Daily Papers

A software agent on a public blockchain accumulates authority and economic stakes, raising the engineering question of what makes it count as an individual. The paper's central contribution is a shift of trust root for the key-to-weights binding of agent identity: from hardware, operator, or wrapper trust to cryptographic assumptions enforced by a pinned implementation (liveness, key custody, oracle trust, and the underlying software stack remain external). We design and deploy on Solana devnet an agent whose neural-network weights are a deterministic function of its private key. The binding is committed in zero knowledge at genesis, re-checked against that commitment at every state transition, and signed by the agent into an on-chain history unforkable once finalized; in a PoC-tier extension, a protocol-imposed metabolic cost is debited each cycle from a key-derived economic account, adding a consumption-side economic-viability constraint to the key-history-economy triple. Empirically, the agent completes a 2.36-day on-chain run with two host-side resumptions but no rejected transition, at bounded per-transition verification cost; a substituted substrate is rejected on chain, and independently keyed agents diverge as predicted while a same-key control stays at zero. To our knowledge, this is the first published on-chain agent whose identity primitive is itself a cryptographic invariant re-checked at every state transition. The resulting transition-time invariant instantiates the cryptographic individuality proposed by Suzuki 2026's Artificial Externality framework.

Smart contract transactions associated with security attacks often exhibit distinct behavioral patterns compared with historical benign transactions before the attacking events. While many runtime monitoring and guarding mechanisms have been proposed to validate invariants and stop anomalous transactions on the fly, the empirical effectiveness of the invariants used remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we studied 23 prevalent invariants of 8 categories, which are either deployed in high-profile protocols or endorsed by leading auditing firms and security experts. Using these well-established invariants as templates, we developed a tool Trace2Inv which dynamically generates new invariants customized for a given contract based on its historical transaction data. We evaluated Trace2Inv on 42 smart contracts that fell victim to 27 distinct exploits on the Ethereum blockchain. Our findings reveal that the most effective invariant guard alone can successfully block 18 of the 27 identified exploits with minimal gas overhead. Our analysis also shows that most of the invariants remain effective even when the experienced attackers attempt to bypass them. Additionally, we studied the possibility of combining multiple invariant guards, resulting in blocking up to 23 of the 27 benchmark exploits and achieving false positive rates as low as 0.32%. Trace2Inv outperforms current state-of-the-art works on smart contract invariant mining and transaction attack detection in terms of both practicality and accuracy. Though Trace2Inv is not primarily designed for transaction attack detection, it surprisingly found two previously unreported exploit transactions, earlier than any reported exploit transactions against the same victim contracts.

In his celebrated book "Mathematical Treatise in Nine Sections" of 1247, Qin, Jiushao described the Chinese remainder theorem with great detail and generality. He also gave a method for computing modular inverse under the name of "DaYan deriving one". Historical significance of DaYan deriving one method has been well studied. In this paper, we investigate its modern mathematical nature from the perspectives of number theory and algorithm. One of the remarkable features of Qin's algorithm is that it keeps a state of four variables in a matrix form. Its choice of variables and layout provide natural ways of connecting several important mathematical concepts. An invariant about the state is also observed which provides a convenient yet powerful tool in proving several important mathematical results. The paper first explains Qin's algorithm and proves some of its properties. Then the connection with continued fractions is examined, the results show that the states of Qin's algorithm contain rich information about continued fractions and some classical arguments can be derived easily. The last part of the paper discusses a family of 2-dimensional lattices of number theoretic significance by proving that the shortest vectors of these lattices can be obtained from the states of Qin's algorithm. This result is surprising in that a shortest lattice vector is found in a well-regulated set. A method of computing such shortest vectors is proposed.ed.

Loop invariants are fundamental to reasoning about programs with loops. They establish properties about a given loop's behavior. When they additionally are inductive, they become useful for the task of formal verification that seeks to establish strong mathematical guarantees about program's runtime behavior. The inductiveness ensures that the invariants can be checked locally without consulting the entire program, thus are indispensable artifacts in a formal proof of correctness. Finding inductive loop invariants is an undecidable problem, and despite a long history of research towards practical solutions, it remains far from a solved problem. This paper investigates the capabilities of the Large Language Models (LLMs) in offering a new solution towards this old, yet important problem. To that end, we first curate a dataset of verification problems on programs with loops. Next, we design a prompt for exploiting LLMs, obtaining inductive loop invariants, that are checked for correctness using sound symbolic tools. Finally, we explore the effectiveness of using an efficient combination of a symbolic tool and an LLM on our dataset and compare it against a purely symbolic baseline. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can help improve the state-of-the-art in automated program verification.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

Many learning algorithms have invariances: when their training data is transformed in certain ways, the function they learn transforms in a predictable manner. Here we formalize this notion using concepts from the mathematical field of category theory. The invariances that a supervised learning algorithm possesses are formalized by categories of predictor and target spaces, whose morphisms represent the algorithm's invariances, and an index category whose morphisms represent permutations of the training examples. An invariant learning algorithm is a natural transformation between two functors from the product of these categories to the category of sets, representing training datasets and learned functions respectively. We illustrate the framework by characterizing and contrasting the invariances of linear regression and ridge regression.

We study a basic question about cryptographic watermarking for generative models: how reliable can a watermark remain when an adversary is allowed to corrupt the encoded signal? To address this question, we introduce a minimal coding abstraction that we call a zero-bit tamper-detection code. This is a secret-key procedure that samples a pseudorandom codeword and, given a candidate word, decides whether it should be treated as unmarked content or as the result of tampering with a valid codeword. It captures the two core requirements of robust watermarking: soundness and tamper detection. Within this abstraction we prove a sharp unconditional limit on robustness to independent symbol corruption. For an alphabet of size q, there is a critical corruption rate of 1-1/q such that no scheme with soundness, even relaxed to allow a fixed constant false positive probability on random content, can reliably detect tampering once an adversary can change more than this fraction of symbols. In particular, in the binary case no cryptographic watermark can remain robust if more than half of the encoded bits are modified. We also show that this threshold is tight by giving simple information-theoretic constructions that achieve soundness and tamper detection for all strictly smaller corruption rates. We then test experimentally whether this limit appears in practice by looking at the recent watermarking for images of Gunn, Zhao, and Song (ICLR 2025). We show that a simple crop and resize operation reliably flipped about half of the latent signs and consistently prevented belief-propagation decoding from recovering the codeword, erasing the watermark while leaving the image visually intact.

