Daily Papers

Linear probing and activation steering use linear directions to predict and control behavior-level concepts such as correctness, safety, and social bias in question answering. We call these behavior-level concept directions. Drawing on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) and circuit studies, these directions are often interpreted as concept representations. Yet controlled evidence for linear concept structure and local mechanisms does not establish that these directions represent the intended behavioral concepts, leaving probing and steering without a unified theoretical account. We propose the Answer-Basin Representation Hypothesis (ABRH): the model's own answer measure organizes the linear structure of these directions. For each question, all continuations yielding the same answer form an answer basin, whose mass is their total probability; these masses define the model's answer distribution. ABRH posits that its concentration before generation and the relative mass of each answer after generation are represented along linear directions shared across questions. Experiments span four Qwen2.5 and Gemma-3 models on correctness, social bias, and safety tasks. Decoupling concept labels from basin mass shows that probing and steering exhibit concept-consistent effects when labels align with mass orderings, weaken as mass gaps shrink, and reverse under conflict. Probes trained solely on mass orderings among wrong answers still select correct answers; a fixed steering vector can instead favor wrong answers when labels conflict with mass orderings. These results support an answer-measure account of behavior-level concept directions and of when probing and steering succeed, fail, or reverse.

Despite superior reasoning prowess demonstrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a lack of understanding prevails around the internal mechanisms of the models that facilitate CoT generation. This work investigates the neural sub-structures within LLMs that manifest CoT reasoning from a mechanistic point of view. From an analysis of Llama-2 7B applied to multistep reasoning over fictional ontologies, we demonstrate that LLMs deploy multiple parallel pathways of answer generation for step-by-step reasoning. These parallel pathways provide sequential answers from the input question context as well as the generated CoT. We observe a functional rift in the middle layers of the LLM. Token representations in the initial half remain strongly biased towards the pretraining prior, with the in-context prior taking over in the later half. This internal phase shift manifests in different functional components: attention heads that write the answer token appear in the later half, attention heads that move information along ontological relationships appear in the initial half, and so on. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards mechanistic investigation of CoT reasoning in LLMs.

Circuit analysis is a promising technique for understanding the internal mechanisms of language models. However, existing analyses are done in small models far from the state of the art. To address this, we present a case study of circuit analysis in the 70B Chinchilla model, aiming to test the scalability of circuit analysis. In particular, we study multiple-choice question answering, and investigate Chinchilla's capability to identify the correct answer label given knowledge of the correct answer text. We find that the existing techniques of logit attribution, attention pattern visualization, and activation patching naturally scale to Chinchilla, allowing us to identify and categorize a small set of `output nodes' (attention heads and MLPs). We further study the `correct letter' category of attention heads aiming to understand the semantics of their features, with mixed results. For normal multiple-choice question answers, we significantly compress the query, key and value subspaces of the head without loss of performance when operating on the answer labels for multiple-choice questions, and we show that the query and key subspaces represent an `Nth item in an enumeration' feature to at least some extent. However, when we attempt to use this explanation to understand the heads' behaviour on a more general distribution including randomized answer labels, we find that it is only a partial explanation, suggesting there is more to learn about the operation of `correct letter' heads on multiple choice question answering.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, growing evidence suggests much of their success stems from memorized answer-reasoning patterns rather than genuine inference. In this work, we investigate a central question: are LLMs primarily anchored to final answers or to the textual pattern of reasoning chains? We propose a five-level answer-visibility prompt framework that systematically manipulates answer cues and probes model behavior through indirect, behavioral analysis. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a strong and consistent reliance on explicit answers. The performance drops by 26.90\% when answer cues are masked, even with complete reasoning chains. These findings suggest that much of the reasoning exhibited by LLMs may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than true inference, calling into question their inferential depth. Our study uncovers the answer-anchoring phenomenon with rigorous empirical validation and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes reasoning in LLMs.

Vision-language models are known to encode spatial information in their hidden states, yet often fail to use it when answering. However, it remains unclear when and where this encoded information reaches the answer. We address this with direction patching, a class-conditioned causal intervention applied across layers, token positions, and prompt formats. Using spatial-ID directions constructed following prior encoding evidence, we find that causal influence on answer logits emerges only at mid-to-deep depths. Text chain-of-thought suppresses immediate object-word argmax-level transport in most models, while visually grounded prompts keep it open. Positive target-logit gain can remain below the argmax threshold, and transport can re-emerge at the final prefix token or at the answer step in deeper layers. Across the ten VLMs we study, these local effects form descriptive transport patterns. Complementary experiments characterize how these patterns shift across datasets, attributes, and encoding amplitudes. Together, these results reframe the encoding-grounding gap as a problem of conditional transport in VLMs.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Multimodal language models (MLLMs) exhibit promising spatial reasoning capabilities, yet the internal mechanisms supporting them remain poorly understood. We uncover S-Space, a linear representation subspace in which object-token representations encode continuous coordinates along horizontal, vertical, and distance axes. Although we identify these axes by differentiating spatial-answer scores with respect to object-token activations, S-Space is intrinsic rather than induced by specific data or prompts, remaining readable under non-spatial questions. We show that S-Space functions as an internal spatial workspace of MLLMs. Perception encodes object locations into it, forming spatial representations that can be directly read out to support accurate spatial judgments. Internal reasoning transforms it for changing viewpoints. Verbal responses selectively access it, evidenced by causal interventions that alter spatial judgments while largely preserving non-spatial responses. Case studies further show that S-Space assigns locations to unseen entities and the observer, and connects physical directions with abstract linguistic meanings, suggesting both the capabilities and limitations of large-scale language training. Finally, we use S-Space as a diagnostic tool for spatial reasoning failures. Direction-word readouts reveal systematic coupling between cardinal and image-relative reference frames. More importantly, a perception-computation decomposition exposes a key bottleneck: MLLMs can form capable spatial representations, yet fall short in the spatial transformations required to reason reliably across viewpoint changes.

Reasoning in large language models unfolds through diverse functional operations, such as problem formulation, goal decomposition, and deduction. Although these operations are explicitly distinguished in text, little is known about how they are geometrically organized in representation spaces. To this end, we investigate whether distinct reasoning operations exhibit corresponding geometric structure in hidden representations. We find that operations are separable in held-out representations, with separability peaking in middle layers, and verify that this structure is not explained by lexical or positional confounds. Across layers, token-wise operation-alignment becomes more distributed over spans, while identical surface tokens are represented differently depending on the operation of its surrounding chunk. Attention-masking interventions further show that operation-aligned representations at chunk onset depend on preceding reasoning context. Consequently, our work demonstrates that language models maintain representational correspondence between linguistic reasoning expressions and their internal geometric structures. Code and project materials are available at https://github.com/naver-ai/beneath-cot.

In community-based question answering (CQA) platforms, automatic answer ranking for a given question is critical for finding potentially popular answers in early times. The mainstream approaches learn to generate answer ranking scores based on the matching degree between question and answer representations as well as the influence of respondents. However, they encounter two main limitations: (1) Correlations between answers in the same question are often overlooked. (2) Question and respondent representations are built independently of specific answers before affecting answer representations. To address the limitations, we devise a novel graph-based tri-attention network, namely GTAN, which has two innovations. First, GTAN proposes to construct a graph for each question and learn answer correlations from each graph through graph neural networks (GNNs). Second, based on the representations learned from GNNs, an alternating tri-attention method is developed to alternatively build target-aware respondent representations, answer-specific question representations, and context-aware answer representations by attention computation. GTAN finally integrates the above representations to generate answer ranking scores. Experiments on three real-world CQA datasets demonstrate GTAN significantly outperforms state-of-the-art answer ranking methods, validating the rationality of the network architecture.

Reverse Chain-of-Thought Generation (RCG) synthesizes reasoning traces from query-answer pairs, but runs the risk of producing post-hoc rationalizations: when models can see the answer during generation, the answer serves as a cognitive anchor that shapes the entire explanation. We formalize this phenomenon through a three-level measurement hierarchy: lexical, entropic, and probabilistic anchoring, each captures surface artifacts, entropy dynamics, and latent answer dependence, respectively. We analyze semantic suppression, the intuitive mitigation strategy that instructs models to ignore the answer, to find out its counterproduction: while it reduces lexical overlap, it paradoxically increases entropic and probabilistic anchoring. Drawing on Ironic Process Theory from cognitive psychology, we attribute this failure to active monitoring of the forbidden answer, which inadvertently deepens dependence on it. To break this cycle, we propose Structural Skeleton-guided Reasoning (SSR), a two-phase approach that first generates an answer-invariant functional skeleton structure, then uses this skeleton to guide full trace generation. By redirecting the information flow to structural planning rather than answer monitoring, SSR consistently reduces anchoring across all three levels. We further introduce Distilled SSR (SSR-D), which fine-tunes models on teacher-generated SSR traces to ensure reliable structural adherence. Experiments across open-ended reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SSR-D achieves up to 10% improvement over suppression baselines while preserving out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization.

Math reasoning has become the poster child of progress in large language models (LLMs), with new models rapidly surpassing human-level performance on benchmarks like MATH and AIME. But as math leaderboards improve week by week, it is worth asking: do these gains reflect broader problem-solving ability or just narrow overfitting? To answer this question, we evaluate over 20 open-weight reasoning-tuned models across a broad suite of tasks, including math, scientific QA, agent planning, coding, and standard instruction-following. We surprisingly find that most models that succeed in math fail to transfer their gains to other domains. To rigorously study this phenomenon, we conduct controlled experiments on Qwen3-14B models using math-only data but different tuning methods. We find that reinforcement learning (RL)-tuned models generalize well across domains, while supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-tuned models often forget general capabilities. Latent-space representation and token-space distribution shift analyses reveal that SFT induces substantial representation and output drift, while RL preserves general-domain structure. Our results suggest a need to rethink standard post-training recipes, particularly the reliance on SFT-distilled data for advancing reasoning models.

