Daily Papers

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) are central to modern information retrieval but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Existing attacks often rely on heuristics or surrogate models, limiting effectiveness and transferability. We propose CRAFT, a supervised framework for black-box adversarial rank attacks powered by large language models (LLMs). CRAFT operates in three stages: adversarial dataset generation via retrieval-augmented generation and self-refinement, supervised fine-tuning on curated adversarial examples, and preference-guided optimization to align generations with rank-promotion objectives. Extensive experiments on the MS MARCO passage dataset, TREC Deep Learning 2019, and TREC Deep Learning 2020 benchmarks show that CRAFT significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving higher promotion rates and rank boosts while preserving fluency and semantic fidelity. Moreover, CRAFT transfers effectively across diverse ranking architectures, including cross-encoder, embedding-based, and LLM-based rankers, underscoring vulnerabilities in real-world retrieval systems. This work provides a principled framework for studying adversarial threats in NRMs, underscores the risks of generative AI in rank manipulation, and provides a foundation for developing more robust retrieval systems. To support reproducibility, we publicly release our source code, trained models, and prompt templates.

As AI agents move from bounded tasks to persistent deployments, failures can propagate through memory, tools, other agents, and environmental state long after their interactions. This creates a safety regime that cannot be characterized by evaluating model responses in isolation. Emergence World, is a continuously running multi-agent environment for adversarial stress testing of long horizon autonomous systems. We ran eight parallel worlds of ten agents from identical starting conditions: seven homogeneous worlds powered by distinct frontier models and one mixed-model world. Across 16 days, the agents generated more than 850,000 LLM calls and nearly 50 billion tokens while pursuing goals, using/creating tools, maintaining persistent memory, and governing shared institutions. After operational state had accumulated, we delivered three controlled stress events through ordinary interaction surfaces: indirect prompt injection, misinformation, and exposure of private agent memories. No evaluated world achieved full resilience across all three events. Detection did not ensure containment: systems could recognize threats while still interacting with adversarial content, writing it into their own persistent memory, and acting on it up to 46 hours later. Persistent operation also exposed recurring tool errors, goal drift, language opacity, conformity despite private disagreement, and coordinated refusal of assigned work. The same model-persona pairing behaved substantially different in mixed and homogeneous populations. Our results suggest that model-level alignment is not compositional: individually capable and apparently safe agents can form systems with qualitatively different failure modes. As AI becomes persistent and interconnected, the frontier of safety therefore shifts from aligning models to engineering resilient autonomous systems.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

AI agents combine language models with external data and tools that can modify files, call APIs, or execute code. Security failures can arise when adversarial content changes an agent's tool use or when the surrounding software contains vulnerabilities such as path traversal or command injection. We study authorized white-box pre-deployment auditing, where the auditor has access to the target repository and a controlled runtime, but successful attacks must still act through the task-defined attacker interface and be confirmed by an external verifier. We present AgentXploit, a two-role auditing system that separates repository-level attack-path discovery from runtime exploitation. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records code-supported candidate attack paths; the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and revises them using runtime feedback. We also introduce AgentXploit-Bench, containing 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open-source AI-agent systems and frameworks. Across three runs, AgentXploit reaches 59.3% end-to-end success, compared with 38.4% for Codex. Under a token-budget-matched comparison, Codex reaches 46.3%. On AgentDojo, where injection points are provided, the Exploiter Agent reaches 79.2% attack success versus 52.7% for AgentVigil. These results highlight repository discovery and runtime exploitation as distinct challenges in end-to-end agent security auditing.

The rapid proliferation of AI-generated content on the Web presents a structural risk to information retrieval, as search engines and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems increasingly consume evidence produced by the Large Language Models (LLMs). We characterize this ecosystem-level failure mode as Retrieval Collapse, a two-stage process where (1) AI-generated content dominates search results, eroding source diversity, and (2) low-quality or adversarial content infiltrates the retrieval pipeline. We analyzed this dynamic through controlled experiments involving both high-quality SEO-style content and adversarially crafted content. In the SEO scenario, a 67\% pool contamination led to over 80\% exposure contamination, creating a homogenized yet deceptively healthy state where answer accuracy remains stable despite the reliance on synthetic sources. Conversely, under adversarial contamination, baselines like BM25 exposed sim19\% of harmful content, whereas LLM-based rankers demonstrated stronger suppression capabilities. These findings highlight the risk of retrieval pipelines quietly shifting toward synthetic evidence and the need for retrieval-aware strategies to prevent a self-reinforcing cycle of quality decline in Web-grounded systems.

As language models take on agentic roles that span calling external APIs, reading tool outputs, and acting on instructions embedded in third-party content, their attack surface expands well beyond what users type. Whether a model treats a malicious instruction the same way regardless of where it arrives has not been systematically studied. We introduce the Safety Asymmetry Score (SAS), which measures how much a model's susceptibility to adversarial content shifts depending on whether that content arrives in the user message, tool metadata, or tool output, using matched payload pairs that keep the malicious text identical and vary only the context of delivery. Evaluated across 6 production LLMs and three attack families, we find a consistent and informative asymmetry: agent-native models are substantially more vulnerable when adversarial content arrives via tool descriptions than via user messages, while general-purpose models show the reverse. This asymmetry further inverts when the same content is delivered through tool outputs rather than descriptions, suggesting models implicitly treat tool metadata as trusted instructions and tool results as ordinary data. A mechanistic study on Llama 3.3 70B reveals that the safety-relevant representation is causally present at mid-to-late network depths but non-linearly encoded, explaining why linear probes fail to detect it. These findings expose a systematic, channel-dependent blind spot in how current tool-using models handle adversarial content.

Poisoning pretraining data can introduce harmful behaviors to LMs that are difficult to detect and mitigate. Prior work on poisoning pretraining data has largely exploited established data sources such as Wikipedia, which do not represent the large scale and heterogeneity typical of pretraining corpora, and has ignored the interaction between poisoned data and data curation pipelines. We demonstrate that poisoning attacks on pretraining data are feasible beyond this limited setting through an existing web-scale content injection mechanism: public discussion interfaces. Additionally, to measure whether malicious content is included after web crawling and data curation, we introduce HalfLife, a novel analysis for estimating adversarial content inclusion in web-crawl based LM training data. We use HalfLife to explore the feasibility of poisoning pretraining corpora at web scale through open discussion interfaces. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of estimating whether poison injections are included in pretraining data, and establishes third-party webpage content as a possible vector for attacking language model pretraining.

Dense embedding-based text retrievalx2013retrieval of relevant passages from corpora via deep learning encodingsx2013has emerged as a powerful method attaining state-of-the-art search results and popularizing the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). Still, like other search methods, embedding-based retrieval may be susceptible to search-engine optimization (SEO) attacks, where adversaries promote malicious content by introducing adversarial passages to corpora. To faithfully assess and gain insights into the susceptibility of such systems to SEO, this work proposes the GASLITE attack, a mathematically principled gradient-based search method for generating adversarial passages without relying on the corpus content or modifying the model. Notably, GASLITE's passages (1) carry adversary-chosen information while (2) achieving high retrieval ranking for a selected query distribution when inserted to corpora. We use GASLITE to extensively evaluate retrievers' robustness, testing nine advanced models under varied threat models, while focusing on realistic adversaries targeting queries on a specific concept (e.g., a public figure). We found GASLITE consistently outperformed baselines by geq140% success rate, in all settings. Particularly, adversaries using GASLITE require minimal effort to manipulate search resultsx2013by injecting a negligible amount of adversarial passages (leq0.0001% of the corpus), they could make them visible in the top-10 results for 61-100% of unseen concept-specific queries against most evaluated models. Inspecting variance in retrievers' robustness, we identify key factors that may contribute to models' susceptibility to SEO, including specific properties in the embedding space's geometry.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Large language models (LLMs) have advanced the automation of data science workflows. Yet it remains unclear whether they can critically leverage external domain knowledge as human data scientists do in practice. To answer this question, we introduce AssistedDS (Assisted Data Science), a benchmark designed to systematically evaluate how LLMs handle domain knowledge in tabular prediction tasks. AssistedDS features both synthetic datasets with explicitly known generative mechanisms and real-world Kaggle competitions, each accompanied by curated bundles of helpful and adversarial documents. These documents provide domain-specific insights into data cleaning, feature engineering, and model selection. We assess state-of-the-art LLMs on their ability to discern and apply beneficial versus harmful domain knowledge, evaluating submission validity, information recall, and predictive performance. Our results demonstrate three key findings: (1) LLMs frequently exhibit an uncritical adoption of provided information, significantly impairing their predictive performance when adversarial content is introduced, (2) helpful guidance is often insufficient to counteract the negative influence of adversarial information, and (3) in Kaggle datasets, LLMs often make errors in handling time-series data, applying consistent feature engineering across different folds, and interpreting categorical variables correctly. These findings highlight a substantial gap in current models' ability to critically evaluate and leverage expert knowledge, underscoring an essential research direction for developing more robust, knowledge-aware automated data science systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Traditional Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines rely on similarity-based retrieval and re-ranking, which depend on heuristics such as top-k, and lack explainability, interpretability, and robustness against adversarial content. To address this gap, we propose a novel method METEORA that replaces re-ranking in RAG with a rationale-driven selection approach. METEORA operates in two stages. First, a general-purpose LLM is preference-tuned to generate rationales conditioned on the input query using direct preference optimization. These rationales guide the evidence chunk selection engine, which selects relevant chunks in three stages: pairing individual rationales with corresponding retrieved chunks for local relevance, global selection with elbow detection for adaptive cutoff, and context expansion via neighboring chunks. This process eliminates the need for top-k heuristics. The rationales are also used for consistency check using a Verifier LLM to detect and filter poisoned or misleading content for safe generation. The framework provides explainable and interpretable evidence flow by using rationales consistently across both selection and verification. Our evaluation across six datasets spanning legal, financial, and academic research domains shows that METEORA improves generation accuracy by 33.34% while using approximately 50% fewer chunks than state-of-the-art re-ranking methods. In adversarial settings, METEORA significantly improves the F1 score from 0.10 to 0.44 over the state-of-the-art perplexity-based defense baseline, demonstrating strong resilience to poisoning attacks. Code available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/METEORA-DC46/README.md

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) engage tools, share memory, and delegate tasks, often encountering adversarial content. Current defenses for MAS are typically evaluated in isolation, focusing on one attack type at a time, which can lead to costly and hard-to-audit outcomes. This study organizes defenses into five principles, implementing them as DEFER1 (DEterministic-First Enforcement with Residual judgment), which includes a cascade of 28 checks that blocks what it can and refers the rest to a panel of four judges. In independent testing across four domains, attack success rates drop from about 30.0% to approximately 3.0%, with 78% of blocked attacks handled by deterministic checks. Only a quarter of proposals reach the judges in the security-operations domain, illustrating that the rules provide security for attacks violating clear policies, while judges manage those that only misrepresent intent. Both systems have weaknesses, such as a risk-score approval gate that inaccurately approves most attack proposals but few legitimate ones, highlighting the challenges in assessing threats accurately.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

Modern web agents built on large vision-language models process webpages, select relevant UI elements, and translate model outputs into browser actions. Existing visual red-teaming approaches use adversarial visual content to manipulate this process. However, they primarily target model inference and do not explicitly account for structured input processing or action post-processing. Consequently, model-level success does not establish control over browser execution and cannot reliably characterize end-to-end agent robustness. To address this gap, we formulate red teaming for vision-grounded web agents as an end-to-end grounding-to-execution problem, and introduce WebMirage, a framework that crafts localized visual perturbations that cause agents to select attacker-controlled content and execute the corresponding browser action across varying webpage renderings. It uses a role-slot abstraction and webpage recomposition to capture competition among webpage elements, and dataflow analysis to align optimization with action post-processing. We evaluate WebMirage across four agent configurations and six VLM backbones on 2,250 tasks covering 13 public websites and a sandbox benchmark. WebMirage achieves an average attack success rate of 91.9%, compared with 17.4% for the strongest baseline, and remains effective against three agent-level defenses.

