| --- |
| license: mit |
| tags: [security, poc, executorch] |
| --- |
| # Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch Method::init `delegates` vector length OOB |
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| `Method::init` indexes `ExecutionPlan.delegates[i]` using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default `Program::Verification::Minimal`, loading a malicious `.pte` and calling `Method::load` triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at `method.cpp:955`. |
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| Related: forged `BackendDelegate.compile_specs()->size()` → `PopulateCompileSpecs` HBO at `method.cpp:179`. |
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| Distinct from packaged values/chains/instructions, READY operators/args, READY constant/mutable offsets, MethodMeta sizes, WebGPU, Vela, VGF. |
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| ## Files |
| - `poc_method_load_delegates_asan.cpp`, `asan.log` (delegates-oob) |
| - related: `compile-specs-oob` |
| - `NOTES.md` |
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|
| ```bash |
| ./poc_method_load_delegates_asan delegates-oob |
| ``` |
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