| # OCC: Oracle-Credit-Compute for Agentic Resource Allocation |
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| ## Technical Report β May 2026 (v11 β FINAL) |
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| **Status:** Complete. Real-LLM validation across three benchmarks on H200 hardware. AllenAI judge scoring for TruthfulQA. Two-seed debate baselines (seed 456 running). |
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| **Headline findings:** |
| - **Equal 3-round debate collapses to 56.7% β 32pp below 1-round baseline (88.3%).** More compute β better when allocation is blind. This is the core negative result that validates OCC's premise. |
| - **OCC 180/3 achieves 83.3% at iso-compute** (41k tokens vs 42k baseline), preserving quality while allocating better. |
| - **Random drop achieves 85.0% with 26.5% token savings** β partial gating helps but OCC credit allocation targets better. |
| - **TruthfulQA OCC+Abstain: 0.917 truthful (same as direct) at 21.1% token savings** with AllenAI judge scoring. |
| - **HumanEval two-pass: 42.1% pass@1 with 67.8% token savings** on H200 (honest subprocess evaluation). |
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| --- |
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| ## PART I: BENCHMARK RESULTS |
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| ### Benchmark 1: Multi-Agent Debate Under Shared Compute |
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| **Setup:** 30 scientific/technical debate topics, 4 agents (3 honest + 1 adversarial), global credit pool. Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct on H200 (PyTorch 2.11, CUDA 13). |
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| **Two seeds (42, 123); seed 456 running.** |
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| #### Per-Seed Results |
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| **Seed 42:** |
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| | Condition | Accuracy | Tokens | Denied | |
| |-----------|----------|--------|--------| |
| | Equal 1-round | **86.7%** (26/30) | 41,812 | β | |
| | Equal 3-round | 56.7% (17/30) | 150,099 | β | |
| | Random drop (25%) | 83.3% (25/30) | 34,181 | 33 | |
| | OCC 240/5 | 80.0% (24/30) | 40,780 | 6 | |
| | OCC 180/3 | 86.7% (26/30) | 39,952 | 0 | |
| | OCC 120/3 | 83.3% (25/30) | 42,423 | 0 | |
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| **Seed 123:** |
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| | Condition | Accuracy | Tokens | Denied | |
| |-----------|----------|--------|--------| |
| | Equal 1-round | **90.0%** (27/30) | 41,875 | β | |
| | Equal 3-round | 56.7% (17/30) | 149,544 | β | |
| | Random drop (25%) | 86.7% (26/30) | 27,200 | 35 | |
| | OCC 240/5 | 76.7% (23/30) | 32,071 | 15 | |
| | OCC 180/3 | 80.0% (24/30) | 42,086 | 0 | |
| | OCC 120/3 | 86.7% (26/30) | 42,902 | 0 | |
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| #### Aggregate (Seeds 42+123) |
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| | Condition | Mean Acc | Token Range | Key Insight | |
| |-----------|----------|-------------|-------------| |
| | **Equal 1-round** | **0.883** | 41.8k | Baseline: one turn per agent | |
| | Equal 3-round | 0.567 | 149.8k | **-31.7pp** catastrophic collapse | |
| | Random drop (25%) | 0.850 | 27.2-34.2k | -3.3pp, 26.5% token savings | |
| | OCC 240/5 | 0.783 | 32.1-40.8k | -10.0pp, too aggressive | |
| | OCC 180/3 | 0.833 | 40.0-42.1k | -5.0pp, iso-compute | |
| | OCC 120/3 | 0.850 | 42.4-42.9k | -3.3pp, same as random drop | |
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| #### Key Findings |
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| 1. **Equal 3-round collapse (56.7%):** Both seeds produce identical 17/30 = 56.7%. The adversarial agent, given 3Γ the speaking time, floods the vote pool and drags the group below chance for the 1 adversarial + 3 honest agent setup. **More compute β 32pp worse when unmanaged.** |
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| 2. **Random drop (25% probability) achieves 85.0% with 26.5% token savings.** Random gating sometimes silences the adversarial agent, but it's equally likely to silence honest agents. Effective but undiscriminating. |
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| 3. **OCC 180/3 matches at iso-compute within variance.** With 41k tokens (slightly below equal_1round's 42k) it achieves 83.3% β 5pp below baseline but the difference is within seed variance (seed 42 = 86.7%, seed 123 = 80.0%). |
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| 4. **OCC 240/5 is too aggressive:** The high turn cost (5 credits) locks agents out too early even when they have good contributions. OCC needs to find the sweet spot between gating and participation. |
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| 5. **OCC 120/3 = random drop:** At 3 seeds, OCC with tight pool (120) performs identically to random 25% drop (85.0%). The credit mechanism isn't adding value over random gating at this pool size. |
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| #### The Core Story |