This paper presents stacked attention networks (SANs) that learn to answer natural language questions from images. SANs use semantic representation of a question as query to search for the regions in an image that are related to the answer. We argue that image question answering (QA) often requires multiple steps of reasoning. Thus, we develop a multiple-layer SAN in which we query an image multiple times to infer the answer progressively. Experiments conducted on four image QA data sets demonstrate that the proposed SANs significantly outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches. The visualization of the attention layers illustrates the progress that the SAN locates the relevant visual clues that lead to the answer of the question layer-by-layer.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

Hybrid-thinking multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allow a single model to alternate between deliberative thinking and latency-efficient non-thinking inference. Although these modes differ in reasoning budget, their delivered responses should satisfy the same user-facing standard. Correctness alone may not characterize this response quality; we therefore evaluate task accuracy and response-pattern failures as complementary outcomes. We study this gap through response-pattern alignment: whether thinking and non-thinking interfaces preserve acceptable final-response behavior. We introduce PatternEval, a failure-enriched diagnostic benchmark comprising 2,415 multimodal prompts spanning visual perception and grounding, structured image understanding, and multimodal knowledge reasoning. PatternEval tests four recurrent failures: chain-of-thought leakage, response repetition, logical contradiction, and performative reasoning. Response-pattern failures are widespread across models from different providers, with non-thinking inference exhibiting substantially higher failure rates and thereby creating systematic misalignment between thinking and non-thinking interfaces. Motivated by this diagnosis, we develop PatternRM, a response-level reward model, and PatternRL, which introduces pattern-specific penalties during reinforcement learning. Experiments on Qwen3-VL-4B and Qwen3-VL-8B show that incorporating pattern-specific penalties into reinforcement learning can mitigate cross-mode misalignment while incurring a marginal task performance trade-off. Together, PatternEval and PatternRL provide an evaluation-and-training framework for aligning user-visible response patterns across hybrid-thinking interfaces.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is the dominant paradigm for inference-time scaling in language models, yet the causal influence of individual steps on the final answer poorly understood. We estimate each step's causal importance via early exit and use this measure to study how answers form across the reasoning traces of several model families. Across diverse tasks, we find that reasoning typically crosses a commitment boundary -- a sharp transition from transient intermediate guesses to a stable, high-confidence answer. This transition often happens in a single step, well before the model's reasoning block ends, and is followed by epiphenomenal CoT steps that leave the final answer probability unaltered. Using attention probes, we show that answer-formation stages can be linearly decoded from intermediate reasoning steps with high accuracy and generalize robustly to unseen reasoning tasks. We exploit this signal to early-exit reasoning blocks at the commitment boundary, reducing the length of CoTs up to 55\% on average with negligible impact on model performance.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can perform multi-hop reasoning implicitly -- producing correct answers without explicitly verbalizing intermediate steps -- but the underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this paper, we study how such implicit reasoning emerges by training transformers from scratch in a controlled symbolic environment. Our analysis reveals a three-stage developmental trajectory: early memorization, followed by in-distribution generalization, and eventually cross-distribution generalization. We find that training with atomic triples is not necessary but accelerates learning, and that second-hop generalization relies on query-level exposure to specific compositional structures. To interpret these behaviors, we introduce two diagnostic tools: cross-query semantic patching, which identifies semantically reusable intermediate representations, and a cosine-based representational lens, which reveals that successful reasoning correlates with the cosine-base clustering in hidden space. This clustering phenomenon in turn provides a coherent explanation for the behavioral dynamics observed across training, linking representational structure to reasoning capability. These findings provide new insights into the interpretability of implicit multi-hop reasoning in LLMs, helping to clarify how complex reasoning processes unfold internally and offering pathways to enhance the transparency of such models.

Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations are usually treated as defects of the model or its decoding strategy. Drawing on classical linguistics, we argue that a query's form can also shape a listener's (and model's) response. We operationalize this insight by constructing a 22-dimension query feature vector covering clause complexity, lexical rarity, and anaphora, negation, answerability, and intention grounding, all known to affect human comprehension. Using 369,837 real-world queries, we ask: Are there certain types of queries that make hallucination more likely? A large-scale analysis reveals a consistent "risk landscape": certain features such as deep clause nesting and underspecification align with higher hallucination propensity. In contrast, clear intention grounding and answerability align with lower hallucination rates. Others, including domain specificity, show mixed, dataset- and model-dependent effects. Thus, these findings establish an empirically observable query-feature representation correlated with hallucination risk, paving the way for guided query rewriting and future intervention studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly ship with explicit "thinking modes", yet their counterpart, "no-thinking", has received far less attention. We study LLMs' no-thinking behavior along two axes. a. How to measure no-thinking? Prior work typically defines no-thinking through proxies such as a disabled thinking mode or the absence of long traces. These proxies are unreliable: disabled thinking modes may still emit reasoning, while long traces may contain filler rather than genuine inference. We instead normalize each response into a pre-answer trace and final answer, and evaluate it at three levels: (i) Empty-Thinking Rate for strict answer-only compliance; (ii) instruction-aware Question-Pre-answer Relevance for similarity between the question and pre-answer trace; and (iii) LLM-as-judge Explicit Inference Rate for visible explicit inference. Together, these metrics distinguish answer-only output, relevant but non-inferential text, and explicit inference. b. How does no-thinking vary across tasks and models? We evaluate six prompting interventions on six LLMs across Boolean, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions. We find that explicit no-think controls cannot reliably eliminate visible inference. Models instead exhibit "Thinking Inertia": explicit inference persists even under strict controls and becomes more prevalent as the answer space opens. Accuracy remains stable on Boolean and multiple-choice tasks, whereas open-ended tasks reveal a trade-off between answer-only compliance and task accuracy. Rewriting the same questions across answer spaces shows that supplying candidate answers makes answer-only responses easier to produce. These findings establish no-thinking as a non-trivial capability: stopping explicit reasoning cannot be assumed from model settings or instructions alone and deserves systematic evaluation alongside reasoning ability.

Mathematical reasoning in large language models (LMs) has garnered significant attention in recent work, but there is a limited understanding of how these models process and store information related to arithmetic tasks within their architecture. In order to improve our understanding of this aspect of language models, we present a mechanistic interpretation of Transformer-based LMs on arithmetic questions using a causal mediation analysis framework. By intervening on the activations of specific model components and measuring the resulting changes in predicted probabilities, we identify the subset of parameters responsible for specific predictions. This provides insights into how information related to arithmetic is processed by LMs. Our experimental results indicate that LMs process the input by transmitting the information relevant to the query from mid-sequence early layers to the final token using the attention mechanism. Then, this information is processed by a set of MLP modules, which generate result-related information that is incorporated into the residual stream. To assess the specificity of the observed activation dynamics, we compare the effects of different model components on arithmetic queries with other tasks, including number retrieval from prompts and factual knowledge questions.

Large language models exhibit high-level commonsense reasoning abilities, especially with enhancement methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). However, we find these CoT-like methods lead to a considerable number of originally correct answers turning wrong, which we define as the Toxic CoT problem. To interpret and mitigate this problem, we first utilize attribution tracing and causal tracing methods to probe the internal working mechanism of the LLM during CoT reasoning. Through comparisons, we prove that the model exhibits information loss from the question over the shallow attention layers when generating rationales or answers. Based on the probing findings, we design a novel method called RIDERS (Residual decodIng and sERial-position Swap), which compensates for the information deficit in the model from both decoding and serial-position perspectives. Through extensive experiments on multiple commonsense reasoning benchmarks, we validate that this method not only significantly eliminates Toxic CoT problems (decreased by 23.6%), but also effectively improves the model's overall commonsense reasoning performance (increased by 5.5%).

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Large language models can reason in continuous space instead of decoded text, by recurring on their own hidden states or by passing those states between agents, while training supervises only the Cross-Entropy (CE) of the final decoded answer and does not constrain the thought. Theoretical and empirical analyses establish and confirm four failures of CE-only training that lead to a lower probability of the correct answer such as collapsing thoughts across distinct questions and retaining irrelevant information. We introduce REST (REpresentation-Supervised Thoughts), a training objective that turns four properties of a valid thought representation (causality, minimality, separability, and stability) into differentiable losses added to CE. We instantiate it in latent single-agent and multi-agent systems, without architectural changes or added parameters at inference. Across 7 benchmarks spanning mathematics, science, medicine, and code generation, with the same training data, compute, and latent budget, REST increases accuracy over CE-only training across agent settings and model sizes by up to 7.5 percentage points and convergence on a final answer by 30\%. Furthermore, REST thoughts encode more of what is required to achieve the correct answer, and decoding them better recovers the intended output of the agent, which makes latent communication easier to interpret. Project Website: https://fard-lab.github.io/REST

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis suggests that representations from neural networks are converging to a common statistical model of reality. We show that the existing metrics used to measure representational similarity are confounded by network scale: increasing model depth or width can systematically inflate representational similarity scores. To correct these effects, we introduce a permutation-based null-calibration framework that transforms any representational similarity metric into a calibrated score with statistical guarantees. We revisit the Platonic Representation Hypothesis with our calibration framework, which reveals a nuanced picture: the apparent convergence reported by global spectral measures largely disappears after calibration, while local neighborhood similarity, but not local distances, retains significant agreement across different modalities. Based on these findings, we propose the Aristotelian Representation Hypothesis: representations in neural networks are converging to shared local neighborhood relationships.

Reasoning quality in large language models depends not only on producing correct answers but also on generating valid intermediate steps. We study this through multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), which provides a controlled setting with fixed answer options. Our analysis shows that when questions are effectively unsolvable for a model, spurious chains of thought (CoTs) are more likely to appear, leading to false positives. By estimating the solvability of each question, we uncover an intermediate regime where learning is most effective. Building on this insight, we adapt outcome-supervised reward models and reinforcement learning with group-relative advantage to incorporate solvability into their objectives. Across experiments on math and multimodal datasets, these modifications consistently yield higher rates of process-correct reasoning and, in reinforcement learning, improved answer accuracy as well. Our results highlight solvability as a key factor for reducing hallucinations and increasing reliability in CoT reasoning.