Isogenies occur throughout the theory of elliptic curves. Recently, the cryptographic protocols based on isogenies are considered as candidates of quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols. Given two elliptic curves E_1, E_2 defined over a finite field k with the same trace, there is a nonconstant isogeny beta from E_2 to E_1 defined over k. This study gives out the index of Hom_{it k}(it E_{rm 1},E_{rm 2})beta as a left ideal in End_{it k}(it E_{rm 2}) and figures out the correspondence between isogenies and kernel ideals. In addition, some results about the non-trivial minimal degree of isogenies between the two elliptic curves are also provided.

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

In state-of-the-art self-supervised learning (SSL) pre-training produces semantically good representations by encouraging them to be invariant under meaningful transformations prescribed from human knowledge. In fact, the property of invariance is a trivial instance of a broader class called equivariance, which can be intuitively understood as the property that representations transform according to the way the inputs transform. Here, we show that rather than using only invariance, pre-training that encourages non-trivial equivariance to some transformations, while maintaining invariance to other transformations, can be used to improve the semantic quality of representations. Specifically, we extend popular SSL methods to a more general framework which we name Equivariant Self-Supervised Learning (E-SSL). In E-SSL, a simple additional pre-training objective encourages equivariance by predicting the transformations applied to the input. We demonstrate E-SSL's effectiveness empirically on several popular computer vision benchmarks, e.g. improving SimCLR to 72.5% linear probe accuracy on ImageNet. Furthermore, we demonstrate usefulness of E-SSL for applications beyond computer vision; in particular, we show its utility on regression problems in photonics science. Our code, datasets and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/rdangovs/essl to aid further research in E-SSL.

In this article, we introduce a new parameterized family of topological invariants, taking the form of candidate decompositions, for multi-parameter persistence modules. We prove that our candidate decompositions are controllable approximations: when restricting to modules that can be decomposed into interval summands, we establish theoretical results about the approximation error between our candidate decompositions and the true underlying module in terms of the standard interleaving and bottleneck distances. Moreover, even when the underlying module does not admit such a decomposition, our candidate decompositions are nonetheless stable invariants; small perturbations in the underlying module lead to small perturbations in the candidate decomposition. Then, we introduce MMA (Multipersistence Module Approximation): an algorithm for computing stable instances of such invariants, which is based on fibered barcodes and exact matchings, two constructions that stem from the theory of single-parameter persistence. By design, MMA can handle an arbitrary number of filtrations, and has bounded complexity and running time. Finally, we present empirical evidence validating the generalization capabilities and running time speed-ups of MMA on several data sets.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon's 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common and complementary informations. Definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also fully detailed and shown compatible with the lattice structure. A new geometric interpretation of such a lattice structure is then investigated that leads to a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for reconstructing the discrete random variable X given a set { X_1,ldots,X_{n} } of elements in the lattice generated by X. Finally, this condition is illustrated in five specific examples of perfect reconstruction problems: reconstruction of a symmetric random variable from the knowledge of its sign and absolute value, reconstruction of a word from a set of linear combinations, reconstruction of an integer from its prime signature (fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and from its remainders modulo a set of coprime integers (Chinese remainder theorem), and reconstruction of the sorting permutation of a list from a minimal set of pairwise comparisons.

Digital signatures prove key possession, not authorship. An author who generates text with AI, constructs intermediate document states post-hoc, and signs each hash produces a signature chain indistinguishable from genuine composition. We address this gap between cryptographic integrity and process provenance. We introduce proof-of-process, a primitive category for evidence that a physical process, not merely a signing key, produced a digital artifact. Our construction, the jitter seal, injects imperceptible microsecond delays derived via HMAC from a session secret, keystroke ordinal, and cumulative document hash. Valid evidence requires that real keystrokes produced the document through those intermediate states. We propose the Adversarial Collapse Principle as an evaluation criterion: evidence systems should be judged by whether disputing them requires a conjunction of specific, testable allegations against components with independent trust assumptions. We present Witnessd, an architecture combining jitter seals with Verifiable Delay Functions, external timestamp anchors, dual-source keystroke validation, and optional hardware attestation. Each layer forces allegations at different capability levels; disputing authentic evidence requires coordinated claims across independent trust boundaries. The system does not prevent forgery: a kernel-level adversary can defeat it, and typing AI-generated content produces valid evidence. The contribution is converting vague doubt into falsifiable allegations. We evaluate across 31,000 verification trials with deterministic rejection of invalid proofs.

This is the second paper devoted to the numerical version of Signature-inverse Theorem in terms of the underlying joint invariants. Signature Theorem and its Inverse guarantee any application of differential invariant signature curves to the invariant recognition of visual objects. We first show the invalidity of Curvature-inverse and Signature inverse theorems, meaning non-congruent meshes may have the same joint invariant numerical curvature or signature. Then by classifying three and five point ordinary meshes respectively in the Euclidean and affine cases, we look for conditions in terms of the associated joint invariant signatures which make these theorems correct. Additionally, we bring forward The Host Theorem to provide a simpler version of Signature-inverse Theorem for closed ordinary meshes.

We define and develop a homotopy invariant notion for the topological complexity of a map f:X to Y, denoted TC(f), that interacts with TC(X) and TC(Y) in the same way cat(f) interacts with cat(X) and cat(Y). Furthermore, TC(f) and cat(f) satisfy the same inequalities as TC(X) and cat(X). We compare it to other invariants defined in the papers [15,16,17,18,20]. We apply TC(f) to studying group homomorphisms f:Hto G.

The advent of quantum computing poses a profound threat to traditional cryptographic systems, exposing vulnerabilities that compromise the security of digital communication channels reliant on RSA, ECC, and similar classical encryption methods. Quantum algorithms, notably Shor's algorithm, exploit the inherent computational power of quantum computers to efficiently solve mathematical problems underlying these cryptographic schemes. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) emerged as a critical field aimed at developing resilient cryptographic algorithms impervious to quantum attacks. This paper delineates the vulnerabilities of classical cryptographic systems to quantum attacks, elucidates the principles of quantum computing, and introduces various PQC algorithms such as lattice-based cryptography, code-based cryptography, hash-based cryptography, and multivariate polynomial cryptography. Highlighting the importance of PQC in securing digital communication amidst quantum computing advancements, this research underscores its pivotal role in safeguarding data integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity in the face of emerging quantum threats.