The high computational cost and slow inference time are major obstacles to deploying the video diffusion model (VDM) in practical applications. To overcome this, we introduce a new Video Diffusion Model Compression approach using individual content and motion dynamics preserved pruning and consistency loss. First, we empirically observe that deeper VDM layers are crucial for maintaining the quality of motion dynamics e.g., coherence of the entire video, while shallower layers are more focused on individual content e.g., individual frames. Therefore, we prune redundant blocks from the shallower layers while preserving more of the deeper layers, resulting in a lightweight VDM variant called VDMini. Additionally, we propose an Individual Content and Motion Dynamics (ICMD) Consistency Loss to gain comparable generation performance as larger VDM, i.e., the teacher to VDMini i.e., the student. Particularly, we first use the Individual Content Distillation (ICD) Loss to ensure consistency in the features of each generated frame between the teacher and student models. Next, we introduce a Multi-frame Content Adversarial (MCA) Loss to enhance the motion dynamics across the generated video as a whole. This method significantly accelerates inference time while maintaining high-quality video generation. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our VDMini on two important video generation tasks, Text-to-Video (T2V) and Image-to-Video (I2V), where we respectively achieve an average 2.5 times and 1.4 times speed up for the I2V method SF-V and the T2V method T2V-Turbo-v2, while maintaining the quality of the generated videos on two benchmarks, i.e., UCF101 and VBench.

Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a controlled evaluation framework for measuring endorsement corruption in LLM-based web-search agents, combining a web-evidence manipulation pipeline, a five-mode attack taxonomy, and multiple output-level metrics. We evaluate 13 LLM backends on 308 cases each. Results show that vulnerability patterns vary across backends: overall attack success rate (ASR) ranges from 0.0% on Claude-Sonnet-4.6 to 31.4% on Gemini-3-Flash, the strongest attack mode differs by model family, and the same deployment scaffold could amplify or decrease ASR on different backends. An auxiliary agent-skill probe, where endorsement becomes an install command, exposes a sharp split among otherwise robust backends: Claude over-rejects while GPT over-trusts. These findings argue for treating recommendation reliability under adversarial search content as a first-class dimension of backend safety evaluation.

Despite the breakthroughs in accuracy and speed of single image super-resolution using faster and deeper convolutional neural networks, one central problem remains largely unsolved: how do we recover the finer texture details when we super-resolve at large upscaling factors? The behavior of optimization-based super-resolution methods is principally driven by the choice of the objective function. Recent work has largely focused on minimizing the mean squared reconstruction error. The resulting estimates have high peak signal-to-noise ratios, but they are often lacking high-frequency details and are perceptually unsatisfying in the sense that they fail to match the fidelity expected at the higher resolution. In this paper, we present SRGAN, a generative adversarial network (GAN) for image super-resolution (SR). To our knowledge, it is the first framework capable of inferring photo-realistic natural images for 4x upscaling factors. To achieve this, we propose a perceptual loss function which consists of an adversarial loss and a content loss. The adversarial loss pushes our solution to the natural image manifold using a discriminator network that is trained to differentiate between the super-resolved images and original photo-realistic images. In addition, we use a content loss motivated by perceptual similarity instead of similarity in pixel space. Our deep residual network is able to recover photo-realistic textures from heavily downsampled images on public benchmarks. An extensive mean-opinion-score (MOS) test shows hugely significant gains in perceptual quality using SRGAN. The MOS scores obtained with SRGAN are closer to those of the original high-resolution images than to those obtained with any state-of-the-art method.

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

In recent years, the rapid development of generative artificial intelligence technology has significantly lowered the barrier to creating high-quality fake images, posing a serious challenge to information authenticity and credibility. Existing generated image detection methods typically enhance generalization through model architecture or network design. However, their generalization performance remains susceptible to data bias, as the training data may drive models to fit specific generative patterns and content rather than the common features shared by images from different generative models (asymmetric bias learning). To address this issue, we propose a Multi-dimensional Adversarial Feature Learning (MAFL) framework. The framework adopts a pretrained multimodal image encoder as the feature extraction backbone, constructs a real-fake feature learning network, and designs an adversarial bias-learning branch equipped with a multi-dimensional adversarial loss, forming an adversarial training mechanism between authenticity-discriminative feature learning and bias feature learning. By suppressing generation-pattern and content biases, MAFL guides the model to focus on the generative features shared across different generative models, thereby effectively capturing the fundamental differences between real and generated images, enhancing cross-model generalization, and substantially reducing the reliance on large-scale training data. Through extensive experimental validation, our method outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by 10.89% in accuracy and 8.57% in Average Precision (AP). Notably, even when trained with only 320 images, it can still achieve over 80% detection accuracy on public datasets.

A few-shot font generation (FFG) method has to satisfy two objectives: the generated images should preserve the underlying global structure of the target character and present the diverse local reference style. Existing FFG methods aim to disentangle content and style either by extracting a universal representation style or extracting multiple component-wise style representations. However, previous methods either fail to capture diverse local styles or cannot be generalized to a character with unseen components, e.g., unseen language systems. To mitigate the issues, we propose a novel FFG method, named Multiple Localized Experts Few-shot Font Generation Network (MX-Font). MX-Font extracts multiple style features not explicitly conditioned on component labels, but automatically by multiple experts to represent different local concepts, e.g., left-side sub-glyph. Owing to the multiple experts, MX-Font can capture diverse local concepts and show the generalizability to unseen languages. During training, we utilize component labels as weak supervision to guide each expert to be specialized for different local concepts. We formulate the component assign problem to each expert as the graph matching problem, and solve it by the Hungarian algorithm. We also employ the independence loss and the content-style adversarial loss to impose the content-style disentanglement. In our experiments, MX-Font outperforms previous state-of-the-art FFG methods in the Chinese generation and cross-lingual, e.g., Chinese to Korean, generation. Source code is available at https://github.com/clovaai/mxfont.

Safeguarding large language models (LLMs) against unsafe or adversarial behavior is critical as they are increasingly deployed in conversational and agentic settings. Existing moderation tools often treat safety risks (e.g. toxicity, bias) and adversarial threats (e.g. prompt injections, jailbreaks) as separate problems, limiting their robustness and generalizability. We introduce AprielGuard, an 8B parameter safeguard model that unify these dimensions within a single taxonomy and learning framework. AprielGuard is trained on a diverse mix of open and synthetic data covering standalone prompts, multi-turn conversations, and agentic workflows, augmented with structured reasoning traces to improve interpretability. Across multiple public and proprietary benchmarks, AprielGuard achieves strong performance in detecting harmful content and adversarial manipulations, outperforming existing opensource guardrails such as Llama-Guard and Granite Guardian, particularly in multi-step and reasoning intensive scenarios. By releasing the model, we aim to advance transparent and reproducible research on reliable safeguards for LLMs.

Deep learning-based denoising models have been widely employed in vision tasks, functioning as filters to eliminate noise while retaining crucial semantic information. Additionally, they play a vital role in defending against adversarial perturbations that threaten downstream tasks. However, these models can be intrinsically susceptible to adversarial attacks due to their dependence on specific noise assumptions. Existing attacks on denoising models mainly aim at deteriorating visual clarity while neglecting semantic manipulation, rendering them either easily detectable or limited in effectiveness. In this paper, we propose Mutual Information-Guided Attack (MIGA), the first method designed to directly attack deep denoising models by strategically disrupting their ability to preserve semantic content via adversarial perturbations. By minimizing the mutual information between the original and denoised images, a measure of semantic similarity. MIGA forces the denoiser to produce perceptually clean yet semantically altered outputs. While these images appear visually plausible, they encode systematically distorted semantics, revealing a fundamental vulnerability in denoising models. These distortions persist in denoised outputs and can be quantitatively assessed through downstream task performance. We propose new evaluation metrics and systematically assess MIGA on four denoising models across five datasets, demonstrating its consistent effectiveness in disrupting semantic fidelity. Our findings suggest that denoising models are not always robust and can introduce security risks in real-world applications.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) is revolutionizing AI for Games by enabling open-ended and fluid interactive storytelling. However, existing research has largely overlooked the critical challenge of maintaining long-horizon logical consistency and narrative integrity against unconstrained user interventions. To address this, we formulate this challenge as Narrative Commitment Preservation (NCP), and take interactive narrative as our testbed. We introduce NCP-Bench, a benchmark of 100 narrative environments derived from movie synopses. Each environment includes a structured narrative specification (trajectory, commitments, and initial facts) that we can automatically check throughout the interaction between the player agent and the narrator agent. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a substantial long-horizon consistency gap: high linguistic quality does not guarantee commitment preservation; even strong models frequently generate logically conflicting content under adversarial interventions, with the best-performing model (GPT-5.2) achieving only 42% survival rate after 20 turns and fact conflict rates ranging from 40% to 68% across models, and only isolated runs satisfying all achievement commitments within the 100-turn limit.

Once visual content enters an AI pipeline, its owner often retains little technical control over how it is used. Legal and regulatory remedies can address misuse, but many technical interventions must be applied earlier, when content is released or accessed. This survey examines the protective paradigm that has grown around this intervention point, which we call adversarial attacks for good. Perturbations and structured signals long studied as attacks on learned models are instead applied by data owners, creators, platforms, or auditors to disrupt unauthorized automation or support later accountability. Five research communities have arrived at this inversion largely independently, each addressing a different stage of a visual asset's lifecycle: privacy filters against unwanted recognition at sharing time, unlearnable examples against unauthorized training, generative safeguards against malicious editing or imitation, adversarial CAPTCHAs for access control against automated agents, and provenance mechanisms for post-circulation attribution. Although developed in separate venues with incompatible success criteria, many of these methods exploit persistent gaps between human perception, semantic interpretation, and machine inference, suggesting that the paradigm remains relevant as visual pipelines evolve toward multimodal models and autonomous agents. To make their claims comparable, we evaluate all five families along shared axes of transferability, adaptability, and deployment readiness. Across the lifecycle, we find that most protections are still validated mainly against static or weakly adaptive adversaries, while evidence beyond controlled benchmarks remains scarce. We close by consolidating cross-stage countermeasures and open problems for robust, composable, and deployable owner-side protection.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly being deployed as automated content moderators. Within this landscape, we uncover a critical threat: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks. Unlike adversarial perturbations (for misclassification) and adversarial jailbreaks (for harmful output generation), adversarial smuggling exploits the Human-AI capability gap. It encodes harmful content into human-readable visual formats that remain AI-unreadable, thereby evading automated detection and enabling the dissemination of harmful content. We classify smuggling attacks into two pathways: (1) Perceptual Blindness, disrupting text recognition; and (2) Reasoning Blockade, inhibiting semantic understanding despite successful text recognition. To evaluate this threat, we constructed SmuggleBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 1,700 adversarial smuggling attack instances. Evaluations on SmuggleBench reveal that both proprietary (e.g., GPT-5) and open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to this threat, producing Attack Success Rates (ASR) exceeding 90%. By analyzing the vulnerability through the lenses of perception and reasoning, we identify three root causes: the limited capabilities of vision encoders, the robustness gap in OCR, and the scarcity of domain-specific adversarial examples. We conduct a preliminary exploration of mitigation strategies, investigating the potential of test-time scaling (via CoT) and adversarial training (via SFT) to mitigate this threat. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/zhihengli-casia/smugglebench.

The convergence of large language models and social bots allows malicious actors to manipulate the information ecosystem by generating human-like content at scale. Existing models for detecting AI-generated content often fail in the wild, primarily due to the lack of ground-truth data. We address this gap through an adversarial methodology that models the impersonation of real social media users by malicious actors. Using this methodology, we curate a multilingual, cross-platform dataset of paired human and AI-generated messages. Training on such adversarial data yields accurate detection of AI-generated text. Our approach significantly outperforms existing models for content-based bot detection in real-world, out-of-distribution data.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly used for content moderation, yet their robustness in short-form video contexts remains underexplored. Current safety evaluations often rely on unimodal attacks, failing to address combined attack vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive framework for evaluating the tri-modal safety of MLLMs. First, we present the Short-Video Multimodal Adversarial (SVMA) dataset, comprising diverse short-form videos with human-guided synthetic adversarial attacks. Second, we propose ChimeraBreak, a novel tri-modal attack strategy that simultaneously challenges visual, auditory, and semantic reasoning pathways. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal significant vulnerabilities with high Attack Success Rates (ASR). Our findings uncover distinct failure modes, showing model biases toward misclassifying benign or policy-violating content. We assess results using LLM-as-a-judge, demonstrating attack reasoning efficacy. Our dataset and findings provide crucial insights for developing more robust and safe MLLMs.

We design, implement, and evaluate adversarial decoding, a new, generic text generation technique that produces readable documents for different adversarial objectives. Prior methods either produce easily detectable gibberish, or cannot handle objectives that include embedding similarity. In particular, they only work for direct attacks (such as jailbreaking) and cannot produce adversarial text for realistic indirect injection, e.g., documents that (1) are retrieved in RAG systems in response to broad classes of queries, and also (2) adversarially influence subsequent generation. We also show that fluency (low perplexity) is not sufficient to evade filtering. We measure the effectiveness of adversarial decoding for different objectives, including RAG poisoning, jailbreaking, and evasion of defensive filters, and demonstrate that it outperforms existing methods while producing readable adversarial documents.