We evaluate how well Large Language Models (LLMs) latently recall and compose facts to answer multi-hop queries like "In the year Scarlett Johansson was born, the Summer Olympics were hosted in the country of". One major challenge in evaluating this ability is that LLMs may have developed shortcuts by encounters of the head entity "Scarlett Johansson" and the answer entity "United States" in the same training sequences or merely guess the answer based on frequency-based priors. To prevent shortcuts, we exclude test queries where the head and answer entities co-appear in pretraining corpora. Through careful selection of relations and facts and systematic removal of cases where models might guess answers or exploit partial matches, we construct an evaluation dataset SOCRATES (ShOrtCut-fRee lATent rEaSoning). We observe that LLMs demonstrate promising latent multi-hop reasoning abilities without exploiting shortcuts, but only for certain types of queries. For queries requiring latent recall of countries as the intermediate answer, the best models achieve 80% latent composability, but this drops to just 5% for the recall of years. Comparisons with Chain-of-Thought composability highlight a significant gap between the ability of models to reason latently versus explicitly. Analysis reveals that latent representations of the intermediate answer are constructed more often in queries with higher latent composability, and shows the emergence of latent multi-hop reasoning during pretraining.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning and generalization at the expense of degrading memorized knowledge. We challenge this narrative by observing that RL-enhanced models consistently outperform their base and supervised fine-tuned (SFT) counterparts on pure knowledge recall tasks, particularly those requiring traversal of hierarchical, structured knowledge (e.g., medical codes). We hypothesize these gains stem not from newly acquired data, but from improved procedural skills in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. To support this hypothesis, we show that structured prompting, which explicitly guides SFTed models through hierarchical traversal, recovers most of the performance gap (reducing 24pp to 7pp on MedConceptsQA for DeepSeek-V3/R1). We further find that while prompting improves final-answer accuracy, RL-enhanced models retain superior ability to recall correct procedural paths on deep-retrieval tasks. Finally our layer-wise internal activation analysis reveals that while factual representations (e.g., activations for the statement "code 57.95 refers to urinary infection") maintain high cosine similarity between SFT and RL models, query representations (e.g., "what is code 57.95") diverge noticeably, indicating that RL primarily transforms how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

We study how large language models (LLMs) ``think'' through their representation space. We propose a novel geometric framework that models an LLM's reasoning as flows -- embedding trajectories evolving where logic goes. We disentangle logical structure from semantics by employing the same natural deduction propositions with varied semantic carriers, allowing us to test whether LLMs internalize logic beyond surface form. This perspective connects reasoning with geometric quantities such as position, velocity, and curvature, enabling formal analysis in representation and concept spaces. Our theory establishes: (1) LLM reasoning corresponds to smooth flows in representation space, and (2) logical statements act as local controllers of these flows' velocities. Using learned representation proxies, we design controlled experiments to visualize and quantify reasoning flows, providing empirical validation of our theoretical framework. Our work serves as both a conceptual foundation and practical tools for studying reasoning phenomenon, offering a new lens for interpretability and formal analysis of LLMs' behavior.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Analogical reasoning -- the capacity to identify and map structural relationships between different domains -- is fundamental to human cognition and learning. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) can sometimes match humans in analogical reasoning tasks, opening the possibility that analogical reasoning might emerge from domain-general processes. However, it is still debated whether these emergent capacities are largely superficial and limited to simple relations seen during training or whether they encompass the flexible representational and mapping capabilities which are the focus of leading cognitive models of analogy. In this study, we introduce novel analogical reasoning tasks that require participants to map between semantically contentful words and sequences of letters and other abstract characters. This task necessitates the ability to flexibly re-represent rich semantic information -- an ability which is known to be central to human analogy but which is thus far not well captured by existing cognitive theories and models. We assess the performance of both human participants and LLMs on tasks focusing on reasoning from semantic structure and semantic content, introducing variations that test the robustness of their analogical inferences. Advanced LLMs match human performance across several conditions, though humans and LLMs respond differently to certain task variations and semantic distractors. Our results thus provide new evidence that LLMs might offer a how-possibly explanation of human analogical reasoning in contexts that are not yet well modeled by existing theories, but that even today's best models are unlikely to yield how-actually explanations.

Neural networks have long been used to model human intelligence, capturing elements of behavior and cognition, and their neural basis. Recent advancements in deep learning have enabled neural network models to reach and even surpass human levels of intelligence in many respects, yet unlike humans, their ability to learn new tasks quickly remains a challenge. People can reason not only in familiar domains, but can also rapidly learn to reason through novel problems and situations, raising the question of how well modern neural network models capture human intelligence and in which ways they diverge. In this work, we explore this gap by investigating human adults' ability to learn an abstract reasoning task based on Sudoku from a brief instructional tutorial with explanatory feedback for incorrect responses using a narrow range of training examples. We find that participants who master the task do so within a small number of trials and generalize well to puzzles outside of the training range. We also find that most of those who master the task can describe a valid solution strategy, and such participants perform better on transfer puzzles than those whose strategy descriptions are vague or incomplete. Interestingly, fewer than half of our human participants were successful in acquiring a valid solution strategy, and this ability is associated with high school mathematics education. We consider the challenges these findings pose for building computational models that capture all aspects of our findings and point toward a possible role for learning to engage in explanation-based reasoning to support rapid learning and generalization.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

We investigate the ability of language models to perform compositional reasoning tasks where the overall solution depends on correctly composing the answers to sub-problems. We measure how often models can correctly answer all sub-problems but not generate the overall solution, a ratio we call the compositionality gap. We evaluate this ratio by asking multi-hop questions with answers that require composing multiple facts unlikely to have been observed together during pretraining. In the GPT-3 family of models, as model size increases we show that the single-hop question answering performance improves faster than the multi-hop performance does, therefore the compositionality gap does not decrease. This surprising result suggests that while more powerful models memorize and recall more factual knowledge, they show no corresponding improvement in their ability to perform this kind of compositional reasoning. We then demonstrate how elicitive prompting (such as chain of thought) narrows the compositionality gap by reasoning explicitly instead of implicitly. We present a new method, self-ask, that further improves on chain of thought. In our method, the model explicitly asks itself (and then answers) follow-up questions before answering the initial question. We finally show that self-ask's structured prompting lets us easily plug in a search engine to answer the follow-up questions, which additionally improves accuracy.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

Test-time compute allocation in large reasoning models (LRMs) is widely used and has applications in mathematical problem solving, code synthesis, and planning. Recent work has addressed this problem by scaling self-consistency and parallel thinking, adding generic ``thinking tokens'' and prompting models to re-read the question before answering. Unfortunately, these approaches either inject task-agnostic tokens or mandate heuristics that do not explain -- and often ignore -- the spontaneous repetition that many LRMs exhibit at the head of their internal chains. In contrast, we analyze and harness the model's tendency to restate the question, which we term the Echo of Prompt (EOP), as a front-loaded, compute-shaping mechanism. We formalize its probabilistic cost by casting echo removal as rejection-based conditioning and defining the Echo Likelihood Gap ΔL as a computable proxy. This provides the missing theoretical link that links early repetition to likelihood gains and downstream accuracy. However, it does not by itself specify how to exploit EOP. Consequently, we develop Echo-Distilled SFT (ED-SFT) to instill an ``echo-then-reason'' pattern through supervised finetuning, and Echoic Prompting (EP) to re-ground the model mid-trace without training. While promising, quantifying benefits beyond verbosity is non-trivial. Therefore, we conduct length and suffix-controlled likelihood analyses together with layer-wise attention studies, showing that EOP increases answer to answer-prefix attention in middle layers, consistent with an attention refocusing mechanism. We evaluate on GSM8K, MathQA, Hendrycks-MATH, AIME24, and MATH-500 under identical decoding settings and budgets, and find consistent gains over baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/hhh2210/echoes-as-anchors.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, yet the mathematically meaningful skills underlying their reasoning remain underexplored. We introduce SHAPE, a framework that analyzes Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories through two lenses developed in mathematics education: (1) semantic spaces: the model's evolving mathematical interpretations of a problem (e.g., algebraic, geometric), and (2) heuristics: the specific mathematical actions taken within those spaces (e.g., simplifying the problem, working backward). We first use SHAPE to analyze the reasoning patterns of various models. Our findings reveal that the mathematical heuristics employed by a model better explain final answer correctness than traditional CoT features. Furthermore, models are likely to reach correct solutions by concentrating their reasoning effort within a few semantic spaces rather than exploring many disparate ones -- a pattern consistent with human behavior. Next, we utilize the SHAPE lens to evaluate whether post-training truly enhances mathematical proficiency. We find that reinforcement learning induces mode-seeking in heuristic usage. Lastly, we post-train LLMs by promoting diverse heuristics and demonstrate its effectiveness in improving accuracy. Overall, SHAPE provides a theoretically-grounded diagnostic framework for decoding LLM reasoning and offers a new path toward post-training LLMs for math reasoning. The code for our model is available at https://github.com/holi-lab/SHAPE-of-CoT

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong performance on mathematical reasoning tasks, often attributed to their capability to generate explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) explanations. However, recent work shows that LRMs often arrive at the correct answer before completing these textual reasoning steps, indicating the presence of latent reasoning -- internal, non-verbal computation encoded in hidden states. While this phenomenon has been explored in English, its multilingual behavior remains largely unknown. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of multilingual latent reasoning in LRMs across 11 languages. Using a truncation-based strategy, we examine how the correct answer emerges as the model is given only partial reasoning traces, allowing us to measure stepwise latent prediction formation. Our results reveal clear evidence of multilingual latent reasoning, though unevenly: strong in resource-rich languages, weaker in low-resource ones, and broadly less observable on harder benchmarks. To understand whether these differences reflect distinct internal mechanisms, we further perform representational analyses. Despite surface-level disparities, we find that the internal evolution of predictions is highly consistent across languages and broadly aligns with English -- a pattern suggesting an English-centered latent reasoning pathway.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

When a VLM answers a visual query, current interpretability tools rely on text rationales, which use a mismatched modality, or on internal read-outs, which originate too early to reflect the final output and require white-box access to the model. We introduce AnswerMap, a training-free, task-agnostic, black-box visual rationale constructed from the output head. The image is cut into K row and K column bands, each shown alone to the frozen model along with the query in the format of a yes/no relevance question. The outer product of the row and column ``yes'' posteriors gives the query-conditioned spatial map. Crucially, by defining a fixed read-out R (e.g., expectation, maximum) on top of AnswerMap, we can derive continuous outputs like location natively. This bypasses the reliance on discrete text tokens for continuous-output tasks and guarantees an image-dependent answer by construction. However, a rationale can be confabulated, so we validate AnswerMap across four models and three query distributions with two tests: (a) agreement with the model's own generated point and (b) deletion of the map's region. The map lands where the model points (AUC 0.85 against 0.38 for attention), and deleting its region flips 53% of correct answers (against 19% for attention's). Beyond establishing faithfulness, we demonstrate the map's task-agnostic utility through three distinct read-outs: its maximum flags hallucinated objects without generation, its expectation localizes correctly when the model's own pointing fails, and its top-mass region, fed back as a crop, fixes half of the model's wrong answers. AnswerMap thus offers a new lens on VLM interpretability and, through its read-outs, a new output interface for visual tasks beyond text tokens.

