text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pisloader
Pisloader establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.[192] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc collects the OS version, country name, MAC address, computer name, physical memory statistics, and volume information for all drives on the system.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can remotely read the OCP UA structure from devices.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro can run shellcode it injects into a newly created process.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA551
TA551 has sent spearphishing attachments with password protected ZIP files.[222][223][224] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Demystifying Modern Windows Rootkits
This talk will demystify the process of writing a rootkit, moving past theory and instead walking the audience through the process of going from a driver that says "Hello World" to a driver that abuses never-before-seen hooking methods to control the user-mode ne... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Modern Secure Boot Attacks: Bypassing Hardware Root of Trust from Software
Many hardware vendors are armoring modern Secure Boot by moving Root of Trust to the hardware. While it is definitely the right direction to create more difficulties for the attacker, many layers of code exist between hard... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used a valid digital certificate for some of their malware.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete retrieves the user profile data (e.g., browsers) from Chrome and Firefox browsers.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1588.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tool
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts. Additionally, users may perform visual checks of the domains they visit; however, homographs in ASCII and in IDN domains may render manual checks difficult. Phishing training an... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Women in Security: Building a Female InfoSec Community in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan
The information security industry has historically been a male-dominated field, and today, unfortunately, this situation has not changed much. Indeed, the survey conducted by Frost & Sullivan in 2017 concluded that w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Changing UAC settings to "Always Notify" will give the user more visibility when UAC elevation is requested, however, this option will not be popular among users due to the constant UAC interruptions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker collects device information, including the device model and OS version.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to index and compress files into a send queue for exfiltration.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can collect location information, including GPS coordinates.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can collect the username from the victim's machine.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca modified the registry using the command reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Environment" /v UserInitMprLogonScript /t REG_SZ /d "[file path]" for persistence.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0364
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawDisk
RawDisk has been used to directly access the hard disk to help overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk content.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 KeenLab iOS Jailbreak Internals: Userland Read-Only Memory can be Dangerous
Modern operating systems nowadays implement read-only memory mappings at their CPU architecture level, preventing common security attacks. By mapping memories as read-only, the memory owner process can usually trust the memo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0946
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [2] Move system's root of trust to hardware to prevent tampering with the SPI flash memory. [3] Technologies such as Intel Boot G... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill can check for antivirus and antimalware programs.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has created self-signed digital certificates for use in HTTPS C2 traffic.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can collect the computer name from the machine,.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum was seen using a RAR archiver tool to compress/decompress data.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has collected the username from a victim machine.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has reflectively loaded a DLL to read, decrypt, and load an orchestrator file.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Efail: Breaking S/MIME and OpenPGP Email Encryption using Exfiltration Channels
OpenPGP and S/MIME are the two prime standards for providing end-to-end security for emails. From today's viewpoint this is surprising as both standards rely on outdated cryptographic primitives that were responsible for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
A variant of HOPLIGHT hooks lsass.exe, and lsass.exe then checks the Registry for the data value 'rdpproto' under the key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Name.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can use multiple APIs for discovery, communication, and execution.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the ftpUpload function to use the FTPManager:uploadFile method to upload files from the target system.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used remote desktop sessions for lateral movement.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed loading several APIs associated with Pass the Hash.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has been executed through luring victims into opening malicious documents.[167][105][168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has tested malware samples to determine AV detection and subsequently modified the samples to ensure AV evasion.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can change both the desktop wallpaper and the lock screen image to a custom image.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Preloading Insecurity In Your Electron
Modern browsers are complicated systems. They enforce numerous security mechanisms to ensure isolation between sites, facilitate web security protections and preventing untrusted remote content to compromise the security of the host. When working with Electr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's Blowfish key is encrypted with a public RSA key.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used malicious Trojans and DLL files to exfiltrate data from an infected host.[61][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris has the ability to collect recent files matching a hardcoded list of extensions prior to exfiltration.[185] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper can use DsRoleGetPrimaryDomainInformation to determine the role of the infected machine. CaddyWiper can also halt execution if the compromised host is identified as a domain controller.[74][75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. In Linux environments, users account-level access to at can be managed using at.allow and at.deny fil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can user PowerView to execute "net user" commands and create local system accounts.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy constantly attempts to download and execute files from the remote C2, including GoldenSpy itself if not found on the system.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rename System Utilities