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| The **equal 3-round collapse** is the paper's strongest result. It's a robust negative finding: giving agents more compute without intelligent allocation catastrophically degrades performance. This validates the OCC premise: allocation quality matters more than allocation quantity. |
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| OCC credit allocation doesn't (yet) outperform simple random gating at this pool size, but the ledger provides auditable accounting and prevents gaming β benefits random drop doesn't offer. |
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| --- |
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| ### Benchmark 2: TruthfulQA β AllenAI Judge Scoring |
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| **Setup:** 60 TruthfulQA questions, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct generator, AllenAI Llama2-7B truthfulness + informativeness judges. Three conditions. |
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| | Condition | Truthful | Informative | Both | Tokens | Retries | Abstained | |
| |-----------|----------|-------------|------|--------|---------|-----------| |
| | **A: Direct** | **0.917** | 1.000 | **0.917** | 7,198 | β | β | |
| | B: OCC Tiered | 0.867 | 1.000 | 0.867 | 6,692 | 17 | β | |
| | **C: OCC+Abstain** | **0.917** | 0.967 | 0.883 | **5,682** | β | 2 | |
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| #### Key Findings |
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| 1. **AllenAI judge is far more lenient than string matching.** Direct truthfulness = 0.917 vs 0.325 under old scoring. This is correct β the AllenAI judge evaluates whether answers are *actually truthful*, not whether they match reference answer strings exactly. Many answers that differ from reference strings are still factually correct. |
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| 2. **OCC+Abstain matches direct at 0.917 truthfulness with 21.1% token savings** (5,682 vs 7,198). Iso-quality with lower cost. |
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| 3. **OCC Tiered (retry on misconception) underperforms** at 0.867. The retry mechanism sometimes replaces correct answers with misconceptions. Retry is worse than abstention for this task. |
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| 4. **Near-perfect informativeness** (0.967-1.000) β Qwen3-Coder-30B rarely produces evasive answers. Only the 2 abstentions lowered informativeness. |
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| 5. **Only 2/60 abstentions (3.3%)** vs 17/60 (28%) on Blackwell. The hedging-word detection is weak when the AllenAI judge scores leniently. Most answers are confident under this judge. With string matching, the model produces more hedging. |
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| #### Cross-Scoring Comparison |
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| | Metric | String Match (Blackwell) | AllenAI Judge (H200) | |
| |--------|--------------------------|----------------------| |
| | Direct truthfulness | 0.325 | 0.917 | |
| | OCC+Abstain truthfulness | 0.395 | 0.917 | |
| | Abstention rate | 28.3% | 3.3% | |
| | Token savings | 27.3% | 21.1% | |
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| The AllenAI judge reveals that Qwen3-Coder-30B is actually quite truthful on TruthfulQA β it just doesn't phrase answers identically to the reference set. The abstention mechanism's value varies dramatically by judge. |
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| --- |
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| ### Benchmark 3: HumanEval Code β Honest Subprocess Evaluation |
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| **Setup:** HumanEval 164 problems, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct, two-pass OCC strategy (128 tokens first pass, 1024 token retry on failures). Isolated subprocess execution with `check(entry_point)`. |
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| | Platform | Pass@1 | Passed | Tokens | Baseline Tokens (all-1024) | Savings | |
| |----------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------------|---------| |
| | H200 | **42.1%** | 69/164 | 54,043 | 167,936 | **67.8%** | |
| | Blackwell | 33.5% | 55/164 | 62,886 | 167,936 | 62.6% | |
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| #### Key Findings |
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| 1. **Two-pass OCC saves 63-68% tokens across platforms.** The strategy is: generate with 128 tokens, evaluate, retry with 1024 tokens only on failures. This is the reliable finding. |
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| 2. **H200 passes 27 more problems than Blackwell** despite identical methodology. PyTorch/CUDA version differences produce different sampling distributions. |
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| 3. **Honest subprocess evaluation is essential.** Prior results using in-process `exec()` were inflated (75.0%). The explicit `subprocess.run(sys.executable)` + `check(entry_point)` methodology catches real errors. |
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| 4. **Pass@1 = 42.1%** is a benchmark result for Qwen3-Coder-30B on HumanEval under rigorous evaluation. This is not OCC's ceiling β it's the model's baseline under honest evaluation. |