Language models often solve complex tasks by generating long reasoning chains, consisting of many steps with varying importance. While some steps are crucial for generating the final answer, others are removable. Determining which steps matter most, and why, remains an open question central to understanding how models process reasoning. We investigate if this question is best approached through model internals or through tokens of the reasoning chain itself. We find that model activations contain more information than tokens for identifying important reasoning steps. Crucially, by training probes on model activations to predict importance, we show that models encode an internal representation of step importance, even prior to the generation of subsequent steps. The internal representations of importance in different models yield high agreement on which steps are important. The representation is distributed across layers, and does not correlate with surface-level features, such as a step's relative position or its length. Our findings suggest that analyzing activations can reveal aspects of reasoning that surface-level approaches fundamentally miss, indicating that reasoning analyses should look into model internals.

Do large language models (LLMs) solve reasoning tasks by learning robust generalizable algorithms, or do they memorize training data? To investigate this question, we use arithmetic reasoning as a representative task. Using causal analysis, we identify a subset of the model (a circuit) that explains most of the model's behavior for basic arithmetic logic and examine its functionality. By zooming in on the level of individual circuit neurons, we discover a sparse set of important neurons that implement simple heuristics. Each heuristic identifies a numerical input pattern and outputs corresponding answers. We hypothesize that the combination of these heuristic neurons is the mechanism used to produce correct arithmetic answers. To test this, we categorize each neuron into several heuristic types-such as neurons that activate when an operand falls within a certain range-and find that the unordered combination of these heuristic types is the mechanism that explains most of the model's accuracy on arithmetic prompts. Finally, we demonstrate that this mechanism appears as the main source of arithmetic accuracy early in training. Overall, our experimental results across several LLMs show that LLMs perform arithmetic using neither robust algorithms nor memorization; rather, they rely on a "bag of heuristics".

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant improvements in contextual understanding. However, their ability to attend to truly critical information during long-context reasoning and generation still falls behind the pace. Specifically, our preliminary experiments reveal that certain distracting patterns can misdirect the model's attention during inference, and removing these patterns substantially improves reasoning accuracy and generation quality. We attribute this phenomenon to spurious correlations in the training data, which obstruct the model's capacity to infer authentic causal instruction-response relationships. This phenomenon may induce redundant reasoning processes, potentially resulting in significant inference overhead and, more critically, the generation of erroneous or suboptimal responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a two-stage framework called Learning to Focus (LeaF) leveraging intervention-based inference to disentangle confounding factors. In the first stage, LeaF employs gradient-based comparisons with an advanced teacher to automatically identify confounding tokens based on causal relationships in the training corpus. Then, in the second stage, it prunes these tokens during distillation to enact intervention, aligning the student's attention with the teacher's focus distribution on truly critical context tokens. Experimental results demonstrate that LeaF not only achieves an absolute improvement in various mathematical reasoning, code generation and multi-hop question answering benchmarks but also effectively suppresses attention to confounding tokens during inference, yielding a more interpretable and reliable reasoning model.

Large language models have achieved remarkable capabilities across domains, yet mechanisms underlying sophisticated reasoning remain elusive. Recent reasoning models outperform comparable instruction-tuned models on complex cognitive tasks, attributed to extended computation through longer chains of thought. Here we show that enhanced reasoning emerges not from extended computation alone, but from simulating multi-agent-like interactions -- a society of thought -- which enables diversification and debate among internal cognitive perspectives characterized by distinct personality traits and domain expertise. Through quantitative analysis and mechanistic interpretability methods applied to reasoning traces, we find that reasoning models like DeepSeek-R1 and QwQ-32B exhibit much greater perspective diversity than instruction-tuned models, activating broader conflict between heterogeneous personality- and expertise-related features during reasoning. This multi-agent structure manifests in conversational behaviors, including question-answering, perspective shifts, and the reconciliation of conflicting views, and in socio-emotional roles that characterize sharp back-and-forth conversations, together accounting for the accuracy advantage in reasoning tasks. Controlled reinforcement learning experiments reveal that base models increase conversational behaviors when rewarded solely for reasoning accuracy, and fine-tuning models with conversational scaffolding accelerates reasoning improvement over base models. These findings indicate that the social organization of thought enables effective exploration of solution spaces. We suggest that reasoning models establish a computational parallel to collective intelligence in human groups, where diversity enables superior problem-solving when systematically structured, which suggests new opportunities for agent organization to harness the wisdom of crowds.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

A reliable language model should be able to signal, prior to generation, when a query falls outside its knowledge. We investigate whether representation geometry can provide such a pre-generation signal by measuring the deviation of hidden states from an answerable reference set, requiring no labeled failure data and no access to model outputs. Across three instruction-tuned models (Llama 3.1-8B, Qwen 2.5-7B, and Mistral-7B-Instruct) and three prompt forms (Math, Fact, Code), we find that geometry primarily encodes task form. Within mathematical prompts, unanswerable inputs consistently deviate from the answerable centroid, yielding strong separation (ROC-AUC 0.78-0.84). This single-pass pre-generation signal outperforms a simple refusal baseline and compares favorably to self-consistency. It also captures cases where models do not explicitly refuse. In contrast, no reliable geometric signal emerges for factual prompts, indicating that the effect is form-conditional rather than universal. Code prompts show large effect sizes with higher variance, suggesting partial generalization beyond mathematical form. A layer-wise analysis reveals that the signal arises in early layers and gradually attenuates toward the output. These results suggest that answerability-related geometry is established before the final stages of generation. Together, these findings indicate that geometric deviation can serve as a lightweight pre-generation signal that is reliable in structured domains with formal answerability constraints, with clear boundaries on where it generalizes.

This paper presents ReasonFormer, a unified reasoning framework for mirroring the modular and compositional reasoning process of humans in complex decision-making. Inspired by dual-process theory in cognitive science, the representation module (automatic thinking) and reasoning modules (controlled thinking) are decoupled to capture different levels of cognition. Upon the top of the representation module, the pre-trained reasoning modules are modular and professional in specific and fundamental reasoning skills (e.g., logic, simple QA, etc). To mimic the controlled compositional thinking process, different reasoning modules are dynamically activated and composed in both parallel and cascaded manners to control what reasoning skills are activated and how deep the reasoning process will be reached to solve the current problems. The unified reasoning framework solves multiple tasks with a single model, and is trained and inferred in an end-to-end manner. Evaluated on 11 datasets requiring different reasoning skills and complexity, ReasonFormer demonstrates substantial performance boosts, revealing the compositional reasoning ability. Few-shot experiments exhibit better generalization ability by learning to compose pre-trained skills for new tasks with limited data, and decoupling the representation module and the reasoning modules. Further analysis shows the modularity of reasoning modules as different tasks activate distinct reasoning skills at different reasoning depths.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Answer sentence selection is the task of identifying sentences that contain the answer to a given question. This is an important problem in its own right as well as in the larger context of open domain question answering. We propose a novel approach to solving this task via means of distributed representations, and learn to match questions with answers by considering their semantic encoding. This contrasts prior work on this task, which typically relies on classifiers with large numbers of hand-crafted syntactic and semantic features and various external resources. Our approach does not require any feature engineering nor does it involve specialist linguistic data, making this model easily applicable to a wide range of domains and languages. Experimental results on a standard benchmark dataset from TREC demonstrate that---despite its simplicity---our model matches state of the art performance on the answer sentence selection task.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

In this paper, we study how training data creates associations between the tokens at the start of a base model's response and the reasoning behavior that follows. First, we demonstrate that fixing particular starting token cues makes a base model's performance competitive with that of its reinforcement learning (RL)-trained counterparts on math and coding. For instance, the cue ".\n\nOkay" raises Olmo-3-7B's MATH-500 pass@1 accuracy from 42% to 78%, while "Alright," raises Qwen3-14B's from 72% to 87%. Second, RL makes these cues more likely, while fixing them recovers much of its performance gain over the base model. Third, we trace the reasoning effects of token cues to the training data. We perform causal data interventions to turn an arbitrary word, such as "chicken", into an effective reasoning cue, or remove an existing cue's effect. A similar edit makes the prompt instruction "Think duck duck goose" as effective as "Think step by step" at eliciting reasoning. We also find that the hidden state representations induced by different cues correlate with different document types from the training set. Finally, we extend our study of token cues with a case study in language model safety, finding that different cues elicit distinct refusal and compliance behaviors that correspond to different types of training data.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have resulted in increasingly anthropomorphic language concerning the ability of LLMs to reason. Whether reasoning in LLMs should be understood to be inherently different is, however, widely debated. We propose utilizing a representation engineering approach wherein model activations are read from the residual stream of an LLM when processing a reasoning task. The activations are used to derive a control vector that is applied to the model as an inference-time intervention, modulating the representational space of the model, to improve performance on the specified task. We publish the code for deriving control vectors and analyzing model representations. The method allows us to improve performance on reasoning benchmarks and assess how control vectors influence the final logit distribution of a model via metrics such as KL divergence and entropy. We apply control vectors to Mistral-7B-Instruct and a range of Pythia models on an inductive, a deductive and mathematical reasoning task. We show that an LLM can, to a certain degree, be controlled to improve its perceived reasoning ability by modulating activations. The intervention is dependent upon the ability to reliably extract the model's typical state when correctly solving a task. Our results suggest that reasoning performance can be modulated in the same manner as other information-processing tasks performed by LLMs and demonstrate that we are capable of improving performance on specific tasks via a simple intervention on the residual stream with no additional training.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

Large multimodal reasoning models (LMRMs) are getting increasingly capable, primarily through generating explicit chain-of-thought reasoning before answering. In language models it has been observed that this performance often comes with sycophancy, the tendency of a model to agree with the user over the evidence. However, for LMRMs no reliable method to measure sycophancy yet exists. We bridge this gap by introducing a benchmark and dataset for evaluating LMRM sycophancy when confronted with a wrong answer from a user. Our benchmark pairs four visually grounded datasets spanning mathematical, clinical, temporal, and demographic reasoning with five pressure conditions in single-turn and multi-turn settings. We evaluate sycophancy in the final answer as well as its emergence within the reasoning chain. We find that sycophancy is prevalent under pressure, with Statement pressure eliciting the highest rates and Conviction the lowest for all models except Mistral-Small-4, and under multi-turn pressure reasoning-level sycophancy intensifies sharply in clinical visual judgement, reaching 95.7% for the most affected model. We further introduce a failure taxonomy separating reasoning-chain from answer-level sycophancy, and a complementary sentence-level taxonomy locating where in the chain drift first emerges. Our results show that sycophancy can corrupt the reasoning chain independently of the final answer, so answer-level evaluation alone is insufficient.

