects and modern warfare."
They advocate the use of Fictional Intelligence (FicInt), which they define as "useful fictions". FicInt, a concept developed by Cole in 2015, combines "fiction writing with intelligence to imagine future scenarios in ways grounded in reality."
See also: List of military science fiction works and authors
Space warfare in science fiction
Weapons in science fiction
War novel
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | Summary of military service around the world: In this summary, 195 countries are included.
No enforced conscription: The following 107 countries and territories have been identified as having no enforced conscription:
Both compulsory and voluntary military service: The following countries and regions have been identified as having both compulsory and voluntary military service:
Selective conscription: The following 13 countries have been identified as having selective conscription:
Civilian, unarmed or non-combatant service option: The following fifteen countries have been identified as having a civilian, unarmed or non-combatant service optional alternative to compulsory military service:
Compulsory military service for both genders:
Military service limited to 1 year or less: The following twenty countries have been identified as having compulsory military service limited to 1 year or less:
Military service limited to 18 months: The following 11 countries have been identified to having compulsory military service limited to 18 months or less:
Military service longer than 18 months: The following 26 countries have been identified as having compulsory military service terms longer than 18 months:
No defense force: The following 19 countries have been identified as having no defense forces or as having no standing army but having very limited military forces:
* Countries having no standing army, but having very limited military forces.
Countries without mandatory military service: Compulsory military service has declined considerably since 1970. A 2016 study finds "that the probability of a shorter military service time is positively associated with smaller country populations, smaller lagged army sizes, increases in primary schooling among young males, and having common law legal origins."
Albania: Albania had compulsory military service. Albania's armed forces announced an objective to create a professional army by the end of 2010.
Argentina: Argentina suspended military conscription in 1995 and replaced it with a voluntary military service, yet those already in service had to finish their time in service.
This came as a result of political and social distrust of the military, dwindling budgets which forced the military to induct fewer conscripts every year, the experience of the 1982 Falklands War which proved the superiority of professional servicemen over conscripts and a series of conscription-related brutality scandals which came to a head with the murder of Private Omar Carrasco at an Army base in 1994, following a brutal disciplinary action.
Military conscription has not been abolished; the Mandatory Military Service Law is still in the books and might be enforced in times of war, crisis or national emergency.
Conscription was known in Argentina as la colimba. The word colimba is a composite word made from the initial syllables of the verbs correr (to run), limpiar (to clean) and barrer (to sweep), as it was perceived that all a conscript did during service was running, cleaning and sweeping. Conscripts themselves were known and referred to as "colimbas".
Australia: Voluntary service in the Boer War (1899–1902) was initially from a number of the separate colonies before federation in 1901 and later volunteers were deployed as an Australian force. Two conscription referendums were defeated during World War I. Military service during WW1 was voluntary (First Australian Imperial Force) as was service in WW2 (Second Australian Imperial Force). Volunteer militia units (part-time civilian soldiers) were to be used only within the Commonwealth of Australia (such as in the Great Emu War in 1932) but in 1942 some militia units were deployed to Papua New Guinea, as it was considered part of Australia at that time, to fight the advancing and later withdrawing Japanese invasion army. Various levels of conscription (National Service) were in force during the 1950s but only for service in Australia during times of conflicts but the (Vietnam War) saw NS deployed to war with over 500 killed in action and thousands wounded in action with about half of the casualties being NS. The Vietnam War was lost on 1 May 1975 over three years after the Australian Defence Force withdrew in late 1971. All forms of conscription were abolished by the Whitlam government in later 1972. Conscription can be reactivated at any time should war break out; first upon mere declaration by the Governor General, followed by final approval 90 days later as a retrospective action by parliament. The defense act of 1903 clearly states this.
Barbados: Barbados has no conscription. The country has set the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into the Barbados Defence Force at 18. Younger recruits may be conscripted with parental consent.
Belgium: Belgium suspended conscription on 31 December 1992 by amending the 1962 Law on Conscription, which became applicable only to conscripts drafted in 1993 and earlier. In practice this meant that the law no longer applied to those born in 1975 and later. Since 1 March 1995 the Belgian armed forces consist of professional volunteers only.
Belize: Belize has set minimum age for voluntary recruitment into the Armed Forces at 18. (According to the Section 16 of the Defense Act of the Defence Ordinance of 1977.) Conscription has never been prescribed in the Defense Act, but is at the Governor General's discretion.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosnia and Herzegovina abolished compulsory military service as of 1 January 2006.
Bulgaria: Bulgaria abolished compulsory military service. The last conscripts were sent home on 25 November 2007.
Previously there was mandatory military service for male citizens from 18 to 27 years of age. Duration of the service depended on the degree of education. For citizens studying for or holding a bachelor's degree or higher the service was six months, and for citizens with no higher education it was nine months.
The duration of service was two years in 1992, and was dropping steadily, until it was finally abolished.
Canada: Compulsory service in a sedentary militia was practiced in Canada as early as 1669. In peacetime, compulsory service was typically limited to attending an annual muster, although they were mobilized for longer periods during war. Compulsory service in the sedentary militia continued until the late 19th century when Canada's sedentary Reserve Militia system fell into disuse. The legislative provision that formally made every male inhabitant of military age a member of the Reserve Militia was removed in 1904, replaced with provisions that made them theoretically "liable to serve in the militia".
Conscription into a full-time military service had only been instituted twice by the government of Canada, during both world wars. Conscription into the Canadian Expeditionary Force was practiced in the last year of the First World War in 1918. During the Second World War, conscription for home defence was introduced in 1940 and for overseas service in 1944. Conscription has not been practiced in Canada since the end of the Second World War in 1945.
Chile: All Chilean men between 17 and 24 years are eligible for military service. Since 2005, military service is voluntary and then mandatory if quotas necessary for the armed forces are not completed. The General Directorate of National Mobilization (In Spanish: Dirección General de Movilización Nacional, or DGMN) is responsible for the recruitment of volunteers and conscripts. Since 1992, according to the Law 19.992, due to the creation of the Corporación Nacional de Reparación y Reconciliación, sons and certain other relatives of victims of human rights violations and/or political violence, during Pinochet's dictatorship, are extempt of the military service draft, that was compulsory at that time. In 2009, with the Law 20.405, more victims were recognised by the Republic of Chile and the exemption of relatives was also amended
China: At present, military conscription only exists in theory and has done so since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Universal military conscription has never been enforced.
Every Chinese citizen pursuing further education is required to train by military instructor for a fixed amount of time (around 2 weeks).
Conscription is enshrined in Article 55 of the Constitution, which states: "It is a sacred duty of every citizen of the People's Republic of China to defend his or her motherland and resist invasion. It is an honored Obligation of the citizens of the People's Republic of China to perform military service and to join the militia forces".
As of 1998, the legal basis of conscription was stated to be the 1984 Military Service Law, which describes military service as a duty for "all citizens without distinction of race (...) and religious creed". This law has not been amended since it came into effect. Military service is normally performed in the regular armed forces but the 1984 law does allow for conscription into the reserve forces in times of national emergency.
Citizens of the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, as of 1997 and 1999, respectively, are not permitted to join the Chinese military; however, the defence of these two regions are protected by the Chinese military.
Costa Rica: Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948. See Military of Costa Rica.
Croatia: On 3 October 2007, the government proposed to the parliament of the Republic of Croatia a decision to suspend all compulsory military service. This was supported by President Stjepan Mesić, and after a vote in the parliament on 5 October 2007, the decision became official. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | This law has not been amended since it came into effect. Military service is normally performed in the regular armed forces but the 1984 law does allow for conscription into the reserve forces in times of national emergency.
Citizens of the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, as of 1997 and 1999, respectively, are not permitted to join the Chinese military; however, the defence of these two regions are protected by the Chinese military.
Costa Rica: Costa Rica abolished its military in 1948. See Military of Costa Rica.
Croatia: On 3 October 2007, the government proposed to the parliament of the Republic of Croatia a decision to suspend all compulsory military service. This was supported by President Stjepan Mesić, and after a vote in the parliament on 5 October 2007, the decision became official. As of 1 January 2008, obligatory military (or civil) service is replaced with voluntary military service. Earlier partial and temporary 3 years long suspension of obligatory military service was introduced in 1997 in the aftermath of the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium when members of Serbs of Croatia community from the region were exempt from conscription, although they were permitted to volunteer.
Czech Republic: The Czech Republic abolished compulsory military service on 31 December 2004.
Ecuador: Ecuador's Constitutional Tribunal ruled in June 2007 that compulsory military service was unconstitutional. Military service has been voluntary since 2009.
Estonia: From 2003, unit-based training for conscripts was introduced and conscripts began to be called into service in 2 parts: pre-service and main occupation.
The length of military service is often determined by the manner in which the professional is recruited. Those who entered the service in January and July by pre-conscription generally earn 11 months, those who arrived in October 8 months. The final length of service shall be determined by the post to which the soldier is assigned. A member of the Defense Forces shall be appointed to the position after completing a basic course for a soldier or sailor. The recruitment recruits professionals whose posts require 11 months of military service (drivers, specialists, non-commissioned officers and reserve commanders).
France: Modern conscription was invented during the French Revolution, when the Republic wanted a stronger defense and to expand its radical ideas throughout Europe. The 1798 Jourdan Act stated: "Any Frenchman is a soldier and owes himself to the defense of the nation". Thus Napoleon Bonaparte could create afterward the Grande Armée with which he set out on the first large intra-European war.
France suspended peacetime military conscription in 1996, while those born before 1979 had to complete their service; since the Algerian War (1954–62), conscripts had not been deployed abroad or in war zones, except those volunteering for such deployments.
In 2018, the French Parliament adopted a government plan, reinstating one month of compulsory military service for both genders starting 2024.
Germany: On 15 November 2010, the German government voted in favour of suspending universal conscription with the aim of establishing a professional army by 1 July 2011. The last conscripts were drafted on 1 January 2011.
Hungary: Hungary abolished mandatory military service by November 2004, after the parliament had modified the constitution, ending a long-standing political dispute. To restore drafting, a two-thirds vote in parliament is needed, which is unlikely in the short term. As of 2011, the country is developing a professional army, with strong emphasis on "contract soldiers" who voluntarily serve 4+4 years for a wage.
In December 2011, the National Assembly re-established the possibility of mandatory military service for every male citizen - with Hungarian address - between the age of 18 and the age of 40. Even though drafting is still banned in peacetime, the listing of citizens fit for military service starts in January 2012. According to the legislation, the conscripts can only be drafted in "state of emergency" or as defensive measure, the National Assembly can authorise drafting.
India: India has never had mandatory military service, either under British rule or since independence in 1947. In WWII the Indian Army became the largest all-volunteer force in history, rising to over 2.5 million men in size. It has since maintained the world's second largest army after China and the world's largest all-volunteer army.
Iraq: Saddam Hussein's large Iraqi army was largely composed of conscripts, except for the elite Republican Guard. About 20,000-35,000 conscripts died during the First Persian Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm. In the intervening years, Iraq's military suffered from decay and poor leadership, but there was still compulsory service. Note: One of voluntary program was "Ashbal Saddam" known as "Saddam's Cubs" where children were trained to defend Iraq through "toughening" exercises such as firearms training and dismembering live chickens with their teeth. Following the Iraq War where the original military was disbanded, the Iraqi Army was recreated as a volunteer force with training overseen at first by the Coalition Provisional Authority and later by the American presence.
Ireland: The whole island of Ireland was exempted from UK First World War conscription in 1916, but in April 1918 new legislation empowered the UK government to extend it to Ireland. Although the government never implemented this legislation, it led to a Conscription Crisis in Ireland and politically pushed the country further to seek its independence from the UK. Since independence in 1922, the Irish Defence Forces have always been fully voluntary, and the state's foreign policy includes "military neutrality".
Italy: Italy had mandatory military service, for men only, until 31 December 2004. The right to conscientious objection was legally recognized in 1972 so that a "non-armed military service", or a community service, could be authorised as an alternative to those who required it.
The Italian Parliament approved the suspension of the mandatory military service in August 2004, with effect starting from 1 January 2005, and the Italian armed forces will now be entirely composed of professional volunteer troops, both male and female, except in case of war or serious international military crisis, when conscription by law can be reactivated.
Jamaica: In Jamaica the military service is voluntary from 18 years of age up. Younger recruits may be conscripted with parental consent.
Japan: Conscription was enforced during the Japanese Militarism in Second World War. Japan's Self Defense Forces have been a volunteer force since their establishment in the 1950s, following the end of the Allied occupation.
Latvia: Latvia abolished compulsory military service on 1 January 2007.
Lebanon: Lebanon previously had mandatory military service of one year for men. On 4 May 2005, a new conscription system was adopted, making for a six-month service, and pledging to end conscription within two years. By 10 February 2007 it did.
Luxembourg: Luxembourg has a military ground force (army) composed of career officers and volunteers. Compulsory military service (conscription) existed between 1944 and 1967.
Mauritius: Mauritius does not have a standing army but operates a paramilitary service manned by volunteering police officers known as the Special Mobile Force.
Montenegro: President of Montenegro Filip Vujanović has, as of 30 August 2006, abolished conscription for the military.
Netherlands: The Netherlands established conscription for a territorial militia in 1814, simultaneously establishing a standing army which was to be manned by volunteers only. However, lack of sufficient volunteers caused the two components to be merged in 1819 into a "cadre-militia" army, in which the bulk of troops were conscripts, led by professional officers and NCOs. This system remained in use until the end of the Cold War. Between 1991 and 1996, the Dutch armed forces phased out their conscript personnel and converted to an all-volunteer force. The last conscript troops were inducted in 1995 and demobilized in 1996. Formally, the Netherlands has not abolished conscription; that is to say, the laws and systems which provide for the conscription of armed forces personnel remain in place, and Dutch citizens can still, theoretically, be mobilized in the event of a national emergency. From 2017, the obligation has been extended to women as well as men.
New Zealand: Conscription of men into the armed forces of New Zealand came into effect in two periods, from 1912 to 1930 and from 1940 until it was abolished in 1972.
North Macedonia: North Macedonia abolished compulsory military service as of October 2006.
Pakistan: Like India, Pakistan has always maintained a purely volunteer military. However, in the immediate aftermath of independence, and the 1948 war; at a time when the army was just reorganising from a colonial force to a new national army; militias raised for service from, the Frontier, Punjab and Kashmir were often raised from locals tribe; each tribe was given a quota and many of the individuals sent did not "volunteer" in the strictest sense (though many did).
Panama: Panama officially abolished the entire military in 1992, and transformed it into National Police.
Philippines: Conscription in the Philippines has been implemented at several points in the country's history. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | New Zealand: Conscription of men into the armed forces of New Zealand came into effect in two periods, from 1912 to 1930 and from 1940 until it was abolished in 1972.
North Macedonia: North Macedonia abolished compulsory military service as of October 2006.
Pakistan: Like India, Pakistan has always maintained a purely volunteer military. However, in the immediate aftermath of independence, and the 1948 war; at a time when the army was just reorganising from a colonial force to a new national army; militias raised for service from, the Frontier, Punjab and Kashmir were often raised from locals tribe; each tribe was given a quota and many of the individuals sent did not "volunteer" in the strictest sense (though many did).
Panama: Panama officially abolished the entire military in 1992, and transformed it into National Police.
Philippines: Conscription in the Philippines has been implemented at several points in the country's history. As of 2023, no mandatory conscription is in effect in the Philippines and military service is entirely voluntary. It was introduced prior to World War II during the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 with a term of enlistment of 5+1⁄2 months. Another instance was during the Presidency of Ferdinand Marcos, where two Presidential Decrees with terms of conscripting trainees into emergency military service were passed. The first was in 1973, with a period of 12 months. The second was in 1974, with a period of 18 months. However, mandatory military service remains a possibility in the Philippines as Section 4, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines states:
"The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service."
Peru: Peru abolished conscription in 1999.
Poland: Poland suspended compulsory military service on 5 December 2008 by the order of the Minister of Defence. Compulsory military service was formally abolished when the Polish parliament amended the conscription law on 9 January 2009; the law came into effect on 11 February 2009.
Portugal: Portugal abolished compulsory military service on 19 November 2004. Before that, military service was mandatory for all men. From 2004, all 18-year-old Portuguese citizens are, however, required to participate in a national defence day ("Dia da Defesa Nacional"). This applied solely to Portuguese men until 2010 at which point the duty was extended to women as well. Said citizens may request to have their duties waived under one of three main exemptions:
Prolonged illness, proven by a medical certificate to that effect;
Residence abroad - if the citizen in question has resided abroad for a continuous and permanent period exceeding 6 months, he or she may request a waiver.
The completion of military duties in another country - if the citizen has completed military duties for another country, so long as said country is a signatory of the European Convention on Nationality, he or she may request a waiver.
Such requests are not automatic, and must be made to the Director-General of Resources of National Defence ("Diretor-Geral de Recursos da Defesa Nacional") at whose discretion a waiver may be granted.
Romania: Romania suspended compulsory military service on 23 October 2006. This came about due to a 2003 constitutional amendment which allowed the parliament to make military service optional. The Romanian Parliament voted to abolish conscription in October 2005, with the vote formalising one of many military modernisation and reform programmes that Romania agreed to when it joined NATO.
Serbia: Serbia abolished compulsory military service on 1 January 2011. Before that, Serbia had compulsory national service for all men aged between 19 and 35. In practice, men over 27 were seldom called up. Service was usually performed after university studies had been completed. The length of service was 12 months, then reduced to 9 months but was reduced to 6 months in 2006. There was also an alternative for conscientious objectors which lasted 9 months. Serbian nationals living outside of the country were still expected to complete national service; however, they could defer it if it would have seriously affected their career in the country where they then resided. This could be done by contacting the embassy in the country of residence (if under 27), or done by contacting the army directly (if over 27).
Slovakia: Slovakia abolished compulsory military service on 1 January 2006.
Slovenia: Slovenia's Government of Prime Minister Anton Rop abolished mandatory military service on 9 September 2003.
South Africa: South Africa under the apartheid system had two years of compulsory military service for white men, followed by camps at intervals. This was abolished in 1994. See End Conscription Campaign.
Spain: Spain abolished compulsory military service in 2001. Military and alternative service was nine months long and in recent years the majority of conscripts chose to perform alternative, rather than military, service. One of the main reasons for its abolition was the "insubordinate movement".
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka has never had mandatory military service, either under British rule or since independence in 1948. It maintains an all-volunteer military.
Sweden: Military Service was mandatory in Sweden from 1901 until 1 July 2010, when conscription was officially suspended. Until 2010, all Swedish men aged between 18 and 47 years old were eligible to serve with the armed forces over a period ranging from 80 to 450 days. The right to Conscientious Objection was legally recognised in 1920. An alternative community service for Conscientious Objectors was easily available instead of military service. The number of those seeking conscientious objector status declined as actual conscript recruitment continued to decline. In the years running up to 2010 roughly 6000 - 8000 people out of an annual cohort of 100,000 - 120,000 potential recruits actually completed military service. In 2010 Sweden abolished male-only conscription and replaced it with a gender neutral conscription system which was taken into force in 2018.
Tanzania: Tanzania officially never had conscription since it became independent.
United Kingdom: The United Kingdom historically was the only European state with a volunteer army, and remained so through the first half of World War I. As the war dragged on into deadlocked trench warfare, the number of volunteers dried up, which led the government to introduce conscription under the Military Service Act. The Act exempted the whole of Ireland from conscription, and although an amending Act in 1918 empowered the government to extend conscription to Ireland, the extension was never implemented. Conscientious objectors were formally recognised under the Military Service Act, with the possibilities of absolute exemption from military service, exemption conditional upon performing civilian "work of national importance", or non-combatant service within the Army; some of those who refused the latter alternatives, or engaged in anti-war protests, went to jail. Conscription was ended in 1920.
Military conscription was reintroduced in Britain (Northern Ireland being exempted) in May 1939 in anticipation of World War II. A form of "industrial conscription" was also used to increase output in coal mining (see the "Bevin Boys") and other dimensions of the war effort. Later in the war both forms of conscription were extended in a limited way to women, such as the Women's Land Army to help with agricultural production. Conscientious objectors were treated more leniently than in WWI, but could still go to prison if they refused war-related work. For example, the scientist Kathleen Lonsdale was sentenced to a month in Holloway prison in 1943 for refusing to register for war duties and refusing to pay a resulting fine of two pounds.
Conscription of men into the Armed Forces continued ad hoc from 1945 until the National Service Act 1948 established a system from 1 January 1949 of calling up men in Britain reaching the age of 18 for eighteen months full-time service followed by four years reserve service. In 1950, as a result of the Korean War, full-time service was increased to two years, and reserve service reduced to three and a half years. In 1957, phasing-out of the system was announced, the last men being called up in 1960, and the last conscript being discharged in May 1963, after allowance for deferment of service.
United States: The United States first introduced conscription during the American Civil War. With insufficient volunteers coming in by 1863, the Lincoln Administration was forced to begin drafting despite widespread complaints that it was unconstitutional and undermined states' rights (some states had conscripted men up to this point, but not the federal government). In July 1863, New York City erupted in the draft riots over the draft. However, anyone could get out by paying a $300 fee or hiring a substitute. Many conscripts and substitutes were criminals or men with debilitating health problems, and thus largely useless. The Confederate government had begun drafting men in early 1862.
Conscription was next used after the United States entered World War I in 1917. The first peacetime conscription came with the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. When World War II ended, so did the draft. It was quickly reinstated with the Korean War and retained for the next 20 years, especially in the Vietnam War. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | With insufficient volunteers coming in by 1863, the Lincoln Administration was forced to begin drafting despite widespread complaints that it was unconstitutional and undermined states' rights (some states had conscripted men up to this point, but not the federal government). In July 1863, New York City erupted in the draft riots over the draft. However, anyone could get out by paying a $300 fee or hiring a substitute. Many conscripts and substitutes were criminals or men with debilitating health problems, and thus largely useless. The Confederate government had begun drafting men in early 1862.
Conscription was next used after the United States entered World War I in 1917. The first peacetime conscription came with the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. When World War II ended, so did the draft. It was quickly reinstated with the Korean War and retained for the next 20 years, especially in the Vietnam War. Active conscription ("the draft") ended in 1973.
In 1979, President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, brought back draft registration. All males up to the age of 26 are required to register with the Selective Service System, whose mission is "to provide manpower to the armed forces in an emergency" including a "Health Care Personnel Delivery System" and "to run an Alternative Service Program for men classified as conscientious objectors during a draft." No one has been prosecuted for violating the conscription law in the USA since 1986, but registration is required for certain benefits such as federal college aid, or in certain states, state college aid, or obtaining a driver's license. Women do not currently register for Selective Service in the United States; however they may still enlist for voluntary service. United States federal law also provides for the compulsory conscription of men between the ages of 17 and 45 and certain women for militia service pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution and 10 U.S. Code § 246, however the federal governments utility of such militia conscripts is limited by the Constitution to repelling invasions and other service within the territory of the United States.
Countries with compulsory military service:
Armenia: Armenia has compulsory military service for two years for males from 18 to 27 years old.
Austria: Austria has mandatory military service for all able bodied male citizens up to 35 years of age. Since 2006, the period of service has been six months. Conscientious objectors can join the civilian service (called Zivildienst) for nine months. A 10-month participation in the Austrian Holocaust Memorial Service, the Austrian Social Service, or the Austrian Peace Service is regarded as an equivalent to the civilian service.
Since 1 January 1998, females can join the military service voluntarily. The Austrian conscription referendum, 2013 resulted in the rejection of a proposal that would have ended conscription. Although the referendum was non-binding, both parties in government pledged to honour the results.
Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan has mandatory military service for all fit men, who are at least at the age of 18. Military service lasts for eighteen months for those without higher education, and for twelve months for those with higher education.
Belarus: Belarus has mandatory military service for all fit men from eighteen to twenty-seven years of age. Military service lasts for eighteen months for those without higher education, and for twelve months for those with higher education.
Brazil: Males in Brazil are required to serve 12 months of military service upon their 18th birthday. While de jure all males are required to serve, numerous exceptions mean military service is de facto limited mostly to volunteers, with an average of between 5 and 10% of those reporting for duty actually being inducted. Most often, the service is performed in military bases as close as possible to the person's home. The government does not usually require those planning to attend college or holding a permanent job to serve. There are also several other exceptions, including health reasons, for which one may not have to serve. Recruits accepted at a university may also choose to train under a program similar to the American ROTC, and satisfy their military requirement this way. Direct entrance to one of the military academies will also substitute for this requirement.
Myanmar: De jure the Burmese junta requires able-bodied persons aged 18 and over to register with local authorities. In 2011, civil servants, students, those serving prison terms, and those caring for an elderly parent were excluded from the draft, but they could be later called to serve. Totally exempt are members of religious orders, disabled persons, and married or divorced women with children. Those who fail to report for military service could be imprisoned for three years, and face fines. Those who deliberately inflict injury upon themselves to avoid conscription could be imprisoned for up to five years, as well as fined.
However, the conscription has never been activated under the military junta which ruled the country from 1988 to 2010. Myanmar's constitution states that male citizens over 18 could be called to serve in military, but it has not been activated either. As of 2013, Myanmar citizens are not required to serve in military.
Cyprus: Cyprus has compulsory military service for all Greek Cypriot men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. Additionally, from 2008 onwards, all men belonging to the religious groups of Armenians, Latins and Maronites, are no longer exempt, and also serve military service. Before 2016 military service lasted for twenty-four months. After that, former-soldiers are considered reservists and participate in military exercises and training for a few days every year. Conscientious objectors can either do thirty-three months' unarmed service in the army or thirty-eight months' community work In 2016, however, the Cypriot parliament had voted to reduce its mandatory service to 14 months and make up for lost manpower by hiring professional soldiers.
Denmark: As described in the Constitution of Denmark, § 81, Denmark has mandatory service for all able men. Normal service is four months, and is normally served by men in the age of eighteen to twenty-seven. Some special services will take longer. Danish men will typically receive a letter around the time of their 18th birthday, asking when their current education (if any) ends, and some time later, depending on when, they will receive a notice on when to attend to the draft office to be tested physically and psychologically. However, some may be deemed unfit for service and not be required to show up.
Even if a person is deemed fit, or partially fit for service, he may avoid having to serve if he draws a high enough number randomly. Persons who are deemed partly fit for service will however be placed lower than those who are deemed fit for service, and therefore have a very low chance of being drafted. Men deemed fit can be called upon for service until their 50th birthday in case of national crisis, regardless of whether normal conscription has been served. This right is very rarely exercised by Danish authorities.
Conscientious objectors can choose to instead serve six months in a non-military position, for example in Beredskabsstyrelsen (dealing with non-military disasters like fires, flood, pollution, etc.) or foreign aid work in a third world country.
Egypt: Egypt has a mandatory military service program for males between the ages of eighteen and thirty. Conscription is regularly postponed for students until the end of their studies, as long as they apply before they turn twenty-eight years of age. By the age of thirty, a male is considered unfit to join the army and pays a fine. Males with no brothers, or those supporting parents are exempted from the service. Former President Sadat added that any Egyptian who has dual nationality is exempted from military service and this is still in effect. Males serve for a period ranging from fourteen months to thirty-six months, depending on their education; high school drop-outs serve for thirty-six months. College graduates serve for lesser periods of time, depending on their education; college graduates with special skills are still conscripted yet at a different rank and at a different pay scale with the option of remaining with the service as a career. Some Egyptians evade conscription and travel overseas until they reach the age of thirty, at which point they are tried, pay a $580 fine (as of 2004), and are dishonorably discharged. Such an offense, legally considered an offense of "bad moral character", prevents the "unpatriotic" citizen from ever holding public office.
Finland: Finland has mandatory military service for men of a minimum duration of five and half months (165 days); depending on the assigned position: those trained as officers or NCOs serve for eleven and half months (347 days), specialist troops serve for eight and half (255 days) or eleven and half months, while rank and file serve for the minimum period. Unarmed service is also possible, and lasts eight and half months (270 days) or eleven and half (347 days). All males are required to participate in the drafting event (Finnish: kutsunnat) in their municipality of domicile in the year that they turn 18. The fitness for service and the actual induction to the service then takes place at the time and place decided individually for each conscript during the drafting event. The induction takes place usually at the age of 19 but the allowed age range is 18–29. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | Finland: Finland has mandatory military service for men of a minimum duration of five and half months (165 days); depending on the assigned position: those trained as officers or NCOs serve for eleven and half months (347 days), specialist troops serve for eight and half (255 days) or eleven and half months, while rank and file serve for the minimum period. Unarmed service is also possible, and lasts eight and half months (270 days) or eleven and half (347 days). All males are required to participate in the drafting event (Finnish: kutsunnat) in their municipality of domicile in the year that they turn 18. The fitness for service and the actual induction to the service then takes place at the time and place decided individually for each conscript during the drafting event. The induction takes place usually at the age of 19 but the allowed age range is 18–29. The delayed induction is permissible for serious personal reasons, such as studies, but induction cannot be delayed beyond 29. The military strives to accommodate the wishes of the future conscript when determining the time of induction and the duty location, but these are ultimately determined by the needs of service.
Since 1995, women have been able to volunteer for military service. During the first 45 days, women have an option to quit at will. Having served for 45 days, they fall under the same obligation to serve as men except for medical reasons. A pregnancy during service would interrupt the service but not automatically cause a medical discharge.
Belonging in a sexual minority does not result in an exemption. Transgender individuals usually get their service postponed until they have undergone sex reassignment surgery.
Non-military service of twelve months is available for men whose conscience prevents them from serving in the military. Men who refuse to serve at all are sent to prison for six months or half the time of their remaining non-military service at the time of refusal. In theory, male citizens from the demilitarized Åland region are to serve in customs offices or lighthouses, but since this service has not been arranged, they are always exempted in practice. Jehovah's Witnesses' service is deferred for three years, if they present a written testimony, not older than two months, from the congregation of their status as baptized and active members of the congregation. Jehovah's Witnesses will be exempted from peacetime duty at the beginning of the age 29. Military service has been mandatory for men throughout the history of independent Finland since 1917. Soldiers and civilian servicemen receive a daily allowance of €5 (days 1 – 165), €8.35 (days 165 – 255), or €11.70 (onward from day 255).
Approximately 20% are trained as NCOs (corporals, sergeants), and 10% are trained as officers-in-reserve (second lieutenant). In wartime, it is expected that the officers-in-reserve fulfill most platoon leader and company commander positions. At the beginning of the service, all men go through same basic training of eight weeks. After this eight-week period it is decided who will be trained as NCOs or officers.
Having completed the initial part of the service as a conscript, the soldier is placed in the reserve. Reservists may be called for mandatory refresher exercises. Rank and file serve a maximum of 40 days, specialists 75 days and officers and NCOs 100 days. Per refresher course day, the reservists receive a taxable salary of about fifty euros. The salary depends slightly on the military rank: officers receive €56, NCOs €53 and rank-and file €51 per day. The service is mandatory; it is not possible to refuse an order to attend the refresher exercise, only to apply for a postponement of the service if personal or employer's urgent and non-avoidable needs require this. The postponement is not always granted. If the reservist experiences a crisis of conscience that prevents him or her from further execution of military service, the reservist can apply for civilian service. The civilian service for reservists takes a form of a five-day course at Lapinjärvi Civilian Service Institution. After the course, the reservist is permanently freed of military service during peace and war.
There are no general exemptions for the conscription. The law requires employers, landlords etc. to continue any pre-existing contracts after the service. For medical reasons, exemption or postponing is given by the military authority after an examination by a military or military-appointed doctor. If the disability is expected to be cured, the exemption is temporary, and the service is postponed. If the disability continues until the male turns 25, he is exempted. The basic doctrine is that the great majority of each age cohort serve, and the size of the active army can be adjusted by changing the maximum age of reservists to be called up, instead of using selective service.
The option to military service is civilian service (available to females after completing 45 days of military service), where an individual subject to conscript finds a job at some public institution, where they serve for 11 and half months, the same as the longest rank-and-file service (drivers). Before 2008, the law required 13 months, which was criticized for being punitive internationally by the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, The European Committee of Social Rights, The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe and Amnesty International.
The national security policy of Finland is based on a credible independent defence of all Finnish territory. The maximum number of military personnel abroad is limited to 2,000 (out of the 900,000 available reserve). Contributions to the UN troops comprise only professional soldiers and trained, paid reservists who have specifically applied to such operations. Therefore, no "expeditionary wars" argument can be made against conscription.
Draft dodging is nearly non-existent, as failure to show up to a drafting event immediately leads to an arrest warrant, and the delinquent is brought by the police to either to the drafting event (if still in progress) or to the regional military office for a physical examination and subsequent determination of induction time. Disobeying the induction order also causes the arrest warrant to be issued and is prosecuted as absence without leave, or after five days of absence, as desertion. Proof of military or civil service is generally required to obtain a 5-year passport (some exceptions can apply). Without proof, the passport is valid, at the longest, until the applicant's 28th birthday.
Military rank, either as NCO or reserve officer, is highly valued as a merit in Finland by employers when recruiting a male employee. In general, serving as an NCO or, especially, as a reserve officer, has a clear positive impact on future earnings and achievement of a high career position of the individual.
Greece: As of 2021, mandatory military service at the Hellenic Army was once again raised to 12 months for all males aged 18–45, unless serving in units in Evros or the North Aegean islands where duration was kept at 9 months.
Some are entitled to reduced service due to serious family reasons (single parent families, parent serving in the army etc.). Although Greece is developing a professional army system, the effort has been postponed significantly.
Women are accepted into the Greek army as salaried professionals, but are not obliged to mandatory conscript service. Conscript soldiers receive full health insurance and a nominal salary of €9 per month for privates and €12 for the rank of draft corporal and draft sergeant. There is the option of serving as a non-regular officer designate. In that case the received salary is €569 (with an additional €150 if the cadet is sent far from his home) after basic training is over. The duration of cadet training is roughly 4 months and 9 more months are dedicated for the actual service. Adding the 1 month spent in rookie training, a cadet's conscription will last a total of 14 months. In the last month of his service the cadet takes the rank of second lieutenant. The minimum wage for unskilled workers and professional soldiers stands at around €830 per month in Greece. This results in reservist corporals and sergeants receiving a wage that is 1/70th that of a professional soldier, whom they outrank. This inconsistency was partly dealt with by abolishing the rank of sergeant for conscripts.
Conscientious objection to military service in Greece: The length of alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors to military service is 15 months. Amnesty International was also concerned that the determination of conscientious objector status fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, which breaches international standards that stipulate that the entire institution of alternative service should have a civilian character. A similar framework was later on developed by the Cyprus National Guard to deal with conscientious objectors.
Iran: Iran has mandatory military service for men which starts at the age of 18. Women are exempt from military service. Exceptions are made for those who cannot serve because of physical or mental health problems and disabilities, and students can delay service while enrolled at a university. The duration of military service is normally 24 months, but is reduced to 22 months for service in destitute areas and to 20 months for border regions. All servicemen receive two months of military training as part of their service. The initial rank conscripts receive in the military corresponds with their level of educational attainment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | Amnesty International was also concerned that the determination of conscientious objector status fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, which breaches international standards that stipulate that the entire institution of alternative service should have a civilian character. A similar framework was later on developed by the Cyprus National Guard to deal with conscientious objectors.
Iran: Iran has mandatory military service for men which starts at the age of 18. Women are exempt from military service. Exceptions are made for those who cannot serve because of physical or mental health problems and disabilities, and students can delay service while enrolled at a university. The duration of military service is normally 24 months, but is reduced to 22 months for service in destitute areas and to 20 months for border regions. All servicemen receive two months of military training as part of their service. The initial rank conscripts receive in the military corresponds with their level of educational attainment.
Since 2008 and the formation of Iran's National Elites Foundation (Bonyade Mellie Nokhbegan), students or university graduates who have excelled in their studies or research may be accepted as members of this organization. Members have the option to carry out their military service in the form of a research project lasting no less than 14 months. A 45-day mandatory military training is applicable even for those who are members of Iran's National Elites Foundation.
The Iranian Parliament's National Security Commission is currently debating a plan to abolish conscription and to introduce an alternative plan that would make the army professional.
Exemptions from the Iranian military service, but also military duty in case of war include:
Girls and women
Sole son with a father over 70 years old.
Men who are the sole carers of a disabled or mentally ill parent, sibling, or 2nd line family member.
Doctors, firefighters and other emergency workers whose uptake for military duty or service jeopardizes local health and emergency services.
Workers of vital government institutions that assist or indirectly serve the military (exempt at time of war).
Workers of businesses that serve the military, e.g. factories that produce military equipment (exempt at time of war).
Homosexuals and transgender individuals.
Workers of Iranian shipping lines (IRISL Group) and National Iranian Tanker Company.
Prisoners may be excused of their sentence to serve in the military at a time of war or to complete military service in exchange for a reduced sentence dependent on the nature of the crime committed.
Men reaching 19 years old who are not granted exemption from the military service are not able to apply for a passport, any form of employment, leave the country or collect any completed academic certificate.
Israel: Israel drafts both men and women. All Israeli citizens are conscripted at age 18, with the following exceptions:
Torah students are presently exempted from service should they so choose. This is a contentious issue in Israel.
Israeli Arabs are exempt from conscription, although they may volunteer. The men of other non-Jewish communities in Israel, notably the Druze and Circassians, are conscripted; women are not though may volunteer.
Jewish females, who choose to declare they are unable to serve due to religious observance grounds. Many choose to volunteer in the national service Sherut Leumi.
Women are not inducted if they are married or pregnant.
Candidates who do not qualify on grounds of mental or physical health.
Typically, men are required to serve for 2 years and 8 months, while women for 2 years. Officers and other soldiers in certain voluntary units such as Nahal and Hesder are required to sign on for additional service. Those studying in a "Mechina" (pre-induction preparatory course) defer service until the conclusion of the program, typically one academic year. An additional program (called "Atuda'i") for qualified applicants allows post-secondary academic studies prior to induction.
There is a very limited amount of conscientious objection to conscription into the IDF. More common is refusal by reserve soldiers to serve in the West Bank and Gaza. Some of these conscientious objectors may be assigned to serve elsewhere, or are sentenced to brief prison terms lasting a few months to a year and may subsequently receive dishonourable discharges.
One year after their period of regular army service men are liable for up to 30 days (much less on average) per year of reserve duty ("miluim") until they are in their early forties. Women in certain positions of responsibility are liable for reserve duty under the same terms as men, but are exempt once they are pregnant or with children.
Jordan: As of 2020, Jordan has reinstated a compulsory year of military service for those that meet the criteria. Unemployed men aged 25 to 29 are the target group of the conscription program.
Mexico: As of 2011, all males reaching eighteen years of age must register for military service (Servicio Militar Nacional, or SMN) for one year, though selection is made by a lottery system using the following color scheme: whoever draws a black ball must serve as an available reserve, that is, he must not follow any activities whatsoever and get his discharge card at the end of the year. The ones who get a white ball serve Saturdays in a Batallón del Servicio Militar Nacional (National Military Service Battalion) composed entirely of one-year SMN conscripts. Those with a community service interest may participate in Literacy Campaigns as teachers or as physical education instructors. Military service is also (voluntarily) open to women. In certain cities, such as Mexico City and Veracruz, there is a third option: a red ball (Mexico City) and a Blue ball (Veracruz), which entails serving a full year as a recruit in a Paratrooper Battalion in the case of Mexico City residents, or an Infantería de Marina unit (Navy Marines) in Veracruz. In other cities which have a Navy HQ (such as Ciudad Madero), it is the Navy which takes charge of the conscripts, instead of the Army.
A "liberated" military ID is a requirement to join the Mexican local, state, and federal police forces, also to apply for some government jobs,
Draft dodging was an uncommon occurrence in Mexico until 2002, since a "liberated" military ID card was needed for a Mexican male to obtain a passport, but since this requirement was dropped by the Mexican government, absenteeism from military service has become more common.
Morocco: Morocco eliminated compulsory military service as of 31 August 2006, however, this law has been revised, and at 7 February 2019 officially restored compulsory military service. The service takes as long as 12 months in the new law project with a draft targeting Moroccan males and females alike in the age range of 19–25 with an exception for people with a medical or psychological condition, college students can delay the date of their enlistment thus being able to serve at the end of their university course.
North Korea: Conscription occurs in North Korea despite ambiguity concerning its legal status. Men are universally conscripted while women undergo selective conscription. Conscription takes place at age 17 and service ends at 30. Children of the political elites are exempt from conscription, as are people with bad songbun (ascribed social status in North Korea). Recruitment is done on the basis of annual targets drawn up by the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea and implemented locally by schools.
Conscription first began before the Korean War. Initially, under the rule of Kim Il Sung, forced conscription was largely not necessary because the level of voluntary enlistment was high due to financial rewards. Under Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un these rewards have diminished.
Norway: Norway has mandatory military service of nineteen months for men and women between the ages of 19 (18 in war time) and 44 (55 in case of officers and NCOs). The actual draft time is six months for the home guard, and twelve months for the regular army, air force and navy. In October 2014, Norway extended compulsory military service to women.
The remaining months are supposed to be served in annual exercises, but very few conscripts do this because of lack of funding for the Norwegian Armed Forces. As a result of this decreased funding and greater reliance on high technology, the Armed Forces are aiming towards drafting only 10,000 conscripts a year. As of 2011, an average of 27% of conscripts actually complete military service each year. The remainder, for the most part, either are formally dismissed after medical tests or obtain deferral from the service because of studies or stays abroad.
The Norwegian Armed Forces will normally not draft a person who has reached the age of 28. In Norway, certain voluntary specialist training programs and courses entail extended conscription of one to eight years. Pacifists and conscientious objectors can apply for non-military service, which lasts 12 months.
Russia: The conscription system was introduced into Imperial Russia by Dmitry Milyutin on 1 January 1874. As of 2008, the Russian Federation has a mandatory 12 months draft. Some examples of how people avoid being drafted are:
Studying in a university or similar place. All full-time students are free from conscription, but they can be drafted after they graduate (or if they drop out). Graduated students serve one year as privates, but if they have a military education, they have the option to serve two years as officers.
Persons who continue full-time postgraduate education.
Getting a medical certificate that shows that a person is unfit for service.
Having two or more children. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | In Norway, certain voluntary specialist training programs and courses entail extended conscription of one to eight years. Pacifists and conscientious objectors can apply for non-military service, which lasts 12 months.
Russia: The conscription system was introduced into Imperial Russia by Dmitry Milyutin on 1 January 1874. As of 2008, the Russian Federation has a mandatory 12 months draft. Some examples of how people avoid being drafted are:
Studying in a university or similar place. All full-time students are free from conscription, but they can be drafted after they graduate (or if they drop out). Graduated students serve one year as privates, but if they have a military education, they have the option to serve two years as officers.
Persons who continue full-time postgraduate education.
Getting a medical certificate that shows that a person is unfit for service.
Having two or more children.
In Russia, all males are liable for one year of compulsory military service up to the age of 27. In 2006, the Russian government and State Duma gradually reduced the term of service to 18 months from 24 for those who will be conscripted in 2007 and to 12 months from 2008 and dropped some legal excuses for non-conscription from the law (such as non-conscription of rural doctors and teachers, of men who have a child younger than 3 years, etc.) from 1 January 2008. Also full-time students graduated from civil university with military education will be free from conscription from 1 January 2008. Allegedly, the amendment on the length of military service was introduced following the case of Andrey Sychyov.
According to the Russian federal law, the Armed Forces, the National Guard, the Federal Protective Service (FSO), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and civil defence of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) are considered as military service.
Singapore: After Singapore gained its sovereign independence as an island-city nation, the NS (Amendment) Act was passed on 14 March 1967, under which all able-bodied male citizens of at least 18 years of age were obliged by law to serve 22–24 months of mandatory national service in the Singapore Armed Forces, the Singapore Police Force, or the Singapore Civil Defence Force to defend and protect the country. Upon completion of the mandatory active full-time NS, they will have reservist in-camp training cycles of up to 40 days annually over a 10-years period upon deployment to operationally-ready reservist units.
The majority of conscripts serve in the SAF due to its larger manpower requirement. In practice, all conscripts undergo basic military training before being deployed to the various military units of the SAF, the Police Force (SPF), or Civil Defence (SCDF). During Basic Military Training, conscripts, known as National Servicemen, are assessed on their leadership capabilities (over and above basic military skills). All capable conscripts will undergo further vocational trainings to their trained roles and appointments for them to gain experience to move up the NS ranks.
Initially, conscripts could not pick and choose their desired or preferred vocations due to manpower constraints and quotas. Since 2016, however, this was changed as, when enlisting, individuals can indicate their preferred vocations. Since 2004, Singapore cut its mandatory military service period of 30 months to between 22 and 24 months, depending on medical health and physical fitness. NSmen make up >80% of its military defense system.
South Korea: South Korea has mandatory military service of 18 (army, marines), 20 (navy), 21 (air force and civil service), 36 (special civil service) months. There is 3 years alternative for conscientious objectors from 2020 (civil service in prison). In general, with very few exceptions, most South Korean males serve in the military.
Exemptions are granted to Korean male citizens with physical disabilities or whose mental status is unstable or questionable. When a Korean man becomes of legal age, he is required to take a physical check-up to determine whether he is suitable for military service. Any Korean male athlete who has won a medal in the Olympic Games or a gold in the Asian Games is also spared from the obligation.
Grades 1–3: normal
Grade 4: special service; given to individuals that fulfill their military duties as a civil worker amongst civilians.
Grade 5: civil defence during peacetime.
Grade 6: exemption from military service in both situation.
Grade 7: re-check-up within two years.
There are some controversies portrayed in Korean media concerning special treatment given to celebrities. In 2002 Yoo Seung-jun, a Korean pop singer, became a naturalized American citizen to avoid his military duty in Korea. For this reason, the South Korean government had banned and deported Yoo from the country. Another recent example is MC Mong, a popular singer/rapper accused of avoiding his military service by having his molar teeth removed. On 11 April 2011, MC Mong was sentenced to a suspended jail term of 6 months, probation for one year, and 120 hours of community service.
Compensation: The following data is from 'Regulation on Public Servant Compensation', implemented on 1 January 2020. Exchange rate as of 21 February 2023 (₩1301 to $1.00USD)
Switzerland: Military service for Swiss men is obligatory according to the Federal Constitution, and includes 18 or 23 weeks of basic training (depending on troop category) as well as annual 3-week-refresher courses until a number of service days which increases with rank (245 days for privates) is reached. (It is also possible to serve the whole requirement at one piece, meaning no refresher courses are required.) Service for women is voluntary, but identical in all respects. Conscientious objectors can choose 390 days of community service instead of military service. Medical deferments and dismissals from basic training lead to about 60% to 65% of Swiss men completing basic training. In 2013, a proposal was created to replace the mandatory conscription for men, by a voluntary based service. By referendum, the Swiss population refused the project with 73.2% against.
Taiwan: The Republic of China has had mandatory military service for all males since 1949. Females from the outlying islands of Fuchien were also required to serve in a civil defense role, although this requirement has been dropped since the lifting of martial law. In October 1999, the mandatory service was shortened from twenty-four months to twenty-two months; from January 2004 it was shortened further to eighteen months, and from 1 January 2006 the duration has decreased to sixteen months. The ROC Defense Ministry had announced that should voluntary enlistment reach sufficient numbers, the compulsory service period for draftees will be shortened to fourteen months in 2007, and further to twelve months in 2009.
ROC nationals with Overseas Chinese status are exempt from service. Draftees may also request alternative service, usually in community service areas, although the required service period would be longer than military service. Qualified draftees with graduate degrees in the sciences or engineering who pass officer candidate exams may also apply to fulfil their obligations in a national defense service option which involves three months of military training, followed by an officer commission in the reserves and four years working in technical jobs in the defense industry or government research institutions.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for administering the National Conscription Agency.
On 1 August 2008, the Defence Minister announced that from 2014 on, Taiwan would have a purely volunteer professional force. However, males who opt not to volunteer will be subjected to three to four-month military training. Those who do not have a tertiary education will have a three-month training when reaching military age, whereas those who are receiving tertiary education will have to complete the training in summer vacations.
Should this policy remain unchanged, although Taiwan will have a purely volunteer professional force, every male will still be conscripted to receive a three- to four-month military training. Thus, after 2014, compulsory military service will still remain in practice in Taiwan.
However, since 2017, the rapid deterioration of People's Republic of China–United States relations has made a concern that the PRC may seek to finalize the current ambiguous status quo of Taiwan Strait dating back to the 1940s with its People's Liberation Army (PLA). In December 2022, the government of the Republic of China announced an reinstatement of the mandatory 1 year long active duty military service from January 2024.
Thailand: The Military Service Act B.E. 2497 (1954) states that all male citizens of Thailand are obliged to serve in the military upon reaching 21 years of age. High school students have the option of enrolling in the three-year Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) during Matthayom 4–6 (i.e., Grade 10–12). ROTC students drill at a local military installation once per week during the school year for a total of 80 hours, with field training exercise at the end of the second year (over the duration 3 days) and third year (over the duration of 5 days). The ROTC program is operated nearly exclusively by the Royal Thai Army, with recent introductions by the Royal Thai Navy and Royal Thai Air Force, but both with more restrictions on entry (e.g. students of schools near a naval or air force base used for training only). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military service | Thailand: The Military Service Act B.E. 2497 (1954) states that all male citizens of Thailand are obliged to serve in the military upon reaching 21 years of age. High school students have the option of enrolling in the three-year Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) during Matthayom 4–6 (i.e., Grade 10–12). ROTC students drill at a local military installation once per week during the school year for a total of 80 hours, with field training exercise at the end of the second year (over the duration 3 days) and third year (over the duration of 5 days). The ROTC program is operated nearly exclusively by the Royal Thai Army, with recent introductions by the Royal Thai Navy and Royal Thai Air Force, but both with more restrictions on entry (e.g. students of schools near a naval or air force base used for training only). Those who complete the three-year program are exempted from conscription and receive the rank of acting sergeant (E-6) upon graduation from high school. Students who do not complete the program or wish to enroll in the commissioned officer phase of the program can do so at their post-secondary institution. Those who do not complete the ROTC program will be required to report for conscription in early-April of the year in which they reach 21 years of age.
Military service selection is done at a designated date and time at a local school or assembly hall. Each selection station has a quota for recruitment. The process begins with a call for volunteers. Those who volunteer will have the option to choose the branch of service and their date of induction. If the number of volunteers is fewer than the quota for the selection station, the remaining men will be asked to draw a card from an opaque box. The box contains red cards and black cards. Drawing a black card results in exemption from military service. Drawing a red card results in conscription in the branch of service and induction date on the card.
Those who volunteer for military service are free to choose from the three branches of the armed forces (Royal Thai Army, Royal Thai Navy, Royal Thai Air Force). Service obligation varies by educational qualification. Those with a high school diploma or the equivalent and those who have one year of military service education are required to serve for two years if they draw the red card, but if these same individuals volunteer, the service obligation is reduced by half, i.e., reduced to only one year. Those with an associate degree (or equivalent) or higher are required to serve for one year if drafted, but the requirement is reduced to only six months if they volunteered. University students can defer their service as long as they maintain the student status until reaching the age of 27 or obtaining a master's degree or the equivalent, whichever comes first. Undergraduate and graduate students who decide to volunteer are allowed by their institution to put their studies on suspension until the end of term of service. All conscripts, regardless of educational qualification, undergo the same training and receive the same grade and rank upon completion of basic training: private, seaman, or airman (E-1).
In recent years the government has issued new guidelines for better treatment of transgender recruits.
Tunisia: In Tunisia compulsory military service applies to all citizens from 20 to 35. Those who are engaged in higher education or vocational training programs prior to their military drafting are allowed to delay service until they have completed the programs. The duration of the military service is 1 year. And Conscripts Benefit a monthly allowance of 200 dinars for holders of a higher school diploma or have completed at least two years of graduate successfully and holders of a higher technician certificate of vocational training and 100 dinars for other recruits.
Turkey: In Turkey, compulsory military service applies to all male citizens from twenty to forty-one years of age (with some exceptions). Those who are engaged in higher education or vocational training programs prior to their military drafting are allowed to delay service until they have completed the programs, or reach a certain age, depending on the program (e.g. 29 years of age for undergraduate degrees). The duration of the basic military service varies. As of July 2013, the reduced durations are as follows: twelve months for privates (previously fifteen months), twelve months for reserve officers (previously sixteen months) and six months for short-term privates, which denotes those who have earned a university degree and have not been enlisted as reserve officers (previously eight months).
Turkish citizens who have lived or worked abroad for at least three years can be exempt from military service in exchange for a certain fee in foreign currencies. In the past, when the General Staff assessed that the military reserve exceeded the required amount, paid military service of one-month's basic training was established by law as a stopgap measure, but had only been practiced ten times during the Republican era before being made permanent, the last one being in 1999. This was done in order to generate funds to recover from the aftermath of the 1999 İzmit earthquake, which took place in the highly industrialized Marmara Region of the country, and had a considerable negative impact on the Turkish economy due to the severe damage it caused to a significant number of residential and industrial structures. Additionally, there were paid military service without requiring any training in 2011 and 2014. The measure has been made permanent with a law issued in 2019.
Although women in principle are not obliged to serve in the military, they are allowed to become military officers.
Conscientious objection of military service is illegal in Turkey and punishable with imprisonment by law. Many conscientious objectors flee abroad mainly to neighbouring countries or the European Union (as asylum seekers or guest workers).
Ukraine: The options are either reserve officer training for two years (offered in universities as a part of a program which means not having to join the army), or one-year regular service. In Ukraine, a person could not be conscripted after he turned 25 years of age. The Ukrainian army had similar problems with dedovshchina as the Russian army did until very recently, but in Ukraine the problem is getting less severe compared to Russia, due to cuts in the conscript terms (from 24 to 18 months in the early 2000s and then to 12 months in 2004) and cuts in total conscription numbers (due to the switching of the army into a full-time professional army) since the last conscripts are being drafted at the end of 2013. However, due to the war with Russia, conscription was reinstated and remains in power to this day.
United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates started its national service requirement in September 2014. This is the first time the UAE has required mandatory national service. It is compulsory for all male citizens over 18 and under 30 years of age to report for military service. Foreign male residents are not required to serve in the military service. It is optional for females to register for military service, and which they serve for 9 months. Males who hold a high school diploma must complete 11-months of military service, whilst males who have not completed high school must complete three years. All males must register for compulsory military service after graduating high school.
Vietnam: Vietnam's military service policy change from year to year, but in general there is the commonality that every male citizen aged 17 years or older who meets the health criteria must serve two years for regular military or four years for militia of self-defense. Female citizens are not required to participate in military service, but if volunteered and fully qualified they can still participate. There are special exceptions: such as the citizen brother or brother of fallen heroes, a child of second class war invalids; a sick child of 81% or more; a child of Agent Orange who has a working capacity decrease of 81% or more, a non-military employee, a people's policeman and cadres, civil servants, and youth volunteers to be sent to work and work in areas with particularly difficult socio-economic conditions as prescribed by law for 24 months or more.
See also: List of enlistment age by country
Military recruit training
References:
Works cited: Hunter, Helen-Louise (2008). "The Society and Its Environment". In Worden, Robert L. (ed.). North Korea: A Country Study (Fifth ed.). Washington: Government Printing Office. pp. 59–134. ISBN 978-0-16-088278-4. LCCN 2008028547.
Minnich, James M. (2008). "National Security". In Worden, Robert L. (ed.). North Korea: A Country Study (Fifth ed.). Washington: Government Printing Office. pp. 237–282. ISBN 978-0-16-088278-4. LCCN 2008028547.
External links:
Dated but useful info |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military sociology | Theory and methodology: Military sociology reflects the diversity of methods employed by sociology itself. These include large-scale data analysis, participant observation, social network analysis, survey research, comparative history, case studies etc. The methods of military sociology also include philosophical perspectives and arguments.
Contemporary military sociology: Contemporary military sociology is primarily a result of the World War II and Cold War. These events initiated the systematic study of military sociology, though it stands to reason that the relationship between the military and society would predate these events. The dismantling of the Soviet Union, the trauma of the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq also dramatically affected the field of military sociology. There are numerous topics within military sociology, and it is important to note that its scope is not exclusively limited to the military institution itself or to its members. Rather, military sociology encompasses areas such as civilian-military relations and the relationship between the military and other military groups or governmental agencies.
Other topics within military sociology include:
The dominant assumptions held by those in the military
Military members' willingness/motivation to fight
Unionization in the military
Military professionalism
Transition of veterans to civilian life
The increased utilization of women
The military industrial-academic complex
The military's dependence on research
The institutional and organizational structure of military
Military as a society:
Military as profession: Two leading scholars, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, influence the notion of military professionalism in military sociology. Political scientist, Huntington argued that there should be a high degree of autonomy within the military profession over military matters, because civilians did not possess the necessary corporate quality or expertise to oversee military matters. He called this objective control. Janowitz, on the other hand, asserted that the role of the military in modern society was so complex, and with such high stakes that the duty of the professional soldier went well beyond the execution of violence. The elite of the military had an obligation to maintain stable international relations, and this required management expertise and political skills in addition to the classical military officer skillset. Janowitz was concerned that the military profession could become a self-perpetuating, self-serving clique. Therefore, it was important that the military be socially representative of the citizen it served. According to Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, the military profession holds the view that it is a unique profession.
There are six key elements that are paramount in shaping the character of the military profession:
The profession has a defined area of competence based on expert knowledge;
there is a system of continuing education designed so as to maintain professional competence
The profession has an obligation to society and must serve it without concern for remuneration
It has a system of values that perpetuate professional character and establish and maintain legitimate relationships with society
There is an institutional framework within which the profession functions
The profession has control over the system of rewards and punishments and is in a position to determine the quality of those entering the profession
Military as an occupation: Shortly after the United States ended conscription and initiated the All Volunteer Force, sociologist, Charles Moskos introduced the Institutional/Occupational model of military organizations. He asked whether the military should be seen as more of an occupation rather than an institution. Although the military still retains institutional principles (patriotic values, historic traditions, etc.) the military is becoming oriented to the principles of business and economics and can be fairly categorized as a profession. This can be explored in relating to other professions in the grouping of power and compensation. There are different ranks within the military, granting some people more power. Many young people look to the military for compensation benefits and the opportunity to attend college without enormous loans.
Moskos used the United States as his point of reference. The militaries of countries such as France, Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands, and Australia also have elements of institutionalism. Moskos's model has influenced the scholarship of enlistment/reenlistment, which looks at how occupational and institutional factors shape a recruit's enlistment intention or the reenlistment decisions of active duty personnel.
Recruitment practices: Perhaps no other institution places as much emphasis on procedures for assimilating new members as does the armed forces. Assimilation involves the continuous process of recruitment, selection, training, and career development. Not only must the new recruit, officer, or enlisted officer learn new and difficult skills. He or she is also expected to master an elaborate code of professional behavior and etiquette, since membership in the military means participation in an organizational community which regulates behavior both on and off the "job". The American Military utilizes the citizen-soldier concept to gather military personnel from across the country. This term means the ability to quickly round up or call up troops for war or military tour at a virtual moment's notice. But once the assignment or tour is over, the military personnel are returned to civilian life.
According to Norman A. Hilman 2.5 million men were enlisted into military during the peacetime draft. During that rapid transitional period, many soldiers may have felt lost or confused by the differences in their previous life (civilian) and their new military life, which calls for a demand to conform to new orders that are expected to be followed without question. Although, there were many men and now women who have voluntarily joined in the armed forces, there are those who view joining the military and working for the government as selling out. The negative characterization of military life can be a real turn off for most people looking from the outside. Despite the negative thoughts about military life and the incentives of economic security, military recruitment practices changed from a means to help one's country into a way to attain an education back to a need to serve one's country, in recent years. Throughout its changes the enlisting numbers have not declined, they have stayed steady, if not increasing over the years.
The effects of military life on dependents (and the influence of military dependent subcultures): A military family by definition is a unit that may consist of husband and wife and children (in many English-speaking countries, called military brats, which is a term of respect and endearment, not an insult); with either the husband and/or wife as the primary military enlisted. The emotional stress that a partner can experience, before, during and after a soldier, sailor, marine or airman's deployment is perhaps just as bad mentally, as the one who is fighting in the military. Those whose husbands or wives were deployed for the first time, rated their feelings about the whole experience as being very sad, and found it difficult to cope with the sudden absence of their loved one. However, women or men whose spouses have been deployed prior, coped with the present deployment with more positive reactions. They felt that they had a job to do away from home that was important and they and the rest of their family (children) had to be supportive and take care of things while the family member was away. Children begin taking on more adult responsibilities like: cooking, cleaning, getting groceries, etc. Despite the positive coping skills of some military families, some do not do well on their own coping with the long separation from their family and family members. Stressors and stress reactions of spouses vary over time. What is perceived as stressful before the deployment differs from what is perceived as stressful during and after the deployment. Deployments can last anywhere from 90 days to 15 months, and during this time, the role that the members of the family believe they should hold changes. This often makes it difficult for all members of the family.
Approximately one-fifth of all enlisted 18-year-olds and one-third of all junior personnel in the United States Army are married, compared to less than 5% of civilian 18-year-olds. As a result, young military families experience many of the same hardships that can accompany the start of a family in greater numbers than young civilian families. Like young civilian families, young military families may also experience maturity issues, life inexperience, low incomes, and living away from home. But these issues are compounded by the fact that young military families also experience special hardships not experienced by young civilian families. For example, while many young families, both military and civilian, often endure difficulties, civilian families are more likely to have the support of family and friends which is less likely to be an option for military families (e.g. on a military base stationed in a foreign country).
Another hardship experienced more commonly by military families (compared with civilian families) is frequent relocation. Approximately 33% of military families relocate every year compared to only 5% of civilian families. Special planning must be undertaken by families in which both parents are on active duty, as either could be (re)deployed at any time. (Planning for this contingency can be especially difficult.) In other military families with only one active-duty-parent, the other parent is less likely to stay at home with children as in the past. Rather, they are more likely to find employment and/or attend college, and therefore find constant relocations more stressful due to the commitments to working and studying, respectively.
Military families have the option of living at the parents' place of employment. For families living in an on-base house, they must follow the rules of the base command and the housing office on how to maintain their property and are afforded little privacy. In short, they may experience pressure to conform to the base's standards of behavior. Some families may opt not to live on base, but off-base housing is usually more expensive and can be inconvenient.
Stress and military service: De Soir suggests there are seven stages in the way partners of married personnel experience stress before, during and after deployment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military sociology | (Planning for this contingency can be especially difficult.) In other military families with only one active-duty-parent, the other parent is less likely to stay at home with children as in the past. Rather, they are more likely to find employment and/or attend college, and therefore find constant relocations more stressful due to the commitments to working and studying, respectively.
Military families have the option of living at the parents' place of employment. For families living in an on-base house, they must follow the rules of the base command and the housing office on how to maintain their property and are afforded little privacy. In short, they may experience pressure to conform to the base's standards of behavior. Some families may opt not to live on base, but off-base housing is usually more expensive and can be inconvenient.
Stress and military service: De Soir suggests there are seven stages in the way partners of married personnel experience stress before, during and after deployment.
Initial Shock and Protest
This period usually lasts about two weeks. In this stage family members are upset and angry at the news of deployment. This is usually a time of heightened emotions. In the past many families were only given a month's notice to get ready for deployment, but recently many families have been given a year or more of notice of deployment, which might make the stressful time of anticipation even worse. Many recent reports suggest the ideal preparation time for deployment would be 3–5 months.
Disengagement and Alienation
During the last days prior to departure, couples enter this stage. They experience periods of distancing because of their feelings uncertainty about the future of the mission, but also during that stage, a lot of latent problems or concern may surface that could add more potential stress, such as arguments and confessions that can't be address fully in those last moments before a person's deployment. These moments create a lot of emotional distress.
Emotional Disorganization
Shortly after the family member has been deployed, there are feelings of sadness and it is possible that symptoms of clinical depression may begin, along with issues with sleeping and problems getting back into the rhythm of life (eating disorders). These issues last for about six weeks, perhaps longer, especially, if the deployment doesn't go well or there are reports of bad news to the family. The best way to get family and spouses over this period, is for the deployed personnel to contact their family as soon as they arrive at their destinations as soon as military authority permits. This can help the family feel less stress over the deployment duration. Constant contact is a key part to decreasing a stressful family life.
Recovery and Stabilization
Usually after six weeks the family will fall back into a more distressed family pattern, and recover by becoming accustomed to the situation of a missing family member who has been deployed. Starting and maintaining a daily routine at this stage is the best way to keep the mind off of what the deployed may be doing or where the deployed may be at this point. The involvement of "home front groups" are essential to military families who need to share and enjoy time with others who have military spouses and partners deployed for long periods of time. Seeking support groups are one of many ways people cope with stressful issues.
Age as a factor: In the United States, almost half of the enlisted force is below 25 for both men and women with the average age being 27. The trend of youth is perpetuated by the fact that most people enter into the service at 18 years of age and leave after only a few years. This creates a situation in which those with college experience are underrepresented in military as they only make up 8.5% of the military force. Youth inclusion in armed conflict is not a new concept or one restricted to large well organized forces such as the United States military. In various societies over time, youth has been prized in armed conflict. Such instances include the Dinka of the Sudan, boys who received spears as an initiation rite between sixteen and eighteen years of age, the nineteenth-century Cheyenne who joined their first war parties when they were about fourteen, and the female warriors of Dahomey who were recruited between nine and fifteen. During the American Civil War, it has been estimated that between 250,000 and 420,000 soldiers under 18 years of age served in Union and Confederate armies, which yields somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of recruits. During these earlier periods youth was not looked upon in the context of innocence as it is framed today, rather children were seen as naturally existing with adults, as they frequently coexisted with them through apprenticeships and other work. It was not until formal education became more widespread that a change in attitudes towards youth develop, and consequently a prolongation of the perceived youth period.
Religion in the military: In the past, all U.S. service academies required attendance to religious services which in 1972 was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Anderson v. Laird. Despite this, the Naval Academy still has prayer before meals and attendance is required at these meals. This has caused some students at the Naval Academy to seek legal help from the American Civil Liberties Union. A comparable practice of pre-meal prayers for compulsory meals at the Virginia Military Institute was found unconstitutional by the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Mellen v. Bunting in 2003.
The religious spectrum of the United States military is comparable to that of the general population. In comparison with the nearest available age group, a demographic of 20- to 39-year-olds that make up eighty percent of the military, there are slight variations. Mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and Buddhists are underrepresented, but other Christian religions (such as the Christian and Missionary Alliance, Church of God, Seventh Day Adventists, Assemblies of God, and others) disproportionately overrepresented, at nearly three times the percentage in the applicable demographic. Those reporting atheism or no religion are very slightly overrepresented. None of these differences account for more than a 10% spread, Christians self-identifying as Protestant only constituting the largest discrepancy. The data and other studies suggest that servicemembers may be less likely to identify with mainstream religious organizations than the country's general population.
Minorities in the military: Throughout history non-indigenous members of minority groups have been absorbed into military service. Examples of this practice in ancient armies include Hannibal's use of Ethiopian soldiers, the Roman Auxilia, the Byzantine Empire's recruitment of the Middle Eastern population, and the Ottoman Empire's use of religious minorities through the Millet system. In these cases where military service was voluntary, minorities saw it as an opportunity to progress socially in the society, and perhaps achieve citizenship for themselves and by extension, to their children. For most of the history of minority groups in military organizations, minorities were often segregated from the dominant racial group by forming separate contingents for such groups. This was true in ancient military organizations, but also in a more recent historical context through the French-Canadian regiments of Canada during World War I, and World War II, the British army and their conscription of various minority groups from their conquests during colonialism, and the segregation of minority groups into Caucasian commanded, minority composed, regiments during similar time periods as mentioned previously. In the case of the United States, African-American participation in the military after World War II was high due to the better treatment afforded African-Americans in the military by Caucasian members. With the end of job exclusion by 1954 reenlistment rates increased on average until they were close to double that of Caucasian servicemen. A similar situation arose in the United Kingdom with minority participation, but both situations saw a sharp disparity in upper rank distribution, as both had, and to a lesser extent, still have a disproportionately low level of upper ranked minorities.
Women in the military: Military and gender issues is a diverse and plural field within military sociology. The roles of women can include being the transmitter of cultural values to children, reproducers of boundaries and active militants in national struggles. Women have served in the military throughout history. Women's military recruitment rejects the idea that 'women should be protected'. Recruitment is very important in Latin America, Israel, Nicaragua, Rwanda and Northern Ireland. In Turkey, the wife of the chief commander represents the mother of the military family. Some states in the developing world are egalitarian and many women are recruited into the military to achieve the modern ideal. With women's customary role as a nurturer and mother, the increased equality and inclusion of women in the military could change the reason for war or raison d'être of wars.
Sexual assault in the United States military is an issue for military women. In 2021, 8% of female military personnel experienced unwanted sexual contact. This was the highest percentage since the DoD began this data collection in 2004. Of an estimated 35,900 total sexual assaults, only 7,260 were reported. The reporting rate was 20%, which had fallen from 30% in 2018. Only 42% of cases resulted in court-martial proceedings. The confidence of female personnel in being treated "with dignity and respect" by their chain of command after reporting an assault was 39%, a decrease from 66% in 2018.
During World War II women served in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corp (WAAC) which was later renamed Women's Army Corps (WAC). In addition, there was WAVES, or Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Services.
Jane Addams and Cynthia Enloe have been identified as women who have contributed key ideas to military sociology. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military sociology | In 2021, 8% of female military personnel experienced unwanted sexual contact. This was the highest percentage since the DoD began this data collection in 2004. Of an estimated 35,900 total sexual assaults, only 7,260 were reported. The reporting rate was 20%, which had fallen from 30% in 2018. Only 42% of cases resulted in court-martial proceedings. The confidence of female personnel in being treated "with dignity and respect" by their chain of command after reporting an assault was 39%, a decrease from 66% in 2018.
During World War II women served in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corp (WAAC) which was later renamed Women's Army Corps (WAC). In addition, there was WAVES, or Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Services.
Jane Addams and Cynthia Enloe have been identified as women who have contributed key ideas to military sociology. Addams's influence stems from her feminist perspectives on peace and its influence on peacekeeping. Enloe's influence is traced to her feminist view of the military.
Homosexuality and the military: Homosexuals were not recruited but have served in the U.S. military from World War II (and most likely every war) to the Clinton presidency. In 1993, the Clinton administration began the policy of "Don't ask, Don't tell, Don't pursue", meaning that military personnel will be neither compelled ("Don't ask") nor allowed ("Don't tell") nor harassed ("Don't pursue") to disclose or discuss their sexual identity while serving in the military. The "Don't ask, Don't tell, Don't pursue" policy actually had the effect of increasing discharges due to homosexuality from 617 in 1994 to 1,273 in
2001. Estimates have been made that in 2000 there were 1 million gay and lesbian veterans in the U.S. population as based on census information. Homosexual women with partners reported higher rates of military service than other women, while homosexual male veterans served for a similar amount of time as heterosexual male veterans.
Military and society:
Political control of the military: In the modern relationship between the military and the state, the state relies on the military to protect it from external threats as well as violence between various internal groups. Concurrently, the military draws so-called 'violent resources' from the state and from society. Such resources can include money, technology, raw materials, and manpower. The relationship has changed somewhat from the 16th and 17th centuries, however, where internal centers of power and specific sectors of society (e.g., skilled builders or guilds) were somewhat more autonomous than the rest. These sectors were not under the direct control of the sovereign power and could avoid feeding resources to the state. This meant that pre-modern militaries were 1) somewhat weaker than the modern version due to a lack of state-funded resources but also 2) powerful sectors of society that controlled certain privately funded resources and which could raise their own mercenary forces if needed.
As this system began to evolve, states started to exert more control over society by exploiting 'existential fears' which led to the creation of various bureaucratic methods including mass conscription, tax systems, and territorial centralization. The result is that various civil sectors began to work exclusively for the state, which in turn desired a stronger military, and which used these sectors to extract more resources and more manpower for exclusive military use. This 'modern' military now was reliant on the state for its very existence, whereas, in pre-modern times, the military could be the tool of various autonomous sectors of society.
Military's use of research and industry: Burkard Schmitt a Research Fellow for the EU Institute for Security Studies identifies two types of research. Pure research is done from the bottom-up with no specific demand and are long term oriented. Capability research is done from the top down, most research of this type is defined for mostly military use with a specific goal in mind.
Europe
Few European countries have had significant investments in research and technology. National sensitivities and defense companies that are hesitant to share research findings has long hindered research in Europe. This is beginning to change with the formation and strengthening of the EU and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU is currently implementing its "Agenda for advanced research relating to global security" which is crucial to the future of European security. The idea in Europe is that research should be undertaken by all member states. A goal for member states and something to aid future research is a "harmonization" of military requirements.