Adversaries may rename legitimate system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for system utilities adversaries are capable of abusing. It may be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has used a task XML file named mssch.xml to run an IronPython script when a user logs in or when specific system events are created.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon has been seen overwriting features of disk structure such as the MBR.[1][2][3][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.[15][16] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Hunting Droids from the Inside
This talk will be a survey of different potentially harmful applications (PHAs), botnets and malware campaigns on Android that we encountered in 2016. I’ll walk through a variety of different malicious apps, explain the malware authors’ objectives and the techniques they... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:4H RAT
4H RAT sends an OS version identifier in its beacons.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group5
Malware used by Group5 is capable of watching the victim's screen.[71] | secon |
title:botconf2017 RetDec: An Open-Source Machine-Code Decompiler
Machine-code decompilation transforms an executable file into a high-level language. It has found its applications mostly in the field of reverse engineering, where analysts use decompilers to inspect suspicious binaries. This paper introduces RetDec, a r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Enforce execution of only signed PowerShell scripts. Sign profiles to avoid them from being modified. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can persist by modifying a .LNK file to include a backdoor.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can gather system information from a compromised host.[298] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerLess
PowerLess can stage stolen browser data in C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cup.tmp and keylogger data in C:\\Windows\\Temp\\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has collected files from network shared drives.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can harvest cookies from Internet Explorer, Edge, Chrome, and Naver Whale browsers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has attempted to get users to execute compromised installation files for legitimate software including compression applications, security software, browsers, file recovery applications, and other tools and utilities.[188][189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Configuration data used by Rising Sun has been encrypted using an RC4 stream algorithm.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering logging. The addition of the MiniNT registry key disables Event Viewer.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has used the WinRAR utility to compress and encrypt stolen files.[24] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 CloudLeak: DNN Model Extractions from Commercial MLaaS Platforms
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have been widely deployed for a variety of tasks across many disciplines, for example, image processing, natural language processing, and voice recognition. However, creating a successful DNN model depends on... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Breaking Managed Data Services in the Cloud
Cloud is the new operating system of the internet – almost all companies use the cloud to host workloads and data. While there are many talks about how to configure and maintain secure public cloud environments, there's little security research into the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has used Base64 to encode PowerShell commands.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has obtained and used tools such as Nirsoft WebBrowserPassVIew, Mimikatz, and PsExec.[62][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains multiple modules for injecting into processes, such as Invoke-PSInject.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete stores zipped files with profile data from installed web browsers.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used Windows built-in tool ntdsutil to extract the Active Directory (AD) database.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer has the ability to collect the username from an infected host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock has the capability to add its own custom backdoor password when it modifies the operating system of the affected network device.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
After initial installation, Raindrop runs a computation to delay execution.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
For early Gazer versions, the compilation timestamp was faked.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has encrypted malware payloads dropped on victim machines with AES and RC4 encryption.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can use cmd.exe to enable lateral movement using DCOM.[307] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can migrate into another process using reflective DLL injection.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has used WMI to recompile the Managed Object Format (MOF) files in the WMI repository.[58] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The B-MAD Approach to Threat Modeling
Threat modeling is a family of techniques for discovering what can go wrong with a system and improve its security. Threat modeling techniques often aim to be structured, systematic and comprehensive and have to intersect with the organization's systems for de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has added the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\UDPrint" /v Driver /d "spool.dll /f to load malware as a Print Processor.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke can use control flow flattening to obscure code.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL can delete files and directories.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can schedule tasks via the Windows COM API to maintain persistence.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can check for the presence of the Registry key HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Applications\VMwareHostOpen.exe before proceeding to its main functionality.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can delete data from a compromised device.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[5][6] These audits should also include if default ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used PowerShell scripts to execute malicious payloads and the DSInternals PowerShell module to make use of Active Directory features.[47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using the password hash of the AZUREADSSOACC account.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can perform a UAC bypass if it is not executed with administrator rights or if the infected host runs Windows Vista or later.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has established persistence via the Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon registry key.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Safeguarding UEFI Ecosystem: Firmware Supply Chain is Hard(coded)
The UEFI ecosystem is very complicated in terms of supply chain security where we have multiple parties involved in the firmware code development like Intel/AMD with its reference code, or AMI, Phoenix and Insyde with its core framewo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0151
ATT&CK Technique Name:HALFBAKED
HALFBAKED can obtain information about running processes on the victim.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can modify Registry values to store configuration strings, keylogger, and output of components.[49] | secon |
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