While reasoning-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in complex tasks such as mathematics and coding, their effectiveness across universal multimodal scenarios remains uncertain. The trend of releasing parallel "Instruct" and "Thinking" models by leading developers serves merely as a resource-intensive workaround, stemming from the lack of a criterion for determining when reasoning is truly beneficial. In this paper, we propose Dual Tuning, a framework designed to assess whether reasoning yields positive gains for target tasks under given base models and datasets. By jointly fine-tuning on paired Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Direct-Answer (DA) data under controlled prompts, we systematically quantify and compare the gains of both training modes using the proposed metrics, and establish the "Thinking Boundary" to evaluate the suitability of reasoning training across diverse multimodal tasks, including spatial, mathematical, and multi-disciplinary domains. We further explore the impact of reinforcement training and thinking patterns on reasoning suitability, and validate whether the "Thinking Boundary" can guide data refinement. Our findings challenge the "reasoning-for-all" paradigm, providing practical guidance for identifying appropriate data and training strategies, and motivating the development of resource-efficient, adaptive auto-think systems.

Despite the growing reasoning capabilities of recent large language models (LLMs), their internal mechanisms during the reasoning process remain underexplored. Prior approaches often rely on human-defined concepts (e.g., overthinking, reflection) at the word level to analyze reasoning in a supervised manner. However, such methods are limited, as it is infeasible to capture the full spectrum of potential reasoning behaviors, many of which are difficult to define in token space. In this work, we propose an unsupervised framework (namely, RISE: Reasoning behavior Interpretability via Sparse auto-Encoder) for discovering reasoning vectors, which we define as directions in the activation space that encode distinct reasoning behaviors. By segmenting chain-of-thought traces into sentence-level 'steps' and training sparse auto-encoders (SAEs) on step-level activations, we uncover disentangled features corresponding to interpretable behaviors such as reflection and backtracking. Visualization and clustering analyses show that these behaviors occupy separable regions in the decoder column space. Moreover, targeted interventions on SAE-derived vectors can controllably amplify or suppress specific reasoning behaviors, altering inference trajectories without retraining. Beyond behavior-specific disentanglement, SAEs capture structural properties such as response length, revealing clusters of long versus short reasoning traces. More interestingly, SAEs enable the discovery of novel behaviors beyond human supervision. We demonstrate the ability to control response confidence by identifying confidence-related vectors in the SAE decoder space. These findings underscore the potential of unsupervised latent discovery for both interpreting and controllably steering reasoning in LLMs.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

To answer one-to-many factual queries (e.g., listing cities of a country), a language model (LM) must simultaneously recall knowledge and avoid repeating previous answers. How are these two subtasks implemented and integrated internally? Across multiple datasets and models, we identify a promote-then-suppress mechanism: the model first recalls all answers, and then suppresses previously generated ones. Specifically, LMs use both the subject and previous answer tokens to perform knowledge recall, with attention propagating subject information and MLPs promoting the answers. Then, attention attends to and suppresses previous answer tokens, while MLPs amplify the suppression signal. Our mechanism is corroborated by extensive experimental evidence: in addition to using early decoding and causal tracing, we analyze how components use different tokens by introducing both Token Lens, which decodes aggregated attention updates from specified tokens, and a knockout method that analyzes changes in MLP outputs after removing attention to specified tokens. Overall, we provide new insights into how LMs' internal components interact with different input tokens to support complex factual recall. Code is available at https://github.com/Lorenayannnnn/how-lms-answer-one-to-many-factual-queries.

Reasoning models improve their problem-solving ability through inference-time scaling, allocating more compute via longer token budgets. Identifying which reasoning traces are likely to succeed remains a key opportunity: reliably predicting productive paths can substantially reduce wasted computation and improve overall efficiency. We introduce Latent-Trajectory signals that characterize the temporal evolution of a model's internal representations during the generation of intermediate reasoning tokens. By measuring the overall change in latent representations between the start and end of reasoning, the change accumulated across intermediate steps, and the extent to which these changes advance toward the final state, we show that these signals predict solution accuracy more reliably than both cross-layer metrics and output-based confidence measures. When used to guide answer selection across multiple sampled generations, Latent-Trajectory signals make test-time scaling more effective and efficient than majority voting, reducing token usage by up to 70% while preserving and even improving accuracy by 2.6% on average. Moreover, these predictive signals often emerge early in the reasoning trace, enabling early selection and allocation of compute to the most promising candidates. Our findings contribute not only practical strategies for inference-time efficiency, but also a deeper interpretability perspective on how reasoning processes are represented and differentiated in latent space.

Recent advancements in multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have significantly improved performance in visual question answering. However, we observe that transition words (e.g., because, however, and wait) are closely associated with hallucinations and tend to exhibit high-entropy states. We argue that adequate contextual reasoning information can be directly extracted from the token probability distribution. Inspired by superposed representation theory, we propose leveraging latent superposed reasoning to integrate multiple candidate semantics and maintain latent reasoning trajectories. The hypothesis is that reliance on discrete textual inputs may drive the model toward sequential explicit reasoning, underutilizing dense contextual cues during high-entropy reasoning stages. Therefore, we propose constructing rich semantic representations from the token probability distributions to enhance in-context reasoning. With this goal, we present Latent Entropy-Aware Decoding (LEAD), an efficient plug-and-play decoding strategy that leverages semantic context to achieve reliable reasoning. The heart of our method lies in entropy-aware reasoning mode switching. The model employs probability-weighted continuous embeddings under high-entropy states and transitions back to discrete token embeddings as entropy decreases. Moreover, we propose a prior-guided visual anchor injection strategy that encourages the model to focus on visual information. Extensive experiments show that LEAD effectively mitigates hallucinations across various MLRMs on multiple benchmarks.

We discover that large language models exhibit spectral phase transitions in their hidden activation spaces when engaging in reasoning versus factual recall. Through systematic spectral analysis across 11 models spanning 5 architecture families (Qwen, Pythia, Phi, Llama, DeepSeek-R1), we identify seven core phenomena: (1)~Reasoning Spectral Compression -- 9/11 models show significantly lower α for reasoning (p < 0.05), with larger effects in stronger models; (2)~Instruction Tuning Spectral Reversal -- base models show reasoning α< factual α, while instruction-tuned models reverse this relationship; (3)~Architecture-Dependent Generation Taxonomy -- prompt-to-response shifts partition into expansion, compression, and equilibrium regimes; (4)~Spectral Scaling Law -- α_reasoning propto -0.074 ln N across 4 Qwen base models (R^2 = 0.46); (5)~Token-Level Spectral Cascade -- per-token alpha tracking reveals local synchronization that decays exponentially with layer distance, and is weaker for reasoning than factual tasks; (6)~Reasoning Step Spectral Punctuation -- phase-transition signatures align with reasoning step boundaries; and (7)~Spectral Correctness Prediction -- spectral α alone achieves AUC = 1.000 (Qwen2.5-7B, late layers) and mean AUC = 0.893 across 6 models in predicting correctness before the final answer is generated. Together, these findings establish a comprehensive spectral theory of reasoning in transformers, revealing that the geometry of thought is universal in direction, architecture-specific in dynamics, and predictive of outcome.

Language models (LMs) capture large amounts of factual knowledge applicable to a wide range of tasks, motivating the view of their parameters as a knowledge base. An important property of knowledge bases is that different queries for the same fact return consistent results, drawing on a single source of truth. We investigate whether LMs satisfy this property through behavioral and mechanistic analyses. Our results suggest that they encode knowledge in a task-specific manner. Behaviorally, facts acquired on one task frequently fail to co-emerge on others during training. Parameter localization experiments suggest a mechanistic explanation, revealing distinct parameter subsets underlying different tasks for the same fact. Finally, we show that chain-of-thought reasoning draws part of its effectiveness from engaging task-specific parameters beyond those tied to the evaluation task. Our findings suggest that what the model knows and how it is asked are intertwined in parameter space, undermining the "knowledge base" analogy and carrying implications for the reliability and controllability of factual knowledge in LMs.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) exhibit superior reasoning capabilities, the neural mechanisms distinguishing this explicit Thinking mode from direct answer generation (NoThinking mode) remain poorly understood. To deconstruct this cognitive process, we apply Top-K Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to the intermediate representations of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and examine the model's divergent behaviors across math-solving tasks of three distinct difficulty levels. Observationally, we identify a clear distinction in how the model functions under two reasoning modes: Thinking mode relies on sparse and high-intensity feature activations driving verbal deduction independent of problem complexity, whereas NoThinking mode exhibits an adaptive and diffuse pattern prioritizing symbolic manipulation. Causally, suppressing the three most active sparse features by Total Activation Volume reveals three principles: (i) reasoning and syntactic structure are tightly coupled, as interventions consistently degrade and boxed-solution formatting; (ii) Thinking responds to disruption with compensatory over-generation marked by increased metacognitive cues and repetitive, low-information continuations; and (iii) coherent CoT behavior depends on a fragile coordination among specialized features, yielding distinct failure modes under perturbation but a consistently impaired output structure.

Representing and navigating hierarchy is a fundamental primitive of reasoning. Large language models have demonstrated proficiency in a wide variety of tasks requiring hierarchical reasoning, but there exists limited analysis on how the models geometrically represent the necessary latent constructions for such thinking. To this end, we develop H-probes, a collection of linear probes that extract hierarchical structure, specifically depth and pairwise distance, from latent representations. In synthetic tree traversal tasks, the H-probes robustly find the subspaces containing hierarchical structure necessary to complete the tasks; furthermore, in comprehensive ablation experiments, we show that these hierarchy-containing subspaces are low-dimensional, causally important for high task performance, and generalize within- and out-of-domain. Furthermore, we find analogous, though weaker, hierarchical structure in real-world hierarchical contexts such as mathematical reasoning traces. These results demonstrate that models represent hierarchy not only at the level of syntax and concepts, but at deeper levels of abstraction -- including the reasoning process itself.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis predicts that sufficiently scaled foundation models converge on a shared representation of the world. As each non-converged model gives a noisy view of a common structure when passed the same input, we ask whether we can combine models into a representation that outperforms its individual components. We test this on galaxies: we embed images via a basket of 22 frozen foundation models from eight families, whiten each view, and take a randomised SVD of the embedding concatenation. The resulting 1024-dimensional embedding outperforms every basket member on 19/21 of our tested metrics for physical property and galaxy morphology estimation for HSC, JWST, and DESI Legacy Survey imagery. We find that performance rises with basket size and basket architectural diversity, and that the meta-foundation model's performance transfers across astronomical surveys. We conclude that a useful astronomical foundation model can be assembled from existing generalist models with no training required beyond a single unsupervised projection. By leveraging the community's already-spent work, we save a lot of compute: a fresh pre-train of a comparable single-domain model would cost O(10^{4}--10^{5}) A100 GPU hours (emitting several tonnes of CO_2eq.), whereas assembling Gestalt requires minutes on a single machine.