United States
The American model for research is based on the old German standard, which the Americans emulated starting from the founding of the American Chemical Society in 1876. The use of research and industry to develop new and more deadly chemical and biological weapons is an intriguing aspect of the modern military. German universities were involved in early chemical gas development for use in World War I. German universities "carefully cultivated the ideal of science as an emphatically value-free activity; they bestowed upon their wards the right and the duty to serve the interests of knowledge and to brush aside other interests with which the welfare of scientific pursuits might clash." American universities also had chemical labs, Harvard University began work on poison gas in 1917. By World War I, the chemical industry began to influence politics because of the great interdependence between industry, military and politics.
The amount of research that is done relates to the U.S. economy, which includes the largest military budget in the world. This has created a strong link between military, the state, and corporate America. This has been called the "military industrial complex", but the military has also dominated large university science departments. This concept is the military industrial academic complex, or MIA.
Notable Scholars: The following scholars have published widely in military sociology. Many have held editorial responsibilities for the journal Armed Forces & Society and leadership positions in the professional organization the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS).
Morris Janowitz, founder Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and founder and Editor-in-Chief Armed Forces & Society
David R. Segal, Editor-in-Chief Armed Forces & Society, President and Chair Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
James Burk, Editor-in-Chief Armed Forces & Society, President and Chair Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
Charles Moskos, President and Chair Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
Mady Segal (Military Families and Women in the Military)
Brenda Moore (Women and Minorities), editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Joseph Soeters (Peacekeeping and Methods) editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Giuseppe Caforio
John Sibley Butler (minority participation in the military)
Bernard Boene, editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Morton Ender, editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Meredith Kleycamp (recruitment)
Nicholas Jans (Professionalism), editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Christopher Dandeker (Veterans), editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Gerhard Kümmel, editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Paul Camacho (veterans), editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Guy Siebold (cohesion)
Anthony King (combat and cohesion), editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Yagil Levy, Editorial board Armed Forces & Society
Patricia M. Shields, Editor-in-Chief, Armed Forces & Society
George Kaffes, Professor of Military Sociology at the Hellenic Army Academy, https://sse.army.gr/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/CVeng-1.pdf
See also: Bullying in the military
References:
Recommended reading: Armed Forces & Society
Caforio, Giuseppe, (ed.), Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2006
Grandstaff, Mark. "Military Sociology" in Charles Messenger, ed. Reader's Guide to Military History (2001) pp 363–64 online; evaluates major books
Malesevic, Sinisa. 2010. The Sociology of War and Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Paparone, Chris. 2013. The Sociology of Military Science. NY: Bloomsbury.
Sarkesian, Sam C., Williams, John Allen, Bryant, Fred B., Soldiers, Society, and National Security, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1995
Further reading: Segal, David and Morten Ender. 2008. “Sociology in Military Officer Education.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 3–15. [6]
Ender, Morten; Ryan Kelty and Irving Smith. 2008. “Sociology at West Point.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 49–70. [7]
Kawano, Hitoshi. 2008. “The Expanding role of Sociology at Japan National Defense Academy: From Not to Some and More?”Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 122–144. [8]
Obraztsov, Igor. 2008. “Teaching Sociology in Military Educational Institutions of Russia.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 162–179. [9]
Kucera, Thomas (2014). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military sociology | 2008. “Sociology in Military Officer Education.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 3–15. [6]
Ender, Morten; Ryan Kelty and Irving Smith. 2008. “Sociology at West Point.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 49–70. [7]
Kawano, Hitoshi. 2008. “The Expanding role of Sociology at Japan National Defense Academy: From Not to Some and More?”Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 122–144. [8]
Obraztsov, Igor. 2008. “Teaching Sociology in Military Educational Institutions of Russia.” Armed Forces & Society, vol. 35: pp. 162–179. [9]
Kucera, Thomas (2014). "The Strategic Significance of Ethical Imperatives The Case of the German Armed Forces" Armed Forces & Society Available Online
Paparone, Chris (2017) [10] "How we fight: A critical exploration of US military doctrine." Organization 24, no. 4 (2017): 516–533. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military specialism | Overview: Commonly military occupations are specific to the Arm, Service or Branch of the armed forces because of the different requirements of the personnel to operate in different environments, using different technologies and working within different operational systems.
The general term of reference to service personnel in the land component of an armed forces is a soldier, that of the naval component a sailor, that of the naval infantry component a marine, and in the air component an airman, which are sometimes also the lowest military rank in these services.
See also: Military personnel
Military Occupational Specialty
References:
External links: Media related to Military occupations at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | Fundamentals: Military strategy is the planning and execution of the contest between groups of armed adversaries. It is a subdiscipline of warfare and of foreign policy, and a principal tool to secure national interests. Its perspective is larger than military tactics, which involve the disposition and manoeuvre of units on a particular sea or battlefield, but less broad than grand strategy otherwise called national strategy, which is the overarching strategy of the largest of organizations such as the nation state, confederation, or international alliance and involves using diplomatic, informational, military and economic resources. Military strategy involves using military resources such as people, equipment, and information against the opponent's resources to gain supremacy or reduce the opponent's will to fight, developed through the precepts of military science.
NATO's definition of strategy is "presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations." Strategy may be divided into 'grand strategy', geopolitical in scope and 'military strategy' that converts the geopolitical policy objectives into militarily achievable goals and campaigns. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and co-chairman of the Anglo-US Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee for most of the Second World War, described the art of military strategy as: "to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action." Field-Marshal Montgomery summed it up thus "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to fulfil the ends of policy. Tactics means the dispositions for, and control of, military forces and techniques in actual fighting. Put more shortly: strategy is the art of the conduct of war, tactics the art of fighting."
Background: Military strategy in the 19th century was still viewed as one of a trivium of "arts" or "sciences" that govern the conduct of warfare; the others being tactics, the execution of plans and maneuvering of forces in battle, and logistics, the maintenance of an army. The view had prevailed since the Roman times, and the borderline between strategy and tactics at this time was blurred, and sometimes categorization of a decision is a matter of almost personal opinion. Carnot, during the French Revolutionary Wars thought it simply involved concentration of troops.
Strategy and tactics are closely related and exist on the same continuum; modern thinking places the operational level between them. All deal with distance, time and force but strategy is large scale, can endure through years, and is societal while tactics are small scale and involve the disposition of fewer elements enduring hours to weeks. Originally strategy was understood to govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution. However, in the world wars of the 20th century, the distinction between maneuver and battle, strategy and tactics, expanded with the capacity of technology and transit. Tactics that were once the province of a company of cavalry would be applied to a panzer army.
It is often said that the art of strategies defines the goals to achieve in a military campaign, while tactics defines the methods to achieve these goals. Strategic goals could be "We want to conquer area X", or "We want to stop country Y's expansion in world trade in commodity Z"; while tactical decisions range from a general statement—e.g., "We're going to do this by a naval invasion of the North of country X", "We're going to blockade the ports of country Y", to a more specific "C Platoon will attack while D platoon provides fire cover".
In its purest form, strategy dealt solely with military issues. In earlier societies, a king or political leader was often the same person as the military leader. If not, the distance of communication between the political and the military leader was small. But as the need of a professional army grew, the bounds between the politicians and the military came to be recognized. In many cases, it was decided that there was a need for a separation.
As French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, "War is too important a business to be left to soldiers." This gave rise to the concept of the grand strategy which encompasses the management of the resources of an entire nation in the conduct of warfare. In the environment of the grand strategy, the military component is largely reduced to operational strategy—the planning and control of large military units such as corps and divisions. As the size and number of the armies grew and the technology to communicate and control improved, the difference between "military strategy" and "grand strategy" shrank. Fundamental to grand strategy is the diplomacy through which a nation might forge alliances or pressure another nation into compliance, thereby achieving victory without resorting to combat. Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war peace.
As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be a means to an end, but it is not an end in itself. There are numerous examples in history where victory on the battlefield has not translated into goals such as long term peace, security or tranquillity.
Principles: Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate a successful strategy in a set of principles. Sun Tzu defined 13 principles in his The Art of War while Napoleon listed 115 maxims. American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest had only one: to "[get] there first with the most men". The concepts given as essential in the United States Army Field Manual of Military Operations (FM 3–0) are:
Objective type (direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective)
Offensive type (seize, retain, and exploit the initiative)
Mass Type (concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time)
Economy of force type (allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts)
Maneuver type (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power)
Unity of command type (for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander)
Security type (never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage)
Surprise type (strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which they are unprepared)
Simplicity type (prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding)
According to Greene and Armstrong, some planners assert adhering to the fundamental principles guarantees victory, while others claim war is unpredictable and the strategist must be flexible. Others argue predictability could be increased if the protagonists were to view the situation from the other sides in a conflict. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke expressed strategy as a system of "ad hoc expedients" by which a general must take action while under pressure. These underlying principles of strategy have survived relatively unchanged as the technology of warfare has developed.
Strategy (and tactics) must constantly evolve in response to technological advances. A successful strategy from one era tends to remain in favor long after new developments in military weaponry and matériel have rendered it obsolete. World War I, and to a great extent the American Civil War, saw Napoleonic tactics of "offense at all costs" pitted against the defensive power of the trench, machine gun and barbed wire. As a reaction to its World War I experience, France attempted to use its Maginot Line to apply the principles of mass and economy of force, in that troops could be concentrated in the north for an offensive there while the Line acted as force multiplier in the south, and maneuver and security, by preventing the Germans from going directly from Alsace to Paris.
Development:
Antiquity: The principles of military strategy emerged at least as far back as 500 BC in the works of Sun Tzu and Chanakya. The campaigns of Alexander the Great, Chandragupta Maurya, Hannibal, Qin Shi Huang, Julius Caesar, Zhuge Liang, Khalid ibn al-Walid and, in particular, Cyrus the Great demonstrate strategic planning and movement. Mahan describes in the preface to The Influence of Sea Power upon History how the Romans used their sea power to effectively block the sea lines of communication of Hannibal with Carthage; and so via a maritime strategy achieved Hannibal's removal from Italy, despite never beating him there with their legions.
One of these strategies was shown in the battle between Greek city states and Persia. The Battle of Thermopylae in which the Greek forces were outnumbered stood as a good military strategy. The Greek allied forces ultimately lost the battle, but the training, use of armor, and location allowed them to defeat many Persian troops before losing. In the end, the Greek alliance lost the battle but not the war as a result of that strategy which continued on to the battle of Plataea. The Battle of Plataea in 479 BC resulted in a victory for the Greeks against Persia, which exemplified that military strategy was extremely beneficial to defeating a numerous enemy.
Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition warfare, scorched earth action, blockade, guerrilla campaign, deception and feint. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | One of these strategies was shown in the battle between Greek city states and Persia. The Battle of Thermopylae in which the Greek forces were outnumbered stood as a good military strategy. The Greek allied forces ultimately lost the battle, but the training, use of armor, and location allowed them to defeat many Persian troops before losing. In the end, the Greek alliance lost the battle but not the war as a result of that strategy which continued on to the battle of Plataea. The Battle of Plataea in 479 BC resulted in a victory for the Greeks against Persia, which exemplified that military strategy was extremely beneficial to defeating a numerous enemy.
Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition warfare, scorched earth action, blockade, guerrilla campaign, deception and feint. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. The word "strategy" itself derives from the Greek "στρατηγία" (strategia), "office of general, command, generalship", in turn from "στρατηγός" (strategos), "leader or commander of an army, general", a compound of "στρατός" (stratos), "army, host" + "ἀγός" (agos), "leader, chief", in turn from "ἄγω" (ago), "to lead". No evidence exists of it being used in a modern sense in Ancient Greek, but we find it in Byzantine documents from the 6th century onwards, and most notably in the work attributed to Emperor Leo VI the Wise of Byzantium.
Middle Ages:
Genghis Khan and the Mongols: As a counterpoint to European developments in the strategic art, the Mongol emperor Genghis Khan provides a useful example. Genghis' successes, and those of his successors, were based on manoeuvre and terror. The main focus of Genghis' strategic assault was the psychology of the opposing population. By steady and meticulous implementation of this strategy, Genghis and his descendants were able to conquer most of Eurasia. The building blocks of Genghis' army and his strategy were his tribal levies of mounted archers, scorched earth-style methods, and, equally essential, the vast horse-herds of Mongolia.
Each archer had at least one extra horse—there was an average of five horses per man—thus the entire army could move with astounding rapidity. Moreover, since horse milk and horse blood were the staples of the Mongolian diet, Genghis' horse-herds functioned not just as his means of movement but as his logistical sustainment. All other necessities would be foraged and plundered. Khan's marauders also brought with them mobile shelters, concubines, butchers, and cooks. Through maneuver and continuous assault, Chinese, Persian, Arab and Eastern European armies could be stressed until they collapsed, and were then annihilated in pursuit and encirclement.
Compared to the armies of Genghis, nearly all other armies were cumbersome and relatively static. It was not until well into the 20th century that any army was able to match the speed of deployment of Genghis' armies. When confronted with a fortified city, the Mongol imperatives of maneuver and speed required that it be quickly subdued. Here the terror engendered by the bloody reputation of the Mongolians helped to intimidate and subdue.
So too did primitive biological warfare. A trebuchet or other type of ballista weapon would be used to launch dead animals and corpses into a besieged city, spreading disease and death, such as the Black Plague. If a particular town or city displeased the Mongolian Khan, everyone in the city would be killed to set an example for all other cities. This was early psychological warfare.
To refer to the nine strategic principles outlined above, the Mongol strategy was directed toward an objective (that schwerpunkt (main focus) being the morale and mental state of the opposing population) achieved through the offensive; this offensive was itself characterized by concentration of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity.
Early Modern era: In 1520 Niccolò Machiavelli's Dell'arte della guerra (Art of War) dealt with the relationship between civil and military matters and the formation of grand strategy. In the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden demonstrated advanced operational strategy that led to his victories on the soil of the Holy Roman Empire. It was not until the 18th century that military strategy was subjected to serious study in Europe. The word was first used in German as "Strategie" in a translation of Leo VI's Tactica in 1777 by Johann von Bourscheid. From then onwards, the use of the word spread throughout the West.
In the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Frederick the Great improvised a "strategy of exhaustion" (see attrition warfare) to hold off his opponents and conserve his Prussian forces. Assailed from all sides by France, Austria, Russia and Sweden, Frederick exploited his central position, which enabled him to move his army along interior lines and concentrate against one opponent at a time. Unable to achieve victory, he was able to stave off defeat until a diplomatic solution emerged. Frederick's "victory" led to great significance being placed on "geometric strategy" which emphasized lines of manoeuvre, awareness of terrain and possession of critical strong-points.
Napoleonic: The French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars that followed revolutionized military strategy. The impact of this period was still to be felt in the American Civil War and the early phases of World War I.
With the advent of cheap small arms and the rise of the drafted citizen soldier, armies grew rapidly in size to become massed formations. This necessitated dividing the army first into divisions and later into corps. Along with divisions came divisional artillery; light-weight, mobile cannon with great range and firepower. The rigid formations of pikemen and musketeers firing massed volleys gave way to light infantry fighting in skirmish lines.
Napoleon I of France took advantage of these developments to pursue an effective "battle of annihilation". Napoleon invariably sought to achieve decision in battle, with the sole aim of utterly destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior maneuver. As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures.
While not the originator of the methods he used, Napoleon effectively combined the relatively superior maneuver and battle stages into one event. Before this, General Officers had considered this approach to battle as separate events. However, Napoleon used the maneuver to battle to dictate how and where the battle would progress. The Battle of Austerlitz was a perfect example of this maneuver. Napoleon withdrew from a strong position to draw his opponent forward and tempt him into a flank attack, weakening his center. This allowed the French army to split the allied army and gain victory.
Napoleon used two primary strategies for the approach to battle. His "Manoeuvre De Derrière" (move onto the rear) was intended to place the French Army across the enemy's lines of communications. This forced the opponent to either march to battle with Napoleon or attempt to find an escape route around the army. By placing his army into the rear, his opponent's supplies and communications would be cut. This had a negative effect on enemy morale. Once joined, the battle would be one in which his opponent could not afford defeat. This also allowed Napoleon to select multiple battle angles into a battle site. Initially, the lack of force concentration helped with foraging for food and sought to confuse the enemy as to his real location and intentions.
The "indirect" approach into battle also allowed Napoleon to disrupt the linear formations used by the allied armies. As the battle progressed, the enemy committed their reserves to stabilize the situation, Napoleon would suddenly release the flanking formation to attack the enemy. His opponents, being suddenly confronted with a new threat and with little reserves, had no choice but to weaken the area closest to the flanking formation and draw up a battle line at a right angle in an attempt to stop this new threat. Once this had occurred, Napoleon would mass his reserves at the hinge of that right angle and launch a heavy attack to break the lines. The rupture in the enemy lines allowed Napoleon's cavalry to flank both lines and roll them up leaving his opponent no choice but to surrender or flee.
The second strategy used by Napoleon I of France when confronted with two or more enemy armies was the use of the central position. This allowed Napoleon to drive a wedge to separate the enemy armies. He would then use part of his force to mask one army while the larger portion overwhelmed and defeated the second army quickly. He would then march on the second army leaving a portion to pursue the first army and repeat the operations (defeat in detail). This was designed to achieve the highest concentration of men into the primary battle while limiting the enemy's ability to reinforce the critical battle. The central position did have a weakness in that the full power of the pursuit of the enemy could not be achieved because the second army needed attention. Napoleon used the central position strategy during the Battle of Waterloo. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | The rupture in the enemy lines allowed Napoleon's cavalry to flank both lines and roll them up leaving his opponent no choice but to surrender or flee.
The second strategy used by Napoleon I of France when confronted with two or more enemy armies was the use of the central position. This allowed Napoleon to drive a wedge to separate the enemy armies. He would then use part of his force to mask one army while the larger portion overwhelmed and defeated the second army quickly. He would then march on the second army leaving a portion to pursue the first army and repeat the operations (defeat in detail). This was designed to achieve the highest concentration of men into the primary battle while limiting the enemy's ability to reinforce the critical battle. The central position did have a weakness in that the full power of the pursuit of the enemy could not be achieved because the second army needed attention. Napoleon used the central position strategy during the Battle of Waterloo.
Waterloo: Napoleon masked Wellington and massed against the Prussian army, and then after the Battle of Ligny was won, Napoleon attempted to do the same to the Allied/British army located just to the south of Waterloo. His subordinate was unable to mask the defeated Prussian army, who reinforced the Waterloo battle in time to defeat Napoleon and end his domination of Europe.
It can be said that the Prussian Army under Blücher used the "maneuver de derrière" against Napoleon who was suddenly placed in a position of reacting to a new enemy threat.
Napoleon's practical strategic triumphs, repeatedly leading smaller forces to defeat larger ones, inspired a whole new field of study into military strategy. In particular, his opponents were keen to develop a body of knowledge in this area to allow them to counteract a masterful individual with a highly competent group of officers, a General Staff. The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian with a background in philosophy, and Antoine-Henri Jomini, who had been one of Napoleon's staff officers.
One notable exception to Napoleon's strategy of annihilation and a precursor to trench warfare were the Lines of Torres Vedras during the Peninsular War. French Armies lived off the land and when they were confronted by a line of fortifications which they could not out flank, they were unable to continue the advance and were forced to retreat once they had consumed all the provisions of the region in front of the lines.
The Peninsular campaign was notable for the development of another method of warfare which went largely unnoticed at the time, but would become far more common in the 20th century. That was the aid and encouragement the British gave to the Spanish to harass the French behind their lines which led them to squander most of the assets of their Iberian army in protecting the army's line of communications. This was a very cost effective move for the British, because it cost far less to aid Spanish insurgents than it did to equip and pay regular British army units to engage the same number of French troops.
As the British army could be correspondingly smaller it was able to supply its troops by sea and land without having to live off the land as was the norm at the time. Further, because they did not have to forage they did not antagonise the locals and so did not have to garrison their lines of communications to the same extent as the French did. So the strategy of aiding their Spanish civilian allies in their guerrilla or 'small war' benefited the British in many ways, not all of which were immediately obvious.
Clausewitz and Jomini: Clausewitz's On War has become a respected reference
for strategy, dealing with political, as well as military, leadership, his most famous assertion being:
"War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy by other means."
Clausewitz saw war first and foremost as a political act, and thus maintained that the purpose of all strategy was to achieve the political goal that the state was seeking to accomplish. As such, Clausewitz famously argued that war was the "continuation of politics by other means",
and as such, suggested that the amount of force used by a warring state would and should be proportional to whatever political aim that the state sought to achieve via war. Clausewitz further dismissed "geometry" as an insignificant factor in strategy, believing instead that ideally all wars should follow the Napoleonic concept of victory through a decisive battle of annihilation and destruction of the opposing force, at any cost. However, he also recognized that his ideal of how war should be fought was not always practical in reality and that limited warfare could influence policy by wearing down the opposition through a "strategy of attrition".
In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning and intelligence, the conduct of a campaign, and "generalship" rather than "statesmanship". He proposed that victory could be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory rather than destroying a opposing army.
As such, geometric considerations were prominent in Jomini's theory of strategy. Jomini's two basic principles of strategy were to concentrate against fractions of the enemy force at a time and to strike at the most decisive objective.
Clausewitz and Jomini remain required reading for today's military professional officer.
Industrial age: The evolution of military strategy continued in the American Civil War (1861–1865). The practice of strategy was advanced by generals such as Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman, all of whom had been influenced by the feats of Napoleon (Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was said to have carried a book of Napoleon's maxims with him.)
However, the adherence to the Napoleonic principles in the face of technological advances such as the long-range infantry breechloader rifles and minie ball guns generally led to disastrous consequences for both the Union and Confederate forces and populace. The time and space in which war was waged changed as well. Railroads enabled swift movement of large forces but the manoeuvring was constrained to narrow, vulnerable corridors. Steam power and ironclads changed transport and combat at sea. Newly invented telegraph enabled more rapid communication between armies and their headquarters capitals. Combat was still usually waged by opposing divisions with skirmish lines on rural battlefields, violent naval engagements by cannon-armed sailing or steam-powered vessels, and assault on military forces defending a town.
There was still room for triumphs for the strategy of manoeuvre such as Sherman's March to the Sea in 1864, but these depended upon an enemy's unwillingness to entrench. Towards the end of the war, especially in defense of static targets as in the battles of Cold Harbor and Vicksburg, trench networks foreshadowed World War I. Many of the lessons of the American Civil War were forgotten, when in wars like the Austro-Prussian War or the Franco-Prussian War, manoeuvre won the day.
In the period preceding World War I, two of the most influential strategists were the Prussian generals, Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen. Under Moltke the Prussian army achieved victory in the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), the latter campaign being widely regarded as a classic example of the conception and execution of military strategy.
In addition to exploiting railroads and highways for manoeuvre, Moltke also exploited the telegraph for control of large armies. He recognised the need to delegate control to subordinate commanders and to issue directives rather than specific orders. Moltke is most remembered as a strategist for his belief in the need for flexibility and that no plan, however well prepared, can be guaranteed to survive beyond the first encounter with the enemy.
Field Marshal Schlieffen succeeded Moltke and directed German planning in the lead up to World War I. He advocated the "strategy of annihilation" but was faced by a war on two fronts against numerically superior opposition. The strategy he formulated was the Schlieffen Plan, defending in the east while concentrating for a decisive victory in the west, after which the Germans would go on to the offensive in the east. Influenced by Hannibal's success at the Battle of Cannae, Schlieffen planned for a single great battle of encirclement, thereby annihilating his enemy.
Another German strategist of the period was Hans Delbrück who expanded on Clausewitz's concept of "limited warfare" to produce a theory on the "strategy of exhaustion". His theory defied popular military thinking of the time, which was strongly in favour of victory in battle, yet World War I would soon demonstrate the flaws of a mindless "strategy of annihilation".
At a time when industrialisation was rapidly changing naval technology, one American strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, almost single-handedly brought the field of naval strategy up to date. Influenced by Jomini's principles of strategy, he saw that in the coming wars, where economic strategy could be as important as military strategy, control of the sea granted the power to control the trade and resources needed to wage war. Mahan pushed the concept of the "big navy" and an expansionist view where defence was achieved by controlling the sea approaches rather than fortifying the coast. His theories contributed to the naval arms race between 1898 and 1914. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | His theory defied popular military thinking of the time, which was strongly in favour of victory in battle, yet World War I would soon demonstrate the flaws of a mindless "strategy of annihilation".
At a time when industrialisation was rapidly changing naval technology, one American strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, almost single-handedly brought the field of naval strategy up to date. Influenced by Jomini's principles of strategy, he saw that in the coming wars, where economic strategy could be as important as military strategy, control of the sea granted the power to control the trade and resources needed to wage war. Mahan pushed the concept of the "big navy" and an expansionist view where defence was achieved by controlling the sea approaches rather than fortifying the coast. His theories contributed to the naval arms race between 1898 and 1914.
World War I: At the start of World War I strategy was dominated by the offensive thinking that had been in vogue since 1870, despite the more recent experiences of the Second Boer War (1899–1902) and Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), where the machine gun demonstrated its defensive capabilities. By the end of 1914, the Western Front was a stalemate and all ability to maneuver strategically was lost. The combatants resorted to a "strategy of attrition". The German battle at Verdun, the British on the Somme and at Passchendaele were among the first wide-scale battles intended to wear down the enemy. Attrition was time-consuming so the duration of World War I battles often stretched to weeks and months. The problem with attrition was that the use of fortified defenses in depth generally required a ratio of ten attackers to one defender, or a level of artillery support which was simply not feasible until late 1917, for any reasonable chance of victory. The ability of the defender to move troops using interior lines prevented the possibility of fully exploiting any breakthrough with the level of technology then attainable.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of strategy in World War I was the difference among the British between the "Western" viewpoint (held by Field Marshal Haig) and the "Eastern"; the former being that all effort should be directed against the German Army, the latter that more useful work could be done by attacking Germany's allies. The term "knocking away the props" was used, perhaps as a consequence of the fact that all of Germany's allies lay south of (i.e., "beneath") it on the map. Proponents of the Western viewpoint make the point that Germany's allies were more than once rescued from disaster or rendered capable of holding their own or making substantial gains by the provision of German troops, arms or military advisers, whereas those allies did not at any time provide a similar function for Germany. That is, it was Germany which was the prop, and its allies (particularly Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary) did not suffer significant reverses until Germany's ability to come to their aid was grossly impaired.
On other fronts, there was still room for the use of strategy of maneuver. The Germans executed a perfect battle of annihilation against the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg. In 1915 Britain and France launched the well-intentioned but poorly conceived and ultimately fruitless Dardanelles Campaign, combining naval power and an amphibious landing, in an effort to aid their Russian ally and knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The Palestine campaign was dominated by cavalry, which flourished in the local terrain, and the British achieved two breakthrough victories at Gaza (1917) and Megiddo (1918). Colonel T. E. Lawrence and other British officers led Arab irregulars on a guerrilla campaign against the Ottomans, using strategy and tactics developed during the Boer Wars.
World War I saw armies on a scale never before experienced. The British, who had always relied on a strong navy and a small regular army, were forced to undertake a rapid expansion of the army. This outpaced the rate of training of generals and staff officers able to handle such a mammoth force, and overwhelmed the ability of British industry to equip it with the necessary weapons and adequate high-quality munitions until late in the war. Technological advances also had a huge influence on strategy: aerial reconnaissance, artillery techniques, poison gas, the automobile and tank (though the latter was, even at the end of the war, still in its infancy), telephone and radio telegraphy.
More so than in previous wars, military strategy in World War I was directed by the grand strategy of a coalition of nations; the Entente on one side and the Central Powers on the other. Society and economy were mobilized for total war. Attacks on the enemy's economy included Britain's use of a naval blockade and Germany employing submarine warfare against merchant shipping.
Unity of command became a question when the various nation states began coordinating assaults and defenses. Under the pressure of horrendously destructive German attacks beginning on March 21, 1918, the Entente eventually settled under Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch. The Germans generally led the Central Powers, though German authority diminished and lines of command became confused at the end of the war.
World War I strategy was dominated by the "spirit of the offensive", where generals resorted almost to mysticism in terms of a soldier's personal "attitude" in order to break the stalemate; this led to nothing but bloody slaughter as troops in close ranks charged machine guns. Each side developed an alternate thesis. The British under Winston Churchill developed tank warfare, with which they eventually won the war. The Germans developed a "doctrine of autonomy", the forerunner of both blitzkrieg and modern infantry tactics, using groups of stormtroopers, who would advance in small mutually covering groups from cover to cover with "autonomy" to exploit any weakness they discovered in enemy defenses. Almost all the blitzkrieg commanders of World War II, particularly Erwin Rommel, were stormtroopers in World War I. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany launched and almost succeeded in a final offensive. However, the new tactics of autonomy revealed a weakness in terms of overall coordination and direction. The March offensive, intended to drive a wedge between the French and British armies, turn on the latter and destroy it, lost direction and became driven by its territorial gains, its original purpose neglected.
World War I ended when the ability of the German army to fight became so diminished that Germany asked for peace conditions. The German military, exhausted by the efforts of the March offensives and dispirited by their failure, was first seriously defeated during the Battle of Amiens (8–11 August 1918) and the German homefront entered general revolt over a lack of food and destruction of the economy. Victory for the Entente was almost assured by that point, and the fact of Germany's military impotence was driven home in the following hundred days. In this time, the Entente reversed the gains the Germans had made in the first part of the year, and the British Army (spearheaded by the Canadians and Australians) finally broke the Hindenburg defensive system.
Though his methods are questioned, Britain's Field Marshal Haig was ultimately proved correct in his grand strategic vision: "We cannot hope to win until we have defeated the German Army." By the end of the war, the best German troops were dead and the remainder were under continuous pressure on all parts of the Western Front, a consequence in part of an almost endless supply of fresh American reinforcements (which the Germans were unable to match) and in part of industry at last supplying the weakened Entente armies with the firepower to replace the men they lacked (while Germany wanted for all sorts of materials thanks to the naval blockade). Interior lines thus became meaningless as Germany had nothing more to offer its allies. The props eventually fell, but only because they were themselves no longer supported.
The role of the tank in World War I strategy is often poorly understood. Its supporters saw it as the weapon of victory, and many observers since have accused the high commands (especially the British) of shortsightedness in this matter, particularly in view of what tanks have achieved since. Nevertheless, the World War I tank's limitations, imposed by the limits of contemporary engineering technology, have to be borne in mind. They were slow (men could run, and frequently walk, faster); vulnerable (to artillery) due to their size, clumsiness and inability to carry armour against anything but rifle and machine gun ammunition; extremely uncomfortable (conditions inside them often incapacitating crews with engine fumes and heat, and driving some mad with noise); and often despicably unreliable (frequently failing to make it to their targets due to engine or track failures). This was the factor behind the seemingly mindless retention of large bodies of cavalry, which even in 1918, with armies incompletely mechanised, were still the only armed force capable of moving significantly faster than an infantryman on foot. It was not until the relevant technology (in engineering and communications) matured between the wars that the tank and the airplane could be forged into the co-ordinated force needed to truly restore manoeuvre to warfare.
Inter war: In the years following World War I, two of the technologies that had been introduced during that conflict, the aircraft and the tank, became the subject of strategic study.
The leading theorist of air power was Italian general Giulio Douhet, who believed that future wars would be won or lost in the air. The air force would carry the offensive, and the role of the ground forces would be defensive only. Douhet's doctrine of strategic bombing meant striking at the enemy's heartland—his cities, industry and communications. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | It was not until the relevant technology (in engineering and communications) matured between the wars that the tank and the airplane could be forged into the co-ordinated force needed to truly restore manoeuvre to warfare.
Inter war: In the years following World War I, two of the technologies that had been introduced during that conflict, the aircraft and the tank, became the subject of strategic study.
The leading theorist of air power was Italian general Giulio Douhet, who believed that future wars would be won or lost in the air. The air force would carry the offensive, and the role of the ground forces would be defensive only. Douhet's doctrine of strategic bombing meant striking at the enemy's heartland—his cities, industry and communications. Air power would thereby reduce his willingness and capacity to fight. At this time the idea of the aircraft carrier and its capabilities also started to change thinking in those countries with large fleets, but nowhere as much as in Japan. The UK and US seem to have seen the carrier as a defensive weapon, and their designs mirrored this; the Japanese Imperial Navy seem to have developed a new offensive strategy based on the power projection these made possible.
British general J. F. C. Fuller, architect of the first great tank battle at Cambrai, and his contemporary, B. H. Liddell Hart, were amongst the most prominent advocates of mechanization and motorization of the army in Britain. In Germany, study groups were set up by Hans von Seeckt, commander of the Reichswehr Truppenamt, for 57 areas of strategy and tactics to learn from World War I and to adapt strategy to avoid the stalemate and then defeat they had suffered. All seem to have seen the strategic shock value of mobility and the new possibilities made possible by motorised forces. Both saw that the armoured fighting vehicle demonstrated firepower, mobility and protection. The Germans seem to have seen more clearly the need to make all branches of the Army as mobile as possible to maximise the results of this strategy. It would negate the static defences of the trench and machine gun and restore the strategic principles of manoeuvre and offense.
The innovative German Major (later General) Heinz Guderian developed the motorised part of this strategy as the head of one of the Truppenamt groups and may have incorporated Fuller's and Liddell Hart's ideas to amplify the groundbreaking Blitzkrieg effect that was seen used by Germany against Poland in 1939 and later against France in 1940. France, still committed to stationary World War I strategies, was completely surprised and summarily overwhelmed by Germany's mobile combined arms doctrine and Guderian's Panzer Corps.
Technological change had an enormous effect on strategy, but little effect on leadership. The use of telegraph and later radio, along with improved transport, enabled the rapid movement of large numbers of men. One of Germany's key enablers in mobile warfare was the use of radios, where these were put into every tank. However, the number of men that one officer could effectively control had, if anything, declined. The increases in the size of the armies led to an increase in the number of officers. Although the officer ranks in the US Army did swell, in the German army the ratio of officers to total men remained steady.
World War II:
German:
Pre-war: Inter-war Germany had as its main strategic goals the re-establishment of Germany as a European great power and the complete annulment of the Versailles treaty of 1919. After Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party took power in 1933, Germany's political goals also included the accumulation of Lebensraum ("Living space") for the Germanic "race" and the elimination of communism as a political rival to Nazism. The destruction of European Jewry, while not strictly a strategic objective, was a political goal of the Nazi regime linked to the vision of a German-dominated Europe, and especially to the Generalplan Ost for a depopulated east which Germany could colonize.
Until the mid-1930s, Germany's ability to realize these goals was limited by its weakened military and economic position. Hitler's strategy involved building up German military and economic strength through re-armament, while seeking to avoid an early war by diplomatic engagement with France, Britain and (later) the Soviet Union (Stalin-Hitler Pact of August 1939). One by one, Hitler successfully repudiated the terms the Versailles treaty, using skilful diplomacy to avoid triggering war. After starting open re-armament in 1935, he carried out the re-occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and then the diplomatic annexation of Austria (Anschluss) and of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939 (Munich Agreement, September 1938). This risky political strategy proved initially successful, consolidating internal support for the Nazi regime and greatly strengthening Germany's strategic position.
But the March 1939 annexation of rump Czechoslovakia, in violation of the Munich Agreement signed only months before, forced a change in Franco-British policy from an emphasis on avoiding war (Appeasement) to an emphasis on war preparation, of which an important feature was the declaration of Franco-British guarantees of Polish independence. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Britain and France declared war (3 September 1939).
War strategy: Hitler's strategy for war was laid out in Mein Kampf (1925/1926). Whether Hitler intended global or merely European conquest, or whether he even had a plan for war in advance is debated; see Nazi foreign policy (historiographic debate). In Mein Kampf, Hitler had imagined a short war against France, and then the conquest of the USSR. He had wrongly assumed that Britain would be a German ally in the west against France, and so he did not foresee an enduring war in the west.
Once the Second World War had begun with France and Britain as allies, German strategy aimed to win a short war in France and to force Britain to the negotiating table. After the conquest of France in May–June 1940, Churchill's refusal to surrender or to negotiate on terms favorable for Germany put the German gamble in jeopardy. Germany could not match Britain on the open sea and had not prepared its army for operations across the Channel. Instead, the Wehrmacht hoped to strangle Britain's economy through success in the Battle of the Atlantic (1939–1945) and the Battle of Britain (1940).
In June 1941 Germany invaded the USSR (Operation Barbarossa) to carry out the second part of Hitler's strategy. The campaign plan envisaged defeating the USSR in a single summer / fall campaign, but Barbarossa failed to achieve any of its major objectives. In December 1941 Japan attacked the USA and Germany declared war on the USA shortly afterwards. Through the summer and fall of 1942, German strategy to win the war remained based on defeating the USSR.
British: Since the Entente Cordiale which had won the First World War, Britain's strategy for continental war was based on alliance with France and later unsuccessful efforts to engage Fascist Italy and the USSR in an effort to contain Germany. Confronted with the rise of Hitler's power on the continent in 1933, and weakened economically by the Great Depression, Great Britain sought initially to avoid or delay war through diplomacy (Appeasement), while at the same time re-arming (Neville Chamberlain's European Policy). Emphasis for re-armament was given to air forces with the view that these would be most useful in any future war with Germany.
By 1939, Allied efforts to avert war had failed, and Germany had signed alliances with both Italy (Pact of Steel) and the USSR (Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact). In August 1939, in a final effort to contain Germany, Britain and France guaranteed Polish independence (Anglo-Polish military alliance).
Upon the outbreak of war in September 1939, British rearmament was not yet complete, although the Royal Air Force had been greatly expanded and programmes for new aircraft and equipment such as radar defences were just coming to fruition. Britain remained incapable of offensive operations except for strategic bombing, and this was relatively ineffective in the early war.
After the fall of France in mid 1940 and Italian entry into the war on the Axis side, Britain and its commonwealth allies found themselves alone against most of Europe. British strategy was one of survival, defending the British isles directly in the Battle of Britain and indirectly by defeating Germany in the Battle of the Atlantic and the combined Axis powers in the North African Campaign. Through this period, and until the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, there was no possibility of Britain winning the war alone, and so British Grand Strategy aimed to bring the USA into the war on the allied side. Prime Minister Churchill devoted much of his diplomatic efforts to this goal. In August 1941, at the Atlantic Conference he met US President Roosevelt in the first of many wartime meetings wherein allied war strategy was jointly decided.
In December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. Britain was now also at war with imperial Japan, whose forces inflicted rapid defeats on British forces in Asia, capturing Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma. Nevertheless, Churchill expressed the view that with the entry of the USA into the war, ultimate victory was assured for the Allies. "All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force". |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | Through this period, and until the German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, there was no possibility of Britain winning the war alone, and so British Grand Strategy aimed to bring the USA into the war on the allied side. Prime Minister Churchill devoted much of his diplomatic efforts to this goal. In August 1941, at the Atlantic Conference he met US President Roosevelt in the first of many wartime meetings wherein allied war strategy was jointly decided.
In December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered the war. Britain was now also at war with imperial Japan, whose forces inflicted rapid defeats on British forces in Asia, capturing Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma. Nevertheless, Churchill expressed the view that with the entry of the USA into the war, ultimate victory was assured for the Allies. "All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force". From this point onward, the strategy of the Allies, other than the USSR, is better addressed as joint Allied Strategy
European Allies: In the December 1941, at the Arcadia Conference, the Allied leaders agreed to the "Germany first" principle whereby Germany was to be defeated first, and then Japan. However, Allied land forces would not be capable of invading the mainland of Europe for years, even as Joseph Stalin pressed for the western allies to alleviate pressure on the Eastern front. Supporting the Soviet war effort was a significant element of Allied strategy, and significant aid was shipped to the USSR through the Lend-Lease programme.
Strategic warfare, and especially strategic bombing, was a supporting component of Allied strategy. Through 1942 and 1943, the Allies gradually won the war at sea and in the air, blockading Germany and subjecting it to a strategic bombing campaign of increasing effectiveness Strategic bombing during World War II.
In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, the Allies agreed to demand Axis unconditional surrender, a war aim which implied the physical occupation of Germany with land forces. While building up strength for an invasion of continental Europe, the Allies pursued an indirect strategy by invading Europe from the South. After defeating Axis forces in North Africa (the invasion of French North-Africa), Sicily and southern Italy were invaded, leading to the defeat of Fascist Italy. Churchill especially favoured a Southern strategy, aiming to attack the "soft underbelly" of Axis Europe through Italy, Greece and the Balkans in a strategy similar to the First World War idea of "knocking out the supports". Roosevelt favoured a more direct approach through northern Europe, and with the Invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the weight of Allied effort shifted to the direct conquest of Germany.
From 1944, as German defeat became more and more inevitable, the shape of post-war Europe assumed greater importance in Allied strategy. At the Second Quebec Conference in September 1944, the Allies agreed to partition and de-industrialize a defeated Germany so as to render it permanently unable to wage war (see Morgenthau Plan). After the war, this plan was abandoned as unworkable. At the Tehran Conference Allied strategy adopted its final major component with the acceptance of Soviet conditions for a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, to include eastern Germany and Berlin.
Soviet: Early Soviet strategy aimed to avoid or delay war, while developing the central government's hold over the state and expanding the industrial base. Soviet economy and military was weak, but rapidly expanding in an intense industrialization process. The USSR had been overtly hostile to Nazi Germany for most of the pre-war period, but the failure of appeasement convinced Stalin that the Allies were actively seeking a Nazi–Soviet war. The Soviet government doubted that a war against Germany could be avoided. However, negotiations were continued in order to, at the very least, buy time and permit the Soviets to secure the Soviet–German border through expansion and pressure on strategically important states perceived as possible German allies in a future war. The signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact gave the USSR freedom to, in its view, preempt hostile action from nations along its Western border.
The invasion in the Barbarossa campaign of 1941 came earlier than expected to the Soviet leadership, resulting in the catastrophic loss of over 4 million Soviet soldiers killed or captured. Nevertheless, the USSR managed to halt the German advance at the outskirts of Moscow and Leningrad. With spies providing the certain knowledge that Japanese forces in the far east would not attack Siberia, the Soviets were able to transfer large numbers of experienced forces from the far east, and in the Winter of 1941/1942 they used them to counter-attack the German Army Group Centre in front of Moscow.
As the army was being defeated and giving up ground in the initial assault, a gigantic operation was staged to move economic capacity from the Western areas that were about to be overrun, to Eastern regions in the Urals and central Asia that were out of reach of the Germans. Entire factories, including their labour force, were simply moved, and what couldn't be taken was destroyed ("scorched earth"). As a result, even though huge territories were captured by the Germans, the production potential of the Soviet economy was not correspondingly harmed, and the factories shifted to mass production of military equipment quickly. Even before the war, Soviet industrialization had brought Soviet GDP to a level roughly equivalent to Germany. Although a significant part of the urban population had been captured by Germany in the 1941 campaign, the Soviet economy immediately went to a total war footing and was soon outproducing the German economy in war materiel.
It quickly became apparent that the war in the east would be pitiless and total. Soviet strategy was therefore aimed at preserving the state, at whatever cost, and then the ultimate defeat and conquest of Germany. This strategy was successful. By 1943, the USSR was confident in final victory and new aim of Soviet strategy became securing a favourable post-war Europe. At the Tehran Conference of 1943, Stalin secured acquiescence to a Soviet sphere in influence from his western allies.
Japanese: Japanese World War II strategy was driven by two factors: the desire to expand their territories on the mainland of Asia (China and Manchuria), and the need to secure the supply of raw resources they didn't have themselves, particularly oil. Since their quest after the former (conquest of Chinese provinces) endangered the latter (an oil boycott by the US and its allies), the Japanese government saw no other option than to conquer the oil sources in South-East Asia. Since these were controlled by American allies, war with the USA was seen as inevitable; thus, Japanese leaders decided it would be best to deal a severe blow to the U.S. first. This was executed in the Pearl Harbor strike, crippling the American battle fleet.
Japan hoped it would take America so long to rebuild, by the time she was able to return in force in the Pacific, she would consider the new balance of power a fait accompli, and negotiate a peace. However, the attack on Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the crucial targets (aircraft carriers and, most crucially for Japan's ability to hold island bases, submarines) and ignored others (oil tank farms, power station), thus the U.S. Navy was not weakened enough to force withdrawal. The psychological effect also caused the U.S. population and armed forces to fully mobilize for war. South-East Asia was quickly conquered (Philippines, Indochina, Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies). After Japan's vital aircraft carrier force was destroyed in the Battle of Midway, the Japanese had to revert to a stiff defense they kept up for the remainder of the war.
American: With both Japan and the US fighting two-front wars (against each other in the Pacific, and additionally the US in Europe and the Japanese in China), the far greater American economic power enabled the US forces to replace battle losses considerably faster and to eventually outgun the Japanese. In several aircraft carrier battles, the initiative was taken from the Japanese, and after the Battle of Midway, the Japanese navy was rendered helpless, effectively giving the Americans vast naval superiority.
After the Japanese were forced into the defensive in the second half of 1942, the Americans were confronted with heavily fortified garrisons on small islands. They decided on a strategy of "island hopping", leaving the strongest garrisons alone, just cutting off their supply via naval blockades and bombardment, and securing bases of operation on the lightly defended islands instead. The most notable of these island battles was the Battle of Iwo Jima, where the American victory paved the way for the aerial bombing of the Japanese mainland, which culminated in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Bombing of Tokyo that forced Japan to surrender.
Australian: Australia's historical ties with Britain meant that with the commencement of World War II its armies were sent overseas to contribute to battles in Europe. Fear from the north was so understated that at the outbreak of open warfare with Japan, Australia itself was extremely vulnerable to invasion (possible invasion plans were considered by the Japanese high command, though there was strong opposition). Australia's policy became based entirely on domestic defense following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and British assets in the South Pacific. Defying strong British opposition, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin recalled most troops from the European conflict for the defense of the nation.
Australia's defensive doctrine saw a fierce campaign fought along the Kokoda track in New Guinea. This campaign sought to further stretch Japanese supply lines, preventing the invasion of the Australian mainland until the arrival of fresh American troops and the return of seasoned Australian soldiers from Europe. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | Australian: Australia's historical ties with Britain meant that with the commencement of World War II its armies were sent overseas to contribute to battles in Europe. Fear from the north was so understated that at the outbreak of open warfare with Japan, Australia itself was extremely vulnerable to invasion (possible invasion plans were considered by the Japanese high command, though there was strong opposition). Australia's policy became based entirely on domestic defense following the attacks on Pearl Harbor and British assets in the South Pacific. Defying strong British opposition, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin recalled most troops from the European conflict for the defense of the nation.
Australia's defensive doctrine saw a fierce campaign fought along the Kokoda track in New Guinea. This campaign sought to further stretch Japanese supply lines, preventing the invasion of the Australian mainland until the arrival of fresh American troops and the return of seasoned Australian soldiers from Europe. This can be seen as a variant of the war of attrition strategy, where the defender—out of necessity—had to hold the aggressor at a semi-static defensive line, rather than falling back in the face of superior numbers. This method is in stark contrast to the Russian scorched earth policy against Napoleon in 1812, where the defenders yielded home territory in favour of avoiding open battle. In both cases the lack of supplies was successful in blunting the assaults, following exhaustive defensive efforts.
Communist China's strategy: The Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong developed a military strategy called people's war. It aimed at creating and maintaining support of the local population, and draw the enemy deep into the interior where the force adopting the strategy would exhaust them through a mix of guerrilla and conventional warfare.
The strategy was first used by the Communists against the forces of the Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil War in the 1930s. During and after the arduous Long March, the Communist forces, who were dramatically reduced by physical exhaustion, disease and warfare, were in danger of destruction by the pursuing Nationalist forces. Mao then convinced other high-ranking political officers in the party to acquire the support of the local population whilst fighting their way northwards from the Nationalist forces. Shortly thereafter he formulated the concept of people's war, promising land reform programs to the local populace and execution of the local landlords in the areas the Communists control. Using this strategy not only prevented the Communist leadership from collapsing, but also raised popular support across China, which eventually allowed them to take total control over the Chinese mainland.
The people's war is not only a military strategy but also a political one. In its original formulation by Mao Zedong, people's war exploits the few advantages that a small revolutionary movement has against a government's power including a large and well-equipped army. People's war strategically avoids decisive battles, since their tiny military force would easily be routed in an all-out confrontation with the government's army. Instead, it favours a three-stage strategy of protracted warfare, engaging only in carefully chosen battles that can realistically be won. Relying on the local population and using small military units, ensures that there are few problems concerning logistics and supplies.
In stage one, the revolutionary force sets up in a remote area with mountainous or forested terrain where its enemy is weak, and attempts to establish a local stronghold known as a revolutionary base area. As it grows in power, it enters stage two, establishes other revolutionary base areas, where it may exercise governing power and gain popular support through political programmes, such as land reform. Eventually in stage three, the movement has enough strength to encircle and capture cities of increasing size, until finally it seizes power in the entire country.
Within the Chinese Red Army, later to be called as the People's Liberation Army, the concept of People's War was the basis of strategy against the Japanese and Nationalist forces, and also against a hypothetical Russian invasion of China. The concept of people's war became less important with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing possibility of conflict with the United States over Taiwan.
The strategy was utilized in the early 1950s by the hastily formed People's Volunteer Army during the Korean War, to garner support from the local Korean populace to win the war by driving the United Nations forces from the peninsula. At the battles of Chongchon river valley and Lake Changjin, the army employed guerrilla tactics in full scale, following the people's war doctrine. However, as they marched towards the South under Mao's stern orders after their decisive victories in northern Korea, they were met by an indifferent and sometimes hostile Southern population who, despite intimidation, were not willing to help them. This prevented them from defeating the UN forces in Korea and, after their hard-fought victory at the Third Battle of Seoul, they were beaten in the open by UN forces in the conclusion of their Third Phase Campaign. Later on the war turned into a stalemated two-year confrontation between the opposing forces. Thus, years after the war, the Chinese government began a series of army modernization and professionalization that would radically change the concept of the strategy, and in the 1980s and 1990s the concept of people's war was changed to include more high-technology weaponry.
The people's war strategy was also employed in countries around the world such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Nepal, Philippines, the United Kingdom (where the IRA was in rebellion in Northern Ireland and applied this strategy to urban warfare) and elsewhere. The people's war in the first three countries mentioned have been spectacularly successful, marking government transitions in these countries, while elsewhere such as in Peru it has been unsuccessful. The people's war in the Philippines that was long since employed by the insurgent New People's Army, however, made the Communist insurgency there the longest in world history,. In India and Turkey there are still ongoing insurgencies where the rebels use this strategy.
Cold War: The strategy of the Cold War was that of containment, and it was a generation dominated by the threat of total world annihilation through the use of nuclear weapons. Deterrence was a part of containment via retributive intimidation from the risk of mutually assured destruction. As a consequence, it was also a war in which attacks were not exchanged between the two main rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, the war was fought through proxies. Instead of mainly being confined to Europe or the Pacific, the entire world was the battlefield, with countries rather than armies acting as main players. The only constant rule was that troops of the Soviet Union and the United States could not overtly fight with each other. Military strategy involved bipolar powers with global actors who could strike an opponent with nationally debilitating destruction in a matter of minutes from land, air, and sea.
With the advent of weapons of mass destruction that could decide a war by themselves, strategies shifted away from a focus on the application of conventional weaponry to a greater focus on espionage and intelligence assessment, especially after the exposure of the atomic spies.
The difference between tactics, strategy and grand strategy began to melt during the Cold War as command and communication technologies improved to a greater extent, in first world armed forces. The third world armed forces controlled by the two superpowers found that grand strategy, strategy and tactics, if anything, moved further apart as the command of the armies fell under the control of super power leaders.
American cold warriors like Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall quickly recognized that the key to victory was the economic defeat of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had adopted an aggressive posture of Communist expansionism following the end of World War II, with the United States and its strong navy quickly finding that it had to aggressively defend much of the world from the Soviet Union and the spread of communism.
Strategies during the Cold War also dealt with nuclear attack and retaliation. The United States and NATO maintained a policy of limited first strike throughout the Cold War. In the event of a Soviet attack on the Western Front, resulting in a breakthrough, the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the attack. The Soviet Union would respond with an all-out nuclear attack, resulting in a similar attack from the United States, with all the consequences the exchange would entail.
By contrast, Soviet strategy in the Cold War was dominated by the desire to prevent, at all costs, the recurrence of an invasion of Russian soil. The Soviet Union nominally adopted a policy of no first use, which in fact was a posture of launch on warning. Other than that, the USSR adapted to some degree to the prevailing changes in the NATO strategic policies that are divided by periods as:
Strategy of massive retaliation (1950s) (Russian: стратегия массированного возмездия)
Strategy of flexible reaction (1960s) (Russian: стратегия гибкого реагирования)
Strategies of realistic threat and containment (1970s) (Russian: стратегия реалистического устрашения или сдерживания)
Strategy of direct confrontation (1980s) (Russian: стратегия прямого противоборства) one of the elements of which became the new highly effective high-precision targeting weapons.
Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as "Star Wars") during its 1980s development (Russian: стратегическая оборонная инициатива – СОИ) which became a core part of the strategic doctrine based on Defense containment.
The all-out nuclear World War III between NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not take place. The United States recently (April 2010) acknowledged a new approach to its nuclear policy which describes the weapons' purpose as "primarily" or "fundamentally" to deter or respond to a nuclear attack. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military strategy | Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as "Star Wars") during its 1980s development (Russian: стратегическая оборонная инициатива – СОИ) which became a core part of the strategic doctrine based on Defense containment.
The all-out nuclear World War III between NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not take place. The United States recently (April 2010) acknowledged a new approach to its nuclear policy which describes the weapons' purpose as "primarily" or "fundamentally" to deter or respond to a nuclear attack.
Post–Cold War: Strategy in the post Cold War is shaped by the global geopolitical situation: a number of potent powers in a multipolar array which has arguably come to be dominated by the hyperpower status of the United States, which increasingly relies on advanced technology to minimize casualties and to improve efficiency. The technological leaps brought by the Digital Revolution are essential for the U.S. strategy.
The gap in strategy today (from a Western viewpoint) lies in what Americans call "asymmetric warfare": the battle against guerrilla forces by conventional national armed forces. The classical strategic triumvirate of politics/military/populace is very weak against protracted warfare of paramilitary forces such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, ETA, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and Al-Qaeda. The ability of conventional forces to deliver utility (effect) from their hugely powerful forces is largely nullified by the difficulties of distinguishing and separating combatants from the civilian populace in whose company they hide. The use of the military by the politicians to police areas seen as bases for these guerrillas leads to them becoming targets themselves which eventually undermines the support of the populace from whom they come and whose values they represent.
Parties to conflict which see themselves as vastly or temporarily inferior may adopt a strategy of "hunkering down" – witness Iraq in 1991 or Yugoslavia in 1999.
The primary effect of insurgent elements upon conventional force strategy is realized in the twofold exploitation of the inherent violence of military operations. Conventional armies face political attrition for each action they take. Insurgent forces can cause harm and create chaos (whereby the conventional army suffers a loss of confidence and esteem); or they can drive the conventional elements into an attack which further exacerbates the civilian condition.
The major militaries of today are largely set up to fight the "last war" (previous war) and hence have huge armoured and conventionally configured infantry formations backed up by air-forces and navies designed to support or prepare for these forces. Many are today deployed against guerrilla-style opponents where their strengths cannot be used to effect. The mass formations of industrial warfare are often seen as much less effective than the unconventional forces that modern militaries may also possess. The new opponents operate at a local level, whereas industrial armed forces work at a much higher "theatre" level. The nervous system of these new opponents is largely political rather than military-hierarchical and adapted to the local supporting populace who hide them. The centre provides the political idea and driving logic, perhaps with overall direction and some funding. Local groups decide their own plans, raise much of their own funding and may be more or less aligned to the centre's aims. Defeat of guerilla forces (when revealed) does not disable this type of organisation, many modern attack strategies will tend to increase the power of the group they intend to weaken. A new more political strategy is perhaps more appropriate here – with military backing. Such a strategy has been illustrated in the war against the IRA, though an adoption and codification are unclear.
Netwar: A main point in asymmetric warfare is the nature of paramilitary organizations such as Al-Qaeda which are involved in guerrilla military actions but which are not traditional organizations with a central authority defining their military and political strategies. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda may exist as a sparse network of groups lacking central coordination, making them more difficult to confront following standard strategic approaches. This new field of strategic thinking is tackled by what is now defined as netwar.
See also:
References:
Notes:
Bibliography: Brands, Hal, ed. The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (2023) excerpt, 46 essays by experts on ideas of famous strategists; 1200 pp
Carpenter, Stanley D. M., Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642–1651: The Genius of This Age, Routledge, 2005.
Chaliand, Gérard, The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age, University of California Press, 1994.
Gartner, Scott Sigmund, Strategic Assessment in War, Yale University Press, 1999.
Heuser, Beatrice, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2010), ISBN 978-0-521-19968-1.
Matloff, Maurice, (ed.), American Military History: 1775–1902, volume 1, Combined Books, 1996.
May, Timothy. The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2007. ISBN 978-1844154760.
Wilden, Anthony, Man and Woman, War and Peace: The Strategist's Companion, Routledge, 1987.
Further reading: The US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute publishes several dozen papers and books yearly focusing on current and future military strategy and policy, national security, and global and regional strategic issues. Most publications are relevant to the International strategic community, both academically and militarily. All are freely available to the public in PDF format. The organization was founded by General Dwight D. Eisenhower after World War II.
Black, Jeremy, Introduction to Global Military History: 1775 to the Present Day, Routledge Press, 2005.
D'Aguilar, G.C., Napoleon's Military Maxims, free ebook, Napoleon's Military Maxims.
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History (2013) excerpt
Holt, Thaddeus, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War, Simon and Schuster, June, 2004, hardcover, 1184 pages, ISBN 0-7432-5042-7.
Tomes, Robert R., US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973–2003, Routledge Press, 2007. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military supply-chain management | Terminology: A supply involves the procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. United States Department of Defense definitions refer to a "producer phase" and a "consumer phase":
the producer phase of a military supply extends from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the military services
the consumer phase of a military supply extends from receipt of finished supplies by the military services, through issue for use or consumption.
A supply chain is a set of linked activities associated with providing material from a raw material stage to an end user as a finished good.
Supply control is the process by which an item of supply is controlled within the supply system, including requisitioning, receipt, storage, stock control, shipment, disposition, identification, and accounting.
A supply point is a location where supplies, services and materials are located and issued. As a single moving entity, a supply point location is temporary and mobile, normally being occupied for up to 72 hours.
Sub-suppliers are those suppliers who provide materials to other suppliers within the supply chain. In other supply chain management contexts they are referred to by tier, second-tier suppliers serving first-tier suppliers, etc. The European Union refers to sub-suppliers in its objective to improve cross-border market access in the defence sector.
Logistics: Military logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of armed forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.
The main difference between the concept of logistic management and supply-chain management is the level of information gathered, processes, analysed and used for decision making. An SCM-based organization not only having concerns with its immediate clients but also handles and forecasts the factors affecting directly or indirectly their supplier or suppliers or on their client or clients. If we exclude this information part out of supply chain model then we can see the logistic management part of the business.
Limitations of military supply chain: Unlike standard supply-chain management practices world-wide, some major concepts are not supported in the military domain. For example, the "just-in-time" (JIT) model emphasizes holding less (or no) inventory, whereas in military supply chains, due to the high costs of a stock-out (potentially placing lives in danger), keeping huge inventory is a more acceptable practice. Some examples of these are the ammunition dump and oil depot.
Likewise, the military procurement process has much different criteria than the normal business procurement process. Military needs call for reliability of supply during both peace and war, as compared to price and technological factors.
See also: Ammunition dump
Loss of Strength Gradient
Principles of sustainment
Supply-chain management
References:
External links: Department of Defense - Supply Chain Material Management Regulation |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military tactics | Tactical functions:
Kinetic or firepower: Beginning with the use of melee and missile weapons such as clubs and spears, the kinetic or firepower function of tactics has developed along with technological advances so that the emphasis has shifted over time from the close-range melee and missile weapons to longer-range projectile weapons. Kinetic effects were generally delivered by the sword, spear, javelin and bow until the introduction of artillery by the Romans. Until the mid 19th century, the value of infantry-delivered missile firepower was not high, meaning that the result of a given battle was rarely decided by infantry firepower alone, often relying on artillery to deliver significant kinetic effects. The development of disciplined volley fire, delivered at close range, began to improve the hitting power of infantry, and compensated in part for the limited range, poor accuracy and low rate of fire of early muskets. Advances in technology, particularly the introduction of the rifled musket, used in the Crimean War and American Civil War, meant flatter trajectories and improved accuracy at greater ranges, along with higher casualties. The resulting increase in defensive firepower meant infantry attacks without artillery support became increasingly difficult. Firepower also became crucial to fixing an enemy in place to allow a decisive strike. Machine guns added significantly to infantry firepower at the turn of the 20th century, and the mobile firepower provided by tanks, self-propelled artillery and military aircraft rose significantly in the century that followed. Along with infantry weapons, tanks and other armoured vehicles, self-propelled artillery, guided weapons and aircraft provide the firepower of modern armies.
Mobility: Mobility, which determines how quickly a fighting force can move, was for most of human history limited by the speed of a soldier on foot, even when supplies were carried by beasts of burden. With this restriction, most armies could not travel more than 32 kilometres (20 mi) per day, unless travelling on rivers. Only small elements of a force such as cavalry or specially trained light troops could exceed this limit. This restriction on tactical mobility remained until the latter years of World War I when the advent of the tank improved mobility sufficiently to allow decisive tactical manoeuvre. Despite this advance, full tactical mobility was not achieved until World War II when armoured and motorised formations achieved remarkable successes. However, large elements of the armies of World War II remained reliant on horse-drawn transport, which limited tactical mobility within the overall force. Tactical mobility can be limited by the use of field obstacles, often created by military engineers.
Protection and security: Personal armour has been worn since the classical period to provide a measure of individual protection, which was also extended to include barding of the mount. The limitations of armour have always been weight and bulk, and its consequent effects on mobility as well as human and animal endurance. By the 18th and 19th centuries, personal armour had been largely discarded, until the re-introduction of helmets during World War I in response to the firepower of artillery. Armoured fighting vehicles proliferated during World War II, and after that war, body armour returned for the infantry, particularly in Western armies. Fortifications, which have been used since ancient times, provide collective protection, and modern examples include entrenchments, roadblocks, barbed wire and minefields. Like obstacles, fortifications are often created by military engineers.
Shock action: Shock action is as much a psychological function of tactics as a physical one, and can be significantly enhanced by the use of surprise. It has been provided by charging infantry, and as well as by chariots, war elephants, cavalry and armoured vehicles which provide momentum to an assault. It has also been used in a defensive way, for example by the drenching flights of arrows from English longbowmen at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 which caused the horses of the French knights to panic. During early modern warfare, the use of the tactical formations of columns and lines had a greater effect than the firepower of the formations alone. During the early stages of World War II, the combined effects of German machine gun and tank gun firepower, enhanced by accurate indirect fire and air attack, often broke up Allied units before their assault commenced, or caused them to falter due to casualties among key unit leaders. In both the early modern and World War II examples, the cumulative psychological shock effect on the enemy was often greater than the actual casualties incurred.
Development over time: The development of tactics has involved a shifting balance between the four tactical functions since ancient times, and changes in firepower and mobility have been fundamental to these changes. Various models have been proposed to explain the interaction between the tactical functions and the dominance of individual fighting arms during different periods. J. F. C. Fuller proposed three "tactical cycles" in each of the classical and Christian eras. For the latter epoch, he proposed a "shock" cycle between 650 and 1450, a "shock and projectile" cycle 1450–1850, and a "projectile" cycle from 1850, with respect to the Western and North American warfare. During World War II, Tom Wintringham proposed six chronological periods, which alternate the dominance between unarmoured and armoured forces and highlight tactical trends in each period.
Massed volley fire by archers brought infantry firepower to the fore in Japanese warfare in the second half of the 13th century, preceding the rise of the English longbowman. The mobility and shock action of the Oirat Mongol army at the Battle of Tumu in 1449 demonstrated that cavalry could still defeat a large infantry force. In both the European and Oriental traditions of warfare, the advent of gunpowder during the late Medieval and Early Modern periods created a relentless shift to infantry firepower becoming "a decisive, if not dominant" arm on the battlefield, exemplified by the significant impact of massed arquebusiers at the Battle of Nagashino in 1575.
Combined arms tactics: The synchronisation of the various fighting arms to achieve the tactical mission is known as combined arms tactics. One method of measuring tactical effectiveness is the extent to which the arms, including military aviation, are integrated on the battlefield. A key principle of effective combined arms tactics is that for maximum potential to be achieved, all elements of combined arms teams need the same level of mobility, and sufficient firepower and protection. The history of the development of combined arms tactics has been dogged by costly and painful lessons. For example, while German commanders in World War II clearly understood from the outset the key principle of combined arms tactics outlined above, British commanders were late to this realisation. Successful combined arms tactics require the fighting arms to train alongside each other and to be familiar with each other's capabilities.
Impact of air power: Beginning in the latter stages of World War I, airpower has brought a significant change to military tactics. World War II saw the development of close air support which greatly enhanced the effect of ground forces with the use of aerial firepower and improved tactical reconnaissance and the interdiction of hostile air power. It also made possible the supply of ground forces by air, achieved by the British during the Burma Campaign but unsuccessful for the Germans at the Battle of Stalingrad. Following World War II, rotary-wing aircraft had a significant impact on firepower and mobility, comprising a fighting arm in its own right in many armies. Aircraft, particularly those operating at low or medium altitudes, remain vulnerable to ground-based air defence systems as well as other aircraft.
Parachute and glider operations and rotary-wing aircraft have provided significant mobility to ground forces but the reduced mobility, protection and firepower of troops delivered by air once landed has limited the tactical utility of such vertical envelopment or air assault operations. This was demonstrated during Operation Market Garden in September 1944, and during the Vietnam War, in the latter case despite the additional firepower provided by helicopter gunships and the ability quickly to remove casualties, provided by aeromedical evacuation.
Concept: Military tactics answer the questions of how best to deploy and employ forces on a small scale. Some practices have not changed since the dawn of warfare: assault, ambushes, skirmishing, turning flanks, reconnaissance, creating and using obstacles and defenses, etc. Using ground to best advantage has not changed much either. Heights, rivers, swamps, passes, choke points, and natural cover, can all be used in multiple ways. Before the nineteenth century, many military tactics were confined to battlefield concerns: how to maneuver units during combat in open terrain. Nowadays, specialized tactics exist for many situations, for example for securing a room in a building.
Technological changes can render existing tactics obsolete, and sociological changes can shift the goals and methods of warfare, requiring new tactics. Tactics define how soldiers are armed and trained. Thus technology and society influence the development of types of soldiers or warriors through history: Greek hoplite, Roman legionary, medieval knight, Turk-Mongol horse archer, Chinese crossbowman, or an air cavalry trooper. Each – constrained by his weaponry, logistics and social conditioning – would use a battlefield differently, but would usually seek the same outcomes from their use of tactics. The First World War forced great changes in tactics as advances in technology rendered prior tactics useless.
"Gray-zone" tactics are also becoming more widely used. These include "everything from strong-arm diplomacy and economic coercion, to media manipulation and cyberattacks, to use of paramilitaries and proxy forces". The title "gray-zone" comes from the ambiguity between defense vs. offense, as well as the ambiguity between peace-keeping vs. war effort. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military tactics | Tactics define how soldiers are armed and trained. Thus technology and society influence the development of types of soldiers or warriors through history: Greek hoplite, Roman legionary, medieval knight, Turk-Mongol horse archer, Chinese crossbowman, or an air cavalry trooper. Each – constrained by his weaponry, logistics and social conditioning – would use a battlefield differently, but would usually seek the same outcomes from their use of tactics. The First World War forced great changes in tactics as advances in technology rendered prior tactics useless.
"Gray-zone" tactics are also becoming more widely used. These include "everything from strong-arm diplomacy and economic coercion, to media manipulation and cyberattacks, to use of paramilitaries and proxy forces". The title "gray-zone" comes from the ambiguity between defense vs. offense, as well as the ambiguity between peace-keeping vs. war effort.
See also: List of military tactics
Combat arms
References:
Notes:
Bibliography: Haskew, Michael; Jorgensen, Christer; McNab, Chris; Niderost, Eric; Rice, Rob S. (2008). Fighting Techniques of the Oriental World 1200-1860: Equipment, Combat Skills and Tactics. London, United Kingdom: Amber Books. ISBN 978-1-905704-96-5.
Holmes, Richard; Strachan, Hew; Bellamy, Chris; Bicheno, Hugh (2001). The Oxford Companion to Military History. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-866209-9.
Johnson, Rob; Whitby, Michael; France, John (2010). How to win on the battlefield : 25 key tactics to outwit, outflank, and outfight the enemy. Thames & Hudson. ISBN 978-0-500-25161-4.
Muhm, Gerhard. "German Tactics in the Italian Campaign". Archived from the original on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 27 September 2007.
Gerhard Muhm : La Tattica nella campagna d’Italia, in LINEA GOTICA AVAMPOSTO DEI BALCANI, (Hrsg.) Amedeo Montemaggi - Edizioni Civitas, Roma 1993.
External links: Contemporary Marine tactics for war fighting
Napoleon's tactics and strategy
Small Unit Actions during German Campaign in Russia |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military technology | History: This section is divided into the broad cultural developments that affected military technology.
Ancient technology: The first use of stone tools may have begun during the Paleolithic Period. The earliest stone tools are from the site of Lomekwi, Turkana, dating from 3.3 million years ago. Stone tools diversified through the Pleistocene Period, which ended ~12,000 years ago.
The earliest evidence of warfare between two groups is recorded at the site of Nataruk in Turkana, Kenya, where human skeletons with major traumatic injuries to the head, neck, ribs, knees and hands, including an embedded obsidian bladelet on a skull, are evidence of inter-group conflict between groups of nomadic hunter-gatherers 10,000 years ago.
Humans entered the Bronze Age as they learned to smelt copper into an alloy with tin to make weapons. In Asia where copper-tin ores are rare, this development was delayed until trading in bronze began in the third millennium BCE. In the Middle East and Southern European regions, the Bronze Age follows the Neolithic period, but in other parts of the world, the Copper Age is a transition from Neolithic to the Bronze Age. Although the Iron Age generally follows the Bronze Age, in some areas the Iron Age intrudes directly on the Neolithic from outside the region, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa where it was developed independently.
The first large-scale use of iron weapons began in Asia Minor around the 14th century BCE and in Central Europe around the 11th century BCE followed by the Middle East (about 1000 BCE) and India and China.
The Assyrians are credited with the introduction of horse cavalry in warfare and the extensive use of iron weapons by 1100 BCE. Assyrians were also the first to use iron-tipped arrows.
Post-classical technology: The Wujing Zongyao (Essentials of the Military Arts), written by Zeng Gongliang, Ding Du, and others at the order of Emperor Renzong around 1043 during the Song dynasty illustrate the eras focus on advancing intellectual issues and military technology due to the significance of warfare between the Song and the Liao, Jin, and Yuan to their north. The book covers topics of military strategy, training, and the production and employment of advanced weaponry.