Learning representations that capture the underlying data generating process is a key problem for data efficient and robust use of neural networks. One key property for robustness which the learned representation should capture and which recently received a lot of attention is described by the notion of invariance. In this work we provide a causal perspective and new algorithm for learning invariant representations. Empirically we show that this algorithm works well on a diverse set of tasks and in particular we observe state-of-the-art performance on domain generalization, where we are able to significantly boost the score of existing models.

Due to Shor's algorithm, quantum computers are a severe threat for public key cryptography. This motivated the cryptographic community to search for quantum-safe solutions. On the other hand, the impact of quantum computing on secret key cryptography is much less understood. In this paper, we consider attacks where an adversary can query an oracle implementing a cryptographic primitive in a quantum superposition of different states. This model gives a lot of power to the adversary, but recent results show that it is nonetheless possible to build secure cryptosystems in it. We study applications of a quantum procedure called Simon's algorithm (the simplest quantum period finding algorithm) in order to attack symmetric cryptosystems in this model. Following previous works in this direction, we show that several classical attacks based on finding collisions can be dramatically sped up using Simon's algorithm: finding a collision requires Ω(2^{n/2}) queries in the classical setting, but when collisions happen with some hidden periodicity, they can be found with only O(n) queries in the quantum model. We obtain attacks with very strong implications. First, we show that the most widely used modes of operation for authentication and authenticated encryption e.g. CBC-MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, and OCB) are completely broken in this security model. Our attacks are also applicable to many CAESAR candidates: CLOC, AEZ, COPA, OTR, POET, OMD, and Minalpher. This is quite surprising compared to the situation with encryption modes: Anand et al. show that standard modes are secure with a quantum-secure PRF. Second, we show that Simon's algorithm can also be applied to slide attacks, leading to an exponential speed-up of a classical symmetric cryptanalysis technique in the quantum model.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is seeing increasing real-world deployment to protect data in use by allowing computation over encrypted data. However, the same malleability that enables homomorphic computations also raises integrity issues, which have so far been mostly overlooked. While FHEs lack of integrity has obvious implications for correctness, it also has severe implications for confidentiality: a malicious server can leverage the lack of integrity to carry out interactive key-recovery attacks. As a result, virtually all FHE schemes and applications assume an honest-but-curious server who does not deviate from the protocol. In practice, however, this assumption is insufficient for a wide range of deployment scenarios. While there has been work that aims to address this gap, these have remained isolated efforts considering only aspects of the overall problem and fail to fully address the needs and characteristics of modern FHE schemes and applications. In this paper, we analyze existing FHE integrity approaches, present attacks that exploit gaps in prior work, and propose a new notion for maliciously-secure verifiable FHE. We then instantiate this new notion with a range of techniques, analyzing them and evaluating their performance in a range of different settings. We highlight their potential but also show where future work on tailored integrity solutions for FHE is still required.

We study the problem of designing models for machine learning tasks defined on sets. In contrast to traditional approach of operating on fixed dimensional vectors, we consider objective functions defined on sets that are invariant to permutations. Such problems are widespread, ranging from estimation of population statistics poczos13aistats, to anomaly detection in piezometer data of embankment dams Jung15Exploration, to cosmology Ntampaka16Dynamical,Ravanbakhsh16ICML1. Our main theorem characterizes the permutation invariant functions and provides a family of functions to which any permutation invariant objective function must belong. This family of functions has a special structure which enables us to design a deep network architecture that can operate on sets and which can be deployed on a variety of scenarios including both unsupervised and supervised learning tasks. We also derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for permutation equivariance in deep models. We demonstrate the applicability of our method on population statistic estimation, point cloud classification, set expansion, and outlier detection.

We introduce Invariant Risk Minimization (IRM), a learning paradigm to estimate invariant correlations across multiple training distributions. To achieve this goal, IRM learns a data representation such that the optimal classifier, on top of that data representation, matches for all training distributions. Through theory and experiments, we show how the invariances learned by IRM relate to the causal structures governing the data and enable out-of-distribution generalization.

We describe a verification pipeline that takes production Rust cryptographic code and produces machine-checked correctness proofs in Lean 4. The pipeline combines three components: symbolic extraction tools (Charon and Aeneas, or Hax) that lift Rust into Lean 4; formal cryptographic specification libraries (ArkLib and CompPoly, from the Verified zkEVM project) that provide the mathematical targets; and AI provers (Aristotle from Harmonic AI and Aleph from Logical Intelligence) that close the resulting proof obligations. Every proof is checked by the Lean kernel, so AI output cannot compromise soundness. Within the scope of the Ethereum Foundation's zkEVM Verification Project, we applied the pipeline to cryptographic primitives in Plonky3 (FRI folding, Mersenne31 and KoalaBear field arithmetic, Horner polynomial evaluation) and RISC Zero (Merkle inclusion verification). In addition, Aleph authored proofs of two bounds-style theorems in Plonky3's compute_log_arity_for_round that previously stood as sorry. The paper describes the architecture, walks through a running example based on Aleph's two proofs, reports which classes of proof obligations AI closed and which required manual work, and discusses the engineering gaps we encountered: Lean 4 toolchain drift across tools and specific Aeneas/Hax extraction limits. We also document concrete missing lemmas, tactic gaps, and code-generation friction points discovered during proof development. We hope this contribution lowers the barrier to adoption of formal verification and facilitates more effective use of AI in this pipeline. The result is a working pipeline for formal verification of Rust, with kernel-checked proofs and reproducible artefacts.