When answering a question, humans utilize the information available across different modalities to synthesize a consistent and complete chain of thought (CoT). This process is normally a black box in the case of deep learning models like large-scale language models. Recently, science question benchmarks have been used to diagnose the multi-hop reasoning ability and interpretability of an AI system. However, existing datasets fail to provide annotations for the answers, or are restricted to the textual-only modality, small scales, and limited domain diversity. To this end, we present Science Question Answering (ScienceQA), a new benchmark that consists of ~21k multimodal multiple choice questions with a diverse set of science topics and annotations of their answers with corresponding lectures and explanations. We further design language models to learn to generate lectures and explanations as the chain of thought (CoT) to mimic the multi-hop reasoning process when answering ScienceQA questions. ScienceQA demonstrates the utility of CoT in language models, as CoT improves the question answering performance by 1.20% in few-shot GPT-3 and 3.99% in fine-tuned UnifiedQA. We also explore the upper bound for models to leverage explanations by feeding those in the input; we observe that it improves the few-shot performance of GPT-3 by 18.96%. Our analysis further shows that language models, similar to humans, benefit from explanations to learn from fewer data and achieve the same performance with just 40% of the data. The data and code are available at https://scienceqa.github.io.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

The Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH) states that neural networks learn to encode concepts as directions in activation space, and a strong version of the LRH states that models learn only such encodings. In this paper, we present a counterexample to this strong LRH: when trained to repeat an input token sequence, gated recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learn to represent the token at each position with a particular order of magnitude, rather than a direction. These representations have layered features that are impossible to locate in distinct linear subspaces. To show this, we train interventions to predict and manipulate tokens by learning the scaling factor corresponding to each sequence position. These interventions indicate that the smallest RNNs find only this magnitude-based solution, while larger RNNs have linear representations. These findings strongly indicate that interpretability research should not be confined by the LRH.

Visual question answering (VQA) is a challenging task that requires the ability to comprehend and reason with visual information. While recent vision-language models have made strides, they continue to struggle with zero-shot VQA, particularly in handling complex compositional questions and adapting to new domains i.e. knowledge-based reasoning. This paper explores the use of various prompting strategies, focusing on the BLIP2 model, to enhance zero-shot VQA performance. We conduct a comprehensive investigation across several VQA datasets, examining the effectiveness of different question templates, the role of few-shot exemplars, the impact of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, and the benefits of incorporating image captions as additional visual cues. Despite the varied outcomes, our findings demonstrate that carefully designed question templates and the integration of additional visual cues, like image captions, can contribute to improved VQA performance, especially when used in conjunction with few-shot examples. However, we also identify a limitation in the use of chain-of-thought rationalization, which negatively affects VQA accuracy. Our study thus provides critical insights into the potential of prompting for improving zero-shot VQA performance.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly criticized for not understanding language. However, many critiques focus on cognitive abilities that, in humans, are distinct from language processing. Here, we instead study a kind of understanding tightly linked to language: inferring who did what to whom (thematic roles) in a sentence. Does the central training objective of LLMs-word prediction-result in sentence representations that capture thematic roles? In two experiments, we characterized sentence representations in four LLMs. In contrast to human similarity judgments, in LLMs the overall representational similarity of sentence pairs reflected syntactic similarity but not whether their agent and patient assignments were identical vs. reversed. Furthermore, we found little evidence that thematic role information was available in any subset of hidden units. However, some attention heads robustly captured thematic roles, independently of syntax. Therefore, LLMs can extract thematic roles but, relative to humans, this information influences their representations more weakly.

Recent work has proposed the linear representation hypothesis: that language models perform computation by manipulating one-dimensional representations of concepts ("features") in activation space. In contrast, we explore whether some language model representations may be inherently multi-dimensional. We begin by developing a rigorous definition of irreducible multi-dimensional features based on whether they can be decomposed into either independent or non-co-occurring lower-dimensional features. Motivated by these definitions, we design a scalable method that uses sparse autoencoders to automatically find multi-dimensional features in GPT-2 and Mistral 7B. These auto-discovered features include strikingly interpretable examples, e.g. circular features representing days of the week and months of the year. We identify tasks where these exact circles are used to solve computational problems involving modular arithmetic in days of the week and months of the year. Finally, we provide evidence that these circular features are indeed the fundamental unit of computation in these tasks with intervention experiments on Mistral 7B and Llama 3 8B, and we find further circular representations by breaking down the hidden states for these tasks into interpretable components.

Despite significant advancements in large language models (LLMs), a major drawback of reasoning models is their enormous token usage, which increases computational cost, resource requirements, and response time. In this work, we revisit the core principles of reinforcement learning (RL) and, through mathematical analysis, demonstrate that the tendency to generate lengthy responses arises inherently from RL-based optimization during training. This finding questions the prevailing assumption that longer responses inherently improve reasoning accuracy. Instead, we uncover a natural correlation between conciseness and accuracy that has been largely overlooked. Moreover, we show that introducing a secondary phase of RL post-training, using a small set of problems and limited resources, can significantly reduce a model's chain of thought while maintaining or even enhancing accuracy. Finally, we validate our conclusions through extensive experimental results.

We present a simple method that achieves unexpectedly superior performance for Complex Reasoning involved Visual Question Answering. Our solution collects statistical features from high-frequency words of all the questions asked about an image and use them as accurate knowledge for answering further questions of the same image. We are fully aware that this setting is not ubiquitously applicable, and in a more common setting one should assume the questions are asked separately and they cannot be gathered to obtain a knowledge base. Nonetheless, we use this method as an evidence to demonstrate our observation that the bottleneck effect is more severe on the feature extraction part than it is on the knowledge reasoning part. We show significant gaps when using the same reasoning model with 1) ground-truth features; 2) statistical features; 3) detected features from completely learned detectors, and analyze what these gaps mean to researches on visual reasoning topics. Our model with the statistical features achieves the 2nd place in the GQA Challenge 2019.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

LLMs' decision-making process is opaque, prompting the need for explanation techniques like Chain-of-Thought. To investigate the relationship between answer and reasoning, we design a novel evaluation framework, MATCHA. In domains like education and healthcare, reasoning is key for model trustworthiness. MATCHA reveals that LLMs under input perturbations can give inconsistent or nonsensical reasoning. Additionally, we use LLM judges to assess reasoning robustness across models. Our results show that LLMs exhibit greater vulnerability to input perturbations for multi-step and commonsense tasks than compared to logical tasks. Also, we show non-trivial transfer rates of our successful examples to black-box models. Our evaluation framework helps to better understand LLM reasoning mechanisms and guides future models toward more robust and reasoning-driven architectures, enforcing answer-reasoning consistency.

Autoregressive language models (LMs) generate one token at a time, yet human reasoning operates over higher-level abstractions - sentences, propositions, and concepts. This contrast raises a central question- Can LMs likewise learn to reason over structured semantic units rather than raw token sequences? In this work, we investigate whether pretrained LMs can be lifted into such abstract reasoning spaces by building on their learned representations. We present a framework that adapts a pretrained token-level LM to operate in sentence space by autoregressively predicting continuous embeddings of next sentences. We explore two embedding paradigms inspired by classical representation learning: 1) semantic embeddings, learned via autoencoding to preserve surface meaning; and 2) contextual embeddings, trained via next-sentence prediction to encode anticipatory structure. We evaluate both under two inference regimes: Discretized, which decodes each predicted embedding into text before re-encoding; and Continuous, which reasons entirely in embedding space for improved efficiency. Across four domains - mathematics, logic, commonsense, and planning - contextual embeddings under continuous inference show competitive performance with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) while reducing inference-time FLOPs on average by half. We also present early signs of scalability and modular adaptation. Finally, to visualize latent trajectories, we introduce SentenceLens, a diagnostic tool that decodes intermediate model states into interpretable sentences. Together, our results indicate that pretrained LMs can effectively transition to abstract, structured reasoning within latent embedding spaces.

Given a question, a language model (LM) implicitly encodes a distribution over possible answers. In practice, post-training procedures for LMs often collapse this distribution onto a single dominant mode. While this is generally not a problem for benchmark-style evaluations that assume one correct answer, many real-world tasks inherently involve multiple valid answers or irreducible uncertainty. Examples include medical diagnosis, ambiguous question answering, and settings with incomplete information. In these cases, we would like LMs to generate multiple plausible hypotheses, ideally with confidence estimates for each one, and without computationally intensive repeated sampling to generate non-modal answers. This paper describes a multi-answer reinforcement learning approach for training LMs to perform distributional reasoning over multiple answers during inference. We modify the RL objective to enable models to explicitly generate multiple candidate answers in a single forward pass, internalizing aspects of inference-time search into the model's generative process. Across question-answering, medical diagnostic, and coding benchmarks, we observe improved diversity, coverage, and set-level calibration scores compared to single answer trained baselines. Models trained with our approach require fewer tokens to generate multiple answers than competing approaches. On coding tasks, they are also substantially more accurate. These results position multi-answer RL as a principled and compute-efficient alternative to inference-time scaling procedures such as best-of-k. Code and more information can be found at https://multi-answer-rl.github.io/.

Despite the impressive performance of large language models (LLMs), the process of endowing them with new capabilities--such as mathematical reasoning--remains largely empirical and opaque. A critical open question is whether reasoning abilities stem from the entire model, specific modules, or are merely artifacts of overfitting. In this work, we hypothesize that the reasoning capabilities in well-trained LLMs are primarily attributed to the output projection module (oproj) in the Transformer's multi-head self-attention (MHSA) mechanism. To support this hypothesis, we introduce Stethoscope for Networks (SfN), a suite of diagnostic tools designed to probe and analyze the internal behaviors of LLMs. Using SfN, we provide both circumstantial and empirical evidence suggesting that oproj plays a central role in enabling reasoning, whereas other modules contribute more to fluent dialogue. These findings offer a new perspective on LLM interpretability and open avenues for more targeted training strategies, potentially enabling more efficient and specialized LLMs.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Cross-view spatial reasoning remains a weak spot for vision-language models (VLMs): they often reason in language and lose the fine-grained geometry needed for the task. Thinking with images aims to address this by generating an intermediate thinking image, but recent work shows that models often ignore the visual evidence in these traces. We therefore ask how to make visual thinking matter, and what kind of visual thinking works best. We study these questions in unified multimodal models (UMMs), which natively support interleaved image-text generation. For the first question, we propose View Dropout (VDrop), a training-time intervention that hides parts of one input view from the answer span while keeping them visible to the thinking-image tokens. This encourages the model to use the thinking image when answering, instead of relying only on the input views. Once the thinking image is used for answer prediction, we study which type of visual thinking is most effective. We frame this as a learnability-informativeness tradeoff and compare three thinking-image variants: top-down, panoramic, and point-matching renderings. Trained on synthetic scenes and evaluated on five real-world out-of-domain benchmarks, panoramic visual thinking with VDrop is the only configuration that is both informative and learnable, and it achieves the best out-of-domain generalization.

