| --- |
| license: mit |
| tags: [security, poc, executorch] |
| --- |
| # Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch Method::load `values` vector length OOB |
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| `Method::parse_values` / `get_num_external_constants` indexes `ExecutionPlan.values[i]` using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default `Program::Verification::Minimal`, loading a malicious `.pte` and calling `Method::load` triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at `method.cpp:324`. |
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| Distinct from READY constant/mutable offsets OOB, MethodMeta sizes OOB, WebGPU, and Vela. |
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| ## Files |
| - `poc_method_load_values_asan.cpp`, `asan.log` (values-oob) |
| - related: `chains-oob`, `instructions-oob` |
| - `NOTES.md` |
|
|
| ```bash |
| ./poc_method_load_values_asan values-oob |
| ``` |
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|
