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license: mit
tags:
  - security
  - poc
  - executorch

Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch Method::load values vector length OOB

Method::parse_values / get_num_external_constants indexes ExecutionPlan.values[i] using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default Program::Verification::Minimal, loading a malicious .pte and calling Method::load triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at method.cpp:324.

Distinct from READY constant/mutable offsets OOB, MethodMeta sizes OOB, WebGPU, and Vela.

Files

  • poc_method_load_values_asan.cpp, asan.log (values-oob)
  • related: chains-oob, instructions-oob
  • NOTES.md
./poc_method_load_values_asan values-oob