text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
titleblackhat:us-20 Carrying our Insecurities with Us: The Risks of Implanted Medical Devices in Secure Spaces
This talk explores the contradiction of allowing increasingly smart Implanted Medical Devices (IMD) in secure spaces through the combination of policy amendments and technical mitigations. The number of IMDs i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can inject its modules into various processes using reflective DLL loading.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0157
ATT&CK Technique Name:SOUNDBITE
SOUNDBITE is capable of enumerating and manipulating files and directories.[284] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 XMPP Stanza Smuggling or How I Hacked Zoom
XMPP is a popular instant messaging protocol based on XML that is used in messengers, online games and other applications. This talk will introduce a new way of attacking XMPP client software: XMPP stanza smuggling. More specifically, it will show how seem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1555.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Managers
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.[64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to printf.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet sends compromised victim information via HTTP.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo registers for the SCREEN_ON and SMS_DELIVER intents to perform actions when the device is unlocked and when the device receives an SMS message.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
The PipeMon installer has modified the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors to install PipeMon as a Print Processor.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chinoxy
Chinoxy can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean can delete various piece of device data, such as contacts, call logs, applications, SMS messages, email, plugins, and files in external storage.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 IoT Skimmer: Energy Market Manipulation through High-Wattage IoT Botnets
Despite the many conveniences afforded by Internet of Things (IoT) devices, their rapid and global deployment has increased the attack vector and raised serious security and privacy concerns for enterprise users and customers.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has targeted victims with remote administration tools including RDP.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner launched the QEMU services in the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder using launchctl. It also uses launchctl to unload all Launch Daemons when updating to a newer version of LoudMiner.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy digitally signs the malware with a code-signing certificate.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to be suspicious about certificate errors. Adversaries may use their own certificates in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. Certificate errors may arise when the application’s certificate does not match the one expected by the host. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec is capable of listing contents of folders on the victim. Remsec also searches for custom network encryption software on victims.[250][251][252] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Phoenix Domain Attack: Vulnerable Links in Domain Name Delegation and Revocation
Phoenix Domain is a general and novel attack that allows adversaries to maintain the revoked malicious domain continuously resolvable at scale, which enables an old, mitigated attack, Ghost Domain. Phoenix Domain has... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has communicated with its C2 servers via HTTPS and HTTP POST requests.[311] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 When Everyone's Dog is Named Fluffy: Abusing the Brand New Security Questions in Windows 10 to Gain Domain-Wide Persistence
In Windows domain environments most attacks involve obtaining domain admin privileges. But that's not enough - once an attacker gets them, he has to make sure he doesn't lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has used Accept-Language to identify hosts in the United Kingdom, United States, France, and Spain.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 OEM Finder: Hunting Vulnerable OEM IoT Devices at Scale
Nowadays, many consumer IoT vendors employ an OEM production model. They purchase IoT devices from OEM suppliers, then customize and sell those devices under their own brands. While this production model can reduce the device manufacturing cos... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Breaking Secure Bootloaders
Bootloaders often use signature verification mechanisms in order to protect a device from executing malicious software. This talk aims to outline actionable weaknesses in modern bootloaders which allow attackers to deploy unsigned code, despite these protection mechanisms... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti Group
Winnti Group looked for a specific process running on infected servers.[274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0315
ATT&CK Technique Name:DualToy
DualToy side loads malicious or risky apps to both Android and iOS devices via a USB connection.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 HTTP/2: The Sequel is Always Worse
HTTP/2 is easily mistaken for a transport-layer protocol that can be swapped in with zero security implications for the website behind it. Two years ago, I presented HTTP Desync Attacks and kicked off a wave of request smuggling, but HTTP/2 escaped serious analysi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1048.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of writing a file to the compromised system from the C2 server.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to capture screenshots and webcam photos.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Systemd Service
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sliver
Sliver has the ability to support C2 communications over HTTP/S.[306][307][308] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can inject a suspended thread of its own process into a new process and initiate via the ResumeThread API.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 On Trust: Stories from the Front Lines
Time and again, we as consumers read about the latest significant data breach, and we feel a familiar disappointment. Disempowered, helpless, without recourse. Angry for being treated like a commodity. Frustrated that nothing's likely to change.On the other si... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 5G IMSI Catchers Mirage
IMSI catchers aka Stingrays aka fake base stations are well-known privacy threats to almost every mobile phone with SIM card connectivity (including iOS or Android-based) in the world. The cellular network generations such as 2G, 3G, and 4G are vulnerable to such almost undet... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems.By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used Mimikatz and a custom tool, SecHack, to harvest credentials. [83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Application isolation will limit the other processes and system features an exploited target can access. Examples of built in features are software restriction policies, AppLocker for Windows, and SELinux or AppArmor for Linux. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs downloads additional files from C2 servers.[251] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0213
ATT&CK Technique Name:DOGCALL