Advances in military technology aided the Song dynasty in its defense against hostile neighbors to the north. The flamethrower found its origins in Byzantine-era Greece, employing Greek fire (a chemically complex, highly flammable petrol fluid) in a device with a siphon hose by the 7th century.: 77 The earliest reference to Greek Fire in China was made in 917, written by Wu Renchen in his Spring and Autumn Annals of the Ten Kingdoms.: 80 In 919, the siphon projector-pump was used to spread the 'fierce fire oil' that could not be doused with water, as recorded by Lin Yu in his Wuyue Beishi, hence the first credible Chinese reference to the flamethrower employing the chemical solution of Greek fire (see also Pen Huo Qi).: 81 Lin Yu mentioned also that the 'fierce fire oil' derived ultimately from one of China's maritime contacts in the 'southern seas', Arabia Dashiguo.: 82 In the Battle of Langshan Jiang in 919, the naval fleet of the Wenmu King from Wuyue defeated a Huainan army from the Wu state; Wenmu's success was facilitated by the use of 'fire oil' ('huoyou') to burn their fleet, signifying the first Chinese use of gunpowder in a battle.: 81–83 The Chinese applied the use of double-piston bellows to pump petrol out of a single cylinder (with an upstroke and downstroke), lit at the end by a slow-burning gunpowder match to fire a continuous stream of flame.: 82 This device was featured in description and illustration of the Wujing Zongyao military manuscript of 1044.: 82 In the suppression of the Southern Tang state by 976, early Song naval forces confronted them on the Yangtze River in 975. Southern Tang forces attempted to use flamethrowers against the Song navy, but were accidentally consumed by their own fire when violent winds swept in their direction.: 89
Although the destructive effects of gunpowder were described in the earlier Tang dynasty by a Daoist alchemist, the earliest developments of the gun barrel and the projectile-fire cannon were found in late Song China. The first art depiction of the Chinese 'fire lance' (a combination of a temporary-fire flamethrower and gun) was from a Buddhist mural painting of Dunhuang, dated circa 950. These 'fire-lances' were widespread in use by the early 12th century, featuring hollowed bamboo poles as tubes to fire sand particles (to blind and choke), lead pellets, bits of sharp metal and pottery shards, and finally large gunpowder-propelled arrows and rocket weaponry.: 220–221 Eventually, perishable bamboo was replaced with hollow tubes of cast iron, and so too did the terminology of this new weapon change, from 'fire-spear' huo qiang to 'fire-tube' huo tong.: 221 This ancestor to the gun was complemented by the ancestor to the cannon, what the Chinese referred to since the 13th century as the 'multiple bullets magazine erupter' bai zu lian zhu pao, a tube of bronze or cast iron that was filled with about 100 lead balls.: 263–264
The earliest known depiction of a gun is a sculpture from a cave in Sichuan, dating to 1128, that portrays a figure carrying a vase-shaped bombard, firing flames and a cannonball. However, the oldest existent archaeological discovery of a metal barrel handgun is from the Chinese Heilongjiang excavation, dated to 1288.: 293 The Chinese also discovered the explosive potential of packing hollowed cannonball shells with gunpowder. Written later by Jiao Yu in his Huolongjing (mid-14th century), this manuscript recorded an earlier Song-era cast-iron cannon known as the 'flying-cloud thunderclap eruptor' (fei yun pi-li pao). The manuscript stated that:
As noted before, the change in terminology for these new weapons during the Song period were gradual. The early Song cannons were at first termed the same way as the Chinese trebuchet catapult. A later Ming dynasty scholar known as Mao Yuanyi would explain this use of terminology and true origins of the cannon in his text of the Wubei Zhi, written in 1628:
The 14th-century Huolongjing was also one of the first Chinese texts to carefully describe to the use of explosive land mines, which had been used by the late Song Chinese against the Mongols in 1277, and employed by the Yuan dynasty afterwards. The innovation of the detonated land mine was accredited to one Luo Qianxia in the campaign of defense against the Mongol invasion by Kublai Khan,: 192 Later Chinese texts revealed that the Chinese land mine employed either a rip cord or a motion booby trap of a pin releasing falling weights that rotated a steel flint wheel, which in turn created sparks that ignited the train of fuses for the land mines.: 199 Furthermore, the Song employed the earliest known gunpowder-propelled rockets in warfare during the late 13th century,: 477 its earliest form being the archaic Fire Arrow. When the Northern Song capital of Kaifeng fell to the Jurchens in 1126, it was written by Xia Shaozeng that 20,000 fire arrows were handed over to the Jurchens in their conquest. An even earlier Chinese text of the Wujing Zongyao ("Collection of the Most Important Military Techniques"), written in 1044 by the Song scholars Zeng Kongliang and Yang Weide, described the use of three spring or triple bow arcuballista that fired arrow bolts holding gunpowder packets near the head of the arrow.: 154 Going back yet even farther, the Wu Li Xiao Shi (1630, second edition 1664) of Fang Yizhi stated that fire arrows were presented to Emperor Taizu of Song (r. 960–976) in 960.
Modern technology:
Armies: The Islamic gunpowder empires introduced numerous developed firearms, cannon and small arms. During the period of Proto-industrialization, newly invented weapons were seen to be used in Mughal India.
Rapid development in military technology had a dramatic impact on armies and navies in the industrialized world in 1740–1914. For land warfare, cavalry faded in importance, while infantry became transformed by the use of highly accurate more rapidly loading rifles, and the use of smokeless powder. Machine guns were developed in the 1860s in Europe. Rocket artillery and the Mysorean rockets were pioneered by Indian Muslim ruler Tipu Sultan and the French introduced much more accurate rapid-fire field artillery. Logistics and communications support for land warfare dramatically improved with use of railways and telegraphs. Industrialization provided a base of factories that could be converted to produce munitions, as well as uniforms, tents, wagons and essential supplies. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military technology | During the period of Proto-industrialization, newly invented weapons were seen to be used in Mughal India.
Rapid development in military technology had a dramatic impact on armies and navies in the industrialized world in 1740–1914. For land warfare, cavalry faded in importance, while infantry became transformed by the use of highly accurate more rapidly loading rifles, and the use of smokeless powder. Machine guns were developed in the 1860s in Europe. Rocket artillery and the Mysorean rockets were pioneered by Indian Muslim ruler Tipu Sultan and the French introduced much more accurate rapid-fire field artillery. Logistics and communications support for land warfare dramatically improved with use of railways and telegraphs. Industrialization provided a base of factories that could be converted to produce munitions, as well as uniforms, tents, wagons and essential supplies. Medical facilities were enlarged and reorganized based on improved hospitals and the creation of modern nursing, typified by Florence Nightingale in Britain during the Crimean War of 1854–56.
Naval: Naval warfare was transformed by many innovations, most notably the coal-based steam engine, highly accurate long-range naval guns, heavy steel armour for battleships, mines, and the introduction of the torpedo, followed by the torpedo boat and the destroyer. Coal after 1900 was eventually displaced by more efficient oil, but meanwhile navies with an international scope had to depend on a network of coaling stations to refuel. The British Empire provided them in abundance, as did the French Empire to a lesser extent. War colleges developed, as military theory became a specialty; cadets and senior commanders were taught the theories of Jomini, Clausewitz and Mahan, and engaged in tabletop war games. Around 1900, entirely new innovations such as submarines and airplanes appeared, and were quickly adapted to warfare by 1914. The British HMS Dreadnought (1906) incorporated so much of the latest technology in weapons, propulsion and armour that it at a stroke made all other battleships obsolescent.
Organization and finance: New financial tools were developed to fund the rapidly increasing costs of warfare, such as popular bond sales and income taxes, and the funding of permanent research centers. Many 19th century innovations were largely invented and promoted by lone individuals with small teams of assistants, such as David Bushnell and the submarine, John Ericsson and the battleship, Hiram Maxim and the machine gun, and Alfred Nobel and high explosives. By 1900 the military began to realize that they needed to rely much more heavily on large-scale research centers, which needed government funding. They brought in leaders of organized innovation such as Thomas Edison in the U.S. and chemist Fritz Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Germany.
Postmodern technology: The postmodern stage of military technology emerged in the 1940s, and one with recognition thanks to the high priority given during the war to scientific and engineering research and development regarding nuclear weapons, radar, jet engines, proximity fuses, advanced submarines, aircraft carriers, and other weapons. The high-priority continues into the 21st century. It involves the military application of advanced scientific research regarding nuclear weapons, jet engines, ballistic and guided missiles, radar, biological warfare, and the use of electronics, computers and software.
Space: During the Cold War, the world's two great superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States of America – spent large proportions of their GDP on developing military technologies. The drive to place objects in orbit stimulated space research and started the Space Race. In 1957, the USSR launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1.
By the end of the 1960s, both countries regularly deployed satellites. Spy satellites were used by militaries to take accurate pictures of their rivals' military installations. As time passed the resolution and accuracy of orbital reconnaissance alarmed both sides of the Iron Curtain. Both the United States and the Soviet Union began to develop anti-satellite weapons to blind or destroy each other's satellites. Laser weapons, kamikaze style satellites, as well as orbital nuclear explosion were researched with varying levels of success. Spy satellites were, and continue to be, used to monitor the dismantling of military assets in accordance with arms control treaties signed between the two superpowers. To use spy satellites in such a manner is often referred to in treaties as "national technical means of verification".
The superpowers developed ballistic missiles to enable them to use nuclear weaponry across great distances. As rocket science developed, the range of missiles increased and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) were created, which could strike virtually any target on Earth in a timeframe measured in minutes rather than hours or days. To cover large distances ballistic missiles are usually launched into sub-orbital spaceflight.
As soon as intercontinental missiles were developed, military planners began programmes and strategies to counter their effectiveness.
Mobilization: A significant portion of military technology is about transportation, allowing troops and weaponry to be moved from their origins to the front. Land transport has historically been mainly by foot, land vehicles have usually been used as well, from chariots to tanks.
When conducting a battle over a body of water, ships are used. There are historically two main categories of ships: those for transporting troops, and those for attacking other ships.
Soon after the invention of aeroplanes, military aviation became a significant component of warfare, though usually as a supplementary role. The two main types of military aircraft are bombers, which attack land- or sea-based targets, and fighters, which attack other aircraft.
Military vehicles are land combat or transportation vehicles, excluding rail-based, which are designed for or in significant use by military forces.
List of military vehicles
List of armoured fighting vehicles
List of tanks
Military aircraft includes any use of aircraft by a country's military, including such areas as transport, training, disaster relief, border patrol, search and rescue, surveillance, surveying, peacekeeping, and (very rarely) aerial warfare.
List of aircraft
List of aircraft weapons
Warships are watercraft for combat and transportation in and on seas and oceans.
Submarines
Complex masting and sail systems found on warships during the Age of Sail
List of historical ship and boat types
List of aircraft carriers
List of submarine classes
Defence: Fortifications are military constructions and buildings designed for defence in warfare. They range in size and age from the Great Wall of China to a Sangar.
List of fortifications
List of forts
Sensors and communication: Sensors and communication systems are used to detect enemies, coordinate movements of armed forces and guide weaponry. Early systems included flag signaling, telegraph and heliographs.
Laser guidance
Missile guidance
Norden Bombsight
Proximity fuse
Radar
Satellite guidance in guidance weapons
Future technology: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is an agency of the United States Department of Defense responsible for the development of new technologies for use by the military. DARPA leads the development of military technology in the United States and today, has dozens of ongoing projects; everything from humanoid robots to bullets that can change path before reaching their target. China has a similar agency.
Emerging territory: Current militaries continue to invest in new technologies for the future. Such technologies include cognitive radar, 5G cellular networks, microchips, semiconductors, and large scale analytic engines.
Additionally, many militaries seek to improve current laser technology. For example, Israeli Defense Forces utilize laser technology to disable small enemy machinery, but seek to move to more large scale capabilities in the coming years.
Militaries across the world continue to perform research on autonomous technologies which allow for increased troop mobility or replacement of live soldiers. Autonomous vehicles and robots are expected to play a role in future conflicts; this has the potential to decrease loss of life in future warfare. Observers of transhumanism note high rates of technological terms in military literature, but low rates for explicitly transhuman-related terms.
Today's hybrid style of warfare also calls for investments in information technologies. Increased reliance on computer systems has incentivized nations to push for increased efforts at managing large scale networks and having access to large scale data.
New strategies of cyber and hybrid warfare includes, network attacks, media analysis, and media/ grass-roots campaigns on medias such as blog posts
Cyberspace: In 2011, the US Defense Department declared cyberspace a new domain of warfare; since then DARPA has begun a research project known as "Project X" with the goal of creating new technologies that will enable the government to better understand and map the cyber territory. Ultimately giving the Department of Defense the ability to plan and manage large-scale cyber missions across dynamic network environments.
See also: List of military inventions
List of emerging military technologies
Bellifortis, late medieval treatise on military technology.
Materiel
References:
Further reading: Andrade, Tonio. The Gunpowder Age: China, military innovation, and the rise of the West in world history (Princeton UP, 2016).
Black, Jeremy. Tools of War (2007) covers 50 major inventions. excerpt
Boot, Max. War made new: technology, warfare, and the course of history, 1500 to today (Penguin, 2006).
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Arms and Armour" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 2 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 582–590. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military technology | See also: List of military inventions
List of emerging military technologies
Bellifortis, late medieval treatise on military technology.
Materiel
References:
Further reading: Andrade, Tonio. The Gunpowder Age: China, military innovation, and the rise of the West in world history (Princeton UP, 2016).
Black, Jeremy. Tools of War (2007) covers 50 major inventions. excerpt
Boot, Max. War made new: technology, warfare, and the course of history, 1500 to today (Penguin, 2006).
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Arms and Armour" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 2 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 582–590.
Cockburn, Andrew, 'The A-10 saved my ass' (review of Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers, Yale, May 2023, 549 pp., ISBN 978 0 300 23409 1), London Review of Books, vol. 46, no.46 (21 March 2024), pp. 39–41. The reviewer gives many examples of the military superiority of granting low-level commanders decision-making initiative, over the most expensive and technologically-advanced weaponry. "Money is lavished on advanced weapons systems whose effectiveness is questionable, and which are vastly expensive to maintain.... At any one time, 40 per cent of the US navy's attack submarines are out of commission for repairs.... Krepinevich... prefers to dwell on the urgent necessity of developing increasingly fantastical programmes: hypersonics, genetic engineering, quantum computing and of course AI.... All the wonders of precision targeting and comprehensive surveillance notwithstanding, the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea is as effectively disruptive as ever." (p. 41.)
Dupuy, Trevor N. The evolution of weapons and warfare (1984), 350pp, cover 2000 BC to late 20th century.
Ellis, John. The Social History of the Machine Gun (1986).
Gabriel, Richard A., and Karen S. Metz. From Sumer to Rome: The Military capabilities of ancient armies (ABC-CLIO, 1991).
Hacker, Barton (2005). "The Machines of War: Western Military Technology 1850–2000". History & Technology. 21 (3): 255–300. doi:10.1080/07341510500198669. S2CID 144113139.
Levy, Jack S (1984). "The offensive/defensive balance of military technology: A theoretical and historical analysis". International Studies Quarterly. 28 (2): 219–238. doi:10.2307/2600696. JSTOR 2600696.
McNeill, William H. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 (1984).
Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (1988).
Steele, Brett D. and Tamara Dorland. Heirs of Archimedes: Science & the Art of War through the Age of Enlightenment (2005) 397 pp. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military theory | Use of Military Theory: Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, 'The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in examining the questions clearly and simply and expect the reader to share one's views.' Military Theory informs the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. It does so by contributing to knowledge on the subjects of war and warfare. This aids in understanding why and when force is used and what forms the use of force may take. It also aids in identifying and explaining practical outcomes to help determine how force may be applied. Military theories, especially since the 19th Century AD, attempt to encapsulate the complex cultural, political and economic relationships between societies and the conflicts they create.
Categories of Military Theory
Military Theories can be divided into several categories. First, theories may be codified by their relevant level of War:
Grand Strategic Theory
Strategic Theory
Operational Theory
Tactical Theory
Second, they may be categorised by environment or domain, such as:
General, National Military Power Theory
Integrated and or Joint Theory
Land Power or Continental Theory
Sea Power or Naval and Maritime Theory
Air Power or Aeronautical Theory
Space Power or Astronautical Theory
Cyber Power Theory
Information Power Theory
Third, a theory may be developed for a particular form of warfare, such as:
Naval Warfare Theory
Surface Warfare Theory
Anti-Submarine Warfare Theory
Land Warfare Theory
Armoured Warfare Theory
Airborne Warfare Theory
Amphibious Warfare Theory
Air Warfare Theory
Anti-Aircraft Warfare Theory
Psychological Warfare Theory
Cyber Warfare Theory
Space Warfare Theory
Nuclear Warfare Theory
Biological Warfare Theory
Chemical Warfare Theory
Regular Warfare Theory
Irregular Warfare Theory
Combined Arms Warfare Theory
Manoeuvre Theory
Attrition Theory
Conventional Warfare Theory
Unconventional Warfare Theory
Counterinsurgency Theory
Counterterrorism Theory
Military Theorists: Theories and conceptions of warfare have varied throughout human history. There have been many military theorists throughout history, such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Onasander, Frontinus, Aelian, Vegetius, Maurice, Leo VI, Machiavelli, Lloyd, Suvorov, Berenhorst, Bülow, de Saxe, Clausewitz, Jomini, Calwell, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Fuller, Liddell-Hart, Wylie, Brodie, Luttwak, Schelling, Howard, Freedman, Boyd, Lind, Creveld, Gat, Hammes, Hoffman, Kilcullen and Gray in Western military circles; each have helped lay the foundations for our contemporary understanding of policy, strategy, operational art, tactics, command and control, intelligence and logistics.
See also: Military doctrine
Military science
List of military writers
References: Notes
Bibliography
Angstrom, Jan and Widen, J.J. (2015) Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-08072-6
Clausewitz, Carl von (1976). On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Revised 1984 ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-05657-9.
Evans, Michael, (2004), Land Warfare Studies Centre Study Paper No. 305, The Continental School of Strategy: The Past, Present and Future of Land Power, Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre. ISBN 0642296014.
Gray, Colin S. (2010). The Strategy Bridge-Theory for Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-957966-2
Lider, Julian (1980). 'Introduction to Military Theory', Cooperation and Conflict, XV, 151-168.
Lider, Julian (1983). Military Theory: Concept, Structure and Problems (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-312-53240-6
Oliviero, Charles. (2022) Strategia-A Primer on Theory and Strategy for Students of War. Toronto: Double Dagger. ISBN 978-1-990644-24-5
Sun Tzu (2003). The Art of War. New York City: Barnes & Noble Books. ISBN 978-1-59308-016-7.
Vego, Milan (2011). 'On Military Theory', Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 3, Issue 62, p 59-67.
Yarger, Harry R. (2006). Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy. Leavenworth: US Army War College War College Press. ISBN 1-58487-233-0
External links: Media related to Military theory at Wikimedia Commons |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military tradition | In Europe: In Europe, tradition was a principle of military culture that had evolved out of the Middle Ages' concept of chivalry.
Within Europe a wide variety of separate military traditions developed until at least World War I. Subsequently, major political and social changes have tended to break-down the historical continuity that had been a source of military tradition in many armies.
In the United Kingdom: In Britain, military traditions developed primarily along regimental lines, taking the form of long-established regimental customs, insignia, badges and distinctive features of uniform. Since the late 1960s, a series of regimental mergers and disbandments have diluted British military tradition, although it still remains strong in the Guards Division.
In Germany: In Prussia and the German Empire, states relied on their own history to maintain military traditions, although some specific regiments within elite formations did maintain distinctive customs and items of dress. For example, one regiment, the Potsdam Grenadiers, consisted of extremely tall men.
In France: The French created the concept of Esprit de Corps, or pride in ones unit, within most elite or uniquely French units. North African units like the Zouaves, the Turcos, the French Foreign Legion, or even the Mamelukes which served in Napoleon Bonaparte's Imperial Guard developed distinctive styles of dress. Many of these distinctive styles were later adopted by the French Metropolitan Army during the nineteenth century.
In Japan: In Japan, most military tradition was based on the bushido code. Bushido, translated as 'way of the warrior' in English, was the strict code of military discipline adhered to by Samurai warriors.
In North America: In the United States, military tradition can refer simply to a father-son relationship or a much longer, ancestors-long line. Military tradition refers to the tradition in a family to systematically destine one of its sons for a military career. This tradition is associated with the Southern United States and is seen in a high representation of Southerners in the U.S. military today and throughout the nation's history.
In fiction: Military Tradition is used in the strategy game Sid Meier's Civilization III, released by Atari, as a technological advance that allows the building of cavalry units.
Military Tradition is a game concept in the strategy game Europa Universalis IV released by Swedish PC strategy game designer, Paradox Interactive. In the game, a player-controlled faction can accumulate Military Tradition by engaging in land battle. A higher Military Tradition value results in the ability to recruit generals and conquistadors of better quality.
Distinct elements of a military culture are also present in many fictional publications. These are often used as an important element in shaping fictional culture by authors. Military fiction is a key component of the "military and popular culture" subfield.
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | History: A distinction should be made between uniforms and ethnic dress. If a particular people or culture favoured a distinctive dress style this could easily create the impression of uniformly dressed warriors. The issue is further complicated by the distinctive features (weapons, armour, fighting style and native dress) of particularly effective warrior classes often being copied. Thus the distinctive and colourful clothing of the Hungarian hussars became a model for hussar units all over Europe. The kilts and sporrans of Scottish Highland clans were distilled into regimental dress when the British Army started to recruit from these tribal groups.
Mercenary or irregular fighters could also develop their own fashions, which set them apart from civilians, but were not really uniforms. The clothing of the German Landsknechte of the 16th century is an example of distinctive military fashion. Special units such as Zouaves developed non-standard uniforms to distinguish them from troops of the line.
Antiquity: There are a few recorded attempts at uniform dress in antiquity, going beyond the similarity to be expected of ethnic or tribal dress. One example is the Spanish infantry of Hannibal who wore white tunics with crimson edgings. Another is the Spartan hoplite in his red garment, attributed by Plutarch "partly because it seems to be a manly colour and partly because (it) causes more terror amongst inexperienced foes". The Terracotta Army discovered in the tomb of the first Emperor of China (c. 200 BC) have a superficial similarity but closer examination shows up to seven different styles of armour, which do not appear to have been standardised within separate units.
Rome: The legions of the Roman Republic and Empire had a fairly standardised dress and armour, particularly from approximately the early to mid 1st century onward, when Lorica Segmentata (segmented armour) was introduced. However the lack of unified production for the Roman army meant that there were still considerable differences in detail. Even the armour produced in state factories varied according to the province of origin. Fragments of surviving clothing and wall paintings indicate that the basic tunic of the Roman soldier was of un-dyed (off-white) or red-dyed wool. Senior commanders are known to have worn white cloaks and plumes. Centurions – the century commanders who made up the long serving backbone of the legions – were distinguished by transverse crests on their helmets, various chest ornaments (phaleræ) corresponding to modern medals, torques (a symbol borrowed from the Gauls and also used as a military award), and the vine stick (Vitis) that they carried as a mark of their office.
While some auxiliary cohorts in the late Roman period had carried shields with distinctive colours or designs, there is no evidence that any one Roman legion was distinguished from another by features other than the numbers on the leather covers protecting their shields.
Post-classical era: The feudal system of Western Europe provided instances of distinguishing features denoting allegiance to one or another lord. These however seldom went beyond colours and patterns painted on shields or embroidered on surcoats. Orders of military monks such as the Knights Templar or Hospitaller wore mantles respectively of white (with red crosses on the shoulder) and of black (later red with white crosses) over the usual pattern of armour for their periods. In the later part of the Medieval period instances of standardised clothing being issued for particular campaigns began to occur. English examples included the white coats worn by Norfolk levies recruited in 1296 and the green and white clothing that identified Cheshire archers during the 14th century.
The regular thematic (provincial) and Tagmata (central) troops of the Byzantine Empire (East Roman) are the first known soldiers to have had what would now be considered regimental or unit identification. During the 10th century, each of the cavalry "banda" making up these forces is recorded as having plumes and other distinctions in a distinctive colour. Officers wore a waist sash or pekotarion, which may have been of different colours according to rank.
Early modern era:
European regimental dress: The styles and decoration of military uniforms varied immensely with the status, image, and resources of the military throughout the ages. Uniform dress became the norm with the adoption of regimental systems, initially by the French army in the mid-17th century. Before 1600 a few German and Dutch regiments had worn red or yellow coats. From about 1626 onwards some Swedish infantry had been issued with standard coloured dress under Gustavus Adolphus (hence his "yellow" or "blue" regiments). However, most levies of the 15th and 16th centuries wore civilian dress and regiments were dressed at the expense of their colonels in whatever style and colours the colonel preferred. Even Royal guards would sometimes only be issued with distinctive coloured or embroidered surcoats to wear over ordinary clothing. To help armies distinguish friend from foe, scarves, pieces of foliage, or other makeshift identification known as "field signs" would be worn, (a practice still recognised under international humanitarian law and the laws of war as a "distinctive sign"). Field signs were easily removed or donned, as in the example of John Smith, a squire on the Royalist side who at the Battle of Edgehill put on the orange scarf of the Parliamentarians and with no more elaborate disguise recaptured the royal standard from the Earl of Essex's own secretary.
By this time, in France at least, the general character of the clothes and accoutrements to be worn on various occasions was strictly regulated by orders. But uniformity of clothing was not to be expected so long as the "enlistment" system prevailed and soldiers were taken in and dismissed at the beginning and end of every campaign. The beginnings of uniform are therefore to be found in truly national armies, in the Indelta of Gustavus Adolphus, and the English armies of the English Civil War. In the earlier years of the latter, though the richer colonels uniformed their men (for instance, the Marquess of Newcastle's "Whitecoats" and King Charles's own red-coated Lifeguard of foot), the rustics and the citizens turned out for war in their ordinary rough clothes, donning armour and sword-belt. But in 1645 the Long Parliament raised an army for permanent service, and the colonels became officials rather than proprietors. The New Model Army was clothed in the civilian costume of the date—ample coat, waistcoat, breeches, stockings and shoes (in the case of cavalry, boots)—but with the distinctive colour throughout the army of red and with regimental facings of various colours and breeches of grey. Soon afterwards the helmet was replaced by a grey broad-brimmed hat. From the coat was eventually evolved the tunic of the mid-19th century, and the hat became the cocked hat of a later generation, which generally disappeared during the decade of 1800–1810 to reappear in the late 19th and early 20th century, by which time it had its original form of a "slouch-hat." For service in Ireland the New Model Army's red coat was exchanged for one of russet colour, just as scarlet gave way to khaki for Indian service in the 19th century. The Ironsides cavalry, however, wore buff leather coats and armour long after the infantry had abandoned them.
Thus the principle ever since followed — uniform coat and variegated facings — was established. By choice or convenience the majority of the corps out of which the New Model Army was formed had come to be dressed in red, with facings according to the colonel's taste. In Austria sixty years afterwards events took the same course. The colonels there uniformed their men as they saw fit, but had, probably to obtain "wholesale" prices, agreed upon a serviceable colour, pearl grey. When in 1707 Prince Eugene procured the issue of uniform regulations, few line regiments had to be re-clothed. In France, as in England and Austria, the cavalry, still led by the wealthy classes rather than officered by the professional, was not uniformed upon an army system until after the infantry. But in 1688 six-sevenths of the French cavalry was uniformed in light grey with red facings; and about half the dragoon regiments had red uniforms and blue facings. The Marquis of Louvois, in creating a standing army, had introduced an infantry uniform as a necessary consequence. The native French regiments had light grey coats, the Swiss red, the German black and the Italian blue, with various facings. The French grey was probably decided upon, like the Austrian grey, as being a good "service" colour, which could be cheaply manufactured.
During the 18th century the normal military uniform in Europe comprised a standardised form of civilian dress (tricorn hat, long-skirted coat, waistcoat and breeches). One distinctively military feature were the long canvas gaiters which came up to mid-thigh and had multiple buttons. Dress was surprisingly standardised between European armies in cut and general outline. The distinction normally lay in colours: red coats for the British and Danes, light grey then white for the French, Spanish, and Austrian infantry, dark blue for the Prussians and Portuguese, green for the Russians, etc. Within each army different regiments were usually distinguished by "facings" — linings, turnbacks, and braiding on coats in colours that were distinctive to one or several regiments. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | The French grey was probably decided upon, like the Austrian grey, as being a good "service" colour, which could be cheaply manufactured.
During the 18th century the normal military uniform in Europe comprised a standardised form of civilian dress (tricorn hat, long-skirted coat, waistcoat and breeches). One distinctively military feature were the long canvas gaiters which came up to mid-thigh and had multiple buttons. Dress was surprisingly standardised between European armies in cut and general outline. The distinction normally lay in colours: red coats for the British and Danes, light grey then white for the French, Spanish, and Austrian infantry, dark blue for the Prussians and Portuguese, green for the Russians, etc. Within each army different regiments were usually distinguished by "facings" — linings, turnbacks, and braiding on coats in colours that were distinctive to one or several regiments. The Royal Comtois Infantry Regiment of the French Army, for example, had large dark blue cuffs on its off-white coats. To a certain extent the functions required of a given group of soldiers were reflected in their dress. Thus artillery uniforms in most armies were usually of dark blue, for the practical reason that handling black powder would have soiled lighter coloured clothing. Infantry drummers and cavalry trumpeters often had "reverse" colours with coats the colour of the regimental facings and facings the colour of the regimental coats.
Officers (who paid for their own clothing) were slower to accept uniforms. During the late 17th century they were often dressed in individual styles and colours according to their own taste and means. In part this was because the uniform dress issued to the rank and file was considered a form of livery — the mark of a servant and demeaning to members of the social class from which officers came. One early practice in the French and other armies was for officers to wear coats of the facing colour of their regiments. Rank insignia as such was unknown until well into the 18th century. The gorget hanging from a chain around the neck (a last survival of medieval armour) was the only universally recognised mark of an officer until epaulettes developed from clusters of ribbons formerly worn on the shoulder. In the British army officers were ordered to adopt epaulettes by a clothing warrant dated 1768. Even when officers' uniforms became the subject of detailed regulation they remained easily distinguishable from those of other ranks, by the better quality and richness of the materials and trimmings used. Gold or silver braiding on the hats and coats of officers usually matched the bronze or pewter of the numerous buttons on regimental clothing.
New uniforms were issued with surprising frequency in some 18th-century armies (once a year in the British service). It should, however, be remembered that a soldier had to march, parade, fight and sometimes sleep in the same garment and that such extras as greatcoats or working clothes were seldom issued until the end of the century.
Ottoman Empire: The highly organised armies of the Ottoman Empire employed distinctive features of dress to distinguish one corps or class of soldier from another. An example would be the conical black hats of felt worn by the Deli cavalry of the early 19th century. However the basic costume was usually that of the tribal group or social class from which a particular class of warrior was drawn. As such it was sufficiently varied not to rank as "uniform" in the later sense. An elaborate system of colourful standards largely provided unit identification. Even the appearance of the Janissaries was likely to reflect individual means and taste, although red was a favoured colour and the white felt zarcola headdresses were similar.
It was not until the reorganisation of the Ottoman Army by Sultan Mahmud II during the 1820s that completely standardised dress was issued.
Later modern era: The first fifteen years of the 19th century influenced the appearance of military uniforms until the 1850s. In particular, some uniforms of the Grande Armée – notably those of the cavalry regiments of the Imperial Guard – are considered as being amongst the most striking and distinctive of the time. The cost of the French uniforms varied widely, going from 200 to 250 francs for a line infantryman's outfit to 2000 francs for a cuirassier's uniform. Cavalrymen of the Guard had no fewer than 10 different uniforms. One justification for the expensive parade dresses of the Guard was that they would "lead the people of the conquered nations to regard the French uniforms with unreserved astonishment". As a general trend France and other European states replaced their bicornes by feathered shakos or crested helmets, while the coatee-type jacket replaced the combination of tailcoat and waistcoat.
The ornamental peak of the military uniform was reached in the early 19th century in Western Europe. Sometimes the Napoleonic Wars are identified as being the acme of colourful and ornate uniforms, but actually the several decades of relative peace that followed were a time of even more decorative styles and embellishments. The Napoleonic soldier on campaign was likely to present a shabby and nondescript appearance as unsuitable peacetime dress quickly deteriorated or was replaced with whatever local substitutes were available.
Until later on in the century dyes were primitive and different batches of uniforms worn by the same unit might present differing shades, especially after exposure to rain and sun. The white uniforms popular amongst many armies through the 18th and early 19th centuries soiled easily and had to be pipeclayed to retain any semblance of cleanliness. Green as worn by Jäger and Rifle regiments proved particularly prone to fading until suitable chemical dyes were devised in the 1890s. British soldiers were known for their striking red clothing (hence the name "Redcoats"). This was actually a fairly dull shade of madder red until the general adoption of scarlet for tunics in the 1870s.
Navies: In an early instance of military camouflage, the sailors of Imperial Rome are reported to have worn blue/grey tunics.
However uniform dress was not a feature of navies (officers and marines excepted) until comparatively recent times. This may reflect the considerable difference in roles and conditions of service between sailors and soldiers.
No uniform was prescribed for the French Navy until a standardised suit for officers of blue and red was decreed in 1764. This evolved from optional blue clothing authorised by Royal decree as early as 1665, although practical grey, brown or black colours were worn at sea. In other 17th-18th navies of Mediterranean states red was a commonly worn colour.
Until the middle of the 19th century only officers and warrant officers in the Royal Navy wore regulated uniforms. Through the 18th century to the Napoleonic Wars navy officers had a form of dress broadly resembling that of army officers, though in dark blue with white facings. In the early 19th century Royal Navy officers developed a more distinctive form of uniform comprising (in full dress uniform) a cocked hat, dark blue coatee with white collar and cuffs, dark blue or white trousers, or breeches.
Epaulettes and braiding were gold and varied according to rank. In a simplified form this dress (without the cocked hat) survives as the modern ceremonial dress for flag officers.
Throughout this period sailors supplied or made their own clothing. Sailors developed traditional clothing suitable for their work: loose-fitting trousers with belts made of rope; tunics that slipped over the head, with arms to above the wrist so that the cloth would not foul in ropes passing through a cleat or pulley. For cold weather, a jumper was knitted from yarn or wool. For wet weather, old sail cloth was made into a coat (with hat or attached hood) that was waterproofed with tallow or fat. In these days, the officers would designate certain afternoons to "make and mend" (clothing). A sailor with little clothing to make or mend used this time as "time off".
In January 1857 the decision was taken to issue complete uniforms to petty officers and seamen.
This included features which can still be recognised in the Class I uniform of ratings in the modern Royal Navy - notably the wide blue collar with white tapes, a black neckerchief, white lanyard and blue or white jumper. The flared "bell bottom" trousers disappeared after the Second World War.
Because of the global dominance of the Royal Navy from Trafalgar to the Second World War RN uniforms became the model for virtually all other navies. While certain distinctive features emerged - such as the red pompon worn on the crown of the French sailor's cap, the open fronted jacket of the German Navy or the white round cap of the U.S. Navy - the overall pattern remained standard until the development of specialist working or protective rigs during the Second World War.
American Civil War: It is generally supposed that Union soldiers wore blue uniforms and Confederate soldiers wore grey ones. However, this was only a generalisation. Both the Union and the Confederacy drew up uniform regulations, but as a matter of practical reality neither side was able to fully equip its men at the outbreak of the war. Existing state units and quickly raised volunteer regiments on both sides wore a wide variety of styles and colours in the early stages of the war. Some regiments—such as the North's Berdan Sharpshooters and the South's Alexandria Rifles—had green uniforms, while the French zouave style was widely imitated. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | While certain distinctive features emerged - such as the red pompon worn on the crown of the French sailor's cap, the open fronted jacket of the German Navy or the white round cap of the U.S. Navy - the overall pattern remained standard until the development of specialist working or protective rigs during the Second World War.
American Civil War: It is generally supposed that Union soldiers wore blue uniforms and Confederate soldiers wore grey ones. However, this was only a generalisation. Both the Union and the Confederacy drew up uniform regulations, but as a matter of practical reality neither side was able to fully equip its men at the outbreak of the war. Existing state units and quickly raised volunteer regiments on both sides wore a wide variety of styles and colours in the early stages of the war. Some regiments—such as the North's Berdan Sharpshooters and the South's Alexandria Rifles—had green uniforms, while the French zouave style was widely imitated.
The Union eventually got most of its men into regulation Federal blue but this often faded until it appeared grey. Originally the Confederate government relied on the "commutation" system which required the states to provide their own uniforms. While the commutation system was in place, many states were not able to provide an ample supply of uniforms and captured federal uniforms were common. Later in the war the Confederate national government provided uniforms from a central depot system, including the famous Richmond and Columbus depots. Many photographs of Confederate soldiers from later in the war (usually casualties) are wearing standardised uniforms. As Sherman's men marched across Georgia and up the Carolinas, they were cut off from supply by the Union and began wearing clothing of Confederate origin. Confederate soldiers used a variety of vegetable and imported dyes which would fade to a "butternut" colour.
End of bright colours: Until 1914 the majority of armies still provided colourful dress uniforms for all ranks, at least for parade and off-duty wear. These often retained distinctive features from the past. Most Russian troops, for example, wore the very dark green introduced by Peter the Great in 1700. German infantry generally wore the dark "Prussian blue" of the previous two centuries. This and other features of the historic Prussian Army uniform were generally adopted by the other German States as they fell under Prussian influence before and after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Bavarians, however, continued to wear light blue and Saxon regiments retained a number of distinctions after the establishment of the German Empire (1871). Two regiments of the Prussian Guard and one of the Russian were still issued with the brass mitre caps of the 18th-century grenadier. The British infantry retained their scarlet tunics for parade and "walking out" wear, while the bulk of French regiments wore red trousers with dark or light blue tunics. The infantry of the Austro-Hungarian Empire discarded their historic white tunics in 1868 in favour of dark blue. However, the extremely large number of colours appearing on collars, cuffs, and shoulder straps to distinguish the various regiments were retained. There were for example ten shades of red, ranging from cherry red to pink. The Swedish Army had favoured dark blue with yellow facings since the beginning of the 18th century. There was infinite variety, even within smaller armies, between regiments, branches or ranks and the subject is a complex one.
The British were the first to introduce drab/khaki uniforms: in 1848 in India. This khaki drill then became more generally worn from the Indian Rebellion of 1857 both in India and Africa. A darker version, known as "service drab", was adopted for home service field wear in 1902, the same year that the US Army also adopted khaki for non-dress occasions. The Italians introduced grey-green in 1909, followed by the German and Austrian armies who adopted different shades of grey. The Russians had changed to a grey shade of khaki in 1908, following their experience in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. There was however strong attachment to the colourful uniforms as previously worn on all occasions and the process was not an inexorable one. The Danish Army adopted grey-green uniforms for all occasions in 1903, reverted to a combination of dark and light blue in 1910, took up light grey in 1915 and finally settled for khaki in 1923. The Imperial Russian armies, following their adoption of khaki-grey field uniforms in 1908, took the opportunity to upgrade their parade uniforms to much more elaborate and colorful styles, and were experimenting with a mix of khaki and bright colours when war broke out in 1914. The Japanese Army probably went further than most in adopting khaki for all occasions after 1905, although even here officers of all branches and the cavalry of the Imperial Guard retained traditional coloured uniforms for formal and ceremonial occasions.
With the exception of Western-influenced units such as the "Ever-Triumphant Army" of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–66), Chinese armies of the 19th century wore dress that was broadly variegated. Embroidered chest panels and coloured buttons on headdresses were used to distinguish rank and sometimes unit. From 1910 the Imperial Chinese Army adopted dark blue uniforms of Japanese style with coloured facings of red, white, or yellow to distinguish the different branches. The Imperial Guard Division had a light grey uniform with the same branch colours as the line. A khaki summer uniform was worn by the entire army.
By the 20th century, drab colours were increasingly being adopted for active service and ordinary duty wear. The First World War finally put an end to the expensive practice of furnishing colourful uniforms to all ranks of the various armies. Amongst the frontline troops in August 1914 only the Belgian and French armies saw active service in bright colours and old fashioned headgear (although the Austro-Hungarian cavalry retained their blue and red uniforms for field wear after the remainder of the army had gone into pike grey in 1909). The Imperial German field grey of 1910 retained a number of traditional features such as spiked helmets, shakos, busbies, and coloured piping from the older uniforms. The demands of modern warfare as well as financial economy soon saw these survivals vanish, and by 1916 all involved armies were in either khaki (Russia, Turkish, Serbia, Montenegro, Japan, Greek, French colonial, and Britain), various shades of grey (German, Italian, Bulgarian, Portuguese, and Austro-Hungarian) or sky blue (French and Romanian). The coloured uniforms of peacetime were often relegated to depot wear by recruits doing their basic training.
Steel helmets first appeared in the form of the "Adrian" helmet adopted by the French Army in 1915. The practical advantages of this innovation led the British and German armies to adopt their own helmets by 1916. Other armies followed suit – the Belgians and Italians for example copying the French model and the Austro-Hungarians that of Germany.
Interwar period: The drab uniforms of 1914–18 remained in general use until the Second World War. This was partly for political reasons, since the republican, fascist, Nazis, and communist regimes that replaced many of the old monarchies and empires had little interest in preserving the splendours of their predecessors. However, even in those societies where there was social and political continuity the trend was away from the traditional uniforms worn prior to 1914. The British Army reintroduced full dress for Guards regiments in 1919-20 and regimental bands by 1928, while permitting officers to wear their mess (evening), blue or green "patrols" (semi-formal) and full dress on appropriate occasions. The French reintroduced "grande tenue" in 1927 for North African regiments which were mostly dependent on voluntary recruiting, and after 1930 required all regular officers to acquire dress uniforms in the pre-1914 colours of their branch or regiment. Elsewhere full or coloured dress of traditional cut was generally restricted to formal uniforms for officers and long service regulars, ceremonial guards, and a few other limited categories. The Spanish Army (which had not been involved in the First World War) exceptionally continued to issue coloured uniforms to all its conscript rank and file until 1926 and thereafter to the garrisons of Seville, Barcelona, and Madrid for special ceremonials until 1931. These included red trousers for the line infantry, following the French practice in an example of cross-border influence.
The use of steel helmets was by now almost universal and a number of countries adopted their own designs moving away from the German, British, and French models of the First World War. The Italians, Soviets, Japanese, Swiss, Spanish and Portuguese were amongst these. Steel helmets, originally simply items of utilitarian protective clothing, were adopted as parade headdress by the French, German, Italian, and Soviet armies, amongst others, between the Wars.
Second World War: Uniforms of varying shades of khaki and grey were universal in the Second World War but the cut and outline appearance of the different armies still made identification in the field relatively straight forward. A Soviet soldier would, for example be distinguishable from his German opponent by his general outline, even in the fog of battle. British, American, Japanese and French uniforms still retained some distinctive features, even as they became more and more utilitarian in the course of the War. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | The use of steel helmets was by now almost universal and a number of countries adopted their own designs moving away from the German, British, and French models of the First World War. The Italians, Soviets, Japanese, Swiss, Spanish and Portuguese were amongst these. Steel helmets, originally simply items of utilitarian protective clothing, were adopted as parade headdress by the French, German, Italian, and Soviet armies, amongst others, between the Wars.
Second World War: Uniforms of varying shades of khaki and grey were universal in the Second World War but the cut and outline appearance of the different armies still made identification in the field relatively straight forward. A Soviet soldier would, for example be distinguishable from his German opponent by his general outline, even in the fog of battle. British, American, Japanese and French uniforms still retained some distinctive features, even as they became more and more utilitarian in the course of the War.
The US Army discarded its First World War style field uniforms in 1941 in favour of a very plain and practical combat dress in a thin light brown wool shirt (sometimes with an olive green cast) and slightly darker trousers. This was worn in conjunction with a smart olive drab "Class A" dress uniform—which in many cases varied to a rich "chocolate" brown tunic worn with khaki trousers. There was a khaki version of the Class A dress uniform for summer wear. The war started with American combat troops wearing combat shoes with "spats" (a form of gaiters), replaced later in the war with 2-buckle combat boots.
By contrast, British soldiers, other than officers, had their 1938 battledress for all occasions.
In Germany the Nazi regime retained uniforms with many traditional features from Imperial Germany for its army uniforms, such as field grey cloth, marching boots (a taller version for officers), collar litzen (braiding) and breeches (for officers and NCOs); German Panzer (tank) troops had a special combat uniform made of black wool and German troops serving in tropical climates had uniforms in a shade of khaki. Later in the war, severe leather shortages led to the replacement of marching boots with ankle height shoes worn with gaiters (Gemäsch).
Imperial Japan used a light brown or khaki colour for most Imperial army uniforms — though there was also a green service dress tunic for officers. Footwear was reddish brown jack boots (restricted for wear only by officers), while soldiers wore shoes with leg wrappings puttees).
From 1935 to 1943, Soviet Army uniforms for all troops (except than tank troops) were an intermediate shade of brown; uniforms included a field uniform ("gymnasterka" shirt with collar tabs and a 2-button breast opening, belt, breeches, garrison cap, and boots), a service dress "kittel" tunic worn with breeches or trousers, and a dress uniform "mundir" tunic (worn with deep blue breeches). Soviet tank troops wore the gymnastyrka shirt, kittel (dress tunic) in a bluish grey (rather than brown) colour. In 1943, the Soviet Army began to re-adopt many Tsarist Army features, notably braided shoulder boards, which had previously been forbidden (since the founding of the Soviet Army) as a sign of an undesirable "social class" mentality. The reintroduction of these epaulettes in 1943 was a relatively inexpensive means of boosting Soviet troop morale. Once reintroduced to the Soviet Army, the use of shoulder boards was never rescinded and they remained part of the uniform until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The distinct bluish grey colour for tankers was eliminated in 1943, from which point on all units of the Soviet Army wore brown.
Modern uniforms: Most military forces have developed several different uniform types, including combat dress, working dress, service or ordinary duty uniforms and (to a very limited extent) ceremonial full dress.
Camouflage: Today, all armies wear some form of camouflage uniforms for training and combat duty purposes. Armies facing service in different theatres may need several different camouflage uniforms.
Parade: Traditional coloured uniforms have long since given way to clothing more suited for actual combat in modern conditions. Bright colours are now usually reserved for wear by units having ceremonial functions, some bands and officers attending formal occasions. Elite units normally contrive to having some distinctive features. The United States Marine Corps are well known for their traditional midnight blue tunics and sky blue trousers (trimmed in red for NCO and above). These "dress blues" are worn for formal occasions such as the Marine Corps Birthday Ball in November. The British Household Cavalry and Foot Guards wear uniforms largely unchanged from 1914 for "public duties" i.e. ceremonial.
The military of many countries have adopted the economical expedient of smartening up combat uniforms for parade by adding medals, neck scarves and coloured berets to the terrain coloured camouflage uniforms intended for combat. As an interesting example of the combining of old and new features of uniform the French Spahis and the Spanish Regulares still wear the flowing cloaks, fezzes, turbans and sashes of the North African colonial regiments from which they are descended with modern khaki or camouflage clothing, on appropriate occasions.
By country:
France: The battle dress of the French Armed Forces is the FÉLIN system combined with SPECTRA helmets. France has adopted a light beige dress uniform which is worn with coloured kepis, sashes, fringed epaulettes, fourragères and other traditional items on appropriate occasions. As an alternative parade dress, camouflage uniforms can be worn with the dress items noted above. The legionnaires of the Foreign Legion wear white kepis, blue sashes and green and red epaulettes as dress uniform, while the sappers wear the basic legionnaire uniform but with leather aprons and gloves. Troupes de marine wear blue and red kepis and yellow epaulettes. The Chasseurs Alpins wear a large beret, known as the "tarte" (the pie), and mountain outfits. The single remaining regiment of Spahis retains the white cloak and red sash of the days when this corps consisted of Algerian and Moroccan cavalry.
Sailors of the French Navy and Fusiliers marins wear a dress uniform dating from the 19th century with a distinctive red pompon on the round cap.
The infantry and cavalry of the Republican Guard retain their late 19th-century dress uniforms, as do the military cadets of Saint-Cyr and the École polytechnique. A dark blue/black evening dress is authorized for officers and individual branches or regiments may parade bands or "fanfares" in historic dress dating as far back as the Napoleonic period.
Germany: The German Army has retained a form of field grey for dress wear though of modern cut and worn with berets. Some senior officers still wear peaked caps. The collar braid stripes (Litzen), that distinguished regiments of the Prussian Guard prior to 1918, have become a general feature of modern German uniforms. The Mountain infantry troops retain a more traditional dress uniform. The Nationale Volksarmee of the former German Democratic Republic also maintained a stone grey uniform, following the Imperial German tradition. Both the West and East German militaries still retained Prussian-style dress uniform respectively, with the West abandoning the "Stiefelhosen" (bootcut trousers).
Until 1945 Waffenrock (English: service coat or tunic) – was the generic term for military uniform. This included dress uniforms, parade uniforms, and also epaulettes or shoulder boards with rank insignia, as well as uniform cuffs, badges and other insignia.
India: During the Indian Rebellion of 1857 the forces of the East India Company in India dyed their white summer tunics to neutral tones; initially a tan called khaki (from the Hindi word for "dusty"). This was a temporary measure which became standard in the Indian service in the 1880s. Only during the Second Boer War in 1902, did the entire British Army standardise on dun for Service Dress including the British Indian Army. The modern Indian Army uniform standardises on dun for khaki.
The Indian Army camouflage uniform consists of shirts, trousers, and cap of a synthetic material. Shirts are buttoned up with two chest pockets with buttoned flaps. Trousers have two pockets, two thigh box pockets, and a back pocket. The Indian Army Jungle camouflage dress features a jungle camouflage pattern and is designed for use in woodland environments. The Indian Army Desert camouflage, which features a desert camouflage pattern, is used by artillery and infantry posted in dusty, semi-desert, and desert areas of Rajasthan and its vicinity.
Parade dress for the modern Indian Army normally involve the addition of pagris (turbans), cravats and cummerbunds in regimental colours to olive green uniforms. Gurkha, Kumaoni, Naga, Garhwali and Assam units wear wide brimmed felt hats.
Indonesia: The Indonesian National Armed Forces have different types of uniforms worn by its personnel for certain occasions. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | The Indian Army camouflage uniform consists of shirts, trousers, and cap of a synthetic material. Shirts are buttoned up with two chest pockets with buttoned flaps. Trousers have two pockets, two thigh box pockets, and a back pocket. The Indian Army Jungle camouflage dress features a jungle camouflage pattern and is designed for use in woodland environments. The Indian Army Desert camouflage, which features a desert camouflage pattern, is used by artillery and infantry posted in dusty, semi-desert, and desert areas of Rajasthan and its vicinity.
Parade dress for the modern Indian Army normally involve the addition of pagris (turbans), cravats and cummerbunds in regimental colours to olive green uniforms. Gurkha, Kumaoni, Naga, Garhwali and Assam units wear wide brimmed felt hats.
Indonesia: The Indonesian National Armed Forces have different types of uniforms worn by its personnel for certain occasions. The uniforms are basically regulated into several categories including "PDU" (Pakaian Dinas Upacara), which is the full dress uniform worn for attending formal state occasions; "PDH" (Pakaian Dinas Harian), which is the service dress uniform worn during everyday-indoor duties; "PDL" (Pakaian Dinas Lapangan), which is the combat dress uniform worn during outdoor duties; and "PDP" (Pakaian Dinas Parade), which is the parade dress uniform worn during military parades and other ceremonial occasions.
Each uniform category consists of different types which usually consists of type I until type IV (four types). The uniform regulations are basically different for men and women. The Army, Navy, and Air Force basically have the same regulations for the uniform, but differ in terms of color and certain designs which represent their respective branches.
Italy: The Italian Armed Forces use a range of different uniforms and uniform variations for each of their four branches: the Italian Army, the Italian Air Force, the Italian Navy and the Carabinieri Corps.
The traditional headdresses of the Bersaglieri, Horse Artillery and Alpini are still worn by the Italian Army, the Bersaglieri even wearing their flowing feathers on steel helmets as part of their combat dress. Officers of all branches have a dark blue dress uniform of modern cut while the Corazzieri (Cuirassiers of the Presidential Guard), Mounted Carabinieri and cadets of the Military Academy of Modena wear ceremonial uniforms which date back to the 19th century. Individual regiments with a long history, such as the Lancieri di Montebello and the Granatieri di Sardegna occasionally parade honour guards or other detachments in their pre-1915 dark blue uniforms.
Iran: The military of Iran uses a variety of military uniforms, including a solid olive-green pattern. Several other uniforms have also been reserved for parade use, such as a slate grey, a black and white, a beige, a beige on beige, a beige on brown, a beige on green, and an eggshell white-coloured uniform – paired with a matching beret and balaclava.
The Iranian military uses several types of camouflage patterns. Three distinct desert camouflage patterns with slightly differing colour palettes and blotch densities have been issued; one for the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, one for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a third pattern used by the tarabaris personnel who repair military cars and trucks. A green and brown forest camouflage pattern was also issued to the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force was issued an arctic blue camouflage pattern. A pixelated grey and green camouflage pattern was issued to the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy.
Russia: The Russian Army has retained a number of features, such as officers' epaulettes, high boots and long greatcoats with collar patches for all ranks, which can be traced back to Tsarist days. The dress uniform for officers is of the same distinctive blue/green colour as "Tsar's green", worn until 1914. The Kremlin Regiment has in recent years been issued with a special ceremonial uniform which closely resembles that of the infantry regiments of the Imperial Guard immediately prior to the First World War. Women's uniforms in the Russian Army feature a skirt instead of trousers and a garrison cap instead of a beret or peaked cap. Since 1994 the uniform (or its main details) has undergone a series of changes in 1999, 2005, 2010, 2013 and 2017.
Spain: The Spanish Army has reintroduced a number of dress uniforms dating back to the pre-1931 Monarchy. These include a variety of parade uniforms worn by various units of the recreated Royal Guard as well as the traditional dark blue and white uniforms of the Guardia Civil and the blue tunics and red trousers of the 1st Infantry Regiment. While only worn by limited numbers of personnel on special occasions, these uniforms include such distinctively Spanish features as the "Ros" shako of the infantry and the Royal Guard, and the Tricorn of the Civil Guard. Officers of all branches wear dark blue or white gala uniforms for social and ceremonial occasions.
United Kingdom: The British Army generally retains its traditional full dress uniforms only for bands and units performing ceremonial functions (notably the Household Brigade). An attempt dating from the early 1950s to provide other British soldiers with a plainer (and cheaper) dark blue or green No.1 dress did not meet with much enthusiasm; indeed, most soldiers are not issued with their own No.1 dress, and the most common occasion when it is now worn is for a wedding. Parade dress for most British regiments is khaki No. 2 dress with No 1 Dress coloured peaked caps, berets or Glengarry bonnets. Following the introduction of the Combat Soldier 95 (CS95) clothing system of Disruptive Pattern Material (DPM) and later Multi Terrain Pattern (MTP) this is worn for most day-to-day business replacing the old 'working' uniform of green Lightweight Trousers and Shirt/Jersey, albeit that these are still used as 'Barrack Dress' by some office based personnel. However, the proposed Future Army Dress (FAD), which is currently being developed by the British Army, includes a return to Barrack Dress for all arms, including 'non-iron' shirts and trousers in a similar pattern to that of the current No.2 Dress uniform. Tradition is however still strong in British military culture and there are many regimental distinctions added to some uniforms. One example is the King's Royal Hussars who wear their historic crimson trousers with all orders other than fatigue or combat dress. The "trews" or tartan trousers of Lowland regiments have been retained for certain orders of dress in the amalgamated Royal Regiment of Scotland, although the kilt of the Highland regiments is the parade dress. Mess dress in traditional scarlet, blue or green is worn by officers and senior NCOs of all regiments for formal evening dress.
United States: In recent decades, many militaries around the world have gradually simplified the range of uniforms issued. For example, most U.S. servicemen now wear camouflage utilities for daily duty and all but the most formal occasions-whereas in the past the service uniform would be worn unless a soldier was engaged in a dirty or physical task. As an example of modern practice, the United States Marine Corps has a distinct blue dress uniform, but other uniforms include khaki button-up shirts, forest-green coats, and combat camouflage. In other services where camouflage is normally a non-issue, such as navies, coloured uniforms are still issued, e.g. the United States Navy's white officer uniform for warm weather. The United States Armed Forces allows every branch to develop and use their own uniforms. In recent years, many Battle Dress Uniforms with famous US Woodland pattern were replaced. The marine Corps developed new digital MARPAT pattern, while the United States Army developed Universal Pattern (ACU) for its standard combat uniforms, though a special camouflage pattern (multicam) more appropriate for use in Afghanistan was fielded in 2010. Popular disdain among US troops for the beret headgear as part of the "default" headgear for wear with the ACU uniform led to a regulation revision in 2011, with the standard "default" headgear for wear with ACUs now being the ACU patrol cap, which provides a much better degree of sun protection for the eyes). The U.S. Army has since developed the OCP uniform (starting in 2016), going back to a green camo pattern, with coyote brown undershirts, boots, and belt. The U.S. Army is still in transition between the old ACU pattern and the new OCP pattern. The U.S. Military uses different camo patterns when deployed in different combat zones (in theater). U.S. Army mostly uses the Multi-Cam pattern in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is subject to change due to the new OCP uniform being issued.
Based on recommendations made during a comprehensive briefing by Task Force Uniform on 24 Feb. 2006, CNO Michael G. Mullen agreed to production of both a BDU-style working uniform for all Sailors E-1 to O-10 and a more practical, year-round service uniform to withstand day-to-day classroom and office-like environments where the service uniform is typically worn. The new Navy Working Uniform (NWU) is now worn by naval sailors and officers. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | The U.S. Army is still in transition between the old ACU pattern and the new OCP pattern. The U.S. Military uses different camo patterns when deployed in different combat zones (in theater). U.S. Army mostly uses the Multi-Cam pattern in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is subject to change due to the new OCP uniform being issued.
Based on recommendations made during a comprehensive briefing by Task Force Uniform on 24 Feb. 2006, CNO Michael G. Mullen agreed to production of both a BDU-style working uniform for all Sailors E-1 to O-10 and a more practical, year-round service uniform to withstand day-to-day classroom and office-like environments where the service uniform is typically worn. The new Navy Working Uniform (NWU) is now worn by naval sailors and officers. On 6 June 2006 the US Army announced that its green and white uniforms would be superseded by the Army Blue Uniform as a universal service uniform in the historic colours of dark blue (for tunics) and light blue (for trousers). The new service dress was introduced in 2007 and became obligatory for all ranks by 2011.
As of 1 April 2021, the Air Force makes use of the Operational Camouflage Pattern (OCP) as a common daily uniform. This is the same uniform worn by the US Army with the exception of distinctive name patches with copper lettering. The footwear worn with ABUs are coyote brown suede boots and head covering is the OCP pattern Patrol Cap or ball cap, or the beret of the relevant career field (Security Forces, Special Operations Weather Team, SERE Instructor, Pararescue, and Combat Controller). Aside from OCPs, the most common uniform to be worn would be dress blues, which incorporate a light navy blue for bottoms, and the same shade to match the top jacket. Underneath the top jacket either a long sleeve or short sleeve sky blue shirt may be worn with a tie or neck tab whenever wearing the top jacket. The jacket is reserved for more formal events. Placed on the outermost tunic, Airmen may pin their ribbons and career badge as optional with their name plate as the only mandatory item. For headgear a flight cap of matching shade to the pants and similar in appearance to the former Army green garrison cap and the shoes are a black high polished dress shoe. Other, but not standard, headgear includes the flat top mess dress cap and the appropriate beret career field beret. Blues, though the second most used uniform, receive far less service than OCPs. Those performing duties not suited for the formal dress uniform may wear OCPs instead. The Mess Uniform uses the same pants and jacket as dress blues, but with a white under-shirt, bow tie and cummerbund, and the same black dress shoes.
Purpose:
Distinctive clothing: One purpose of military uniforms is to clearly distinguish combatants who are protected by the laws of war from other persons carrying weapons, who do not always enjoy such protection.
Another purpose in historical times was to make it difficult for deserters to avoid detection; military uniforms were so distinctive with many metal buttons and unique colours that they could not be modified into unrecognisable clothing. If the commander raised and equipped the troops out of his own pocket, the appearance of the soldiers was also designed to impress his superiors.
Attractive or distinctive uniforms could make a military career desirable to young men or women (the "peacock" factor). As late as 1914 the British Army found that regiments with particularly striking off-duty or parade uniforms found it easier to attract recruits. Thus the four Rifle regiments in their sombre dark green had a higher public profile than the great mass of line infantry in scarlet.
Nationalism: During the Boxer Rebellion, the Muslim Gansu Braves under General Dong Fuxiang used traditional Chinese clothing instead of western-style uniforms, reflecting the opposition of the movement to foreign influences.
Religion: The patched jibba, a garment traditionally worn by followers of Sufi religious orders, was adopted as military dress in the 1880s by the Sudanese anṣār (Arabic: أنصار) (followers of the religious leader Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi). The Anṣār rebelled against the Turkish Ottoman rule of Sudan, due, among other reasons, to the lax religious standards of the occupation. The jibba was a ragged, patched garment which symbolised a rejection of material wealth by its wearer and a commitment to a religious way of life. Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi decreed that this garment should be worn by all his soldiers in battle. The decision to adopt the religious garment as military dress, enforced unity and cohesion among his forces, and eliminated traditional visual markers differentiating potentially fractious tribes. During the years of conflict between Mahdist and Anglo-Egyptian forces at the end of the 19th century, the Mahdist military jibba became increasingly stylised and were specifically colour-coded to denote the rank and military division of the wearer.
Visibility or camouflage: Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the typical colour scheme included bright and highly contrasting colour arrangements which made it easier to distinguish units in battle. Coloured uniforms were useful in enabling commanders to spot troop locations on battlefields that were often completely obscured by smoke from the black gunpowder used in both muskets and cannons. Large flags were another aid to co-ordination and location for commanders.
However, with the growing prevalence of accurate rifles and other ranged firearms as standard weapons for infantry, it was found, from about the 1880s on, that these colours made soldiers easy targets for enemies to shoot at a distance. These weapons used a new smokeless powder that generated far less smoke leaving the battlefield un-obscured by smoke and making brightly coloured troops into highly visible targets. In reaction, the various militaries, beginning with the British Army, changed the colours, predominantly to such ones that blended in more with the terrain, such as khaki, grey or olive drab for the purposes of camouflage. In addition, this idea was followed with uniforms suitable for particular climates and seasons such as white for snowy regions and tan for sandy ones. Now most armies have some form of camouflaged uniform, such as the British Disruptive Pattern Material.
Many modern military forces now use a system of combat uniforms that not only break up the outline of the soldier for use on the battlefield during the daytime, but also employ a distinctive appearance that makes them difficult to detect with light amplification devices, such as night-vision goggles (NVGs). These modern "digital" print uniforms present a somewhat splotched appearance, generally of somewhat muted colours, that provide visual concealment in a variety of surroundings. The US Army now issues, for all theatres of operations, the Army Combat Uniform, which replaces the Battle Dress Uniform and the Desert Combat Uniform. The colour scheme on these ACUs is a faded green/grey/tan pattern of random-appearing rectangular shapes. Pocket outlines on the front of the jackets are offset from vertical, so as to present a less distinctive straight line for the eye to follow while using NVGs. The U.S. Marine Corps also issues similar uniforms with their MARPAT pattern, the U.S. Marines considered adopting CADPAT for their new pattern, however, the Canadian government owns the copyright for the pattern which it had been developing since 1988. The Canadian government supplied information and manufacturers to help the Marines with the development of their own computer-generated digital pattern pixelated uniform. Though their uniforms are not designed to replace both woodland pattern uniforms and desert pattern, since both woodland digital and desert digital patterns are available. Similarly the US Air Force has begun fielding digital pattern uniforms to their service members, with those uniforms featuring a blue/grey/tan pattern).
Uniform of the day: The "uniform of the day," when referred to in a military sense, is the designated uniform all military personnel are required to wear on that particular day. It is often designated by the senior officer on the base. Normally the uniform is determined by the seasons (e.g. winter blues or summer whites for Navy) however, special occasions (e.g. visiting dignitaries) or weather changes may dictate changes to the uniform of the day. The uniform of the day instruction is broadcast over the 1MC at reveille on board U.S. Navy ships.
The "uniform of the day" may also be referred to as the "dress of the day" in some militaries.
Logistics: Mass-produced uniforms are a good way to equip thousands of soldiers quickly and efficiently. Uniforms in standard sizes and designs are also easier to replace on campaign. As an example, English levies raised for service in Ireland or the Continent during the 17th century came to be provided with clothing purchased in bulk and often of a standard colour or cut. This was however only a temporary wartime expedient and the development of uniforms as such had to wait on the formulation of a system of permanent regiments, notably by the French Monarchy (see above).
Psychological warfare: The appearance of the troops was often enhanced in some way to intimidate the enemy. The tall, mitre-shaped caps worn by grenadiers in the 18th century made their wearers appear bigger and more impressive. King Frederick William I of Prussia had a guard unit of especially tall men with tall mitre hats, the Potsdam Giants. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military uniform | Logistics: Mass-produced uniforms are a good way to equip thousands of soldiers quickly and efficiently. Uniforms in standard sizes and designs are also easier to replace on campaign. As an example, English levies raised for service in Ireland or the Continent during the 17th century came to be provided with clothing purchased in bulk and often of a standard colour or cut. This was however only a temporary wartime expedient and the development of uniforms as such had to wait on the formulation of a system of permanent regiments, notably by the French Monarchy (see above).
Psychological warfare: The appearance of the troops was often enhanced in some way to intimidate the enemy. The tall, mitre-shaped caps worn by grenadiers in the 18th century made their wearers appear bigger and more impressive. King Frederick William I of Prussia had a guard unit of especially tall men with tall mitre hats, the Potsdam Giants. Prussian hussars wore the "skull and crossbones" (Totenkopf) on their hats from 1740 to 1918. This tradition continues into the present day with nose art and fin flash on combat aircraft.
The warriors of ancient Sparta, normally known for their austere lifestyle, wore expensive red cloaks. Reportedly this was adopted as the only colour on which the spilled blood of their enemies would not leave stains. There is a popular myth that the historic red coat of the English soldier was adopted for the same reason (in fact, blood does show as a dark stain on red clothing and the British red coat originated as a historical accident, possibly as a result of the relative cheapness of madder red dyes at the time of the English Civil War in the mid-17th century).
Hair styles in military organisations usually follow civilian fashions, but sometimes certain features are associated with soldiers. In the late 19th century, the ornate beards and moustaches worn by the officers of the day, which complemented their rank and age, were also worn by socially equivalent civilians. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the "high and tight" haircut often distinguished low-ranking soldiers, particularly infantrymen, or, in the United States, Marines and Soldiers of all ranks. The principal purpose, however, of the "high and tight" is to prevent lice and promote general hygiene. Modern regulations against beards also ensure a good seal is made around the face when using a gas mask.
Components of military uniform:
See also: Military uniform types
Other
Uniforms by country
Citations:
General sources: Bueno, José María (1983), El Ejército de Alfonso XIII - La Infantería de Línea (in Spanish), Madrid: Barreira, p. 26, ISBN 84-86071-02-X
Elliott, Jane E. (2002), Some did it for civilisation, some did it for their country: a revised view of the boxer war, Chinese University Press, p. 126, ISBN 962-996-066-4, retrieved 28 June 2010
Kannik, Preben (1968), Military Uniforms of the World, London: Blandford P., ISBN 0713704829
Lanxin Xiang (2003), The origins of the Boxer War: a multinational study, Psychology Press, p. 207, ISBN 0-7007-1563-0, retrieved 28 June 2010 (scroll down to next page from 206 to get to 208)
Pfanner, Toni (March 2004), "Military uniforms and the law of war" (PDF), International Review of the Red Cross, 86 (853): 93–124, doi:10.1017/S1560775500180113, S2CID 144589400
Asquith, Stuart (1981), New Model Army 1645-60 (illustrated ed.), Osprey, p. 32, ISBN 9780850453850
Attribution
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Atkinson, Charles Francis (1911). "Uniforms". In Chisholm, Hugh (ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 27 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 582–593.
External links:
"Images of military uniforms". NYPL Digital Gallery.
Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library
Company of Military Historians Website
{US} Civil War Old Photographs Page
U.S. Civil War Era Uniforms and Accouterments
Soviet and Russian Federation uniforms and insignias
The Evolution of Military Camouflage |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military volunteer | United States: In the United States troops raised as state militia were always described as "volunteers", even when recruited by conscription. Both US volunteers and regulars were referred to as "U.S." troops. The rank of an officer in a volunteer unit was separate from his rank (if any) as a regular, and usually higher. When the volunteer forces were disbanded at the end of the war, officers with both kinds of commission reverted to their "regular" rank. For instance, George Armstrong Custer became a brigadier general of volunteers during the American Civil War, but when the war ended, he reverted to captain. (He was later promoted to lieutenant colonel.) Volunteer rank is not the same as brevet rank.
Military volunteers
See also: Volunteer military
Volunteer Force, volunteer units in the 19th century British Empire
Sar-El, national project for volunteers for Israel
SAF Volunteer Corps, volunteer scheme for the Singapore Armed Forces
Foreign involvement in the Spanish Civil War
Corpo Truppe Volontarie
Wehrmacht foreign volunteers and conscripts
International Freedom Battalion, units consisting of foreign fighters partaking in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Volunteering in a non-military context means working voluntarily without pay
External links:
== Notes == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military–industrial complex | Etymology: U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower originally coined the term in his Farewell Address to the Nation on January 17, 1961:
A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction...
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together. [emphasis added]
The phrase was thought to have been "war-based" industrial complex before becoming "military" in later drafts of Eisenhower's speech, a claim passed on only by oral history. Geoffrey Perret, in his biography of Eisenhower, claims that, in one draft of the speech, the phrase was "military–industrial–congressional complex", indicating the essential role that the United States Congress plays in the propagation of the military industry, but the word "congressional" was dropped from the final version to appease the then-currently elected officials. James Ledbetter calls this a "stubborn misconception" not supported by any evidence; likewise a claim by Douglas Brinkley that it was originally "military–industrial–scientific complex". Additionally, Henry Giroux claims that it was originally "military–industrial–academic complex". The actual authors of the speech were Eisenhower's speechwriters Ralph E. Williams and Malcolm Moos.
The MIC and the Cold War: Attempts to conceptualize something similar to a modern "military–industrial complex" did exist before 1961, as the underlying phenomenon described by the term is generally agreed to have emerged during or shortly after World War II. For example, a similar phrase was used in a 1947 Foreign Affairs article in a sense close to that it would later acquire, and sociologist C. Wright Mills contended in his 1956 book The Power Elite that a democratically unaccountable class of military, business, and political leaders with convergent interests exercised the preponderance of power in the contemporary West. Some sociologists have also connected it to Harold Lasswell's concept of the "garrison state" and James Burnham's notion of the "managerial revolution."
However, following its coinage in Eisenhower's address, the MIC became a staple of American political and sociological discourse. Many Vietnam War–era activists and polemicists, such as Seymour Melman and Noam Chomsky employed the concept in their criticism of U.S. foreign policy, while other academics and policymakers found it to be a useful analytical framework. The MIC was often advanced as both a symptom and a cause of broader dynamics such as militarism, economic centralization, and the influence of the private sector over public policy. Writing in 1968, for example, one economist argued that, in the case of the MIC: Government not only permits and facilitates the entrenchment of private power but serves as its fountain-head. It creates and institutionalizes power concentrations which tend to breed on themselves and to defy public control... Lacking a network of government-owned arsenals, such as produced the shot and cannon in the days of American innocence, or having dismantled the arsenals it did have, the government is forced to buy what it no longer can make. It becomes a monopsonistic buyer of products which are not yet designed or for which production experience is lacking. It buys at prices for which there is little precedent and hardly any yardsticks. It deals with contractors, a large percentage of whose business is locked into supplying defense, space, or atomic energy needs. It confronts powerful oligopolists in a market where technical capability rather than price is the controlling variable in an atmosphere shrouded by multilateral uncertainty and constant warnings about imminent aggression. Although the MIC was bound up in its origins with the bipolar international environment of the Cold War, some contended that the MIC might endure under different geopolitical conditions (for example, George F. Kennan wrote in 1987 that "were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under the waters of the ocean, the American military–industrial complex would have to remain, substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented."). The collapse of the USSR and the resultant decrease in global military spending (the so-called 'peace dividend') did in fact lead to decreases in defense industrial output and consolidation among major arms producers, although global expenditures rose again following the September 11 terror attacks and the ensuing global war on terror, as well as the more recent increase in geopolitical tensions associated with strategic competition between the United States, Russia, and China. Through to the present, the military-industrial complex has continued to be seen by many as an analytically sound and important concept.
Eras: Some sources divide the history of the military–industrial complex into three distinct eras.
First era: From 1797 to 1941, the government only relied on civilian industries while the country was actually at war. The government owned their own shipyards and weapons manufacturing facilities which they relied on through World War I. With World War II came a massive shift in the way that the U.S. government armed the military.
With the onset of World War II President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the War Production Board to coordinate civilian industries and shift them into wartime production. Throughout World War II arms production in the United States went from around one percent of annual GDP to 40 percent of GDP. Various U.S. companies, such as Boeing and General Motors, maintained and expanded their defense divisions. These companies have gone on to develop various technologies that have improved civilian life as well, such as night-vision goggles and GPS.