Watermark algorithms for large language models (LLMs) have achieved extremely high accuracy in detecting text generated by LLMs. Such algorithms typically involve adding extra watermark logits to the LLM's logits at each generation step. However, prior algorithms face a trade-off between attack robustness and security robustness. This is because the watermark logits for a token are determined by a certain number of preceding tokens; a small number leads to low security robustness, while a large number results in insufficient attack robustness. In this work, we propose a semantic invariant watermarking method for LLMs that provides both attack robustness and security robustness. The watermark logits in our work are determined by the semantics of all preceding tokens. Specifically, we utilize another embedding LLM to generate semantic embeddings for all preceding tokens, and then these semantic embeddings are transformed into the watermark logits through our trained watermark model. Subsequent analyses and experiments demonstrated the attack robustness of our method in semantically invariant settings: synonym substitution and text paraphrasing settings. Finally, we also show that our watermark possesses adequate security robustness. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/THU-BPM/Robust_Watermark.

The synthesis of inductive loop invariants remains a critical bottleneck in automated program verification. While Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in mitigating this issue, they often fail on complex programs, producing invariants that are invalid or computationally ineffective. Although fine-tuning is a natural strategy to address these limitations, obtaining high-quality training data remains an open challenge. We first formalize the properties required for a high-quality training invariant, and then present Wonda, a rigorous data curation pipeline that extracts such invariants from raw verifier output via AST-based normalization followed by LLM-driven semantic rewriting and augmentation with provable quality guarantees. Fine-tuning Small Language Models (SLMs) on Wonda-curated data yields consistent gains across the Qwen3, Llama-3.1, and Mistral families: the 4B and 8B Qwen3 models nearly double invariant correctness and double speedup rates, while Llama-3.1-8B triples both. On the challenging InvBench suite, the same 4B model outperforms an off-the-shelf model 20x its size and matches the end-to-end verification time of GPT-OSS-120B, while a 14B Qwen3 model matches that of the frontier model GPT-5.2, all without test-time compute overhead. Our code is publicly available on GitHub.

Contemporary neural inference architectures rely on dense floating-point weight matrices stored in high-bandwidth memory (VRAM), incurring severe memory-wall bottlenecks and preventing native execution inside deterministic virtual machines like the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). Verifying termination and arithmetic invariants for recursive dynamical systems over continuous domains is generally undecidable in the Blum-Shub-Smale model. Here, we present the formal verification and bare-metal empirical validation of WERR (Waves & Errors) and Phase III Orbital Error Dynamics (OED), a non-tensor decision paradigm that procedurally synthesizes non-linear decision boundaries on demand from a 24-byte coordinate seed Θ= (c_x, c_y, zoom) along the boundary of the Mandelbrot set (partialM). By projecting the recurrence z_{n+1} = z_n^2 + c onto the modular residue ring Z/9Z and the fixed-point domain Q_{16.16}, we establish ten machine-verified theorems in Lean 4 (v4.34.1) with Mathlib4 and zero unproven conjectures (sorry): proving I_3 = {0,3,6} subset Z/9Z ideal closure, universal fuel-bounded halting (le 9 and le 12 steps), absence of Q_{16.16} square overflow below 2^{63}-1, non-constant boundary escape sensitivity, and a parametric EVM gas bound (le 22,557 le 24,000 gas). Evaluated on a 40-core Dual Intel Xeon server, the vectorized 36-iteration CPU kernel processes 100,000 decisions in 6.49 s (15,397 decisions/s, 0 Bytes VRAM, 15.15x speedup), while a sigmoidal outlier gate suppresses 100.00% of adversarial spikes while preserving 89.60% of clean baseline signals.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is an encryption scheme that allows for computation to be performed directly on encrypted data, effectively closing the loop on secure and outsourced computing. Data is encrypted not only during rest and transit, but also during processing. However, FHE provides a limited instruction set: SIMD addition, SIMD multiplication, and cyclic rotation of 1-D vectors. This restriction makes performing multi-dimensional tensor operations challenging. Practitioners must pack these tensors into 1-D vectors and map tensor operations onto this one-dimensional layout rather than their traditional nested structure. And while prior systems have made significant strides in automating this process, they often hide critical packing decisions behind layers of abstraction, making debugging, optimizing, and building on top of these systems difficult. In this work, we approach multi-dimensional tensor operations in FHE through Einstein summation (einsum) notation. Einsum notation explicitly encodes dimensional structure and operations in its syntax, naturally exposing how tensors should be packed and transformed. We decompose einsum expressions into a fixed set of FHE-friendly operations. We implement our design and present EinHops, a minimalist system that factors einsum expressions into a fixed sequence of FHE operations. EinHops enables developers to perform encrypted tensor operations using FHE while maintaining full visibility into the underlying packing strategy. We evaluate EinHops on a range of tensor operations from a simple transpose to complex multi-dimensional contractions. We show that the explicit nature of einsum notation allows us to build an FHE tensor system that is simple, general, and interpretable. We open-source EinHops at the following repository: https://github.com/baahl-nyu/einhops.

We report genuine-un-compiled, textbook-faithful-quantum cryptanalysis of symmetric-cipher structures executed on real IBM quantum hardware (ibm\_kingston, Heron generation). Using Simon's algorithm we recover the hidden period of the Even-Mansour cipher up to security parameter N = 10 on real hardware, beyond the largest previously reported real-hardware key recovery of N = 4, and we cleanly recover the periods of a 3-round Feistel (DES-family) construction at block sizes 6 and 8; a 21-qubit block-10 instance is verified in simulation and submitted to hardware. We further provide a breadth-first benchmark of five genuine quantum attacks spanning four symmetric-cipher design paradigms -- Bernstein-Vazirani (linear structure, single query), Grover (SPN key search, quadratic), and Simon (Even-Mansour, CBC-MAC forgery, and Feistel; exponential-to-polynomial in query complexity) -- validated to the classical-simulation ceiling of 25 qubits. We are deliberately explicit about scope: these attacks target reduced or structured constructions in the Q2 (quantum-query) model, asymptotically follow the birthday bound and therefore do not constitute quantum advantage over classical collision-finding, do not break full AES/RSA or 16-round DES, and rely on error mitigation rather than fault-tolerant error correction. Our contribution is the real-hardware demonstration at record structure sizes, the breadth of genuine algorithmic coverage across four paradigms, and an honest, reproducible benchmark with public artifacts.