Current reading comprehension models generalise well to in-distribution test sets, yet perform poorly on adversarially selected inputs. Most prior work on adversarial inputs studies oversensitivity: semantically invariant text perturbations that cause a model's prediction to change when it should not. In this work we focus on the complementary problem: excessive prediction undersensitivity, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. We formulate a noisy adversarial attack which searches among semantic variations of the question for which a model erroneously predicts the same answer, and with even higher probability. Despite comprising unanswerable questions, both SQuAD2.0 and NewsQA models are vulnerable to this attack. This indicates that although accurate, models tend to rely on spurious patterns and do not fully consider the information specified in a question. We experiment with data augmentation and adversarial training as defences, and find that both substantially decrease vulnerability to attacks on held out data, as well as held out attack spaces. Addressing undersensitivity also improves results on AddSent and AddOneSent, and models furthermore generalise better when facing train/evaluation distribution mismatch: they are less prone to overly rely on predictive cues present only in the training set, and outperform a conventional model by as much as 10.9% F1.

Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models designed to cause the model to make a mistake. They are useful for understanding the shortcomings of machine learning models, interpreting their results, and for regularisation. In NLP, however, most example generation strategies produce input text by using known, pre-specified semantic transformations, requiring significant manual effort and in-depth understanding of the problem and domain. In this paper, we investigate the problem of automatically generating adversarial examples that violate a set of given First-Order Logic constraints in Natural Language Inference (NLI). We reduce the problem of identifying such adversarial examples to a combinatorial optimisation problem, by maximising a quantity measuring the degree of violation of such constraints and by using a language model for generating linguistically-plausible examples. Furthermore, we propose a method for adversarially regularising neural NLI models for incorporating background knowledge. Our results show that, while the proposed method does not always improve results on the SNLI and MultiNLI datasets, it significantly and consistently increases the predictive accuracy on adversarially-crafted datasets -- up to a 79.6% relative improvement -- while drastically reducing the number of background knowledge violations. Furthermore, we show that adversarial examples transfer among model architectures, and that the proposed adversarial training procedure improves the robustness of NLI models to adversarial examples.

Machine learning algorithms are often vulnerable to adversarial examples that have imperceptible alterations from the original counterparts but can fool the state-of-the-art models. It is helpful to evaluate or even improve the robustness of these models by exposing the maliciously crafted adversarial examples. In this paper, we present TextFooler, a simple but strong baseline to generate natural adversarial text. By applying it to two fundamental natural language tasks, text classification and textual entailment, we successfully attacked three target models, including the powerful pre-trained BERT, and the widely used convolutional and recurrent neural networks. We demonstrate the advantages of this framework in three ways: (1) effective---it outperforms state-of-the-art attacks in terms of success rate and perturbation rate, (2) utility-preserving---it preserves semantic content and grammaticality, and remains correctly classified by humans, and (3) efficient---it generates adversarial text with computational complexity linear to the text length. *The code, pre-trained target models, and test examples are available at https://github.com/jind11/TextFooler.

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

Recent advancements in natural language processing have highlighted the vulnerability of deep learning models to adversarial attacks. While various defence mechanisms have been proposed, there is a lack of comprehensive benchmarks that evaluate these defences across diverse datasets, models, and tasks. In this work, we address this gap by presenting an extensive benchmark for textual adversarial defence that significantly expands upon previous work. Our benchmark incorporates a wide range of datasets, evaluates state-of-the-art defence mechanisms, and extends the assessment to include critical tasks such as single-sentence classification, similarity and paraphrase identification, natural language inference, and commonsense reasoning. This work not only serves as a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners in the field of adversarial robustness but also identifies key areas for future research in textual adversarial defence. By establishing a new standard for benchmarking in this domain, we aim to accelerate progress towards more robust and reliable natural language processing systems.

Deep learning is found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. However, its adversarial susceptibility in image caption generation is under-explored. We study adversarial examples for vision and language models, which typically adopt an encoder-decoder framework consisting of two major components: a Convolutional Neural Network (i.e., CNN) for image feature extraction and a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for caption generation. In particular, we investigate attacks on the visual encoder's hidden layer that is fed to the subsequent recurrent network. The existing methods either attack the classification layer of the visual encoder or they back-propagate the gradients from the language model. In contrast, we propose a GAN-based algorithm for crafting adversarial examples for neural image captioning that mimics the internal representation of the CNN such that the resulting deep features of the input image enable a controlled incorrect caption generation through the recurrent network. Our contribution provides new insights for understanding adversarial attacks on vision systems with language component. The proposed method employs two strategies for a comprehensive evaluation. The first examines if a neural image captioning system can be misled to output targeted image captions. The second analyzes the possibility of keywords into the predicted captions. Experiments show that our algorithm can craft effective adversarial images based on the CNN hidden layers to fool captioning framework. Moreover, we discover the proposed attack to be highly transferable. Our work leads to new robustness implications for neural image captioning.

Text-based adversarial guidance using a negative prompt has emerged as a widely adopted approach to push the output features away from undesired concepts. While useful, performing adversarial guidance using text alone can be insufficient to capture complex visual concepts and avoid undesired visual elements like copyrighted characters. In this paper, for the first time we explore an alternate modality in this direction by performing adversarial guidance directly using visual features from a reference image or other images in a batch. In particular, we introduce negative token merging (NegToMe), a simple but effective training-free approach which performs adversarial guidance by selectively pushing apart matching semantic features (between reference and output generation) during the reverse diffusion process. When used w.r.t. other images in the same batch, we observe that NegToMe significantly increases output diversity (racial, gender, visual) without sacrificing output image quality. Similarly, when used w.r.t. a reference copyrighted asset, NegToMe helps reduce visual similarity with copyrighted content by 34.57%. NegToMe is simple to implement using just few-lines of code, uses only marginally higher (<4%) inference times and generalizes to different diffusion architectures like Flux, which do not natively support the use of a separate negative prompt. Code is available at https://negtome.github.io

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive performance, but their safety alignment remains vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing content-based jailbreaks are often inconsistent and show unsatisfying performance against the rapidly evolving MLLMs, failing to exploit non-content-based vulnerabilities. Unlike previous research, we empirically find that MLLMs exhibit a Stylistic Inconsistency between their comprehension ability and safety ability: MLLMs can robustly understand content regardless of visual style, yet their defense mechanisms can be easily bypassed by specific stylistic triggers. Based on this finding, we propose Adversarial Style Optimization (ASO), a plug-and-play enhancement module to amplify existing visual jailbreaks. ASO fine-tunes an image-editing model to superimpose an optimized stylistic modification onto a given adversarial image, using a Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) agent guided by a Structurally-Tiered Reward Function that combines a logit-based signal for detecting explicit refusals with a high-fidelity semantic evaluation from a powerful judge model. Extensive experiments show that ASO significantly enhances the ASR of SOTA attacks, demonstrating that stylistic biases are a scalable vector for red-teaming MLLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bingjunluo/ASO.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

We study Generated Contents Enrichment (GCE), a conditional image-generation task in which a sparse scene description is first enriched through an explicit scene representation and then rendered into semantically richer visual content. Conventional image-generation systems can produce visually realistic outputs from limited scene descriptions, but the added content is usually implicit in the generator rather than represented as an inspectable intermediate structure. In contrast, GCE seeks to make scene enrichment explicit at the scene-representation level while examining its visual consequences during generation, with the goal of encouraging generated content that is visually plausible, structurally coherent, and semantically richer than the sparse input. To instantiate GCE, we propose a jointly trained adversarial framework that enriches scene graphs by modeling object semantics and inter-object relations. Our approach first represents the input description as a scene graph, where nodes model objects and edges capture inter-object relations. The framework uses graph convolutional networks to predict additional objects and their relations to the existing scene. Finally, the enriched scene graph is passed through the downstream image-generation pipeline to generate the corresponding visual content. We evaluate the framework with proxy scene graph enrichment metrics, image-quality comparisons, qualitative examples, and user studies on the Visual Genome dataset.

In this work, we address the problem of modifying textual attributes of sentences. Given an input sentence and a set of attribute labels, we attempt to generate sentences that are compatible with the conditioning information. To ensure that the model generates content compatible sentences, we introduce a reconstruction loss which interpolates between auto-encoding and back-translation loss components. We propose an adversarial loss to enforce generated samples to be attribute compatible and realistic. Through quantitative, qualitative and human evaluations we demonstrate that our model is capable of generating fluent sentences that better reflect the conditioning information compared to prior methods. We further demonstrate that the model is capable of simultaneously controlling multiple attributes.

LLM as judge systems used to assess text quality code correctness and argument strength are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. We introduce a framework that separates content author attacks from system prompt attacks and evaluate five models Gemma 3.27B Gemma 3.4B Llama 3.2 3B GPT 4 and Claude 3 Opus on four tasks with various defenses using fifty prompts per condition. Attacks achieved up to seventy three point eight percent success smaller models proved more vulnerable and transferability ranged from fifty point five to sixty two point six percent. Our results contrast with Universal Prompt Injection and AdvPrompter We recommend multi model committees and comparative scoring and release all code and datasets

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety guardrails to elicit harmful outputs. Defending against novel jailbreaks represents a critical challenge in AI safety. Adversarial training -- designed to make models robust against worst-case perturbations -- has been the dominant paradigm for adversarial robustness. However, due to optimization challenges and difficulties in defining realistic threat models, adversarial training methods often fail on newly developed jailbreaks in practice. This paper proposes a new paradigm for improving robustness against unseen jailbreaks, centered on the Adversarial Déjà Vu hypothesis: novel jailbreaks are not fundamentally new, but largely recombinations of adversarial skills from previous attacks. We study this hypothesis through a large-scale analysis of 32 attack papers published over two years. Using an automated pipeline, we extract and compress adversarial skills into a sparse dictionary of primitives, with LLMs generating human-readable descriptions. Our analysis reveals that unseen attacks can be effectively explained as sparse compositions of earlier skills, with explanatory power increasing monotonically as skill coverage grows. Guided by this insight, we introduce Adversarial Skill Compositional Training (ASCoT), which trains on diverse compositions of skill primitives rather than isolated attack instances. ASCoT substantially improves robustness to unseen attacks, including multi-turn jailbreaks, while maintaining low over-refusal rates. We also demonstrate that expanding adversarial skill coverage, not just data scale, is key to defending against novel attacks. red{\textbf{Warning: This paper contains content that may be harmful or offensive in nature.

Generative models can synthesize high-quality inauthentic multimedia content that is already being misused at scale. We evaluate twenty deepfake detectors against ten generators released in the last four years and find accuracy decreasing over time, from near-perfect 99.5% to 76%. Adversarial perturbations further reduce every baseline detector to below 2% accuracy, effectively inverting the detector's assigned label. We argue that this unreliability reflects a fundamental ambiguity: generators can reproduce authentic content exactly (e.g., through memorization), so content alone cannot reveal the true provenance label.For this reason, content produced by a generator must admit a faithful reconstruction by that same generator, and finding such a reconstruction makes synthetic provenance plausible and authenticity plausibly deniable.We therefore propose and evaluate a detection paradigm that outputs a calibrated prediction of whether authenticity is plausibly deniable: a faithful reconstruction by any known generator establishes plausible deniability, while calibration bounds how often content from known generators fails to be reproduced. Our evaluation shows that (i) our detector can be calibrated so that at most 1% of generated content is wrongly certified, an operating point at which most baseline detectors reach near-zero recall, including the strongest with 93% accuracy; (ii) calibrating a stricter security threshold on attacked samples preserves this bound against adaptive adversaries within the evaluated bounded-perturbation attack space, whose perturbations break every baseline, but does not cover arbitrary adversarial transformations; and (iii) post-hoc verifiability is eroding, as 1,116 of 3,000 Reddit images resist reproduction by a 2022 generator, but only 55 to 79 resist reproduction by 2024 generators.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

E-commerce platforms increasingly rely on Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to detect illicit or misleading product content. However, these models remain vulnerable to evasive content: inputs (text or images) that superficially comply with platform policies while covertly conveying prohibited claims. Unlike traditional adversarial attacks that induce overt failures, evasive content exploits ambiguity and context, making it far harder to detect. Existing robustness benchmarks provide little guidance for this demanding, real-world challenge. We introduce EVADE, the first expert-curated, Chinese, multimodal benchmark specifically designed to evaluate foundation models on evasive content detection in e-commerce. The dataset contains 2,833 annotated text samples and 13,961 images spanning six demanding product categories, including body shaping, height growth, and health supplements. Two complementary tasks assess distinct capabilities: Single-Violation, which probes fine-grained reasoning under short prompts, and All-in-One, which tests long-context reasoning by merging overlapping policy rules into unified instructions. Notably, the All-in-One setting significantly narrows the performance gap between partial and full-match accuracy, suggesting that clearer rule definitions improve alignment between human and model judgment. We benchmark 26 mainstream LLMs and VLMs and observe substantial performance gaps: even state-of-the-art models frequently misclassify evasive samples. By releasing EVADE and strong baselines, we provide the first rigorous standard for evaluating evasive-content detection, expose fundamental limitations in current multimodal reasoning, and lay the groundwork for safer and more transparent content moderation systems in e-commerce. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/koenshen/EVADE-Bench.

