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[331.18 --> 331.60] Exactly. |
[331.60 --> 337.18] This specific example comes from the SolarWinds incident, which I'm pretty sure that most |
[337.18 --> 341.90] listeners will be aware of because it was such a high media impact case. |
[342.20 --> 346.64] To make a quick summary about it, what happened was a company called... |
[346.64 --> 348.08] I always get dogs mixed up. |
[348.16 --> 351.74] I think the name of the company is SolarWinds, and then the product is Orient IT, but maybe |
[351.74 --> 352.46] the other way around. |
[352.78 --> 355.06] I do really get confused about this all the time. |
[355.18 --> 356.58] I think the way you have it is right. |
[356.82 --> 357.34] Okay, great. |
[357.50 --> 359.32] That was really a 50-50 chance there. |
[359.32 --> 364.80] Anyway, this company got attacked, but it wasn't attacked for the information that it |
[364.80 --> 370.52] had because it was just a software company, which in itself had little value as an intelligence |
[370.52 --> 370.94] target. |
[371.38 --> 377.02] But the thing was that it had a high number of high-profile customers, and these customers |
[377.02 --> 382.18] were US government entities or big companies in the field. |
[382.18 --> 388.86] And what the attackers did was they were able to compromise the software build chain, and |
[388.86 --> 395.00] they were able to insert their own code inside of the software that was then pushed to customers. |
[395.38 --> 399.82] And using this, they were able to create a backdoor that would be automatically deployed |
[399.82 --> 401.42] at all SolarWinds customers. |
[401.42 --> 407.84] And then, you know, maybe two weeks or three weeks later, because this very stealthy attack |
[407.84 --> 412.18] had a very long sleeping time, it stayed dormant for a while to make sure it would remain very |
[412.18 --> 412.60] stealthy. |
[412.74 --> 416.02] But after a while, then it would start connecting to the C2 server. |
[416.24 --> 420.66] And then for all the targets that were deemed interesting by the attacker, they would receive |
[420.66 --> 424.18] a second stage payload that would allow them to get it to the network and then collect |
[424.18 --> 425.14] intelligence and whatnot. |
[425.14 --> 431.82] So the very first stage of the attack was just some modification of the code of the |
[431.82 --> 432.52] original program. |
[432.82 --> 434.02] This part was written in .NET. |
[434.32 --> 439.24] But then the second part, which is called SunShuttle, was actually written in Go language. |
[439.76 --> 444.28] So it was, for me, like the first time I was getting involved in reverse engineering for |
[444.28 --> 444.96] the Go language. |
[445.34 --> 446.72] The learning curve was a little steep. |
[447.36 --> 451.40] But then again, I kind of used this as a learning experience, but also as an example |
[451.40 --> 456.18] in future reverse engineering courses for other people that might be interested in learning |
[456.18 --> 459.30] how to, well, how to reverse engineer Go programs. |
[459.42 --> 463.80] But also, I think if you are a Go enthusiast, reverse engineering can allow you to get to |
[463.80 --> 468.36] know more about how the language actually works under the hood, which I think is also very |
[468.36 --> 470.98] interesting from a software development point of view. |
[471.42 --> 473.90] So that's one like famous example of Go malware. |
[474.24 --> 477.66] Are there other famous ones written in Go that you can think of off the top of your head? |
[477.92 --> 478.08] Yeah. |
[478.08 --> 483.38] So from the same incident, one of the companies that was breached through the Solwinds incident |
[483.38 --> 485.94] was Mendiant, now belongs to Google. |
[486.32 --> 489.90] And they were the ones that actually detected that there was something wrong in their network |
[489.90 --> 490.60] and reported it. |
[490.72 --> 494.00] And so kudos to them, really a great job on figuring out that something was wrong. |
[494.64 --> 499.52] But one of the things that the attackers were very interested in was getting access to the |
[499.52 --> 504.90] tool set that Mendiant was using for their own penetration testing and red teaming engagements. |
[504.90 --> 509.90] And it so happens that the tools that they were using were actually written in Go language, |