This paper proposes a video encryption algorithm using RSA and Pseudo Noise (PN) sequence, aimed at applications requiring sensitive video information transfers. The system is primarily designed to work with files encoded using the Audio Video Interleaved (AVI) codec, although it can be easily ported for use with Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) encoded files. The audio and video components of the source separately undergo two layers of encryption to ensure a reasonable level of security. Encryption of the video component involves applying the RSA algorithm followed by the PN-based encryption. Similarly, the audio component is first encrypted using PN and further subjected to encryption using the Discrete Cosine Transform. Combining these techniques, an efficient system, invulnerable to security breaches and attacks with favorable values of parameters such as encryption/decryption speed, encryption/decryption ratio and visual degradation; has been put forth. For applications requiring encryption of sensitive data wherein stringent security requirements are of prime concern, the system is found to yield negligible similarities in visual perception between the original and the encrypted video sequence. For applications wherein visual similarity is not of major concern, we limit the encryption task to a single level of encryption which is accomplished by using RSA, thereby quickening the encryption process. Although some similarity between the original and encrypted video is observed in this case, it is not enough to comprehend the happenings in the video.

We present an end-to-end reconfigurable algorithmic pipeline for solving a famous problem in knot theory using a noisy digital quantum computer, namely computing the value of the Jones polynomial at the fifth root of unity within additive error for any input link, i.e. a closed braid. This problem is DQC1-complete for Markov-closed braids and BQP-complete for Plat-closed braids, and we accommodate both versions of the problem. Even though it is widely believed that DQC1 is strictly contained in BQP, and so is 'less quantum', the resource requirements of classical algorithms for the DQC1 version are at least as high as for the BQP version, and so we potentially gain 'more advantage' by focusing on Markov-closed braids in our exposition. We demonstrate our quantum algorithm on Quantinuum's H2-2 quantum computer and show the effect of problem-tailored error-mitigation techniques. Further, leveraging that the Jones polynomial is a link invariant, we construct an efficiently verifiable benchmark to characterise the effect of noise present in a given quantum processor. In parallel, we implement and benchmark the state-of-the-art tensor-network-based classical algorithms for computing the Jones polynomial. The practical tools provided in this work allow for precise resource estimation to identify near-term quantum advantage for a meaningful quantum-native problem in knot theory.

This definitive research memoria presents a comprehensive, mathematically verified paradigm for neural communication with Bitcoin mining Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs), integrating five complementary frameworks: thermodynamic reservoir computing, hierarchical number system theory, algorithmic analysis, network latency optimization, and machine-checked mathematical formalization. We establish that obsolete cryptocurrency mining hardware exhibits emergent computational properties enabling bidirectional information exchange between AI systems and silicon substrates. The research program demonstrates: (1) reservoir computing with NARMA-10 Normalized Root Mean Square Error (NRMSE) of 0.8661; (2) the Thermodynamic Probability Filter (TPF) achieving 92.19% theoretical energy reduction; (3) the Virtual Block Manager achieving +25% effective hashrate; and (4) hardware universality across multiple ASIC families including Antminer S9, Lucky Miner LV06, and Goldshell LB-Box. A significant contribution is the machine-checked mathematical formalization using Lean 4 and Mathlib, providing unambiguous definitions, machine-verified theorems, and reviewer-proof claims. Key theorems proven include: independence implies zero leakage, predictor beats baseline implies non-independence (the logical core of TPF), energy savings theoretical maximum, and Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) distinguishability witnesses. Vladimir Veselov's hierarchical number system theory explains why early-round information contains predictive power. This work establishes a new paradigm: treating ASICs not as passive computational substrates but as active conversational partners whose thermodynamic state encodes exploitable computational information.

Interpretability methods are valuable only if their explanations faithfully describe the explained model. In this work, we consider neural networks whose predictions are invariant under a specific symmetry group. This includes popular architectures, ranging from convolutional to graph neural networks. Any explanation that faithfully explains this type of model needs to be in agreement with this invariance property. We formalize this intuition through the notion of explanation invariance and equivariance by leveraging the formalism from geometric deep learning. Through this rigorous formalism, we derive (1) two metrics to measure the robustness of any interpretability method with respect to the model symmetry group; (2) theoretical robustness guarantees for some popular interpretability methods and (3) a systematic approach to increase the invariance of any interpretability method with respect to a symmetry group. By empirically measuring our metrics for explanations of models associated with various modalities and symmetry groups, we derive a set of 5 guidelines to allow users and developers of interpretability methods to produce robust explanations.

The recursive-line and signed Zarankiewicz numbers maximize the number of squares in augmentations of a maximum C_4-free base, subject to two sufficient irreducibility criteria. The count includes one square per base cell and one per selected pair of unused cells. We compare these parameters with the second-order number, which uses irreducibility itself. Every maximum mtimes n base admits a recursive-line augmentation with at least mn/2-Cmax(m,n) squares, for an absolute constant C. Combining this bound with a two-column extension of known fixed-width families, we show that all three parameters are asymptotically equivalent, uniformly as the larger dimension tends to infinity. For individual displays, a transfer graph shows that once the signed closure identifies every selected pair, the signed criterion is equivalent to irreducibility. We determine the second-order number for every six-column rectangle and give eventual exact formulas for all three numbers at widths seven, nine and eleven. We also prove signed and recursive-line equality at 8times7 and, together with earlier values, whenever the shorter side is at most six, except possibly at 14times4. The exact-value results are computer-assisted, using exhaustive enumeration, checked propositional refutations and symbolic certificates with a proved lifting argument for arbitrary lengths.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted R_{CVA}, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