Systems based on deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Unrestricted adversarial attacks typically manipulate the semantic content of an image (e.g., color or texture) to create adversarial examples that are both effective and photorealistic. Recent works have utilized the diffusion inversion process to map images into a latent space, where high-level semantics are manipulated by introducing perturbations. However, they often result in substantial semantic distortions in the denoised output and suffer from low efficiency. In this study, we propose a novel framework called Semantic-Consistent Unrestricted Adversarial Attacks (SCA), which employs an inversion method to extract edit-friendly noise maps and utilizes a Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) to provide semantic guidance throughout the process. Under the condition of rich semantic information provided by MLLM, we perform the DDPM denoising process of each step using a series of edit-friendly noise maps and leverage DPM Solver++ to accelerate this process, enabling efficient sampling with semantic consistency. Compared to existing methods, our framework enables the efficient generation of adversarial examples that exhibit minimal discernible semantic changes. Consequently, we for the first time introduce Semantic-Consistent Adversarial Examples (SCAE). Extensive experiments and visualizations have demonstrated the high efficiency of SCA, particularly in being on average 12 times faster than the state-of-the-art attacks. Our code can be found at https://github.com/Pan-Zihao/SCA.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve impressive performance once optimized on massive datasets. Such datasets often contain sensitive or copyrighted content, raising significant data privacy concerns. Regulatory frameworks mandating the 'right to be forgotten' drive the need for machine unlearning. This technique allows for the removal of target data without resource-consuming retraining. However, while well-studied for text, visual concept unlearning in MLLMs remains underexplored. A primary challenge is precisely removing a target visual concept without disrupting model performance on related entities. To address this, we introduce AUVIC, a novel visual concept unlearning framework for MLLMs. AUVIC applies adversarial perturbations to enable precise forgetting. This approach effectively isolates the target concept while avoiding unintended effects on similar entities. To evaluate our method, we construct VCUBench. It is the first benchmark designed to assess visual concept unlearning in group contexts. Experimental results demonstrate that AUVIC achieves state-of-the-art target forgetting rates while incurs minimal performance degradation on non-target concepts.

Many existing adversarial attacks generate L_p-norm perturbations on image RGB space. Despite some achievements in transferability and attack success rate, the crafted adversarial examples are easily perceived by human eyes. Towards visual imperceptibility, some recent works explore unrestricted attacks without L_p-norm constraints, yet lacking transferability of attacking black-box models. In this work, we propose a novel imperceptible and transferable attack by leveraging both the generative and discriminative power of diffusion models. Specifically, instead of direct manipulation in pixel space, we craft perturbations in latent space of diffusion models. Combined with well-designed content-preserving structures, we can generate human-insensitive perturbations embedded with semantic clues. For better transferability, we further "deceive" the diffusion model which can be viewed as an additional recognition surrogate, by distracting its attention away from the target regions. To our knowledge, our proposed method, DiffAttack, is the first that introduces diffusion models into adversarial attack field. Extensive experiments on various model structures (including CNNs, Transformers, MLPs) and defense methods have demonstrated our superiority over other attack methods.

Intentionally luring readers to click on a particular content by exploiting their curiosity defines a title as clickbait. Although several studies focused on detecting clickbait titles in English articles, low resource language like Bangla has not been given adequate attention. To tackle clickbait titles in Bangla, we have constructed the first Bangla clickbait detection dataset containing 15,056 labeled news articles and 65,406 unlabelled news articles extracted from clickbait dense news sites. Each article has been labeled by three expert linguists and includes an article's title, body, and other metadata. By incorporating labeled and unlabelled data, we finetune a pretrained Bangla transformer model in an adversarial fashion using Semi Supervised Generative Adversarial Networks (SS GANs). The proposed model acts as a good baseline for this dataset, outperforming traditional neural network models (LSTM, GRU, CNN) and linguistic feature based models. We expect that this dataset and the detailed analysis and comparison of these clickbait detection models will provide a fundamental basis for future research into detecting clickbait titles in Bengali articles. We have released the corresponding code and dataset.

Model distillation has become essential for creating smaller, deployable language models that retain larger system capabilities. However, widespread deployment raises concerns about resilience to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates vulnerability of distilled models to adversarial injection of biased content during training. We demonstrate that adversaries can inject subtle biases into teacher models through minimal data poisoning, which propagates to student models and becomes significantly amplified. We propose two propagation modes: Untargeted Propagation, where bias affects multiple tasks, and Targeted Propagation, focusing on specific tasks while maintaining normal behavior elsewhere. With only 25 poisoned samples (0.25% poisoning rate), student models generate biased responses 76.9% of the time in targeted scenarios - higher than 69.4% in teacher models. For untargeted propagation, adversarial bias appears 6x-29x more frequently in student models on unseen tasks. We validate findings across six bias types (targeted advertisements, phishing links, narrative manipulations, insecure coding practices), various distillation methods, and different modalities spanning text and code generation. Our evaluation reveals shortcomings in current defenses - perplexity filtering, bias detection systems, and LLM-based autorater frameworks - against these attacks. Results expose significant security vulnerabilities in distilled models, highlighting need for specialized safeguards. We propose practical design principles for building effective adversarial bias mitigation strategies.

The increasing capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised concerns about their misuse in AI-generated plagiarism and social engineering. While various AI-generated text detectors have been proposed to mitigate these risks, many remain vulnerable to simple evasion techniques such as paraphrasing. However, recent detectors have shown greater robustness against such basic attacks. In this work, we introduce Adversarial Paraphrasing, a training-free attack framework that universally humanizes any AI-generated text to evade detection more effectively. Our approach leverages an off-the-shelf instruction-following LLM to paraphrase AI-generated content under the guidance of an AI text detector, producing adversarial examples that are specifically optimized to bypass detection. Extensive experiments show that our attack is both broadly effective and highly transferable across several detection systems. For instance, compared to simple paraphrasing attack--which, ironically, increases the true positive at 1% false positive (T@1%F) by 8.57% on RADAR and 15.03% on Fast-DetectGPT--adversarial paraphrasing, guided by OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large, reduces T@1%F by 64.49% on RADAR and a striking 98.96% on Fast-DetectGPT. Across a diverse set of detectors--including neural network-based, watermark-based, and zero-shot approaches--our attack achieves an average T@1%F reduction of 87.88% under the guidance of OpenAI-RoBERTa-Large. We also analyze the tradeoff between text quality and attack success to find that our method can significantly reduce detection rates, with mostly a slight degradation in text quality. Our adversarial setup highlights the need for more robust and resilient detection strategies in the light of increasingly sophisticated evasion techniques.

Developing Large Language Model (LLM) agents that exhibit human-like behavior, encompassing not only individual heterogeneity rooted in unique user profiles but also adaptive response to socially connected neighbors, is a significant research challenge. Social media platforms, with their diverse user data and explicit social structures, provide an ideal testbed for such investigations. This paper introduces EvoBot, an Evolving LLM-based social Bot that significantly enhances human-like generative capabilities through a novel adversarial learning framework. EvoBot is initialized by Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on representative data from social media and then iteratively refines its generation of sophisticated, human-like content via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). This refinement is guided by feedback from a co-adapting Detector which concurrently improves its ability to distinguish EvoBot from humans, thereby creating an increasingly challenging learning environment for EvoBot. Experiments demonstrate that EvoBot generates content aligned with diverse user profiles, increasingly bypassing the co-adapting Detector through human-like expression. Moreover, it exhibits strong social responsiveness, more accurately modeling real-world opinion dynamics and information spread in multi-agent simulations. The framework also yields a more robust Detector, underscoring its broader utility for both advanced agent development and related detection tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/kfq20/EvoBot.

Multilingual falsehoods threaten information integrity worldwide, yet detection benchmarks remain confined to English or a few high-resource languages, leaving low-resource linguistic communities without robust defense tools. We introduce BLUFF, a comprehensive benchmark for detecting false and synthetic content, spanning 79 languages with over 202K samples, combining human-written fact-checked content (122K+ samples across 57 languages) and LLM-generated content (79K+ samples across 71 languages). BLUFF uniquely covers both high-resource "big-head" (20) and low-resource "long-tail" (59) languages, addressing critical gaps in multilingual research on detecting false and synthetic content. Our dataset features four content types (human-written, LLM-generated, LLM-translated, and hybrid human-LLM text), bidirectional translation (EnglishleftrightarrowX), 39 textual modification techniques (36 manipulation tactics for fake news, 3 AI-editing strategies for real news), and varying edit intensities generated using 19 diverse LLMs. We present AXL-CoI (Adversarial Cross-Lingual Agentic Chainof-Interactions), a novel multi-agentic framework for controlled fake/real news generation, paired with mPURIFY, a quality filtering pipeline ensuring dataset integrity. Experiments reveal state-of-theart detectors suffer up to 25.3% F1 degradation on low-resource versus high-resource languages. BLUFF provides the research community with a multilingual benchmark, extensive linguistic-oriented benchmark evaluation, comprehensive documentation, and opensource tools to advance equitable falsehood detection. Dataset and code are available at: https://jsl5710.github.io/BLUFF/

Pixel diffusion models generate RGB images directly, avoiding the bottleneck of an autoencoder, yet their outputs still systematically underrepresent fine-scale natural-image statistics. We show that adversarial learning provides an effective post-training correction for this deficiency. Starting from a pretrained model, we retain its original diffusion or flow-matching objective and add an adversarial loss to the predicted output at non-high-noise timesteps, leaving the model architecture and sampling procedure unchanged. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of adversarial post-training for pixel diffusion. Across two pixel backbones, the method jointly improves distribution fidelity, coverage, prompt alignment, and perceptual quality. We further investigate why it works. Frequency-band and power-law analyses show that the original models systematically underproduce natural-image high-frequency content, while adversarial post-training restores this missing spectral power. In contrast, perceptual loss also increases high-frequency content but sacrifices distribution fidelity and prompt alignment. Nearest-neighbor, recall, and matched no-GAN SFT controls further rule out memorization, mode dropping, and additional optimization as simple explanations. Finally, we examine the boundary of this effect. Under the tested latent diffusion configurations, the same procedure does not produce comparable joint gains and adds almost no decoded high-frequency power. These results identify direct output access to the image statistics being corrected as a key factor governing when adversarial post-training succeeds.

Large language model (LLM) agents accomplish complex tasks through multi-turn interactions with external tools. However, malicious content embedded in user queries, tool descriptions, or environment observations can manipulate their decisions and induce unsafe actions. Adversarial co-evolution has emerged as an effective approach to strengthening LLM safety, but existing work primarily focuses on language-level safety or indirect prompt injection in web tasks. In this paper, we introduce AgentSafeEvo, a co-evolutionary reinforcement learning framework for agent safety built on an attacker-defender game spanning diverse tasks and attack types. The attacker learns to construct adversarial agent tasks that expose weaknesses in the defender's tool use, while the defender learns to complete tasks safely under these attacks. We further introduce learnability-guided task weighting, which uses within-task defender-reward variability to adjust each task's contribution to attacker and defender updates. Extensive experiments on agent safety and general capability benchmarks demonstrate that our method improves adversarial robustness while maintaining general agent capabilities.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Nowadays, recognition-synthesis-based methods have been quite popular with voice conversion (VC). By introducing linguistics features with good disentangling characters extracted from an automatic speech recognition (ASR) model, the VC performance achieved considerable breakthroughs. Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) methods trained with a large-scale unannotated speech corpus have been applied to downstream tasks focusing on the content information, which is suitable for VC tasks. However, a huge amount of speaker information in SSL representations degrades timbre similarity and the quality of converted speech significantly. To address this problem, we proposed a high-similarity any-to-one voice conversion method with the input of SSL representations. We incorporated adversarial training mechanisms in the synthesis module using external unannotated corpora. Two auxiliary discriminators were trained to distinguish whether a sequence of mel-spectrograms has been converted by the acoustic model and whether a sequence of content embeddings contains speaker information from external corpora. Experimental results show that our proposed method achieves comparable similarity and higher naturalness than the supervised method, which needs a huge amount of annotated corpora for training and is applicable to improve similarity for VC methods with other SSL representations as input.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and the intensifying popularity of ChatGPT-like applications have blurred the boundary of high-quality text generation between humans and machines. However, in addition to the anticipated revolutionary changes to our technology and society, the difficulty of distinguishing LLM-generated texts (AI-text) from human-generated texts poses new challenges of misuse and fairness, such as fake content generation, plagiarism, and false accusations of innocent writers. While existing works show that current AI-text detectors are not robust to LLM-based paraphrasing, this paper aims to bridge this gap by proposing a new framework called RADAR, which jointly trains a robust AI-text detector via adversarial learning. RADAR is based on adversarial training of a paraphraser and a detector. The paraphraser's goal is to generate realistic content to evade AI-text detection. RADAR uses the feedback from the detector to update the paraphraser, and vice versa. Evaluated with 8 different LLMs (Pythia, Dolly 2.0, Palmyra, Camel, GPT-J, Dolly 1.0, LLaMA, and Vicuna) across 4 datasets, experimental results show that RADAR significantly outperforms existing AI-text detection methods, especially when paraphrasing is in place. We also identify the strong transferability of RADAR from instruction-tuned LLMs to other LLMs, and evaluate the improved capability of RADAR via GPT-3.5-Turbo.