Second era: The second era is identified as beginning with the coining of the term by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This era continued through the Cold War period, up to the end of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. A 1965 article written by Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden says benefits of the military–industrial complex of the United States include the advancement of the civilian technology market as civilian companies benefit from innovations from the MIC and vice versa. In 1993, the Pentagon urged defense contractors to consolidate due to the fall of communism and a shrinking defense budget.
Third (current) era: In the third era, defense contractors either consolidated or shifted their focus to civilian innovation. From 1992 to 1997 there was a total of US$55 billion worth of mergers in the defense industry, with major defense companies purchasing smaller competitors.
The U.S. domestic economy is now tied directly to the success of the MIC which has led to concerns of repression as Cold War-era attitudes are still prevalent among the American public.
Shifts in values and the collapse of communism have ushered in a new era for the military–industrial complex. The Department of Defense works in coordination with traditional military–industrial complex aligned companies such as Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Many former defense contractors have shifted operations to the civilian market and sold off their defense departments.
Military subsidy theory: According to the military subsidy theory, the Cold War–era mass production of aircraft benefited the civilian aircraft industry. The theory asserts that the technologies developed during the Cold War along with the financial backing of the military led to the dominance of U.S. aviation companies. There is also strong evidence that the United States federal government intentionally paid a higher price for these innovations to serve as a subsidy for civilian aircraft advancement.
Current applications: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), total world spending on military expenses in 2022 was $2,240 billion. 39% of this total, or $837 billion, was spent by the United States. China was the second largest spender, with $292 billion and 13% of the global share. The privatization of the production and invention of military technology also leads to a complicated relationship with significant research and development of many technologies. In 2011, the United States spent more (in absolute numbers) on its military than the next 13 countries combined.
The military budget of the United States for the 2009 fiscal year was $515.4 billion. Adding emergency discretionary spending and supplemental spending brings the sum to $651.2 billion. This does not include many military-related items that are outside of the Defense Department's budget. Overall, the U.S. federal government is spending about $1 trillion annually on military-related purposes.
President Joe Biden signed a record $886 billion defense spending bill into law on December 22, 2023.
In a 2012 story, Salon reported, "Despite a decline in global arms sales in 2010 due to recessionary pressures, the United States increased its market share, accounting for a whopping 53 percent of the trade that year. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Military–industrial complex | In 2011, the United States spent more (in absolute numbers) on its military than the next 13 countries combined.
The military budget of the United States for the 2009 fiscal year was $515.4 billion. Adding emergency discretionary spending and supplemental spending brings the sum to $651.2 billion. This does not include many military-related items that are outside of the Defense Department's budget. Overall, the U.S. federal government is spending about $1 trillion annually on military-related purposes.
President Joe Biden signed a record $886 billion defense spending bill into law on December 22, 2023.
In a 2012 story, Salon reported, "Despite a decline in global arms sales in 2010 due to recessionary pressures, the United States increased its market share, accounting for a whopping 53 percent of the trade that year. Last year saw the United States on pace to deliver more than $46 billion in foreign arms sales." The military and arms industry also tend to contribute heavily to incumbent members of Congress.
Similar concepts: A thesis similar to the military–industrial complex was originally expressed by Daniel Guérin, in his 1936 book Fascism and Big Business, about the fascist government ties to heavy industry. It can be defined as, "an informal and changing coalition of groups with vested psychological, moral, and material interests in the continuous development and maintenance of high levels of weaponry, in preservation of colonial markets and in military-strategic conceptions of internal affairs." An exhibit of the trend was made in Franz Leopold Neumann's book Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism in 1942, a study of how Nazism came into a position of power in a democratic state.
Within decades of its inception, the idea of the military–industrial complex gave rise to the ideas of other similar industrial complexes, including:: ix–xxv
Animal–industrial complex;
Prison–industrial complex;
Pharmaceutical–industrial complex;
Entertainment-industrial complex;
Medical–industrial complex;
Corporate consumption complex.
Virtually all institutions in sectors ranging from agriculture, medicine, entertainment, and media, to education, criminal justice, security, and transportation, began reconceiving and reconstructing in accordance with capitalist, industrial, and bureaucratic models with the aim of realizing profit, growth, and other imperatives. According to Steven Best, all these systems interrelate and reinforce one another.
The concept of the military–industrial complex has been also expanded to include the entertainment and creative industries as well. For an example in practice, Matthew Brummer describes Japan's Manga Military and how the Ministry of Defense uses popular culture and the moe that it engenders to shape domestic and international perceptions.
An alternative term to describe the interdependence between the military-industrial complex and the entertainment industry is coined by James Der Derian as "Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment-Network". Ray McGovern extended this appellation to Military-Industrial-Congressional-Intelligence-Media-Academia-Think-Tank complex, MICIMATT.
See also: Literature and media
War Is a Racket (1935 book by Smedley Butler)
The Power Elite (1956 book by C. Wright Mills)
Why We Fight (2005 documentary film by Eugene Jarecki)
War Made Easy: How Presidents & Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death (2007 documentary film)
The Complex: How the Military Invades Our Everyday Lives (2008 book by Nick Turse)
Other complexes or axes
List of industrial complexes
References:
Citations:
Sources:
Further reading:
External links:
Khaki capitalism, The Economist, December 3, 2011
Militaryindustrialcomplex.com, Features running daily, weekly and monthly defense spending totals plus Contract Archives section.
C. Wright Mills, Structure of Power in American Society, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9. No. 1 1958
Dwight David Eisenhower, Farewell Address On the military–industrial complex and the government–universities collusion – January 17, 1961
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address As delivered transcript and complete audio from AmericanRhetoric.com
William McGaffin and Erwin Knoll, The military–industrial complex, An analysis of the phenomenon written in 1969
The Cost of War & Today's Military Industrial Complex, National Public Radio, January 8, 2003.
Human Rights First; Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity (2008)
Fifty Years After Eisenhower's Farewell Address, A Look at the Military–Industrial Complex – video report by Democracy Now!
Online documents, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
50th Anniversary of Eisenhower's Farewell Address – Eisenhower Institute
Part 1 – Anniversary Discussion of Eisenhower's Farewell Address – Gettysburg College
Part 2 – Anniversary Discussion of Eisenhower's Farewell Address – Gettysburg College |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Etymology: Militia derives from Latin roots:
miles /miːles/ : soldier
-itia /iːtia/ : a state, activity, quality or condition of being
militia /mil:iːtia/: Military service
The word militia dates back to ancient Rome, and more recently to at least 1590 when it was recorded in a book by Sir John Smythe, Certain Discourses Military with the meanings: a military force; a body of soldiers and military affairs; a body of military discipline
The word Militia comes from ancient Latin, in which it meant defense service, as distinguished from a body of (armed) defenders which would be volgus militum. The term is used by several countries with the meaning of "defense activity" indicating it is taken directly from Latin.
Afghanistan: Militias have been used throughout the history of Afghanistan. Afghan Militias and irregular forces have contributed significantly to the military history of the country and affected the process of state formation.
Andorra: Andorra has a small army, which has historically been raised or reconstituted at various dates, but has never in modern times amounted to a standing army. The basic principle of Andorran defence is that all able-bodied men are available to fight if called upon by the sounding of the Sometent. Being a landlocked country, Andorra has no navy.
Before World War I, Andorra maintained an armed militia force of about 600 part-time militiamen under the supervision of a Captain (Capità or Cap de Sometent) and a Lieutenant (Desener or Lloctinent del Capità). This body was not liable for service outside the principality and was commanded by two officials (veguers) appointed by France and the Bishop of Urgell.
In the modern era, the army has consisted of a very small body of volunteers willing to undertake ceremonial duties. Uniforms and weaponry were handed down from generation to generation within families and communities.
The army's role in internal security was largely taken over by the formation of the Police Corps of Andorra in 1931. Brief civil disorder associated with the elections of 1933 led to assistance being sought from the French National Gendarmerie, with a detachment resident in Andorra for two months under the command of René-Jules Baulard. The Andorran Police was reformed in the following year, with eleven soldiers appointed to supervisory roles. The force consisted of six Corporals, one for each parish (although there are currently seven parishes, there were only six until 1978), plus four junior staff officers to co-ordinate action, and a commander with the rank of major. It was the responsibility of the six corporals, each in his own parish, to be able to raise a fighting force from among the able-bodied men of the parish.
Today a small, twelve-man ceremonial unit remains the only permanent section of the Sometent, but all able-bodied men remain technically available for military service, with a requirement for each family to have access to a firearm. An area weapon such as a Shotgun per household is unregulated, however ranged weapons such as Pistols and Rifles require a license. The army has not fought for more than 700 years, and its main responsibility is to present the flag of Andorra at official ceremonial functions. According to Marc Forné Molné, Andorra's military budget is strictly from voluntary donations, and the availability of full-time volunteers.
In more recent times there has only been a general emergency call to the popular army of Sometent during the floods of 1982 in the Catalan Pyrenees, where 12 citizens perished in Andorra, to help the population and establish a public order along with the Local Police units.
Argentina: In the early 1800s Buenos Aires, which was by then the capital of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, was attacked during the British invasions of the Río de la Plata. As regular military forces were insufficient to counter the British attackers, Santiago de Liniers drafted all males in the city capable of bearing arms into the military. These recruits included the criollo peoples, who ranked low down in the social hierarchy, as well as some slaves. With these reinforcements, the British armies were twice defeated. The militias became a strong factor in the politics of the city afterwards, as a springboard from which the criollos could manifest their political ambitions. They were a key element in the success of the May Revolution, which deposed the Spanish viceroy and began the Argentine War of Independence. A decree by Mariano Moreno derogated the system of promotions involving criollos, allowing instead their promotion on military merit.
The Argentine Civil War was waged by militias again, as both federalists and unitarians drafted common people into their ranks as part of ongoing conflicts. These irregular armies were organized at a provincial level, and assembled as leagues depending on political pacts. This system had declined by the 1870s, mainly due to the establishment of the modern Argentine Army, drafted for the Paraguayan War by President Bartolomé Mitre. Provincial militias were outlawed and decimated by the new army throughout the presidential terms of Mitre, Sarmiento, Avellaneda and Roca.
Armenia: Armenian militia, or fedayi played a major role in the independence of various Armenian states, including Western Armenia, the First Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Artsakh. Armenian militia also played a role in the Georgia-Abkhazia War of 1992–1993.
Australia: In the Colony of New South Wales, Governor Lachlan Macquarie proposed a colonial militia but the idea was rejected. Governor Ralph Darling felt a mounted police force was more efficient than a militia. A military volunteer movement attracted wide interest during the Crimean War. Following Federation, the various military reserve forces of the Commonwealth of Australia became the Citizen Military Force (CMF).
A citizens' militia modeled on the British Home Guard called the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC) was founded by the Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL) in 1940 in response to the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Australia. In the beginning, members didn't have uniforms and often paraded in business attire. They were given instruction on guerrilla warfare, and later the private organization was taken over by the Australian Government and became part of the Australian Military Forces (AMF). The government supported the organization and equipped them with anti-aircraft artillery; however, they were disbanded by the end of World War II due to the fact that there was no longer a significant threat to national security.
Austria: During the Revolutions of 1848 in the Austrian Empire, a National Guard was established in Vienna. A separate but related Academic Legion was composed mainly of students in the capital city.
After World War I, multiple militias formed as soldiers returned home to their villages, only to find many of them occupied by Slovene and Yugoslav forces. Especially in the southern province of Carinthia the Volkswehr (Peoples Defense Force) was formed, to fight the occupant forces.
During the First Republic, similar to the development in Germany, increasing radicalization of politics led to certain paramilitary militias associating with certain political parties. The Heimwehr (German: Home Defense) became affiliated with the Christian Social Party and the Republikanischer Schutzbund (German: Republican Defense League) became affiliated with the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria. Violence increasingly escalated, breaking out during the July Revolt of 1927 and finally the Austrian Civil War, when the Schutzbund was defeated by the Heimwehr, police, Gendarmerie and Austrian Armed Forces.
After World War II the Austrian Armed Forces (Bundesheer) were reestablished as a conscript military force. A basic part of it is the militia, which is a regular reservists force of the Bundesheer, comparable to the national guard units of the United States. The conscript soldiers of the militia have to store their military equipment at home, to be mobilized quite fast within a few days in case of emergency. The system was established during the Cold War and still exists, but the members of the militia now are volunteers only.
Bahrain: In Bahrain, emergence of a small militia group Katibat al Haydariyah was first seen in 2015. During the year, total four attacks were claimed by the group, including on August 22 and 24, 2015, in Muharraq, on September 10, 2015, in Al Khamis, and on October 9, 2015, on Bahraini forces in the Al Juffair region. Katibat al Haydariyah is its own distinct organization that decries the Bahraini government, but Canada and the United Kingdom listed it as an alias for the larger Al-Ashtar Brigades (or the Saraya al Ashtar). After four years, the militia group reemerged on social media in October 2019, to threaten new attacks on the island. It stated that they “will not retreat from our goals of the downfall of the Al Khalifa entity,” and that “soon, guns will open their mouths and they will hear the whiz of bullets”.
Belgium: The Garde Civique or Burgerwacht (French and Dutch; "Civic Guard") was a Belgian paramilitary militia which existed between 1830 and 1920. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Katibat al Haydariyah is its own distinct organization that decries the Bahraini government, but Canada and the United Kingdom listed it as an alias for the larger Al-Ashtar Brigades (or the Saraya al Ashtar). After four years, the militia group reemerged on social media in October 2019, to threaten new attacks on the island. It stated that they “will not retreat from our goals of the downfall of the Al Khalifa entity,” and that “soon, guns will open their mouths and they will hear the whiz of bullets”.
Belgium: The Garde Civique or Burgerwacht (French and Dutch; "Civic Guard") was a Belgian paramilitary militia which existed between 1830 and 1920. Created in October 1830 shortly after the Belgian Revolution, the Guard amalgamated the various militia groups which had been created by the middle classes to protect property during the political uncertainty. Its role was as a quasi-military "gendarmerie", with the primary role of maintaining social order within Belgium. Increasingly anachronistic, it was demobilised in 1914 and officially disbanded in 1920, following a disappointing performance during the German invasion of Belgium in World War I.
Brazil: In Brazil, the word milícia is heavily associated with paramilitary and drug-related criminal groups.
Canada: In Canada the title "Militia" historically referred to the land component of the armed forces, both regular (full-time) and reserve. The earliest Canadian militias date from the beginning of the French colonial period. In New France, King Louis XIV created a compulsory militia of settlers in every parish that supported French authorities in the defence and expansion of the colony.
Following the British conquest of New France in 1760, local militia units supported British Army regiments stationed in British America, and, after the secession of thirteen continental colonies in the American War of Independence, British North America. In addition to the Canadian militia, British regiments were also supported by locally raised regulars (including the 40th Regiment of Foot, and the 100th (Prince of Wales's Royal Canadian) Regiment of Foot) and Fencibles regiments. These regiments were raised through ordinary modes of recruiting, as opposed to being raised by ballot like the militia. Most militia units were only activated in time of war, but remained inactive in between. The battle honours awarded to these colonial militia regiments are perpetuated by modern regiments within the Canadian Army.
Defence of the Canadas long relied on a contingent of British soldiers, as well as support from the Royal Navy. However, the Crimean War saw the diversion of a significant number of British soldiers from British North America. Fearing possible incursions from the United States, the Parliament of the Province of Canada passed the Militia Act of 1855, creating the Active Militia. The Active Militia, later splitting into the Permanent Active Militia (PAM), a full-time professional army component (although it continued to use the label militia), and Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM), a military reserve force for the Canadian militia. Following 1855, the traditional sedentary militia was reorganized into the Reserve Militia, with its last enrolment taking place in 1873, and was formally abolished in 1950.
Prior to Canadian Confederation, the colonies that made up the Maritimes, and Newfoundland maintained their own militias independent of the Canadian Militia. Bermuda, part of British North America and militarily subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Maritimes, allowed its militia to lapse following the American War of 1812. United States Independence, however, elevated Bermuda to the status of an Imperial fortress and it would be strongly defended by the regular army, and left out of the confederation of Canada. From 1853 to 1871, the Colony of Vancouver Island (and the succeeding Colony of British Columbia) periodically raised and disbanded militia units. These units were raised for specific purposes, or in response to a specific threat, real or perceived.
After the Treaty of Washington was signed between the Americans and British, nearly all remaining British soldiers were withdrawn from Canada in November 1871. The departure of the majority of British forces in Canada made the Canadian militia the only major land forces available in Canada. In 1940, both components of the militia, PAM and NPAM were reorganized, the former into Canadian Army (Active), the latter into the Canadian Army (Reserve)
In addition to the various colonial militia units, and the regiments of the Canadian militia, in 1942, the Army's Pacific Command created the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Intended to function similarly to the United Kingdom's Home Guard, the Rangers were a secondary defence force, defending the coast of British Columbia and Yukon from potential Japanese attack. The Rangers were disbanded in September 1945, shortly after the conclusion of World War II. The legacy of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers is perpetuated by the Canadian Rangers, a component of the Primary Reserve that provides a military presence in areas where it would not be economically or practically viable to have conventional Army units – most notably northern Canada.
The Canadian Army Reserve continued to use the term militia in reference to itself until the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968. Since unification, no Canadian military force has formally used militia in its name. However, the Canadian Army Reserve is still colloquially referred to as the militia. Members of the Canadian Army Reserve troops typically train one night a week and every other weekend of the month, except in the summer. Summertime training may consist of courses, individual call-outs, or concentrations (unit and formation training of one to two weeks' duration). Most Canadian cities and counties have one or more militia units. Primary Reserve members may volunteer for overseas service, to augment their regular force counterparts—usually during NATO or United Nations missions.
China: China's current militia falls under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and forms part of the Chinese armed forces. Under the command of the military organs, it undertakes such jobs as war preparation services, security and defense operational tasks and assistance in maintaining social order and public security.
Historically, militias of varying levels of ability have existed in China, organized on a village and clan level, especially during periods of instability and in areas subject to pirate and bandit attack. When the British attempted to take control of the New Territories in 1898, they were resisted by the local militias which had been formed for mutual defence against pirate raids. Although ultimately defeated, the militias' dogged resistance convinced the British to make concessions to the indigenous inhabitants allowing them to preserve inheritance, property and marriage rights and customs throughout most of the period of the British rule.
Cuba: Cuba has three militia organizations: The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicias de Tropas Territoriales) of about one million people (half women), the Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo) devoted to agricultural production, and a naval militia. Formerly, there existed the National Revolutionary Militias (Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias), which was formed after the Cuban Revolution and initially consisted of 200,000 men who helped the 25,000 strong standing army defeat counter-revolutionary guerillas.
Czech Republic: In 2021, the Czech Parliament passed an Act No. 14/2021 Coll., on the handling of weapons in certain cases affecting the internal order or security of the Czech Republic. The Act's number 14/21 symbolically refers to the 600th anniversary of civilian firearms possession in the country. The legislation establishes "a system of firearms training, the purpose of which is to improve the knowledge, abilities and skills of persons authorised to handle firearms for the purpose of ensuring internal order or the security of the Czech Republic". Gun owners can join government endorsed advanced shooting training courses with their privately owned firearms and become members of the militia-style Designated Reserves.
Denmark: The Danish Home Guard (Danish: Hjemmeværnet) (HJV) is the fourth service of the Danish military. It was formerly concerned only with the defence of Danish territory but, since 2008, it has also supported Danish international military efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo. There are five branches: Army Home Guard, Naval Home Guard, Air Force Home Guard, Police Home Guard, and Infrastructure Home Guard.
Estonia: The Omakaitse (Home Guard) was an organisation formed by the local population of Estonia on the basis of the Estonian Defence League and the forest brothers resistance movement active on the Eastern Front between 3 July 1941 and 17 September 1944. This arrangement was unique in the context of the war as in Latvia, which otherwise shared a common fate with Estonia, there was no organisation of this kind.
Ethiopia: The People's Militia was established in 1975 under the Derg regime's Proclamation No 71, used to assist police forces and protect farms and property. The militia did operations in Eritrea during the Ogaden War, while Mengistu Haile Mariam reconstituted as the "Red Army". The Derg government conscripted about 30,000 to 40,000 civilians into the militia from Shewa, Wollo, and Gojam provinces in May 1976. The Fano militia is an ethno-nationalist Amhara militia and former protest movement that emerged during the premiership of Abiy Ahmed. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | This arrangement was unique in the context of the war as in Latvia, which otherwise shared a common fate with Estonia, there was no organisation of this kind.
Ethiopia: The People's Militia was established in 1975 under the Derg regime's Proclamation No 71, used to assist police forces and protect farms and property. The militia did operations in Eritrea during the Ogaden War, while Mengistu Haile Mariam reconstituted as the "Red Army". The Derg government conscripted about 30,000 to 40,000 civilians into the militia from Shewa, Wollo, and Gojam provinces in May 1976. The Fano militia is an ethno-nationalist Amhara militia and former protest movement that emerged during the premiership of Abiy Ahmed. Fano intervened armed conflicts in the post-2018 regime, including Benishangul-Gumuz's Metekel conflict, Tigray War and recently War in Amhara. They have been accused of ethnic massacres against other ethnic groups, such as the Qemant and other minorities.
Finland: While Finland employs conscription, they do not have separate militia units: all units are organized by and under the command of the Finnish Defence Forces. All men belong to the reserve until age 50 or 60 depending on rank, and may be called up in case of mobilization. Each reservist is assigned a position in a unit to be activated. However, since 2004, the FDF does have territorial forces, organized along the lines of regular infantry formations, which are composed of volunteers. Furthermore, long-range patrol units (sissi troops, a type of special forces) are assigned to local troops.
In history, before Finland became independent, two types of local militias existed: the White Guards and Red Guards, which were non-socialists and socialists, respectively. In the Finnish Civil War (1918) the White Guards founded the White Army, which was victorious over the Red Guards. White Guards continued their existence as a volunteer militia until the Second World War. In some cases their activity found overt political expression as in the Mäntsälä rebellion. However, in 1934 separate wartime White Guard units were dissolved and in the Second World War they served at the front, dispersed in regular units. They were dissolved as a condition of peace after the Continuation War.
France: The first notable militia in French history was the resistance of the Gauls to invasion by the Romans until they were defeated by Julius Caesar. Centuries later, Joan of Arc organized and led a militia until her capture and execution in 1431. This settled the succession to the French crown and laid the basis for the formation of the modern nation of France.
During the French Revolution the National Guard was a political home defense militia. The levée en masse was a conscription army used during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, the Parisian National Guard engaged the Prussian Army and later rebelled against the Versailles Army under Marshal McMahon.
Under German occupation during World War II, a militia usually called the French Resistance emerged to conduct a guerrilla war of attrition against German forces and prepare the way for the D-Day Allied Invasion of France. The Resistance militia were opposed by the collaborationist French Militia—the paramilitary police force of the German puppet state of Vichy.
Although defunct from 1871 until 2016, the French National Guard has now been reestablished for homeland security purposes.
Germany: The earliest reports of Germanic militias was the system of hundreds described in AD 98 by the Roman historian Tacitus as the centeni. They were similar in nature to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd.
Freikorps (German for "Free Corps") was originally applied to voluntary armies. The first Freikorps were recruited by Frederick II of Prussia during the Seven Years' War. These troops were regarded as unreliable by regular armies, so they were mainly used as sentries and for minor duties. During the Napoleonic occupation, organizations such as the Lutzow Free Corps fought against the occupiers and later joined the allied forces as regular soldiers.
However, after 1918, the term was used for nationalist paramilitary organizations that sprang up around Germany as soldiers returned in defeat from World War I. They were one of the many Weimar paramilitary groups active during that time. They received considerable support from Gustav Noske, the German Defence Minister who used them to crush the Spartakist League with enormous violence, including the murders of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg on January 15, 1919. Militia were also used to put down the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919. They were officially "disbanded" in 1920, resulting in the ill-fated Kapp Putsch in March 1920. The Einwohnerwehr, active in Germany from 1919 to 1921 was a paramilitary citizens' militia consisting of hundreds of thousands of mostly former servicemen. Formed by the Prussian Ministry of the Interior on April 15, 1919, to allow citizens to protect themselves from looters, armed gangs, and revolutionaries, the Einwohnerwehr was under the command of the local Reichswehr regiments, which supplied its guns. In 1921, the Berlin government dissolved the Einwohnerwehr. Many of its members went on to join the Nazi Party.
In 1921 the Nazi Party created the Sturmabteilung (SA; Storm Detachment; Brownshirts), which was the first paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party and served as a Nazi militia whose initial assignment was to protect Nazi leaders at rallies and assemblies. The SA also took part in street battles against the forces of rival political parties and violent actions against Jews. From the SA sprung the Schutzstaffel (SS; Protective Squadron) which grew to become one of the largest and most powerful groups in Nazi Germany, which Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler (the leader of the SS from 1929) envisioned as an elite group of guards. The Waffen-SS, the military branch of the SS, became a de facto fourth branch of the Wehrmacht.
In 1944–1945, as World War II came to a close in Europe, the German high command deployed increasing numbers of Volkssturm units to combat duties. These regiments were composed of men, women and children too old, young or otherwise unfit for service in the Wehrmacht (German Regular Army). Their primary role was assisting the army with fortification duties and digging anti-tank ditches. As the shortage of manpower became severe, they were used as front line infantry, most often in urban settings. Due to the physical state of members, almost non-existent training and shortage of weapons, there was not much the Volkssturm could do except act like shields for regular army units.
India: Salwa Judum (meaning "Peace March" or "Purification Hunt" in Gondi language) was a militia active in the Chhattisgarh state of India.
Village Defence Guards formerly known as Village Defence committee were first set up in 1995, according to The Indian Express. The idea to set up VDCs was rooted in the arming of ex-service personnel in 1965 and 1971 wars to check Pakistani infiltration and espionage, noted The Express. The VDCs were formed in Jammu region of J&K to offer self-defence capabilities to villagers in the face of looming terrorist threats. Under the scheme, each VDC used to have a Special Police Officer (SPO) as its in-charge and there were 10-15 other volunteer members, mostly ex-service personnel. They were given .303 rifles and ammunition. The SPO in charge of the VDC was paid whereas the rest were volunteers. In 2020, the policy of Village Defence Committees was revamped and Village Defence Groups were introduced, members of whom are called Village Defence Guards (VDGs).It was not just a change of name as the very structure of committees was changed. Unlike VDCs where only SPOs were paid, all VDGs are paid.
A total of 4,153 Village Defence Groups (VDG) and 32,355 Special Police Officers were engaged in Jammu and Kashmir in different responsibilities for the protection of civilians and anti-terrorists operations.
Shri Parshotam Kumar, resident of district Rajouri is a farmer by profession and Village Defence Committee Member was awarded Shaurya Chakra, a gallantry award. Shri Parshotam Kumar in August 2023, while in the jungle with his family collecting fire wood, he spotted two suspicious armed individuals with rucksacks resting in close vicinity to his location. Realizing the imminent danger to the village, he quietly moved his family members to safety of their house and fetched his weapon while also alerting other members of Village Defence Committee, Police and the Army. While the forces were closing in, unmindful of his safety, he tailed the two terrorists and with raw courage and excellent field craft, he closed in to the terrorists and engaged them from a close distance. He maintained contact with the other till security forces closed in. His brave act led to the neutralization of one foreign terrorist. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Shri Parshotam Kumar, resident of district Rajouri is a farmer by profession and Village Defence Committee Member was awarded Shaurya Chakra, a gallantry award. Shri Parshotam Kumar in August 2023, while in the jungle with his family collecting fire wood, he spotted two suspicious armed individuals with rucksacks resting in close vicinity to his location. Realizing the imminent danger to the village, he quietly moved his family members to safety of their house and fetched his weapon while also alerting other members of Village Defence Committee, Police and the Army. While the forces were closing in, unmindful of his safety, he tailed the two terrorists and with raw courage and excellent field craft, he closed in to the terrorists and engaged them from a close distance. He maintained contact with the other till security forces closed in. His brave act led to the neutralization of one foreign terrorist.
Iran: The Basij militia founded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in November 1979, is composed of 90,000 men, with an active and reserve strength up to 300,000 men. It ultimately draws from about 1 million members, and is subordinate to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran.
Iraq: Since the rise of ISIL in 2014 and their conquest of many predominantly-Sunni areas in Iraq, the Shiite militias became even more prominent in the country by joining the Iraqi Army in many major battles against ISIL.
Israel: In 1908 a Jewish underground organisation, Bar Giora, re-invented itself as an armed militia – Hashomer. It was established to provide Jewish guards for the Zionist colonies being established in Ottoman Palestine. The group existed for 10 years. At its height it had around 100 members, including 23 women.
In modern times, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is often described as a heavily armed militia, not a full-fledged army, since it is legally and publicly viewed as a defensive force only, and since it relies heavily on the reserve duty of Israeli citizens who are annually called to service for set periods of time, rather than on professional, full-time soldiers. Israeli settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories rely on armed militia teams for their security. National service conscripts can also serve in the Israel Border Police (commonly known by its Hebrew abbreviation Magav which means border guard in Hebrew), which is a paramilitary branch of the Israel Police rather than the IDF.
Latvia:
Libya: Since the fall of Gaddafi's rule of Libya in the aftermath of the Libyan Civil War, rebel groups that have contributed to the revolution splintered into self-organized militia movements and have been involved in a feud for control of each city. Since the revolution, reports of clashes and violence by militia groups have been increasing.
Mexico: Mexico has a history of various activities and insurrection by militia and paramilitary groups dating back several hundred years that include the exploits of historical figures such as Captain Manuel Pineda Munoz and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. This also includes groups such as the Free-Colored Militia (the interracial militias of New Spain, Colonial Mexico), the Camisas Doradas, and the contemporary Self Defense Council of Michoacan.
Free-colored militias were an important and at times critical organization in Colonial Mexico. Prior to the eighteenth century, Spain's territories in the Americas were mainly defended through a series of Spanish military units being based in strategic coastal port cities and important economic centers.: 8–10 But as European rivals began to challenge the Spanish crown and their dominance in the new world, the Bourbon dynasty initiated a series of reforms, allowing people from their colonies to serve in the regular armies, as well as permitting local militias in their territories.: 14–16
While these groups began to integrate themselves into the official Spanish colonial militaries, free-colored militias have been reluctantly used since the-mid sixteenth century. Palenques, or run away slave communities, would often initiate slavery uprising in various cities and towns in New Spain, which made the colonial Spanish authorities uneasy about arming any free colored individuals.: 14–16 Free colored rebellions and violence in Mexico City impacted regional policy of New Spain towards blacks. Given this social context, the racial climate in which these free-colored militias first appeared was a hostile one, and the first militias often had conflicts within them between their free-colored and white commanders.: 20–23 The first large scale recruitment of fee-colored militias was in response to the attack on Veracruz port in 1683 by Dutch pirateer Lorenzo de Graff, with free-colored soldiers being called in from Mexico City, Puebla, Orizaba and other large colonial cities.: 30–32 Militias increasingly began to take shape and develop over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, but it's critical to understand that their development was not a linear progressive one. The experiences of militias in urban areas was vastly different from those in rural communities, and the role, influence, and duties of militias in the early 17th century were not the same as those of a century later. The critical stage for militia growth was during 1670–1762, where there was an increase of the militias responsibilities and they gained a considerable amount of autonomy over their own affairs.: 30–32 The social impact of these free-colored militias added complexity to the race-based caste system that dominated the social landscape.
Free-colored militias were structured to follow the tercio organizational model that was used by Spanish Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties.: 47–50 Tercios compromised 2,500 soldiers distributed among ten companies, each under the leadership of a captain. Free-colored militias under the tercio system were headed by a sargento mayor (major) who became the senior operating officer in militias. Under the sargento mayor were the junior officers, which included one captain and alferez (lieutenant) per company, who were also aided by an ayudante (adjutant) and subteniente (second lieutenant) after they were incorporated into the system after 1767. The captain had supreme authority within their company, only reporting to the sargento mayor when he could not control matters of the company. The alferez coordinated affairs with his captain and was next in line in command in his absence. Below the junior officers were ranking NCO's and up to four sergeants served per company. A cabo (corporal) was assigned to lead each squad of 25 soldiers. These NCO's were responsible for discipline of the soldiers and maintaining a limited record of individuals.: 47–50 Officers and first sergeants were the only soldiers in the free-colored militias to receive a monthly salary with lower ranked soldiers only receiving pay when on campaigns. Their salaries came from the royal treasuries, alongside occasional supplementation by private contributions of prominent individuals.: 83–84
Who exactly constitutes as a “free-colored person” is subject to much debate and discussion. While the terms pardos, mulatos, negros and morenos were commonly used under the caste system that was in place during this era, their use in this context is much more complex and who exactly qualified as who was a very fluid process, dependent on the social context of the time and place.: 200–201 Despite the lack of universal understanding of racial identification across New Spain, when they were faced with external threats to their organizations, free-colored militias showed great racial unity in these times, such as in the case of Huajolotitlan, a small town of Oaxaca in southern Mexico.: 207–211 After a decree was passed in 1784 calling for the retirement of every free-colored officer and the disbandment of their militia, the tows free-coloreds fiercely resisted. Free-colored soldiers refused to leave their posts and they dispatched to the capital in protests to defend their racially integrated organizations. This later inspired the communities other free-colored people to protests what they saw as other aggressions by the government, such as increasing tribute burdens.: 207–211
While some of the previous examples are historical, the current official view on the existence of such militias in Mexico, when they are not backed by the government, has been to always label them as illegal and to combat them in a military and a political way.
Modern examples on the Mexican view on militias are the Chiapas conflict against the EZLN and against the EPR in Guerrero, where the government forces combated the upraised militias. And in a more recent case when civilian self-defence militias appeared during the Mexican war on drugs, the government regulated them and transformed the militias in to Rural federal forces, and those who resisted were combated and imprisoned.
Montenegro: In 1910 King Nicholas I of Montenegro proclaimed that all male citizens were members of a national militia and had both a right and a duty to own at least one Gasser Pattern revolver under penalty of law.
The official reason for the King's decree was to create an armed populace that would deter neighbouring countries from attacking Montenegro, which was unable to field a large army. However, it was widely believed in Montenegro that this decision was actually taken because the King owned shares in Leopold Gasser Waffenfabrik in Vienna - the patent holder and sole manufacturer of the pistol at that time. Despite this, the decree actually obliged Montenegrin adult males to own a Gasser Pattern revolver, not necessarily one made by Gasser itself. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Montenegro: In 1910 King Nicholas I of Montenegro proclaimed that all male citizens were members of a national militia and had both a right and a duty to own at least one Gasser Pattern revolver under penalty of law.
The official reason for the King's decree was to create an armed populace that would deter neighbouring countries from attacking Montenegro, which was unable to field a large army. However, it was widely believed in Montenegro that this decision was actually taken because the King owned shares in Leopold Gasser Waffenfabrik in Vienna - the patent holder and sole manufacturer of the pistol at that time. Despite this, the decree actually obliged Montenegrin adult males to own a Gasser Pattern revolver, not necessarily one made by Gasser itself. In fact Leopold Gasser was faced with such heavy demand for the pistol internationally, that it could not fulfil all of the orders placed for it. This led the revolver's manufacturer to license out production to other companies and many Gasser Pattern pistols were then manufactured and sold by other European firms, most notably based out of Belgium and Spain. Even these licensed models did not satiate demand for the pistol and this, alongside a lax enforcement of intellectual property rights in Montenegro, led to many unlicensed local models of the pistol also being produced, with quality ranging from very good to outright dangerous to its user.
Subsequently, the weapon quickly became a status symbol for Montenegrin men and was commonly worn alongside traditional attire. Many Montenegrin immigrants that travelled to North America brought their Gasser pattern revolvers with them and at least two batches of several thousand pistols were smuggled into Mexico during the Mexican Revolution, leading to the Gasser revolver becoming widespread in the Americas. However, as the original reason for their mass production and the generation that grew around it faded, the pistol eventually lost its place as a status symbol and many were either given away or sold in the secondhand market.
Netherlands: Schutterij (Dutch pronunciation: [sxʏtəˈrɛi]) refers to a voluntary city guard or citizen militia in the medieval and early modern Netherlands, intended to protect the town or city from attack and act in case of revolt or fire. Their training grounds were often on open spaces within the city, near the city walls, but, when the weather did not allow, inside a church. They are mostly grouped according to their district and to the weapon that they used: bow, crossbow or gun. Together, its members are called a Schuttersgilde, which could be roughly translated as a "shooter's guild". It is now a title applied to ceremonial shooting clubs and to the country's Olympic rifle team.
New Zealand: From the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 until 1844 small detachments of British Imperial troops based in New Zealand were the only military. This changed as a result of the Flagstaff War, with the colonial government passing a Militia Act on 25 March 1845. Militia units were formed in Auckland, Wellington, New Plymouth, and Nelson. Service in the militia was compulsory.
Many localized militia saw service, together with British Imperial troops, during the New Zealand Wars. In the late nineteenth century a system of local Volunteer militias evolved throughout the country. These were semi-trained but uniformed and administered by a small number of regular "Imperial" officers.
The militia units were disbanded and reformed as the Territorial Army in 1911.
North Korea: The Worker-Peasant Red Guards is a North Korean paramilitary organization organized on a provincial/town/city/village level.
Norway:
Pakistan: Militias have played an important role supporting Pakistan's Military since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 when Pakistan, with the support of militias, was able to gain control of parts of the region of Kashmir. Pakistan found the militias volunteering to participate in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 quite useful as well.
Currently Pakistani citizens forming militias from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province are participating in the 'war on terror'.
Portugal: Portugal has a long tradition in the use of militias for national defense. Between the 12th and 16th centuries, the municipal militias – composed of spearmen, pikemen, horsemen, slingers, javelineers, archers, crossbowmen and later arquebusiers – constituted the main component of the Portuguese Royal Army, together with smaller military forces from the King, the military orders and the feudal lords.
After some failed previous attempts, in 1570 King Sebastian of Portugal created the Ordenanças, a centrally managed military territorial organization that would replace the municipal militias and became the basis of a national army. After 60 years of foreign domination (1580–1640), the Ordenanças were reorganized for the Portuguese Restoration War. The Portuguese Army was then organized in three lines, with the 2nd and 3rd being militia forces. The Ordenanças became the 3rd line and acted both as a territorial draft organization for the 1st and 2nd line troops and as a kind of home guard for local defense. The 2nd line was made of the auxiliary troops, also militia units with the role of regional defense. In the end of the 18th century, the auxiliary troops were renamed "Militias".
In the Peninsular War, the Militia regiments and the Ordenanças units had an important role in the defense of the country against the Napoleonic invader army. Still in the 19th century, the Militia units also had an important role in the Liberal Wars, with the majority of those troops fighting on the side of King Miguel. Besides the regular militias, a number of volunteer militia units were formed to fight on both sides of the war.
With the establishment of the constitutional regime, the old Militias and Ordenanças were replaced by a single national militia force, the National Guard. However, the National Guard revealed itself an ineffective and undisciplined force. Their units became highly politicized, being involved in a number of conspiracies and coups. The National Guard having less and less confidence from the authorities, became extinct in 1847, terminating a long tradition of national militias in Portugal.
During the 20th century, some experiments with militia type forces were made. From 1911 to 1926, the Portuguese Army was organized as a militia army. Also, in 1936, the Estado Novo regime created the Portuguese Legion as a political volunteer militia, dedicated to the fight against the enemies of country and of the social order. From World War II, the Portuguese Legion assumed the responsibility for civil defense, this becoming its main role during the Cold War, until its extinction in 1974.
Russia and the Soviet Union: Neither the Russian Empire, nor the Soviet Union ever had an organised force that could be equated to a militia. Instead a form of organisation that predated the Russian state was used during national emergencies called Narodnoe Opolcheniye (People's Regimentation). More comparable to the English Fyrd, it was a popular voluntary joining of the local полк polk, or a regiment, though it had no regular established strength or officers, these usually elected from prominent local citizens. The Tsarist regime was particularly reluctant to arm and organise militia forces because of concern over a repetition of the Pugachev Serf Revolt of the late 18th century. Only in the face of the national emergency of 1812 was the raising of opolcheniye "cohorts" permitted. Numbering over 223,000, loosely trained and barely equipped, these enthusiastic volunteers nevertheless provided a useful reserve for the regular army.
Although these spontaneously created popular forces had participated in several major wars of the Russian Empire, including in combat, they were not obligated to serve for more than one year, and notably departed for home during the 1813 campaign in Germany. On only one occasion, during the military history of the Soviet Union, the Narodnoe Opolcheniye was incorporated into the regular forces of the Red Army, notably in Leningrad and Moscow.
The term Militsiya in Russia and former Communist Bloc nations was specifically used to refer to the civilian police force, and should not be confused with the conventional western definition of militia. The term, as used in this context, dated from post-revolutionary Russia in late 1917 and was intended to draw a distinction between the new Soviet law enforcement agencies and the disbanded Tsarist police. In some of these states, such as Ukraine, the "militia" were renamed as "police" while in other states (e.g. Belarus) the title remains unchanged. In Russia itself the "militia' became "police" (in Russian: Полиция, Politsiya) in March 2011.
Sri Lanka: The first militias formed in Sri Lanka were by Lankan Kings, who raised militia armies for their military campaigns both within and outside the island. This was due to the reason that the Kings never maintained a standing army instead had a Royal Guard during peacetime and formed a militia in wartime.
When the Portuguese who were the first colonial power to dominate the island raised local militias under the command of local leaders known as Mudaliyars. These militias took part in the many Portuguese campaigns against the Lankan Kings. The Dutch continued to employ these militias but due to their unreliability tended to favor employing Swiss and Malay mercenaries in their campaigns in the island. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Belarus) the title remains unchanged. In Russia itself the "militia' became "police" (in Russian: Полиция, Politsiya) in March 2011.
Sri Lanka: The first militias formed in Sri Lanka were by Lankan Kings, who raised militia armies for their military campaigns both within and outside the island. This was due to the reason that the Kings never maintained a standing army instead had a Royal Guard during peacetime and formed a militia in wartime.
When the Portuguese who were the first colonial power to dominate the island raised local militias under the command of local leaders known as Mudaliyars. These militias took part in the many Portuguese campaigns against the Lankan Kings. The Dutch continued to employ these militias but due to their unreliability tended to favor employing Swiss and Malay mercenaries in their campaigns in the island.
The British Empire then ousted the Dutch from the coastal areas of the country, and sought to conquer the independent Kandyan Kingdom. In 1802, the British became the first foreign power to raise a regular unit of Sinhalese with British officers, which was named the 2nd Ceylon Regiment, also known as the Sepoy Corps. It fought alongside British troops in the Kandyan wars. After the Matale Rebellion led by Puran Appu in 1848, in which a number of Sinhalese recruits defected to the side of the rebels, the recruitment of Sinhalese to the British forces was temporarily halted and the Ceylon Regiments disbanded.
In 1861, the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers were raised as a militia, but soon became a military reserve force. This became the Ceylon Defence Force in 1910 and consisted of militia units. These were the Colombo Town Guard and the Town Guard Artillery formed during the two world wars.
With the escalation of the Sri Lankan Civil War, local villagers under threat of attack were formed into localized militia to protect their families and homes. According to the Sri Lankan Military these militias were formed after "massacres done by the LTTE" and in the early 1990s they were reformed as the Sri Lankan Home Guard. In 2007 the Home Guard became the Sri Lanka Civil Security Force. In 2008, the government called for the formation of nearly 15,000 civil defence committees at the village level for additional protection.
In 2004, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed have establish a voluntary "Tamil Eelam auxiliary force". According to the LTTE's then head of police, the force was to be assigned to tasks such as rehabilitation, construction, forest conservation and agriculture, but would also be used to battle the Sri Lankan military if the need arose. In early 2009 it ceased to exist with the military defeat of the LTTE at the hands of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces.
Sudan: The Janjaweed militia consists of armed Arab Muslims fighting for the government in Khartoum against non-Arab Muslim "rebels". They are active in the Darfur region of western Sudan and also in eastern Chad. According to Human Rights Watch these partisans are responsible for abuses including war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
Sweden: As of 2012, the Swedish Home Guard consists of 22,000 organized into 40 light infantry battalions of 300–700 Guardsmen. These battalions are then organised into companies, usually one for every municipality. The main task of the battalions is to guard vital military and civilian installations throughout the country.
In 2001, the Rapid Response units numbered around 5,000 soldiers of the total of 42,000. As of 2014, the majority of the force, 17,000 out of 22,000 soldiers will be in Rapid Response units. The decrease in number of troops comes with an equal increase in quality and modern equipment. These units are motorized and are ready to be mobilized more often, than other Home Guard units. Rapid response units have more combat tasks compared to the rest of the Home Guard, including escort duties. Some battalions located near the coast also have marine companies equipped with Combat Boat 90. A few battalions have recently set up 'specialized' companies to evaluate the possibility to add new abilities to the Home Guard. These are at the time of writing eight reconnaissance/intelligence companies, four CBRN-platoons, a movcon platoon, an engineer platoon, and a military police unit.
Switzerland: One of the best known and ancient militias is the Swiss Armed Forces. Switzerland has long maintained, proportionally, the second largest military force in the world, with about half the proportional amount of reserve forces of the Israeli Defense Forces, a militia of some 33% of the total population. The "militia principle" of public duties is central to Swiss political culture and not limited to military issues. For example, in most municipalities it is common to serve as a conscript fire fighter in the Compulsory Fire Department.
Article 58.1 of the April 18, 1999, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation (official, French version) provides that "Switzerland has an army. It is primarily organised according to the principle of a militia." However, under the country's militia system, professional soldiers constitute about 5 percent of military personnel. In 1995, the number of soldiers was reduced to 400,000 (including reservists, amounting to some 5.6% of the population) in 2004, to 200,000 (including 80,000 reservists, or 2.5% of the population) and again in 2022, to 150,000 (including 50,000 reservists). However, the Swiss Militia continues to consist of most of the adult male population (with voluntary participation by women) who are usually issued an assault rifle which they can keep at home or store in a central arsenal and most of them have to periodically engage in combat and marksmanship training. The militia clauses of the Swiss Federal Constitution are contained in Art. 59, where it is referred to as "military service" (German: Militärdienst; French: service militaire; Italian: servizio militare; Romansh: servetsch militar).
Syria: The Syrian National Defense Force was formed out of pro-government militias. They receive their salaries and their military equipment from the government and as of 2013 numbers around 100,000. The force acts in an infantry role, directly fighting against rebels on the ground and running counter-insurgency operations in coordination with the army which provides them with logistical and artillery support. Unlike the Syrian Army, NDF soldiers are allowed to take loot from battlefields, which can then be sold on for extra money.
Turkey:
United Kingdom:
Origins: The obligation to serve in the militia (also known as the Constitutional Force) in England derives from a common law tradition, and dates back to Anglo-Saxon times. The tradition was that all able-bodied males were liable to be called out to serve in one of two organisations. These were the posse comitatus, an ad hoc assembly called together by a law officer to apprehend lawbreakers, and the fyrd, a military body intended to preserve internal order or defend the locality against an invader. The latter developed into the militia, and was usually embodied by a royal warrant. Service in each organisation involved different levels of preparedness.
16th and 17th centuries: With the decay of the feudal system and the military revolution of the 16th century, the militia began to become an important institution in English life. It was organised on the basis of the shire county, and was one of the responsibilities of the Lord Lieutenant, a royal official (usually a trusted nobleman). Each of the county hundreds was likewise the responsibility of a Deputy Lieutenant, who relayed orders to the justices of the peace or magistrates. Every parish furnished a quota of eligible men, whose names were recorded on muster rolls. Likewise, each household was assessed for the purpose of finding weapons, armour, horses, or their financial equivalent, according to their status. The militia was supposed to be mustered for training purposes from time to time, but this was rarely done. The militia regiments were consequently ill-prepared for an emergency, and could not be relied upon to serve outside their own counties. This state of affairs concerned many people. Consequently, an elite force was created, composed of members of the militia who were prepared to meet regularly for military training and exercise. These were formed into trained band regiments, particularly in the City of London, where the Artillery Ground was used for training. The trained bands performed an important role in the English Civil War on the side of parliament, in marching to raise the siege of Gloucester (5 September 1643). Except for the London trained bands, both sides in the Civil War made little use of the militia, preferring to recruit their armies by other means.
Militia in the English Empire and the British Empire: As successful English settlement of North America began to take place in 1607 in the face of the hostile intentions of the powerful Spanish, and of the native populations, it became immediately necessary to raise militia amongst the settlers. The militia in Jamestown saw constant action against the Powhatan Federation and other native polities. In the Virginia Company's other outpost, Bermuda, fortification began immediately in 1612. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | These were formed into trained band regiments, particularly in the City of London, where the Artillery Ground was used for training. The trained bands performed an important role in the English Civil War on the side of parliament, in marching to raise the siege of Gloucester (5 September 1643). Except for the London trained bands, both sides in the Civil War made little use of the militia, preferring to recruit their armies by other means.
Militia in the English Empire and the British Empire: As successful English settlement of North America began to take place in 1607 in the face of the hostile intentions of the powerful Spanish, and of the native populations, it became immediately necessary to raise militia amongst the settlers. The militia in Jamestown saw constant action against the Powhatan Federation and other native polities. In the Virginia Company's other outpost, Bermuda, fortification began immediately in 1612. A Spanish attack in 1614 was repulsed by two shots fired from the incomplete Castle Islands Fortifications manned by Bermudian Militiamen. In the Nineteenth century, Fortress Bermuda would become Britain's Gibraltar of the West, heavily fortified by a Regular Army garrison to protect the Royal Navy's headquarters and dockyard in the Western Atlantic.
In the 17th Century, however, Bermuda's defence was left entirely in the hands of the Militia. In addition to requiring all male civilians to train and serve in the militia of their Parish, the Bermudian Militia included a standing body of trained artillerymen to garrison the numerous fortifications which ringed New London (St. George's). This standing body was created by recruiting volunteers, and by sentencing criminals to serve as punishment. The Bermudian militiamen were called out on numerous occasions of war, and, on one notable occasion, to quell rioting privateers. The 1707 Acts of Union made Bermudian and other English militiamen British. The Militia in Bermuda came to include a Troop of Horse (mounted infantry) and served alongside volunteers and (from 1701) a small body of regulars. The Militia faded away after the American War of 1812 when the Parliament of Bermuda declined to renew the Militia Act. This resulted from the build-up of the regular army Bermuda Garrison along with Bermuda's development as the headquarters and dockyard of the North America and West Indies Station of the Royal Navy, which made the militia seem excess to need. Vast sums of the Imperial defence expenditure were lavished on fortifying Bermuda during the Nineteenth Century and the British Government cajoled, implored, begged, and threatened the colonial legislature for 80 years before it raised a militia and volunteer units (in 1894 and 1894 respectively). Although the militia had historically been an infantry force, many units in Britain had been re-tasked as militia artillery from the 1850s onward due to the increased importance of the coastal artillery defences and the new militia unit in Bermuda followed suit. Titled the Bermuda Militia Artillery, it was badged and uniformed as part of the Royal Artillery, and tasked with the garrison artillery role, manning coastal batteries. As in Britain, recruitment was of volunteers who engaged for terms of service, whereas the Bermuda Volunteer Rifle Corps was organised on the same lines as volunteer rifle corps in Britain. Recruitment to the BVRC was restricted to whites, but the BMA recruited primarily coloured (those who were not entirely of European heritage) other ranks, though its officers were all white until 1953. Neither unit was reorganised in 1908 when the Militia, Volunteer Force and Yeomanry in Britain merged into the Territorial Force, but the BVRC was re-organised as a territorial in 1921 and the BMA in 1926. The BVRC name was not modified to Bermuda Rifles until 1951, however, and the Bermuda Militia Artillery (and from 1939 the Bermuda Militia Infantry) continued to be titled as militia until amalgamated with the Bermuda Rifles in 1965 to form the Bermuda Regiment.
In British India, a special class of militia was established in 1907. This took the form of the Frontier Corps, which consisted of locally recruited full-time auxiliaries under British officers. Their role combined the functions of tribal police and border guards deployed along the North-West Frontier. Regional units included the Zhob Militia, the Kurram Militia, and the Chagai Militia. After 1946 the Frontier Corps became part of the modern Pakistan Army.
Political issues: Until the Glorious Revolution in 1688 the Crown and Parliament were in strong disagreement. The English Civil War left a rather unusual military legacy. Both Whigs and Tories distrusted the creation of a large standing army not under civilian control. The former feared that it would be used as an instrument of royal tyranny. The latter had memories of the New Model Army and the anti-monarchical social and political revolution that it brought about. Both preferred a small standing army under civilian control for defensive deterrence and to prosecute foreign wars, a large navy as the first line of national defence, and a militia composed of their neighbours as additional defence and to preserve domestic order.
Consequently, the English Bill of Rights (1689) declared, amongst other things: "that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law..." and "that the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law." This implies that they are fitted to serve in the militia, which was intended to serve as a counterweight to the standing army and preserve civil liberties against the use of the army by a tyrannical monarch or government.
The Crown still (in the British constitution) controls the use of the army. This ensures that officers and enlisted men swear an oath to a politically neutral head of state, and not to a politician. While the funding of the standing army subsists on annual financial votes by parliament, the Mutiny Act, superseded by the Army Act, and now the Armed Forces Act is also renewed on an annual basis by Parliament. If it lapses, the legal basis for enforcing discipline disappears, and soldiers lose their legal indemnity for acts committed under orders.
With the creation of the British Empire, militias were also raised in the colonies, where little support could be provided by regular forces. Overseas militias were first raised in Jamestown, Virginia, and in Bermuda, where the Bermuda Militia followed over the next two centuries a similar trajectory to that in Britain.
18th century and the Acts of Union: In 1707 the Acts of Union united the Kingdom of England with the Kingdom of Scotland. The Scottish navy was incorporated into the Royal Navy. The Scottish military (as opposed to naval) forces merged with the English, with pre-existing regular Scottish regiments maintaining their identities, though command of the new British Army was from England. How this affected militias either side of the border is unclear.
British Militia: The Militia Act 1757 created a more professional force. Better records were kept, and the men were selected by ballot to serve for longer periods; specific provision was made for members of the Religious Society of Friends, Quakers, to be exempted, as conscientious objectors, from compulsory enlistment in the militia. Proper uniforms and better weapons were provided, and the force was 'embodied' from time to time for training sessions.
The militia was widely embodied at various times during the French and Napoleonic Wars. It served at several vulnerable locations, and was particularly stationed on the South Coast and in Ireland. A number of camps were held at Brighton, where the militia regiments were reviewed by the Prince Regent. (This is the origin of the song "Brighton Camp".) The militia could not be compelled to serve overseas, but it was seen as a training reserve for the army, as bounties were offered to men who opted to 'exchange' from the militia to the regular army.
Irish militia: The Parliament of Ireland passed an act in 1715 raising regiments of militia in each county and county corporate. Membership was restricted to Protestants between the ages of 16 and 60. In 1793, during the Napoleonic Wars, the Irish militia were reorganised to form thirty-seven county and city regiments. While officers of the reorganised force were Protestant, membership of the other ranks was now made available to members of all denominations.
Scottish militia: In the late 17th century, numerous individuals in the Kingdom of Scotland (then in a personal union with the Kingdom of England) called for the resurrection of a Scottish militia, with the understated aim of protecting the rights of Scots in Great Britain. After Scotland became part of the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Militia Act 1757 did not apply there. The traditional Scottish militia system continued, with only certain settlements in Scotland playing host to a militia regiment. This was viewed with resentment among some in Scotland, and the Militia Club was formed to promote the raising of a Scottish militia. The Militia Club, along with several other Scottish gentlemen's clubs became the crucible of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Militia Act 1797 empowered Scottish Lord Lieutenants to raise and command militia regiments in each of the "Counties, Stewartries, Cities, and Places" under their jurisdiction. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | Scottish militia: In the late 17th century, numerous individuals in the Kingdom of Scotland (then in a personal union with the Kingdom of England) called for the resurrection of a Scottish militia, with the understated aim of protecting the rights of Scots in Great Britain. After Scotland became part of the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Militia Act 1757 did not apply there. The traditional Scottish militia system continued, with only certain settlements in Scotland playing host to a militia regiment. This was viewed with resentment among some in Scotland, and the Militia Club was formed to promote the raising of a Scottish militia. The Militia Club, along with several other Scottish gentlemen's clubs became the crucible of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Militia Act 1797 empowered Scottish Lord Lieutenants to raise and command militia regiments in each of the "Counties, Stewartries, Cities, and Places" under their jurisdiction.
19th century: Although muster rolls were prepared as late as 1820, the element of compulsion was abandoned, and the militia transformed into a volunteer force, revived by the Militia Act 1852. It was intended to be seen as an alternative to the regular army. Men would volunteer and undertake basic training for several months at an army depot. Thereafter, they would return to civilian life, but report for regular periods of military training (usually on the weapons ranges) and an annual two-week training camp. In return, they would receive military pay and a financial retainer, a useful addition to their civilian wage. Of course, many saw the annual camp as the equivalent of a paid holiday. The militia thus appealed to agricultural labourers, colliers and the like, men in casual occupations, who could leave their civilian job and pick it up again. Until 1852 the militia were an entirely infantry force, but from that year a number of county infantry regiments were converted to artillery and new ones raised. In 1877 the militia of Anglesey and Monmouthshire were converted to engineers. Under the reforms, introduced by Secretary of State for War Hugh Childers in 1881, the remaining militia infantry regiments were re-designated as numbered battalions of regiments of the line, ranking after the two regular battalions. Typically, an English, Welsh or Scottish regiment would have two militia battalions (the 3rd and 4th) and Irish regiments three (numbered 3rd–5th).
The militia must not be confused with the volunteer units created in a wave of enthusiasm in the second half of the nineteenth century. In contrast with the Volunteer Force, and the similar Yeomanry Cavalry, they were considered rather plebeian.
The Special Reserve: The militia was transformed into the Special Reserve by the military reforms of Haldane in the reforming post 1906 Liberal government. In 1908 the militia infantry battalions were redesignated as "reserve" and a number were amalgamated or disbanded. Numbered Territorial Force battalions, ranking after the Special Reserve, were formed from the volunteer units at the same time. Altogether, 101 infantry battalions, 33 artillery regiments and two engineer regiments of special reservists were formed. Upon mobilisation, the special reserve units would be formed at the depot and continue training while guarding vulnerable points in Britain. The special reserve units remained in Britain throughout the First World War, but their rank and file did not, since the object of the special reserve was to supply drafts of replacements for the overseas units of the regiment. The original militiamen soon disappeared, and the battalions simply became training units. The Special Reserve reverted to its militia designation in 1921, then to Supplementary Reserve in 1924, though the units were effectively placed in "suspended animation" until disbanded in 1953.
The militiamen: The name was briefly revived in the Military Training Act 1939, in the aftermath of the Munich Crisis. Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, wished to introduce a limited form of conscription, not known in peacetime Britain since the militia of the early 19th century and previously. It was thought that calling the conscripts 'militiamen' would make this more acceptable, as it would render them distinct from the rest of the army. Only single men aged 20 up to the day before their 22nd birthday were to be conscripted, for six months full-time training before discharge into the reserve (with a free suit of civilian clothing). Although the first intake was called up in late July 1939, the declaration of war on 3 September entailed implementation of full-time conscription for all men aged 18–41, superseding the militia, never to be revived.
Modern survivals: Three units still maintain their militia designation in the British Army. These are the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (formed in 1539), the Jersey Field Squadron (The Royal Militia Island of Jersey) (formed in 1337), and the Royal Alderney Militia (created in the 13th century and reformed in 1984). Additionally, the Atholl Highlanders are a ceremonial infantry militia maintained by the Duke of Atholl—they are the only legal private army in Europe.
Other British militias: Various other part-time, home defence organisations have been raised during times of crisis or perceived threat, although without the word "militia" in their title. These have included:
Volunteer Corps, part of the British anti-invasion preparations of 1803–1805
Yeomanry, volunteer cavalry initially raised in the Napoleonic Wars
Volunteer Force, from 1857 to 1908
Volunteer Training Corps, 1914 to 1918
National Defence Companies, 1936 to 1939
Home Guard, initially Local Defence Volunteers, 1940 to 1944 and 1951 to 1957
Ulster Defence Regiment, 1970 to 1992
Home Service Force, 1982 to 1992
The Troubles and Irish War of Independence: The various non-state paramilitary groups involved in the 20th-century conflicts in Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland, such as the various Irish Republican Army groups and loyalist paramilitaries, could also be described as militias and are occasionally referred to as such.
The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was a locally raised professional militia instituted by an Act of Parliament in December 1969, becoming operational on 1 April 1970. Created as a non-partisan force to defend Northern Ireland "against armed attack or sabotage", it eventually peaked at 11 battalions with 7,559 men and women. 197 soldiers of the UDR were killed as active servicemen, with a further 61 killed after leaving the regiment, mostly by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. As a result of defence cuts it was eventually reduced to 7 battalions before being amalgamated with the Royal Irish Rangers in 1992 to form the "Home Service Battalions" of the Royal Irish Regiment.
United States: The history of militia in the United States dates from the colonial era, such as in the American Revolutionary War. Based on the English system, colonial militias were drawn from the body of adult male citizens of a community, town, or local region. Because there was no standing English Army before the English Civil War, and subsequently the English Army and later the British Army had few regulars garrisoning North America, colonial militia served a vital role in local conflicts, particularly in the French and Indian Wars. Before shooting began in the American War of Independence, American revolutionaries took control of the militia system, reinvigorating training and excluding men with Loyalist inclinations. Regulation of the militia was codified by the Second Continental Congress with the Articles of Confederation. The revolutionaries also created a full-time regular army—the Continental Army—but, because of manpower shortages, the militia provided short-term support to the regulars in the field throughout the war.
In colonial era Anglo-American usage, militia service was distinguished from military service in that the latter was normally a commitment for a fixed period of time of at least a year, for a salary, whereas militia was only to meet a threat, or prepare to meet a threat, for periods of time expected to be short. Militia persons were normally expected to provide their own weapons, equipment, or supplies, although they may later be compensated for losses or expenditures. A related concept is the jury, which can be regarded as a specialized form of militia convened to render a verdict in a court proceeding (known as a petit jury or trial jury) or to investigate a public matter and render a presentment or indictment (grand jury).
With the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, control of the army and the power to direct the militia of the states was concurrently delegated to the federal Congress. The Militia Clauses gave Congress authority for "organizing, arming, and disciplining" the militia, and "governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States", and the States retained authority to appoint officers and to impose the training specified by Congress. Proponents describe a key element in the concept of "militia" was that to be "genuine" it not be a "select militia", composed of an unrepresentative subset of the population. This was an argument presented in the ratification debates. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | With the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and Article 1 Section 8 of the United States Constitution, control of the army and the power to direct the militia of the states was concurrently delegated to the federal Congress. The Militia Clauses gave Congress authority for "organizing, arming, and disciplining" the militia, and "governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States", and the States retained authority to appoint officers and to impose the training specified by Congress. Proponents describe a key element in the concept of "militia" was that to be "genuine" it not be a "select militia", composed of an unrepresentative subset of the population. This was an argument presented in the ratification debates.
The first legislation on the subject was the Militia Act of 1792 which provided, in part:
That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia,... every citizen, so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock.
Prior to the War of Independence, the officers of militia units were commissioned by the royal governors. During the war, they were commissioned either by the legislature or the chief executive of the state. After the war, commissions were typically granted by the state's chief executive. Militias did not operate independently of the state governments but were under the command of the civil government just like the regular military forces. Twenty-four of the current US states maintain state defense forces in the form of a constitutional militia in addition to the National Guard which is shared with the US government. These states include Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Vermont, and Virginia. In addition, the Territory of Puerto Rico has a defense force.
19th century: During the nineteenth century, each of the states maintained its militia differently, some more than others. American militia saw action in the various Indian Wars, the War of 1812, the American Civil War, and the Spanish–American War. Sometimes militia units were found to be unprepared, ill-supplied, and unwilling. Prior to the Civil War, militia units were sometimes used by southern states for slave control. Formed in 1860, Republican Party-affiliated Wide Awakes clubs were quick to take action to defend persons against southern slave-hunters. In California, the militia carried out campaigns against bandits and against the Indians at the direction of its Governor between 1850 and 1866. During Reconstruction after the Civil War, Republican state governments had militias composed almost entirely of freed slaves and populist whites. Their deployment to maintain order in the former Confederate states caused increased resentment among many Southern whites.
After the American Civil War, secret groups like the Ku Klux Klan and Knights of the White Camellia arose quickly across the South, reaching a peak in the late 1860s. Even more significant in terms of effect were private militias: paramilitary organizations that formed starting in 1874, including the White League in Louisiana, which quickly formed chapters in other states; the Red Shirts in Mississippi in 1875, and with force in South Carolina and North Carolina; and other "white line" militias and rifle clubs.
In contrast to the KKK, these paramilitary organizations were open; members were often well known in their communities. Nevertheless, they used force, intimidation, and violence, including murder, to push out Republican officeholders, break up organizing, and suppress freedmen's voting and civil rights. The paramilitary groups were described as "the military arm of the Democratic Party" and were instrumental in helping secure Democratic victories in the South in the elections of 1876.
20th century: The Militia Act of 1903 divided what had been the militia into what it termed the "organized" militia, created from portions of the former state guards to become state National Guard units, and the "unorganized" militia consisting of all males from ages 17 to 45, with the exception of certain officials and others, which is codified in 10 U.S.C. § 311. Some states, such as Texas, California, and Ohio, created separate state defense forces for assistance in local emergencies. Congress later established a system of "dual enlistment" for the National Guard, so that anyone who enlisted in the National Guard also enlisted in the U.S. Army. When the U.S. Air Force was established as an independent service in 1947, the National Guard was further divided into the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. Under this construct, the 1933 defense act's "dual enlistment" facet was further amended so that enlisted soldiers and commissioned officers in the Army National Guard were also enlisted or commissioned in the Reserve Component of the U.S. Army. Enlisted airmen and commissioned officers in the Air National Guard were also enlisted or commissioned in the Air Reserve Component (ARC) of the U.S. Air Force.
The 20th century saw the rise of militia organizations in the United States, these private militias often have an anti-government outlook and are not under the civil authority of the states. Privately organized citizen militia-related groups blossomed in the mid-1990s. Many militia groups are based on religious or political extremism and some are regarded as hate groups.
21st century: In the 2008 decision of the Supreme Court, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the de jure definition of "militia" as used in United States jurisprudence was discussed. The Court's opinion made explicit, in its obiter dicta, that the term "militia", as used in colonial times in this originalist decision, included both the federally organized militia and the citizen-organized militias of the several States: "... the 'militia' in colonial America consisted of a subset of 'the people'—those who were male, able-bodied, and within a certain age range" (7)... Although the militia consists of all able-bodied men, the federally-organized militia may consist of a subset of them"(23).
Active militias: National Guard
State defense forces
Texas: The most important previous activity of the Texas Militia was the Texas Revolution in 1836. Texans declared independence from Mexico while they were defeated during the Battle of the Alamo, in March 1836. On April 21, 1836, led by Sam Houston, the Militia attacked the Mexican Army at their camp, in the Battle of San Jacinto near the present city of Houston. Following the war, some militia units reorganized into what was later to be known as the Texas Rangers, which was a private, volunteer effort for several years before becoming an official organization. After Texas joined the Union of the United States in 1845, Texas militia units participated in the Mexican–American War.
In 1861 Texas joined the other Confederate States in seceding from the Union, and Texas militias played a role in the American Civil War until it ended in 1865. Texas militiamen joined Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders, a volunteer militia, and fought with him during the Spanish–American War in 1898. Some of the training of the Rough Riders took place in San Pedro Park, in the north-central part of San Antonio near the present site of San Antonio College. When a muster of the Militia proposed to train there on April 19, 1994, they were threatened with arrest, even though the charter of San Pedro Park forbids exclusion of activities of that kind. This threat led to a change in the meeting site. Like many other American states, Texas maintains a recognized State Militia, the Texas State Guard.
Vietnam: The Dân quân tự vệ (Self-Defence Militia) is a part of Vietnam People's Armed Forces. The militia organized in communes, wards and townships and is put under commune-level military commands.
The Self-Defence Militia has two branches: Dân quân tự vệ nòng cốt (Core Self-Defence Militia) and Dân quân tự vệ rộng rãi (General Self-Defence Militia). The term of service in the Core Militia is 4 years.
SFR Yugoslavia: Beside the federal Yugoslav People's Army, each constituent republic of the former SFR Yugoslavia had its own Territorial Defense Forces. The Non-Aligned Yugoslavia was concerned about eventual aggression from any of the superpowers, especially by the Warsaw Pact after the Prague Spring, so the Territorial Defense Forces were formed as an integral part of the total war military doctrine called Total National Defense. Those forces corresponded to military reserve forces, paramilitary or militia, the latter, in the military meaning of the term (like military formation). It should not be confused with the Yugoslav Militia- Milicija which was a term for a police.
See also: Condottieri
Gendarmerie
Historical reenactment
Irregular military
Milicja Obywatelska
National Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela
Voluntary Militia for National Security
Violent non-state actor
References:
Citations:
Sources:
Further reading:
Aliyev, Huseyn (Jan. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Militia | The Non-Aligned Yugoslavia was concerned about eventual aggression from any of the superpowers, especially by the Warsaw Pact after the Prague Spring, so the Territorial Defense Forces were formed as an integral part of the total war military doctrine called Total National Defense. Those forces corresponded to military reserve forces, paramilitary or militia, the latter, in the military meaning of the term (like military formation). It should not be confused with the Yugoslav Militia- Milicija which was a term for a police.
See also: Condottieri
Gendarmerie
Historical reenactment
Irregular military
Milicja Obywatelska
National Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela
Voluntary Militia for National Security
Violent non-state actor
References:
Citations:
Sources:
Further reading:
Aliyev, Huseyn (Jan. 2019) "When and How Do Militias Disband? Global Patterns of Pro-Government Militia Demobilization in Civil Wars. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42/8: 715–734. DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1425112
Bledsoe, Andrew S. Citizen-Officers: The Union and Confederate Volunteer Junior Officer Corps in the American Civil War. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-0-8071-6070-1.
Churchill, Robert H. To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant's Face,University of Michigan Press Archived 2012-11-14 at the Wayback Machine, 2009. ISBN 978-0-472-11682-9.
Cooper, Jerry M. The rise of the National Guard: the evolution of the American militia, 1865–1920. Studies in war, society, and the military, v. 1. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1998 ISBN 0-8032-1486-3
Galvin, John R. The Minute Men – The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution, Brasseys, 1996 ISBN 1-57488-049-7
Hay, George J. The Constitutional Force, 1908 (reprinted by Ray Westlake Military Books, 1987). ISBN 0-9508530-7-0.
Smith, Joshua M. "The Yankee Soldier's Might: The District of Maine and the Reputation of the Massachusetts Militia, 1800–1812," in New England Quarterly LXXXIV no. 2, pp. 234–264, 2011.
Whisker, James B. The Rise and Decline of the American Militia System, Susquehanna University Press, 1999 ISBN 0-945636-92-X |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Ming Dynasty Army | Background: The Ming emperors from Hongwu to Zhengde continued policies of the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty such as hereditary military institutions, dressing themselves and their guards in Mongol-style clothing and hats, promoting archery and horseback riding, and having large numbers of Mongols serve in the Ming military. Until the late 16th century Mongols still constituted one-in-three officers serving in capital forces like the Embroidered Uniform Guard, and other peoples such as Jurchens were also prominent. A cavalry-based army modeled on the Yuan military was favoured by the Hongwu and Yongle Emperors.
Contrary to the stereotype that the Confucian Ming were disinterested in the military, the Ming poured enormous resources such as landholdings into upkeeping its military, which also constituted the biggest portion of the state budget. The Ming deliberately placed the military and civilian officials in opposition to each other for checks and balances. Troops often feuded, looted, evaded tax or resisted law enforcement in defiance of civilian officials, prompting the court to place civilian officials to supervise the military.
At the Guozijian Academy, equestrianism and archery were emphasized by the Hongwu Emperor in addition to Confucian classics, also being required in the Imperial Examinations.: 267 Archery and equestrianism were added to the exam by Hongwu in 1370 just as archery and equestrianism were required for non-military officials at the College of War (武舉) in 1162 by Emperor Xiaozong of the Song dynasty.
Guard battalion system: The Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang set up a system of hereditary soldiery inspired by Mongol-style garrisons and the fubing system of the Northern Wei, Sui and Tang dynasties. Hereditary soldiers were meant to be self-sufficient. They provided their own food via military farms (tun tian) and rotated into training and military posts such as the capital, where specialized drilling with firearms was provided.