We present a systems-security case study of a two-node split-LLM training system whose privacy evaluation passed while leaving an observable channel untested. The Trusted Local Node (TLN) sends protected activations to the Untrusted Cloud Node (UCN), the UCN returns its output, and TLN, holding the private loss, returns the output gradient. The frame the UCN receives mixes real rows with decoys, and the loss ignores the decoys. Their gradients are exactly zero, so the pattern of zeros reveals which rows were real. We measure it with a protocol fixed in advance: a leak injected at known strength to prove the instrument can see one, a shuffled-label control to prove it does not report absent leaks, and a threshold set before the runs. Across nine seeds, the zeros identified the real rows on every frame, 4,096 of 4,096 per run. An attack on the frame contents recovered about one extra token per hundred over a constant-guess baseline (+0.65 to +1.50 percentage points); the shuffled controls recovered nothing. A second set of runs repeated this on a configuration that keeps model quality within budget, so the finding is not confined to a setting nobody would deploy. On both datasets, every such run passed the forward-channel privacy check and the quality check, yet failed that same check once the returned gradient was included. Clipping and noising each row of the gradient closed the leak for about 0.01 nats of held-out cross-entropy. The system is not thereby safe: five classes of attack, including those accumulating observations across training steps, were never measured.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) faithfulness detectors are widely used to audit reasoning models, yet a detector is itself a predictor whose verdicts are treated as stable properties. We ask whether a detector is faithful to itself under distribution shift. We formalize meta-faithfulness as an invariance principle: a valid detector must return identical verdicts on traces that differ only by transformations preserving ground-truth faithfulness. We prove three results: (i) no detector using only intervention-response profiles can separate faithful from epiphenomenal mechanisms with identical signatures; (ii) any detector relying on shift-sensitive features violates invariance at a rate independent of its in-distribution accuracy; (iii) an asymptotic certified selective-risk guarantee enables confident abstention. We operationalize the principle in FaithShift, a stress-test protocol spanning ten shift axes, and propose SIFT, a hidden-state trajectory detector trained with cross-environment invariance objectives and certified abstention. Across 14,996 traces, four domains, and eight models, three findings emerge. First, transfer collapse is real: all existing detectors show gaps geq 0.15 AUROC. Second, the dominant bottleneck is sampling stochasticity, not shift: over 80% of detector instability stems from random seed variation, falsifying our preregistered prediction that shift-attributable violations exceed 0.25. Third, SIFT cuts invariance violations by 64% over the best single-seed baseline, but a four-seed ensemble of any detector narrows the margin to 0.01 (indistinguishable at matched coverage, p=0.21), and SIFT needs a 51% abstention rate. Cross-model transfer degrades from within-family to cross-family to open-weight-to-API, partly closed by multi-model training. We offer a framework for auditing auditors: the real barrier is detector variance, not distribution shift.

Identifying LLM-generated code through watermarking poses a challenge in preserving functional correctness. Previous methods rely on the assumption that watermarking high-entropy tokens effectively maintains output quality. Our analysis reveals a fundamental limitation of this assumption: syntax-critical tokens such as keywords often exhibit the highest entropy, making existing approaches vulnerable to logic corruption. We present STONE, a syntax-aware watermarking method that embeds watermarks only in non-syntactic tokens and preserves code integrity. For rigorous evaluation, we also introduce STEM, a comprehensive metric that balances three critical dimensions: correctness, detectability, and imperceptibility. Across Python, C++, and Java, STONE preserves correctness, sustains strong detectability, and achieves balanced performance with minimal computational overhead. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/inistory/STONE-watermarking.

Modern cryptographic methods for implementing privacy-preserving LLMs such as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) require the LLMs to have a polynomial form. Forming such a representation is challenging because Transformers include non-polynomial components, such as Softmax and layer normalization. Previous approaches have either directly approximated pre-trained models with large-degree polynomials, which are less efficient over HE, or replaced non-polynomial components with easier-to-approximate primitives before training, e.g., Softmax with pointwise attention. The latter approach might introduce scalability challenges. We present a new HE-friendly variant of self-attention that offers a stable form for training and is easy to approximate with polynomials for secure inference. Our work introduces the first polynomial LLMs with 32 layers and over a billion parameters, exceeding the size of previous models by more than tenfold. The resulting models demonstrate reasoning and in-context learning (ICL) capabilities comparable to standard transformers of the same size, representing a breakthrough in the field. Finally, we provide a detailed latency breakdown for each computation over encrypted data, paving the way for further optimization, and explore the differences in inductive bias between transformers relying on our HE-friendly variant and standard transformers. Our code is attached as a supplement.

The goal of this chapter is to present a survey of homomorphic encryption techniques and their applications. After a detailed discussion on the introduction and motivation of the chapter, we present some basic concepts of cryptography. The fundamental theories of homomorphic encryption are then discussed with suitable examples. The chapter then provides a survey of some of the classical homomorphic encryption schemes existing in the current literature. Various applications and salient properties of homomorphic encryption schemes are then discussed in detail. The chapter then introduces the most important and recent research direction in the filed - fully homomorphic encryption. A significant number of propositions on fully homomorphic encryption is then discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes by outlining some emerging research trends in this exicting field of cryptography.

Under the conditional framework breaking the longstanding O(n log n) integer multiplication barrier (originating from OpenAI Preprint #109), the asymptotic time complexity exponent T(n) = O(n (log n)^{1-κ}) is governed by bounding the second moment E[X^2] < 1 of recursive branching processes over trilinear tensor carrier graphs. In this work, we present a constructive combinatorial optimization over the alternating carrier bipartite matching graphs of the Schönhage trilinear tensor decomposition at dimensions h=23 and h=25. Through an alternating augmenting path search, we uncover a non-trivial cluster-unlocking cascade that eliminates 185 carrier roles (95 roles in h=23 and 90 roles in h=25), reducing the global physical wire width by 377,890 wires from the reviewed baseline W = 177,284,805 down to W = 176,906,915. Evaluated over the exact 10^{-14} rational grid, this wire reduction certifies an improved second-moment coefficient AB = 5,164,059 / 125,000,000,000 and establishes the sharpened conditional exponent κ= 826,215,307 / 20,000,000,000,000 \approx 4.131076535 \times 10^{-5}, strictly surpassing the preceding record on this architecture (κ\approx 4.123864 \times 10^{-5}). All 47 polynomial constraints and 7 rational security margins are audited in exact Q-arithmetic with zero floating-point error, and the fundamental wire reduction identity is formally verified in the Lean 4 interactive theorem prover without unproven axioms.

QDNA-ID is a trust-chain framework that links physical quantum behavior to digitally verified records. The system first executes standard quantum circuits with random shot patterns across different devices to generate entropy profiles and measurement data that reveal device-specific behavior. A Bell or CHSH test is then used to confirm that correlations originate from genuine non classical processes rather than classical simulation. The verified outcomes are converted into statistical fingerprints using entropy, divergence, and bias features to characterize each device. These features and metadata for device, session, and random seed parameters are digitally signed and time stamped to ensure integrity and traceability. Authenticated artifacts are stored in a hierarchical index for reproducible retrieval and long term auditing. A visualization and analytics interface monitors drift, policy enforcement, and device behavior logs. A machine learning engine tracks entropy drift, detects anomalies, and classifies devices based on evolving patterns. An external verification API supports independent recomputation of hashes, signatures, and CHSH evidence. QDNA-ID operates as a continuous feedback loop that maintains a persistent chain of trust for quantum computing environments.