DOGCALL can capture microphone data from the victim's machine.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has compromised victims by directly exploiting vulnerabilities of public-facing servers, including those associated with Microsoft Exchange and Oracle GlassFish.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can search for network shares on the domain or workgroup using net view .[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can inject into known, vulnerable binaries on targeted hosts.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT executed Hildegard through the kubelet API run command and by executing commands on running containers.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has utilized mshta.exe to execute a malicious hta file.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used a reconnaissance module that can be used to retrieve the date and time of the system.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Block SMB traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Service Scanning
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon establishes persistence by creating a service and naming it based off the operating system version running on the current machine.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT uses Rundll32 for executing the dropper program.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary is capable of configuring itself as a service.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has the ability to download files to a compromised host.[339][432] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format com.[random_name].plist in the /Library/LaunchDaemons folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to true.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has deobfuscated itself before executing its commands.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can execute PowerShell scripts received from C2.[238][239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors spawned a new cmd.exe process to execute commands.[252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has used WMI to gather information about the system.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop used a custom packer for its Cobalt Strike payload, which was compressed using the LZMA algorithm.[69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use rundll32 for execution of its components.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used ntdsutil.exe to back up the Active Directory database, likely for credential access.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has searched folders and subfolders for files to encrypt.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader can enumerate all Common Language Runtimes (CLRs) and running Application Domains in the compromised AD FS server's Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe process.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to maintain persistence by creating scheduled tasks set to run every hour.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Felismus can download files from remote servers.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 10 introduced changes to prevent applications from accessing clipboard data if they are not in the foreground or set as the device’s default IME.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary has the capability to download files from the C2 server.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0624
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ecipekac
Ecipekac has used a valid, legitimate digital signature to evade detection.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use the QuarksPwDump tool to obtain local passwords and domain cached credentials.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 A Measured Response to a Grain of Rice
Over time, our hardware has become smaller, faster, cheaper - and also incredibly more complicated. Just like with software, this complexity brings with it both increased attack surfaces and a more difficult detection problem.Unfortunately right now, when it co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk deletes system files to make the OS unbootable. KillDisk also targets and deletes files with 35 different file extensions.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
For C0011, Transparent Tribe used malicious VBA macros within a lure document as part of the Crimson malware installation process onto a compromised host.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property is set to disabled unless there are application requirements.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has collected the user name from a compromised host using GetUserNameA.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Obfuscated Files or Information
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Message in a Broken Bottle: Exploring the Linux IPC Attack Surface
There might be some truth to the joke that "Linux" is what the systemd operating system used to be called. Systemd is one of several system services that run in userspace and communicate via IPC. You could almost imagine it as a mic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.[7] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Turla operations from a front row seat
Our research team at ESET has tracked the infamous Turla espionage group for many years. By leveraging unique telemetry data, forensic analysis of infected machines and in-depth malware reverse-engineering, we gained a quite comprehensive knowledge of their opera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT has gained execution on targeted systems through luring users to click on links to malicious URLs.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load oci.dll as a persistence mechanism.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can detect the infected machine's network topology using ipconfig and arp.[235] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can collect data from an infected host.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor will delete the folder containing malicious scripts if it detects the hostname as PIS-APP, PIS-MOB, WSUSPROXY, or PIS-DB.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
title:botconf2017 How to Compute the Clusterization of a Very Large Dataset of Malware with Open Source Tools for Fun & Profit?
Malware are now developed at an industrial scale and human analysts need automatic tools to help them.We propose here to present the results of our experiments on this difficult problem: how t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can monitor the clipboard for cryptocurrency addresses and change the intended address to one controlled by the adversary.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can use Base64 to encode information sent to its C2.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.013
ATT&CK Technique Name:KernelCallbackTable
Adversaries may abuse the KernelCallbackTable of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads. The KernelCallbackTable can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions availa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has staged data remotely prior to exfiltration.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all PTA agents in the Azure Management Portal to identify any unwanted or unapproved ones.[5] If ADFS is in use, review DLLs and executable files in the AD FS and Global Assembl... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 FragAttacks: Breaking Wi-Fi through Fragmentation and Aggregation
This presentation introduces three novel security-related design flaws in Wi-Fi and various widespread implementation flaws. An adversary can abuse these to inject packets or exfiltrate selected frames. As an example, it will be demo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used Winexe to install a service on the remote system.[54][55] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.