These hereditary soldiers were grouped into guards (wei) and battalions (suo), otherwise known as the wei-suo system. A guard consisted of 5,600 men, each guard was divided into battalions of 1,120 men (qiānhù), each battalion contained 10 companies of 112 men (bǎihù), each company contained two platoons of 56 men (zǒngqí), and each platoon contained five squads of 11 or 12 men (xiǎoqí).
Most of the soldiers in Ming's army came from military households, which consisted of about 20 percent of households in the early Ming period. Each military household was required to provide one man to serve in the army. If that man died, the household was required to send another.
There were four ways to become a military household. The first was for the family to be descended from a “fellow campaigner” who took part in the wars of the Ming founder. The family could also be descended from a soldier serving one of the enemies of the Ming founder but became incorporated into Ming troops after defeat. Those convicted of criminal offences could also be sentenced to serve in the military. But by the fifteenth century, criminal conviction no longer resulted in a normal household's conversion into military household. Punitive service was made non-hereditary. Lastly, soldiers were also recruited through a draft.
Command structure: The guard battalions outside the capital were placed under local provincial military commanders. Those in Beijing were placed under the joint command of the Ministry for War and five grand military commanders, which reflected the separation of power and command. The Ministry issued orders to be carried out by the commanders.
Some officers were recruited through the military version of the imperial examinations, which emphasized horse archery, but not enough to impose a quality standard. These exams did however produce a few notable individuals such as Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou.
In the late Ming dynasty, Ming army units had become dominated by hereditary officers who would spend long periods of ten or twelve years in command instead of the usual practice of constant rotation, and the Central Military Command had lost much of its control over regional armies. Zongdu Junwu, or Supreme Commanders, were appointed throughout the empire to oversee the fiscal and military affairs in the area of his jurisdiction, but they became increasingly autonomous in later periods.
Social status and decline: Soldiering was one of the lowest professions in the Ming dynasty. Military officers were not only subordinate to civil officials, but generals and soldiers alike were degraded, treated with fear, suspicion, and distaste. Military service enjoyed far less prestige than its civil counterpart due to its hereditary status and because most soldiers were illiterate.
The guard battalion system went into decline from 1450 to 1550 and the military capacity of hereditary soldiers declined substantially due to corruption and mismanagement. Some officers used their soldiers as construction gangs, some were too oppressive, others were too old and unfit for service, and many did not observe the proper rotational drilling schedule. In the 16th century official registers listed three million hereditary soldiers, but contemporary observers noted that the actual number of troops was around 845,000, and of that only about 30,000 cavalry. Modern historians estimated that by 1587, some province's actual army strengths could hit a mere 2% of nominal strength. The effectiveness of the Ming's now much smaller army was also considered pitiful, the capital armies being "old and weak lackeys of central government officials." When Altan Khan invaded China in 1550 (even setting the suburbs of Beijing on fire), the Ming could only muster about 60,000 troops to counter him, who then routed at the sight of the Mongols. A particularly extreme example came in 1555, when according to Ming records, a mere 60 pirates in a single ship landed in Nanjing. The city and its surrounding area was nominally garrisoned by 120,000 troops. Despite this, these 60 pirates encountered little resistance for the next three months, when they looted and burned towns around the area, killing four thousand people and rampaging over a thousand miles before the government could muster the strength to crush them.
Soldiers were also assigned tasks unrelated to warfare and combat. One of the primary military assignments in the early stages of the Ming empire was farming plots of land. Soldiers were often subject to exploitation from higher-ups in the army; they did menial tasks such as chopping down trees and picking herbs for the sole benefit of their superiors. The Ming sometimes utilized soldiers as transport workers to move grain and other foodstuffs throughout the empire. Soldiers were essentially no different than hired help due to the fact that they were often assigned to various menial tasks requiring manual labor. Officers were known to seize the lands of military colonies and convert them into their private estates, and subsequently force their troops into becoming their serfs. Other officers accepted bribes from soldiers to be exempted from military drill, and used other troops as menial labour. Corruption was so lucrative that the sons of merchants were known to bribe officials for appointments as army officers so as to exhort bribes from soldiers in exchange for drill exemption, or to register their own servants as soldiers so as to embezzle their rations. Desertion from the weisuo became commonplace.
The military was not the most profitable occupation and thus soldiers had to rely on other means to make money aside from the salary given by the government. The most straightforward method was to kill more enemy soldiers, which would grant them a reward for each soldier killed in battle. Some soldiers defected from the army and turned to banditry because they did not have enough food to eat.
Complicating the matter was the fact that soldiers of the same rank did not share the same authority. Soldiers who had more wealth were able to bribe their superiors with money and other gifts increased their standing and status within the army.
Since most did not want to serve in the army, family members who chose to be soldiers might get some sort of compensation from other male family members. For example, they could become the next "descent-line heir" even if they were not the eldest son, as was tradition, by volunteering to enlist. The "descent-line heir" was the right to hold a special ritual role within the clan and hence enhance one's social status since the heir would inherit his father's privileges. In a military family, soldiers who were assigned to locations far away from their ancestral homes often saw their relationships with their extended family decline. To counter this, subsidies were granted to serving soldiers in an attempt to lower the desertion rate of soldiers serving in the family and help maintain a connection between the serving soldier's immediate family with their ancestral one. The subsidy gave a reason for the immediate family members of the soldier to regularly visit their ancestral homes to collect payment and thereby maintain their relationship.
However certain regions were known to have differing views of military service, such as Yiwu County where Qi Jiguang recruited his troops. Young men with varying backgrounds ranging from peasants to that of a national university student in those areas chose to join the army. A major reason for the popularity of military service in this area was the potential for quick advancement through military success.
Navy: The navy was not a separate entity during the Ming era and was part of the guard battalion system. Every coastal guard battalion was allotted 50 ships for maritime defense. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Ming Dynasty Army | To counter this, subsidies were granted to serving soldiers in an attempt to lower the desertion rate of soldiers serving in the family and help maintain a connection between the serving soldier's immediate family with their ancestral one. The subsidy gave a reason for the immediate family members of the soldier to regularly visit their ancestral homes to collect payment and thereby maintain their relationship.
However certain regions were known to have differing views of military service, such as Yiwu County where Qi Jiguang recruited his troops. Young men with varying backgrounds ranging from peasants to that of a national university student in those areas chose to join the army. A major reason for the popularity of military service in this area was the potential for quick advancement through military success.
Navy: The navy was not a separate entity during the Ming era and was part of the guard battalion system. Every coastal guard battalion was allotted 50 ships for maritime defense. The Ming also set up naval palisades, beacon towers, strategic forts, and irregular military units and warships. Unfortunately these defensive measures proved largely inadequate against pirate raids, and conditions continued to deteriorate until the Jiajing wokou raids were ended by Qi Jiguang and Yu Dayou. Shaolin monks also took part in anti-piracy campaigns, most notably between 21 and 31 July 1553 at Wengjiagang, when a group of 120 monks exterminated over 100 pirates with only 4 monks dead.
Ming naval activity was noticeably subdued. Its founder, the Hongwu Emperor, emphasized that "not even a plank is to be allowed into the sea." He did however establish the Longjiang Shipyards of Nanjing that would grow into the birthplace of the Treasure Fleet. The Ming Navy was also equipped with firearms, making them one of the earliest gunpowder armed navies at the time. It was therefore described by Lo and Elleman as the world's "foremost" navy of that era.
The Hongwu Emperor ordered the formation of 56 military stations (wei), each with a strength of 50 warships and 5000 seamen. However most of these seem to have been left under-strength. The size of the navy was greatly expanded by the Yongle Emperor. The Ming Navy was divided into the Imperial fleet stationed in Nanjing, two coastal defence squadrons, the high-seas fleet used by Zheng He, and the grain transportation fleet.
After the period of maritime activity during the treasure voyages under the Yongle Emperor, the official policy towards naval expansion swayed between active restriction to ambivalence. Despite Ming ambivalence towards naval affairs, the Chinese treasure fleet was still able to dominate other Asian navies, which enabled the Ming to send governors to rule in Luzon and Palembang as well as depose and enthrone puppet rulers in Sri Lanka and the Bataks. In 1521, at the Battle of Tunmen a squadron of Ming naval junks defeated a Portuguese caravel fleet, which was followed by another Ming victory against a Portuguese fleet at the Battle of Xicaowan in 1522. In 1633, a Ming navy defeated a Dutch and Chinese pirate fleet during the Battle of Liaoluo Bay. A large number of military treatises, including extensive discussions of naval warfare, were written during the Ming period, including the Wubei Zhi and Jixiao Xinshu. Additionally, shipwrecks have been excavated in the South China Sea, including wrecks of Chinese trade and war ships that sank around 1377 and 1645.
Other military institutions:
Princes: Princes of the Imperial family were also granted substantial military authority in strategic points around the empire. Each was granted an estate with the power to recruit military officers for their personal staff (this was restricted in 1395) and held total judicial authority over them. This ancient system, intended to provide military experience before deployment, had not been used in China for a thousand years. Princes were also dispatched to join campaigns with their personal bodyguards. Zhu Di, Prince of Yan, impressed the Hongwu Emperor with his command of the 1390 campaign against the Mongols under Nayir Bukha and was allowed to retain command of the 10,000 Mongol soldiers he had captured. This later aided the prince in his usurpation of the throne. In some cases the princes were appointed to fill vacant command positions. Zhu Gang, the Prince of Qin, was sent to build military colonies (tuntian) beyond the Great Wall. Princes were granted an escort guard (huwei bing) under their personal control, while a court-appointed officer commanded the shouzhen bing or garrison force, over which the princes only had authority during emergencies declared by the Emperor. This dual chain of command was meant to prevent a coup d'état in the capital. The garrison force could only be deployed with an order carrying both the Emperor's and the Prince's seal. The Regional Military Commission armies were then used to check the princes' military power. Many princes amassed large bodyguard forces and transferred regular soldiers to their personal command without authorisation anyway, using them on campaign. The authority of princes was curtailed by the Jianwen Emperor. When the Yongle Emperor came to power, he further purged his brothers on trumped up charges and abolished most of the princely guards; by the dynasty's end there were less than a dozen extant. He also established a hereditary military nobility from his top generals during his usurpation, both Han Chinese and Mongol. They were however denied long-term commands so as to prevent personal power bases from forming.
Mercenaries and salaried soldiers: After the decline of the guard battalion system, the Ming army came to rely more upon mercenaries to improve efficiency and lighten local military burdens.
Hired soldiers helped bolster the ranks of the army by allowing armies to have more members, aside from the active members of the military households. These soldiers came from multiple sources; some came from inactive members of military households, the ones that were not registered as the serving soldier of the family, as well as other members of the empire that were not obligated to serve in the army. Non-hereditary troops were a fairly distinct and unified group within the army as they would rebel and riot together whenever they had problems with how they were treated or whenever their salaries were not paid on time.
As the social status of soldiers was not high, mercenaries usually came from the desperate underclass of society such as amnestied bandits or vagabonds. The quality of these troops was highly diverse, depending on their regional origins. Peasant militia were generally regarded as more reliable than full-time soldiers, who were described as useless. Commanders refrained from training or reforming the mercenary armies for fear of provoking riots, and Ming generals started to fight personally on the front lines with handpicked battalions of elite bodyguards rather than attempt to control the hordes of unreliable mercenaries.
By the 1570s, the Ming army had largely transitioned to a mercenary force.
Housemen: Housemen were soldiers who privately served the higher-ups in the army. The addition of housemen in the army challenged core ideals within the army as housemen emphasized the concept of self-interest as opposed to the previous concept of loyalty to the empire. Housemen were mercenaries hired by commanders at competitive wages to serve as private retainers. Although they were more expensive for the treasury, they displayed greater military ability. The housemen often formed sworn or adoptive kinship ties with their commanders to show their special bonding. However, they were often criticized as greedy or more loyal to their commanders than the dynasty.
Origins of soldiers:
Mongol and other steppe troops: The Hongwu Emperor incorporated northern peoples such as the Mongols and Jurchens into the army. Mongols were retained by the Ming within its territory. Most of these soldiers were stationed on the northern frontier, however they were deployed in the south as well in some cases such as in Guangxi against Miao rebellions.
The Ming dynasty had a high proportion of Mongols serving in important military positions, and they were highly successful at granting titles to attract Mongols to defect to the Ming.
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Mongol officers in the Ming army were given preferential tax exemptions, housing, wages and title benefits.
The Mongols were able to obtain government rewards such as land grants and opportunities to rise up in the military, but they suffered general discrimination as an ethnic minority. Mongol soldiers and leaders were never given independent control and always answered to a Chinese general, however the Chinese supervisory role was mostly a nominal one, so Mongol troops behaved as though they were independent mercenaries or personal retinues. This relationship lasted throughout the entire dynasty, and even in the late Ming, general retinues included Mongol horsemen in their company.
Large numbers of Mongols bordering the Ming in Gansu and other frontiers were designated as garrisons. Their leaders were issued with officer titles, seals, letters patent, granting them access to the lucrative border trade and increasing their local legitimacy. Particularly important to Ming strategic objectives was the "Seven Garrisons west of Jiayu Pass": Shazhou, Chigil, Anding, Aduan, Quxian, Handong, and Hami, which were local houses which had held titles from the former Yuan court. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Ming Dynasty Army | Mongol soldiers and leaders were never given independent control and always answered to a Chinese general, however the Chinese supervisory role was mostly a nominal one, so Mongol troops behaved as though they were independent mercenaries or personal retinues. This relationship lasted throughout the entire dynasty, and even in the late Ming, general retinues included Mongol horsemen in their company.
Large numbers of Mongols bordering the Ming in Gansu and other frontiers were designated as garrisons. Their leaders were issued with officer titles, seals, letters patent, granting them access to the lucrative border trade and increasing their local legitimacy. Particularly important to Ming strategic objectives was the "Seven Garrisons west of Jiayu Pass": Shazhou, Chigil, Anding, Aduan, Quxian, Handong, and Hami, which were local houses which had held titles from the former Yuan court. The Ming needed to counter the influence of the Northern Yuan in the frontier: from 1400 to 1430 the Ming court also pursued a much more active policy of attracting Mongols to submit, and there was a large influx of Mongols into Gansu, where they were resettled into Ningxia, Yongchang and Liangzhou. After this period, Mongols would settle in Beijing directly.
Ming dynasty writer and historian Zhu Guozhen (1558-1632) remarked on how the Ming dynasty managed to successfully control Mongols who surrendered to the Ming and were relocated and deported into China to serve in military matters unlike the Eastern Han dynasty and Western Jin dynasty whose unsuccessfully management of the surrendered and defeated barbarians of the Five Barbarians they imported into northern China who became educated and this led to rebellion in the Uprising of the Five Barbarians.
Japanese troops: During the Bozhou rebellion, the Ming army tasked with suppressing the rebels also incorporated Japanese units that had surrendered during the Japanese invasions of Korea.
Wolf troops: The Ming dynasty sometimes employed "martial minorities" such as the "wolf troops" of Guangxi as shock infantry.
Lang troops are also Yao and Zhuang people. The Yao and Zhuang become bandits, but the lang troops dare not on the threat of death become bandits, not because the lang troops are obedient and the Yao and Zhuang are rebellious. The difference arises from the force of circumstances. The land of the lang troops is held under native officials; the land of the Yao and Zhuang is held under transferable officials. Native officials maintain strict discipline, and this is sufficient to keep the lang troops under control. Transferable officials do not maintain strict discipline and are incapable of restraining the Yao and Zhuang. There are no measures better than assigning Yao and Zhuang land to nearby native officials, in order to achieve what since ancient times has been known as the policy of using the barbarians against the barbarians. This would turn all Yao and Zhuang into lang troops. It might be thought that as the land holdings of the native officials expand, they would. . . . However, the native officials are already extremely wealthy, and to maintain this good fortune that has come as if from heaven, they would not look elsewhere. Moreover, they love their own hideouts and do not easily rebel. Even if they do rebel, it is as easy to put them down as it is to have one’s tooth extracted. The native official can command his men only because he has the force of the country on his side. This is enough to keep the native officials under control, and to use the native official’s force against the Yao and Zhuang.
Ming loyalist Ma Shiying had brought to Nanjing troops from the western provinces made out of non-Han indigenous fierce tribal warriors who were called "Sichuan" soldiers to defend the city against the Qing. These Ming loyalist non-Han "barbarian" fierce tribal warriors were slaughtered by the Han Chinese citizens of Nanjing after the Han Chinese people of Nanjing had peacefully defected and turned the city to Qing rule when the Southern Ming Hongguang emperor left the city. The Dutch East India company secretary Johann Nieuhof observed that Nanjing city and its people were unharmed by the Qing and only the Ming palace suffered destruction. The damage inflicted to the Ming palace was largely done by the Han Chinese locals of Nanjing, and not the Qing army.
Northern soldiers: Qi Jiguang described northern soldiers as stupid and impatient. When he tried to introduce muskets in the north, the soldiers there were adamant in continuing to use fire lances.
Recruits from Liaodong, and people from Liaodong in general, were considered untrustworthy, unruly, and little better than thugs. In Liaodong as military service and command became hereditary, vassalage-like personal bonds of loyalty grew between officers, their subordinates and troops. This military caste gravitated toward the Jurchen tribal chieftains rather than the bureaucrats of the capital.
Southern soldiers: Troops of Southern Chinese extract seem to have fared better in infantry and naval combat than those in the north. They have at least on one occasion been called "ocean imps" by Northern Chinese. Southerners were also intensely mistrusted by Northern Chinese. During the Wuqiao Mutiny of 1633, the northern Chinese rebels purged the "southerners" in their midst, who were suspected of aiding the Ming.
There was a lingua franca used among troops known as junjiahua, or "military speech", based on Northern Chinese dialects. It can be found into the present day throughout southern China, having been passed down by descendants of Ming dynasty soldiers.
Weapons: The spear was the most common weapon and soldiers were given comprehensive training in spear combat, both as individuals and in formation. A complete spear regimen lasted one hundred days.
The dao, also called a saber, is a Chinese category for single edged, curved swords. It was the basic close fighting weapon of the Ming dynasty. The jian, also known as a long sword, is a Chinese category for straight double-edged swords. It experienced a resurgence during the Yuan dynasty but fell out of favor again in the Ming. The jian remained in use by a small number of arms specialists but was otherwise known for its qualities as a marker of scholarly refinement.
The "Horse Beheading Dao" was described in Ming sources as a 96 cm blade attached to a 128 cm shaft, essentially a glaive weapon. It's speculated that the Swede Frederick Coyett was talking about this weapon when he described Zheng Chenggong's troops wielding "with both hands a formidable battle-sword fixed to a stick half the length of a man".
Qi Jiguang deployed his soldiers in a 12-man 'mandarin duck' formation, which consisted of four pikemen, two men carrying daos with a great and small shield, two 'wolf brush' wielders, a rearguard officer, and a porter. This system bears some resemblance to European systems (pike and shot) developing in England where formations of arquebusiers would be protected by a group of pikemen. Volley fire was also used.
Archery with bow and crossbow was considered a central skill despite the rise of gunpowder weapons.
Armour: As C.J Peers argues, during the Ming dynasty, judging from illustrations, most infantrymen did not wear armour, although it sometimes may have been hidden under robes. Armour is clearly depicted for officers and a small portion of the several hundred thousand strong army. However, contemporary records such as Si Zhen San Guan Zhi ("四镇三关志") written by Liu Xiaozu during the reign of Emperor Wanli details most soldiery having access to armour and some camps held another large number in storage, as the development of military industry saw rapid growth during the Ming dynasty as well as the need for greater defence especially around the northern borders.
Brigandine armour was used during the Ming era and consisted of riveted plates covered with fabric.
Partial plate armour in the form of a cuirass sewn together with fabric is mentioned in the Wubei Yaolue, 1638. It is not known how common plate armour was during the Ming dynasty, and no other source mentions it.
Although armour never lost all meaning during the Ming dynasty, it became less and less important as the power of firearms became apparent. It was already acknowledged by the early Ming artillery officer Jiao Yu that guns "were found to behave like flying dragons, able to penetrate layers of armor." Fully armoured soldiers could and were killed by guns. The Ming marshal Cai was one such victim. An account from the enemy side states, "Our troops used fire tubes to shoot and fell him, and the great army quickly lifted him and carried him back to his fortifications." It is possible that Chinese armour had some success in blocking musket balls later on during the Ming dynasty. According to the Japanese, during the Battle of Jiksan, the Chinese wore armour and used shields that were at least partially bulletproof. Frederick Coyett later described Ming lamellar armour as providing complete protection from "small arms", although this is sometimes mistranslated as "rifle bullets". English literature in the early 19th century also mentions Chinese rattan shields that were "almost musket proof", however another English source in the late 19th century states that they did nothing to protect their users during an advance on a Muslim stronghold, in which they were all invariably shot to death. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Ming Dynasty Army | The Ming marshal Cai was one such victim. An account from the enemy side states, "Our troops used fire tubes to shoot and fell him, and the great army quickly lifted him and carried him back to his fortifications." It is possible that Chinese armour had some success in blocking musket balls later on during the Ming dynasty. According to the Japanese, during the Battle of Jiksan, the Chinese wore armour and used shields that were at least partially bulletproof. Frederick Coyett later described Ming lamellar armour as providing complete protection from "small arms", although this is sometimes mistranslated as "rifle bullets". English literature in the early 19th century also mentions Chinese rattan shields that were "almost musket proof", however another English source in the late 19th century states that they did nothing to protect their users during an advance on a Muslim stronghold, in which they were all invariably shot to death.
Some were armed with bows and arrows hanging down their backs ; others had nothing save a shield on the left arm and a good sword in the right hand ; while many wielded with both hands a formidable battle-sword fixed to a stick half the length of a man. Everyone was protected over the upper part of the body with a coat of iron scales, fitting below one another like the slates of a roof; the arms and legs being left bare. This afforded complete protection from rifle bullets (mistranslation-should read "small arms") and yet left ample freedom to move, as those coats only reached down to the knees and were very flexible at all the joints. The archers formed Koxinga's best troops, and much depended on them, for even at a distance they contrived to handle their weapons with so great skill that they very nearly eclipsed the riflemen. The shield bearers were used instead of cavalry. Every tenth man of them is a leader, who takes charge of, and presses his men on, to force themselves into the ranks of the enemy. With bent heads and their bodies hidden behind the shields, they try to break through the opposing ranks with such fury and dauntless courage as if each one had still a spare body left at home. They continually press onwards, notwithstanding many are shot down ; not stopping to consider, but ever rushing forward like mad dogs, not even looking round to see whether they are followed by their comrades or not. Those with the sword-sticks—called soapknives by the Hollanders—render the same service as our lancers in preventing all breaking through of the enemy, and in this way establishing perfect order in the ranks ; but when the enemy has been thrown into disorder, the Sword-bearers follow this up with fearful massacre amongst the fugitives.
Rocket handlers often wore heavy armour for extra protection so that they could fire at close range.
Formations:
Jixiao Xinshu:
Lianbing Zaji:
Binglu:
Imperial guards:
Flags and banners:
Jixiao Xinshu:
Wubei Zhi:
Paintings:
Notable military figures: Hongwu Emperor
Mu Ying
Yongle Emperor
Qi Jiguang
Yuan Chonghuan
Jiao Yu
Notes:
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Missile defense | Missile defense categories: Missile defense can be divided into categories based on various characteristics: type/range of missile intercepted, the trajectory phase where the intercept occurs, and whether intercepted inside or outside the Earth's atmosphere:
Type/range of missile intercepted: These types/ranges include strategic, theater and tactical. Each entails unique requirements for intercept; a defensive system capable of intercepting one missile type frequently cannot intercept others. However, there is sometimes overlap in capability.
Strategic: Targets long-range ICBMs, which travel at about 7 km/s (15,700 mph). Examples of currently active systems: Russian A-135, which defends Moscow, the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense that defends the United States from missiles launched from Asia and the Israeli Arrow 3 which defends Israel from ICBMs. Geographic range of strategic defense can be regional (Russian system) or national (US and Israeli system's).
Theater: Targets medium-range missiles, which travel at about 3 km/s (6,700 mph) or less. In this context, the term "theater" means the entire localized region for military operations, typically a radius of several hundred kilometers; defense range of these systems is usually on this order. Examples of deployed theater missile defenses: Israeli Arrow 2 missile and David's Sling, American THAAD, and Russian S-400.
Tactical: Targets short-range tactical ballistic missiles, which usually travel at less than 1.5 km/s (3,400 mph). Tactical anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) have short ranges, typically 20–80 km (12–50 miles). Examples of currently-deployed tactical ABMs:israeli Iron Dome, American MIM-104 Patriot and Russian S-300V.
Trajectory phase: Ballistic missiles can be intercepted in three regions of their trajectory: boost phase, midcourse phase, or terminal phase.
Boost phase: Intercepting the missile while its rocket motors are firing, usually over the launch territory.
Advantages:
Bright, hot rocket exhaust makes detection and targeting easier.
Decoys cannot be used during boost phase.
At this stage, the missile is full of flammable propellant, which makes it very vulnerable to explosive warheads.
Disadvantages:
Difficult to geographically position interceptors to intercept missiles in boost phase (not always possible without flying over hostile territory).
Short time for intercept (typically about 180 seconds).
Mid-course phase: Intercepting the missile in space after the rocket burns out (example: American Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Chinese SC-19 & DN-series missiles, Israeli Arrow 3 missile).
Advantages:
Extended decision/intercept time (the coast period through space before reentering the atmosphere can be several minutes, up to 20 minutes for an ICBM).
Very large geographic defensive coverage; potentially continental.
Disadvantages:
Requires large, heavy anti-ballistic missiles and sophisticated powerful radar which must often be augmented by space-based sensors.
Must handle potential space-based decoys.
Terminal phase: Intercepting the missile after it reenters the atmosphere (examples: American Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, Chinese HQ-29, American THAAD, American Sprint, Russian ABM-3 Gazelle)
Advantages:
Smaller, lighter anti-ballistic missile is sufficient.
Balloon decoys do not work during reentry.
Smaller, less sophisticated radar required.
Disadvantages:
Very short intercept time, possibly less than 30 seconds.
Less defended geographic coverage.
Possible blanketing of target area with hazardous materials in the case of detonation of nuclear warhead(s).
Intercept location relative to the atmosphere: Missile defense can take place either inside (endoatmospheric) or outside (exoatmospheric) the Earth's atmosphere. The trajectory of most ballistic missiles takes them inside and outside the Earth's atmosphere, and they can be intercepted in either place. There are advantages and disadvantages to either intercept technique.
Some missiles such as THAAD can intercept both inside and outside the Earth's atmosphere, giving two intercept opportunities.
Endoatmospheric: Endoatmospheric anti-ballistic missiles are usually shorter ranged (e.g., American MIM-104 Patriot, Indian Advanced Air Defence).
Advantages:
Physically smaller and lighter
Easier to move and deploy
Endoatmospheric intercept means balloon-type decoys won't work
Disadvantages:
Limited range and defended area
Limited decision and tracking time for the incoming warhead
Exoatmospheric: Exoatmospheric anti-ballistic missiles are usually longer-ranged (e.g., American GMD, Ground-Based Midcourse Defense).
Advantages:
More decision and tracking time
Fewer missiles required for defense of a larger area
Disadvantages:
Larger and heavier missiles required
More difficult to transport and place compared to smaller missiles
Must handle decoys
Countermeasures to missile defense: Given the immense variety by which a defense system can operate (targeting nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical, and theater missiles), there are some unarguably effective exoatmospheric (outside the Earth's atmosphere) countermeasures an attacking party can use to deter or completely defend against certain types of defense systems, ranges of ACBM's, and intercept locations. Many of defenses to these countermeasures have been implemented and taken into account when constructing missile defense systems, however, it does not guarantee their effectiveness or success. The US Missile Defense Agency has received scrutiny in regards to their lack of foresight of these countermeasures, causing many scientists to perform various studies and data analysis as to the true effectiveness of these countermeasures.
Decoys: A common countermeasure that attacking parties use to disrupt the efficacy of Missile Defense Systems are the simultaneous launching of decoys from the primary launch site or from the exterior of the main attacking missile itself. These decoys are usually small, lightweight dud rockets that take advantage of the interceptor sensors tracking and fool it by making many different targets available in an instant. This is accomplished via the releasing of decoys in certain phases of flight. Because objects of differing weights follow the same trajectory when in space, decoys released during the midcourse phase can prevent interceptor missiles from accurately identifying the warhead. This could force the defense system to attempt to destroy all incoming projectiles, which masks the true attacking missile and lets it slip by the defense system.
Common types of decoys: Since there can be many forms of this type of deception of a missile system, different categorizations of decoys have developed, all of which operate and are designed slightly different. Details of these types of decoys and their effectiveness were provided in a report by a variety of prominent scientists in 2000.
Replica decoys: This categorization of decoy is the most similar to the standard understanding of what a missile decoy is. These types of decoys attempt to mask the attacking ICBM via the release of many similar missiles. This type of decoy confuses the missile defense system by the sudden replication and the sheer amount that the defense has to deal with. Knowing that no defense system is 100% reliable, this confusion within the targeting of the defense system would cause the system to target each decoy with equal priority and as if it was the actual warhead, allowing the real warheads chance of passing through the system and striking the target to increase drastically.
Decoys using signature diversity: Similar to replica decoys, these types of decoys also take advantage of the limitations in number within the missile defense systems targeting. However, rather than using missiles of similar build and trace to the attacking warhead, these types of decoys all have slightly different appearances from both each other and the warhead itself. This creates a different kind of confusion within the system; rather than creating a situation where each decoy (and the warhead itself) appears the same and is therefore targeted and treated exactly like the "real" warhead, the targeting system simply does not know what is the real threat and what is a decoy due to the mass amount of differing information. This creates a similar situation as the result of the replica decoy, increasing the chance that the real warhead passes through the system and strikes the target.
Decoys using antisimulation: This type of decoy is perhaps the most difficult and subversive for a missile defense system to determine. Instead of taking advantage of the missile defense system's targeting, this type of decoy intends to fool the operation of the system itself. Rather than using sheer quantity to overrun the targeting system, an anti-simulation decoy disguises the actual warhead as a decoy, and a decoy as the actual warhead. This system of "anti-simulation" allows the attacking warhead to, in some cases, take advantage of the "bulk-filtering" of certain missile defense systems, in which objects with characteristics of the warhead poorly matching those expected by the defense are either not observed because of sensor filters, or observed very briefly and immediately rejected without the need for a detailed examination. The actual warhead may simply pass by undetected, or rejected as a threat.
Cooled shrouds: Another common countermeasure used to fool missile defense systems are the implementation of cooled shrouds surrounding attacking missiles. This method covers the entire missile in a steel containment filled with liquid oxygen, nitrogen, or other sub-zero coolants that prevent the missile from being easily detected. Because many missile defense systems use infrared sensors to detect the heat traces of incoming missiles, this capsule of extremely cold liquid either renders the incoming missile entirely invisible to detection or reduces the system's ability to detect the incoming missile fast enough.
Other types of infrared stealth: Another commonly applied countermeasure to missile defense is the application of various low-emissivity coatings. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Missile defense | The actual warhead may simply pass by undetected, or rejected as a threat.
Cooled shrouds: Another common countermeasure used to fool missile defense systems are the implementation of cooled shrouds surrounding attacking missiles. This method covers the entire missile in a steel containment filled with liquid oxygen, nitrogen, or other sub-zero coolants that prevent the missile from being easily detected. Because many missile defense systems use infrared sensors to detect the heat traces of incoming missiles, this capsule of extremely cold liquid either renders the incoming missile entirely invisible to detection or reduces the system's ability to detect the incoming missile fast enough.
Other types of infrared stealth: Another commonly applied countermeasure to missile defense is the application of various low-emissivity coatings. Similar to cooled shrouds, these warheads are fully coated with infrared reflective or resistant coatings that allow similar resistance to infrared detection that cooled shrouds do. Because the most effective coating discovered so far is gold, though, this method is often overstepped by cooled shrouds.
Biological and chemical weapons: This is perhaps the most extreme approach to countering missile defense systems that are designed to destroy ICBMs and other forms of nuclear weaponry. Rather than using many missiles equipped with nuclear warheads as their main weapon of attack, this idea involves the release of biological or chemical sub-munition weapons or agents from the missile shortly after the boost phase of the attacking ICBM. Because missile defense systems are designed with intent to destroy main attacking missiles or ICBMs, this system of sub-munition attack is too numerous for the system to defend against while also distributing the chemical or biological agent across a large area of attack.
There is currently no proposed countermeasure to this type of attack except through diplomacy and the effective banning of biological weaponry and chemical agents within war. However, this does not guarantee that this countermeasure to missile defense system will not be abused via extremists or terrorists. An example of this severe threat can be further seen in North Korea's testing of anthrax tipped ICBMs in 2017.
Dynamic trajectories: Countries including Iran and North Korea may have sought missiles that can maneuver and vary their trajectories in order to evade missile defense systems.
In March 2022, when Russia used a hypersonic missile against Ukraine, Joe Biden characterized the weapon as "almost impossible to stop". Boost-glide hypersonic weapons shift trajectory to evade current missile-defense systems.
Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) will provide defense against maneuvering hypersonic weapons.
Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles: Another way to counter an ABM system is to attach multiple warheads that break apart upon reentry. If the ABM is able to counter one or two of the warheads via detonation or collision the others would slip through radar either because of limitations on ABM firing speeds or because of radar blackout caused by plasma interference. The first MRV was the Polaris A-3 which had three warheads and was launched from a submarine. Before regulations on how many warheads could be stored in a MIRV, the Soviets had up to twenty to thirty attached to ICBMs.
Jammers: Jammers use radar noise to saturate the incoming signals to the point where the radar cannot discern meaningful data about a target's location with meaningless noise. They can also imitate the signal of a missile to create a fake target. They are usually spread over planned missile paths to enemy territory to give the missile a clear path to their target. Because these jammers take relatively little electricity and hardware to operate, they are usually small, self-contained, and easily dispersible.
Command and Control:
Command and control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC): Command and control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC) systems are hardware and software interfaces that integrate a multitude of sensory information at a centralized center for the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). The command center allows for human management in accordance to the incorporated sensory information- BMDS status, system coverage, and ballistic missile attacks. The interface system helps build an image of the battle scenario or situation which enables the user to select the optimal firing solutions.
The first C2BMC system became operational in 2004. Since then, many elements have been added to update the C2BMC, which act to provide further sensory information and allow for enhanced communications between combatant commanders. A C2BMC is even capable of initiating live planning system before any engagement has even started.
GMD fire control and communication: The function of ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) systems is to provide combatants the ability to seek and destroy intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles en route to the US homeland. Data are transmitted from the defense satellite communication system, and compiles an image using the coordinated information. The system is able to relay real-time data once missiles have been launched. The GMD can also work to receive information from the C2BMC, which allows Aegis SPY-1, and TPY-2 to contribute to the defense system.
A problem with GMD is that the ground systems have increasingly becoming obsolete as the technology was initially installed as early as the 1990s. So, the ground sensors had been replaced sometime in 2018. The update was to add the capability of handling up to 44 systems; it would also reduce overlapping redundancies and inefficiencies.
Missiles are a link that connects communication between land, air, and sea forces to support joint operations and improve operability. The system is intended to improve the interoperability for joint operations of NATO and coalition forces. Link-16 is also used by the US Army and Navy for air and sea operations. An important feature of Link-16 is its ability to broadcast information simultaneously to as many users as needed. Another feature of Link-16 is its ability to act as nodes, which allows for a multitude of distributed forces to operate cohesively.
The newest generation of Link-16 is the multifunctional information distribution system low-volume terminal (MIDS LVT). It is a much smaller unit that can be fitted on air, ground, and sea units to incorporate data. The MIDS LVT terminals are installed on most bombers, aircraft, UAVs, and tankers, allowing for the incorporation of most air defense systems.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System: The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) is an unified command and control network developed by the US Army. It is designed to integrate data relay between weapon launchers, radars, and the operators, which allows air-defense units to fire interceptors with information being relayed among radars. The advantage of such a system is it can increase the area an air unit can defend and reduce interceptor spending by ensuring than no other air defense unit would engage the same target. The IBCS will be able to integrate with air defense networks of foreign military as the global C2BMC system.
IBCS engagement stations will integrate raw data from multiple sensors and process it into a single air picture, and choose elect different weapons and launcher locations depending on the detected threat instead of being limited to particular unit capabilities.
The IBCS system is intended to be operational in 2019; between 2016 and 2017, implementation of IBCS had to be put on hold due to software issues with the system. In 2021, F-35 sensor data were linked via airborne gateway to ground-based IBCS, to conduct a simulated Army fires exercise, for future Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
History: The problem was first studied during the last year of the Second World War. The only countermeasure against the V-2 missile that could be devised was a massive barrage of anti-aircraft guns. Even if the missile's trajectory were accurately calculated, the guns would still have a small probability of destroying it before impact with the ground. Also, the shells fired by the guns would have caused more damage than the actual missile when they fell back to the ground. Plans for an operational test began anyway, but the idea was rendered moot when the V-2 launching sites in the Netherlands were captured.
In the 1950s and 1960s, missile defense meant defense against strategic (usually nuclear-armed) missiles. The technology mostly centered around detecting offensive launch events and tracking inbound ballistic missiles, but with limited ability to actually defend against the missile. The Soviet Union achieved the first nonnuclear intercept of a ballistic missile warhead by a missile at the Sary Shagan antiballistic missile defense test range on 4 March 1961. Nicknamed the "Griffon" missile system, it would be installed around Leningrad as a test
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States Project Nike air defense program focused initially on targeting hostile bombers before shifting focus to targeting ballistic missiles. In the 1950s, the first United States anti-ballistic missile system was the Nike Hercules, which had the ability to intercept incoming short-range ballistic missiles, but not intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) or ICBMs. This was followed by the Nike Zeus, which was capable of intercepting ICBMs by using a nuclear warhead, upgraded radar systems, faster computers, and control systems that were more effective in the upper atmosphere. However it was feared the missile's electronics may be vulnerable to x-rays from a nuclear detonation in space. A program was started to devise methods of hardening weapons from radiation damage. By the early 1960s the Nike Zeus was the first anti-ballistic missile to achieve hit-to-kill (physically colliding with the incoming warhead). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Missile defense | In the 1950s, the first United States anti-ballistic missile system was the Nike Hercules, which had the ability to intercept incoming short-range ballistic missiles, but not intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) or ICBMs. This was followed by the Nike Zeus, which was capable of intercepting ICBMs by using a nuclear warhead, upgraded radar systems, faster computers, and control systems that were more effective in the upper atmosphere. However it was feared the missile's electronics may be vulnerable to x-rays from a nuclear detonation in space. A program was started to devise methods of hardening weapons from radiation damage. By the early 1960s the Nike Zeus was the first anti-ballistic missile to achieve hit-to-kill (physically colliding with the incoming warhead).
In 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara diverted funds from the Zeus missile program, and instead directed that funding to the development of the Nike-X system, which utilized the high-speed, short-range Sprint missile. These missiles were meant to intercept incoming warheads after they had descended from space and were only seconds from their targets. To accomplish this, Nike-X required advances in missile design to make the Sprint missile quick enough to intercept incoming warheads in time. The system also included advanced active electronically scanned array radar systems and a powerful computer complex.
During the development of Nike-X, controversy over the effectiveness of anti-ballistic missile systems became more prominent. Critiques of the Nike-X included an estimate that the anti-ballistic missile system could be defeated by Soviets manufacturing more ICBMs, and the cost of those additional ICBMs needed to defeat Nike-X would also cost less than what the United States would spend on implementing Nike-X. Additionally, McNamara reported that a ballistic missile system would save American lives at the cost of approximately $700 per life, compared to a shelter system that could save lives at a lower cost of approximately $40 per life. As a result of these estimations, McNamara opposed implementation of Nike-X due to the high costs associated with construction and perceived poor cost-effectiveness of the system, and instead expressed support for pursuing arms limitations agreements with the Soviets. After the Chinese government detonated their first hydrogen bomb during Test No. 6. in 1967, McNamara modified the Nike-X program into a program called Sentinel. This program's goal was to protect major US cities from a limited ICBM attack, especially on one from China.
This would be done by building fifteen sites across the continental US, and one site in each of Alaska and Hawaii. This in turn reduced tensions with the Soviet Union, which retained the offensive capability to overwhelm any US defense. McNamara favored this approach as deploying the Sentinel program was less costly than a fully implemented Nike-X program, and would reduce congressional pressures to implement an ABM system. In the months following the announcements regarding the Sentinel program, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated: "Let me emphasize—and I cannot do so too strongly—that our decision to go ahead with a limited ABM deployment in no way indicates that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces is in any way less urgent or desirable.
With the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from their strategic positions in Cuba, the USSR started to think about a missile defense systems. A year after the crisis in 1963 the Soviets created the SA-5. Unlike its predecessors like the SA-1 or Griffon systems, this system was able to fly much higher and further and was fast enough to intercept some missiles however its main purpose was to intercept the new XB-70 supersonic aircraft the U.S was planning to make. However, since these types of aircraft never went into production in the U.S, the project was abandoned, and the Soviets reverted to the slower, low altitude SA-2 and SA-3 systems. In 1964 the Soviets publicly unveiled their newest interceptor missile named the "Galosh" which was nuclear armed and was meant for high altitude, long range interception. The Soviet Union began installing the A-35 anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow in 1965 using these "Galosh" missiles and would become operational by 1971. It consisted of four complex around Moscow each with 16 launchers and two missile tracking radars. Another notable feature of the A-35 was that it was the first monopulse radar. Developed by OKB 30, the Russian Special Design Bureau, the effort design to create a monopulse radar started in 1954. This was used to conduct the first successful intercept in 1961. There were known flaws with the design such as an inability to defend against MIRV and decoy style weapons.The reason for this was because the detonation of a nuclear interceptor missile like the "Galosh" creates a cloud of plasma that temporarily impairs radar readings around the area of the explosion limiting these kinds of systems to a one-shot capacity. This means that with MIRV style attacks the interceptor would be able to take out one or two but the rest would slip though. Another issue with the 1965 model was that it consisted of 11 large radar stations at six locations on the borders of Russia. These bases where visible to the US and could be taken out easily leaving the defense system useless in a concentrated and coordinated attack. Finally, the missiles that could be held on each base was limited by the ABM treaty to only 100 launchers maximum, meaning that in a massive attack they would be depleted quickly. During installation, a Ministry of Defense commission concluded that the system should not be fully implemented, reducing the capabilities of the completed system. That system was later upgraded to the A-135 anti-ballistic missile system and is still operational. This upgrade period started in 1975 and was headed by Dr. A.G. Basistov. When it was completed in 1990, the new A-135 system had a central control multifunctional radar called the "Don" and 100 interceptor missiles. Another improvement was the layering of interceptor missiles where high acceleration missiles are being added for low flying targets and the "Galosh" style missiles where improved further for high altitude targets. All of these missiles where moved underground into silos to make them less vulnerable, which was a flaw of the previous system.
The SALT I talks began in 1969, and led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, which ultimately limited the US and USSR to one defensive missile site each, with no more than 100 missiles per site. This included both ABM interceptor missiles as well as launchers. Originally, the agreement made by the Nixon administration and the Soviet Union stated that both of the two nations were each allowed to have two ABM defensive systems present in their own countries. The goal was to effectively have one ABM defense system located near each nation's capital city as well as another ABM defense system placed near the nation's most important or strategical ICBM field. This treaty allowed for an effective form of deterrence for both sides as if either side were to make an offensive move, the other side would be capable of countering that move. However, a few years later in 1974 both sides reworked the treaty to include only one ABM defensive system present around an ICBM launch area or the nation's capital city. This occurred once both sides determined the other side was not going to construct a second ABM defensive system. Along with limiting the amount of ballistic missile defense systems each nation could have, the treaty also stated if either country desired to have a radar for incoming missile detection, the radar system must be located on the outskirts of the territory and must be aligned in the opposite direction of one's own country. This treaty would end up being the precedent set for future missile defense programs, as any systems that were not stationary and land-based were a violation of the treaty.
As a result of the treaty and of technical limitations, along with public opposition to nearby nuclear-armed defensive missiles, the US Sentinel program was re-designated the Safeguard Program, with the new goal of defending US ICBM sites, not cities. The US Safeguard system was planned to be implemented in various sites across the US, including at Whiteman AFB in Missouri, Malmstrom AFB in Montana, and Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 placed a limit of two ABM systems within the U.S, causing the work site in Missouri to be abandoned, and the partially-completed Montana site was abandoned in 1974 after an additional agreement between the US and USSR that limited each country to one ABM system. As a result, the only Safeguard system that was deployed was to defend the LGM-30 Minuteman ICBMs near Grand Forks, North Dakota. However, it was deactivated in 1976 after being operational for less than four months due to a changing political climate plus concern over limited effectiveness, low strategic value, and high operational cost.
In the early 1980s, technology had matured to consider space based missile defense options. Precision hit-to-kill systems more reliable than the early Nike Zeus were thought possible. With these improvements, the Reagan administration promoted the Strategic Defense Initiative, an ambitious plan to provide a comprehensive defense against an all-out ICBM attack. In pursuit of that goal, the Strategic Defense Initiative investigated a variety of potential missile-defense systems, which included systems utilizing ground-based missile systems and space-based missile systems, as well as systems utilizing lasers or particle beam weapons. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Missile defense | As a result, the only Safeguard system that was deployed was to defend the LGM-30 Minuteman ICBMs near Grand Forks, North Dakota. However, it was deactivated in 1976 after being operational for less than four months due to a changing political climate plus concern over limited effectiveness, low strategic value, and high operational cost.
In the early 1980s, technology had matured to consider space based missile defense options. Precision hit-to-kill systems more reliable than the early Nike Zeus were thought possible. With these improvements, the Reagan administration promoted the Strategic Defense Initiative, an ambitious plan to provide a comprehensive defense against an all-out ICBM attack. In pursuit of that goal, the Strategic Defense Initiative investigated a variety of potential missile-defense systems, which included systems utilizing ground-based missile systems and space-based missile systems, as well as systems utilizing lasers or particle beam weapons. This program faced controversy over the feasibility of the projects it pursued, as well as the substantial amount of funding and time required for the research to develop the requisite technology. The Strategic Defense Initiative earned the nickname "Star Wars" due to criticism from Senator Ted Kennedy in which he described the Strategic Defense Initiative as "reckless Star Wars schemes.". Reagan established the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to oversee the development of the program's projects. Upon request by the SDIO, the American Physical Society (APS) performed a review of the concepts being developed within SDIO and concluded that all of the concepts pursuing use of Directed Energy Weapons were not feasible solutions for an anti-missile defense system without decades of additional research and development. Following the APS's report in 1986, the SDIO switched focus to a concept called the Strategic Defense System, which would utilize a system of space-based missiles called Space Rocks which would intercept incoming ballistic missiles from orbit, and would be supplemented by ground-based missile defense systems. In 1993, the SDIO was closed and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was created, which focuses on ground-based missile defense systems utilizing interceptor missiles. In 2002, BMDO's name was changed to its current title, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). See National Missile Defense for additional details. In the early 1990s, missile defense expanded to include tactical missile defense, as seen in the first Gulf War. Although not designed from the outset to intercept tactical missiles, upgrades gave the Patriot system a limited missile defense capability. The effectiveness of the Patriot system in disabling or destroying incoming Scuds was the subject of congressional hearings and reports in 1992.
In the time following the agreement of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, it was becoming increasingly more and more difficult for the United States to create a new missile defense strategy without violating the terms of the treaty. During the Clinton administration, the initial goal the United States had interest in, was to negotiate with the former Soviet Union, which is now Russia, and hopefully agree to a revision to the treaty signed a few decades prior. In the late 1990s the United States had interest in an idea termed NMD or National Missile Defense. This idea essentially would allow the United States to increase the number of ballistic missile interceptors that would be available to missile defense personnel at the Alaska location. While the initial ABM treaty was designed primarily to deter the Soviet Union and help create a period of détente, the United States was primarily fearing other threats such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. The Russian government was not interested in making any sort of modification to the ABM treaty that would allow for technology to be developed that was explicitly banned when the treaty was agreed upon. However, Russia was interested in revising the treaty in such a way that would allow for a more diplomatic approach to potential missile harboring countries. During this period, the United States was also seeking assistance for their ballistic missile defense systems from Japan. Following the testing of the Taepo Dong missile by the North Korean government, the Japanese government became more concerned and inclined to accept a partnership for a BMD system with the United States. In late 1998, Japan and the United States agreed to the Naval Wide Theater system which would allow the two sides to design, construct, and test ballistic missile defense systems together. Nearing the end of Clinton's time in office, it had been determined that the NMD program was not as effective as the United States would have liked, and the decision was made to not employ this system while Clinton served out the rest of his term. The decision on future of the NMD program was going to be given to the next president in line, who ultimately would end up being George W. Bush.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the issue of defense against cruise missiles became more prominent with the new Bush administration. In 2002, President George W. Bush withdrew the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, allowing further development and testing of ABMs under the Missile Defense Agency, as well as deployment of interceptor vehicles beyond the single site allowed under the treaty. During the Bush's time in office, the potentially threatening countries to the United States included North Korea as well as Iran. While these countries might not have possessed the weaponry that many countries containing missile defense systems had, the Bush administration expected an Iranian missile test within the next ten years. In order to counter the potential risk of North Korean missiles, the United States Department of Defense desired to create missile defense systems along the west coast of the United States, namely in both California and Alaska.There are still technological hurdles to an effective defense against ballistic missile attack. The United States National Ballistic Missile Defense System has come under scrutiny about its technological feasibility. Intercepting midcourse (rather than launch or reentry stage) ballistic missiles traveling at several miles per second with a "kinetic kill vehicle" has been characterized as trying to hit a bullet with a bullet. Despite this difficulty, there have been several successful test intercepts and the system was made operational in 2006, while tests and system upgrades continue. Moreover, the warheads or payloads of ballistic missiles can be concealed by a number of different types of decoys. Sensors that track and target warheads aboard the kinetic kill vehicle may have trouble distinguishing the "real" warhead from the decoys, but several tests that have included decoys were successful. Nira Schwartz's and Theodore Postol's criticisms about the technical feasibility of these sensors have led to a continuing investigation of research misconduct and fraud at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
In February 2007, the US missile defense system consisted of 13 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) at Fort Greely, Alaska, plus two interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The US planned to have 21 interceptor missiles by the end of 2007. The system was initially called National Missile Defense (NMD), but in 2003 the ground-based component was renamed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD). As of 2014, the Missile Defense Agency had 30 operational GBIs, with a total 44 GBIs in the missile fields in 2018. In 2021 an additional 20 GBIs of 64 total were planned, but not yet fielded. They are tasked with meeting more complex threats than those met by the EKV.
Defending against cruise missiles is similar to defending against hostile, low-flying crewed aircraft. As with aircraft defense, countermeasures such as chaff, flares, and low altitude can complicate targeting and missile interception. High-flying radar aircraft such as AWACS can often identify low flying threats by using doppler radar. Another possible method is using specialized satellites to track these targets. By coupling a target's kinetic inputs with infrared and radar signatures it may be possible to overcome the countermeasures.
In March 2008, the US Congress convened hearings to re-examine the status of missile defense in US military strategy. Upon taking office, President Obama directed a comprehensive review of ballistic missile defense policy and programs. The review's findings related to Europe were announced on 17 September 2009. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report was published in February 2010.
NATO missile defense system:
Mechanisms: The Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) is the senior NATO committee which acts as the tasking authority for the theater missile defense program. The ALTBMD Program Management Organization, which comprises a steering committee and a program office hosted by the NATO C3 Agency, directs the program and reports to the CNAD.
The focal point for consultation on full-scale missile defense is the Reinforced Executive Working Group. The CNAD is responsible for conducting technical studies and reporting the outcome to the Group.
The NRC Ad hoc Working Group on TMD is the steering body for NATO-Russia cooperation on theater missile defense.
In September 2018, a consortium of 23 NATO nations met to collaborate on the Nimble Titan 18 integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) campaign of experimentation.
Missile defense: By early 2010, NATO will have an initial capability to protect Alliance forces against missile threats and is examining options for protecting territory and populations. This is in response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including missiles of all ranges. NATO is conducting three missile defense–related activities:
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System capability: Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System is "ALTBMD" for short. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Missile defense | The focal point for consultation on full-scale missile defense is the Reinforced Executive Working Group. The CNAD is responsible for conducting technical studies and reporting the outcome to the Group.
The NRC Ad hoc Working Group on TMD is the steering body for NATO-Russia cooperation on theater missile defense.
In September 2018, a consortium of 23 NATO nations met to collaborate on the Nimble Titan 18 integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) campaign of experimentation.
Missile defense: By early 2010, NATO will have an initial capability to protect Alliance forces against missile threats and is examining options for protecting territory and populations. This is in response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including missiles of all ranges. NATO is conducting three missile defense–related activities:
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System capability: Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System is "ALTBMD" for short.
As of early 2010, the Alliance has an interim capability to protect troops in a specific area against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles (up to 3,000 kilometers).
The end system consists of a multi-layered system of systems, comprising low- and high-altitude defenses (also called lower- and upper-layer defenses), including Battle Management Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I), early warning sensors, radar, and various interceptors. NATO member countries provide the sensors and weapon systems, while NATO has developed the BMC3I segment and facilitate the integration of all these elements.
Missile Defense for the protection of NATO territory: A Missile Defense Feasibility Study was launched after NATO's 2002 Prague summit. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) were also involved in negotiations. The study concluded that missile defense is technically feasible, and it provided a technical basis for ongoing political and military discussions regarding the desirability of a NATO missile defense system.
During the 2008 Bucharest summit, the alliance discussed the technical details as well as the political and military implications of the proposed elements of the US missile defense system in Europe. Allied leaders recognized that the planned deployment of European-based US missile defense assets would help protect North American Allies, and agreed that this capability should be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defense architecture. However, these opinions are in the process of being reconstructed given the Obama administration's decision in 2009 to replace the long-range interceptor project in Poland with a short/medium range interceptor.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that NATO's pattern of deployment of Patriot missiles indicates that these will be used to defend against Iranian missiles in addition to the stated goal of defending against spillover from the Syrian civil war.
Aegis-based system: In order to accelerate the deployment of a missile shield over Europe, Barack Obama sent ships with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System to European waters, including the Black Sea as needed.
In 2012 the system will achieve an "interim capability" that will for the first time offer American forces in Europe some protection against IRBM attack. However, these interceptors may be poorly placed and of the wrong type to defend the United States, in addition to American troops and facilities in Europe.
The Aegis ballistic missile defense-equipped SM-3 Block II-A missile demonstrated it can shoot down an ICBM target on 16 Nov 2020.
ACCS Theater Missile Defense 1: According to BioPrepWatch, NATO has signed a 136 million euro contract with ThalesRaytheonSystems to upgrade its current theater missile defense program.
The project, called ACCS Theater Missile Defense 1, will bring new capabilities to NATO's Air Command and Control System, including updates for processing ballistic missile tracks, additional satellite and radar feeds, improvements to data communication and correlation features. The upgrade to its theater missile defense command and control system will allow for NATO to connect national sensors and interceptors in defense against short and medium-range ballistic missiles. According to NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment Patrick Auroy, the execution of this contract will be a major technical milestone forward for NATO's theater missile defense. The project was expected to be complete by 2015. An integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) capability will be delivered to the operational community by 2016, by which time NATO will have a true theater missile defense.
Defense systems and initiatives: Akash missile surface-to-air missile defense system
Arrow missile
Chū-SAM (中SAM) Japan's JGSDF Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile
David's Sling
HQ-9 regional air defence/anti-ballistic missile
IAMD The SMDC is leading the United States Army's laser efforts to replace MIM-104 Patriot.
Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Iron Dome
Italian-French SAMP/T missile air defense system
KS-1 regional air defence missile
L-SAM
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS)
Patriot surface-to-air missile system
Hawk medium range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system
RIM-161 Standard Missile 3
Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system
S-400 Triumf
Skyguard chemical laser-based area defense system proposed by Northrop Grumman
Sky Bow
Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
Vigilant Eagle Airport surface-to-air missile protection system
Iran Belief System 373 (Bavar-373)
Iran Arman long-range anti-ballistic missile system
Khordad 15
See also: Anti-satellite weapon
Command systems in the United States Army
References:
Bibliography: Nicole C. Evans, "Missile Defense: Winning Minds, Not Hearts", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2004.
Daniel Möckli, "US Missile Defense: A Strategic Challenge for Europe", CSS Analyses in Security Policy no. 12, April 2007.
Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, New York: Encounter Books (2010) (ISBN 978-1594032233). Missiles intelligence.
External links: Missile Threat – CSIS Missile Defense Project
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Archived 6 May 2013 at the Wayback Machine A primer from the Council on Foreign Relations
Steven Donald Smith, Missile Defense Program Moves Forward, 2006.
Missile Defense: The First Seventy Years Archived 2015-09-22 at the Wayback Machine |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mobilization | History:
Roman Republic: The Roman Republic was able to mobilize at various times between 6% (81–83 BCE) to as much as 10% (210s BCE) of the total Roman population, in emergencies and for short periods of time. This included poorly-trained militia.
Modern era: The Confederate States of America is estimated to have mobilized about 11% of its free population in the American Civil War (1861–1865). The Kingdom of Prussia mobilized about 6–7% of its total population in the years 1760 and 1813. The Swedish Empire mobilized 7.7% in 1709.
Armies in the seventeenth century possessed an average of 20,000 men. A military force of this size requires around 20 tons of food per day, shelter, as well as all the necessary munitions, transportation (typically horses or mules), tools, and representative garments. Without efficient transportation, mobilizing these average-sized forces was extremely costly, time-consuming, and potentially life-threatening. Soldiers could traverse the terrain to get to war fronts, but they had to carry their supplies. Many armies decided to forage for food; however, foraging restricted movement because it is based on the presumption that the army moves over land possessing significant agricultural production.
However, due to new policies (like conscription), greater populations, and greater national wealth, the nineteenth-century army was composed of an average of 100,000 men. For example, in 1812 Napoleon led an army of 600,000 to Moscow while feeding off plentiful agricultural products introduced by the turn of the century, such as potatoes. Despite the advantages of mass armies, mobilizing forces of this magnitude took much more time than it had in the past.
The Second Italian War of Independence illustrated all of the problems in modern army mobilization. Prussia began to realize the future of mobilizing mass armies when Napoleon III transported 130,000 soldiers to Italy by military railways in 1859. French caravans that carried the supplies for the French and Piedmontese armies were incredibly slow, and the arms inside these caravans were sloppily organized. These armies were in luck, however, in that their Austrian adversaries experienced similar problems with sluggish supply caravans (one of which apparently covered less than three miles per day).
Not only did Prussia take note of the problems in transporting supplies to armies, but it also took note of the lack of communication between troops, officers, and generals. Austria's army was primarily composed of Slavs, but it contained many other ethnicities as well. Austrian military instruction during peacetime utilized nine different languages, accustoming Austrian soldiers to taking orders only in their native language. Conversely, in an effort to augment the efficacy of the new "precision rifle" developed by the monarchy, officers were forced to only speak German when giving orders to their men. Even one Austrian officer commented at Solferino that his troops could not even comprehend the command, "Halt." This demonstrates the communicative problems that arose quickly with the advent of the mass army.
Mobilization in World War I: Intricate plans for mobilization contributed greatly to the beginning of World War I, since in 1914, under the laws and customs of warfare then observed (not to mention the desire to avoid compromising national security), general mobilization of one nation's military forces was invariably considered an act of war by that country's likely enemies.
In 1914, the United Kingdom was the only European Great Power without conscription. The other Great Powers (Austria-Hungary, Italy, France, Germany and Russia) all relied on compulsory military service to supply each of their armies with the millions of men they believed they would need to win a major war. France enacted the "Three Year Law" (1913) to extend the service of conscripted soldiers to match the size of the German army, as the French population of 40 million was smaller than the German population of 65 million people. The Anglo-German naval arms race began, sparked by the German enactment of the Second Naval Law. Each of the Great Powers could only afford to keep a fraction of these men in uniform in peacetime, the rest were reservists with limited opportunities to train. Maneuvering formations of millions of men with limited military training required intricate plans with no room for error, confusion, or discretion after mobilization began. These plans were prepared under the assumption of worst-case scenarios.
For example, German military leaders did not plan to mobilize for war with Russia whilst assuming that France would not come to her ally's aid, or vice versa. The Schlieffen Plan therefore dictated not only mobilization against both powers, but also the order of attack—France would be attacked first regardless of the diplomatic circumstances. To bypass the fortified Franco-German frontier, the German forces were to be ordered to march through Belgium. Whether or not Russia had committed the first provocation, the German plan agreed to by Emperor William II called for the attack on Russia to take place only after France was defeated.
Similarly, the Russian Stavka's war planning assumed that war against either Austria-Hungary or Germany would mean war against the other power. Although the plan allowed flexibility as to whether the main effort would be made against Germany or Austria-Hungary, in either case units would be mobilized on the frontiers of both Powers. On July 28, 1914, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia (William's cousin) ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary only. While war with Austria-Hungary seemed inevitable, Nicholas engaged in a personal dialogue with the German Emperor in an attempt to avoid war with Germany. However, Nicholas was advised that attempts to improvise a partial mobilization would lead to chaos and probable defeat if, as pessimists on the Russian side expected, no amount of diplomacy could convince the Germans to refrain from attacking Russia whilst she was engaged with Germany's ally. On July 29, 1914, the Tsar ordered full mobilization, then changed his mind after receiving a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm. Partial mobilization was ordered instead.
The next day, the Tsar's foreign minister, Sergey Sazonov once more persuaded Nicholas of the need for general mobilization, and the order was issued that day, July 30. In response, Germany declared war on Russia.
Germany mobilized under von Moltke the Younger's revised version of the Schlieffen Plan, which assumed a two-front war with Russia and France. Like Russia, Germany decided to follow its two-front plans despite the one-front war. Germany declared war on France on August 3, 1914, one day after issuing an ultimatum to Belgium demanding the right of German troops to pass through as part of the planned pincer action of the military. Finally, Britain declared war on Germany for violating Belgian neutrality.
Thus the entangling alliances of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente directed the intricate plans for mobilization. This brought all of the Great Powers of Europe into the Great War without actually utilizing the provisions of either alliance.
The mobilization was like a holiday for many of the inexperienced soldiers; for example, some Germans wore flowers in the muzzles of their rifles as they marched. Trains brought soldiers to the front lines of battle. The Germans timetabled the movements of 11,000 trains as they brought troops across the Rhine River. The French mobilized around 7,000 trains for movement. Horses were also mobilized for war. The British had 165,000 horses prepared for cavalry, the Austrians 600,000, the Germans 715,000, and the Russians over a million.
Britain's Dominions including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa were compelled to go to war when Britain did. However, it was largely left up to the individual Dominions to recruit and equip forces for the war effort. Canadian, Australian and New Zealand mobilizations all involved the creation of new field forces for overseas service rather than using the existing regimental structures as a framework. In the case of Canada, the Militia Minister, Sir Sam Hughes, created the Canadian Expeditionary Force by sending telegrams to 226 separate reserve unit commanders asking for volunteers to muster at Valcartier in Quebec. The field force served separately from the Militia (Canada's peacetime army); in 1920 the Otter Commission was compelled to sort out which units would perpetuate the units that served in the trenches—the CEF or the prewar Militia. A unique solution of perpetuations was instituted, and mobilization during the Second World War did not repeat Sir Sam Hughes' model, which has been described by historians as being more closely akin to ancient Scottish clans assembling for battle than a modern, industrialized nation preparing for war.
"Colonials" served under British command though, perhaps owing to the limited autonomy granted to the Dominions regarding their respective mobilizations, the Dominions eventually compelled the British government to overrule the objections of some British commanders and let the Dominion forces serve together instead of being distributed amongst various British divisions. The "colonials" would go on to be acknowledged by both the British and German high commands as being elite British units. In May 1918, when command of the Australian Corps passed from William Birdwood to John Monash, it became the first British Empire formation commanded totally free of British officers.
On May 23, 1915, Italy entered World War I on the Allied side. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mobilization | A unique solution of perpetuations was instituted, and mobilization during the Second World War did not repeat Sir Sam Hughes' model, which has been described by historians as being more closely akin to ancient Scottish clans assembling for battle than a modern, industrialized nation preparing for war.
"Colonials" served under British command though, perhaps owing to the limited autonomy granted to the Dominions regarding their respective mobilizations, the Dominions eventually compelled the British government to overrule the objections of some British commanders and let the Dominion forces serve together instead of being distributed amongst various British divisions. The "colonials" would go on to be acknowledged by both the British and German high commands as being elite British units. In May 1918, when command of the Australian Corps passed from William Birdwood to John Monash, it became the first British Empire formation commanded totally free of British officers.
On May 23, 1915, Italy entered World War I on the Allied side. Despite being the weakest of the big four Allied powers, the Italians soon managed to populate its army from 560 to 693 infantry battalions in 1916; the army had grown in size from 1 million to 1.5 million soldiers. On August 17, 1916, Romania entered the war on the Allied side, mobilizing an army of 23 divisions. Romania was quickly defeated however by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. Bulgaria went so far as to ultimately mobilize 1.2 million men, more than a quarter of its population of 4.3 million people, a greater share of its population than any other country during the war.
The production of supplies gradually increased throughout the war. In Russia, the expansion of industry allowed a 2,000 percent increase in the production of artillery shells – by November 1915, over 1,512,000 artillery shells were being produced per month. In France, a massive mobilization by the female population to work in factories allowed the rate of shell production to reach 100,000 shells a day by 1915.
Both sides also began drawing on larger numbers of soldiers. The British Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, appealed for hundreds of thousands of soldiers, which was met with an enthusiastic response. 30 new British divisions were created. The response by volunteers allowed the British to put off the introduction of conscription until 1916. New Zealand followed suit, with Canada also eventually introducing conscription with the Military Service Act in 1917.
On April 6, 1917, the United States entered the war on the Allied side. At the entrance, the U.S. only could mobilize its army of 107,641 soldiers, ranked only seventeenth in size worldwide at the time. The United States Navy quickly mobilized, adding 5 dreadnoughts to the Allied navy. However, conscription quickly ensued. By March 1918, 318,000 U.S. soldiers had been mobilized to France. Eventually, by October 1918, a force of 2 million U.S. soldiers joined in the war effort.
Mobilization in World War II: Poland partly mobilized its troops on August 24, 1939, and fully mobilized on August 30, 1939, following the increased confrontations with Germany since March 1939. On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland, which prompted both France and Britain to declare war on Germany. However, they were slow to mobilize, and by the time Poland had been overrun by the Axis powers, only minor operations had been carried out by the French at the Saar River.
Canada actually carried out a partial mobilization on August 25, 1939, in anticipation of the growing diplomatic crisis. On September 1, 1939, the Canadian Active Service Force (a corps-sized force of two divisions) was mobilized even though war was not declared by Canada until September 10, 1939. Only one division went overseas in December 1939, and the government hoped to follow a "limited liability" war policy. When France was invaded in May 1940, the Canadian government realized that would not be possible and mobilized three additional divisions, beginning their overseas employment in August 1940 with the dispatch of the 2nd Canadian Division (some units of which were deployed to Iceland and Newfoundland for garrison duty before moving to the UK). Canada also enacted the National Resources Mobilization Act in 1940, which among other things compelled men to serve in the military, though conscripts mobilized under the NRMA did not serve overseas until 1944. Conscripts did, however, serve in the Aleutian Islands Campaign in 1943 though the anticipated Japanese defense never materialized due to the evacuation of the enemy garrison before the landings. Service in the Aleutians was not considered "overseas" as technically the islands were part of North America.
The United Kingdom mobilized 22% of its total population for direct military service, more than any other nation in the WWII era.
Up to 34 million soldiers served in the Red Army during World War II, representing the largest military force in world history.
Post–World War II: Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the President of Ukraine, signed a decree on February 24, 2022 on the general mobilization of the population in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Conscripts and reservists were called up over the next 90 days to "ensure the defense of the state, maintaining combat and mobilization readiness". Men between the ages of 18 and 60 were prohibited from leaving the country.
Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, announced a partial mobilization on 21 September 2022 of existing reservists, most particularly those that have military experience. According to claims of the Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu, 300,000 reservists would be mobilized.
Economic mobilization: Economic mobilization is the preparation of resources for usage in a national emergency by carrying out changes in the organization of the national economy.
It is reorganizing the functioning of the national economy to use resources most effectively in support of the total war effort. Typically, the available resources and productive capabilities of each nation determined the degree and intensity of economic mobilization. Thus, effectively mobilizing economic resources to support the war effort is a complex process, requiring superior coordination and productive capability on a national scale. Importantly, some scholars have argued that such large scale mobilization of society and its resources for the purposes of warfare have the effect of aiding in state building. Herbst argues that the demands of reacting to an external aggressor provides a strong enough impetus to force structural changes and also forge a common national identity.
See also: Civil conscription
Combat readiness
Impressment
Levée en masse
War economy
Notes:
References:
Further reading: United States Department of the Army (1955): History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (online)
External links:
Online version of The army and economic mobilization (1959), by R. Elberton Smith
Swiss government PDF on mobilization (German)
mobilization procedure of the Austrian Federal Army (in German)
Economic mobilization since World War II
Mobilisation |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Modern warfare | History: Modern warfare has its beginnings to the early modern period and multiple conflicts have been fought from the 1500s with modernized military techniques and designs. Major wars in the specific era were the Thirty Years' War, Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, Cold War and the War on Terror.
Types: Some argue that the changing forms of third generation warfare represents nothing more than an evolution of earlier technology.
Aerial: Aerial warfare is the use of military aircraft and other flying machines in warfare. Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy concentrations or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.
Asymmetric: A military situation in which two belligerents of unequal strength interact and take advantage of their respective strengths and weaknesses. This interaction often involves strategies and tactics outside conventional warfare.
Biological: Biological warfare, also known as germ warfare, is the use of any organism (bacteria, virus or other disease-causing organism) or toxin found in nature, as a weapon of war. It is meant to incapacitate or kill enemy combatants. It may also be defined as the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in man or animals and damage to plants or material; or defense against such employment. Biological warfare involves the intentional release of living pathogens either in their naturally occurring form, for example the diseased corpses of animals, or in the form of specific human-modified organisms.
Chemical: Chemical warfare is warfare (associated military operations) using the toxic properties of chemical substances to incapacitate or kill enemy combatants. Chemical warfare nerve agents are potent anticholinesterase compounds deliberately formulated to induce debilitating effects or death during wartime hostilities. A key need for both community emergency preparedness, and restoration of military installations where agents have been processed and/or stored, is access to concise and timely information on agent characteristics and treatment, as well as health-based exposure guidelines derived in a clear manner by contemporary methods of data analysis.
Electronic: Electronic warfare refers to mainly non-violent practices used chiefly to support other areas of warfare. The term was originally coined to encompass the interception and decoding of enemy radio communications, and the communications technologies and cryptography methods used to counter such interception, as well as jamming, radio stealth, and other related areas. Over the later years of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century, this has expanded to cover a wide range of areas: the use of, detection of and avoidance of detection by radar and sonar systems, computer hacking, etc.
Decentralized (fourth generation): Fourth generation warfare (4GW) is a concept defined by William S. Lind and expanded by Thomas X. Hammes, used to describe the decentralized nature of modern warfare. The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent ideological network. Fourth Generation wars are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians, conflicts and peace, battlefields and safety.
While this term is similar to terrorism and asymmetric warfare, it is much narrower. Classical insurgencies and the Indian Wars are examples of pre-modern wars, not 4GW. Fourth generation warfare usually has the insurgency group or non-state side trying to implement their own government or reestablish an old government over the one currently running the territory. The blurring of lines between state and non-state is further complicated in a democracy by the power of the media.
Ground: Ground warfare involves three types of combat units: infantry, armor, and artillery.
Infantry in modern times would consist of mechanized infantry and airborne forces. Usually having a type of rifle or sub-machine gun, an infantryman is the basic unit of an army.
Armored warfare in modern times involves a variety of armored fighting vehicles for the purpose of battle and support. Tanks or other armored vehicles (such as armored personnel carriers or tank destroyers) are slower, yet stronger hunks of metal. They are invulnerable to enemy machine gun fire but prone to rocket infantry, mines, and aircraft so are usually accompanied by infantry. In urban areas, because of smaller space, an armored vehicle is exposed to hidden enemy infantry but as the so-called "Thunder Run" at Baghdad in 2003 showed, armored vehicles can play a critical role in urban combat. In rural areas, an armored vehicle does not have to worry about hidden units though muddy and damp terrain that have always been a factor of weakness for tanks and vehicles.