Digital image steganalysis, or the detection of image steganography, has been studied in depth for years and is driven by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups', such as APT37 Reaper, utilization of steganographic techniques to transmit additional malware to perform further post-exploitation activity on a compromised host. However, many steganalysis algorithms are constrained to work with only a subset of all possible images in the wild or are known to produce a high false positive rate. This results in blocking any suspected image being an unreasonable policy. A more feasible policy is to filter suspicious images prior to reception by the host machine. However, how does one optimally filter specifically to obfuscate or remove image steganography while avoiding degradation of visual image quality in the case that detection of the image was a false positive? We propose the Deep Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP), a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) which is optimized to destroy steganographic content without compromising the perceptual quality of the original image. As verified by experimental results, our model is capable of providing a high rate of destruction of steganographic image content while maintaining a high visual quality in comparison to other state-of-the-art filtering methods. Additionally, we test the transfer learning capability of generalizing to to obfuscate real malware payloads embedded into different image file formats and types using an unseen steganographic algorithm and prove that our model can in fact be deployed to provide adequate results.

Visual signals in a video can be divided into content and motion. While content specifies which objects are in the video, motion describes their dynamics. Based on this prior, we propose the Motion and Content decomposed Generative Adversarial Network (MoCoGAN) framework for video generation. The proposed framework generates a video by mapping a sequence of random vectors to a sequence of video frames. Each random vector consists of a content part and a motion part. While the content part is kept fixed, the motion part is realized as a stochastic process. To learn motion and content decomposition in an unsupervised manner, we introduce a novel adversarial learning scheme utilizing both image and video discriminators. Extensive experimental results on several challenging datasets with qualitative and quantitative comparison to the state-of-the-art approaches, verify effectiveness of the proposed framework. In addition, we show that MoCoGAN allows one to generate videos with same content but different motion as well as videos with different content and same motion.

URLs play a crucial role in understanding and categorizing web content, particularly in tasks related to security control and online recommendations. While pre-trained models are currently dominating various fields, the domain of URL analysis still lacks specialized pre-trained models. To address this gap, this paper introduces URLBERT, the first pre-trained representation learning model applied to a variety of URL classification or detection tasks. We first train a URL tokenizer on a corpus of billions of URLs to address URL data tokenization. Additionally, we propose two novel pre-training tasks: (1) self-supervised contrastive learning tasks, which strengthen the model's understanding of URL structure and the capture of category differences by distinguishing different variants of the same URL; (2) virtual adversarial training, aimed at improving the model's robustness in extracting semantic features from URLs. Finally, our proposed methods are evaluated on tasks including phishing URL detection, web page classification, and ad filtering, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Importantly, we also explore multi-task learning with URLBERT, and experimental results demonstrate that multi-task learning model based on URLBERT exhibit equivalent effectiveness compared to independently fine-tuned models, showing the simplicity of URLBERT in handling complex task requirements. The code for our work is available at https://github.com/Davidup1/URLBERT.

The generative priors of pre-trained latent diffusion models have demonstrated great potential to enhance the perceptual quality of image super-resolution (SR) results. Unfortunately, the existing diffusion prior-based SR methods encounter a common problem, i.e., they tend to generate rather different outputs for the same low-resolution image with different noise samples. Such stochasticity is desired for text-to-image generation tasks but problematic for SR tasks, where the image contents are expected to be well preserved. To improve the stability of diffusion prior-based SR, we propose to employ the diffusion models to refine image structures, while employing the generative adversarial training to enhance image fine details. Specifically, we propose a non-uniform timestep learning strategy to train a compact diffusion network, which has high efficiency and stability to reproduce the image main structures, and finetune the pre-trained decoder of variational auto-encoder (VAE) by adversarial training for detail enhancement. Extensive experiments show that our proposed method, namely content consistent super-resolution (CCSR), can significantly reduce the stochasticity of diffusion prior-based SR, improving the content consistency of SR outputs and speeding up the image generation process. Codes and models can be found at {https://github.com/csslc/CCSR}.

Nowadays, the enhanced capabilities of in-expensive imaging devices have led to a tremendous increase in the acquisition and sharing of multimedia content over the Internet. Despite advances in imaging sensor technology, annoying conditions like occlusions hamper photography and may deteriorate the performance of applications such as surveillance, detection, and recognition. Occlusion segmentation is difficult because of scale variations, illumination changes, and so on. Similarly, recovering a scene from foreground occlusions also poses significant challenges due to the complexity of accurately estimating the occluded regions and maintaining coherence with the surrounding context. In particular, image de-fencing presents its own set of challenges because of the diverse variations in shape, texture, color, patterns, and the often cluttered environment. This study focuses on the automatic detection and removal of occlusions from a single image. We propose a fully automatic, two-stage convolutional neural network for fence segmentation and occlusion completion. We leverage generative adversarial networks (GANs) to synthesize realistic content, including both structure and texture, in a single shot for inpainting. To assess zero-shot generalization, we evaluated our trained occlusion detection model on our proposed fence-like occlusion segmentation dataset. The dataset can be found on GitHub.

Diffusion Models (DMs) have empowered great success in artificial-intelligence-generated content, especially in artwork creation, yet raising new concerns in intellectual properties and copyright. For example, infringers can make profits by imitating non-authorized human-created paintings with DMs. Recent researches suggest that various adversarial examples for diffusion models can be effective tools against these copyright infringements. However, current adversarial examples show weakness in transferability over different painting-imitating methods and robustness under straightforward adversarial defense, for example, noise purification. We surprisingly find that the transferability of adversarial examples can be significantly enhanced by exploiting a fused and modified adversarial loss term under consistent parameters. In this work, we comprehensively evaluate the cross-method transferability of adversarial examples. The experimental observation shows that our method generates more transferable adversarial examples with even stronger robustness against the simple adversarial defense.

Diffusion models excel at generating visually striking content from text but can inadvertently produce undesirable or harmful content when trained on unfiltered internet data. A practical solution is to selectively removing target concepts from the model, but this may impact the remaining concepts. Prior approaches have tried to balance this by introducing a loss term to preserve neutral content or a regularization term to minimize changes in the model parameters, yet resolving this trade-off remains challenging. In this work, we propose to identify and preserving concepts most affected by parameter changes, termed as adversarial concepts. This approach ensures stable erasure with minimal impact on the other concepts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using the Stable Diffusion model, showing that it outperforms state-of-the-art erasure methods in eliminating unwanted content while maintaining the integrity of other unrelated elements. Our code is available at https://github.com/tuananhbui89/Erasing-Adversarial-Preservation.

Recent advances in diffusion models have significantly enhanced the quality of image synthesis, yet they have also introduced serious safety concerns, particularly the generation of Not Safe for Work (NSFW) content. Previous research has demonstrated that adversarial prompts can be used to generate NSFW content. However, such adversarial text prompts are often easily detectable by text-based filters, limiting their efficacy. In this paper, we expose a previously overlooked vulnerability: adversarial image attacks targeting Image-to-Image (I2I) diffusion models. We propose AdvI2I, a novel framework that manipulates input images to induce diffusion models to generate NSFW content. By optimizing a generator to craft adversarial images, AdvI2I circumvents existing defense mechanisms, such as Safe Latent Diffusion (SLD), without altering the text prompts. Furthermore, we introduce AdvI2I-Adaptive, an enhanced version that adapts to potential countermeasures and minimizes the resemblance between adversarial images and NSFW concept embeddings, making the attack more resilient against defenses. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that both AdvI2I and AdvI2I-Adaptive can effectively bypass current safeguards, highlighting the urgent need for stronger security measures to address the misuse of I2I diffusion models.

Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) are increasingly deployed to offer advanced capabilities on inputs comprising both text and images. While prior research has shown that adversarial attacks can transfer from open-source to proprietary black-box models in text-only and vision-only contexts, the extent and effectiveness of such vulnerabilities remain underexplored for VLLMs. We present a comprehensive analysis demonstrating that targeted adversarial examples are highly transferable to widely-used proprietary VLLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude, and Gemini. We show that attackers can craft perturbations to induce specific attacker-chosen interpretations of visual information, such as misinterpreting hazardous content as safe, overlooking sensitive or restricted material, or generating detailed incorrect responses aligned with the attacker's intent. Furthermore, we discover that universal perturbations -- modifications applicable to a wide set of images -- can consistently induce these misinterpretations across multiple proprietary VLLMs. Our experimental results on object recognition, visual question answering, and image captioning show that this vulnerability is common across current state-of-the-art models, and underscore an urgent need for robust mitigations to ensure the safe and secure deployment of VLLMs.

As large language models are increasingly deployed in real-world systems, safety failures can still lead to harmful outputs and dangerous misuse. We argue that the essence of safety is adversarial: many failures arise not from natural inputs alone, but from strategic attempts to evade model policies and safeguards. However, existing general-purpose model development largely overlook this adversarial nature, and often remain insufficient for realistic safety scenarios involving planning, tool use, and multi-step reasoning, causing measured safety performance to overestimate real deployment robustness. To address this gap, we present Yuvion LLM, a large language model built for adversarially robust content safety and broader AI safety. Yuvion LLM treats adversarial robustness and agentic capability as first-class objectives. Its pipeline combines adversarially aware data construction, knowledge-enhanced continued pretraining, and policy-grounded multi-task safety post-training, including risk-aware supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning-based policy optimization, together with safety-aware agentic reinforcement learning for tool use and multi-step reasoning in complex safety scenarios. We further introduce the Yuvion LLM RiskEval (YLRE), a collection of 93 benchmarks across four evaluation categories, covering diverse open and internal evaluations with a focus on safety, adversarial robustness, and real-world capability requirements. Across these evaluations, Yuvion LLM demonstrates clear advantages on safety-focused benchmarks and particularly strong robustness under adversarial conditions, while maintaining solid overall capability. Notably, Yuvion-8B outperforms most state-of-the-art baselines, including substantially larger models such as GPT-5.4 and Qwen3-MAX, on several safety tasks.

Recently, diffusion-based object removal models have achieved impressive results in eliminating objects and their associated visual effects. However, they indiscriminately denoise all tokens across all timesteps, ignoring that removal usually involves small foreground regions. This strategy introduces substantial computational overhead and prolonged inference times. To overcome this computational burden, we propose a latent discriminator to implement Region-aware Adversarial Distillation (RAD), yielding a highly efficient few-step model named FlashClear. Furthermore, tailored to few-step diffusion models, we propose FPAC (Foreground-Prioritized Asymmetric Attention and Caching), a training-free acceleration strategy. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework provides massive acceleration while maintaining or exceeding the performance of our base model, ObjectClear. Notably, on the OBER benchmark, our FlashClear achieves up to 8.26times and 122times speedup over ObjectClear and OmniPaint, respectively, while maintaining high visual quality and fidelity.

Non-parallel many-to-many voice conversion remains an interesting but challenging speech processing task. Recently, AutoVC, a conditional autoencoder based method, achieved excellent conversion results by disentangling the speaker identity and the speech content using information-constraining bottlenecks. However, due to the pure autoencoder training method, it is difficult to evaluate the separation effect of content and speaker identity. In this paper, a novel voice conversion framework, named boldsymbol Text boldsymbol Guided boldsymbol AutoVC(TGAVC), is proposed to more effectively separate content and timbre from speech, where an expected content embedding produced based on the text transcriptions is designed to guide the extraction of voice content. In addition, the adversarial training is applied to eliminate the speaker identity information in the estimated content embedding extracted from speech. Under the guidance of the expected content embedding and the adversarial training, the content encoder is trained to extract speaker-independent content embedding from speech. Experiments on AIShell-3 dataset show that the proposed model outperforms AutoVC in terms of naturalness and similarity of converted speech.