The inability of deep learning models to handle data drawn from unseen distributions has sparked much interest in unsupervised out-of-distribution (U-OOD) detection, as it is crucial for reliable deep learning models. Despite considerable attention, theoretically-motivated approaches are few and far between, with most methods building on top of some form of heuristic. Recently, U-OOD was formalized in the context of data invariants, allowing a clearer understanding of how to characterize U-OOD, and methods leveraging affine invariants have attained state-of-the-art results on large-scale benchmarks. Nevertheless, the restriction to affine invariants hinders the expressiveness of the approach. In this work, we broaden the affine invariants formulation to a more general case and propose a framework consisting of a normalizing flow-like architecture capable of learning non-linear invariants. Our novel approach achieves state-of-the-art results on an extensive U-OOD benchmark, and we demonstrate its further applicability to tabular data. Finally, we show our method has the same desirable properties as those based on affine invariants.

In symmetric cryptanalysis, the model of superposition queries has led to surprising results, with many constructions being broken in polynomial time thanks to Simon's period-finding algorithm. But the practical implications of these attacks remain blurry. In contrast, the results obtained so far for a quantum adversary making classical queries only are less impressive. In this paper, we introduce a new quantum algorithm which uses Simon's subroutines in a novel way. We manage to leverage the algebraic structure of cryptosystems in the context of a quantum attacker limited to classical queries and offline quantum computations. We obtain improved quantum-time/classical-data tradeoffs with respect to the current literature, while using only as much hardware requirements (quantum and classical) as a standard exhaustive search with Grover's algorithm. In particular, we are able to break the Even-Mansour construction in quantum time O(2^{n/3}), with O(2^{n/3}) classical queries and O(n^2) qubits only. In addition, we improve some previous superposition attacks by reducing the data complexity from exponential to polynomial, with the same time complexity. Our approach can be seen in two complementary ways: reusing superposition queries during the iteration of a search using Grover's algorithm, or alternatively, removing the memory requirement in some quantum attacks based on a collision search, thanks to their algebraic structure. We provide a list of cryptographic applications, including the Even-Mansour construction, the FX construction, some Sponge authenticated modes of encryption, and many more.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, especially the recent advancements in reasoning, such as o1 and o3, pushing the boundaries of AI. Despite these impressive achievements in mathematics and coding, the reasoning abilities of LLMs in domains requiring cryptographic expertise remain underexplored. In this paper, we introduce CipherBank, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of LLMs in cryptographic decryption tasks. CipherBank comprises 2,358 meticulously crafted problems, covering 262 unique plaintexts across 5 domains and 14 subdomains, with a focus on privacy-sensitive and real-world scenarios that necessitate encryption. From a cryptographic perspective, CipherBank incorporates 3 major categories of encryption methods, spanning 9 distinct algorithms, ranging from classical ciphers to custom cryptographic techniques. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on CipherBank, e.g., GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, and cutting-edge reasoning-focused models such as o1 and DeepSeek-R1. Our results reveal significant gaps in reasoning abilities not only between general-purpose chat LLMs and reasoning-focused LLMs but also in the performance of current reasoning-focused models when applied to classical cryptographic decryption tasks, highlighting the challenges these models face in understanding and manipulating encrypted data. Through detailed analysis and error investigations, we provide several key observations that shed light on the limitations and potential improvement areas for LLMs in cryptographic reasoning. These findings underscore the need for continuous advancements in LLM reasoning capabilities.

Using Fourier analysis, this paper establishes exact security bounds for linear extractors in True Random Number Generators (TRNGs). We provide the first near-optimal total variation security characterization by interpolating between optimal ell_{infty} and ell_2 norm results, expressed through code weight enumerators and input bias parameters. Our bounds improve security assessments by an order of magnitude over previous approximations. By scanning ~20,000 codes, we reveal fundamental trade-offs between compression efficiency and cryptographic security. For instance, we show that achieving 80 bits of security can require sacrificing more than 50\% of the code rate when correcting 10\% input bias. Our bounds enhance security evaluation of TRNG post-processing schemes and quantify the inherent cost of randomness extraction in hardware implementations.

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their effectiveness unknown and wild-only evaluations biased. We present MalSkillBench, the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills: 3,944 malicious skills labeled along a three-dimensional taxonomy of 108 cells. Of these, 3,214 come from a closed-loop Generate-Verify-Feedback pipeline admitting only samples whose malicious behavior fires inside a Docker sandbox under system-call monitoring and an LLM judge; we add 703 in-the-wild and 4,000 matched benign skills. Our measurements are consistent: code injection reaches 94.5% verification yield but prompt injection only 75.8%, the same fragility that later makes it hard to detect; the wild sample is narrow, dominated by one cryptocurrency-theft campaign (86.6% one behavior, 81% from two accounts) with a small but architecturally new tail attacking the agent control plane; the strongest skill-specific detector reaches 98.4% recall on code injection yet collapses on prompt-injection and agent-control attacks, and wild-only scoring swings the ranking by up to 66 recall points; supply-chain scanners and prompt-injection defenses each see only half of a skill, and no combination recovers the code-instruction relationship. Detecting malicious skills therefore requires reasoning jointly over task intent, code, and instructions. We release the dataset, pipeline, baselines, and results.