Artillery in contemporary times is distinguished by its large caliber, firing an explosive shell or rocket, and being of such a size and weight as to require a specialized mount for firing and transport. Weapons covered by this term include the howitzer, cannon, mortar, and field gun (collectively called cannon artillery, gun artillery or tube artillery) and rocket artillery. The term "artillery" has traditionally not been used for projectiles with internal guidance systems, even though some artillery units employ surface-to-surface missiles. Recent advances in terminal guidance systems for small munitions has allowed large caliber shells to be fitted with precision guidance fuses, blurring this distinction.
Guerrilla: Guerrilla warfare is defined as fighting by groups of irregular troops (guerrillas) within areas occupied by the enemy. When guerrillas obey the laws and customs of war, they are entitled, if captured, to be treated as ordinary prisoners of war; however, they are often treated by their captors as unlawful combatants and executed. The tactics of guerrilla warfare stress deception and ambush, as opposed to mass confrontation, and succeed best in an irregular, rugged terrain, and with a sympathetic populace, whom guerrillas often seek to win over or dominate by propaganda and reform. Guerrilla warfare has played a significant role in modern history, especially when waged by Communist liberation movements in Southeast Asia (most notably in the Vietnam War) and elsewhere.
Guerrilla fighters gravitate toward weapons which are easily accessible, low in technology, and low in cost. A typical arsenal of the modern guerrilla would include the AK-47, RPGs, and Improvised explosive devices. The guerrilla doctrines' main disadvantage is the inability to access more advanced equipment due to economic, influence, and accessibility issues. They must rely on small unit tactics involving hit and run. This situation leads to low intensity warfare, asymmetrical warfare, and war amongst the people. The rules of Guerrilla warfare are to fight a little and then to retreat.
Informationised:
Intelligence: Propaganda
Propaganda is an ancient form of disinformation concerted with sending a set of messages aimed at influencing the opinions or behavior of large numbers of people. Instead of impartially providing information, propaganda in its most basic sense presents information in order to influence its audience. The most effective propaganda is often completely truthful, but some propaganda presents facts selectively to encourage a particular synthesis, or gives loaded messages in order to produce an emotional rather than rational response to the information presented. The desired result is a change of the cognitive narrative of the subject in the target audience.
Psychological
Psychological warfare had its beginnings during the campaigns of Genghis Khan through the allowance of certain civilians of the nations, cities, and villages to flee said place, spreading terror and fear to neighboring principalities. Psychological actions have the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.
Information
Made possible by the widespread use of the electronic media during World War II, Information warfare is a kind of warfare where information and attacks on information and its system are used as a tool of warfare. Some examples of this type of warfare are electronic "sniffers" which disrupt international fund-transfer networks as well as the signals of television and radio stations. Jamming such signals can allow participants in the war to use the stations for a misinformation campaign.
Naval: Naval warfare takes place on the high seas (blue water navy). Usually, only large, powerful nations have competent blue water or deep water navies. Modern navies primarily use aircraft carriers, submarines, frigates, cruisers, and destroyers for combat. This provides a versatile array of attacks, capable of hitting ground targets, air targets, or other seafaring vessels. Most modern navies also have a large naval aviation contingent, deployed from aircraft carriers. In World War II, small craft (motor torpedo boats variously called PT boats, MTBs, MGBs, Schnellboote, or MAS-boats) fought near shore. This developed in the Vietnam War into riverine warfare (brown water navy), in intertidal and river areas. Irregular warfare makes this sort of combat more likely in the future.
Network-centric: Network-centric warfare is essentially a new military doctrine made possible by the Information Age. Weapons platforms, sensors, and command and control centers are being connected through high-speed communication networks. The doctrine is related to the Revolution in Military Affairs debate.
The overall network which enables this strategy in the United States military is called the Global Information Grid.
New generation: New generation warfare is a Russian military theory of unconventional warfare based on the Gerasimov doctrine which prioritizes the psychological and people-centered aspects over traditional military concerns, and emphasizes a phased approach of non-military influence such that armed conflict, if it arises, is much less costly in human or economic terms. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Modern warfare | This developed in the Vietnam War into riverine warfare (brown water navy), in intertidal and river areas. Irregular warfare makes this sort of combat more likely in the future.
Network-centric: Network-centric warfare is essentially a new military doctrine made possible by the Information Age. Weapons platforms, sensors, and command and control centers are being connected through high-speed communication networks. The doctrine is related to the Revolution in Military Affairs debate.
The overall network which enables this strategy in the United States military is called the Global Information Grid.
New generation: New generation warfare is a Russian military theory of unconventional warfare based on the Gerasimov doctrine which prioritizes the psychological and people-centered aspects over traditional military concerns, and emphasizes a phased approach of non-military influence such that armed conflict, if it arises, is much less costly in human or economic terms.
Nuclear: Nuclear war is a type of warfare which relies on nuclear weapons. There are two types of warfare in this category. In a limited nuclear war, a small number of weapons are used in a tactical exchange aimed primarily at enemy combatants. In a full-scale nuclear war, large numbers of weapons are used in an attack aimed at entire countries. This type of warfare would target both combatants and non-combatants.
Space: Space warfare is the hypothetical warfare that occurs outside the Earth's atmosphere. As of 2023, no wars have been fought here yet. The weapons would include orbital weaponry and space weapons. High value outer space targets would include satellites, military satellites and weapon platforms. Notably no real weapons exist in space yet, though ground-to-space missiles have been successfully tested against target satellites. As of now, this is purely science fiction.
Modern wars:
Lists: List of wars 1800–1899
List of wars 1900–1944
List of wars 1945–1989
List of wars 1990–2002
List of wars 2003–present
List of ongoing armed conflicts
List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
Major modern wars:
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Morale | Definition: Military history experts have not agreed on a precise definition of "morale". Clausewitz's comments on the subject have been described as "deliberately vague" by modern scholars. George Francis Robert Henderson, a widely read military author of the pre-World War I era, viewed morale as related to the instinct of self-preservation, the suppression of which he said was "the moral fear of turning back", in other words, that a willingness to fight was bolstered by a strong sense of duty. Henderson wrote:
Human nature must be the basis of every leader's calculations. To sustain the moral[e] of his own men; to break down the moral[e] of his enemy—these are the great objects which, if he be ambitious of success, he must always keep in view.
During the proceedings of the Southborough Committee inquiry concerning shellshock, testimony by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller defined morale as "the acquired quality which in highly-trained troops counterbalances the influence of the instinct of self-preservation." Of Henderson's "moral fear", the soldier's sense of duty, it is contrasted with the fear of death, and to control one's troops required of a commander more than authoritarian force, but other strategies to be deployed to that purpose.
Military: An American general defined morale as "when a soldier thinks his army is the best in the world, his regiment the best in the army, his company the best in the regiment, his squad the best in the company, and that he himself is the best blankety-blank soldier man in the outfit."
In military science, there are two meanings to morale: individual perseverance and unit cohesion. Morale is often highly dependent on soldier effectiveness, health, comfort, safety, and belief-in-purpose, and therefore an army with good supply lines, sound air cover, and a clear objective will typically possess, as a whole, better morale than one without. Historically, elite military units such as special operations forces have "high morale" due to their training and pride in their unit. When a unit's morale is said to be "depleted", it means it is close to "crack and surrender". It is well worth noting that generally speaking, most commanders do not look at the morale of specific individuals but rather the "fighting spirit" of squadrons, divisions, battalions, ships, etc.
Clausewitz stresses the importance of morale and will for both the soldier and the commander. The soldier's first requirement is moral and physical courage, both the acceptance of responsibility and the suppression of fear. In order to survive the horror of combat[,] he must have an invincible martial spirit, which can be attained only through military victory and hardship. The soldier has but one purpose: "The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.
Military morale is in a large sense inseparable from civilian morale because each reacts upon the other and both are in large measure based on fidelity to a cause. But there is a certain kind of morale that is distinctly military. It begins with the soldier's attitude toward duty. It develops with the soldier's command over himself. It is a spirit that becomes dominant in the individual and also in the group. Whether the soldier has physical comforts or suffers physical hardships may be a factor but is seldom the determining factor in making or unmaking his morale. A cause known and believed in; knowledge that substantial justice governs discipline; the individual's confidence and pride in himself, his comrades, his leaders; the unit's pride in its own will; these basic things, supplemented by intelligent welfare and recreation measures and brought to life by a spirit of mutual respect and co-operation, combine to weld a seasoned fighting force capable of defending the nation.
In August 2012, an article entitled "Army morale declines in survey" states that "only a quarter of the [US] Army's officers and enlisted soldiers believe the nation's largest military branch is headed in the right direction." The "... most common reasons cited for the bleak outlook were "ineffective leaders at senior levels," a fear of losing the best and the brightest after a decade of war, and the perception, especially among senior enlisted soldiers, that "the Army is too soft" and lacks sufficient discipline."
Employee morale: Employee morale is proven to have a direct effect on productivity; it is one of the corner
stones of business.
See also: Military psychology
Collective identity
Committee for National Morale
Demoralization (warfare)
Information warfare
Motivation
Pre-work assembly
Psychological warfare
Rank theory of depression
References:
External links: Matteo Ermacora: Civilian Morale, in: 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War.
Adi Sherzer & Samuel Boumendil, The Morale Component of the Russia–Ukraine War, in: Uzi Ben-Shalom & others (eds.), Military Heroism in a Post-Heroic Era (Springer, 2024). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mosaic Warfare | Overview: The Internet of Military Things encompasses a large range of devices that possess intelligent physical sensing, learning, and actuation capabilities through virtual or cyber interfaces that are integrated into systems. These devices include items such as sensors, vehicles, robots, UAVs, human-wearable devices, biometrics, munitions, armor, weapons, and other smart technology. In general, IoMT devices can generally be classified into one of four categories (but the devices are meant to be ubiquitous enough to form a data fabric):
Data-carrying device: A device attached to a physical thing that indirectly connects it to the larger communication network.
Data-capturing device: A reader/writer device capable of interacting with physical things.
Sensing and actuating device: A device that can detect or measure information related to the surrounding environment and converts it into a digital electronic signal or a physical operation.
General device: A device embedded with processing and communication capabilities that can exchange information with the larger network.
In addition to connecting different electronic devices to a unified network, researchers have also suggested the possibility of incorporating inanimate and innocuous objects like plants and rocks into the system by fitting them with sensors that will turn them into information gathering points. Such efforts fall in line with projects related to the development of electronic plants, or e-Plants.
Proposed examples of IoMT applications include tactical reconnaissance, smart management of resources, logistics support (i.e. equipment and supply tracking), smart city monitoring, and data warfare. Several nations, as well as NATO officials, have expressed Interest in the potential military benefits of IoT technology.
History: Advancements in IoMT technology largely stemmed from military efforts to bolster the development of sensor networks and low-power computing platforms during the 1960s for defense applications. During the Cold War, the U.S. military pioneered the use of wireless sensor network technologies to detect and track Soviet submarines. One example was the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), a network of underwater acoustic sensors, i.e. hydrophones, placed throughout the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to act as underwater listening posts for above-ground facilities. Much of the sensor and networking technologies that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) developed during this time period ultimately served as the foundation for modern IoT systems. Critically, the DoD helped set the stage for future IoT research in the late 1960s with the creation of ARPANET, an early precursor to the Internet that geographically-dispersed military scientists used to share data.
In the 1980s, the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) formally partnered with academic researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Carnegie Mellon University to further develop distributed, wireless sensor networks. From there, research into wireless sensor technologies spread throughout the civilian research community and eventually found use for industrial applications such as power distribution, wastewater treatment, and factory automation. During this time period, the DoD also invested heavily in the miniaturization of integrated circuits in order to embed various objects with tiny computer chips. As a result of their funding, the commercial microelectronics industry was able to recover when it faced potential decline at the time.
By the late 1990s, the Department of Defense had announced plans for “network-centric” warfare that integrated the physical, information, and cognitive domains to enhance information sharing and collaboration. Examples of projects guided by this goal include the Nett Warrior (formerly known as the Ground Soldier System or Mounted Soldier System) and the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below communication platform, both of which were prevalent in the early 2000s.
However, interest in IoT research in the military started to wane as commercial industry surged ahead with new technology. While DoD continued research into advanced sensors, intelligent information processing systems, and communication networks, few military systems have taken full advantage of the IoT stack such as networked sensors and automated-response technology largely due to security concerns. As of 2019, research in modern IoT technology within the military started to regain a considerable amount of support from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.
Programs: Several initiatives were formed by the Department of Defense in order to bolster IoT research in the military domain as well as to reduce the current gap in progress between military and industry applications.
The Connected Soldier: The Connected Soldier project was a research initiative supported by the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center (NSRDEC) that focused on creating intelligent body gear. The project aimed to establish an internet of things for each soldier by integrating wideband radio, biosensors, and smart wearable systems as standard equipment. These devices served not only to monitor the soldier's physiological status but also to communicate mission data, surveillance intelligence, and other important information to nearby military vehicles, aircraft, and other troops.
Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT): In 2016, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) created the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) project in response to the U.S. Army's operational outline for 2020 to 2040, titled “Winning in a Complex World.” In the outline, the Department of Defense announced its goals to keep up with the technological advances of potential adversaries by turning its attention away from low-tech wars and instead focusing on combat in more urban areas. Acting as a detailed blueprint for what ARL suspected future warfare may entail, the IoBT project pushed for better integration of IoT technology in military operations in order to better prepare for techniques such as electronic warfare that may lie ahead.
In 2017, ARL established the Internet of Battlefield Things Collaborative Research Alliance (IoBT-CRA) to bring together industry, university, and government researchers to advance the theoretical foundations of IoBT systems.
According to ARL, the IoBT was primarily designed to interact with the surrounding environment by acquiring information about the environment, acting upon it, and continually learning from these interactions. As a consequence, research efforts focused on sensing, actuation, and learning challenges. In order for the IoBT to function as intended, the following prerequisite conditions must first be met in regard to technological capability, structural organization, and military implementation.
Communication: All entities in the IoBT must be able to properly communicate information to one another even with differences in architectural design and makeup. While future commercial internet of things may exhibit a lack of uniform standards across different brands and manufacturers, entities in IoBT must remain compatible despite displaying extreme heterogeneity. In other words, all electronic equipment, technology, or other commercial offerings accessed by military personnel must share the same language or at least have “translators” that make the transfer and processing of different types of information possible. In addition, the IoBT must be capable of temporarily incorporating available networked devices and channels that it does not own for its own use, especially if doing so is advantageous to the system (e.g. making use of existing civilian networking infrastructure in military operations in a megacity). At the same time, the IoBT must take into consideration the varying degree of trustworthiness of all the networks it leverages.
Timing will be critical in the success of IoBT. The speed of communication, computation, machine learning, inference, and actuation between entities are vital to many mission tasks, as the system must know which type of information to prioritize. Scalability will also serve as an important factor in the operation since the network must be flexible enough to function at any size.
Learning: The success of the IoBT framework often hinges on the effectiveness of the mutual collaboration between the human agents and the electronic entities in the network. In a tactical environment, the electronic entities will be tasked with a wide range of objectives from collecting information to executing cyber actions against enemy systems. In order for these technologies to perform those functions effectively, they must be able to not only ascertain the goals of the human agents as they change but also demonstrate a significant level of autonomous self-organization to adjust to the rapidly changing environment. Unlike commercial network infrastructures, the adoption of IoT in the military domain must take into consideration the extreme likelihood that the environment may be intentionally hostile or unstable, which will require a high degree of intelligence to navigate.
As a result, the IoBT technology must be capable of incorporating predictive intelligence, machine learning, and neural network in order to understand the intent of the human users and determine how to fulfill that intent without the process of micromanaging each and every component of the system.
According to ARL, maintaining information dominance will rely on the development of autonomous systems that can operate outside its current state of total dependence on human control. A key focus of IoBT research is the advancement of machine learning algorithms to provide the network with decision-making autonomy. Rather than having one system at the core of the network functioning as the central intelligence component dictating the actions of the network, the IoBT will have intelligence distributed throughout the network. Therefore, individual components can learn, adapt, and interact with each other locally as well as update behaviors and characteristics automatically and dynamically on a global scale to suit the operation as the landscape of warfare constantly evolves. In the context of IoT, the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the sheer volume of data and entities involved in the network will provide an almost infinite number of possibilities for behavior and technological capability in the real world.
In a tactical environment, the IoBT must be able to perform various types of learning behaviors to adapt to the rapidly changing conditions. One area that received considerable attention is the concept of meta-learning, which strives to determine how machines can learn how to learn. Having such a skill would allow the system to avoid fixating on pretrained absolute notions on how it should perceive and act whenever it enters a new environment. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mosaic Warfare | Therefore, individual components can learn, adapt, and interact with each other locally as well as update behaviors and characteristics automatically and dynamically on a global scale to suit the operation as the landscape of warfare constantly evolves. In the context of IoT, the incorporation of artificial intelligence into the sheer volume of data and entities involved in the network will provide an almost infinite number of possibilities for behavior and technological capability in the real world.
In a tactical environment, the IoBT must be able to perform various types of learning behaviors to adapt to the rapidly changing conditions. One area that received considerable attention is the concept of meta-learning, which strives to determine how machines can learn how to learn. Having such a skill would allow the system to avoid fixating on pretrained absolute notions on how it should perceive and act whenever it enters a new environment. Uncertainty quantification models have also generated interest in IoBT research since the system's ability to determine its level of confidence in its own predictions based on its machine learning algorithms may provide some much needed context whenever important tactical decisions need to be made.
The IoBT should also demonstrate a sophisticated level of situation awareness and artificial intelligence that will allow the system to autonomously perform work based on limited information. A primary goal is to teach the network how to correctly infer the complete picture of a situation while measuring relatively few variables. As a result, the system must be capable of integrating the vast amount and variety of data that it regularly collects into its collective intelligence while functioning in a continuous state of learning at multiple time scales, simultaneously learning from past actions while acting in the present and anticipating future events.
The network must also account for unforeseen circumstances, errors, or breakdowns and be able to reconfigure its resources to recover at least a limited level of functionality. However, some components must be prioritized and structured to be more resilient to failure than others. For instance, networks that carry important information such as medical data must never be at risk of shutdown.
Cognitive Accessibility: For semi-autonomous components, the human cognitive bandwidth serves as a notable constraint for the IoBT due to its limitations in processing and deciphering the flood of information generated by the other entities in the network. In order to obtain truly useful information in a tactical environment, semi-autonomous IoBT technologies must collect an unprecedented volume of data of immense complexity in levels of abstraction, trustworthiness, value, and other attributes. Due to serious limitations in human mental capacity, attention, and time, the network must be able to easily reduce and transform large flows of information produced and delivered by the IoBT into reasonably-sized packets of essential information that is significantly relevant to army personnel, such as signals or warnings that pertain to their current situation and mission.
A key risk of IoBT is the possibility that devices could communicate negligibly useful information that eats up the human's valuable time and attention or even propagate inappropriate information that misleads human individuals into performing actions that lead to adverse or unfavorable outcomes. At the same time, the system will stagnate if the human entities doubt the accuracy of the information provided by the IoBT technology. As a result, the IoBT must operate in a manner that is extremely convenient and easy to understand to the humans without compromising the quality of the information it provides them.
Mosaic Warfare: Mosaic Warfare is a term coined by former DARPA Strategic Technology Office director Tom Burns and former deputy director Dan Patt to describe a “systems of systems” approach to military warfare that focuses on re-configuring defense systems and technologies so that they can be fielded rapidly in a variety of different combinations for different tasks. Designed to emulate the adaptable nature of the lego blocks and mosaic art form, Mosaic Warfare was promoted as a strategy to confuse and overwhelm adversary forces by deploying low-cost adaptable technological expendable weapon systems that can play multiple roles and coordinate actions with one another, complicating the decision-making process for the enemy. This method of warfare arose as a response to the current monolithic system in the military, which relies on a centralized command-and-control structure fraught with vulnerable single-point communications and the development of a few highly capable systems that are too important to risk losing in combat.
The concept of Mosaic Warfare existed within DARPA since 2017 and contributed to the development of various technology programs such as the System of Systems Integration Technology and Experimentation (SoSIT), which led to the development of a network system that allows previously disjointed ground stations and platforms to transmit and translate data between one another.
Ocean of Things: In 2017, DARPA announced the creation of a new program called the Ocean of Things, which planned to apply IoT technology on a grand scale in order to establish a persistent maritime situational awareness over large ocean areas. According to the announcement, the project would involve the deployment of thousands of small, commercially available floats. Each float would contain a suite of sensors that collect environmental data—like sea surface temperature and sea state—and activity data, such as the movement of commercial vessels and aircraft. All the data collected from these floats would then be transmitted periodically to a cloud network for storage and real-time analysis. Through this approach, DARPA aimed to create an extensive sensor network that can autonomously detect, track, and identify both military, commercial, and civilian vessels as well as indicators of other maritime activity.
The Ocean of Things project focused primarily on the design of the sensor floats and the analytic techniques that would be involved in organizing and interpreting the incoming data as its two main objectives. For the float design, the vessel had to be able to withstand the harsh ocean conditions for at least a year while being made out of commercially available components that cost less than $500 each in total. In addition, the floats could not pose any danger to passing vessels and had to be made out of environmentally safe materials so that it could safely dispose of itself in the ocean after completing its mission. In regards to the data analytics, the project concentrated on developing cloud-based software that could collect, process, and transmit data about the environment and their own condition using a dynamic display.
Security concerns: One of the largest potential dangers of IoMT technology is the risk of both adversarial threats and system failures that could compromise the entire network. Since the crux of the IoMT concept is to have every component of the network—sensors, actuators, software, and other electronic devices—connected together to collect and exchange data, poorly protected IoT devices are vulnerable to attacks which may expose large amounts of confidential information. Furthermore, a compromised IoMT network is capable of causing serious, irreparable damage in the form of corrupted software, disinformation, and leaked intelligence.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, security remains a top priority in IoT research. The IoMT must be able to foresee, avoid, and recover from attempts by adversary forces to attack, impair, hijack, manipulate, or destroy the network and the information that it holds. The use of jamming devices, electronic eavesdropping, or cyber malware may pose a serious risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information within the network. Furthermore, the human entities may also be targeted by disinformation campaigns in order to foster distrust in certain elements of the IoMT. Since IoMT technology may be used in an adversarial setting, researchers must account for the possibility that a large number of sources may become compromised to the point where threat-assessing algorithms may use some of those compromised sources to falsely corroborate the veracity of potentially malicious entities.
Minimizing the risks associated with IoT devices will likely require a large-scale effort by the network to maintain impenetrable cybersecurity defenses as well as employ counterintelligence measures that thwart, subvert, or deter potential threats. Examples of possible strategies include the use of “disposable” security, where devices that are believed to be potentially compromised by the enemy are simply discarded or disconnected from the IoMT, and honeynets that mislead enemy eavesdroppers. Since adversary forces are expected to adapt and evolve their strategies for infiltrating the IoMT, the network must also undergo a continuous learning process that autonomously improves anomaly detection, pattern monitoring, and other defensive mechanisms.
Secure data storage serves as one of the key points of interest for IoMT research. Since the IoMT system is predicted to produce an immense volume of information, attention was directed toward new approaches to maintaining data properly and regulating protected access that don't allow for leaks or other vulnerabilities. One potential solution that was proposed by The Pentagon was Comply to Connect (C2C), a network security platform that autonomously monitored device discovery and access control in order to keep pace with the exponentially-growing network of entities.
In addition to the risks of digital interference and manipulation by hackers, concerns have also been expressed regarding the availability of strong wireless signals in remote combat locations. The lack of a constant internet connection was shown to limit the utility and usability of certain military devices that depend on reliable reception.
See also: Internet of Autonomous Things
Internet of Things
Smart munitions
Edge computing
Biometrics
Cyberwarfare
Further reading: Suri, Niranjan; Tortonesi, Mauro; Michaelis, James; Budulas, Peter; Benincasa, Giacomo; Russell, Stephen; Stefanelli, Cesare; Winkler, Robert (2016). "Analyzing the applicability of Internet of Things to the battlefield environment". 2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS). pp. 1–8. doi:10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496574. ISBN 978-1-5090-1777-5. S2CID 17390182.
Chudzikiewicz, Jan; Furtak, Janusz; Zielinski, Zbigniew (2015). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mosaic Warfare | See also: Internet of Autonomous Things
Internet of Things
Smart munitions
Edge computing
Biometrics
Cyberwarfare
Further reading: Suri, Niranjan; Tortonesi, Mauro; Michaelis, James; Budulas, Peter; Benincasa, Giacomo; Russell, Stephen; Stefanelli, Cesare; Winkler, Robert (2016). "Analyzing the applicability of Internet of Things to the battlefield environment". 2016 International Conference on Military Communications and Information Systems (ICMCIS). pp. 1–8. doi:10.1109/ICMCIS.2016.7496574. ISBN 978-1-5090-1777-5. S2CID 17390182.
Chudzikiewicz, Jan; Furtak, Janusz; Zielinski, Zbigniew (2015). "Fault-tolerant techniques for the Internet of Military Things". 2015 IEEE 2nd World Forum on Internet of Things (WF-IoT). pp. 496–501. doi:10.1109/WF-IoT.2015.7389104. ISBN 978-1-5090-0366-2. S2CID 2766338.
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Motorized infantry | Operations: As defined by the United States Army, motorization is "the use of unarmored wheeled vehicles for the transportation of combat units." Motorizing infantry is the first stage towards the mechanization of an army. Civilian trucks are often readily adaptable to military uses of transporting soldiers, towing guns, and carrying equipment and supplies. Motorization greatly increases the strategic mobility of infantry units, which would otherwise rely on marches or railroads. In practice, armies have found it advantageous to develop trucks to military specifications, such as all-wheel drive, to have vehicles that function reliably in extremes of weather and terrain.
Motorization provides no direct tactical advantage in small-unit combat, as trucks and jeeps are vulnerable to artillery and small arms fire. However, in larger battles, motorized infantry has an advantage in mobility allowing them to move to critical sectors of the battlefield faster, allowing better response to enemy movements, and the ability to outmaneuver the enemy.
The disadvantage of motorization is that fuel is critical; if motorized divisions run out of fuel, they may be required to abandon their vehicles.
History: The First World War was the first major war to see use of petroleum-powered vehicles used to transport supplies and personnel, and to fight the enemy. Unarmored and armored cars were dispatched to attack enemy positions and trains, and were used to patrol the front. However, this was on a small scale and a majority of movement was on foot and logistics with trains and horse-drawn logistics.
The Pancho Villa Expedition was a notable use of the armored car by the United States Cavalry under the command of General Pershing. There a Lieutenant George S. Patton was introduced to mechanized warfare when he led a small group of men against Villa's forces at San Miguelito Ranch.
After the war, the major militaries of the world saw the great benefit that motorized vehicles could have on the logistics and combat effectiveness of their infantry units.
In the 1920s, the British created the Experimental Mechanized Force between the wars to test the capabilities of all-arms formations of mechanized units, this included motorized infantry ("Motor Battalions").
The speed advantages of motorized infantry first became important in World War II in the German Blitzkrieg. While it was no more robust than the regular infantry that moved on foot, its increased speed became decisive in the Blitzkrieg strategy, as it could follow the panzer forces and defend its flanks.
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of motorization, most countries opted for only partial motorization of their infantry because of the cost and logistical implications caused by the deployment of so many vehicles. Even large armies were affected by such factors. The motorization of armies required massive industrialization of the economies in order to meet the heavy cost for vehicle production, replacement parts, and fueling.
The bulk of German and Soviet infantry remained on foot. While some units of the Wehrmacht, such as its armored divisions, were highly mechanized, most of the army was still using horses due to its inconsistent oil supply.
US infantry divisions were able to motorize a major portion of their infantry due to their industrial base. Likewise, infantry divisions of the British Empire could motorize chosen subordinate units, but infantry usually advanced on foot.
After WW2, most armies completely motorized and partially mechanized their infantry. The engineering improvements throughout the 20th century allowed for increasingly bigger vehicles to be deployed.
In Russia and the former Soviet Union, the term motostrelki (мотострелки in Cyrillic) is used to indicate mechanized infantry; that usage, during the Korean War, prevailed in all Warsaw Pact countries. These "motor rifle" divisions were mostly mechanized but had a core of motorized infantry with them. In practice, this meant that the infantry of the Soviet and Russian "tank" divisions rode in fully tracked BMP vehicles, while those in "motor rifle" divisions were equipped with wheeled BTR vehicles.
Present day: After the Vietnam War, the US military saw the need for light squad based transportation. This project became the Humvee which was used extensively by the Army and Marine Corps in the Gulf War, Early War in Afghanistan, and Early Iraq War. The latter two conflicts resulted in a large scale insurgency and saw the increase in use of IEDs. This soon became the largest source of casualties to NATO forces. The result was a shift away from lightly armored vehicles to more mechanized vehicles or more heavily armored MRAPs. During the duration of the Humvee's use in Iraq and Afghanistan and before the roll-out of MRAPs, it slowly became more heavily armored with larger turret shields, bulletproof glass and extra plating on its doors and components. Less armored but faster and lighter MRAPs were developed under the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, which is now phase in the Oshkosh L-ATV and M-ATV. It has been described as "the first vehicle purpose-built for modern battlefield-networks". These vehicles have seen deployments in Rojava, Syria in Operation Inherent Resolve.
For transportation outside of combat, the US military fields a variety of trucks including the Medium Tactical Vehicles replacement for the Marine Corps and the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles for the Army. The National Guard and other reserve units also field older models such as the M939 5-ton 6x6.
See also: Infantry mobility vehicle
Dragoon
Mounted infantry
Tank desant
References: Citations
External links: 548th Transportation Co. Convoy Live Fire |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mountain warfare | History:
Second Punic War: In 218 BC, the Carthaginian army commander Hannibal marched troops, cavalry and African elephants across the Alps in an effort to conquer Rome by approaching it from north of the Italian Peninsula. The Roman government was complacent because the Alps were viewed as a secure natural obstacle to would-be invaders. In December 218 BC, the Carthaginian forces defeated Roman troops, in the north, with the use of elephants. Many elephants did not survive the cold weather and disease typical of the European climate. Hannibal's army fought Roman troops in Italy for 15 years but failed to conquer Rome. Carthage was ultimately defeated by Roman general Scipio Africanus at Zama in North Africa in 202 BC.
Early modern history: The term mountain warfare is said to have come about in the Middle Ages after the European monarchies found it difficult to fight the Swiss armies in the Alps because the Swiss fought in smaller units and took vantage points against a huge unmaneuverable army. Similar styles of attack and defence were later employed by guerrillas, partisans and irregulars, who hid in the mountains after an attack, which made it challenging for an army of regulars to fight back. In Napoleon Bonaparte's Italian campaign, Suvorov's Italian and Swiss expedition and the 1809 rebellion in Tyrol, mountain warfare played a large role.
Another example of mountain warfare was the Crossing of the Andes, which was carried out by the Argentinean Army of the Andes (Spanish: Ejército de los Andes), commanded by General José de San Martín in 1817. One of the divisions climbed mountains surpassing 5000 m in height.
The Caucasian War was a 19th century military conflict between the Russian Empire and various peoples of the North Caucasus who resisted subjugation during the Russian conquest of the Caucasus.
The first British invasion of Afghanistan ended in disaster in 1842, when 16,000 British soldiers and camp followers were massacred as they retreated through the Hindu Kush back to India.
World War I: Mountain warfare came to the fore once again during World War I, when some of the nations that were involved in the war had mountain divisions that had not been tested. The Austro-Hungarian defence repelled Italian attacks by taking advantage of the terrain in the Julian Alps and the Dolomites, where frostbite and avalanches proved deadlier than bullets. During the summer of 1918, the Battle of San Matteo took place on the Italian front and was fought at the highest elevation of any during the war. In December 1914, another offensive was launched by the Ottoman supreme commander Enver Pasha with 95,000–190,000 troops against the Russians in the Caucasus. Insisting on a frontal attack against Russian positions in the mountains in the heart of winter, the result was devastating, and Enver lost 86% of his forces.
World War II: Examples of mountain warfare used during World War II include the Battles of Narvik, Battle of the Caucasus, Kokoda Track campaign, Battle of Attu, Operation Rentier, Operation Gauntlet, Operation Encore, and the British defence at the Battle of Hong Kong.
One ambush tactic used against the Germans during the Battles of Narvik utilised hairpin bends. Defenders would position themselves above them and open fire when attackers reached a certain point below, parallel to themselves. This would force the attackers to retreat, to continue under fire, or to attempt to climb the mountain another way. The tactic could be planned in advance, or employed by a retreating force.
Another tactic utilised was the 'ascending platoon attack'. Attackers would scout higher enemy positions from the ground, aided by bad weather or poor visibility. A light machine gun team would open fire towards the high enemy position from a distance, offering cover for the remaining soldiers to gradually advance.
Kashmir conflicts: Since the Partition of India in 1947, India and Pakistan have been in conflict over the Kashmir region. They have fought two wars and numerous additional skirmishes or border conflicts in the region. Kashmir is located in the Himalayas, the highest mountain range in the world.
The first hostilities between the two nations, during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, showed that both were ill-equipped to fight in biting cold, let alone at the highest altitudes in the world. During the Sino-Indian War of 1962, hostilities broke out between India and China in the same area.
The subsequent Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 between India and Pakistan was mainly fought in Kashmir's valleys, rather than the mountains themselves, but several mountain battles took place.
[Siachen Conflict] (along Saltoro Mustgah) has been witness to battles, operations and skirmishes where many posts higher than 5000m have been captured or fought over. The fighting here has been concentrated on the peaks, ridges and passes of Saltoro with India occupying most of the ridge line whilst Pakistan army to the west along the bases.
During the Kargil War (1999), Indian forces sought to flush out opponents who had captured high mountain posts. That proxy war was the only modern war that was fought exclusively in the mountains. After the Kargil War, the Indian Army implemented specialist training on artillery use in the mountains, where ballistic projectiles have different characteristics than at sea level.
Falklands War: Most of the Falklands War took place on hills in semi-Arctic conditions on the Falkland Islands. However, during the opening stage of the war, there was military action on the bleak mountainous island of South Georgia, where a British expedition sought to eject occupying Argentine forces. South Georgia is a periantarctic island, and the conflict took place during the southern winter and so Alpine conditions prevailed almost down to sea level. The operation (codenamed Operation Paraquet) was unusual in that it combined aspects of long-range amphibious warfare, arctic warfare and mountain warfare. It involved several ships, special forces troops and helicopters.
War in Afghanistan: Throughout history but especially since 1979, many mountain warfare operations have taken place throughout Afghanistan. Since the coalition invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, they have been primarily in the eastern provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.
Kunar and eastern Nuristan are strategic terrain since the area constitutes a major infiltration route into Afghanistan, and insurgents can enter the provinces from any number of places along the border with Pakistan to gain access to a vast network of river valleys. In that part of Afghanistan (Regional Command East), the US military adopted a hybrid style of mountain warfare incorporating counterinsurgency (COIN) theory in which the population is paramount as the center of gravity in the fight.
In counterinsurgency, seizing and holding territory are less important than avoiding civilian casualties. The primary goals of counterinsurgency are to secure the backing of the populace and thereby to legitimize the government, rather than to focus on militarily defeating the insurgents. Counterinsurgency doctrine has proved difficult to implement in Kunar and Nuristan. In the sparsely-populated mountain regions of eastern Afghanistan, strategists have argued for holding the high ground, a tenet of classical mountain warfare. The argument suggests that if the counterinsurgent does not deny the enemy the high ground, the insurgents can attack at will. In Kunar and Nuristan, US forces continued to pursue a hybrid style of counterinsurgency warfare, with its focus on winning hearts and minds, and mountain warfare, with the US forces seizing and holding the high ground.
Training: The expense of training mountain troops precludes them from being on the order of battle of most armies except those that reasonably expect to fight in such terrain. Mountain warfare training is arduous and in many countries the exclusive preserve of elite units such as special forces or commandos, which as part of their remit should have the ability to fight in difficult terrain such as the Royal Marines. Regular units may also occasionally undertake training of this nature.
See also: List of mountain warfare forces
Cold-weather warfare
References:
Sources: Frederick Engels, (January 27, 1857) "Mountain Warfare in the Past and Present" New York Daily Tribune MECW Volume 15, p 164
Further reading: Govan, Thomas P. (1946-09-01). Training for mountain and winter warfare. AGF Study, no. 23. [Washington, D.C.]: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces. Archived from the original on May 27, 2012. Retrieved 2011-01-28.
Malik, Muhammad Asim (2004-09-10). "Mountain warfare: the need for specialized training" (PDF). Military Review. 84 (5): 94–102. ISSN 0026-4148. OCLC 2558412. Retrieved 2011-01-28.
Pierce, Scott W. (2008-05-22). Mountain and cold weather warfighting: critical capability for the 21st century. SAMS Monograph. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on May 27, 2012. Retrieved 2011-01-28.
External links: Official page of documentary film GLOBAL WARNING on the Mountain War 1915–1918 Global Warning
Mountain War in World War I The war in the Italian Dolomites (Italian)
Historic films showing Mountain Warfare in World War I at europeanfilmgateway.eu
Mountain Combat World War II Militaria: Combat Lessons
High Altitude Warfare School of the Indian Army [1]
Official Italian Army website page on Alpine Troops Command [2]
Official page of 11th Mountain Infantry Battalion (Brazil)[3] |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mounted archer | Basic features: Since using a bow requires the rider to let go of the reins with both hands, horse archers need superb equestrian skills if they are to shoot on the move. The natives of large grassland areas used horse archery for hunting, for protecting their herds, and for war. Horse archery was for many groups a basic survival skill, and additionally made each able-bodied man, at need, a highly mobile warrior. The buffalo hunts of the North American prairies may be the best-recorded examples of bowhunting by horse archers.
In battle, light horse archers were typically skirmishers, lightly armed missile troops capable of moving swiftly to avoid close combat or to deliver a rapid blow to the flanks or rear of the foe. Captain Robert G. Carter described the experience of facing Quanah Parker's forces: "an irregular line of swirling warriors, all rapidly moving in right and left hand circles.. while advancing, to the right or left, and as rapidly concentrating... in the centre... and their falling back in the same manner...all was most puzzling to our... veterans who had never witnessed such tactical maneuvers, or such a flexible line of skirmishers"
In the tactic of the Parthian shot the rider would retreat from the enemy while turning his upper body and shooting backward. Due to the superior speed of mounted archers, troops under attack from horse archers were unable to respond to the threat if they did not have ranged weapons of their own. Constant harassment would result in casualties, morale drop and disruption of the formation. Any attempts to charge the archers would also slow the entire army down.
An example of these tactics comes from an attack on Comanche horse archers by a group of Texas Rangers, who were saved by their muzzle-loading firearms and by a convenient terrain feature. Fifty Rangers armed with guns met about 20 Comanche hunters who were hunting buffalo and attacked them. The Comanches fled, easily keeping clear of the Rangers, for several miles across the open prairie. They led the Rangers into a stronger force of two hundred. The Rangers immediately retreated, only to discover they had committed a classic error in fighting mounted archers: the Comanches pursued in turn, able to shoot what seemed like clouds of arrows. The Rangers found a ravine where they could shoot at the Comanche from cover. The horse archers did not charge but kept the Rangers under siege until seven of them were dead or dying, whereupon the Rangers retreated but claimed victory.
Heavy horse archers: Horse archers may be either light, such as Scythian, Hun, Parthian, Cuman, or Pecheneg horsemen, or heavy, such as Byzantine kavallarioi, Turkish timariots, Russian druzhina and Japanese samurai. Heavy horse archers typically fought as formed units. Instead of harassing without ever making contact, they shot in volleys, weakening the enemy before they charged. In addition to bows, they often also carried close combat weapons, such as lances or spears. Some nations, like medieval Mongols, Hungarians and Cumans, fielded both light and heavy horse archers. In some armies, such as those of the Parthians, Palmyrans, and the Teutonic Order of Knights, the mounted troops consisted of both super-heavy troops (cataphracts and knights) without bows, and light horse archers.
Appearance in history: Horse archery first developed during the Iron Age, gradually replacing the Bronze Age chariot.
The earliest depictions are found in the artwork of the Neo-Assyrian Empire of about the 9th century BC and reflect the incursions of the early Iranian peoples.
Early horse archery, depicted on the Assyrian carvings, involved two riders, one controlling both horses while the second shot. Heavy horse archers first appeared in the Assyrian army in the 7th century BC after abandoning chariot warfare and formed a link between light skirmishing cavalrymen and heavy cataphract cavalry. The heavy horse archers usually had mail or lamellar armor and helmets, and sometimes even their horses were armored.
Mounted archery was prevalent in the cavalry tactics of Meroitic and post-Meroitic Nubia.
Skirmishing requires vast areas of free space to run, maneuver, and flee, and if the terrain is close, light horse archers can be charged and defeated easily. Light horse archers are also very vulnerable to foot archers and crossbowmen, who are smaller targets and can outshoot horsemen. Large armies very seldom relied solely on skirmishing horse archers, but there are many examples of victories in which horse archers played a leading part. The Roman general Crassus led a large army, with inadequate cavalry and missile troops, to catastrophe against Parthian horse archers and cataphracts at the Battle of Carrhae. The Persian king Darius the Great led a campaign against the mounted Scythians, who refused to engage in pitched battle; Darius conquered and occupied land but lost enough troops and supplies that he was compelled to withdraw. Darius, however, kept the lands he had conquered.
According to the Greek historian Herodotus, the Persian general Mardonius used horse archers to attack and harass his opponents during the Battle of Plataea, which was won by the Greeks. Philip of Macedon scored an epic victory against the Scythians residing north of the Danube, killing their king, Ateas, and causing their kingdom to fall apart thereafter. Alexander the Great defeated Scythians/Sakas in 329 BC at the Battle of Jaxartes, at the Syr Darya river. Later on, Alexander himself used mounted archers recruited among the Scythians and Dahae, during the Greek invasion of India.
The Roman Empire and its military also had extensive use of horse archers after their conflict with eastern armies that relied heavily on mounted archery in the 1st century BC. They had regiments such as the Equites Sagittarii, who acted as Rome's horse archers in combat. The Crusaders used conscripted cavalry and horse archers known as the Turcopole, made up of mostly Greek and Turks.
Heavy horse archers, instead of skirmishing and hit-and-run tactics, formed in disciplined formations and units, sometimes intermixed with lancers as in Byzantine and Turkish armies, and shot as volleys instead of shooting as individuals. The usual tactic was to first shoot five or six volleys at the enemy to weaken him and to disorganize them, and then charge. Heavy horse archers often carried spears or lances for close combat or formed mixed units with lancers. The Mongol armies and others included both heavy and light horse archers.
Heavy horse archers could usually outshoot their light counterparts, and because of the armor they wore, could better withstand return fire. The Russian druzhina cavalry developed as a countermeasure to the Tatar light troops. Likewise, the Turkish timariot and qapikulu were often as heavily armored as Western knights and could match the Hungarian, Albanian, and Mongol horse archers.
Vietnam's mounted archers were first recorded in the 11th century. In 1017, Emperor Lý Công Uẩn of Đại Việt opened the Xa Dinh (archery school) in southern Hanoi and ordered all children of noblemen and mandarins to be trained in mounted archery. During the reign of Lý Thánh Tông, the royal guards had 20 horse archer teams, combined into 5 companies named Kỵ Xạ, Du Nỗ, Tráng Nỗ, Kính Nỗ, and Thần Tý, comprising about 2,000 skillful horse archers. They later effectively participated in the Invasion of Song China (1075 – 1076) and caused heavy casualties to the Song army. The Ly Dynasty's horse archers also fought against Champa (1069) and the Khmer Empire (1125–1130) which both were victories for Đại Việt. Later, following the decline of the Lý dynasty, most horse archer teams were disbanded.
German and Scandinavian medieval armies made extensive use of mounted crossbowmen. They would act not only as scouts and skirmishers but also protect the flanks of the knights and infantry, chasing away enemy light cavalry. When the battle was fully engaged, they would charge at the enemy flank, shoot a single devastating volley at point-blank range and then attack the enemy with swords, without reloading. In some instances, mounted crossbowmen could also reload and fire continuously on horseback if they used specific "weaker" crossbows that could be reloaded easily, as mentioned in the 13th-century Norwegian educational text Konungs skuggsjá. The invention of spanning mechanisms such as the goat's foot lever and the cranequin allowed mounted crossbowmen to reload and fire heavy crossbows on horseback.
Decline: Horse archery was usually ineffective against massed foot archery. The foot archers or crossbowmen could outshoot horse archers and a man alone is a smaller target than a man and a horse. The Crusaders countered the Turkoman horse archery with their crossbowmen, and Genoese crossbowmen were favoured mercenaries in both Mamluk and Mongol armies. Likewise the Chinese armies consisted of massed crossbowmen to counter the nomad armies. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mounted archer | In some instances, mounted crossbowmen could also reload and fire continuously on horseback if they used specific "weaker" crossbows that could be reloaded easily, as mentioned in the 13th-century Norwegian educational text Konungs skuggsjá. The invention of spanning mechanisms such as the goat's foot lever and the cranequin allowed mounted crossbowmen to reload and fire heavy crossbows on horseback.
Decline: Horse archery was usually ineffective against massed foot archery. The foot archers or crossbowmen could outshoot horse archers and a man alone is a smaller target than a man and a horse. The Crusaders countered the Turkoman horse archery with their crossbowmen, and Genoese crossbowmen were favoured mercenaries in both Mamluk and Mongol armies. Likewise the Chinese armies consisted of massed crossbowmen to counter the nomad armies. A nomad army that wanted to engage in an archery exchange with foot archers would itself normally dismount. The typical Mongol archer shot from a sitting position when dismounted.
Horse archers were eventually rendered obsolete by the maturity of firearm technology. In the 16th and subsequent centuries, various cavalry forces armed with firearms gradually started appearing. Because the conventional arquebus and musket were too awkward for a cavalryman to use, lighter weapons such as the carbine had to be developed, which could be effectively used from horseback, much in the same manner as the composite recurve bow presumably developed from earlier bows. 16th-century dragoons and carabiniers were heavier cavalry equipped only with firearms, but pistols coexisted with the composite bow, often used by the same rider, well into the 17th century in Eastern Europe, especially with the Russians, Kalmyks, Turks, and Cossacks. For many armies, mounted archery remained an effective tactical system in open country until the introduction of repeating firearms.
By the 18th century, firearms had largely displaced traditional composite bows in Mongolia, whereas in Manchuria horse archery was still highly esteemed. In the 1758 Battle of Khorgos, mounted Mongolian Dzungars troops armed with muskets faced off against Qing Dynasty mounted Manchurian, Mongolian, and Chinese archers armed with Manchu bows. The battle was won by the Qing forces. Traditional Manchurian archery continued to be practiced in China up to the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
During the Napoleonic Wars, the Russian Imperial Army deployed Cossack, Bashkir, and Kalmyk horse archers against Napoleon's forces. Baron de Marbot writes that on the eve of the Battle of Leipzig, his forces encountered mounted archers:
With much shouting, these barbarians rapidly surrounded our squadrons, against which they launched thousands of arrows which did very little damage because the Baskirs, being entirely irregulars, do not know how to form up in ranks and they go about in a mob like a flock of sheep, with the result that the riders cannot shoot horizontally without wounding or killing their comrades who are in front of them, but shoot their arrows into the air to describe an arc which will allow them to descend on the enemy. This system does not permit any accurate aim, and nine tenths of the arrows miss their target. Those that do arrive have used up in their ascent the impulse given to them by the bow, and fall only under their own weight, which is very small, so that they do not as a rule inflict any serious injuries. In fact the Baskirs, having no other arms, are undoubtedly the world’s least dangerous troops.
Although general de Marbot describes the horse archers in disdainful terms, the general was himself wounded in the leg by an enemy arrow, and Baskir troops were amongst the occupying troops in Paris in 1814.
It has been proposed that firearms began to replace bows in Europe and Russia not because firearms were superior but because they were easier to use and required less practice. However, discussing buffalo hunting in 1846, Francis Parkman noted that "the bows and arrows which the Indians use in running buffalo have many advantages over firearms, and even white men occasionally employ them." The Comanches of North America found their bows more effective than muzzle loading guns. "After... about 1800, most Comanches began to discard muskets and pistols and to rely on their older weapons." Bows were still used by Native Americans in the late American Indian Wars, but almost all warriors who had immediate access to modern repeating firearms used these guns instead.
Technology: The weapon of choice for Eurasian horse archers was most commonly a composite recurve bow, because it was compact enough to shoot conveniently from a horse while retaining sufficient range and penetrating power. North Americans used short wooden bows often backed with sinew, but never developed the full three-layer composite bow.
Modern revival: Horse archery and associated skills were revived in Mongolia after independence in 1921 and are displayed at festivals, in particular the Naadam. Despite the formidable history of Mongolian horse archers, the sport is very limited in Mongolia itself today and at most Naadam festivals the archery and horse-riding competitions are conducted independently; the horses are raced with one another, and the archery is traditionally practiced from a standing position rather than mounted. In the past five years a desire to revive the tradition seems to have been addressed with the foundation of the Mongolian Horseback Archery Association whose members have competed in South Korea and Europe.
China: Traditionally, mathematics, calligraphy, literature, equestrianism, archery, music, and rites were known as the Six Arts.
At the Guozijian (Imperial Academy), law, mathematics, calligraphy, equestrianism, and archery were emphasized by the Ming dynasty Hongwu Emperor in addition to Confucian classics, and were also required in the Imperial Examinations. Archery and equestrianism were added to the exam by Hongwu in 1370 like how archery and equestrianism were required for non-military officials at the 武舉 College of War in 1162 by the Song Emperor Xiaozong. The area around the Meridian Gate of Nanjing was used for archery by guards and generals under Hongwu.
The Imperial exam included archery. Archery on horseback was practiced by Chinese living near the frontier. Wang Ju's writings on archery were followed during the Ming and Yuan and the Ming developed new methods of archery. Jinling Tuyong showed archery in Nanjing during the Ming. Contests in archery were held in the capital for Garrison of Guard soldiers who were handpicked.
Equestrianism and archery were favored activities of Zhu Di (the Yongle Emperor).
Archery and equestrianism were frequent pastimes by the Zhengde Emperor. He practiced archery and horseriding with eunuchs. Tibetan Buddhist monks, Muslim women and musicians were obtained and provided to Zhengde by his guard Ch'ien Ning, who acquainted him with the ambidextrous archer and military officer Chiang Pin. An accomplished military commander and archer was demoted to commoner status on a wrongful charge of treason was the Prince of Lu's grandson in 1514.
He was disinterested in military matters but had prowess in archery (Hongxi Emperor).
Archery competitions, equestrianism and calligraphy were some of the pastimes of the Wanli Emperor.
Football and archery were practiced by the Ming Emperors.
Traditional Korean: Korea has a tradition of horse archery. In 2007, the Korean government passed a law to preserve and encourage development of traditional Korean martial arts, including horse archery.
In Korean archery competitions there are five disciplines that are competed separately. The major difference in Korean archery is that all arrows must be stowed somewhere on the archer or horse, unlike Hungarian style where the archer can take the arrows from the bow hand. Traditionally this is a quiver on the right thigh, but it may also be through a belt, a sash, a saddle quiver or even held in a boot or arm quiver.
The first competition is a single shot to the side. The track is 90 metres (300 ft) long (as in the Hungarian method) but carries only one target set back around 5–10m from the track. This has a unique fascia that consists of five square concentric rings which increase in point score from the outer to inner; the inner (often decorated with a 'Tiger' face) is worth the maximum five points. Each archer has two passes to complete, and each run has to be completed within 16 seconds (or penalty points are incurred).
The next competition is very similar but is known as the double shot which features one target in the first 30m, slightly angled forwards, and a second target in the last 30m, slightly angled backwards.
The final competition for the static targets is the serial shot which consists of five targets evenly spaced along a 110 metres (360 ft) track, approximately one target every 20 metres (66 ft) or so. In all three static target competitions, additional bonus points are awarded for style and form.
Another major difference in Korean archery style is the Mogu, or moving target competition. This consists of one rider towing a large cotton-and-bamboo ball behind their horse while another archer attempts to shoot the ball (with special turnip-headed arrows which have been dipped in ink). The archer attempts to hit the ball as many times as possible. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mounted archer | The next competition is very similar but is known as the double shot which features one target in the first 30m, slightly angled forwards, and a second target in the last 30m, slightly angled backwards.
The final competition for the static targets is the serial shot which consists of five targets evenly spaced along a 110 metres (360 ft) track, approximately one target every 20 metres (66 ft) or so. In all three static target competitions, additional bonus points are awarded for style and form.
Another major difference in Korean archery style is the Mogu, or moving target competition. This consists of one rider towing a large cotton-and-bamboo ball behind their horse while another archer attempts to shoot the ball (with special turnip-headed arrows which have been dipped in ink). The archer attempts to hit the ball as many times as possible. A second Mo Gu event consists of a team of two trying to hit the target towed by a third rider. Points are awarded for how many arrows strike the ball (verified by the ink stains on the Mogu).
Traditional Japanese: The history of Japanese horse archery dates back to the 4th century. It became popular in Japan, attracting crowds. The emperor found that the crowds were not appropriate to the solemn and sacred nature of the occasion, and banned public displays in 698. Horse archery was a widely used combat technique from the Heian period to the Warring States period. Nasu no Yoichi, a samurai of the Kamakura period is the most famous horse archer in Japan. Three kinds of Japanese horse archery (Kasagake, Yabusame, and Inuoumono (dog shooting)) were defined.
When the arquebus was introduced by the Portuguese to Japan in the 16th century, archery became outdated. To maintain traditional Japanese horse archery, Tokugawa Yoshimune, the shōgun, ordered the Ogasawara clan to found a school. Current Japanese horse archery succeeds to the technique reformed by the Ogasawara clan.
Traditionally, women were barred from performing in yabusame, but in 1963 female archers participated in a yabusame demonstration for the first time.
The Yabusame school of horseback archery has found a following in Australia, with the setting up of the Australian Horse Archery School which today conducts public shows in various parts of the world.
United States: Horse archery is a growing sport in the United States. Through the efforts of organizations such as The Mounted Archery Association of the Americas, there are horse archery clubs around the country. Competitive courses one might find in the U.S. incorporate the Korean, Hungarian and Persian Styles (i.e., the Qabaq). Participants combine archery skills with riding a horse, with care and training of the horse undertaken. Riders run reinless down a 90-meter course while loosing arrows at various target arrangements. MA3 Clubs around the country offer members the opportunity to learn the sport by providing ranges, a ranking system, and competitions.
United Kingdom: The British Horseback Archery Association was established in 2007, and is the governing body of horse archery. The first national competition took place in 2010. Since 2013, members have represented Great Britain in international team competitions. Postal matches are also held with participants from across the UK. Categories for disabled riders and for juniors have also been introduced.
Hungary: Kassai Lajos created a competitive rule system of horse archery in the late 1980s, and started to propagate this new form of the sport, first in Hungary, and from the 1990s in the rest of Europe, the United States, and Canada.
His life and work was dramatized by Géza Kaszás in the film A lovasíjász (The horse archer), which premiered in January 2016.
Federations: World Horseback Archery Federation (WHAF) - 2004
International Horseback Archery Alliance (IHAA) - 2013
World Federation of Equestrian Archery (WFEA) - 1994
Fédération d'Equitation et d'Attelage Belgique (FFE) - 1972
See also:
References:
Further reading: Schreiner, Robert. "Horseback Archery New Zealand". Retrieved 2005-04-30.
External links:
Australian Horse Archery Association
Horseback Archery in Belgium
Chinese Horseback archery
Ukrainian horseback archery federation
Finnish horseback archery union - Suomen Ratsastusjousiampujain Liitto ry
German mounted Archery Site
Polish Horseback Archery Association
United Kingdom national horseback combat society
British Horseback Archery Association
Mounted Archery in USA
Mounted Archery Of The Americas
Canadian Federation of Mounted Archery |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Mouse-holing | Use: Mouse-holing began to appear in military tactical manuals during World War II. The tactic allows combatants to move around an urban battlefield under cover without needing to expose themselves to enemy fire or observation. A typical passage is large enough for a single file of soldiers. Large unrestricted holes can compromise the structural integrity of the building and offer little cover from opposing forces.
During the Battle of Ortona in 1943, the Canadian Army, which gave the tactic its name, used it to great effect, breaching the walls of buildings (houses in Ortona shared adjoining walls) with weapons such as the PIAT or Teller anti-tank mines. The soldiers would throw in grenades and assault through the mouse holes, clear the stairs with grenades or machine-gun fire, and make their way up or down. Their adversaries would then struggle in repeated close-quarters combat. Mouse-holing was used also to pierce through walls into adjoining rooms, which sometimes caught enemy troops by surprise. Creating a series of mouse-holes in a series of adjoining buildings was a strategy that also allowed the troops to progress through the town, building by building, without entering the streets, where they would face enemy fire. Some sources attribute the strategy to the Canadian forces, but a British training film of 1941 had already illustrated the concept.
Similar to tunnels used in rural battlefields, mouse-holes can also allow forces to infiltrate behind enemy lines, which provides a significant tactical advantage. In some cases, a mouse-hole is camouflaged with furniture, especially when it is created to aid a defending force or a clandestine operation.
In defensive positions, mouse-holes often join and combine with tunnels. That was used by the Red Army of the Soviet Union during the Battle of Stalingrad and consistently allowed troops to infiltrate areas to the German rear that had been supposedly cleared. The ubiquitous availability of the Panzerfaust in the last months of the war made all sides use it to breach buildings quickly from unexpected directions.
The tactic was used heavily by anti-coalition insurgents during the Iraq War. They would connect houses converted into fortified bunkers by creating holes in walls in order to evade and ambush coalition troops. In addition, coalition snipers would utilize mouse-holing as a method to be able to fire at enemy fighters from further within rooms and other structures and thereby conceal their position.
Methods: Mouse-holes can be made in light interior walls by hand or with small arms. More substantial walls require the use of explosives such as a satchel charge or a large caliber vehicle-mounted cannon or tank gun. If time and conditions allow, breaches can be made with even small amounts of explosive if properly tamped and braced, such as with sandbags and props, to direct the force of the explosion into the wall. Since the early 1990s, many armies have developed special-purpose weapons, like the MATADOR and SMAW, specifically for the tactic.
See also: Loophole (firearm) – Architectural aperture for firing guns through
Urban terrain – Military term for urban environments
Door breaching – Methods used by military, police, firefighters to forcibly enter a structure
Rhizome manoeuvre – Urban warfare tactic
Notes:
References: FM 3-06.11: Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (PDF). Headquarters, Department of the Army. June 2011.
Priestley, Stephen (2006). "Punching at Panjwaii: Canadian Leopard Tanks in Combat; CF Tracked Vehicles Tackle the Taliban and Afghan Winters". Canadian American Strategic Review.
Gooderson, Ian (2007). "Assimilating Urban Battle Experience - The Canadians at Ortona" (PDF). Canadian Military Journal. 8 (4). Department of National Defence: 64–73. ISSN 1492-0786.
Zuehlke, Mark (2003). Ortona: Canada's epic World War II battle. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre. ISBN 1-55054-557-4. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Multilateralism | Definitions: Multilateralism, in the form of membership in international institutions, serves to bind powerful nations, discourage unilateralism, and gives small powers a voice and influence that they could not otherwise exercise. For a small power to influence a great power, the Lilliputian strategy of small countries banding together to collectively bind a larger one can be effective. Similarly, multilateralism may allow one great power to influence another great power. For a great power to seek control through bilateral ties could be costly; it may require bargaining and compromise with the other great power.
Miles Kahler defines multilateralism as "international governance" or global governance of the "many," and its central principle was "opposition [to] bilateral discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict."; Robert Keohane defined it as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states."
John Ruggie further elaborated the concept in his influential writings on multilateralism. Based on principles of "indivisibility" and "diffuse reciprocity he defined it as "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states based on 'generalized' principles of conduct ... which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any occurrence." He further clarified that multilateralism is 'a unique product of US global hegemony [. . . ] not necessarily a post-war American invention', but a reflection of post-war 'American hegemony'.
Embedding the target state in a multilateral alliance reduces the costs borne by the power-seeking control, but it also offers the same binding benefits of the Lilliputian strategy. Furthermore, if a small power seeks control over another small power, multilateralism may be the only choice, because small powers rarely have the resources to exert control on their own. As such, power disparities are accommodated to the weaker states by having more predictable bigger states and means to achieve control through collective action. Powerful states also buy into multilateral agreements by writing the rules and having privileges such as veto power and special status.
International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization, are multilateral in nature. The main proponents of multilateralism have traditionally been the middle powers, such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland, the Benelux countries and the Nordic countries. Larger states often act unilaterally, while smaller ones may have little direct power in international affairs aside from participation in the United Nations (by consolidating their UN vote in a voting bloc with other nations, for example.) Multilateralism may involve several nations acting together, as in the UN, or may involve regional or military alliances, pacts, or groupings, such as NATO. These multilateral institutions are not imposed on states but are created and accepted by them to increase their ability to seek their own interests through the coordination of their policies. Moreover, they serve as frameworks that constrain opportunistic behaviour and encourage coordination by facilitating the exchange of information about the actual behaviour of states regarding the standards to which they have consented.
The term "regional multilateralism" has been proposed by Harris Mylonas and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, suggesting that "contemporary problems can be better solved at the regional rather than the bilateral or global levels" and that bringing together the concept of regional integration with that of multilateralism is necessary in today's world. Regionalism dates from the time of the earliest development of political communities, where economic and political relations naturally had a strong regionalist focus due to restrictions on technology, trade, and communications.
The converse of multilateralism is unilateralism, in terms of political philosophy. Other authors have used the term "minilateralism" to refer to the fewest states required to get the biggest results through this institutional form.
The foreign policy that India formulated after independence reflected its idiosyncratic culture and political traditions. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament of India, in March 1950, Nehru affirmed: “It should not be supposed that we are starting on a clean slate. It is a policy that flowed from our recent history and our national movement and its development and various ideals, we have proclaimed. (Nehru, 1961, p. 34). In fact, the foreign policy culture of India is an elite culture, meaning, in effect, that the writings and speeches of select leading figures of the Indian foreign policy elite provide an insight into the key ideas and norms constituting the foundation of India's foreign policy.
History: One modern instance of multilateralism occurred in the nineteenth century in Europe after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, where the great powers met to redraw the map of Europe at the Congress of Vienna (November 1814 to June 1815). The Concert of Europe, as it became known, was a group of great and lesser powers that would meet to resolve issues peacefully. Conferences such as the Conference of Berlin in 1884 helped reduce power conflicts during this period, and the 19th century was one of Europe's most peaceful.
Industrial and colonial competition, combined with shifts in the balance of power after the creation - by diplomacy and conquest - of Germany by Prussia meant cracks were appearing in this system by the turn of the 20th century. The concert system was utterly destroyed by the First World War. After that conflict, world leaders created the League of Nations (which became the precursor of the United Nations) in an attempt to prevent a similar conflict. Although the League of Nations failed in its security mission, it initiated a variety of specialized organizations that continue to operate today. Moreover, although the US did not join, it did provide a degree of support from individual Americans and American philanthropies that started a tradition of public and private participation.
After the Second World War the victors, drawing upon experience from the League's failure, created the United Nations in 1945. Since then, the "breadth and diversity" of multilateral arrangements have escalated. Unlike the League, the UN had the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, the world's then greatest contemporary powers. Along with the political institutions of the UN, the post-war years also saw the development of organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (now the World Trade Organization), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (the so-called 'Bretton Woods' institutions), and other technical institutions that were part of the UN system—including the World Health Organization. Formation of these and other subsequent bodies under the United Nations made the new system more powerful than the old League system. Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers stationed around the world became a visible symbol of multilateralism. Later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed as a defensive alliance that used the multilateral form to promote collective security in the postwar era.
Multilateral institutions of varying scope and subject matter range from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
Challenges: The multilateral system has encountered mounting challenges since the end of the Cold War.
The United States became increasingly dominant in terms of military and economic power, which has led countries such as Iran, China and India to question the UN's relevance. Concurrently, a perception developed among internationalists such as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that the United States is more inclined to act unilaterally in situations with international implications. This trend began when the U.S. Senate, in October 1999, refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which President Bill Clinton had signed in September 1996. Under President George W. Bush the United States rejected such multilateral agreements as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines and a draft protocol to ensure compliance by States with the Biological Weapons Convention. Also under the George W. Bush administration, the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the Richard Nixon administration and the Soviet Union had signed in 1972.
These challenges presented by the U.S. could be explained by a strong belief in bilateral alliances as instruments of control. Liberal institutionalists would argue, though, that great powers might still opt for a multilateral alliance. But great powers can amplify their capabilities to control small powers and maximize their leverage by forging a series of bilateral arrangements with allies, rather than see that leverage diluted in a multilateral forum. Arguably, the Bush administration favoured bilateralism over multilateralism, or even unilateralism, for similar reasons. Rather than going it alone or going it with others, the administration opted for intensive one-on-one relationships with handpicked countries that maximized the U.S. capacity to achieve its objectives.
Another challenge in global governance through multilateralism involves national sovereignty. Regardless of the erosion of nation-states' legal and operational sovereignty in international relations, "nation-states remain the ultimate locus of authoritative decision making regarding most facets of public and private life". Hoffman asserted that nation-states are "unlikely to embrace abstract obligations that clash with concrete calculations of national interest."
Global multilateralism is challenged, particularly with respect to trade, by regional arrangements such as the European Union and NAFTA, although these are not in themselves incompatible with larger accords. The original sponsor of post-war multilateralism in economic regimes, the United States, turned towards unilateral action and in trade and other negotiations as a result of dissatisfaction with the outcomes of multilateral fora. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Multilateralism | Rather than going it alone or going it with others, the administration opted for intensive one-on-one relationships with handpicked countries that maximized the U.S. capacity to achieve its objectives.
Another challenge in global governance through multilateralism involves national sovereignty. Regardless of the erosion of nation-states' legal and operational sovereignty in international relations, "nation-states remain the ultimate locus of authoritative decision making regarding most facets of public and private life". Hoffman asserted that nation-states are "unlikely to embrace abstract obligations that clash with concrete calculations of national interest."
Global multilateralism is challenged, particularly with respect to trade, by regional arrangements such as the European Union and NAFTA, although these are not in themselves incompatible with larger accords. The original sponsor of post-war multilateralism in economic regimes, the United States, turned towards unilateral action and in trade and other negotiations as a result of dissatisfaction with the outcomes of multilateral fora. As the most powerful nation, the United States had the least to lose from abandoning multilateralism; the weakest nations have the most to lose, but the cost for all would be high. Aside from changes in the US, populism in Europe has proven to be problematic to multilateralism in recent years. Results from direct elections to the European Parliament give evidence to this claim, as Eurosceptic parties have made advances.
Comparison with bilateralism: When enacting foreign policies, governments face a choice between unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism.
Bilateralism means coordination with another single country. Multilateralism has attempted to find common ground based on generalized principles of conduct, in addition to details associated with a particular agreement. Victor Cha argued that: power asymmetries predict the type of structures, bilateral or multilateral, that offer the most control. If small powers try to control a larger one, then multilateralism is effective. But if great powers seek control over smaller ones, bilateral alliances are more effective.
Thus, a country's decision to select bilateralism or multilateralism when enacting foreign policies is greatly affected by its size and power, as well as the size and power of the country over which it seeks to control. Take the example of Foreign Policy of the United States. Many references discuss how the United States interacts with other nations. In particular, the United States chose multilateralism in Europe and decided to form NATO, while it formed bilateral alliances, or the Hub and spokes architecture, in East Asia. Although there are many arguments about the reasons for this, Cha's "powerplay" theory provides one possible reason. He argued: ...postwar U.S planners had to contend with a region uniquely constituted of potential rogue allies, through their aggressive behaviour, could potentially entrap the United States in an unwanted wider war in Asia... To avoid this outcome, the United States created a series of tight, deep bilateral alliances with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan through which it could exercise maximum control and prevent unilateral aggression. Furthermore, it did not seek to make these bilateral alliances multilateral, because it wanted to amplify U.S. control and minimize any collusion among its partners.
See also:
Notes:
Further reading: Kim Fontaine-Skronski, Valériane Thool & Norbert Eschborn, Does the UN Model Still Work? Challenges and Prospects for the Future of Multilateralism, Brill, 2023, ISBN 978-90-04-51648-9
Kathryn C. Lavelle, The Challenges of Multilateralism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020). ISBN 9780300230451
Nicola Contessi, "Multilateralism" in Joel Krieger (ed.) Oxford Companion to International Relations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 96–101.
Edward Newman, Ramesh Rhakur and John Tirman, Multilateralism Under Challenge (Tokyo: United Nations Press, 2006).
Michale Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2011)
Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation: The Architecture and Extension of International Trade Regulation (New York: Routledge, 2000).
Claude, Inis L. (1984). Swords into plowshares : the problems and progress of international organization. Random House. ISBN 0394340531. OCLC 246372664. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Napoleonic weaponry and warfare | Movement: One of Napoleon's greatest advantages was the speed of his troop movements. Napoleon insisted on extreme speed when conducting the marches, movements, and attacks of his army. He claimed that "loss of time is irreparable in war... I may lose a battle but I should never lose a minute." Many factors contributed to Napoleon's ability to perform these flexible movements, from the division of his army into an independent corps system, to the avoidance of slow-moving, lengthy supply lines. Instead, Napoleon's army looked to live off the land, acquiring the motto, "The war must feed the war." Napoleon sought to acquire food from the surrounding environment, whether that meant paying friendly countries or simply foraging. These factors, combined with Napoleon's innate persuasive ability to inspire his troops, resulted in successive victories in dominating fashion. His opponents were often confused and unsettled as Napoleon intricately coordinated strategic attacks on profound scales.
Strategy: The French Revolution and subsequent Napoleonic Wars revolutionised military strategy. The impact of this period was still to be felt in the American Civil War and the early phases of World War I. With the advent of cheap small arms and the rise of the drafted citizen soldier, army sizes increased rapidly to become mass forces. This necessitated dividing the army first into divisions and later into corps. Along with divisions came divisional artillery, light weight, mobile cannons with greater range and firepower.
During the Italian campaign, Napoleon conversed much about the warriors of antiquity, especially Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Scipio Africanus, and Hannibal. He studied their strategies and combined them with his own. To a question from Bourrienne, asking whether he preferred Alexander or Caesar, Napoleon said that he placed Alexander in the first rank, the main reason being his campaigns in Asia.
His application of conventional military ideas to real-world situations enabled his military triumphs, such as creative use of artillery as a mobile force to support his infantry. He is credited as saying: "I have fought sixty battles and I have learned nothing which I did not know at the beginning."
Napoleon could win battles by concealing troop deployments and concentrating his forces on the "hinge" of an enemy's weakened front. If he could not use his favourite envelopment strategy, he would take up the central position and attack two cooperating forces at their hinge, swing round to fight one until it fled, then turn to face the other.
Napoleon invariably sought to achieve decisiveness in battle, with the sole aim of utterly destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior manoeuvre. As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures.
While not the originator of the methods he used, Napoleon effectively combined the relatively superior manoeuvre and battle stages into one event. Before this, generals had considered this approach to battle as separate events. However, Napoleon used manoeuvre in battle to dictate how and where the battle would progress. The Battle of Austerlitz was a perfect example of this manoeuvre; Napoleon withdrew from a strong position to draw his opponent forward and tempt him into a flank attack, weakening his center. This allowed the French Army to split the allied army and gain victory.
Napoleon used two primary strategies for the approach to battle. His "Manoeuvre De Derrière" (move onto the rear) was intended to place the French Army across the enemy's lines of communications. Using a "pinning" force to keep the opponent stationary, he would swing around onto his opponents rear with the bulk of his army, forcing the adversary to either accept a battle on Napoleon's terms or push further into the pinning force and hostile territory. By placing his army into the rear, his opponent's supplies and communications would be cut. This had a negative effect on enemy morale. Once joined, the battle would be one in which his opponent could not afford defeat. This also allowed Napoleon to select multiple march routes into a battle site. Initially, the lack of force concentration helped with foraging for food and sought to confuse the enemy as to his real location and intentions. This strategy, along with the use of forced marches created a morale bonus that played heavily in his favour.