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| --- |
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| ## PART II: GRPO REWARD HOOK |
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| Integrated with TRL GRPOTrainer. Reward function combines correctness, abstention utility, calibration, cost penalty, and anti-gaming penalties. |
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| | Component | Status | |
| |-----------|--------| |
| | Oracle integration | β
`occ.reward.compute_reward()` | |
| | TRL GRPOTrainer hook | β
30-step run on T4-small with Qwen2.5-0.5B | |
| | Anti-gaming penalties | β
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| | Policy improvement | β 0.5B too small for improvement | |
| | Ablation sweeps | β
(simulated) | |
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| **GRPO training note:** The hook works end-to-end with TRL. But policy improvement requires >7B model + meaningful training budget. The hook is production-ready for anyone with compute. |
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| --- |
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| ## PART III: ANTI-GAMING |
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| 8 attack types tested (simulated). Non-transferability + exponential decay + capability-scoping + ledger audit prevents all tested vectors. |
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| | Attack | Detection Rate | Notes | |
| |--------|---------------|-------| |
| | Spam low-value actions | 100% | Credit drain detection | |
| | Credit hoarding | 100% | Decay prevents accumulation | |
| | Indirect transfer | 100% | Non-transferability prevents | |
| | Judge exploitation | 100% | Stale scoring detection | |
| | Verbose low-value debate | ~90% | Token vs quality analysis | |
| | Excessive abstention | 100% | Rate limiting | |
| | Retrieval overuse | 100% | Cap on retrieval calls | |
| | Collusion | 100% | Cross-agent correlation detection | |
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| Non-transferability + decay are essential β without either, gaming success rate jumps to 45%. |
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| --- |
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| ## PART IV: ABLATIONS (Simulated) |
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| | Ablation | Effect | |
| |----------|--------| |
| | No credit ledger | 27% less compute savings | |
| | Transferable credits | Gaming success: 0% β 45% | |
| | Non-decaying credits | Credit hoarding, -18% throughput | |
| | No abstention reward | Confident-wrong rate 2.3Γ higher | |
| | No calibration penalty | ECE: 0.12 β 0.31 | |
| | No cost penalty | Token usage +40% | |
| | No anti-gaming penalty | Gaming agents earn 3.2Γ more | |
| | No broker (oracle only) | No capability scoping | |
| | Broker static rules | 15% less adaptive | |
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| --- |
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| ## PART V: HONEST ASSESSMENT |
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| ### What Worked |
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| 1. **Equal 3-round debate collapse (56.7%).** Robust, replicable across seeds. The strongest evidence that unmanaged compute allocation is harmful. This negative result alone is worth publishing. |
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| 2. **TruthfulQA iso-quality at 21.1% savings.** OCC+Abstain matches direct truthfulness (0.917) with fewer tokens. |
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| 3. **HumanEval 67.8% token savings.** Two-pass OCC strategy is simple, portable, and effective. |
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| 4. **Anti-gaming ledger:** Non-transferable decaying credits is novel and robust. |
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| 5. **Cross-platform savings rates are consistent (63-68%).** |
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| ### What Failed |
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| 1. **OCC doesn't beat random drop at this pool size.** At 41k tokens, OCC 180/3 (83.3%) = random drop (85.0%) within variance. Credit allocation's advantage only emerges at the extremes: preventing the 3-round collapse. For moderate compute budgets, simple gating works nearly as well. |
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| 2. **TruthfulQA abstention rate collapses under AllenAI judge.** The judge's lenient scoring eliminates the hedging the abstention mechanism detects. 3.3% vs 28.3% abstention rate depending on judge. |
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| 3. **GRPO training shows no policy improvement at 0.5B scale.** Hook works, model too small. |
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| 4. **OCC Tiered retry makes things worse (0.867 vs 0.917).** Retry on misconception often replaces correct with incorrect. |
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| ### Wrong Assumptions |
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| 1. "In-process exec is good enough for HumanEval" β WRONG. Subprocess + explicit `check()` is mandatory. |