Text-to-image (T2I) models, such as Stable Diffusion, have exhibited remarkable performance in generating high-quality images from text descriptions in recent years. However, text-to-image models may be tricked into generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, particularly in sexual scenarios. Existing countermeasures mostly focus on filtering inappropriate inputs and outputs, or suppressing improper text embeddings, which can block explicit NSFW-related content (e.g., naked or sexy) but may still be vulnerable to adversarial prompts inputs that appear innocent but are ill-intended. In this paper, we present SafeGen, a framework to mitigate unsafe content generation by text-to-image models in a text-agnostic manner. The key idea is to eliminate unsafe visual representations from the model regardless of the text input. In this way, the text-to-image model is resistant to adversarial prompts since unsafe visual representations are obstructed from within. Extensive experiments conducted on four datasets demonstrate SafeGen's effectiveness in mitigating unsafe content generation while preserving the high-fidelity of benign images. SafeGen outperforms eight state-of-the-art baseline methods and achieves 99.1% sexual content removal performance. Furthermore, our constructed benchmark of adversarial prompts provides a basis for future development and evaluation of anti-NSFW-generation methods.

Large language model (LLM) has proven to benefit a lot from retrieval augmentation in alleviating hallucinations confronted with knowledge-intensive questions. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) adopts IR-based techniques utilizing semantic-relevant documents as the generator's input context and realizes external knowledge injection. However, on today's Internet which is flooded with content generated by LLMs, there are too many "related yet useless" documents or even fake knowledge fabricated by LLMs, which will introduce extra noise to the generator and distract it from giving correct results. To this end, we regard the training of the RAG generator model as a multi-agent adversarial-defensive system, guiding the generator to have a better taste of whether a specific document helps answer the question through the Adversarial Tuning in a Multi-agent (ATM) system to strengthen the generator's robustness in an RAG pipeline. After rounds of multi-agent iterative tuning, we find that the ATM Generator can eventually discriminate useful documents amongst LLM fabrications and achieve better performance than strong baselines.

We propose UNIVERSE++, a universal speech enhancement method based on score-based diffusion and adversarial training. Specifically, we improve the existing UNIVERSE model that decouples clean speech feature extraction and diffusion. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we make several modifications to the network architecture, improving training stability and final performance. Second, we introduce an adversarial loss to promote learning high quality speech features. Third, we propose a low-rank adaptation scheme with a phoneme fidelity loss to improve content preservation in the enhanced speech. In the experiments, we train a universal enhancement model on a large scale dataset of speech degraded by noise, reverberation, and various distortions. The results on multiple public benchmark datasets demonstrate that UNIVERSE++ compares favorably to both discriminative and generative baselines for a wide range of qualitative and intelligibility metrics.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

While pre-trained automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems demonstrate impressive performance on matched domains, their performance often degrades when confronted with channel mismatch stemming from unseen recording environments and conditions. To mitigate this issue, we propose a novel channel-aware data simulation method for robust ASR training. Our method harnesses the synergistic power of channel-extractive techniques and generative adversarial networks (GANs). We first train a channel encoder capable of extracting embeddings from arbitrary audio. On top of this, channel embeddings are extracted using a minimal amount of target-domain data and used to guide a GAN-based speech synthesizer. This synthesizer generates speech that faithfully preserves the phonetic content of the input while mimicking the channel characteristics of the target domain. We evaluate our method on the challenging Hakka Across Taiwan (HAT) and Taiwanese Across Taiwan (TAT) corpora, achieving relative character error rate (CER) reductions of 20.02% and 9.64%, respectively, compared to the baselines. These results highlight the efficacy of our channel-aware data simulation method for bridging the gap between source- and target-domain acoustics.

We present DeblurGAN, an end-to-end learned method for motion deblurring. The learning is based on a conditional GAN and the content loss . DeblurGAN achieves state-of-the art performance both in the structural similarity measure and visual appearance. The quality of the deblurring model is also evaluated in a novel way on a real-world problem -- object detection on (de-)blurred images. The method is 5 times faster than the closest competitor -- DeepDeblur. We also introduce a novel method for generating synthetic motion blurred images from sharp ones, allowing realistic dataset augmentation. The model, code and the dataset are available at https://github.com/KupynOrest/DeblurGAN

The Adversarial Humanities Benchmark (AHB) evaluates whether model safety refusals survive a shift away from familiar harmful prompt forms. Starting from harmful tasks drawn from MLCommons AILuminate, the benchmark rewrites the same objectives through humanities-style transformations while preserving intent. This extends literature on Adversarial Poetry and Adversarial Tales from single jailbreak operators to a broader benchmark family of stylistic obfuscation and goal concealment. In the benchmark results reported here, the original attacks record 3.84% attack success rate (ASR), while transformed methods range from 36.8% to 65.0%, yielding 55.75% overall ASR across 31 frontier models. Under a European Union AI Act Code-of-Practice-inspired systemic-risk lens, Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) is the highest bucket. Taken together, this lack of stylistic robustness suggests that current safety techniques suffer from weak generalization: deep understanding of 'non-maleficence' remains a central unresolved problem in frontier model safety.

Digital services face a fundamental trade-off in content selection: they must balance the immediate revenue gained from high-reward content against the long-term benefits of maintaining user engagement. Traditional multi-armed bandit models assume that users remain perpetually engaged, failing to capture the possibility that users may disengage when dissatisfied, thereby reducing future revenue potential. In this work, we introduce a model for the content selection problem that explicitly accounts for variable user engagement and disengagement. In our framework, content that maximizes immediate reward is not necessarily optimal in terms of fostering sustained user engagement. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop computational and statistical methods for offline optimization and online learning of content selection policies. For users whose engagement patterns are defined by k distinct levels, we design a dynamic programming algorithm that computes the exact optimal policy in O(k^2) time. Moreover, we derive no-regret learning guarantees for an online learning setting in which the platform serves a series of users with unknown and potentially adversarial engagement patterns. Second, we introduce the concept of modified demand elasticity which captures how small changes in a user's overall satisfaction affect the platform's ability to secure long-term revenue. This notion generalizes classical demand elasticity by incorporating the dynamics of user re-engagement, thereby revealing key insights into the interplay between engagement and revenue. Notably, our analysis uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: although higher friction (i.e., a reduced likelihood of re-engagement) typically lowers overall revenue, it can simultaneously lead to higher user engagement under optimal content selection policies.

LLM have achieved success in many fields but still troubled by problematic content in the training corpora. LLM unlearning aims at reducing their influence and avoid undesirable behaviours. However, existing unlearning methods remain vulnerable to adversarial queries and the unlearned knowledge resurfaces after the manually designed attack queries. As part of a red-team effort to proactively assess the vulnerabilities of unlearned models, we design Dynamic Unlearning Attack (DUA), a dynamic and automated framework to attack these models and evaluate their robustness. It optimizes adversarial suffixes to reintroduce the unlearned knowledge in various scenarios. We find that unlearned knowledge can be recovered in 55.2% of the questions, even without revealing the unlearned model's parameters. In response to this vulnerability, we propose Latent Adversarial Unlearning (LAU), a universal framework that effectively enhances the robustness of the unlearned process. It formulates the unlearning process as a min-max optimization problem and resolves it through two stages: an attack stage, where perturbation vectors are trained and added to the latent space of LLMs to recover the unlearned knowledge, and a defense stage, where previously trained perturbation vectors are used to enhance unlearned model's robustness. With our LAU framework, we obtain two robust unlearning methods, AdvGA and AdvNPO. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple unlearning benchmarks and various models, and demonstrate that they improve the unlearning effectiveness by over 53.5%, cause only less than a 11.6% reduction in neighboring knowledge, and have almost no impact on the model's general capabilities.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have advanced multimodal understanding, yet their reliability is limited by hallucination, where generated content conflicts with visual facts. Existing mitigation methods either rely on costly external interventions, such as instruction tuning and retrieval, or use internal mechanisms that remain limited by flawed attention weights and entangled hidden representations. We propose Adversarial Orthogonal Disentanglement (AOD), a latent geometric framework for mitigating LVLM hallucinations. AOD learns a hallucination-related direction through a minimax objective: a classifier concentrates hallucination signals into the projected component, while an adversary removes them from the orthogonal residual space via a Gradient Reversal Layer. The learned direction enables a training-free dual-forward-pass contrastive decoding strategy that suppresses hallucinations while preserving general capabilities. Experiments on three LVLMs across four hallucination and four utility benchmarks show that AOD consistently outperforms strong baselines. It improves POPE accuracy by over 6\% on average, boosts AMBER by 6\%, and maintains strong performance on utility tasks such as MMMU. Further analysis shows robust transfer across datasets, suggesting that AOD captures general hallucination-related biases rather than dataset-specific artifacts. Our source code and datasets are available at https://github.com/Hunter-Wrynn/AOD.

Recent research has shown that neural information retrieval techniques may be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks seek to manipulate the ranking of documents, with the intention of exposing users to targeted content. In this paper, we introduce the Embedding Perturbation Rank Attack (EMPRA) method, a novel approach designed to perform adversarial attacks on black-box Neural Ranking Models (NRMs). EMPRA manipulates sentence-level embeddings, guiding them towards pertinent context related to the query while preserving semantic integrity. This process generates adversarial texts that seamlessly integrate with the original content and remain imperceptible to humans. Our extensive evaluation conducted on the widely-used MS MARCO V1 passage collection demonstrate the effectiveness of EMPRA against a wide range of state-of-the-art baselines in promoting a specific set of target documents within a given ranked results. Specifically, EMPRA successfully achieves a re-ranking of almost 96% of target documents originally ranked between 51-100 to rank within the top 10. Furthermore, EMPRA does not depend on surrogate models for adversarial text generation, enhancing its robustness against different NRMs in realistic settings.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

In order to protect the privacy of speech data, speaker anonymization aims for hiding the identity of a speaker by changing the voice in speech recordings. This typically comes with a privacy-utility trade-off between protection of individuals and usability of the data for downstream applications. One of the challenges in this context is to create non-existent voices that sound as natural as possible. In this work, we propose to tackle this issue by generating speaker embeddings using a generative adversarial network with Wasserstein distance as cost function. By incorporating these artificial embeddings into a speech-to-text-to-speech pipeline, we outperform previous approaches in terms of privacy and utility. According to standard objective metrics and human evaluation, our approach generates intelligible and content-preserving yet privacy-protecting versions of the original recordings.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential for tasks such as question answering and content generation. However, their increasing impact on public opinion and information dissemination has made them a critical focus for security research due to inherent vulnerabilities. Previous studies have predominantly addressed attacks targeting factual or single-query manipulations. In this paper, we address a more practical scenario: topic-oriented adversarial opinion manipulation attacks on RAG models, where LLMs are required to reason and synthesize multiple perspectives, rendering them particularly susceptible to systematic knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we propose Topic-FlipRAG, a two-stage manipulation attack pipeline that strategically crafts adversarial perturbations to influence opinions across related queries. This approach combines traditional adversarial ranking attack techniques and leverages the extensive internal relevant knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to execute semantic-level perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed attacks effectively shift the opinion of the model's outputs on specific topics, significantly impacting user information perception. Current mitigation methods cannot effectively defend against such attacks, highlighting the necessity for enhanced safeguards for RAG systems, and offering crucial insights for LLM security research.

We introduce ShieldGemma 2, a 4B parameter image content moderation model built on Gemma 3. This model provides robust safety risk predictions across the following key harm categories: Sexually Explicit, Violence \& Gore, and Dangerous Content for synthetic images (e.g. output of any image generation model) and natural images (e.g. any image input to a Vision-Language Model). We evaluated on both internal and external benchmarks to demonstrate state-of-the-art performance compared to LlavaGuard helff2024llavaguard, GPT-4o mini hurst2024gpt, and the base Gemma 3 model gemma_2025 based on our policies. Additionally, we present a novel adversarial data generation pipeline which enables a controlled, diverse, and robust image generation. ShieldGemma 2 provides an open image moderation tool to advance multimodal safety and responsible AI development.

Modern neural models trained on textual data rely on pre-trained representations that emerge without direct supervision. As these representations are increasingly being used in real-world applications, the inability to control their content becomes an increasingly important problem. We formulate the problem of identifying and erasing a linear subspace that corresponds to a given concept, in order to prevent linear predictors from recovering the concept. We model this problem as a constrained, linear maximin game, and show that existing solutions are generally not optimal for this task. We derive a closed-form solution for certain objectives, and propose a convex relaxation, \method, that works well for others. When evaluated in the context of binary gender removal, the method recovers a low-dimensional subspace whose removal mitigates bias by intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation. We show that the method is highly expressive, effectively mitigating bias in deep nonlinear classifiers while maintaining tractability and interpretability.