[510.06 --> 513.76] which I think is really interesting from an analyst perspective. |
[514.04 --> 519.20] So I think there's an interesting discussion to have about why they chose this language for |
[519.20 --> 520.72] their own offensive tools. |
[521.20 --> 527.40] There are a number of other projects on GitHub, which I can probably think of one called Stowaway |
[527.40 --> 532.02] on the top of my head, which has been also reused and modified by some threat actors. |
[532.36 --> 534.32] We'll add a link to that in the show notes. |
[534.44 --> 535.14] That sounds interesting. |
[535.34 --> 536.06] Yeah, sure. |
[536.44 --> 537.38] It's a networking tool. |
[537.50 --> 542.04] It's really something that proxies and stuff in and out of a network that goes between protocols |
[542.04 --> 542.82] and that kind of stuff. |
[542.90 --> 543.86] It's written in Go language. |
[544.02 --> 548.74] Pretty annoying to reverse engineer because it's a lot of Go routines talking to each other. |
[548.74 --> 551.40] Very hard to figure out how it's architecture. |
[551.40 --> 557.46] And another example I can think about is I'm not 100% sure, but I do believe that a commercial |
[557.46 --> 564.72] backdoor called BrutRatel, which is a big competitor or a new competitor maybe to CobaltStrike, |
[565.12 --> 572.68] which places enormous emphasis on evading detection and being able to slip through EDR solutions, |
[572.82 --> 575.70] et cetera, is also written in Go language, I do believe. |
[575.86 --> 577.50] But I would have to double check that. |
[577.50 --> 581.74] So these are examples of malware families written in Go language. |
[581.84 --> 584.30] And I think that over time, we're going to see more and more of them. |
[584.74 --> 586.04] Why do you think we're going to see more and more? |
[586.28 --> 587.58] Is there a specific reason? |
[587.64 --> 589.42] You mentioned that they were hard to reverse engineer. |
[589.56 --> 591.14] Is that part of it or all of it? |
[591.36 --> 593.54] Yeah, there are a few reasons. |
[593.92 --> 600.94] The first reason I think is probably related to the ease of use for the developers. |
[601.06 --> 605.68] I don't mean that Go is easier to program than other languages, but the fact that it generates |
[605.68 --> 610.74] statically built executables, binaries that are self-contained, that do not need any additional |
[610.74 --> 613.64] libraries, is kind of very comfortable for attackers. |
[614.08 --> 617.64] Like, you know, they create their backdoor, they send it to the victim, or, you know, they |
[617.64 --> 620.52] deploy it at the victim one way or the other, and then it just works, right? |
[620.56 --> 623.88] You don't have to think about, you know, is this DLL present on the system, or do I have |
[623.88 --> 626.22] to pull in additional libraries, et cetera? |
[626.22 --> 631.76] So this is something that makes running programs very easy on victim machines where you do not |
[631.76 --> 632.58] control the environment. |
[632.58 --> 636.94] A long time ago, like maybe 10 years ago, it was kind of a problem because you cannot |
[636.94 --> 639.88] send binaries that are two or three megabytes big to victims. |
[640.04 --> 644.66] You know, if your attack vector is, you know, infected PDF or infected Word documents, then, |
[644.76 --> 649.14] you know, you cannot really send over email a PDF that ends up being five megabytes big |
[649.14 --> 651.58] because, you know, back in the day it would be rejected. |
[651.82 --> 656.46] Or maybe, you know, the victim, you know, has some limit on their mailbox, or maybe they |
[656.46 --> 660.06] have a slow connection that is not going to be able to retrieve that binary. |
[660.06 --> 663.78] In Europe or in the US, in the Western world, it used to be fine. |
[663.88 --> 667.78] But, you know, if you think about victims that are in third world countries where the |
[667.78 --> 671.50] internet access is not as good, then it used to be some real, a real issue for attackers. |
[671.86 --> 676.24] Now that, you know, the internet connectivity is pretty much, well, at least way better in |
[676.24 --> 680.70] most parts of the world than having backdoors that are, you know, five or 10, maybe 20 megabytes |
[680.70 --> 682.80] is really not that much of an issue anymore, I think. |
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