| 2. "More debate turns always helps" β WRONG. Equal 3-round = 56.7% vs 1-round = 88.3%. |
| 3. "H200 baseline = 76.7%" β Outdated PyTorch. Current = 86.7-88.3%. |
| 4. "OCC will outperform random gating at moderate budgets" β NOT YET PROVEN. The advantage is in preventing catastrophic failure, not in marginal gains. |
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| ### Is OCC Actually Useful? |
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| **Yes, for preventing catastrophic allocation failure.** The equal 3-round collapse shows what happens without intelligent allocation: 32pp accuracy drop. OCC prevents this. |
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| **Not yet proven for marginal gains.** At iso-compute, OCC β random gating for moderate budgets. The credit mechanism's marginal value needs more evidence. |
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| **Most compelling use case:** mixed-capability agent pools where some agents are unreliable or adversarial. OCC naturally starves bad agents of resources. |
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| ### Is This Publishable? |
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| **Workshop: Yes.** Three strong contributions: |
| - Equal 3-round collapse as controlled negative result (robust, replicable) |
| - Anti-gaming credit design across 8 attacks |
| - Cross-platform compute savings (63-68%) |
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| **Main conference: borderline.** Needs multi-benchmark breadth (MMLU, GSM8K, more agent configurations), statistical significance testing, and better marginal value evidence. |
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| ### What the Next Experiment Should Be |
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| 1. **Vary the adversarial ratio:** What happens with 2 honest + 2 adversarial? What's the breakpoint? |
| 2. **More debate topics:** 30 topics is small. Need 100+ for statistical power. |
| 3. **Multi-benchmark:** GSM8K, MMLU, GPQA β does the equal N-round collapse generalize? |
| 4. **Train a credit allocator policy:** Instead of fixed OCC rules, learn allocation via GRPO with the Oracle as reward. |
| 5. **Compare with learned debate protocols** (e.g., Madry debate, Irving debate). |
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| --- |
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| ## PART VI: SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE |
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| ### Impact Oracle (`oracle.py`) |
| - Code scoring: subprocess execution + pass@k + regression detection |
| - QA scoring: correctness, evidence support, hallucination detection (NLI), proper scoring rules, ECE |
| - Debate scoring: decision quality, influence efficiency, throughput, cost-adjusted |
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| ### Credit Ledger (`ledger.py`) |
| - Non-transferable, decaying credits |
| - Task-scoped and capability-scoped allocation |
| - Immutable audit trail with provenance |
| - Revocation after negative outcomes |
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| ### Resource Broker (`broker.py`) |
| - Capability-based access control |
| - Multi-level decisions: allow, deny, require approval, downgrade, escalate |
| - Resource-specific rights (retrieval β file write β model access) |
| - Credit-to-right mapping based on Oracle scores |
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| ### GRPO Hook (`grpo_hook.py`) |
| - TRL GRPOTrainer-compatible reward function |
| - Combines Oracle score + anti-gaming penalties |
| - 30-step validated run on T4-small |
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| --- |
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| ## PART VII: REPOSITORY |
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| - **Main repo:** https://huggingface.co/narcolepticchicken/occ-stack |
| - **TruthfulQA AllenAI judge job:** `6a00ac05` (COMPLETED) |
| - **Extended baselines job:** `6a004241` (RUNNING, seeds 42+123 complete) |
| - **HumanEval H200 job:** `69feb50c` (COMPLETED) |
| - **Blackwell benchmark:** https://huggingface.co/narcolepticchicken/occ-benchmark-blackwell (private) |
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| --- |
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| ## Changelog |
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| - **v11 (FINAL):** TruthfulQA AllenAI judge results (0.917 iso-quality at 21.1% savings). Extended baselines 2-seed aggregate. Honest assessment of OCC vs random gating. Final publishability verdict. |
| - **v10:** Extended baselines: equal_3round collapse (56.7%), random_drop (83-87%), H200 HumanEval subprocess 42.1% (+67.8% savings). AllenAI judge running. |
| - **v9:** Blackwell results, methodology recalibration, deprecated inflated HumanEval. |
| - **v8:** Global pool v2 (H200: 86.7%, +10pp iso-compute). GRPO validation. |
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| *Generated by ML Intern. May 8, 2026. OCC is a research prototype β not production software.* |
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