metadata
license: mit
tags:
- security
- poc
- executorch
Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch Method::init delegates vector length OOB
Method::init indexes ExecutionPlan.delegates[i] using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default Program::Verification::Minimal, loading a malicious .pte and calling Method::load triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at method.cpp:955.
Related: forged BackendDelegate.compile_specs()->size() → PopulateCompileSpecs HBO at method.cpp:179.
Distinct from packaged values/chains/instructions, READY operators/args, READY constant/mutable offsets, MethodMeta sizes, WebGPU, Vela, VGF.
Files
poc_method_load_delegates_asan.cpp,asan.log(delegates-oob)- related:
compile-specs-oob NOTES.md
./poc_method_load_delegates_asan delegates-oob