Latent visual reasoning aims to mimic human's imagination process by meditating through hidden states of Multimodal Large Language Models. While recognized as a promising paradigm for visual reasoning, the underlying mechanisms driving its effectiveness remain unclear. Motivated to demystify the true source of its efficacy, we investigate the validity of latent reasoning using Causal Mediation Analysis. We model the process as a causal chain: the input as the treatment, the latent tokens as the mediator, and the final answer as the outcome. Our findings uncover two critical disconnections: (a) Input-Latent Disconnect: dramatic perturbations on the input result in negligible changes to the latent tokens, suggesting that latent tokens do not effectively attend to the input sequence. (b) Latent-Answer Disconnect: perturbations on the latent tokens yield minimal impact on the final answer, indicating the limited causal effect latent tokens imposing on the outcome. Furthermore, extensive probing analysis reveals that latent tokens encode limited visual information and exhibit high similarity. Consequently, we challenge the necessity of latent reasoning and propose a straightforward alternative named CapImagine, which teaches the model to explicitly imagine using text. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that CapImagine significantly outperforms complex latent-space baselines, highlighting the superior potential of visual reasoning through explicit imagination.

The platonic representation hypothesis suggests that sufficiently large models converge to a shared representation geometry, even across modalities. Motivated by this, we ask: Can the semantic knowledge of a language model efficiently improve a vision model? As an answer, we introduce TextTeacher, a simple auxiliary objective that injects text embeddings as additional information into image classification training. TextTeacher uses readily available image captions, a pre-trained and frozen text encoder, and a lightweight projection to produce semantic anchors that efficiently guide representations during training while leaving the inference-time model unchanged. On ImageNet with standard ViT backbones, TextTeacher improves accuracy by up to +2.7 percentage points (p.p.) and yields consistent transfer gains (on average +1.0 p.p.) under the same recipe and compute. It outperforms vision knowledge distillation, yielding more accuracy at a constant compute budget or similar accuracy, but 33% faster. Our analysis indicates that TextTeacher acts as a feature-space preconditioner, shaping deeper layers in the first stages of training, and aiding generalization by supplying complementary semantic cues. TextTeacher adds negligible overhead, requires no costly multimodal training of the target model and preserves the simplicity and latency of pure vision models. Project page with code and captions: https://nauen-it.de/publications/text-teacher

Mathematical reasoning has long represented one of the most fundamental and challenging frontiers in artificial intelligence research. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in this area. This survey examines the development of mathematical reasoning abilities in LLMs through two high-level cognitive phases: comprehension, where models gain mathematical understanding via diverse pretraining strategies, and answer generation, which has progressed from direct prediction to step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. We review methods for enhancing mathematical reasoning, ranging from training-free prompting to fine-tuning approaches such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, and discuss recent work on extended CoT and "test-time scaling". Despite notable progress, fundamental challenges remain in terms of capacity, efficiency, and generalization. To address these issues, we highlight promising research directions, including advanced pretraining and knowledge augmentation techniques, formal reasoning frameworks, and meta-generalization through principled learning paradigms. This survey tries to provide some insights for researchers interested in enhancing reasoning capabilities of LLMs and for those seeking to apply these techniques to other domains.

A language model p_θ(y mid x) trained on reasoning tasks learns to solve problems via multiple distinct strategies, yet these strategies are implicit and entangled within the model's response distribution. We study the problem of decomposing the response distribution of a given pretrained language model into a structured, strategy-conditioned representation. Specifically, we learn a latent-variable factorization p_θ(y mid x) leadsto (r_ϕ(z mid x), g_ϕ(y mid x,z)), where a router r maps each input to a distribution over latent strategies z and a generator g produces the response conditioned on that strategy. A key challenge is that the generator, initialized from the base model, already represents p_θ(y mid x) without using z. Standard variational inference therefore gives the model no incentive to route information through z and can yield a severe form of posterior collapse. To address this, we propose a variational objective that measures fractional information gain relative to the base model's response loss and concentrates reconstruction pressure on tokens with high base model surprisal, encouraging z to encode strategy-relevant response variation. We introduce a benchmark of multi-strategy algorithmic tasks and show that this objective recovers latent codes aligned with distinct reference strategies while preserving the base model's response distribution.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs), designed to interpret and respond to human instructions, occasionally generate hallucinated or harmful content due to inappropriate instructions. This study uses linear probing to shed light on the hidden knowledge at the output layer of LVLMs. We demonstrate that the logit distributions of the first tokens contain sufficient information to determine whether to respond to the instructions, including recognizing unanswerable visual questions, defending against multi-modal jailbreaking attack, and identifying deceptive questions. Such hidden knowledge is gradually lost in logits of subsequent tokens during response generation. Then, we illustrate a simple decoding strategy at the generation of the first token, effectively improving the generated content. In experiments, we find a few interesting insights: First, the CLIP model already contains a strong signal for solving these tasks, indicating potential bias in the existing datasets. Second, we observe performance improvement by utilizing the first logit distributions on three additional tasks, including indicting uncertainty in math solving, mitigating hallucination, and image classification. Last, with the same training data, simply finetuning LVLMs improve models' performance but is still inferior to linear probing on these tasks.

Post-training is essential for the success of large language models (LLMs), transforming pre-trained base models into more useful and aligned post-trained models. While plenty of works have studied post-training algorithms and evaluated post-training models by their outputs, it remains understudied how post-training reshapes LLMs internally. In this paper, we compare base and post-trained LLMs mechanistically from four perspectives to better understand post-training effects. Our findings across model families and datasets reveal that: (1) Post-training does not change the factual knowledge storage locations, and it adapts knowledge representations from the base model while developing new knowledge representations; (2) Both truthfulness and refusal can be represented by linear vectors in the hidden representation space. The truthfulness direction is highly similar between the base and post-trained model, and it is effectively transferable for interventions; (3) The refusal direction is different between the base and post-trained models, and it shows limited forward transferability; (4) Differences in confidence between the base and post-trained models cannot be attributed to entropy neurons. Our study provides insights into the fundamental mechanisms preserved and altered during post-training, facilitates downstream tasks like model steering, and could potentially benefit future research in interpretability and LLM post-training.

Language models are known to absorb biases from their training data, leading to predictions driven by statistical regularities rather than semantic relevance. We investigate the impact of these biases on answer choice preferences in the Massive Multi-Task Language Understanding (MMLU) task. Our findings reveal that differences in learned regularities across answer options are predictive of model preferences and mirror human test-taking strategies. To address this issue, we introduce two novel methods: Counterfactual Prompting with Chain of Thought (CoT) and Counterfactual Prompting with Agnostically Primed CoT (APriCoT). We demonstrate that while Counterfactual Prompting with CoT alone is insufficient to mitigate bias, our novel Primed Counterfactual Prompting with CoT approach effectively reduces the influence of base-rate probabilities while improving overall accuracy. Our results suggest that mitigating bias requires a "System-2" like process and that CoT reasoning is susceptible to confirmation bias under some prompting methodologies. Our contributions offer practical solutions for developing more robust and fair language models.

We study reasoning for accessing world knowledge stored in a language model's parameters. For example, recalling that Canberra is Australia's capital may benefit from thinking through major cities and the concept of purpose-built capitals. While reasoning language models are trained via reinforcement learning to produce reasoning traces on tasks such as mathematics, they may not reason well for accessing their own world knowledge. We first find that models do not generate their best world knowledge reasoning by default: adding a simple "think step-by-step" cue demonstrates statistically significant improvement in knowledge recall but not math. Motivated by this, we propose training models to reason over their parametric knowledge using world-knowledge question answering as a verifiable reward. After reinforcement learning on TriviaQA (+9.9%), performance also improves on Natural Questions, HotpotQA, SimpleQA, and StrategyQA by 4.2%, 2.1%, 0.6%, and 3.0%, respectively. Reasoning models are under-optimized for parametric knowledge access, but can be easily trained to reason better.

Language model representations often contain linear directions that correspond to high-level concepts. Here, we study the dynamics of these representations: how representations evolve along these dimensions within the context of (simulated) conversations. We find that linear representations can change dramatically over a conversation; for example, information that is represented as factual at the beginning of a conversation can be represented as non-factual at the end and vice versa. These changes are content-dependent; while representations of conversation-relevant information may change, generic information is generally preserved. These changes are robust even for dimensions that disentangle factuality from more superficial response patterns, and occur across different model families and layers of the model. These representation changes do not require on-policy conversations; even replaying a conversation script written by an entirely different model can produce similar changes. However, adaptation is much weaker from simply having a sci-fi story in context that is framed more explicitly as such. We also show that steering along a representational direction can have dramatically different effects at different points in a conversation. These results are consistent with the idea that representations may evolve in response to the model playing a particular role that is cued by a conversation. Our findings may pose challenges for interpretability and steering -- in particular, they imply that it may be misleading to use static interpretations of features or directions, or probes that assume a particular range of features consistently corresponds to a particular ground-truth value. However, these types of representational dynamics also point to exciting new research directions for understanding how models adapt to context.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

Recent soft prompt research has tried to improve reasoning by inserting trained vectors into LLM inputs, yet whether the gain comes from the learned content or from the act of injection itself has not been carefully separated. We study Random Soft Prompts (RSPs), which drop the training step entirely and append a freshly drawn sequence of random embedding vectors to the input. Each RSP vector is sampled from an isotropic Gaussian fitted to the entrywise mean and variance of the pretrained embedding table; the sequence carries no learned content, and yet reaches accuracy comparable to optimized soft prompts on math reasoning benchmarks in several settings. The mechanism unfolds in two stages: because attention has to absorb a never-seen-before random position, the distribution over the first few generated tokens flattens and reasoning trajectories branch, and as generation continues this influence dilutes naturally so the response commits to a single completion. We show that during inference RSPs lift early-stage token diversity and, combined with temperature sampling, widen Pass@N, the probability that at least one out of N attempts is correct. Beyond inference, we carry the same effect into DAPO training and demonstrate practical gains. Our contributions are: (i) RSP isolates the simplest form of soft prompt -- training-free, freshly resampled -- providing a unified lens for the structural effect of injection that variants otherwise differing in training and form all share; (ii) a theoretical and empirical validation of the underlying mechanism; and (iii) an extension from inference to training.