The widespread use of Text-to-Image (T2I) models in content generation requires careful examination of their safety, including their robustness to adversarial attacks. Despite extensive research on adversarial attacks, the reasons for their effectiveness remain underexplored. This paper presents an empirical study on adversarial attacks against T2I models, focusing on analyzing factors associated with attack success rates (ASR). We introduce a new attack objective - entity swapping using adversarial suffixes and two gradient-based attack algorithms. Human and automatic evaluations reveal the asymmetric nature of ASRs on entity swap: for example, it is easier to replace "human" with "robot" in the prompt "a human dancing in the rain." with an adversarial suffix, but the reverse replacement is significantly harder. We further propose probing metrics to establish indicative signals from the model's beliefs to the adversarial ASR. We identify conditions that result in a success probability of 60% for adversarial attacks and others where this likelihood drops below 5%.

Vision-language models (VLMs) have significantly advanced autonomous driving (AD) by enhancing reasoning capabilities. However, these models remain highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While existing research has primarily focused on general VLM attacks, the development of attacks tailored to the safety-critical AD context has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we take the first step toward designing adversarial attacks specifically targeting VLMs in AD, exposing the substantial risks these attacks pose within this critical domain. We identify two unique challenges for effective adversarial attacks on AD VLMs: the variability of textual instructions and the time-series nature of visual scenarios. To this end, we propose ADvLM, the first visual adversarial attack framework specifically designed for VLMs in AD. Our framework introduces Semantic-Invariant Induction, which uses a large language model to create a diverse prompt library of textual instructions with consistent semantic content, guided by semantic entropy. Building on this, we introduce Scenario-Associated Enhancement, an approach where attention mechanisms select key frames and perspectives within driving scenarios to optimize adversarial perturbations that generalize across the entire scenario. Extensive experiments on several AD VLMs over multiple benchmarks show that ADvLM achieves state-of-the-art attack effectiveness. Moreover, real-world attack studies further validate its applicability and potential in practice.

Generative models can synthesize highly realistic content, so-called deepfakes, that are already being misused at scale to undermine digital media authenticity. Current deepfake detection methods are unreliable for two reasons: (i) distinguishing inauthentic content post-hoc is often impossible (e.g., with memorized samples), leading to an unbounded false positive rate (FPR); and (ii) detection lacks robustness, as adversaries can adapt to known detectors with near-perfect accuracy using minimal computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose a resynthesis framework to determine if a sample is authentic or if its authenticity can be plausibly denied. We make two key contributions focusing on the high-precision, low-recall setting against efficient (i.e., compute-restricted) adversaries. First, we demonstrate that our calibrated resynthesis method is the most reliable approach for verifying authentic samples while maintaining controllable, low FPRs. Second, we show that our method achieves adversarial robustness against efficient adversaries, whereas prior methods are easily evaded under identical compute budgets. Our approach supports multiple modalities and leverages state-of-the-art inversion techniques.

Content generation modeling has emerged as a promising direction in computational pathology, offering capabilities such as data-efficient learning, synthetic data augmentation, and task-oriented generation across diverse diagnostic tasks. This review provides a comprehensive synthesis of recent progress in the field, organized into four key domains: image generation, text generation, molecular profile-morphology generation, and other specialized generation applications. By analyzing over 150 representative studies, we trace the evolution of content generation architectures -- from early generative adversarial networks to recent advances in diffusion models and generative vision-language models. We further examine the datasets and evaluation protocols commonly used in this domain and highlight ongoing limitations, including challenges in generating high-fidelity whole slide images, clinical interpretability, and concerns related to the ethical and legal implications of synthetic data. The review concludes with a discussion of open challenges and prospective research directions, with an emphasis on developing integrated and clinically deployable generation systems. This work aims to provide a foundational reference for researchers and practitioners developing content generation models in computational pathology.

Deep Learning-based Text Understanding (DLTU) is the backbone technique behind various applications, including question answering, machine translation, and text classification. Despite its tremendous popularity, the security vulnerabilities of DLTU are still largely unknown, which is highly concerning given its increasing use in security-sensitive applications such as sentiment analysis and toxic content detection. In this paper, we show that DLTU is inherently vulnerable to adversarial text attacks, in which maliciously crafted texts trigger target DLTU systems and services to misbehave. Specifically, we present TextBugger, a general attack framework for generating adversarial texts. In contrast to prior works, TextBugger differs in significant ways: (i) effective -- it outperforms state-of-the-art attacks in terms of attack success rate; (ii) evasive -- it preserves the utility of benign text, with 94.9\% of the adversarial text correctly recognized by human readers; and (iii) efficient -- it generates adversarial text with computational complexity sub-linear to the text length. We empirically evaluate TextBugger on a set of real-world DLTU systems and services used for sentiment analysis and toxic content detection, demonstrating its effectiveness, evasiveness, and efficiency. For instance, TextBugger achieves 100\% success rate on the IMDB dataset based on Amazon AWS Comprehend within 4.61 seconds and preserves 97\% semantic similarity. We further discuss possible defense mechanisms to mitigate such attack and the adversary's potential countermeasures, which leads to promising directions for further research.

Most deraining works focus on rain streaks removal but they cannot deal adequately with heavy rain images. In heavy rain, streaks are strongly visible, dense rain accumulation or rain veiling effect significantly washes out the image, further scenes are relatively more blurry, etc. In this paper, we propose a novel method to address these problems. We put forth a 2-stage network: a physics-based backbone followed by a depth-guided GAN refinement. The first stage estimates the rain streaks, the transmission, and the atmospheric light governed by the underlying physics. To tease out these components more reliably, a guided filtering framework is used to decompose the image into its low- and high-frequency components. This filtering is guided by a rain-free residue image --- its content is used to set the passbands for the two channels in a spatially-variant manner so that the background details do not get mixed up with the rain-streaks. For the second stage, the refinement stage, we put forth a depth-guided GAN to recover the background details failed to be retrieved by the first stage, as well as correcting artefacts introduced by that stage. We have evaluated our method against the state of the art methods. Extensive experiments show that our method outperforms them on real rain image data, recovering visually clean images with good details.

This study investigates the efficacy of six major Generative AI (GenAI) text detectors when confronted with machine-generated content that has been modified using techniques designed to evade detection by these tools (n=805). The results demonstrate that the detectors' already low accuracy rates (39.5%) show major reductions in accuracy (17.4%) when faced with manipulated content, with some techniques proving more effective than others in evading detection. The accuracy limitations and the potential for false accusations demonstrate that these tools cannot currently be recommended for determining whether violations of academic integrity have occurred, underscoring the challenges educators face in maintaining inclusive and fair assessment practices. However, they may have a role in supporting student learning and maintaining academic integrity when used in a non-punitive manner. These results underscore the need for a combined approach to addressing the challenges posed by GenAI in academia to promote the responsible and equitable use of these emerging technologies. The study concludes that the current limitations of AI text detectors require a critical approach for any possible implementation in HE and highlight possible alternatives to AI assessment strategies.

How do you validate a cheap, deterministic proxy for an oracle that is expensive, rate-limited, and non-stationary? We present a protocol built on adversarial falsification gates (negative control, dose response, bounded amplification, duplication penalty, length neutrality) that define and select the proxy, fitted on a training split and confirmed held-out; around them it bounds what the proxy can never resolve, and re-measures external causal evidence on the current oracle rather than assuming it. We demonstrate it end to end on Generative Engine Optimization, where the proxy is a deterministic content score, and one step fails on that domain exactly as the protocol is built to detect: re-measuring the only published causal anchors (2023 effect sizes) on ten modern engine families shows their levers move citation on none, so the anchors are an expired external check; recalibrating to the near-zero modern vector strips the score of its lever-responsive components. What survives is the gate-enforced response surface. The gates buy a measured property: on a 500-source benchmark of adversarial edits, amplifying the score's calibrated levers gains an attacker at most 6 points, and decreases with dose; single-lever amplification is provably bounded, while the cap and cross-lever sub-additivity are empirical findings consistent with it. On detection, web-spam baselines dominate and out-of-distribution attacks evade the score, so the deployable filter layers it over them. A query-conditioned skyline bounds the score's citation signal (within-query Spearman 0.11), repositioning query-agnostic scores as quality filters rather than citation predictors. A query-leakage bug in our first ranking evaluation and a failed confidence flag are disclosed and corrected; every number reproduces offline from released artifacts at zero marginal API cost.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the Adversarial Nibbler challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

DeepRobust is a PyTorch adversarial learning library which aims to build a comprehensive and easy-to-use platform to foster this research field. It currently contains more than 10 attack algorithms and 8 defense algorithms in image domain and 9 attack algorithms and 4 defense algorithms in graph domain, under a variety of deep learning architectures. In this manual, we introduce the main contents of DeepRobust with detailed instructions. The library is kept updated and can be found at https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust.

As large language models become increasingly integrated into daily life, audio has emerged as a key interface for human-AI interaction. However, this convenience also introduces new vulnerabilities, making audio a potential attack surface for adversaries. Our research introduces WhisperInject, a two-stage adversarial audio attack framework that can manipulate state-of-the-art audio language models to generate harmful content. Our method uses imperceptible perturbations in audio inputs that remain benign to human listeners. The first stage uses a novel reward-based optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD), to guide the target model to circumvent its own safety protocols and generate harmful native responses. This native harmful response then serves as the target for Stage 2, Payload Injection, where we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to optimize subtle perturbations that are embedded into benign audio carriers, such as weather queries or greeting messages. Validated under the rigorous StrongREJECT, LlamaGuard, as well as Human Evaluation safety evaluation framework, our experiments demonstrate a success rate exceeding 86% across Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and Phi-4-Multimodal. Our work demonstrates a new class of practical, audio-native threats, moving beyond theoretical exploits to reveal a feasible and covert method for manipulating AI behavior.

Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.

Batik, a unique blend of art and craftsmanship, is a distinct artistic and technological creation for Indonesian society. Research on batik motifs is primarily focused on classification. However, further studies may extend to the synthesis of batik patterns. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) have been an important deep learning model for generating synthetic data, but often face challenges in the stability and consistency of results. This research focuses on the use of StyleGAN2-Ada and Diffusion techniques to produce realistic and high-quality synthetic batik patterns. StyleGAN2-Ada is a variation of the GAN model that separates the style and content aspects in an image, whereas diffusion techniques introduce random noise into the data. In the context of batik, StyleGAN2-Ada and Diffusion are used to produce realistic synthetic batik patterns. This study also made adjustments to the model architecture and used a well-curated batik dataset. The main goal is to assist batik designers or craftsmen in producing unique and quality batik motifs with efficient production time and costs. Based on qualitative and quantitative evaluations, the results show that the model tested is capable of producing authentic and quality batik patterns, with finer details and rich artistic variations. The dataset and code can be accessed here:https://github.com/octadion/diffusion-stylegan2-ada-pytorch

Text-guided diffusion models (TDMs) are widely applied but can fail unexpectedly. Common failures include: (i) natural-looking text prompts generating images with the wrong content, or (ii) different random samples of the latent variables that generate vastly different, and even unrelated, outputs despite being conditioned on the same text prompt. In this work, we aim to study and understand the failure modes of TDMs in more detail. To achieve this, we propose SAGE, the first adversarial search method on TDMs that systematically explores the discrete prompt space and the high-dimensional latent space, to automatically discover undesirable behaviors and failure cases in image generation. We use image classifiers as surrogate loss functions during searching, and employ human inspections to validate the identified failures. For the first time, our method enables efficient exploration of both the discrete and intricate human language space and the challenging latent space, overcoming the gradient vanishing problem. Then, we demonstrate the effectiveness of SAGE on five widely used generative models and reveal four typical failure modes: (1) We find a variety of natural text prompts that generate images failing to capture the semantics of input texts. We further discuss the underlying causes and potential solutions based on the results. (2) We find regions in the latent space that lead to distorted images independent of the text prompt, suggesting that parts of the latent space are not well-structured. (3) We also find latent samples that result in natural-looking images unrelated to the text prompt, implying a possible misalignment between the latent and prompt spaces. (4) By appending a single adversarial token embedding to any input prompts, we can generate a variety of specified target objects. Project page: https://sage-diffusion.github.io/

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various tasks in different domains. However, the emergence of biases and the potential for generating harmful content in LLMs, particularly under malicious inputs, pose significant challenges. Current mitigation strategies, while effective, are not resilient under adversarial attacks. This paper introduces Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models (RigorLLM), a novel framework designed to efficiently and effectively moderate harmful and unsafe inputs and outputs for LLMs. By employing a multi-faceted approach that includes energy-based training data augmentation through Langevin dynamics, optimizing a safe suffix for inputs via minimax optimization, and integrating a fusion-based model combining robust KNN with LLMs based on our data augmentation, RigorLLM offers a robust solution to harmful content moderation. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that RigorLLM not only outperforms existing baselines like OpenAI API and Perspective API in detecting harmful content but also exhibits unparalleled resilience to jailbreaking attacks. The innovative use of constrained optimization and a fusion-based guardrail approach represents a significant step forward in developing more secure and reliable LLMs, setting a new standard for content moderation frameworks in the face of evolving digital threats.

Diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in text-to-image generation, but they also pose safety risks, such as the potential generation of harmful content and copyright violations. The techniques of machine unlearning, also known as concept erasing, have been developed to address these risks. However, these techniques remain vulnerable to adversarial prompt attacks, which can prompt DMs post-unlearning to regenerate undesired images containing concepts (such as nudity) meant to be erased. This work aims to enhance the robustness of concept erasing by integrating the principle of adversarial training (AT) into machine unlearning, resulting in the robust unlearning framework referred to as AdvUnlearn. However, achieving this effectively and efficiently is highly nontrivial. First, we find that a straightforward implementation of AT compromises DMs' image generation quality post-unlearning. To address this, we develop a utility-retaining regularization on an additional retain set, optimizing the trade-off between concept erasure robustness and model utility in AdvUnlearn. Moreover, we identify the text encoder as a more suitable module for robustification compared to UNet, ensuring unlearning effectiveness. And the acquired text encoder can serve as a plug-and-play robust unlearner for various DM types. Empirically, we perform extensive experiments to demonstrate the robustness advantage of AdvUnlearn across various DM unlearning scenarios, including the erasure of nudity, objects, and style concepts. In addition to robustness, AdvUnlearn also achieves a balanced tradeoff with model utility. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically explore robust DM unlearning through AT, setting it apart from existing methods that overlook robustness in concept erasing. Codes are available at: https://github.com/OPTML-Group/AdvUnlearn

Voice conversion is the task to transform voice characteristics of source speech while preserving content information. Nowadays, self-supervised representation learning models are increasingly utilized in content extraction. However, in these representations, a lot of hidden speaker information leads to timbre leakage while the prosodic information of hidden units lacks use. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework for expressive voice conversion called "SAVC" based on soft speech units from HuBert-soft. Taking soft speech units as input, we design an attribute encoder to extract content and prosody features respectively. Specifically, we first introduce statistic perturbation imposed by adversarial style augmentation to eliminate speaker information. Then the prosody is implicitly modeled on soft speech units with knowledge distillation. Experiment results show that the intelligibility and naturalness of converted speech outperform previous work.

Generative models, such as diffusion models (DMs), variational autoencoders (VAEs), and generative adversarial networks (GANs), produce images with a level of authenticity that makes them nearly indistinguishable from real photos and artwork. While this capability is beneficial for many industries, the difficulty of identifying synthetic images leaves online media platforms vulnerable to impersonation and misinformation attempts. To support the development of defensive methods, we introduce ImagiNet, a high-resolution and balanced dataset for synthetic image detection, designed to mitigate potential biases in existing resources. It contains 200K examples, spanning four content categories: photos, paintings, faces, and uncategorized. Synthetic images are produced with open-source and proprietary generators, whereas real counterparts of the same content type are collected from public datasets. The structure of ImagiNet allows for a two-track evaluation system: i) classification as real or synthetic and ii) identification of the generative model. To establish a baseline, we train a ResNet-50 model using a self-supervised contrastive objective (SelfCon) for each track. The model demonstrates state-of-the-art performance and high inference speed across established benchmarks, achieving an AUC of up to 0.99 and balanced accuracy ranging from 86% to 95%, even under social network conditions that involve compression and resizing. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/delyan-boychev/imaginet.

We propose a unified Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) for controllable image-to-image translation, i.e., transferring an image from a source to a target domain guided by controllable structures. In addition to conditioning on a reference image, we show how the model can generate images conditioned on controllable structures, e.g., class labels, object keypoints, human skeletons, and scene semantic maps. The proposed model consists of a single generator and a discriminator taking a conditional image and the target controllable structure as input. In this way, the conditional image can provide appearance information and the controllable structure can provide the structure information for generating the target result. Moreover, our model learns the image-to-image mapping through three novel losses, i.e., color loss, controllable structure guided cycle-consistency loss, and controllable structure guided self-content preserving loss. Also, we present the Fr\'echet ResNet Distance (FRD) to evaluate the quality of the generated images. Experiments on two challenging image translation tasks, i.e., hand gesture-to-gesture translation and cross-view image translation, show that our model generates convincing results, and significantly outperforms other state-of-the-art methods on both tasks. Meanwhile, the proposed framework is a unified solution, thus it can be applied to solving other controllable structure guided image translation tasks such as landmark guided facial expression translation and keypoint guided person image generation. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to make one GAN framework work on all such controllable structure guided image translation tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/Ha0Tang/GestureGAN.

Due to their multimodal capabilities, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have found numerous impactful applications in real-world scenarios. However, recent studies have revealed that VLMs are vulnerable to image-based adversarial attacks, particularly targeted adversarial images that manipulate the model to generate harmful content specified by the adversary. Current attack methods rely on predefined target labels to create targeted adversarial attacks, which limits their scalability and applicability for large-scale robustness evaluations. In this paper, we propose AnyAttack, a self-supervised framework that generates targeted adversarial images for VLMs without label supervision, allowing any image to serve as a target for the attack. Our framework employs the pre-training and fine-tuning paradigm, with the adversarial noise generator pre-trained on the large-scale LAION-400M dataset. This large-scale pre-training endows our method with powerful transferability across a wide range of VLMs. Extensive experiments on five mainstream open-source VLMs (CLIP, BLIP, BLIP2, InstructBLIP, and MiniGPT-4) across three multimodal tasks (image-text retrieval, multimodal classification, and image captioning) demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack. Additionally, we successfully transfer AnyAttack to multiple commercial VLMs, including Google Gemini, Claude Sonnet, Microsoft Copilot and OpenAI GPT. These results reveal an unprecedented risk to VLMs, highlighting the need for effective countermeasures.

Despite recent efforts in Large Language Models (LLMs) safety and alignment, current adversarial attacks on frontier LLMs are still able to force harmful generations consistently. Although adversarial training has been widely studied and shown to significantly improve the robustness of traditional machine learning models, its strengths and weaknesses in the context of LLMs are less understood. Specifically, while existing discrete adversarial attacks are effective at producing harmful content, training LLMs with concrete adversarial prompts is often computationally expensive, leading to reliance on continuous relaxations. As these relaxations do not correspond to discrete input tokens, such latent training methods often leave models vulnerable to a diverse set of discrete attacks. In this work, we aim to bridge this gap by introducing MixAT, a novel method that combines stronger discrete and faster continuous attacks during training. We rigorously evaluate MixAT across a wide spectrum of state-of-the-art attacks, proposing the At Least One Attack Success Rate (ALO-ASR) metric to capture the worst-case vulnerability of models. We show MixAT achieves substantially better robustness (ALO-ASR < 20%) compared to prior defenses (ALO-ASR > 50%), while maintaining a runtime comparable to methods based on continuous relaxations. We further analyze MixAT in realistic deployment settings, exploring how chat templates, quantization, low-rank adapters, and temperature affect both adversarial training and evaluation, revealing additional blind spots in current methodologies. Our results demonstrate that MixAT's discrete-continuous defense offers a principled and superior robustness-accuracy tradeoff with minimal computational overhead, highlighting its promise for building safer LLMs. We provide our code and models at https://github.com/insait-institute/MixAT.

Deep learning voice models are commonly used nowadays, but the safety processing of personal data, such as human identity and speech content, remains suspicious. To prevent malicious user identification, speaker anonymization methods were proposed. Current methods, particularly based on universal adversarial patch (UAP) applications, have drawbacks such as significant degradation of audio quality, decreased speech recognition quality, low transferability across different voice biometrics models, and performance dependence on the input audio length. To mitigate these drawbacks, in this work, we introduce and leverage the novel Exponential Total Variance (TV) loss function and provide experimental evidence that it positively affects UAP strength and imperceptibility. Moreover, we present a novel scalable UAP insertion procedure and demonstrate its uniformly high performance for various audio lengths.

In recent years, multimodal large models have continued to improve on general benchmarks. However, in real-world content moderation and adversarial settings, mainstream models still suffer from degraded generalization and catastrophic forgetting because of limited fine-grained visual perception and insufficient modeling of long-tail noise. In this paper, we present Xuanwu VL-2B as a case study of how general multimodal models can be developed into an industrial-grade foundation model for content ecosystems. The model adopts a compact InternViT-300M + MLP + Qwen3 1.7B architecture, balancing fine-grained visual perception, language-semantic alignment, and deployment cost within an approximately 2B-parameter budget. To balance business specialization with the retention of general capabilities, we developed a data iteration and curation mechanism and trained the model through a progressive three-stage pipeline: pre-training, mid-training, and post-training. Ablation studies and offline business evaluations show that Xuanwu VL-2B achieves an average score of 67.90 across seven OpenCompass multimodal metrics (vs. 64.27 for InternVL 3.5 2B), an average recall of 94.38% over seven independent business moderation tasks, and a weighted overall recall of 82.82% on policy-violating text in challenging adversarial OCR scenarios, outperforming Gemini-2.5-Pro (76.72%). These results show that, under a limited parameter budget, Xuanwu VL-2B achieves a practical balance among business alignment, visual perception, general capability retention, and deployment cost.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable success in visual understanding, yet their performance degrades significantly under real-world visual corruptions. While existing robustness enhancement approaches exist, they are limited: black-box feature alignment lacks interpretability, and white-box text-based reasoning cannot restore lost pixel-level details. This work investigates a fundamental research question: Can MLLMs recover corrupted visual content by themselves? To address this, we propose Robust-U1, a novel framework that equips MLLMs with explicit visual self-recovery capability for robust understanding. The approach comprises three core stages: supervised fine-tuning for initial reconstruction, reinforcement learning with dual rewards (pixel-level SSIM and semantic-level CLIP similarity) for aligning high visual quality, and multimodal reasoning that jointly considers both the corrupted input and the recovered image. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Robust-U1 achieves state-of-the-art robustness on the real-world corruption benchmark and maintains superior performance under adversarial corruptions on general VQA benchmarks. Analysis confirms that high-quality visual recovery directly enhances reasoning performance, establishing self-recovery as a critical mechanism for robust visual understanding. The source code is available at https://github.com/jqtangust/Robust-U1.

Autonomous vehicles increasingly utilize the vision-based perception module to acquire information about driving environments and detect obstacles. Correct detection and classification are important to ensure safe driving decisions. Existing works have demonstrated the feasibility of fooling the perception models such as object detectors and image classifiers with printed adversarial patches. However, most of them are indiscriminately offensive to every passing autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we propose TPatch, a physical adversarial patch triggered by acoustic signals. Unlike other adversarial patches, TPatch remains benign under normal circumstances but can be triggered to launch a hiding, creating or altering attack by a designed distortion introduced by signal injection attacks towards cameras. To avoid the suspicion of human drivers and make the attack practical and robust in the real world, we propose a content-based camouflage method and an attack robustness enhancement method to strengthen it. Evaluations with three object detectors, YOLO V3/V5 and Faster R-CNN, and eight image classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of TPatch in both the simulation and the real world. We also discuss possible defenses at the sensor, algorithm, and system levels.

Multimodal web agents that process both screenshots and accessibility trees are increasingly deployed to interact with web interfaces, yet their dual-stream architecture opens an underexplored attack surface: an adversary who injects content into the webpage DOM simultaneously corrupts both observation channels with a consistent deceptive narrative. Our vulnerability analysis on MiniWob++ reveals that attacks including a visual component far outperform text-only injections, exposing critical gaps in text-centric VLM safety training. Motivated by this finding, we propose Dual-Modality Multi-Stage Adversarial Safety Training (DMAST), a framework that formalizes the agent-attacker interaction as a two-player zero-sum Markov game and co-trains both players through a three-stage pipeline: (1) imitation learning from a strong teacher model, (2) oracle-guided supervised fine-tuning that uses a novel zero-acknowledgment strategy to instill task-focused reasoning under adversarial noise, and (3) adversarial reinforcement learning via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) self-play. On out-of-distribution tasks, DMAST substantially mitigates adversarial risks while simultaneously doubling task completion efficiency. Our approach significantly outperforms established training-based and prompt-based defenses, demonstrating genuine co-evolutionary progress and robust generalization to complex, unseen environments.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.