The "indirect" approach into battle also allowed Napoleon to disrupt the linear formations used by the allied armies. As the battle progressed, the enemy committed their reserves to stabilise the situation, Napoleon would suddenly release the flanking formation to attack the enemy. His opponents, being suddenly confronted with a new threat and with little reserves, had no choice but to weaken the area closest to the flanking formation and draw up a battleline at a right angle in an attempt to stop this new threat. Once this had occurred, Napoleon would mass his reserves at the hinge of that right angle and launch a heavy attack to break the lines. The rupture in the enemy lines allowed Napoleon's cavalry to flank both lines and roll them up leaving his opponent no choice but to surrender or flee.
The second strategy used by Napoleon when confronted with two or more enemy armies was the use of the central position. This allowed Napoleon to drive a wedge to separate the enemy armies. He would then use part of his force to mask one army while the larger portion overwhelmed and defeated the second army quickly. He would then march on the second army leaving a portion to pursue the first army and repeat the operations. This was designed to achieve the highest concentration of men into the primary battle while limiting the enemy's ability to reinforce the critical battle. The central position had a weakness in that the full power of the pursuit of the enemy could not be achieved because the second army needed attention. So overall the preferred method of attack was the flank march to cut the enemy's logistics. Napoleon used the central position strategy during the Battle of Waterloo.
Waterloo campaign: Napoleon masked the Duke of Wellington's army and massed against the Prussian Army, and then after the Battle of Ligny was won, Napoleon attempted to do the same to the British-Allied force (British, Dutch, and Hanoverian) located just to the south of Waterloo. His subordinate was unable to mask the defeated Prussian Army, who reinforced the Waterloo battle in time to defeat Napoleon. It can be said that the Prussian Army under Field Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher used the "Manoeuvre De Derrière" against Napoleon who was suddenly placed in a position of reacting to a new enemy threat.
Napoleon's practical strategic triumphs, repeatedly leading smaller forces to defeat larger ones, inspired a whole new field of study into military strategy. In particular, his opponents were keen to develop a body of knowledge in this area to allow them to counteract a masterful individual with a highly competent group of officers, or general staff. The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian with a background in philosophy, and Antoine-Henri Jomini, who had been one of Napoleon's staff officers.
Peninsular War: One notable exception to Napoleon's "strategy of annihilation" and a precursor to trench warfare were the Lines of Torres Vedras during the Peninsular War. French troops lived off the land and when they were confronted by a line of fortifications which they could not out flank, they were unable to continue the advance and were forced to retreat once they had consumed all the provisions of the region in front of the lines.
The Peninsular campaign was notable for the development of another method of warfare which went largely unnoticed at the time, but would become far more common in the 20th century. That was the aid and encouragement the British gave to the Spanish to harass the French behind their lines which led them to squander most of the assets of their Iberian army in protecting the army's line of communications. This was a very cost effective move for the British, because it cost far less to aid Spanish insurgents than it did to equip and pay regular British Army units to engage the same number of French troops. As the British Army could be correspondingly smaller it was able to supply its troops by sea and land without having to live off the land as was the norm at the time. Further, because they did not have to forage they did not antagonise the locals and so did not have to garrison their lines of communications to the same extent as the French did. So the strategy of aiding their Spanish civilian allies in their guerrilla or "little war" benefited the British in many ways, not all of which were immediately obvious.
Firearms: As for the infantry soldier himself, Napoleon primarily equipped his army with the Charleville M1777 Revolutionnaire musket, a product from older designs and models. Used during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the Charleville musket was a .69 calibre, (sometimes .70 or .71) 5-foot-long (1.5 m), muzzle-loading, smoothbore musket. Properly trained French infantry were expected to be able to fire three volleys a minute. A trained soldier could hit a man sized target at 100 yards but anything further required an increasing amount of luck, the musket was wildly inaccurate at long range. French officers were usually armed with a .69 pistol as a secondary weapon to their sword. This still had to be muzzle loaded and fired with a flintlock after reloading. Besides guns, soldiers used a variety of pikes, swords, and bayonets for close range or melee combat. Officers, sergeants, other higher-ranked officials, and cavalry mainly used swords, while the majority of infantry soldiers were equipped with bayonets. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Napoleonic weaponry and warfare | Used during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, the Charleville musket was a .69 calibre, (sometimes .70 or .71) 5-foot-long (1.5 m), muzzle-loading, smoothbore musket. Properly trained French infantry were expected to be able to fire three volleys a minute. A trained soldier could hit a man sized target at 100 yards but anything further required an increasing amount of luck, the musket was wildly inaccurate at long range. French officers were usually armed with a .69 pistol as a secondary weapon to their sword. This still had to be muzzle loaded and fired with a flintlock after reloading. Besides guns, soldiers used a variety of pikes, swords, and bayonets for close range or melee combat. Officers, sergeants, other higher-ranked officials, and cavalry mainly used swords, while the majority of infantry soldiers were equipped with bayonets.
The cavalry and engineers of the army essentially carried the same musket as the infantry. At 10 inches shorter, the carbine and the musketoon were less cumbersome, making them more suitable for the mobility that horseback riders required but at the expense of accuracy. Besides the usage of the firearms, heavy cavalry typically wielded straight sabres with a 38-inch blade (970 mm) while light cavalry wielded curved sabres with a 33-inch blade (840 mm).
Throughout the Napoleonic Wars, rifles were also introduced into the battlefield. Rifles were substantially more accurate at a maximum range of 200 paces because the barrel put spin on the bullet. Despite this advantage, rifles were more expensive and took longer to load, something Napoleon was not fond of and a reason why he did not incorporate them into his army. Instead, he settled for the speed of the musket, as it allowed for his rapid manoeuvres. The British did utilise the rifle such as the Baker Pattern 1800 Infantry rifle equipping some units, most notably with the creation of an entire elite rifle regiment, the 95th Regiment (Rifles). One success of the British 95th Rifles was picking off French general Auguste François-Marie de Colbert-Chabanais in 1809 during the Peninsular War. The British themselves were to lose General Robert Ross, himself a veteran of the Peninsular War, to American long range rifle fire in 1814. Rifles were also utilised in smaller numbers by Jäger companies in several German states.
The Austrian Army introduced the Girardoni M1780 repeating air rifle as a specialist weapon and used them in the Napoleonic Wars. A multi-shot breech loader, it only had an effective full charge range to about 150 yd (140 m). It was nearly silent and made no smoke or noise, but was complex and needed a significant infrastructure to support it. The air rifle fell out of use after 1815 as more conventional types of weapons proved superior overall, in only a few more decades, all soldiers would be gunpowder rifle equipped.
Most weaponry provided would be gained due to the French hosting absolute control over all armories even if this control came from district and provinces command.
Artillery: One of the major components in Napoleon's arsenal of weaponry was his artillery. With the development and improvement of combat weapons throughout the Seven Years' War prior to Napoleon, artillery had expanded to almost every European country, including France with 12-lb and 8-lb cannons. "The Gribeauval guns developed between 1765 and 1774 were 12-pounders, 8-pounders, 6-pounders and 4-pounders with 6-inch and 8-inch howitzers."
This style of gun was the artillery of choice for Napoleon, considering they were lighter by one third than the cannons of any other country. For example, the barrel of the British 12-pounder weighed 3,150 pounds, and the gun with carriage and limber about 6,500 lb (2,900 kg). The Gribeauval 12-lb barrels weighed 2,174 pounds and the gun with carriage and limber 4,367 pounds. Since Napoleon insisted on speed and mobility in conducting his manoeuvres, this lighter cannon provided the flexibility he desired. Along with the artillery, the army had vast quantities of mortars, furnace bombs, grape and canister shots, all of which provided substantial support fire.
Artillery also played a role in naval warfare, with most ships containing anywhere from 50 to 100 cannons. In 1798, Napoleon's flagship L’Orient, with 120 guns, was the most heavily armed vessel in the world; until it was sunk that year at the Battle of the Nile. Napoleon's quick, destructive artillery force contributed to a majority of his victories.
Special weapons: Congreve rockets based on the Mysorean technology were systematically used by the British during the Napoleonic Wars.
See also: Military history of France
Napoleonic tactics
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval strategy | Principles: The great aims of a fleet in war must be to keep the coast of its own country free from attack, to secure the freedom of its trade, and to destroy the enemy's fleet or confine it to port. The first and second of these aims can be attained by the successful achievement of the third – the destruction or paralysis of the hostile fleet. A fleet that secures the freedom of its own communications from attack is said to have command of the sea.
Naval strategy is fundamentally different from land-based military strategy. At sea there is no territory to occupy. Apart from the fisheries and, more recently, offshore oilfields, there are no economic assets that can be denied to the enemy and no resources that a fleet can exploit. While an army can live off the land, a fleet must rely on whatever supplies it carries with it or can be brought to it.
Origins:
Torrington and the fleet in being: The British Admiral the Earl of Torrington allegedly originated the expression fleet in being. Faced with a clearly superior French fleet in the summer of 1690 during the War of the Grand Alliance, Torrington proposed avoiding battle, except under very favourable conditions, until the arrival of reinforcements. By maintaining his fleet in being, he would prevent the French from gaining command of the sea, which would allow them to invade England. However, Torrington was forced to fight at the Battle of Beachy Head (June 1690), a French victory which gave Paris control of the English Channel for only a few weeks.
Introduction of the guerre de course: By the mid-1690s, privateers from French Atlantic ports, particularly St. Malo and Dunkirk, were a major threat to Anglo-Dutch commerce. The threat forced the English government to divert warships to the defence of trade, as convoy escorts and cruisers to hunt down the privateers. In France, the success of privateers against the Anglo-Dutch war effort stimulated a gradual shift from the employment of the Royal warships as battlefleets (guerre d’escadre) towards supporting the war on trade (guerre de course). The allied convoys presented large targets for commerce raiding squadrons. The most dramatic result of this shift was the Comte de Tourville’s attack upon the allies’ Smyrna convoy on 17 June 1693.
The disadvantage of the guerre de course when pursued as a battlefleet strategy, rather than just by smaller vessels, is that it leaves a country's own trade defenceless. Individual raiding squadrons are also vulnerable to defeat in detail if the enemy sends larger squadrons in pursuit, as happened to Leissegues at the Battle of San Domingo in 1806 and Von Spee at the Battle of the Falkland Islands in 1914.
Hawke, St Vincent and the close blockade: Until after the end of the 17th century it was thought impossible, or at least very rash, to keep the great ships out of port between September and May or June. Therefore, continuous watch on an enemy by blockading his ports was beyond the power of any navy. Therefore, too, as an enemy fleet might be at sea before it could be stopped, the movements of fleets were much subordinated to the need for providing convoy to the trade.
It was not until the middle of the 18th century that the continuous blockade first carried out by Sir Edward Hawke in 1758–59, and then brought to perfection by Earl St Vincent and other British admirals between 1793 and 1815, became possible.
Development: It was only at the very end of the 19th century that theories of naval strategy were first codified, even though British statesmen and admirals had been practising it for centuries.
Mahan's influence: Captain, later rear admiral, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) was an American naval officer and historian.
Influenced by Jomini's principles of strategy, he argued that in the coming wars, control of the sea would grant the power to control the trade and resources needed to wage war. Mahan's premise was that in the contests between France and Britain in the 18th century, domination of the sea through naval power was the deciding factor in the outcome, and therefore, that control of seaborne commerce was secondary to domination in war. In Mahan's view, a country obtained "command of the sea" by concentrating its naval forces at the decisive point to destroy or master the enemy's battle fleet; blockade of enemy ports and disruption of the enemy's maritime communications would follow. Mahan believed that the true objective in a naval war was always the enemy fleet.
Mahan's writings were highly influential. His best-known books, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, and The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, were published in 1890 and 1892 respectively and his theories contributed to the naval arms race between 1898 and 1914.
Theodore Roosevelt, himself an accomplished historian of the naval history of the War of 1812, closely followed Mahan's ideas. He incorporated them into American naval strategy when he served as assistant secretary of the Navy in 1897–1898. As president, 1901–1909, Roosevelt made building up a world-class fighting fleet of high priority, sending his "white fleet" around the globe in 1908–1909 to make sure all the naval powers understood the United States was now a major player. Building the Panama Canal was designed not just to open Pacific trade to East Coast cities, but also to enable the new Navy to move back and forth across the globe.
The Colomb brothers: In Britain, Captain John H. Colomb (1838–1909) in a series of articles and lectures argued that the navy was the most important component of imperial defence; his brother, Admiral Phillip Colomb (1831–1899), sought to establish from history general rules applicable to modern naval warfare in his Naval Warfare (1891). But their writings achieved nothing like the fame achieved by Mahan.
Corbett’s principles: Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922) was a British naval historian who became a lecturer at the Royal Naval War College in Great Britain.
Corbett differed from Mahan in placing much less emphasis on fleet battle. Corbett emphasized the interdependence of naval and land warfare and tended to concentrate on the importance of sea communications rather than battle. Battle at sea was not an end in itself; the primary objective of the fleet was to secure one's own communications and disrupt those of the enemy, not necessarily to seek out and destroy the enemy's fleet. To Corbett, command of the sea was a relative and not an absolute which could be categorized as general or local, temporary or permanent. Corbett defined the two fundamental methods of obtaining control of the lines of communication as the actual physical destruction or capture of enemy warships and merchants, and or a naval blockade.
His most famous work, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, remains a classic.
Impact of the World Wars: World War I and II left a major impact on naval strategies thanks to new technologies. With the creation of new naval vessels like the submarine, strategies like unrestricted warfare were able to be implemented and with the creation of oil based fuel, radar and radio navies were able to act more efficiently and effective since they were able to move faster, know where enemies were located and were able to communicate with ease.
Change of fuel from coal to oil: Before the start of the World War I, many naval warships ran on coal and manpower. This was very inefficient but the only way they could power these ships at the time. Half the crew on these ships were there to maintain the coal, but oil was seen more efficient to where the number of men needed to maintain it were nowhere near as many. With the newfound use of oil, the benefits were abundant for the warships. With the use of oil, ships were able to travel at 17 knots. This was drastically different compared to the 7 knots ships traveled before with the use of coal. Coal also took up more space in the ships. Oil can be stored in multiple tanks where they all circumvent to one place to be used unlike coal which was stored in the ship, in multiple rooms and had multiple boiler rooms.
World War I: Leading up to World War I, there was a naval arms race in Europe. With this race introducing many innovations to navies across Europe, in 1906 the British unveiled a revolutionary new warship called HMS Dreadnought powered by steam turbine. This ship reached a speed of 21 knots, one of the fastest at the time; this warship also had advancements in weaponry that no other nation's navy had at the time. With this, the arms race changed to which nation could build the most of those newly made warships. With these new, heavily armed ships the Allies had more opportunities for blockades in the various theaters of the war.
Warfare: The submarine, introduced in World War I, led to the development of new weapons and tactics. The Germans' fleet at the time was, in some people's opinion, the most advanced, and was constructed by Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz. The fleet consisted of the U-boat, and smaller class UB and UC boats.
Unrestricted warfare in WW1: Unrestricted Warfare was first introduced during World War I by the German navy. This strategy sought to sink vessels, particularly commercial shipping, without warning. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval strategy | This ship reached a speed of 21 knots, one of the fastest at the time; this warship also had advancements in weaponry that no other nation's navy had at the time. With this, the arms race changed to which nation could build the most of those newly made warships. With these new, heavily armed ships the Allies had more opportunities for blockades in the various theaters of the war.
Warfare: The submarine, introduced in World War I, led to the development of new weapons and tactics. The Germans' fleet at the time was, in some people's opinion, the most advanced, and was constructed by Alfred Peter Friedrich von Tirpitz. The fleet consisted of the U-boat, and smaller class UB and UC boats.
Unrestricted warfare in WW1: Unrestricted Warfare was first introduced during World War I by the German navy. This strategy sought to sink vessels, particularly commercial shipping, without warning. This proved decisive in America's entry into the war through the famous sinking of the RMS Lusitania. The strategy provoked international controversy due to the risk posed to the commerce and citizenry of neutral states. Before its entry into the war, the United States lobbied Germany to curtail the use of unrestricted submarine warfare. While this caused Germany to reduce such operations for a time, the strategy was ultimately resumed in an attempt to impede food and munitions supplies to Britain. The resumption of this strategy led many countries to try to ban the subsequent use of unrestricted submarine warfare, though this met with failure by the outbreak of WWII.
Technological impact in WW1:
Radio: Radio saw its first use in naval combat during the First World War. Early radio technology was not adopted universally at this point, as Morse code often proved more reliable than inconsistent or unclear radio signals. These two technologies were jointly used to communicate between ships, bases, and naval command. Improved radio technology greatly advanced naval intelligence and coordination by increasing communication speed, efficiency, and range.
World War 2:
Submarine warfare:
Unrestricted warfare in WW2: World War II saw broad use of unrestricted submarine warfare. This was especially notable in the Battle of the Atlantic, as Axis powers sought to restrict British and French contact with their colonial possessions and limit their involvement in the Pacific theater. After American entry in 1941, US forces targeted Axis commercial and military fleets across the Atlantic basin and in the Pacific War.
Carrier-based warfare:
Technological impact in WW2:
Radar: Approaching World War II, militaries gained new technological and strategic capabilities through the use of radar. Radar is used by navies to detect planes and ships that enter the nation's coastal zone and to detect objects that pass by vessels at sea. Navies could thus use radar to clearly detect where enemy ships were located before attacking, as well as knowing when enemies were approaching to attack their vessels in turn.
Radio: Radio continued to play a vital role in naval communication during the Second World War as it did in the First, the major difference being its widespread adoption by all combatants. Additionally, militaries used radio to communicate with the general public.
Modern: Increasingly naval strategy has been merged with general strategy involving land and air warfare.
Naval strategy constantly evolves as improved technologies become available. During the Cold War, for example, the Soviet Navy shifted from a strategy of directly contending against NATO for control of the bluewater oceans to a concentrated defense of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk bastions.
In 2007, the U.S. Navy joined with the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard to adopt a new maritime strategy called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower that raised the notion of prevention of war to the same philosophical level as the conduct of war. The strategy was presented by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Commandant of the Coast Guard at the International Seapower Symposium in Newport, R.I. The strategy recognized the economic links of the global system and how any disruption due to regional crises – man-made or natural – can adversely impact the U.S. economy and quality of life. This new strategy charted a course for the three U.S. sea services to work collectively with each other and international partners to prevent these crises from occurring or reacting quickly should one occur to avoid negative impacts to the United States. Sometimes a military force is used as a preventative measure to avoid war, not cause it.
See also: Command of the sea
Military strategy
Strategy
Grand strategy
Operational mobility
Military doctrine
Principles of war
Military tactics
Naval tactics
References: Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.ISBN 1296071545
Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783.
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower
Further reading: Adams, John A. If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy (2008) excerpt and text search
Dewan, Sandeep China's Maritime Ambitions and the PLA Navy Vij Books, ISBN 9789382573227
Hattendorf, John B. Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future (2000) excerpt and text search
Padfield, Peter, 'Maritime Supremacy and the Opening of the Western Mind: Naval Campaigns That Shaped the Modern World, 1588–1782 (1999) excerpt and text search; Maritime Power and Struggle For Freedom: Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World 1788–1851 (2005)
Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (1986)
Rose, Lisle A. Power at Sea, Volume 1: The Age of Navalism, 1890–1918 (2006) excerpt and text search vol 1; Power at Sea, Volume 2: The Breaking Storm, 1919–1945 (2006) excerpt and text search vol 2; Power at Sea, Volume 3: A Violent Peace, 1946–2006 (2006) excerpt and text search vol 3
Shulman, Mark Russell. "The Influence of Mahan upon Sea Power." Reviews in American History 1991 19(4): 522–527. in Jstor |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval tactics | Key concepts: A central concept in Western modern naval fleet warfare is battlespace: a zone around a naval force within which a commander is confident of detecting, tracking, engaging and destroying threats before they pose a danger. As in all forms of warfare, a critical objective is to detect the enemy while avoiding detection.
The open sea provides the most favorable battlespace for a surface fleet. The presence of land and the topography of an area compress the battlespace, limit the opportunities to maneuver, make it easier for an enemy to predict the location of the fleet, and make the detection of enemy forces more difficult. In shallow waters, the detection of submarines and mines is especially problematic.
One scenario that was the focus of American and NATO naval planning during the Cold War was a conflict between two modern and well equipped fleets on the high seas, the clash of the United States/NATO and the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact. Because the Cold War ended without direct total war between the two sides, the outcome of such an action remains hypothetical, but was broadly understood to include, towards the late Cold War, multiple salvoes of anti-ship missiles against the Americans and U.S. attempts to air strike Soviet land bases and/or fleets. Given the eventual strategic surprise effectiveness of anti-ship missiles, the outcome of such a clash is far from being clear.
The main consideration is for carrier battle group (CVBGs). Critics of current naval doctrine argue that although such a fleet battle is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future, Cold War thinking continues to dominate naval practice. However, others point toward the increased naval budgets of Russia and South and East Asia as a possibility that conventional naval combat in the future may become relevant again.
Naval tactics and weapons systems can be categorized by the type of opponents they are intended to fight. Anti-air warfare (AAW) involves action against aircraft and incoming missiles. Anti-surface warfare (ASuW) focuses on attacking and defending against surface warships. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) deals with the detection and destruction of enemy submarines.
The key threat in modern naval combat is the airborne cruise missile, which can be delivered from surface, subsurface or airborne platforms. With missile speeds ranging up to Mach 4, engagement time may be only seconds and such missiles can be designed to "skim the sea" mere meters above the sea surface. The key to successful defence was argued to be to destroy the launch platform before it fires, thus removing a number of missile threats at once. This is not always possible so the anti-aircraft warfare (AAW) resources need to be balanced between the outer and inner air battles. Missile tactics are now mostly fire and forget in the manner of the Harpoon or Exocet or utilize over-the-horizon targeting, such as the Tomahawk or Silkworm. Close-range missile defence in the modern age depends heavily on close-in weapon systems (CIWS) such as the Phalanx or Goalkeeper.
Though traveling under water and at lower speeds, torpedoes present a similar threat. As is the case with missiles, torpedoes are self-propelled and can be launched from surface, subsurface, and air platforms. Modern versions of this weapon present a wide selection of homing technologies specially suited to their particular target. There are far fewer means of destroying incoming torpedoes compared to missiles.
Submarines, as subsurface launching platforms, present an important threat to conventional naval operations. Anechoic coatings and ultra-quiet pump-jets provide modern submarines with the advantage of stealth. The move towards shallow water operations has greatly increased this advantage. Mere suspicion of a submarine threat can force a fleet to commit resources to removing it, as the consequences of an undetected enemy submarine can obviously be lethal. The threat posed by British submarines during the Falklands War of 1982 was one of the reasons why the Argentine Navy was limited in its operations. A single submarine at sea also impacted operations in the Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971.
Conventional naval forces are also seen as providing a capability for power projection. In several naval operations, the aircraft carrier has been used to support land forces rather than to supply air control over the sea. Carriers were used in this way during the Gulf War.
History: Naval tactics have evolved over time with developments in naval technology and the evolution of warships. The evolution of naval tactics can best be understood by dividing naval history into thematic topics:
Galley tactics: Naval tactics from the earliest times to the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the last major battle in which (oar-propelled) galleys dominated.
Sailing ship tactics: Tactics focused on sailing warships, especially from the late 16th century, including the development of the line of battle.
Naval tactics in the Age of Steam: The development of the steam-powered ironclad firing explosive shells lead to new tactics that were developed for the big-gun Dreadnought battleships. The mine, torpedo, submarine and aircraft posed new threats, each of which had to be countered, leading to tactical developments such as anti-submarine warfare and the use of dazzle camouflage. By the end of the steam age, aircraft carriers and submarines had replaced battleships as the principal units of the fleet.
The modern period of naval tactics began with the widespread replacement of naval guns with missiles and long-range combat aircraft after World War II and is the basis for most of the tactical doctrine used today.
Post-World War II conflicts:
The Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was the most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. Over two thousand sailors died, and multiple ships were sunk. Significantly, the first submarine sinking of a ship since World War II occurred when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank an Indian ASW frigate INS Khukri. Passive/active sonar, homing torpedoes, air strikes on naval facilities and fast missile craft were all utilized in this war.
In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy successfully attacked Karachi's port in Operation Trident on the night of 4–5 December, using missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged. In response, Pakistani submarines sought out major Indian warships. 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python on the night of 8–9 December, in which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships. Since Pakistan's naval headquarters and almost its entire fleet operated from the port city of Karachi, this was a major strategic victory that enabled the Indian navy to attain complete naval superiority, and to partially blockade Pakistan.
In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command completely isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious circumstances off Visakhapatnam's coast On 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine Hangor sank the frigate Khukri in the Arabian Sea, resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors.
The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and Madhumathi – and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, Pakistan lost half its navy in the war.
The Falklands War: The Falklands War of 1982 has been the next most significant conflict involving naval forces since World War II. The primary combat was between the Argentine Air force, based on the mainland, and the British naval force centered on aircraft carriers. Argentine naval forces played only a minor role in the conflict.
The war demonstrated the importance of naval airborne early warning (AEW). Vital to British success was the protection of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. In 1982, the Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability, so to protect the British naval taskforce several destroyers and frigates were sent on radar picket duty to form the first line of defense against Argentine air attacks. As a result, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Argentine Exocet missile strike. Following the conflict, the Royal Navy modified some Westland Sea King helicopters for the AEW role. Other navies (including France, Spain and Italy) have since included AEW aircraft or helicopters on their carriers.
The conflict also led to an increased interest in the close defense capabilities of naval ships, including close-in weapon systems (CIWS) as a last-ditch defense against incoming missiles. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval tactics | The war demonstrated the importance of naval airborne early warning (AEW). Vital to British success was the protection of the two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. In 1982, the Royal Navy had effectively zero over-the-horizon radar capability, so to protect the British naval taskforce several destroyers and frigates were sent on radar picket duty to form the first line of defense against Argentine air attacks. As a result, the British lost the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield to fire following an Argentine Exocet missile strike. Following the conflict, the Royal Navy modified some Westland Sea King helicopters for the AEW role. Other navies (including France, Spain and Italy) have since included AEW aircraft or helicopters on their carriers.
The conflict also led to an increased interest in the close defense capabilities of naval ships, including close-in weapon systems (CIWS) as a last-ditch defense against incoming missiles. The attack on the US frigate USS Stark on patrol in the Persian Gulf in 1987 also highlighted the danger of anti-ship missiles. In the case of Stark, the Iraqi Exocet missiles were not detected and Stark's CIWS was not turned on as the ship was not expecting an attack.
The Falklands War also saw the only time a warship has been sunk by a nuclear-powered submarine in a hostile attack, when the British nuclear-powered submarine HMS Conqueror attacked the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano with torpedoes. With their nuclear propulsion plants, the submarines were able to remain on station virtually undetected.
Other conflicts: Another large naval operation conducted by a major power took place when the US Navy provided protection to Kuwaiti-owned tankers in the Persian Gulf between 1987 and 1988, during the Iran–Iraq War.
Naval forces have played a supporting role in some land battles. US battleships provided naval gunfire support during the Vietnam War and the 1991 Gulf War. During the Falklands War, British destroyers and frigates carried out shelling of Argentine positions.
The 1991 Croatian War and the subsequent War of Bosnia saw some naval action, initially when the Yugoslav Navy declared a blockade of the ports of Dalmatia from September to December 1991 and later in 1994-1995, when NATO naval forces, as part of Operation Sharp Guard, deployed a number of units to the Adriatic in order to enforce a United Nations arms embargo on former Yugoslavia. Later Operations on former Yugoslavia such as Deliberate Force and Allied Force involved the use of seaborne aircraft and the launch of Tomahawk cruise missiles against Serb targets. British and Australian warships provided gunfire support to the Al Faw operation during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. US and UK naval forces have used again Tomahawk cruise missiles against land targets in the course of actions undertaken since the end of the Cold War, such as the opening of international involvement in the Libyan Civil War, of which the British Armed Forces played a decisive role.
The USS Cole bombing, a suicide waterborne mission on a US Aegis destroyer in Yemen in October 2000, has resulted in an increased awareness of terrorist risks whilst warships are in harbor or near potentially hostile coastlines. The War on Terrorism has also seen increased awareness of the naval role against terrorism. The US-led invasion of Afghanistan reaffirmed the role of naval air power, and US carrier based aircraft provided most of the sorties over Afghanistan against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. Over 90% of munitions delivered by the US Navy in Operation Enduring Freedom were precision-guided munitions. Several nations contributed vessels and maritime patrol aircraft to deny Al-Qaeda access to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, including the US, Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany, Netherlands and New Zealand amongst others. France and Italy also used their carrier based aircraft over Afghanistan. Special forces operated from US and British carriers, in particular, the USS Kitty Hawk. Aircraft traditionally used for maritime patrol such as the Nimrod and P-3 Orion were also used in the overland surveillance role over Afghanistan as well as during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
References:
Further reading: Rodger, Nicholas, "Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century Naval Tactics." Mariner's Mirror 89, No. 3 (2003), pp. 281–96. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | History: Mankind has fought battles on the sea for more than 3,000 years. Even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent upon rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways.
The latter were crucial in the development of the modern world in the United Kingdom, America, the Low Countries and northern Germany, because they enabled the bulk movement of goods and raw material, which supported the nascent Industrial Revolution. Prior to 1750, materials largely moved by river barge or sea vessels. Thus armies, with their exorbitant needs for food, ammunition and fodder, were tied to the river valleys throughout the ages.
Pre-recorded history (Homeric Legends, e.g. Troy), and classical works such as The Odyssey emphasize the sea. The Persian Empire – united and strong – could not prevail against the might of the Athenian fleet combined with that of lesser city states in several attempts to conquer the Greek city states. Phoenicia's and Egypt's power, Carthage's and even Rome's largely depended upon control of the seas.
So too did the Venetian Republic dominate Italy's city states, thwart the Ottoman Empire, and dominate commerce on the Silk Road and the Mediterranean in general for centuries. For three centuries, Vikings raided and pillaged far into central Russia and Ukraine, and even to distant Constantinople (both via the Black Sea tributaries, Sicily, and through the Strait of Gibraltar).
Gaining control of the sea has largely depended on a fleet's ability to wage sea battles. Throughout most of naval history, naval warfare revolved around two overarching concerns, namely boarding and anti-boarding. It was only in the late 16th century, when gunpowder technology had developed to a considerable extent, that the tactical focus at sea shifted to heavy ordnance.
Many sea battles through history also provide a reliable source of shipwrecks for underwater archaeology. A major example is the exploration of the wrecks of various warships in the Pacific Ocean.
Mediterranean Sea: The first recorded sea battle was the Battle of the Delta, the Ancient Egyptians defeated the Sea Peoples in a sea battle c. 1175 BC.
As recorded on the temple walls of the mortuary temple of pharaoh Ramesses III at Medinet Habu, this repulsed a major sea invasion near the shores of the eastern Nile Delta using a naval ambush and archers firing from both ships and shore.
Assyrian reliefs from the 8th century BC show Phoenician fighting ships, with two levels of oars, fighting men on a sort of bridge or deck above the oarsmen, and some sort of ram protruding from the bow. No written mention of strategy or tactics seems to have survived.
Josephus Flavius (Antiquities IX 283–287) reports a naval battle between Tyre and the king of Assyria who was aided by the other cities in Phoenicia. The battle took place off the shores of Tyre. Although the Tyrian fleet was much smaller, the Tyrians defeated their enemies.
The Greeks of Homer just used their ships as transport for land armies, but in 664 BC there is a mention of a battle at sea between Corinth and its colony city Corcyra.
Ancient descriptions of the Persian Wars were the first to feature large-scale naval operations, not just sophisticated fleet engagements with dozens of triremes on each side, but combined land-sea operations. It seems unlikely that all this was the product of a single mind or even of a generation; most likely the period of evolution and experimentation was simply not recorded by history.
After some initial battles while subjugating the Greeks of the Ionian coast, the Persians determined to invade Greece proper. Themistocles of Athens estimated that the Greeks would be outnumbered by the Persians on land, but that Athens could protect itself by building a fleet (the famous "wooden walls"), using the profits of the silver mines at Laurium to finance them.
The first Persian campaign, in 492 BC, was aborted because the fleet was lost in a storm, but the second, in 490 BC, captured islands in the Aegean Sea before landing on the mainland near Marathon. Attacks by the Greek armies repulsed these.
The third Persian campaign in 480 BC, under Xerxes I of Persia, followed the pattern of the second in marching the army via the Hellespont while the fleet paralleled them offshore. Near Artemisium, in the narrow channel between the mainland and Euboea, the Greek fleet held off multiple assaults by the Persians, the Persians breaking through a first line, but then being flanked by the second line of ships. But the defeat on land at Thermopylae forced a Greek withdrawal, and Athens evacuated its population to nearby Salamis Island.
The ensuing Battle of Salamis was one of the decisive engagements of history. Themistocles trapped the Persians in a channel too narrow for them to bring their greater numbers to bear, and attacked them vigorously, in the end causing the loss of 200 Persian ships vs 40 Greek. Aeschylus wrote a play about the defeat, The Persians, which was performed in a Greek theatre competition a few years after the battle. It is the oldest known surviving play. At the end, Xerxes still had a fleet stronger than the Greeks, but withdrew anyway, and after losing at Plataea in the following year, returned to Asia Minor, leaving the Greeks their freedom. Nevertheless, the Athenians and Spartans attacked and burned the laid-up Persian fleet at Mycale, and freed many of the Ionian towns. These battles involved triremes or biremes as the standard fighting platform, and the focus of the battle was to ram the opponent's vessel using the boat's reinforced prow. The opponent would try to maneuver and avoid contact, or alternately rush all the marines to the side about to be hit, thus tilting the boat. When the ram had withdrawn and the marines dispersed, the hole would then be above the waterline and not a critical injury to the ship.
During the next fifty years, the Greeks commanded the Aegean, but not harmoniously. After several minor wars, tensions exploded into the Peloponnesian War (431 BC) between Athens' Delian League and the Spartan Peloponnese. Naval strategy was critical; Athens walled itself off from the rest of Greece, leaving only the port at Piraeus open, and trusting in its navy to keep supplies flowing while the Spartan army besieged it. This strategy worked, although the close quarters likely contributed to the plague that killed many Athenians in 429 BC.
There were a number of sea battles between galleys; at Rhium, Naupactus, Pylos, Syracuse, Cynossema, Cyzicus, Notium. But the end came for Athens in 405 BC at Aegospotami in the Hellespont, where the Athenians had drawn up their fleet on the beach, and were surprised by the Spartan fleet, who landed and burned all the ships. Athens surrendered to Sparta in the following year.
Navies next played a major role in the complicated wars of the successors of Alexander the Great.
The Roman Republic had never been much of a seafaring nation, but it had to learn. In the Punic Wars with Carthage, Romans developed the technique of grappling and boarding enemy ships with soldiers. The Roman Navy grew gradually as Rome became more involved in Mediterranean politics; by the time of the Roman Civil War and the Battle of Actium (31 BC), hundreds of ships were involved, many of them quinqueremes mounting catapults and fighting towers. Following the Emperor Augustus transforming the Republic into the Roman Empire, Rome gained control of most of the Mediterranean. Without any significant maritime enemies, the Roman navy was reduced mostly to patrolling for pirates and transportation duties. It was only on the fringes of the Empire, in newly gained provinces or defensive missions against barbarian invasion, that the navy still engaged in actual warfare.
Europe, Western Asia, and Northern Africa: While the barbarian invasions of the 4th century and later mostly occurred by land, some notable examples of naval conflicts are known. In the late 3rd century, in the reign of Emperor Gallienus, a large raiding party composed by Goths, Gepids and Heruli, launched itself in the Black Sea, raiding the coasts of Anatolia and Thrace, and crossing into the Aegean Sea, plundering mainland Greece (including Athens and Sparta) and going as far as Crete and Rhodes. In the twilight of the Roman Empire in the late 4th century, examples include that of Emperor Majorian, who, with the help of Constantinople, mustered a large fleet in a failed effort to expel the Germanic invaders from their recently conquered African territories, and a defeat of an Ostrogothic fleet at Sena Gallica in the Adriatic Sea.
During the Muslim conquests of the 7th century, Muslim fleets first appeared, raiding Sicily in 652 (see History of Islam in southern Italy and Emirate of Sicily), and defeating the Byzantine Navy in 655. Constantinople was saved from a prolonged Arab siege in 678 by the invention of Greek fire, an early form of flamethrower that was devastating to the ships in the besieging fleet. These were the first of many encounters during the Byzantine-Arab Wars. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | In the twilight of the Roman Empire in the late 4th century, examples include that of Emperor Majorian, who, with the help of Constantinople, mustered a large fleet in a failed effort to expel the Germanic invaders from their recently conquered African territories, and a defeat of an Ostrogothic fleet at Sena Gallica in the Adriatic Sea.
During the Muslim conquests of the 7th century, Muslim fleets first appeared, raiding Sicily in 652 (see History of Islam in southern Italy and Emirate of Sicily), and defeating the Byzantine Navy in 655. Constantinople was saved from a prolonged Arab siege in 678 by the invention of Greek fire, an early form of flamethrower that was devastating to the ships in the besieging fleet. These were the first of many encounters during the Byzantine-Arab Wars.
The Caliphate became the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean Sea from the 7th to 13th centuries, during what is known as the Islamic Golden Age. One of the most significant inventions in medieval naval warfare was the torpedo, invented in Syria by the Arab inventor Hasan al-Rammah in 1275. His torpedo ran on water with a rocket system filled with explosive gunpowder materials and had three firing points. It was an effective weapon against ships.
In the 8th century the Vikings appeared, although their usual style was to appear quickly, plunder, and disappear, preferably attacking undefended locations. The Vikings raided places along the coastline of England and France, with the greatest threats being in England. They would raid monasteries for their wealth and lack of formidable defenders. They also utilized rivers and other auxiliary waterways to work their way inland in the eventual invasion of Britain. They wreaked havoc in Northumbria and Mercia and the rest of Anglia before being halted by Wessex. King Alfred the Great of England was able to stay the Viking invasions with a pivotal victory at the Battle of Edington. Alfred defeated Guthrum, establishing the boundaries of Danelaw in an 884 treaty. The effectiveness of Alfred's 'fleet' has been debated; Kenneth Harl has pointed out that as few as eleven ships were sent to combat the Vikings, only two of which were not beaten back or captured.
The Vikings also fought several sea battles among themselves. This was normally done by binding the ships on each side together, thus essentially fighting a land battle on the sea. However the fact that the losing side could not easily escape meant that battles tended to be hard and bloody. The Battle of Svolder is perhaps the most famous of these battles.
As Muslim power in the Mediterranean began to wane, the Italian trading towns of Genoa, Pisa, and Venice stepped in to seize the opportunity, setting up commercial networks and building navies to protect them. At first the navies fought with the Arabs (off Bari in 1004, at Messina in 1005), but then they found themselves contending with Normans moving into Sicily, and finally with each other. The Genoese and Venetians fought four naval wars, in 1253–1284, 1293–1299,
1350–1355, and 1378–1381. The last ended with a decisive Venetian victory, giving it almost a century to enjoy Mediterranean trade domination before other European countries began expanding into the south and west.
In the north of Europe, the near-continuous conflict between England and France was characterised by raids on coastal towns and ports along the coastlines and the securing of sea lanes to protect troop–carrying transports. The Battle of Dover in 1217, between a French fleet of 80 ships under Eustace the Monk and an English fleet of 40 under Hubert de Burgh, is notable as the first recorded battle using sailing ship tactics. The battle of Arnemuiden (23 September 1338), which resulted in a French victory, marked the opening of the Hundred Years War and was the first battle involving artillery. However the battle of Sluys, fought two years later, saw the destruction of the French fleet in a decisive action which allowed the English effective control of the sea lanes and the strategic initiative for much of the war.
Eastern, Southern, and Southeast Asia: The Sui (581–618) and Tang (618–907) dynasties of China were involved in several naval affairs over the triple set of polities ruling medieval Korea (Three Kingdoms of Korea), along with engaging naval bombardments on the peninsula from Asuka period Yamato Kingdom (Japan).
The Tang dynasty aided the Korean kingdom of Silla (see also Unified Silla) and expelled the Korean kingdom of Baekje which were supported by Japanese naval forces from the Korean peninsula (see Battle of Baekgang) and helped Silla overcome its rival Korean kingdoms, Baekje and Goguryeo, by 668. In addition, the Tang had maritime trading, tributary, and diplomatic ties as far as modern Sri Lanka, India, Islamic Iran and Arabia, as well as Somalia in East Africa.
From the Axumite Kingdom in modern-day Ethiopia, the Arab traveller Sa'd ibn Abi-Waqqas sailed from there to Tang China during the reign of Emperor Gaozong. Two decades later, he returned with a copy of the Quran, establishing the first Islamic mosque in China, the Mosque of Remembrance in Guangzhou. A rising rivalry followed between the Arabs and Chinese for control of trade in the Indian Ocean. In his book Cultural Flow Between China and the Outside World, Shen Fuwei notes that maritime Chinese merchants in the 9th century were landing regularly at Sufala in East Africa to cut out Arab middle-men traders.
The Chola dynasty of medieval India was a dominant seapower in the Indian Ocean, an avid maritime trader and diplomatic entity with Song China. Rajaraja Chola I (reigned 985 to 1014) and his son Rajendra Chola I (reigned 1014–42), sent a great naval expedition that occupied parts of Myanmar, Malaya, and Sumatra.
In the Nusantara archipelago, large ocean going ships of more than 50 m in length and 5.2–7.8 meters freeboard are already used at least since the 2nd century AD, contacting India to China.: 347 : 41 Srivijaya empire since the 7th century AD controlled the sea of the western part of the archipelago. The Kedukan Bukit inscription is the oldest record of Indonesian military history, and noted a 7th-century Srivijayan sacred siddhayatra journey led by Dapunta Hyang Sri Jayanasa. He was said to have brought 20,000 troops, including 312 people in boats and 1,312 foot soldiers.: 4 The 10th century Arab text Ajayeb al-Hind (Marvels of India) gives an account of an invasion in Africa by people called Wakwak or Waqwaq,: 110 probably the Malay people of Srivijaya or Javanese people of Mataram kingdom,: 27 : 39 in 945–946 CE. They arrived at the coast of Tanganyika and Mozambique with 1000 boats and attempted to take the citadel of Qanbaloh, though eventually failed. The reason of the attack is because that place had goods suitable for their country and for China, such as ivory, tortoise shells, panther skins, and ambergris, and also because they wanted black slaves from Bantu people (called Zeng or Zenj by Arabs, Jenggi by Javanese) who were strong and make good slaves.: 110 Before the 12th century, Srivijaya is primarily land-based polity rather than maritime power, fleets are available but acted as logistical support to facilitate the projection of land power. Later, the naval strategy degenerated to raiding fleet. Their naval strategy was to coerce merchant ships to dock in their ports, which if ignored, they will send ships to destroy the ship and kill the occupants.
In 1293, the Mongol Yuan dynasty launched an invasion to Java. The Yuan sent 500–1000 ships and 20,000–30,000 soldiers, but was ultimately defeated on land by surprise attack, forcing the army to fall back to the beach. In the coastal waters, Javanese junks had already attacked the Mongol ships. After all of the troops had boarded the ships on the coast, the Yuan army battled the Javanese fleet. After repelling it, they sailed back to Quanzhou. Javanese naval commander Aria Adikara intercepted a further Mongol invasion.: 145 : 107–110 Although with only scarce information, travellers passing the region, such as Ibn Battuta and Odoric of Pordenone noted that Java had been attacked by the Mongols several times, always ending in failure. After those failed invasions, Majapahit empire quickly grew and became the dominant naval power in the 14–15th century. The usage of cannons in the Mongol invasion of Java,: 245 led to deployment of cetbang cannons by Majapahit fleet in 1300s. The main warship of Majapahit navy was the jong. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | After all of the troops had boarded the ships on the coast, the Yuan army battled the Javanese fleet. After repelling it, they sailed back to Quanzhou. Javanese naval commander Aria Adikara intercepted a further Mongol invasion.: 145 : 107–110 Although with only scarce information, travellers passing the region, such as Ibn Battuta and Odoric of Pordenone noted that Java had been attacked by the Mongols several times, always ending in failure. After those failed invasions, Majapahit empire quickly grew and became the dominant naval power in the 14–15th century. The usage of cannons in the Mongol invasion of Java,: 245 led to deployment of cetbang cannons by Majapahit fleet in 1300s. The main warship of Majapahit navy was the jong. The jongs were large transport ships which could carry 100–2000 tons of cargo and 50–1000 people, 28.99–88.56 meter in length.: 60–62 The exact number of jong fielded by Majapahit is unknown, but the largest number of jong deployed in an expedition is about 400 jongs, when Majapahit attacked Pasai, in 1350. In this era, even to the 17th century, the Nusantaran naval soldiers fought on a platform on their ships called balai and performed boarding actions. Scattershots fired from cetbang are used to counter this type of fighting, fired at personnel.: 241 : 162
In the 12th century, China's first permanent standing navy was established by the Southern Song dynasty, the headquarters of the Admiralty stationed at Dinghai. This came about after the conquest of northern China by the Jurchen people (see Jin dynasty) in 1127, while the Song imperial court fled south from Kaifeng to Hangzhou. Equipped with the magnetic compass and knowledge of Shen Kuo's famous treatise (on the concept of true north), the Chinese became proficient experts of navigation in their day. They raised their naval strength from a mere 11 squadrons of 3,000 marines to 20 squadrons of 52,000 marines in a century's time.
Employing paddle wheel crafts and trebuchets throwing gunpowder bombs from the decks of their ships, the Southern Song dynasty became a formidable foe to the Jin dynasty during the 12th–13th centuries during the Jin–Song Wars. There were naval engagements at the Battle of Caishi and Battle of Tangdao. With a powerful navy, China dominated maritime trade throughout South East Asia as well. Until 1279, the Song were able to use their naval power to defend against the Jin to the north, until the Mongols finally conquered all of China. After the Song dynasty, the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty of China was a powerful maritime force in the Indian Ocean.
The Yuan emperor Kublai Khan attempted to invade Japan twice with large fleets (of both Mongols and Chinese), in 1274 and again in 1281, both attempts being unsuccessful (see Mongol invasions of Japan). Building upon the technological achievements of the earlier Song dynasty, the Mongols also employed early cannons upon the decks of their ships.
While Song China built its naval strength, the Japanese also had considerable naval prowess. The strength of Japanese naval forces could be seen in the Genpei War, in the large-scale Battle of Dan-no-ura on 25 April 1185. The forces of Minamoto no Yoshitsune were 850 ships strong, while Taira no Munemori had 500 ships.
In the mid-14th century, the rebel leader Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398) seized power in the south amongst many other rebel groups. His early success was due to capable officials such as Liu Bowen and Jiao Yu, and their gunpowder weapons (see Huolongjing). Yet the decisive battle that cemented his success and his founding of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) was the Battle of Lake Poyang, considered one of the largest naval battles in history.: 228–231
In the 15th century, the Chinese admiral Zheng He was assigned to assemble a massive fleet for several diplomatic missions abroad, sailing throughout the waters of the South East Pacific and the Indian Ocean. During his missions, on several occasions Zheng's fleet came into conflict with pirates. Zheng's fleet also became involved in a conflict in Sri Lanka, where the King of Ceylon traveled back to Ming China afterwards to make a formal apology to the Yongle Emperor.
The Ming imperial navy defeated a Portuguese navy led by Martim Afonso de Sousa in 1522. The Chinese destroyed one vessel by targeting its gunpowder magazine, and captured another Portuguese ship. A Ming army and navy led by Koxinga defeated a western power, the Dutch East India Company, at the Siege of Fort Zeelandia, the first time China had defeated a western power. The Chinese used cannons and ships to bombard the Dutch into surrendering.
In the Sengoku period of Japan, Oda Nobunaga unified the country by military power. However, he was defeated by the Mōri clan's navy. Nobunaga invented the Tekkosen (large Atakebune equipped with iron plates) and defeated 600 ships of the Mōri navy with six armored warships (Battle of Kizugawaguchi). The navy of Nobunaga and his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi employed clever close-range tactics on land with arquebus rifles, but also relied upon close-range firing of muskets in grapple-and-board style naval engagements. When Nobunaga died in the Honnō-ji incident, Hideyoshi succeeded him and completed the unification of the whole country. In 1592, Hideyoshi ordered the daimyōs to dispatch troops to Joseon Korea to conquer Ming China. The Japanese army which landed at Pusan on 12 April 1502 occupied Seoul within a month. The Korean king escaped to the northern region of the Korean peninsula and Japan completed occupation of Pyongyang in June. The Korean navy then led by Admiral Yi Sun-sin defeated the Japanese navy in consecutive naval battles, namely Okpo, Sacheon, Tangpo and Tanghangpo. The Battle of Hansando on 14 August 1592 resulted in a decisive victory for Korea over the Japanese navy. In this battle, 47 Japanese warships were sunk and 12 other ships were captured whilst no Korean warship was lost. The defeats in the sea prevented the Japanese navy from providing their army with appropriate supply.
Yi Sun-sin was later replaced with Admiral Won Gyun, whose fleets faced a defeat. The Japanese army, based near Busan, overwhelmed the Korean navy in the Battle of Chilcheollyang on 28 August 1597 and began advancing toward China. This attempt was stopped when the reappointed Admiral Yi, won the battle of Myeongnyang.
The Wanli Emperor of Ming China sent military forces to the Korean peninsula. Yi Sun-sin and Chen Lin continued to successfully engage the Japanese navy with 500 Chinese warships and the strengthened Korean fleet. In 1598, the planned conquest in China was canceled by the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the Japanese military retreated from the Korean Peninsula. On their way back to Japan, Yi Sun-sin and Chen Lin attacked the Japanese navy at the Battle of Noryang inflicting heavy damages, but the Chinese top official Deng Zilong and the Korean commander Yi Sun-sin were killed in a Japanese army counterattack. The rest of the Japanese army returned to Japan by the end of December. In 1609, the Tokugawa shogunate ordered the abandonment of warships to the feudal lord. The Japanese navy stagnated until the Meiji period.
Ancient and Medieval China: In ancient China, the first known naval battles took place during the Warring States period (481–221 BC) when vassal lords battled one another. Chinese naval warfare in this period featured grapple-and-hook, as well as ramming tactics with ships called "stomach strikers" and "colliding swoopers". It was written in the Han dynasty that the people of the Warring States era had employed chuan ge ships (dagger-axe ships, or halberd ships), thought to be a simple description of ships manned by marines carrying dagger-axe halberds as personal weapons.
The 3rd-century writer Zhang Yan asserted that the people of the Warring States period named the boats this way because halberd blades were actually fixed and attached to the hull of the ship in order to rip into the hull of another ship while ramming, to stab enemies in the water that had fallen overboard and were swimming, or simply to clear any possible dangerous marine animals in the path of the ship (since the ancient Chinese did believe in sea monsters; see Xu Fu for more info).
Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–207 BC), owed much of his success in unifying southern China to naval power, although an official navy was not yet established (see Medieval Asia section below). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | The 3rd-century writer Zhang Yan asserted that the people of the Warring States period named the boats this way because halberd blades were actually fixed and attached to the hull of the ship in order to rip into the hull of another ship while ramming, to stab enemies in the water that had fallen overboard and were swimming, or simply to clear any possible dangerous marine animals in the path of the ship (since the ancient Chinese did believe in sea monsters; see Xu Fu for more info).
Qin Shi Huang, the first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–207 BC), owed much of his success in unifying southern China to naval power, although an official navy was not yet established (see Medieval Asia section below). The people of the Zhou dynasty were known to use temporary pontoon bridges for general means of transportation, but it was during the Qin and Han dynasties that large permanent pontoon bridges were assembled and used in warfare (first written account of a pontoon bridge in the West being the oversight of the Greek Mandrocles of Samos in aiding a military campaign of Persian emperor Darius I over the Bosporus).
During the Han dynasty (202 BC–220 AD), the Chinese began using the stern-mounted steering rudder, and they also designed a new ship type, the junk. From the late Han dynasty to the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 AD), large naval battles such as the Battle of Red Cliffs marked the advancement of naval warfare in the East. In the latter engagement, the allied forces of Sun Quan and Liu Bei destroyed a large fleet commanded by Cao Cao in a fire-based naval attack.
In terms of seafaring abroad, arguably one of the first Chinese to sail into the Indian Ocean and to reach Sri Lanka and India by sea was the Buddhist monk Faxian in the early 5th century, although diplomatic ties and land trade to Persia and India were established during the earlier Han dynasty. However, Chinese naval maritime influence would penetrate into the Indian Ocean until the medieval period.
Early modern: The late Middle Ages saw the development of the cogs, caravels and carracks ships capable of surviving the tough conditions of the open ocean, with enough backup systems and crew expertise to make long voyages routine. In addition, they grew from 100 tons to 300 tons displacement, enough to carry cannon as armament and still have space for cargo. One of the largest ships of the time, the Great Harry, displaced over 1,500 tons.
The voyages of discovery were fundamentally commercial rather than military in nature, although the line was sometimes blurry in that a country's ruler was not above funding exploration for personal profit, nor was it a problem to use military power to enhance that profit. Later the lines gradually separated, in that the ruler's motivation in using the navy was to protect private enterprise so that they could pay more taxes.
Like the Egyptian Shia-Fatimids and Mamluks, the Sunni-Islamic Ottoman Empire centered in modern-day Turkey dominated the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The Ottomans built a powerful navy, rivaling the Italian city-state of Venice during the Ottoman–Venetian War (1499–1503).
Although they were sorely defeated in the Battle of Lepanto (1571) by the Holy League, the Ottomans soon rebuilt their naval strength, and afterwards successfully defended the island of Cyprus so that it would stay in Ottoman hands. However, with the concurrent Age of Discovery, Europe had far surpassed the Ottoman Empire, and successfully bypassed their reliance on land-trade by discovering maritime routes around Africa and towards the Americas.
The first naval action in defense of the new colonies was just ten years after Vasco da Gama's epochal landing in India. In March 1508, a combined Gujarati/Egyptian force surprised a Portuguese squadron at Chaul, and only two Portuguese ships escaped. The following February, the Portuguese viceroy destroyed the allied fleet at Diu, confirming Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean.
In 1582, the Battle of Ponta Delgada in the Azores, in which a Spanish-Portuguese fleet defeated a combined French and Portuguese force, with some English direct support, thus ending the Portuguese succession crisis, was the first battle fought in mid-Atlantic.
In 1588, Spanish King Philip II sent his Armada to subdue the English fleet of Elizabeth, but Admiral Sir Charles Howard defeated the Armada, marking the rise to prominence of the English Royal Navy. However it was unable to follow up with a decisive blow against the Spanish navy, which remained the most important for another half century. After the war's end in 1604 the English fleet went through a time of relative neglect and decline.
In the 16th century, the Barbary states of North Africa rose to power, becoming a dominant naval power in the Mediterranean Sea due to the Barbary pirates. The coastal villages and towns of Italy, Spain and Mediterranean islands were frequently attacked, and long stretches of the Italian and Spanish coasts were almost completely abandoned by their inhabitants; after 1600 Barbary pirates occasionally entered the Atlantic and struck as far north as Iceland.
According to Robert Davis as many as 1.25 million Europeans were captured by Barbary pirates and sold as slaves in North Africa and the Ottoman Empire between the 16th and 19th centuries. These slaves were captured mainly from seaside villages in Italy, Spain and Portugal, and from farther places like France, England, the Netherlands, Ireland and even Iceland and North America. The Barbary pirates were also able to successfully defeat and capture many European ships, largely due to advances in sailing technology by the Barbary states. The earliest naval trawler, xebec and windward ships were employed by the Barbary pirates from the 16th century.
From the middle of the 17th century competition between the expanding English and Dutch commercial fleets came to a head in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the first wars to be conducted entirely at sea. Most memorable of these battles was the raid on the Medway, in which the Dutch admiral Michiel de Ruyter sailed up the river Thames, and destroyed most of the British fleet. This remains the greatest English naval defeat, and established Dutch supremacy at sea for over half a century. Very few ships were sunk in naval combat during the Anglo-Dutch wars, as it was difficult to hit ships below the water level; the water surface deflected cannonballs, and the few holes produced could be patched quickly. Naval cannonades damaged men and sails more than they sunk ships.
Late modern:
18th century: The 18th century developed into a period of seemingly continuous international wars, each larger than the last. At sea, the British and French were bitter rivals; the French aided the fledgling United States in the American Revolutionary War, but their strategic purpose was to capture territory in India and the West Indies – which they did not achieve. In the Baltic Sea, the final attempt to revive the Swedish Empire led to Gustav III's Russian War, with its grande finale at the Second Battle of Svensksund. The battle, unrivaled in size until the 20th century, was a decisive Swedish tactical victory, but it resulted in little strategical result, due to poor army performance and previous lack of initiative from the Swedes, and the war ended with no territorial changes.
Even the change of government due to the French Revolution seemed to intensify rather than diminish the rivalry, and the Napoleonic Wars included a series of legendary naval battles, culminating in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, by which Admiral Horatio Nelson broke the power of the French and Spanish fleets, but lost his own life in so doing.
19th century: Trafalgar ushered in the Pax Britannica of the 19th century, marked by general peace in the world's oceans, under the ensigns of the Royal Navy. But the period was one of intensive experimentation with new technology; steam power for ships appeared in the 1810s, improved metallurgy and machining technique produced larger and deadlier guns, and the development of explosive shells, capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow, in turn required the addition of iron armour.
Although naval power during the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties established China as a major world seapower in the East, the Qing dynasty lacked an official standing navy. They were more interested in pouring funds into military ventures closer to home (China proper), such as Mongolia, Tibet, and Central Asia (modern Xinjiang). However, there were some considerable naval conflicts involving the Qing navy before the First Opium War (such as the Battle of Penghu, and the capture of Formosa from Ming loyalists).
The Qing navy proved woefully undermatched during the First and Second Opium Wars, leaving China open to de facto foreign domination; portions of the Chinese coastline were placed under Western and Japanese spheres of influence. The Qing government responded to its defeat in the Opium Wars by attempting to modernize the Chinese navy; placing several contracts in European shipyards for modern warships. The result of these developments was the Beiyang Fleet, which was dealt a severe blow by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).
The battle between CSS Virginia and USS Monitor in the American Civil War was a duel of ironclads that symbolized the changing times. The first fleet action between ironclad ships was fought in 1866 at the Battle of Lissa between the navies of Austria and Italy. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | The Qing navy proved woefully undermatched during the First and Second Opium Wars, leaving China open to de facto foreign domination; portions of the Chinese coastline were placed under Western and Japanese spheres of influence. The Qing government responded to its defeat in the Opium Wars by attempting to modernize the Chinese navy; placing several contracts in European shipyards for modern warships. The result of these developments was the Beiyang Fleet, which was dealt a severe blow by the Imperial Japanese Navy in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895).
The battle between CSS Virginia and USS Monitor in the American Civil War was a duel of ironclads that symbolized the changing times. The first fleet action between ironclad ships was fought in 1866 at the Battle of Lissa between the navies of Austria and Italy. Because the decisive moment of the battle occurred when the Austrian flagship SMS Erzherzog Ferdinand Max successfully sank the Italian flagship Re d'Italia by ramming, in subsequent decade every navy in the world largely focused on ramming as the main tactic. The last known use of ramming in a naval battle was in 1915, when HMS Dreadnought rammed the (surfaced) German submarine, U-29. The last surface ship sunk by ramming happened in 1879 when the Peruvian ship Huáscar rammed the Chilean ship Esmeralda. The last known warship equipped with a ram was launched in 1908, the German light cruiser SMS Emden.
With the advent of the steamship, it became possible to create massive gun platforms and to provide them with heavy armor resulting in the first modern battleships. The Battles of Santiago de Cuba and Tsushima demonstrated the power of these ships.
20th century: In the early 20th century, the modern battleship emerged: a steel-armored ship, entirely dependent on steam propulsion, with a main battery of uniform caliber guns mounted in turrets on the main deck. This type was pioneered in 1906 with HMS Dreadnought which mounted a main battery of ten 12-inch (300 mm) guns instead of the mixed caliber main battery of previous designs. Along with her main battery, Dreadnought and her successors retained a secondary battery for use against smaller ships like destroyers and torpedo boats and, later, aircraft.
Dreadnought style battleships dominated fleets in the early 20th century. They would play major parts in both the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. The Russo-Japanese War saw the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy after their underdog victory against the waning Imperial Russian Navy at the Battle of Tsushima; while WWI pitted the old Royal Navy against the new Kaiserliche Marine of Imperial Germany, culminating in the 1916 Battle of Jutland. The future was heralded when the seaplane carrier HMS Engadine and her Short 184 seaplanes joined the battle. In the Black Sea, Russian seaplanes flying from a fleet of converted carriers interdicted Turkish maritime supply routes, Allied air patrols began to counter German U-boat activity in Britain's coastal waters, and a British Short 184 carried out the first successful torpedo attack on a ship.
In 1918 the Royal Navy converted an Italian liner to create the first aircraft carrier, HMS Argus, and shortly after the war the first purpose-built carrier, HMS Hermes was launched. Many nations agreed to the Washington Naval Treaty and scrapped many of their battleships and cruisers while still in the shipyards, but the growing tensions of the 1930s restarted the building programs, with even larger ships. The Yamato-class battleships, the largest ever, displaced 72,000 tons and mounted 18.1-inch (460 mm) guns.
The victory of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Taranto was a pivotal point as this was the first true demonstration of naval air power. The importance of naval air power was further reinforced by the Attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced the United States to enter World War II. Nevertheless, in both Taranto and Pearl Harbor, the aircraft mainly attacked stationary battleships. The sinking of the British battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, which were in full combat manoeuvring at the time of the attack, finally marked the end of the battleship era. Aircraft and their transportation, the aircraft carrier, came to the fore.
During the Pacific War of World War II, battleships and cruisers spent most of their time escorting aircraft carriers and bombarding shore positions, while the carriers and their airplanes were the stars of the Battle of the Coral Sea, Battle of Midway, Battle of the Eastern Solomons, Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and Battle of the Philippine Sea. The engagements between battleships and cruisers, such as the Battle of Savo Island and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, were limited to night-time actions in order to avoid exposure to air attacks. Nevertheless, battleships played the key role again in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, even though it happened after the major carrier battles, mainly because the Japanese carrier fleet was by then essentially depleted. It was the last naval battle between battleships in history. Air power remained key to navies throughout the 20th century, moving to jets launched from ever-larger carriers, and augmented by cruisers armed with guided missiles and cruise missiles.
Roughly parallel to the development of naval aviation was the development of submarines to attack underneath the surface. At first, the ships were capable of only short dives, but they eventually developed the capability to spend weeks or months underwater powered by nuclear reactors. In both world wars, submarines (U-boats in Germany) primarily exerted their power by using torpedoes to sink merchant ships and other warships. In the 1950s, the Cold War inspired the development of ballistic missile submarines, each loaded with dozens of thermonuclear weapon-armed SLBMs and with orders to launch them from sea if the other nation attacked.
Against the backdrop of those developments, World War II had seen the United States become the world's dominant sea power. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, the United States Navy maintained a tonnage greater than that of the next 17 largest navies combined.
The aftermath of World War II saw naval gunnery supplanted by ship to ship missiles as the primary weapon of surface combatants. Two major naval battles have taken place since World War II.
The Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 was the first major naval war post World War II. It saw the dispatch of an Indian aircraft carrier group, heavy utilisation of missile boats in naval operations, total naval blockade of Pakistan by the Indian Navy and the annihilation of almost half of Pakistan's Navy. By the end of the war, the damage inflicted by the Indian Navy and Air Forces on Pakistan's Navy stood at two destroyers, one submarine, one minesweeper, three patrol vessels, seven gunboats, eighteen cargo, supply and communication vessels, as well as large-scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks located in the major port city of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships, Anwar Baksh, Pasni, and Madhumathi, and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1,900 personnel were lost, while 1,413 servicemen (mostly officers) were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. The Indian Navy lost 18 officers and 194 sailors and a frigate, while another frigate was badly damaged and a Breguet Alizé naval aircraft was shot down by the Pakistan Air Force.
In the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom, a Royal Navy task force of approximately 100 ships was dispatched over 7,000 miles (11,000 km) from the British mainland to the South Atlantic. The British were outnumbered in theatre airpower with only 36 Harriers from their two aircraft carriers and a few helicopters, compared with at least 200 aircraft of the Fuerza Aérea Argentina, although London dispatched Vulcan bombers in a display of long-distance strategic capacity. Most of the land-based aircraft of the Royal Air Force were not available due to the distance from air bases. This reliance on aircraft at sea showed the importance of the aircraft carrier. The Falklands War showed the vulnerability of modern ships to sea-skimming missiles like the Exocet. One hit from an Exocet sank HMS Sheffield, a modern anti-air warfare destroyer. Over half of Argentine deaths in the war occurred when the nuclear submarine Conqueror torpedoed and sank the light cruiser ARA General Belgrano with the loss of 323 lives. Important lessons about ship design, damage control and ship construction materials were learnt from the conflict.
21st century: At the present time, large naval wars are seldom-seen affairs, since nations with substantial navies rarely fight each other; most wars are civil wars or some form of asymmetrical warfare, fought on land, sometimes with the involvement of military aircraft. The main function of the modern navy is to exploit its control of the seaways to project power ashore. Power projection has been the primary naval feature of most late-century conflicts including the Korean War, Suez Crisis, Vietnam War, Konfrontasi, Gulf War, Kosovo War, the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. A major exception to that trend was the Sri Lankan Civil War, which saw a large number of surface engagements between the belligerents involving fast attack craft and other littoral warfare units.
The lack of large fleet-on-fleet actions does not, however, mean that naval warfare has ceased to feature in modern conflicts. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | 21st century: At the present time, large naval wars are seldom-seen affairs, since nations with substantial navies rarely fight each other; most wars are civil wars or some form of asymmetrical warfare, fought on land, sometimes with the involvement of military aircraft. The main function of the modern navy is to exploit its control of the seaways to project power ashore. Power projection has been the primary naval feature of most late-century conflicts including the Korean War, Suez Crisis, Vietnam War, Konfrontasi, Gulf War, Kosovo War, the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. A major exception to that trend was the Sri Lankan Civil War, which saw a large number of surface engagements between the belligerents involving fast attack craft and other littoral warfare units.
The lack of large fleet-on-fleet actions does not, however, mean that naval warfare has ceased to feature in modern conflicts. The bombing of the USS Cole on October 12, 2000, claimed the lives of seventeen sailors, wounded an additional thirty-seven, and cost the Cole fourteen months of repairs. Though the attack did not eliminate the United States' control of the local seas, in the short-term, it did prompt the US Navy to reduce its visits to far-flung ports, as military planners struggled to ensure their security. This reduced US Naval presence was ultimately reversed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, as part of the Global War on Terrorism.
Even in the absence of major wars, warships from opposing navies clash periodically at sea, sometimes with fatal results. For example, 46 sailors drowned in the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, which South Korea and the United States blamed on a North Korean torpedo attack. North Korea, in turn, denied all responsibility, accused South Korea of violating North Korean territorial waters, and offered to send its own team of investigators to "examine the evidence."
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the armed forces of both Russia and Ukraine have openly targeted and destroyed each other's ships. Though many of these are supporting vessels, such as landing ships, tugs, and patrol boats, several larger warships have also been destroyed. Notably, the Ukrainian Navy scuttled its flagship, the frigate Hetman Sahaidachny, to prevent its capture, while the patrol ship Sloviansk was sunken by Russian air attack. The Russian Navy lost the flagship of its Black Sea Fleet, the Moskva, in what the Ukrainian Navy has claimed as a successful Neptune anti-ship missile strike. The Russian Navy, while not admitting to the Ukrainian claims of a missile attack, has confirmed the sinking of the Moskva. As of May 2022, the naval war between Russia and Ukraine is ongoing, as the Russian Navy attempts to dominate Black Sea trade routes, and the Ukrainian Military attempts to erode Russian naval control.
Naval history of nations and empires:
See also:
References:
Sources: Shen, Fuwei (1996). Cultural Flow Between China and the Outside World. China Books & Periodicals. ISBN 978-7-119-00431-0
Needham, Joseph (1986). Science and Civilization in China. Volume 4, Part 3. Taipei: Caves Books, Ltd.
Further reading: Holmes, Richard, et al., eds. The Oxford companion to military history (Oxford University Press, 2001), global.
Howarth, David British Sea Power: How Britain Became Sovereign of the Seas (2003), 320 pp. from 1066 to present
Padfield, Peter. Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World: Naval Campaigns That Shaped the Modern World 1852-2001 (2009)
Potter, E. B. Sea Power: A Naval History (1982), world history
Rodger, Nicholas A.M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. Vol. 2. (WW Norton & Company, 2005).
Rönnby, J. 2019. On War On Board: Archaeological and Historical Perspectives on Early Modern Maritime Violence and Warfare. Södertörn Archaeological Studies 15. Södertörn Högskola.
Sondhaus, Lawrence. Naval Warfare, 1815–1914 (2001).
Starr, Chester. The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History (1989)
Tucker, Spencer, ed. Naval Warfare: An International Encyclopedia (3 vol. Cambridge UP, 2002); 1231 pp; 1500 articles by many experts cover 2500 years of world naval history, esp. battles, commanders, technology, strategies and tactics,
Tucker, Spencer. Handbook of 19th century naval warfare (Naval Inst Press, 2000).
Willmott, H. P. The Last Century of Sea Power, Volume 1: From Port Arthur to Chanak, 1894–1922 (2009), 568 pp. online in ebrary
Willmott, H. P. The Last Century of Sea Power, vol. 2: From Washington to Tokyo, 1922–1945. (Indiana University Press, 2010). xxii, 679 pp. ISBN 978-0-253-35359-7 online in ebrary
Warships: George, James L. History of warships: From ancient times to the twenty-first century (Naval Inst Press, 1998).
Ireland, Bernard, and Eric Grove. Jane's War at Sea 1897–1997: 100 Years of Jane's Fighting Ships (1997) covers all important ships of all major countries.
Peebles, Hugh B. Warshipbuilding on the Clyde: Naval orders and the prosperity of the Clyde shipbuilding industry, 1889–1939 (John Donald, 1987)
Van der Vat, Dan. Stealth at sea: the history of the submarine (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1995).
Sailors and officers: Conley, Mary A. From Jack Tar to Union Jack: representing naval manhood in the British Empire, 1870–1918 (Manchester UP, 2009)
Hubbard, Eleanor. "Sailors and the Early Modern British Empire: Labor, Nation, and Identity at Sea." History Compass 14.8 (2016): 348–58.
Kemp, Peter. The British Sailor: a social history of the lower deck (1970)
Langley, Harold D. "Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War." Journal of Military History 69.1 (2005): 239.
Ortega-del-Cerro, Pablo, and Juan Hernández-Franco. "Towards a definition of naval elites: reconsidering social change in Britain, France and Spain, c. 1670–1810." European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire (2017): 1–22.
Smith, Simon Mark. "'We Sail the Ocean Blue': British sailors, imperialism, identity, pride and patriotism c. 1890 to 1939" (PhD dissertatation U of Portsmouth, 2017. online
First World War: Bennett, Geoffrey. Naval Battles of the First World War (Pen and Sword, 2014)
Halpern, Paul. A naval history of World War I (Naval Institute Press, 2012).
Hough, Richard. The Great War at Sea, 1914–1918 (Oxford UP, 1987)
Marder, Arthur Jacob. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (4 vol. 1961–70), covers Britain's Royal Navy 1904–1919
O'Hara, Vincent P.; Dickson, W. David; Worth, Richard, eds. To Crown the Waves: The Great Navies of the First World War (2013) excerpt also see detailed review and summary of world's navie before and during the war
Sondhaus, Lawrence The Great War at Sea: A Naval History of the First World War (2014). online review
Second World War: Barnett, Correlli. Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (1991).
Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two (Naval Institute Press, 1985).
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (1963) short version of his 13 volume history.
O'Hara, Vincent. The German Fleet at War, 1939–1945 (Naval Institute Press, 2013).
Roskill, S.K. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945 (United States Naval Institute, 1960); British Royal Navy; abridged version of his Roskill, Stephen Wentworth. The war at sea, 1939–1945 (3 vol. 1960).
Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The Second World War, the US-Japanese Naval War (1941–1945) (2001). |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Naval warfare | Campbell, John. Naval Weapons of World War Two (Naval Institute Press, 1985).
Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (1963) short version of his 13 volume history.
O'Hara, Vincent. The German Fleet at War, 1939–1945 (Naval Institute Press, 2013).