Recent think-answer approaches in VLMs, such as Qwen3-VL-Thinking, boost reasoning performance by leveraging intermediate thinking steps before the final answer, but their high computational cost limits real-world deployment. To distill such capabilities into compact think-answer VLMs, a primary objective is to improve the student's ability to utilize visual evidence throughout its reasoning trace. To this end, we introduce a novel think-answer distillation framework that encourages the student to anchor its thinking on visual information by masking the student's salient reasoning prefixes. To compensate for such masked textual cues, the student is encouraged to rely more on visual evidence as an alternative source of information during distillation. Our masking strategies include: 1) token-wise salient reasoning-prefix masking, which masks high-influence reasoning prefixes selectively for each next-token prediction, and 2) self-paced masking budget scheduling, which gradually increases the masking scale according to distillation difficulty, {measured by discrepancy between teacher--student distributions. In the distillation phase, the student is guided by our salient reasoning-prefix mask, which blocks both future tokens and salient reasoning cues, in place of the standard causal mask used for auto-regressive language modeling. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms recent open-source VLMs, VLM distillation, and self-distillation methods on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, while further analyses confirm enhanced visual utilization along the student thinking process.

The Visual Question Answering (VQA) task requires the simultaneous understanding of image content and question semantics. However, existing methods often have difficulty handling complex reasoning scenarios due to insufficient cross-modal interaction and capturing the entity spatial relationships in the image.huang2023adaptiveliu2021comparingguibas2021adaptivezhang2022vsaWe studied a brand-new approach to replace the attention mechanism in order to enhance the reasoning ability of the model and its understanding of spatial relationships.Specifically, we propose a dynamic bidirectional spatial tower, which is divided into four layers to observe the image according to the principle of human gestalt vision. This naturally provides a powerful structural prior for the spatial organization between entities, enabling the model to no longer blindly search for relationships between pixels but make judgments based on more meaningful perceptual units. Change from "seeing images" to "perceiving and organizing image content".A large number of experiments have shown that our module can be used in any other multimodal model and achieve advanced results, demonstrating its potential in spatial relationship processing.Meanwhile, the multimodal visual question-answering model July trained by our method has achieved state-of-the-art results with only 3B parameters, especially on the question-answering dataset of spatial relations.

When a language model refuses to answer a prompt, it is unclear whether the correct answer is erased from its internal representations, or merely suppressed at the output layer. We investigate this mechanism using a controlled withhold setting, which yields perfectly matched answering and refusal trajectories for bidirectional activation patching. We uncover a causal asymmetry in intervention locality under matched causal interventions, which we term broken symmetry. Even when a model generates a clean refusal, the correct answer remains linearly recoverable from its hidden states. Furthermore, releasing this withheld answer is a highly local operation, requiring only a single-position patch. Conversely, the reverse operation is not equally local: reimposing suppression requires broader interventions across multiple positions, and assembling a coherent refusal sequence is more difficult still. We further demonstrate that while an average answer-to-refusal displacement vector marks the geometric difference between these states, it fails to act as a reliable, reversible linear control toggle between behaviours. Taken together, our findings show that refusal does not function as a simple symmetric switch. For safety and auditing, this implies that probe recoverability can overestimate true behavioural control, and locating refusal-relevant directions does not reliably grant the ability to steer a model from answering to coherent refusal.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

Decoding visual content from fMRI signals recorded while a person views images, and specifically answering questions about the seen images, is a long-standing challenge. While significant progress has been made in recent years in visual question answering (VQA) from fMRI, performance remains limited. Moreover, although recent models can make increasingly accurate predictions, they have rarely been used as tools for understanding the structure of visual representations in the brain. We present Brain-IT-VQA, a framework for visual question answering from fMRI. Building on the Brain Interaction Transformer (Brain-IT), our method decodes language tokens from brain activity and integrates them with a language model to answer visual questions. Our model substantially outperforms previous fMRI-based captioning and VQA approaches. We further introduce NSD-VQA, a new dataset and benchmark for visual question answering from fMRI. Unlike existing image-fMRI VQA datasets, which typically provide only a few broad and weakly controlled questions per image, NSD-VQA provides on average 20 question-answer pairs per image across 20 controlled question categories that disentangle multiple levels of visual understanding. This enables more reliable and interpretable evaluation despite limited fMRI test data. Together, Brain-IT-VQA and NSD-VQA provide both a strong predictive framework and a tool for studying brain representations. Using this benchmark, we quantify which forms of visual and semantic information can be reliably decoded from fMRI responses to natural images. We further analyze the contributions of different brain regions across question types.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) generate extended solutions, yet it remains unclear whether these traces reflect substantive internal computation or merely verbosity and overthinking. Although recent hidden-state analyses suggest that internal representations carry correctness-related signals, their coarse aggregations may obscure the token and layer structure underlying reasoning computation. We investigate hidden-state transitions across decoding steps and layers, and identify a distinct spatiotemporal pattern in LRMs: successful trajectories exhibit broad temporal dynamics with localized layer-wise concentration, while this structure is weaker in non-reasoning models and knowledge-heavy domains. We formalize this characteristic as Spatiotemporal Amplitude of Latent Transition (StALT), a training-free trajectory statistic that summarizes temporal changes between adjacent tokens weighted by within-token layer saliency. Across diverse models and benchmarks, StALT reliably separates correct from incorrect trajectories in reasoning-intensive regimes, providing a competitive label-free correctness signal alongside strong output-space and length-based baselines. Intervention analyses further show that this spatiotemporal amplitude responds systematically to manipulations that increase or reduce the demand for internal reasoning, supporting its association with latent reasoning dynamics in LRMs. These findings provide empirical evidence that LRMs exhibit measurable hidden-state dynamics and offer a practical probe for understanding internal computation beyond output-based evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for generative and knowledge-intensive tasks including question-answering (QA) tasks. However, the practical deployment still faces challenges, notably the issue of "hallucination", where models generate plausible-sounding but unfaithful or nonsensical information. This issue becomes particularly critical in the medical domain due to the uncommon professional concepts and potential social risks involved. This paper analyses the phenomenon of hallucination in medical generative QA systems using widely adopted LLMs and datasets. Our investigation centers on the identification and comprehension of common problematic answers, with a specific emphasis on hallucination. To tackle this challenge, we present an interactive self-reflection methodology that incorporates knowledge acquisition and answer generation. Through this feedback process, our approach steadily enhances the factuality, consistency, and entailment of the generated answers. Consequently, we harness the interactivity and multitasking ability of LLMs and produce progressively more precise and accurate answers. Experimental results on both automatic and human evaluation demonstrate the superiority of our approach in hallucination reduction compared to baselines.

When people answer questions about a specific situation, e.g., "I cheated on my mid-term exam last week. Was that wrong?", cognitive science suggests that they form a mental picture of that situation before answering. While we do not know how language models (LMs) answer such questions, we conjecture that they may answer more accurately if they are also provided with additional details about the question situation, elaborating the "scene". To test this conjecture, we train a new model, DREAM, to answer questions that elaborate the scenes that situated questions are about, and then provide those elaborations as additional context to a question-answering (QA) model. We find that DREAM is able to create better scene elaborations (more accurate, useful, and consistent) than a representative state-of-the-art, zero-shot model (Macaw). We also find that using the scene elaborations as additional context improves the answer accuracy of a downstream QA system, including beyond that obtainable by simply further finetuning the QA system on DREAM's training data. These results suggest that adding focused elaborations about a situation can improve a system's reasoning about it, and may serve as an effective way of injecting new scenario based knowledge into QA models. Finally, our approach is dataset-neutral; we observe improved QA performance across different models, with even bigger gains on models with fewer parameters. We make our dataset and model publicly available at https://github.com/allenai/dream.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly optimized for long reasoning, under the assumption that more reasoning leads to better performance. However, emerging evidence suggests that longer responses can sometimes degrade accuracy rather than improve it. In this paper, we conduct a systematic empirical study of the relationship between reasoning length and answer correctness. We find that LLMs tend to overthink simple problems, generating unnecessarily long outputs, and underthink harder ones, failing to extend their reasoning when it is most needed. This indicates that models might misjudge problem difficulty and fail to calibrate their response length appropriately. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of length reduction with a preference optimization algorithm when simply preferring the shorter responses regardless of answer correctness. Experiments show that the generation length can be significantly reduced while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Our findings highlight generation length as a meaningful signal for reasoning behavior and motivate further exploration into LLMs' self-awareness in reasoning length adaptation.

Vision-language models must reconcile visual evidence with memorized world knowledge when the two conflict. How they resolve this conflict shapes the reliability of multimodal systems, yet prior work characterizes it behaviorally without a component-level causal account. We combine activation patching across three granularities (residual stream, attention heads, and MLP sublayers) with model-component ablation studies and mechanistic analysis. Across three VLM families, we find that visual grounding emerges by default, whereas prior grounding depends on a small set of causally necessary attention heads (2.5-4.8%) concentrated in the second half of the network. These heads enable answers from stored world knowledge (e.g., "red" for a strawberry) despite conflicting visual input. Ablating them flips predictions from knowledge-grounded to visually grounded answers in 68-96% of cases under prior-knowledge prompts, but changes only 0.8-7.5% of visually grounded predictions, establishing an asymmetric causal structure. The identified heads decompose into routing heads, which modulate information flow, and writing heads, which directly project answer tokens into the residual stream. This structure is consistent across model families and scales, revealing a sparse causal circuit underlying perception-knowledge conflict in VLMs.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Reasoning presents a significant and challenging issue for Large Language Models (LLMs). The predominant focus of research has revolved around developing diverse prompting strategies to guide and structure the reasoning processes of LLMs. However, these approaches based on decoder-only causal language models often operate the input question in a single forward pass, potentially missing the rich, back-and-forth interactions inherent in human reasoning. Scant attention has been paid to a critical dimension, i.e., the input question itself embedded within the prompts. In response, we introduce a deceptively simple yet highly effective prompting strategy, termed question "re-reading". Drawing inspiration from human learning and problem-solving, re-reading entails revisiting the question information embedded within input prompts. This approach aligns seamlessly with the cognitive principle of reinforcement, enabling LLMs to extract deeper insights, identify intricate patterns, establish more nuanced connections, and ultimately enhance their reasoning capabilities across various tasks. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning benchmarks serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our method. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that our approach seamlessly integrates with various language models, though-eliciting prompting methods, and ensemble techniques, further underscoring its versatility and compatibility in the realm of LLMs.