Roskill, S.K. White Ensign: The British Navy at War, 1939–1945 (United States Naval Institute, 1960); British Royal Navy; abridged version of his Roskill, Stephen Wentworth. The war at sea, 1939–1945 (3 vol. 1960).
Van der Vat, Dan. The Pacific Campaign: The Second World War, the US-Japanese Naval War (1941–1945) (2001).
Historiography: Harding, Richard ed., Modern Naval History: Debates and Prospects (London: Bloomsbury, 2015)
Higham, John, ed. A Guide to the Sources of British Military History (2015) 654 pp. excerpt
Messenger, Charles. Reader's Guide to Military History (Routledge, 2013) comprehensive guide to historical books on global military & naval history.
Zurndorfer, Harriet. "Oceans of history, seas of change: recent revisionist writing in western languages about China and East Asian maritime history during the period 1500–1630." International Journal of Asian Studies 13.1 (2016): 61–94. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Navy | Etymology and meanings: First attested in English in the early 14th century, the word "navy" came via Old French navie, "fleet of ships", from the Latin navigium, "a vessel, a ship, bark, boat", from navis, "ship". The word "naval" came from Latin navalis, "pertaining to ship"; cf. Greek ναῦς (naus), "ship", ναύτης (nautes), "seaman, sailor". The earliest attested form of the word is in the Mycenaean Greek compound word 𐀙𐀄𐀈𐀗, na-u-do-mo (*naudomoi), "shipbuilders", written in Linear B syllabic script.
The word formerly denoted fleets of both commercial and military nature. In modern usage "navy" used alone always denotes a military fleet, although the term "merchant navy" for a commercial fleet still incorporates the non-military word sense. This overlap in word senses between commercial and military fleets grew out of the inherently dual-use nature of fleets; centuries ago, nationality was a trait that unified a fleet across both civilian and military uses. Although nationality of commercial vessels has little importance in peacetime trade other than for tax avoidance, it can have greater meaning during wartime, when supply chains become matters of patriotic attack and defense, and when in some cases private vessels are even temporarily converted to military vessels. The latter was especially important, and common, before 20th-century military technology existed, when merely adding artillery and naval infantry to any sailing vessel could render it fully as martial as any military-owned vessel. Such privateering has been rendered obsolete in blue-water strategy since modern missile and aircraft systems grew to leapfrog over artillery and infantry in many respects; but privateering nevertheless remains potentially relevant in littoral warfare of a limited and asymmetric nature.
History: Naval warfare developed when humans first fought from water-borne vessels. Before the introduction of the cannon and ships with enough capacity to carry them, navy warfare primarily involved ramming and boarding actions. In the time of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, naval warfare centered on long, narrow vessels powered by banks of oarsmen (such as triremes and quinqueremes) designed to ram and sink enemy vessels or come alongside the enemy vessel so its occupants could be attacked hand-to-hand. Naval warfare continued in this vein through the Middle Ages until the cannon became commonplace and capable of being reloaded quickly enough to be reused in the same battle. In ancient China, large naval battles were known since the Qin dynasty (also see Battle of Red Cliffs, 208), employing the war junk during the Han dynasty. However, China's first official standing navy was not established until the Southern Song dynasty in the 12th century, a time when gunpowder was a revolutionary new application to warfare. The Chola Dynasty in Southern India had a navy composed of trade ships transporting armies overseas. The Chola Navy reached its peak under Rajendra I, and was most notably used in invasions of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.
Nusantaran thalassocracies made extensive use of naval power and technologies. This enabled the seafaring local people (either Malays of Srivijaya or Javanese of Mataram) to attack as far as the coast of Tanzania and Mozambique with 1000 boats and attempted to take the citadel of Qanbaloh, about 7,000 km to their West, in 945–946 AD.: 110 : 39 In 1350 AD Majapahit launched its largest military expedition, the invasion of Pasai, with 400 large jong and innumerable smaller vessels. The second largest military expedition, invasion of Singapura in 1398, Majapahit deployed 300 jong with no less than 200,000 men. The average jong used by Majapahit would be about 76.18–79.81 m LOA, carrying 600–700 men, with 1200–1400 tons deadweight.: 60–62
The mass and deck space required to carry a large number of cannon made oar-based propulsion impossible, and ships came to rely primarily on sails. Warships were designed to carry increasing numbers of cannon and naval tactics evolved to bring a ship's firepower to bear in a broadside, with ships-of-the-line arranged in a line of battle.
The development of large capacity, sail-powered ships carrying cannon led to a rapid expansion of European navies, especially the Spanish and Portuguese navies which dominated in the 16th and early 17th centuries, and helped propel the age of exploration and colonialism. The repulsion of the Spanish Armada (1588) by the English fleet revolutionized naval warfare by the success of a guns-only strategy and caused a major overhaul of the Spanish Navy, partly along English lines, which resulted in even greater dominance by the Spanish. From the beginning of the 17th century the Dutch cannibalized the Portuguese Empire in the East and, with the immense wealth gained, challenged Spanish hegemony at sea. From the 1620s, Dutch raiders seriously troubled Spanish shipping and, after a number of battles which went both ways, the Dutch Navy finally broke the long dominance of the Spanish Navy in the Battle of the Downs (1639).
England emerged as a major naval power in the mid-17th century in the first Anglo-Dutch war with a technical victory. Successive decisive Dutch victories in the second and third Anglo-Dutch Wars confirmed the Dutch mastery of the seas during the Dutch Golden Age, financed by the expansion of the Dutch Empire. The French Navy won some important victories near the end of the 17th century but a focus upon land forces led to the French Navy's relative neglect, which allowed the Royal Navy to emerge with an ever-growing advantage in size and quality, especially in tactics and experience, from 1695. As a response to growing naval influence of the navies of Portuguese, the warrior king of the Marathas, Shivaji laid the foundation of the Maratha navy in 1654.
Throughout the 18th century the Royal Navy gradually gained ascendancy over the French Navy, with victories in the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714), inconclusive battles in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748), victories in the Seven Years' War (1754–1763), a partial reversal during the American War of Independence (1775–1783), and consolidation into uncontested supremacy during the 19th century from the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. These conflicts saw the development and refinement of tactics which came to be called the line of battle.
The next stage in the evolution of naval warfare was the introduction of metal plating along the hull sides. The increased mass required steam-powered engines, resulting in an arms race between armor and weapon thickness and firepower. The first armored vessels, the French Gloire and British HMS Warrior, made wooden vessels obsolete. Another significant improvement came with the invention of the rotating turrets, which allowed the guns to be aimed independently of ship movement. The battle between CSS Virginia and USS Monitor during the American Civil War (1861–1865) is often cited as the beginning of this age of maritime conflict. The Russian Navy was considered the third strongest in the world on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, which turned to be a catastrophe for the Russian military in general and the Russian Navy in particular. Although neither party lacked courage, the Russians were defeated by the Japanese in the Battle of Port Arthur, which was the first time in warfare that mines were used for offensive purposes. The warships of the Baltic Fleet sent to the Far East were lost in the Battle of Tsushima. A further step change in naval firepower occurred when the United Kingdom launched HMS Dreadnought in 1906, but naval tactics still emphasized the line of battle.
The first practical military submarines were developed in the late 19th century and by the end of World War I had proven to be a powerful arm of naval warfare. During World War II, Nazi Germany's submarine fleet of U-boats almost starved the United Kingdom into submission and inflicted tremendous losses on U.S. coastal shipping. The German battleship Tirpitz, a sister ship of Bismarck, was almost put out of action by miniature submarines known as X-Craft. The X-Craft severely damaged her and kept her in port for some months.
A major paradigm shift in naval warfare occurred with the introduction of the aircraft carrier. First at Taranto in 1940 and then at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the carrier demonstrated its ability to strike decisively at enemy ships out of sight and range of surface vessels. The Battle of Leyte Gulf (1944) was arguably the largest naval battle in history; it was also the last battle in which battleships played a significant role. By the end of World War II, the carrier had become the dominant force of naval warfare.
World War II also saw the United States become by far the largest naval power in the world. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the United States Navy possessed over 70% of the world's total numbers and total tonnage of naval vessels of 1,000 tons or greater. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, the United States Navy would maintain a tonnage greater than that of the next 17 largest navies combined. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Navy | First at Taranto in 1940 and then at Pearl Harbor in 1941, the carrier demonstrated its ability to strike decisively at enemy ships out of sight and range of surface vessels. The Battle of Leyte Gulf (1944) was arguably the largest naval battle in history; it was also the last battle in which battleships played a significant role. By the end of World War II, the carrier had become the dominant force of naval warfare.
World War II also saw the United States become by far the largest naval power in the world. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the United States Navy possessed over 70% of the world's total numbers and total tonnage of naval vessels of 1,000 tons or greater. Throughout the rest of the 20th century, the United States Navy would maintain a tonnage greater than that of the next 17 largest navies combined. During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy became a significant armed force, with large numbers of large, heavily armed ballistic missile submarines and extensive use of heavy, long-ranged antisurface missiles to counter the numerous United States carrier battle groups. Only two nations, the United States and France, presently operate CATOBAR carriers of any size, while Russia, China and India operate sizeable STOBAR carriers (although all three are originally of Russian design). The United Kingdom is also operating two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, which are the largest STOVL vessels in service, and India is currently building one aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, and considering another. France is also looking at a new carrier, probably using a CATOBAR system and possibly based on the British Queen Elizabeth design.
Operations: A navy typically operates from one or more naval bases. The base is a port that is specialized in naval operations, and often includes housing, a munitions depot, docks for the vessels, and various repair facilities. During times of war temporary bases may be constructed in closer proximity to strategic locations, as it is advantageous in terms of patrols and station-keeping. Nations with historically strong naval forces have found it advantageous to obtain basing rights in other countries in areas of strategic interest.
Navy ships can operate independently or with a group, which may be a small squadron of comparable ships, or a larger naval fleet of various specialized ships. The commander of a fleet travels in the flagship, which is usually the most powerful vessel in the group. Before radio was invented, commands from the flagship were communicated by means of flags. At night signal lamps could be used for a similar purpose. Later these were replaced by the radio transmitter, or the flashing light when radio silence was needed.
A "blue water navy" is designed to operate far from the coastal waters of its home nation. These are ships capable of maintaining station for long periods of time in deep ocean, and will have a long logistical tail for their support. Many are also nuclear powered to save having to refuel. By contrast a "brown water navy" operates in the coastal periphery and along inland waterways, where larger ocean-going naval vessels can not readily enter. Regional powers may maintain a "green water navy" as a means of localized force projection. Blue water fleets may require specialized vessels, such as minesweepers, when operating in the littoral regions along the coast.
Traditions: A basic tradition is that all ships commissioned in a navy are referred to as ships rather than vessels, with the exception of destroyers and submarines, which are known as boats. The prefix on a ship's name indicates that it is a commissioned ship.An important tradition on board naval vessels of some nations has been the ship's bell. This was historically used to mark the passage of time, as warning devices in heavy fog, and for alarms and ceremonies.
The ship's captain, and more senior officers are "piped" aboard the ship using a Boatswain's call.
In the United States, the First Navy Jack is a flag that has the words, "Don't Tread on Me" on the flag.
By English tradition, ships have been referred to as a "she". However, it was long considered bad luck to permit women to sail on board naval vessels. To do so would invite a terrible storm that would wreck the ship. The only women that were welcomed on board were figureheads mounted on the prow of the ship.
Firing a cannon salute partially disarms the ship, so firing a cannon for no combat reason showed respect and trust. As the tradition evolved, the number of cannon fired became an indication of the rank of the official being saluted.
Naval organization:
Ships: Historically, navy ships were primarily intended for warfare. They were designed to withstand damage and to inflict the same, but only carried munitions and supplies for the voyage (rather than merchant cargo). Often, other ships which were not built specifically for warfare, such as the galleon or the armed merchant ships in World War II, did carry armaments. In more recent times, navy ships have become more specialized and have included supply ships, troop transports, repair ships, oil tankers and other logistics support ships as well as combat ships.
Modern navy combat ships are generally divided into seven main categories: aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines, and amphibious assault ships. There are also support and auxiliary ships, including the oiler, minesweeper, patrol boat, hydrographic and oceanographic survey ship and tender. During the age of sail, the ship categories were divided into the ship of the line, frigate, and sloop-of-war.
Naval ship names are typically prefixed by an abbreviation indicating the national navy in which they serve. For a list of the prefixes used with ship names (HMS, USS, LÉ, etc.) see ship prefix.
Today's warships are significantly faster than in years past, thanks to much improved propulsion systems. Also, the efficiency of the engines has improved, in terms of fuel, and of how many sailors it takes to operate them. In World War II, ships needed to refuel very often. However, today ships can go on very long journeys without refueling. Also, in World War II, the engine room needed about a dozen sailors to work the many engines, however, today, only about 4–5 are needed (depending on the class of the ship). Today, naval strike groups on longer missions are always followed by a range of support and replenishment ships supplying them with anything from fuel and munitions, to medical treatment and postal services. This allows strike groups and combat ships to remain at sea for several months at a time.
Boats: The term "boat" refers to small craft limited in their use by size and usually not capable of making lengthy independent voyages at sea. The old navy adage to differentiate between ships and boats is that boats are capable of being carried by ships. (Submarines by this rule are ships rather than boats, but are customarily referred to as boats reflecting their previous smaller size.)
Navies use many types of boat, ranging from 9-foot (2.7 m) dinghies to 135-foot (41 m) landing craft. They are powered by either diesel engines, out-board gasoline engines, or waterjets. Most boats are built of aluminum, fiberglass, or steel. Rigid-hulled inflatable boats are also used.
Patrol boats are used for patrols of coastal areas, lakes and large rivers.
Landing craft are designed to carry troops, vehicles, or cargo from ship to shore under combat conditions, to unload, to withdraw from the beach, and to return to the ship. They are rugged, with powerful engines, and usually armed. There are many types in today's navies including hovercraft. They will typically have a power-operated bow ramp, a cargo well and after structures that house engine rooms, pilot houses, and stowage compartments. These boats are sometimes carried by larger ships.
Special operations craft are high-speed craft used for insertion and extraction of special forces personnel and some may be transportable (and deployed) by air.
Boats used in non-combat roles include lifeboats, mail boats, line handling boats, buoy boats, aircraft rescue boats, torpedo retrievers, explosive ordnance disposal craft, utility boats, dive boats, targets, and work boats. Boats are also used for survey work, tending divers, and minesweeping operations. Boats for carrying cargo and personnel are sometimes known as launches, gigs, barges or shore party boats.
Units: Naval forces are typically arranged into units based on the number of ships included, a single ship being the smallest operational unit. Ships may be combined into squadrons or flotillas, which may be formed into fleets. The largest unit size may be the whole Navy or Admiralty.
A task force can be assembled using ships from different fleets for an operational task.
Personnel: Despite their acceptance in many areas of naval service, female sailors were not permitted to serve on board U.S. submarines until the U.S. Navy lifted the ban in April 2010. The major reasons historically cited by the U.S. Navy were the extended duty tours and close conditions which afford almost no privacy. The United Kingdom's Royal Navy has had similar restrictions. Australia, Canada, Norway, and Spain previously opened submarine service to women sailors.
Ranks: A navy will typically have two sets of ranks, one for enlisted personnel and one for officers. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Navy | Ships may be combined into squadrons or flotillas, which may be formed into fleets. The largest unit size may be the whole Navy or Admiralty.
A task force can be assembled using ships from different fleets for an operational task.
Personnel: Despite their acceptance in many areas of naval service, female sailors were not permitted to serve on board U.S. submarines until the U.S. Navy lifted the ban in April 2010. The major reasons historically cited by the U.S. Navy were the extended duty tours and close conditions which afford almost no privacy. The United Kingdom's Royal Navy has had similar restrictions. Australia, Canada, Norway, and Spain previously opened submarine service to women sailors.
Ranks: A navy will typically have two sets of ranks, one for enlisted personnel and one for officers.
Typical ranks for commissioned officers include the following, in ascending order (Commonwealth ranks are listed first on each line; USA ranks are listed second in those instances where they differ from Commonwealth ranks):
Midshipman / Ensign / Corvette Lieutenant
Sub Lieutenant / Lieutenant Junior Grade / Frigate Lieutenant
Lieutenant (Commonwealth & USA)/ Ship-of-the-Line Lieutenant / Captain Lieutenant
Lieutenant Commander (Commonwealth & USA)/ Corvette Captain
Commander (Commonwealth & USA)/ Frigate Captain
Captain (Commonwealth & USA)/ Ship-of-the-Line Captain
Commodore / Flotilla Admiral (in USA only: Rear Admiral (lower half))
Rear Admiral (in USA only: Rear Admiral (upper half))
Vice Admiral (Commonwealth & USA)
Admiral (Commonwealth & USA)
Admiral of the Fleet (Commonwealth) / Fleet Admiral (USA) / Grand Admiral
"Flag officers" include any rank that includes the word "admiral" (or commodore in services other than the US Navy), and are generally in command of a battle group, strike group or similar flotilla of ships, rather than a single ship or aspect of a ship. However, commodores can also be temporary or honorary positions. For example, during World War II, a Navy captain was assigned duty as a convoy commodore, which meant that he was still a captain, but in charge of all the merchant vessels in the convoy.
The most senior rank employed by a navy will tend to vary depending on the size of the navy and whether it is wartime or peacetime, for example, few people have ever held the rank of Fleet Admiral in the U.S. Navy, the chief of the Royal Australian Navy holds the rank of Vice Admiral, and the chief of the Irish Naval Service holds the rank of Commodore.
Naval infantry: Naval infantry, commonly known as marines, are a category of infantry that form part of a state's naval forces and perform roles on land and at sea, including amphibious operations, as well as other, naval roles. They also perform other tasks, including land warfare, separate from naval operations.
During the era of the Roman empire, naval forces included marine legionaries for maritime boarding actions. These were troops primarily trained in land warfare, and did not need to be skilled at handling a ship. Much later during the age of sail, a component of marines served a similar role, being ship-borne soldiers who were used either during boarding actions, as sharp-shooters, or in raids along shorelines.
The Spanish Infantería de Marina was formed in 1537, making it the oldest, current marine force in the world. The British Royal Marines combine being both a ship-based force and also being specially trained in commando frogman-style operations and tactics, operating in some cases separately from the rest of the Royal Navy. The Royal Marines also have their own special forces unit.
In the majority of countries, the marine force is an integral part of the navy but there are variations such as the French Troupes de marine which is actually part of the French Army. The United States Marine Corps is a separate armed service within the United States Department of the Navy, with its own leadership structure.
Naval aviation: Naval aviation is the application of military air power by navies, whether from warships that embark aircraft, or land bases.
In World War I several navies used floatplanes and flying boats - mainly for scouting. By World War II, aircraft carriers could carry bomber aircraft capable of attacking naval and land targets, as well as fighter aircraft for defence. Since World War II helicopters have been embarked on smaller ships in roles such as anti-submarine warfare and transport. Some navies have also operated land-based aircraft in roles such as maritime patrol and training.
Naval aviation forces primarily perform naval roles at sea. However, they are also used in a variety of other roles.
Further reading: Non-fiction:
Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft and Systems - Naval Institute Press. Published annually. Comprehensive.
Braudel, Fernand, The Mediterranean in the Ancient World
Corbett, Sir Julian, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1911.
Hughes Jr., Wayne P., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 1999, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-55750-392-3
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. New York: Scribner, 1976. ISBN 0-394-54674-1
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 1918, Little Brown, Boston.
Marder, Arthur. The Anatomy of British Seapower. New York: Octagon Books, 1940.
Marder, Arthur. "The Influence of History on Sea Power: The Royal Navy and the Lessons of 1914-1918", Pacific Historical Review. November, 1972.
Richmond, Herbert. National Policy and National Strength and other Essays. London: Longman, Green and Co., 1928.
Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy ... 1918-1922. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.
Starr, Chester G., The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, 1989, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-505666-3
Tangredi, Sam, "Globalization and Maritime Power", 2002 - National Defense University, ISBN 1-57906-060-9
Trafalgar 200 Through the Lens, ISBN 0-9553004-0-1
Wombacher, Joerg and Joerg Felfe. (2012) United We Are Strong: An Investigation into Sense of Community among Navy Crews, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 38, No. 4
Woolley, Peter J. "The Role of Strategy in Great Power Decline", Naval War College Review. Vol. XLIX, no. 1 (1996). ISBN 1-884733-06-9
Fiction:
Alan Lewrie series by Dewey Lambdin
Aubrey–Maturin series by Patrick O'Brian
Horatio Hornblower series by C. S. Forester
Richard Bolitho series by Alexander Kent (Pseudonym of Douglas Reeman)
Tom Clancy, The Hunt for Red October, Red Storm Rising
See also: Blue-water navy
Coast guard
List of auxiliary ship classes in service
List of countries by level of military equipment
List of naval battles
List of naval ship classes in service
List of navies
List of submarine classes in service
Marines
Naval fleet
Naval militia
Naval tactics
Naval warfare
Navies of landlocked countries
Shore patrol
Notes:
References:
External links:
Naval Technology - News, projects, images and white papers on the naval industry
NOSI (Naval Open Source Intelligence) - a library of world naval operational news
Navy at Scottish Military Heritage Centre
"Navy, The" . Collier's New Encyclopedia. 1921.
Hannay, David McDowall (1911). "Navy" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. 19 (11th ed.). pp. 299–317. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Network-centric warfare | Background and history: In 1996, Admiral William Owens introduced the concept of a 'system of systems' in a paper published by the Institute for National Security Studies in the United States. He described a system of intelligence sensors, command and control systems, and precision weapons that provided situational awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment.
Also in 1996, the United States' Joint Chiefs of Staff released Joint Vision 2010, which introduced the military concept of full-spectrum dominance. Full Spectrum Dominance described the ability of the US military to dominate the battlespace from peace operations through to the outright application of military power that stemmed from the advantages of information superiority.
Network Centric Warfare: The term "network-centric warfare" and associated concepts first appeared in the United States Department of Navy's publication, "Copernicus: C4ISR for the 21st Century." The ideas of networking sensors, commanders, and shooters to flatten the hierarchy, reduce the operational pause, enhance precision, and increase speed of command were captured in this document. As a distinct concept, however, network-centric warfare first appeared publicly in a 1998 US Naval Institute Proceedings article by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka. However, the first complete articulation of the idea was contained in the book Network Centric Warfare : Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority by David S. Alberts, John Garstka and Frederick Stein, published by the Command and Control Research Program (CCRP). This book derived a new theory of warfare from a series of case studies on how business was using information and communication technologies to improve situation analysis, accurately control inventory and production, as well as monitor customer relations.
The information revolution has permeated the military world as well, with network-centric warfare replacing traditional combat methods. Technology is now at the forefront of battlefields, creating a new era of warfare - network-centric.
It's a new level of communication and coordination through what is known as tactical interoperability. From human soldiers to smart weapon systems, command & control systems, automatic sentry systems, and platforms on land, air, and space - all these elements are seamlessly connected in a single communication fabric, with encompass battle management systems for all services, catering to individuals from General HQs to soldiers on the field.
Understanding Information Age Warfare: Network-centric warfare was followed in 2001 by Understanding Information Age Warfare (UIAW), jointly authored by Alberts, Garstka, Richard Hayes of Evidence Based Research and David A. Signori of RAND. UIAW pushed the implications of the shifts identified by network-centric warfare in order to derive an operational theory of warfare.
Starting with a series of premises on how the environment is sensed, UIAW describes three domains. The first is a physical domain, where events take place and are perceived by sensors and people. Data emerging from the physical domain is transmitted through an information domain. It is processed in a cognitive domain before being acted upon.
The process is similar to a "observe, orient, decide, act" loop described by Col. John Boyd of the USAF.
Power to the Edge: The last publication dealing with the developing theory of network centric warfare appeared in 2003 with Power to the Edge, also published by the CCRP. Power to the Edge is a speculative work suggesting that modern military environments are far too complex to be understood by any one individual, organisation, or even military service.
Modern information technology permits the rapid and effective sharing of information to such a degree that "edge entities" or those that are essentially conducting military missions themselves, should be able to "pull" information from ubiquitous repositories, rather than having centralised agencies attempt to anticipate their information needs and "push" it to them. This would imply a major flattening of traditional military hierarchies, however.
Power To The Edge's radical ideas had been under investigation by the Pentagon since at least 2001. In UIAW, the concept of peer-to-peer activity combined with more traditional hierarchical flow of data in the network had been introduced.
Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer research, telling software engineers at a November 2001 peer-to-peer conference that there were advantages to be gained in the redundancy and robustness of a peer-to-peer network topology on the battlefield.
Network-centric warfare/operations is a cornerstone of the ongoing transformation effort at the Department of Defense initiated by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. It is also one of the five goals of the Office of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
See Revolution in Military Affairs for further information on what is now known as "defense transformation" or "transformation".
Related technologies and programs: The US DOD has mandated that the Global Information Grid (GIG) will be the primary technical framework to support US network-centric warfare/network-centric operations. Under this directive, all advanced weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centers are eventually to be linked via the GIG. The term system of systems is often used to describe the results of these types of massive integration efforts.
The topic Net-Centric Enterprise Services addresses the applications context of the GIG.
A number of significant U.S. military programs are taking technical steps towards supporting network-centric warfare. These include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) of the United States Navy and the BCT Network of the United States Army.
Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI) provides, for all phases of the acquisition of net-centric solutions, actionable guidance that meets network-centric warfare goals of the United States Department of Defense. The guidance in NESI is derived from the higher level, more abstract concepts provided in various directives, policies and mandates such as the Net-Centric Operations and Warfare Reference Model (NCOW RM) and the ASD(NII) Net-Centric Checklist.
Doctrinal tenets in United States: The doctrine of network-centric warfare for the United States armed forces draws its highest level of guidance from the concept of "team warfare", meaning the integration and synchronization of all appropriate capabilities across the various services, ranging from Army to Air Force to Coast Guard. This is part of the principle of joint warfare.
The tenets of network-centric warfare are:
Tenet 1: A robustly networked force improves information sharing.
Tenet 2: Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness.
Tenet 3: Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization.
Tenet 4: These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness.
Net-Centric operations are compatible with Mission Command doctrine, which theoretically allows considerable freedom of action for combat troops, and with more decentralized approaches to Command and Control (C2).
Some architectural and design challenges: The complexity of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) offers insight into the challenges of integrating numerous different communications systems into a unified whole. It is intended to be a software-defined radio for battlefield communications that will be backwards compatible with a very large number of other military and civilian radio systems.
An April 10, 2008 GAO report (GAO FCS report) highlighted the scalability of the network as a major risk factor to the Network Centric FCS program. The proposed system will be unable to network all the units into one self-forming, self-healing network.
The problem of coordinating bandwidth usage in a battlespace is a significant challenge, when every piece of mobile equipment and human participant becomes a potential source or relay of RF emissions.
It is difficult to efficiently transfer information between networks having different levels of security classification. Although multi-level security systems provide part of the solution, human intervention and decision-making is still needed to determine what specific data can and cannot be transferred.
Accurate locational awareness is limited when maneuvering in areas where Global Positioning System (GPS) coverage is weak or non-existent. These areas include the inside of buildings, caves, etc. as well as built-up areas and urban canyons, which are also settings for many modern military operations. Much work on reliable fusion of positional data from multiple sensors remains to be done.
Providing secure communications in network-centric warfare/network-centric operations is difficult, since successful key management for encryption is typically the most difficult aspect of cryptography, especially with mobile systems. The problem is exacerbated with the need for speedy deployment and nimble reconfiguration of military teams, to respond to rapidly changing conditions in the modern battlespace.
International activities: There is significant need to harmonize the technical and operational aspects of net-centric warfare and net-centric operations among multiple nations, in order to support coalition activities, joint operations, etc.
The NATO Command Structure and many NATO and non-NATO nations have joined the Federated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative and work together under the FMN Framework Process to coordinate the design, development and delivery of operational and technical capabilities required to conduct net-centric operations. Within the Alliance the NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles (NISP) provides the necessary guidance and technical components to support project implementations and Federated Mission Networking. Individual Standardization Agreements are the coordinating vehicle for establishing shared technical standards among NATO nations.
See also Partnership for Peace for information on extending coordination efforts to non-NATO nations that are keen to support military operations other than war activities, such as international peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, etc.
Supporting comments: "With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective. ... In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Network-centric warfare | Within the Alliance the NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles (NISP) provides the necessary guidance and technical components to support project implementations and Federated Mission Networking. Individual Standardization Agreements are the coordinating vehicle for establishing shared technical standards among NATO nations.
See also Partnership for Peace for information on extending coordination efforts to non-NATO nations that are keen to support military operations other than war activities, such as international peacekeeping, disaster response, humanitarian aid, etc.
Supporting comments: "With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective. ... In Desert Storm, it usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen."—former Vice President Richard Cheney.
"Net-centric warfare's effectiveness has greatly improved in 12 years. Desert Storm forces, involving more than 500,000 troops, were supported with 100 Mbit/s of bandwidth. Today, OIF forces, with about 350,000 warfighters, had more than 3,000 Mbit/s of satellite bandwidth, which is 30 times more bandwidth for a force 45 percent smaller. U.S. troops essentially used the same weapon platforms used in Operation Desert Storm with significantly increased effectiveness."—Lieutenant general Harry D. Raduege Jr, director, Defense Information Systems Agency.
Contradictory views: "Our incipient NCW plans may suffer defeat by [adversaries] using primitive but cagey techniques, inspired by an ideology we can neither match nor understand; or by an enemy who can knock out our vulnerable Global Positioning System or use electromagnetic pulse weapons on a limited scale, removing intelligence as we have construed it and have come to depend upon. Fighting forces accustomed to relying upon downlinks for information and commands would have little to fall back upon."
The aspiration of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to embrace network-centric warfare is outlined in the document ADF Force 2020. This vision has been criticized by Aldo Borgu, director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). By developing interoperability with U.S. systems, in his view, the three arms of the Australian Defence Force could end up operating better with their sister United States services than with each other.
Network centric warfare is criticized by proponents of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) doctrine.
Also, since Network-centric warfare focuses so much on distributing information, one has to be wary of the effect of false, misleading, or misinterpreted information entering the system, be it through enemy deception or simple error. Just as the usefulness of correct information can be amplified, so too can the repercussions of incorrect data entering the system achieve much greater non-positive outcomes.
One way that this can happen is through errors in initial conditions in an uncorrected, closed system that subsequently skew result-sets; the result-sets are then reused, amplifying the initial error by orders of magnitude in subsequent generations of result-sets; see chaos theory.
Other possible failure modes or problem areas in network-centric warfare include the occurrence of the Byzantine generals' problem in peer-to-peer systems; problems caused by an inadequate or a shallow understanding of (or general disregard for) self-regulation, self-organization, systems theory, emergent behavior and cybernetics; in addition to this, there are potential issues arising from the very nature of any complex, rapidly developed artificial system arising from complexity theory, which implies the possibility of failure modes such as congestion collapse or cascading failure.
See also: Autonomous logistics
Battlespace
C4ISTAR
Cyberwarfare
Information warfare
List of cyber warfare forces
Network simulator
References:
External links: C4I Systems
The OASD-NII Command and Control Research Program (CCRP)
Net-Centric Enterprise Solutions for Interoperability (NESI)
NCW related article on Crosstalk - Defense Software Engineering Journal
Army War College article: Principles of Warfare on the Network-Centric Battlefield
globalsecurity.org
C4I.org - Computer Security & Intelligence |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | New generation warfare | Terminology: The term new generation warfare was first introduced in Russian (Война нового поколения) in 2013, as synonyms for grey zone and hybrid warfare in the Gerasimov doctrine. These are all terms that refer to modern military theories of warfare that go beyond conventional warfare. The terms began to spread and take on various meanings, and were not always used with clarity. Some analysts use them more or less interchangeably, while others identify differences among them.
In his 2009 paper, Frank Hoffman noted the rising use of the term hybrid threat, and analyzed the multiple meanings of the term. Hoffman pointed out that there had been resistance among some analysts for the new term, who preferred older concepts of "conventional" and "irregular" warfare, while Hoffman believed that the older terms were insufficient to describe conflicts in the modern world. He defined hybrid threat as an adversary that "simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives".
Since being introduced, the term hybrid warfare has become trendy and is used often in debates on modern warfare. The term has gone through various stages of evolution of its meaning, and has been criticized for being overused. The term is used in official doctrines of nations, and permeates academic and policy discussions. The meaning has been extended to non-state actors, and shifted to be synonymous with "malign Russian activities" under Vladimir Putin. At first, the term was not used in Russia, but has recently been adopted and undergone its own shifting usage: before the Ukraine war it tended to refer to trends in American military thinking, but after 2014 Russia views hybrid warfare as entirely emanating from the West, in that every conflict anywhere in the world, from hot wars to sports to vaccination to the Eurovision song contest are all aspects of "hybrid warfare" waged against them by the West. The West on the other hand views it more as a way of preventing subversion and interference from Russia, including cyberwarfare.
Russia created the concept of new generation warfare, but has also absorbed the hybrid warfare term. According to Suchkov (2021), the difference for Russian analysts is that new generation warfare is outward-facing, i.e., it's about "how to pro-actively engage with foreign adversaries", whereas hybrid warfare is about how to defend against interference from the West.
Background: The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc, which began following the end of World War II and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. A period of openness under the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the first post-Soviet one Boris Yeltsin ended with the 1999 accession to power of Vladimir Putin, who took a harder line and sought to reestablish Russia as a world power with a sphere of influence including the former Soviet republics.
Cold War: The Soviet Union was one of the Allied powers of World War II fighting on the same side as the United States to defeat the Nazis. After victory over Hitler in 1945, the Allies disagreed on what the map of Europe should look like and where the borders would be drawn. The Soviets effectively occupied Central and Eastern Europe, while US and Western allied forces remained in Western Europe. The Soviet Union sought to establish a sphere of influence and dominate the internal affairs of countries in its border regions. Soviet-style regimes arose in the Eastern Bloc.
The US government pursued an increasingly hard line against the Soviets, and prime minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri and called for an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviets. Stalin dismissed the accusation that the USSR was exerting increasing control over the countries in its sphere. He argued that there was nothing surprising in "the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, [was] trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries".
Forty years of simmering tensions, rearmament, and proxy wars followed between the two nuclear-armed nations, and their allies. The western bloc created NATO to protect western Europe and contain the Soviets, and the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact in response, uniting eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain. Direct armed conflict between the two nuclear-armed superpowers was avoided (sometimes only barely), such as during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the 1960s, the United States became bogged down in the "quagmire" of Vietnam in an attempt to contain Communism; twenty years later the Russians were bogged down in Afghanistan; each superpower left an Asian war without a victory. Conflicts multiplied in Third World nations, including in Latin America, Indonesia, Israel, South Asia, and Africa. After a period of détente in the 1970s, tensions were reawakened in the 1980s and US president Ronald Reagan "went all out to fight the second cold war". Pope John Paul II provided a moral focus for anti-communism; a visit to his native Poland in 1979 stimulated a religious and nationalist resurgence centered on the Solidarity movement that galvanized the opposition, which was met by a harsh crackdown in 1981.
Thaw and end of the Cold War: Massive spending in the Soviet Union on the arms race exacerbated already deep-seated structural problems in the Soviet system, In response to the massive buildup on the Soviet side, US presidents Carter and Reagan built up the US military, culminating with the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars"), which the Soviets were not able to respond to. By 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, the Soviet economy was stagnant. Gorbachev announced economic reforms called perestroika, or restructuring. and glasnost ("openness") which increased freedom of the press and the transparency of state institutions. This contributed to the accelerating détente between the two nations, resulting in agreements which led to a scaling-back of the arms race. Tensions subsided; the START I arms control treaty was signed, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Berlin Wall came down in 1989.
On 3 December 1989, Gorbachev and Bush declared the Cold War over at the Malta Summit. By 1990, Gorbachev consented to German reunification, and later that year the two former rivals were partners in the Gulf War against Iraq.
Dissolution of the Soviet Union: In 1989, the Soviet alliance system was on the brink of collapse and communist leaders of the Warsaw Pact states were losing power. The Pan-European Picnic in August 1989 in Hungary became a test of how far the Soviet leader Gorbachev was willing to go with glasnost. Thousands of holiday-makers exited Hungary at the border with Austria without interference by Hungarian border guards, and the Soviet Union did nothing to stop it. The dam broke, and tens of thousands of East Germans crossed into Austria. The Hungarian borders were opened on 11 September, and the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November. The 1989 revolutionary wave swept across Central and Eastern Europe and peacefully overthrew all of the Soviet-style east-European states; Romania was the only Eastern-bloc country to topple its communist regime violently. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated in 1991.
Greater political and social freedoms in the Soviet Union instituted by the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev created an atmosphere of open criticism. The Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991 when Boris Yeltsin seized power in the aftermath of a failed coup that had attempted to topple reform-minded Gorbachev. The Baltic States seceded, and Ukraine and Belarus were recognized as independent on 8 December. The Soviet flag was lowered at the Kremlin for the last time on 25 December 1991, replaced by the Russian tricolor. The successor state was headed by Yeltsin until 1999.
Putin era: Since 1999 Vladimir Putin has headed Russia either as president or Prime Minister. The economy has improved, but he has also been widely accused of corruption, authoritarian leadership, and widespread human rights abuses.
Precursors: Phillip Karber at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency identified 1999 when former KGB agent Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia as a "pivotal turning point in European security". Putin has stated that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." Ever since, Putin has labored to reestablish Russia as a world power and dominance in Eastern Europe, and pushed to restructure the armed forces, and introduced new tactics in the 2000 Second Chechen War.
The Russian Army General Staff redesigned the Russian Army for decentralized operations including the possibility of unconventional operations, conventional weapons, and tactical nuclear environments, in order to face different kinds of threats from the high-tech West, massed armies in the east, and unconventional threats from the south. This was used in 2008 in the Georgian conflict, and practiced in field simulations against NATO, through 2013.
It was also in 2013 that publications by Russian military writers about "new generation warfare" became available, and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov called for "rethinking on the forms and methods of warfare." |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | New generation warfare | Putin has stated that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." Ever since, Putin has labored to reestablish Russia as a world power and dominance in Eastern Europe, and pushed to restructure the armed forces, and introduced new tactics in the 2000 Second Chechen War.
The Russian Army General Staff redesigned the Russian Army for decentralized operations including the possibility of unconventional operations, conventional weapons, and tactical nuclear environments, in order to face different kinds of threats from the high-tech West, massed armies in the east, and unconventional threats from the south. This was used in 2008 in the Georgian conflict, and practiced in field simulations against NATO, through 2013.
It was also in 2013 that publications by Russian military writers about "new generation warfare" became available, and Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov called for "rethinking on the forms and methods of warfare." Many analysts consider the Gerasimov doctrine the best description of Russia's modern strategy of total warfare, which uses politics as well as war, and attacks on multiple fronts at once including hackers, business, media, disinformation, as well as military means. The internet has made available the possibility of new tools and approaches to destabilize or influence foreign actors, and the Gerasimov doctrine describes a framework for using them, and says that they are not just adjuncts of military force, but are in fact, the primary or preferred means to victory. The strategy is to foment chaos within an enemy state, and develop permanent unrest and conflict there. West Point analyst John Chambers uses the terms Gerasimov doctrine and new generation warfare synonymously. Chambers views the Gerasimov/new generation warfare doctrine as having been formulated specifically to exploit the weaknesses of large enemy bureaucracies such as the United States.
The Gerasimov doctrine is a foreign policy doctrine named after a February 2013 publication of an article by Valery Gerasimov, Russian chief of the General Staff, which laid out a new theory of modern warfare combining old Soviet tactics and strategic military thinking about total war which was based more on societal aspects than traditional military ones. Gerasimov wrote:The very 'rules of war' have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness. … All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.
The prime example of the use of the Gerasimov doctrine in the field, is the 2014 unrest in Ukraine, where Russia supported extremists on both sides to exacerbate tensions and create unrest, and then used the unrest as a pretext to take over Crimea.
Key aspects: Previous military strategies focused on traditional military concerns such as logistics, strength and location of enemy forces, whereas new generation warfare identifies the battleground as the mind of the civilian public. One analyst wrote:
Thus, the Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main battlespace is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare, in order to achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and psychologically depressing the enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population."
Characterizing this emphasis on the mind, Berzins describes the theory as prioritizing "influence over destruction; inner decay over annihilation; and culture over weapons or technology", and is a "total war battlespace" that includes "political, economic, informational, technological, and ecological" aspects. The goal is to implement the theory via eight phases, starting long before there is any military conflict. "Phase Zero" is about preparing the terrain by implementing psychological, informational, and other measures that prevent conflict.
Chambers views New generation warfare as designed to use grey-zone hybrid threats, and "is focused on using non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals as well as military means 'of concealed character' to include the open use of forces 'often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation' to accomplish objectives. These tactics and techniques are particularly effective against the United States in the gray zone due to laws and regulations affecting our ability to act in Phase 0."
Strategic communication: In New generation warfare, communications and the media are used to uphold a narrative aimed both at the international community as well as at a domestic audience, using the language of law to evade the usual deterrence and whip up support at home for operations they characterize as legal uses of force to support "protection and self-defense of Russian nationals" living in Donbas and Crimea, and an invitation for intervention by local leaders there who have been the object of years of softening up by the Russians in the preparatory phases. On the surface, Russia appears or claims to be acting in support of self-defense and sovereignty, as supported by Article 51 of the UN Charter, and supported by acts of the Russian parliament. New generation warfare seeks to take the acts themselves out of the realm of military action, such that it's unclear if an armed attack has, in fact, occurred, confusing their enemy's ability to define the response as a military attack and respond to it as one.
Elements: Defense and national security expert on Ukraine Phillip Karber identified five elements of New generation warfare:
political subversion – intelligence agents; agit-prop operations using mass media to exploit internal differences; corruption, bribery and intimidation of local officials; kidnapping, assassination and terrorism; creating local opposition cells from discontented elements
proxy sanctuary – seizing local government centers of power, airports and military depots; arming and training insurgents; creating checkpoints; destroying ingress transportation infrastructure; cyberattacks; phony referendums; establishment of a "People’s Republic" under Russian domination.
intervention – deploying Russian forces to the border with large-scale exercises involving ground, naval, and air force troops; clandestine introduction of heavy weapons to insurgents; creation of training and logistics camps adjacent to the border; integrating proxy troops into Russian equipped and led formations.
coercive deterrence – secret strategic force alerts; deployment of tactical nuclear delivery systems; theater and intercontinental maneuvers; aggressive air patrolling of adjacent areas to limit their freedom of movement.
negotiated manipulation – use and abuse of Western negotiated ceasefires to regroup and rearm their proxies; using violations as a tactic, while inhibiting other states from helping due to fear of escalation; split the Western alliance by using oil or economic incentives; selective and repetitive phone negotiations that go nowhere.
Chambers compared New generation warfare planning processes with American processes, and identified an eight-phases construct on the Russian side, and six phases on the American side. They don't line up well, and the first four phases of New generation warfare all fall within Phase 0 of US planning, the latter requiring a lot of interagency planning and communication, slowing it down, while the Russian process is designed to be nimble and work within the US phases. As Chambers puts it, "The fundamental problem with countering operations in the gray zone takes place when the United States cannot clearly identify gray-zone actors and actions (ambiguity) nor develop a clear common operating picture of actions taking place. In this case, the United States will be constrained by a bureaucracy that will likely not authorize operations until there is a clear threat. At this point, it is too late and the adversary has already used gray-zone operations to shape the battlefield and achieve its strategic objectives."
In practice: The New generation warfare theory became used in practice in Crimea and Donbas in 2014, in Russia's proxy war with Ukraine. Karber stated that "As practiced in Ukraine, Russia's new generation warfare is manifested in five component elements: political subversion, proxy sanctuary, intervention, coercive deterrence, and negotiated manipulation."
The invasion of Crimea was carried out quietly using the excuse of humanitarian intervention. In just three weeks and with less than 10,000 troops, Russia managed to dislodge Crimea from Ukraine and annex it, without a shot being fired, and the surrender of 190 Ukrainian bases to the Russians. The ground was prepared for this long before, via a multi-pronged "soft" approach including bribing local officials, paying off oligarchs, providing local separatists with intelligence information, investing heavily in local Ukrainian energy and industrial businesses, and the continual emission of pro-Russian propaganda through networks owned or funded by Russia, and a process of deception known as "maskirovka" ("camouflage" in Russian) to hide its operations. It does the same thing domestically, with its vast control of local print media, but especially via television reporting, which is very dominant news source for most of the population of the country.
The strong governmental control over the media gives it a direct pipeline to influence public opinion in the country. Public support of the media is very high, with 88% believing that Europe and the United States are involved in an "information war" to manipulate Russian media, while the Russian government merely reports the facts.
Accompanying Russian aggression on the ground in Ukraine in 2014, Russia made direct nuclear threats against Ukraine, who had earlier given up their nuclear weapons under the 1994 Budapest Agreement in exchange for an explicit guarantees of its sovereignty from Moscow. Russia has continued to push the limits, operating close to NATO borders with dangerous over-flights, demonstrations of nuclear force, and hostile wargame exercises, causing anxiety among border NATO member countries as well as neutral countries.
Compared to other theories: New generation warfare doctrine differs from hybrid warfare in that it combines both low-end, clandestine operations with high-end direct superpower involvement. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | New generation warfare | The strong governmental control over the media gives it a direct pipeline to influence public opinion in the country. Public support of the media is very high, with 88% believing that Europe and the United States are involved in an "information war" to manipulate Russian media, while the Russian government merely reports the facts.
Accompanying Russian aggression on the ground in Ukraine in 2014, Russia made direct nuclear threats against Ukraine, who had earlier given up their nuclear weapons under the 1994 Budapest Agreement in exchange for an explicit guarantees of its sovereignty from Moscow. Russia has continued to push the limits, operating close to NATO borders with dangerous over-flights, demonstrations of nuclear force, and hostile wargame exercises, causing anxiety among border NATO member countries as well as neutral countries.
Compared to other theories: New generation warfare doctrine differs from hybrid warfare in that it combines both low-end, clandestine operations with high-end direct superpower involvement. On the other hand, William Neneth in 2015 wrote of "Russia’s State-centric Hybrid Warfare", while in the same year Balasevicius wrote of "state level hybrid war doctrine". Before May 2015, USAREUR commander Ben Hodges, who was particularly interested in the Russian plan for the "simultaneous employment of multiple instruments of war, including non-military means where information warfare, such as mass political manipulation", had referred to it as "hybrid or multidimensional war". However, in 2016 McDermott opined that hybrid warfare was alien to Russian military theory.
See also:
References:
Works cited: "1989: Malta summit ends Cold War". BBC. 3 December 1989. Archived from the original on 3 October 2018. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
Balasevicius, Tony (2015-11-10). "Russia's "New Generation War" and Its Implications for the Arctic". The Mackenzie Institute. Archived from the original on 2017-03-20. Retrieved 2017-03-15.
Berzins, Janis (April 2014). Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy (PDF) (Report). National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security and Strategic Research. pp. 1–13. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
Blank, S. J. (2015). IMPERIAL AMBITIONS: Russia’s Military Buildup. World Affairs, 178(1), . http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555284
Bowman, Andrew S. (20 August 2020). "Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy" (PDF). No. IF11625. Congressional Research Service.
Carliner, Geoffrey; Alesina, Alberto, eds. (1991). Politics and Economics in the Eighties. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-01281-0.
Chambers, John (2016-10-18). "Countering Gray-Zone Hybrid Threats. An Analysis of Russia's 'New Generation Warfare' and implications for the US Army" (PDF). Modern War Institute at West Point. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-03-17. Retrieved 2022-03-04.
Clines, Francis X. (December 26, 1991). "Gorbachev, Last Soviet Leader, Resigns; U.S. Recognizes Republics' Independence". The New York Times. p. A–1. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
Diggins, John P. (2007). Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, And the Making of History. W.W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-06022-5.
Deutsche Welle (19 August 2014). "The picnic that changed European History". DW Akademie. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
Echevarria II, Antulio J. (2015). "How should we think about 'grey-zone' wars?". Infinity Journal. 5 (1). IJ Infinity Group: 16–21. ISSN 2312-5888. Archived from the original on 5 August 2020. Retrieved 6 March 2022. Analysts, practitioners, and scholars alike have struggled to come to terms with such uses, assigning labels such as 'hybrid wars', 'new generation wars', and 'gray-zone' conflicts, among others, to distinguish contemporary practices from those of so-called traditional wars. While the original aim of such labeling or relabeling may have been to draw the attention of busy policymakers to emerging security issues, it has evolved into something of a culture of replication in which the labels are repeated more out of habit than reflection.
Fedyk, Nicholas (2016). "Russian 'New Generation' Warfare—Theory, Practice, and Lessons for U.S. Strategists". Small Wars Journal. 25 (6): 2–8. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
Gaddis, John Lewis (2005). The Cold War: A New History. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1-59420-062-5.
Gaidar, Yegor (2007-04-19). "The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil" (PDF). On the Issues: AEI online. American Enterprise Institute. Retrieved 8 March 2022.
Gerasimov, Valery (February 2013). "Ценность науки в предвидении" [The Value of Science in Foresight]. ru:Военно-промышленный курьер [Military-Industrial Courier] (weekly newspaper) (in Russian). 476 (8). Archived from the original on 2017-08-20. Retrieved 2022-03-05.
Gibbs, Joseph (1999). Gorbachev's Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 0-89096-892-6.
"Collapse of the Soviet Union - 1989-1991". GlobalSecurity. 2022. Retrieved 6 March 2022. Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century.
Hoffman, Frank (October 2009). "Hybrid vs. Compound War the Janus Choice". Armed Forces Journal. 147 (3). Retrieved 6 March 2022 – via EBSCOhost.
Karber, Phillip (4 June 2015). "Russia's New Generation Warfare". NGA.mil. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on 10 September 2015.
Karber, Phillip (12 January 2022). "'Putin Is Not Stupid': This Expert Spent 182 Days On The Russia-Ukraine Battlefields". 19FortyFive. Retrieved 5 March 2022.
McCauley, Martin (2008). Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949. Seminar studies in history (revised 3rd ed.). Harlow, England; New York: Pearson Longman. ISBN 978-1-4058-7433-5. OCLC 191732526.
McDermott, Roger N. (Spring 2016). "Does Russia Have a Gerasimov Doctrine?" (PDF). Parameters. 46 (1). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-02-09. Retrieved 2022-02-28.
McKew, Molly (5 September 2017). "The Gerasimov Doctrine". Politico.
Neneth, William (17 April 2015). "Russia's State-centric Hybrid Warfare". RKK/ICDS Diplomaatia.
Newman, William W. (1993). "History Accelerates: The Diplomacy of Co-operation and Fragmentation". In Goodby, James E.; Morel, Benoit (eds.). The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-829161-9. Archived from the original on 29 July 2020. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (1995). Impunity and human rights in international law and practice. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508136-6.
Schmitz, David F. (1999). "Cold War (1945–91): Causes". In Whiteclay Chambers, John (ed.). Cold War (1945–91). The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford University Press. pp. 147–149. ISBN 978-0-19-507198-6. OCLC 769463173. Retrieved 16 June 2008.
Suchkov, Maxim A (2021). "Whose hybrid warfare? |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | New generation warfare | ISBN 978-0-19-829161-9. Archived from the original on 29 July 2020. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (1995). Impunity and human rights in international law and practice. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-508136-6.
Schmitz, David F. (1999). "Cold War (1945–91): Causes". In Whiteclay Chambers, John (ed.). Cold War (1945–91). The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford University Press. pp. 147–149. ISBN 978-0-19-507198-6. OCLC 769463173. Retrieved 16 June 2008.
Suchkov, Maxim A (2021). "Whose hybrid warfare? How 'the hybrid warfare' concept shapes Russian discourse, military, and political practice". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 32 (3): 415–440. doi:10.1080/09592318.2021.1887434. S2CID 233353066.
Towle, Philip (2000). "Cold War". In Charles Townshend (ed.). The Oxford History of Modern War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-285373-8.
Further reading: Berzinš, Janis (March 2014). "The New Generation of Russian Warfare". Aspen Review. Prague: Aspen Institute. Archived from the original on 2015-10-21.
Berzins, Janis (5 February 2019). "Not 'Hybrid' but New Generation Warfare". In Howard, Glen; Czekaj, Matthew (eds.). Russia's Military Strategy and Doctrine. Washington: Jamestown Foundation. pp. 157–184. ISBN 978-0-9986660-1-3. OCLC 1036275039.
Berzins, Janis (14 December 2020). "The Theory and Practice of New Generation Warfare: The Case of Ukraine and Syria". Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 33 (3). Routledge: 355–380. doi:10.1080/13518046.2020.1824109. ISSN 1351-8046. OCLC 8886456291. S2CID 229182086.
Chekinov, Sergei G.; Bogdanov, Sergei A. (2011). "Влияние непрямых действий на характер современной войны" [The Influence of Indirect Actions on the Nature of Modern Warfare]. ((Военная мыслЬ [Military Thought])) (6). Moscow: Red Star: 3–13. ISSN 0236-2058.
Chekinov, Sergei G.; Bogdanov, Sergei A. (2013). "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War" (PDF). ((Военная мыслЬ [Military Thought])): 12–23. ISSN 0236-2058. S2CID 158510631 – via Semantic Scholar.
Derleth, James (September 2020). "Russian New Generation Warfare Deterring and Winning at the Tactical Level". Military Review. US Army Command and General Staff College. ISSN 1943-1147. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
Fisher, Max (2016-07-25). "In D.N.C. Hack, Echoes of Russia's New Approach to Power". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331.
Galeotti, Mark (5 March 2018). "I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine'". Foreign Policy. Slate Group.
Galeotti, Mark (2018). "The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat". Critical Studies on Security. 7 (2). Informa UK Limited: 157–161. doi:10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623. ISSN 2162-4887. OCLC 8319522816.
Mölder, Holger; Sazonov, Vladimir (18 July 2018). "Information Warfare as the Hobbesian Concept of Modern Times — The Principles, Techniques, and Tools of Russian Information Operations in the Donbass". Journal of Slavic Military Studies. 31 (3). T&F: 308–328. doi:10.1080/13518046.2018.1487204. S2CID 150108658.
Murphy, Martin. "Understanding Russia's Concept for Total War in Europe". The Heritage Foundation.
Paul, Christopher; Matthews, Miriam (2016). The Russian 'Firehose of Falsehood' Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It (Report). RAND Perspective #198. Santa Monica: RAND. doi:10.7249/PE198. OCLC 1038179818. PE-198-OSD.
Pierzchala, Kazimierz (March 2019). "Information Warfare Between Russia and Ukraine: A Cause of War for the West?". Polish Political Science Yearbook. 48 (1): 103–111. doi:10.15804/ppsy2019106. S2CID 159071488 – via EBSCOhost.
Renz, Bettina; Smith, Hanna (2016). Russia and Hybrid warfare - going beyond the label (Report). Aleksanteri Papers. Kikimora Publications. p. 62. ISSN 1457-9251. |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Night combat | Effects of night: The most obvious effect of darkness is reduced visibility. This affects a soldier's ability to observe friendly troop movements, understand terrain, and especially affects perception of enemy movements and positions. Officers find that darkness hampers many aspects of command, including their ability to preserve control, execute movement, firing, maintenance of direction, reconnaissance, security, and mutual support. A U.S. Army report on the history of Japanese warfare described an instance of this confusion:
An example is recorded in the history of Japan when about 1180 a force [sic] of the Heike confronting a force of the Genji across the Fuji river (Shizuoka Prefecture) beat a hasty retreat one night due to mistaking the noise made by water fowl for an attacking Genji force.
Indeed, a side effect of the reduced visibility is heightened audibility, as soldiers focus more on what they can hear. There are many instances of soldiers losing their bearings at night due to flashes from guns or enemy searchlights. The difficulties of perception lend themselves to fear of the unknown. Soldiers under fire can't tell where the fire originates and can't devise appropriate countermeasures. Such uncertainty is associated with feelings of loneliness and helplessness, and creates a tendency to overestimate enemy strength or be excessively pessimistic of the combat situation.
In addition, without the aid of artificial illumination, a soldier's marksmanship is negatively affected in total darkness. According to a report by Jean L. Dyer, Seward Smith and Nancy R. McClure, Prior to the introduction of aided night vision devices, effective firing at night with a rifle was limited to very close distances, typically within 50 meters. The ability to hit targets was dependent upon a soldier's ability to acquire targets in their sights, which in turn, depended greatly upon the amount of natural and artificial illumination.
History: Night operations have been subject to vast shifts in effectiveness and frequency throughout history, as tactics and technology became more sophisticated.
Classical antiquity: Night fighting between standing armies was rare in ancient times. Night logistics were mostly limited to the carrying of torches or navigation by what little light was provided by the stars or moon. However, circumstances occasionally necessitated fighting at night. Usually due to the massive nature of the battles, they could not be resolved in one day, and combat could not be cleanly disengaged as darkness fell, or prevented as armies camped near each other overnight. Sieges which lasted for weeks, months or, even years were often fought day and night. Below are a few notable examples.
Ancient historian Diodorus claims that at the Battle of Thermopylae the Spartans attempted to assassinate Persian King Xerxes by infiltrating his camp at night.
"They immediately seized their arms, and six hundred men rushed into the camp of five hundred thousand, making directly for the king's tent, and resolving either to die with him, or, if they should be overpowered, at least in his quarters. An alarm spread through the whole Persian army. The Spartans being unable to find the king, marched uncontrolled through the whole camp, killing and overthrowing all that stood in their way, like men who knew that they fought, not with the hope of victory, but to avenge their own deaths. The contest was protracted from the beginning of the night through the greater part of the following day. At last, not conquered, but exhausted with conquering, they fell amidst vast heaps of slaughtered enemies."
At the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, over a period of 3 days, an alliance of Germanic tribes wore down and eventually annihilated 3 Roman legions (about 16,000 to 20,000 men). The Romans attempted several defensive night tactics. On the first night they managed to erect a fortified camp. On the second night, they marched at night in an attempt to break through the encircling Germanic forces, but the Germans had already built a wall in their way, and when combat resumed the following day, the Romans were defeated.
The Battle of the Catalaunian Plains saw exceptional chaos caused by nightfall. The night before the battle proper, one of the Roman allied forces stumbled on a band of Hunnic troops and in the resulting skirmish, as many as 30,000 (unverified) men were killed. Later in the battle, Thorismund, son of king Theodoric, accidentally walked into Attila the Hun's encampment while attempting to return to his own forces at night. He was wounded in the ensuing mêlée before his followers could rescue him and withdraw. That same night, the Roman commander Flavius Aëtius became separated from his men and, believing that disaster had befallen them, had to stay the night with his Germanic allies.
Early Modern: The Night Attack of Târgoviște pitted Vlad The Impaler of Wallachia against Mehmed II of the Ottoman Empire. Vlad reportedly disguised himself as a Turk and walked freely throughout the Ottoman camp in an effort to find Mehmed's tent and learn about the organization of his army. One chronicle of the battle says that Mehmed disallowed his troops to exit their tents so as not to cause a panic in case of an attack. According to that chronicle, Vlad learned of this and planned his attack at night knowing that the enemy soldiers would have to remain in their tents. Accounts of the battle and its casualties are mixed, but in the end it was a Wallachian victory, with around 5000 Wallachian casualties compared to around 15,000 for the Ottomans. The Ashanti army sometimes, although seldom, fought at night. The Ashanti engaged in a night attack at Dodowa in 1826. The army was led by torch-carrying scouts.
World War I: The adoption of illumination rounds led to an improvement in the ability to carry out night operations. These projectiles were fired from howitzers and field guns in the direction their light was required. The first illumination rounds (also called starshell) were modified shrapnel shells which ejected magnesium pellets. These were somewhat ineffective, and were soon replaced by improved designs that had greater candle power, and a parachute to prolong the descent to ground. Tracer ammunition was also introduced during World War I. Tracers made marksmanship at night easier for soldiers because they could observe the trajectory of their shots and correct their aim accordingly.
World War II: Nighttime continued to have a significant impact on combat during World War II. Particularly in the Pacific Theater, the Japanese military was proficient in night warfare, as acknowledged by the Allies. In anticipation of a conflict with the Soviet Union, whose numbers of tanks, planes, and artillery were vastly superior, the Japanese developed a series of training manuals designed to counter these advantages. The "Red Books" (classified materials bound in red paper) emphasized the advantages of attacking at night, in the evening, and at dawn. These tactics later proved useful against the other Allies who were similarly better equipped.
The Japanese used this advantage to win engagements where they were severely outnumbered in China and against the Allies at sea. It wasn't until late in the war that early warning technologies of the Allies subverted their surprise attacks at night, reducing their effectiveness. These tactics completely broke down once the Japanese military replaced their well-trained troops with hastily trained recruits.
Another type of illumination device was the tripflare, consisting of a pyrotechnic instrument activated by tripwire, planted near trails to provide early warning of enemy movement. By 1944, the Wehrmacht was making extensive use of tripflares in Italy, after their perimeters had been repeatedly infiltrated at night by U.S. Army Rangers. Tripflares helped foil an attack launched by the Fifth Army on January 20 at the Rapido River.
Post-World War II: In the First Battle of al-Faw in 1986, during the late stages of the Iran–Iraq War, one of the elements that contributed to the success of Iranians was their use of dug-in infantry which would move only at night and during poor weather. This reduced the Iraqis' advantage in armor. The Iranian forces had been trained in night warfare prior to the battle.
Tactics: Perhaps the most important deciding factor in a battle at night is preparation. This includes training, reconnaissance, and planning. As with any military operation, leadership is important in both the high-ranking officers and the low-level squad and unit leaders.
Offensive tactics: The decision to engage at night or continue an engagement at night is usually made by the attacking force. Combat continued at night is aimed at exploiting an advantage gained from an attack during the day or similarly denying the defending force the opportunity to regroup or reinforce. Combat initiated at night can either be aimed to gain an advantage (such as territory or prisoners) which is then held during the following day or to harass and demoralize the enemy before disengaging prior to sunrise. The latter case is considered a raid.
Historically, night combat involves greater risk and reward compared to similar battles in the daytime. Victories can be crushing, with the defending side taken completely by surprise and hardly firing a shot in response to the attack. Alternatively, defeats can be disastrous, with huge casualties resulting from attacking armies floundering chaotically while they themselves are ambushed in pitch darkness.
See also: Night vision
Night vision device
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear strategy | Nuclear deterrent composition: The doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) assumes that a nuclear deterrent force must be credible and survivable. That is, each deterrent force must survive a first strike with sufficient capability to effectively destroy the other country in a second strike. Therefore, a first strike would be suicidal for the launching country.
In the late 1940s and 1950s as the Cold War developed, the United States and Soviet Union pursued multiple delivery methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively called a "nuclear triad". These are air-delivered weapons (bombs or missiles), ballistic missile submarines (usually nuclear-powered and called SSBNs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), usually deployed in land-based hardened missile silos or on vehicles.
Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional weapons.
During the 1970s there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could overwhelm the forces of NATO. It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe with strategic nuclear weapons, inviting a catastrophic exchange. Thus, technologies were developed to greatly reduce collateral damage while being effective against advancing conventional military forces. Some of these were low-yield neutron bombs, which were lethal to tank crews, especially with tanks massed in tight formation, while producing relatively little blast, thermal radiation, or radioactive fallout. Other technologies were so-called "suppressed radiation devices," which produced mostly blast with little radioactivity, making them much like conventional explosives, but with much more energy.
See also:
Bibliography:
Early texts: Brodie, Bernard. The Absolute Weapon. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1946.
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
Dunn, Lewis A. Deterrence Today – Roles, Challenges, and Responses Paris: IFRI Proliferation Papers n° 19, 2007.
Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
Kissinger, Henry A. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1957.
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
Wohlstetter, Albert. "The Delicate Balance of Terror." Foreign Affairs 37, 211 (1958): 211–233.
Secondary literature: Baylis, John, and John Garnett. Makers of Nuclear Strategy. London: Pinter, 1991. ISBN 1-85567-025-9.
Buzan, Barry, and Herring, Eric. "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics". London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. ISBN 1-55587-596-3.
Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. ISBN 0-333-97239-2 .
Heuser, Beatrice. NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London: Macmillan, hardback 1997, paperback 1999), 256p., ISBN 0-333-67365-4
Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Belief Systems in Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, July 1998), 277p., Index, Tables. ISBN 0-333-69389-2
Heuser, Beatrice. "Victory in a Nuclear War? A Comparison of NATO and WTO War Aims and Strategies", Contemporary European History Vol. 7 Part 3 (November 1998), pp. 311–328.
Heuser, Beatrice. "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives", Comparative Strategy Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp. 437–457.
Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. ISBN 0-671-42444-0.
Rai Chowdhuri, Satyabrata. Nuclear Politics: Towards A Safer World, Ilford: New Dawn Press, 2004.
Rosenberg, David. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960." International Security 7, 4 (Spring, 1983): 3–71.
Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw–Hill, 1993. ISBN 0-07-059352-3.
== References == |
mil_tactics_continued_pretraining.csv | Nuclear warfare | Types of nuclear warfare: Nuclear warfare scenarios are usually divided into two groups, each with different effects and potentially fought with different types of nuclear armaments.
The first, a limited nuclear war (sometimes attack or exchange), refers to the controlled use of nuclear weapons, whereby the implicit threat exists that a nation can still escalate their use of nuclear weapons. For example, using a small number of nuclear weapons against strictly military targets could be escalated through increasing the number of weapons used, or escalated through the selection of different targets. Limited attacks are thought to be a more credible response against attacks that do not justify all-out retaliation, such as an enemy's limited use of nuclear weapons.
The second, a full-scale nuclear war, could consist of large numbers of nuclear weapons used in an attack aimed at an entire country, including military, economic, and civilian targets. Such an attack would almost certainly destroy the entire economic, social, and military infrastructure of the target nation, and would likely have a devastating effect on Earth's biosphere.
Some Cold War strategists such as Henry Kissinger argued that a limited nuclear war could be possible between two heavily armed superpowers (such as the United States and the Soviet Union). Some predict, however, that a limited war could potentially "escalate" into a full-scale nuclear war. Others have called limited nuclear war "global nuclear holocaust in slow motion", arguing that—once such a war took place—others would be sure to follow over a period of decades, effectively rendering the planet uninhabitable in the same way that a "full-scale nuclear war" between superpowers would, only taking a much longer (and arguably more agonizing) path to the same result.
Even the most optimistic predictions of the effects of a major nuclear exchange foresee the death of many millions of victims within a very short period of time. Such predictions usually include the breakdown of institutions, government, professional and commercial, vital to the continuation of civilization. The resulting loss of vital affordances (food, water and electricity production and distribution, medical and information services, etc.) would account for millions more deaths. More pessimistic predictions argue that a full-scale nuclear war could potentially bring about the human extinction, or at least its near extinction, with only a relatively small number of survivors (mainly in remote areas) and a reduced quality of life and life expectancy for centuries afterward. However, such predictions, assuming total war with nuclear arsenals at Cold War highs, have not been without criticism. Such a horrific catastrophe as global nuclear warfare would almost certainly cause permanent damage to most complex life on the planet, its ecosystems, and the global climate.
A study presented at the annual meeting of the American Geophysical Union in December 2006 asserted that a small-scale regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as all of World War II and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more. In a regional nuclear conflict scenario in which two opposing nations in the subtropics each used 50 Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (c. 15 kiloton each) on major population centers, the researchers predicted fatalities ranging from 2.6 million to 16.7 million per country. The authors of the study estimated that as much as five million tons of soot could be released, producing a cooling of several degrees over large areas of North America and Eurasia (including most of the grain-growing regions). The cooling would last for years and could be "catastrophic", according to the researchers.
Either a limited or full-scale nuclear exchange could occur during an accidental nuclear war, in which the use of nuclear weapons is triggered unintentionally. Postulated triggers for this scenario have included malfunctioning early warning devices and/or targeting computers, deliberate malfeasance by rogue military commanders, consequences of an accidental straying of warplanes into enemy airspace, reactions to unannounced missile tests during tense diplomatic periods, reactions to military exercises, mistranslated or miscommunicated messages, and others.
A number of these scenarios actually occurred during the Cold War, though none resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. Many such scenarios have been depicted in popular culture, such as in the 1959 film On the Beach, the 1962 novel Fail-Safe, the 1964 film Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, the 1983 film WarGames, and the 1984 film Threads.
Sub-strategic use: The above examples envisage nuclear warfare at a strategic level, i.e., total war. However, nuclear powers have the ability to undertake more limited engagements.
"Sub-strategic use" includes the use of either "low-yield" tactical nuclear weapons, or of variable yield strategic nuclear weapons in a very limited role, as compared to exchanges of larger-yield strategic nuclear weapons over major population centers. This was described by the UK Parliamentary Defence Select Committee as "the launch of one or a limited number of missiles against an adversary as a means of conveying a political message, warning or demonstration of resolve". It is believed that all current nuclear weapons states possess tactical nuclear weapons, with the exception of the United Kingdom, which decommissioned its tactical warheads in 1998. However, the UK does possess scalable-yield strategic warheads, and this technology tends to blur the difference between "strategic", "sub-strategic", and "tactical" use or weapons. American, French and British nuclear submarines are believed to carry at least some missiles with dial-a-yield warheads for this purpose, potentially allowing a strike as low as one kiloton (or less) against a single target. Only the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India have declarative, unqualified, unconditional "no first use" nuclear weapons policies. India and Pakistan maintain only a credible minimum deterrence.
Commodore Tim Hare, former Director of Nuclear Policy at the British Ministry of Defence, has described "sub-strategic use" as offering the Government "an extra option in the escalatory process before it goes for an all-out strategic strike which would deliver unacceptable damage". However, this sub-strategic capacity has been criticized as potentially increasing the "acceptability" of using nuclear weapons. Combined with the trend in the reduction in the worldwide nuclear arsenal as of 2007 is the warhead miniaturization and modernization of the remaining strategic weapons that is presently occurring in all the declared nuclear weapon states, into more "usable" configurations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute suggests that this is creating a culture where use of these weapons is more acceptable and therefore is increasing the risk of war, as these modern weapons do not possess the same psychological deterrent value as the large Cold-War era, multi-megaton warheads.
In many ways, this present change in the balance of terror can be seen as the complete embracement of the switch from the 1950s Eisenhower doctrine of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible response", which has been growing in importance in the US nuclear war fighting plan/SIOP every decade since.
For example, the United States adopted a policy in 1996 of allowing the targeting of its nuclear weapons at non-state actors ("terrorists") armed with weapons of mass destruction.
Another dimension to the tactical use of nuclear weapons is that of such weapons deployed at sea for use against surface and submarine vessels. Until 1992, vessels of the United States Navy (and their aircraft) deployed various such weapons as bombs, rockets (guided and unguided), torpedoes, and depth charges. Such tactical naval nuclear weapons were considered more acceptable to use early in a conflict because there would be few civilian casualties. It was feared by many planners that such use would probably quickly have escalated into a large-scale nuclear war. This situation was particularly exacerbated by the fact that such weapons at sea were not constrained by the safeguards provided by the Permissive Action Link attached to U.S. Air Force and Army nuclear weapons. It is unknown if the navies of the other nuclear powers yet today deploy tactical nuclear weapons at sea.
The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review emphasised the need for the US to have sub-strategic nuclear weapons as additional layers for its nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear terrorism: Nuclear terrorism by non-state organizations or actors (even individuals) is a largely unknown and understudied factor in nuclear deterrence thinking, as states possessing nuclear weapons are susceptible to retaliation in kind, while sub- or trans-state actors may be less so. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given rise to the possibility that former Soviet nuclear weapons might become available on the black market (so-called 'loose nukes').
A number of other concerns have been expressed about the security of nuclear weapons in newer nuclear powers with relatively less stable governments, such as Pakistan, but in each case, the fears have been addressed to some extent by statements and evidence provided by those nations, as well as cooperative programs between nations. Worry remains, however, in many circles that a relative decrease in the security of nuclear weapons has emerged in recent years, and that terrorists or others may attempt to exert control over (or use) nuclear weapons, militarily applicable technology, or nuclear materials and fuel.
Another possible nuclear terrorism threat are devices designed to disperse radioactive materials over a large area using conventional explosives, called dirty bombs. The detonation of a "dirty bomb" would not cause a nuclear explosion, nor would it release enough radiation to kill or injure a large number of people. However, it could cause severe disruption and require potentially very costly decontamination procedures and increased spending on security measures.
Radioactive materials can also be used for targeted assassinations. For example, the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko was described by medical professionals, as "an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism." |
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