We present gap-lean4-port (Release v0.2.0), a machine-checked formalization of foundational algorithms in computational discrete algebra and permutation group theory within the Lean 4 interactive theorem prover and Mathlib4. While modern proof assistants feature extensive abstract algebraic hierarchies, constructive and operational permutation group algorithms, such as Charles Sims' 1970 Schreier-Sims algorithm, transversal tree lookups, and backtrack ordered partition refinement, have remained largely unformalized in dependent type theory. Here, we formalize the operational algorithmic core of the Groups, Algorithms, Programming (GAP) system library across four foundational modules, proving 35 machine-checked theorems with zero unproven conjectures (sorry) and zero custom axioms under standard Lean 4 foundations (propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound). We machine-check: (1) Schreier-Sims stabilizer chain hierarchies (StabLevel, StabChain) and the invariance of incremental transversal tree extensions (extendSchreierPoint_invariant); (2) single-level and multi-level Schreier sifting reductions (siftOneLevel, siftFull), proving that full sifting strictly fixes all base points (siftFull_fixes_all_basePoints); (3) constructive soundness and completeness of Base and Strong Generating Set (BSGS) membership testing (membershipTestKnownBase_iff_mem); (4) backtrack ordered partition cell refinement (splitCellByPred), proving mutual cell disjointness, union conservation, and exact cardinality preservation; (5) cyclotomic extension rings Z/nZ(eps_m) and machine-check GAP's exact size theorem |Z/nZ(eps_m)| = n^m; and (6) executable Bezout inverses via Extended Euclidean GCD (Nat.gcdA) over residue rings Z/nZ. The entire codebase compiles deterministically under 'lake build RequestProject' and is openly available at https://github.com/pCwOrM/gap-lean4-port.

This paper explores the deep-zoom properties of the chaotic k-logistic map, in order to propose an improved chaos-based cryptosystem. This map was shown to enhance the random features of the Logistic map, while at the same time reducing the predictability about its orbits. We incorporate its strengths to security into a previously published cryptosystem to provide an optimal pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) as its core operation. The result is a reliable method that does not have the weaknesses previously reported about the original cryptosystem.

The widespread lack of broad source code verification on blockchain explorers such as Etherscan, where despite 78,047,845 smart contracts deployed on Ethereum (as of May 26, 2025), a mere 767,520 (< 1%) are open source, presents a severe impediment to blockchain security. This opacity necessitates the automated semantic analysis of on-chain smart contract bytecode, a fundamental research challenge with direct implications for identifying vulnerabilities and understanding malicious behavior. Prevailing decompilers struggle to reverse bytecode in a readable manner, often yielding convoluted code that critically hampers vulnerability analysis and thwarts efforts to dissect contract functionalities for security auditing. This paper addresses this challenge by introducing a pioneering decompilation pipeline that, for the first time, successfully leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into human-readable and semantically faithful Solidity code. Our novel methodology first employs rigorous static program analysis to convert bytecode into a structured three-address code (TAC) representation. This intermediate representation then guides a Llama-3.2-3B model, specifically fine-tuned on a comprehensive dataset of 238,446 TAC-to-Solidity function pairs, to generate high-quality Solidity. This approach uniquely recovers meaningful variable names, intricate control flow, and precise function signatures. Our extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates a significant leap beyond traditional decompilers, achieving an average semantic similarity of 0.82 with original source and markedly superior readability. The practical viability and effectiveness of our research are demonstrated through its implementation in a publicly accessible system, available at https://evmdecompiler.com.

We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto's proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task T(x) (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input x. The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol, is using the native computation of T(x) to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of T(cdot) -- This ensures malicious miners cannot ``game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability compared to honest miners (while using similar computational resources). Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with O(1)-factor overhead is trivial for any task T, but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of Matrix Multiplication MatMul(A,B) of arbitrary matrices with 1+o(1) multiplicative overhead compared to naive MatMul (even in the presence of Fast Matrix Multiplication-style algorithms, which are currently impractical). We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture is based on reducing hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of low-rank random linear equations which is of independent interest. Since MatMuls are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol, which nearly eliminates the energy-waste of Bitcoin mining -- allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by ``re-using" it for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1). This blockchain is currently under construction.

We formalize prefix invariance: representations at position t must not depend on future inputs. We give a lightweight audit, two forward passes, no training or gradients, that localizes exactly where causality breaks. Attention-mask inspection is incomplete: leaks can occur via scans or normalization despite correct masks. Across 192 injected-fault trials on eight checkpoints, mask inspection found none, while our audit localized all 192/192, also finding a defect in Zamba2 and Nemotron-H.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large scale deep learning model, such as modern language models and diffusion architectures, have revolutionized applications ranging from natural language processing to computer vision. However, their deployment in distributed or decentralized environments raises significant privacy concerns, as sensitive data may be exposed during inference. Traditional techniques like secure multi-party computation, homomorphic encryption, and differential privacy offer partial remedies but often incur substantial computational overhead, latency penalties, or limited compatibility with non-linear network operations. In this work, we introduce Equivariant Encryption (EE), a novel paradigm designed to enable secure, "blind" inference on encrypted data with near zero performance overhead. Unlike fully homomorphic approaches that encrypt the entire computational graph, EE selectively obfuscates critical internal representations within neural network layers while preserving the exact functionality of both linear and a prescribed set of non-linear operations. This targeted encryption ensures that raw inputs, intermediate activations, and outputs remain confidential, even when processed on untrusted infrastructure. We detail the theoretical foundations of EE, compare its performance and integration complexity against conventional privacy preserving techniques, and demonstrate its applicability across a range of architectures, from convolutional networks to large language models. Furthermore, our work provides a comprehensive threat analysis, outlining potential attack vectors and baseline strategies, and benchmarks EE against standard inference pipelines in decentralized settings. The results confirm that EE maintains high fidelity and throughput, effectively bridging the gap between robust data confidentiality and the stringent efficiency requirements of modern, large scale model inference.

Two geometric spaces are in the same topological class if they are related by certain geometric deformations. We propose machine learning methods that automate learning of topological invariance and apply it in the context of knot theory, where two knots are equivalent if they are related by ambient space isotopy. Specifically, given only the knot and no information about its topological invariants, we employ contrastive and generative machine learning techniques to map different representatives of the same knot class to the same point in an embedding vector space. An auto-regressive decoder Transformer network can then generate new representatives from the same knot class. We also describe a student-teacher setup that we use to interpret which known knot invariants are learned by the neural networks to compute the embeddings, and observe a strong correlation with the Goeritz matrix in all setups that we tested. We also develop an approach to resolving the Jones Unknot Conjecture by exploring the vicinity of the embedding space of the Jones polynomial near the locus where the unknots cluster, which we use to generate braid words with simple Jones polynomials.

We study suffix-based jailbreaksx2013a powerful family of attacks against large language models (LLMs) that optimize adversarial suffixes to circumvent safety alignment. Focusing on the widely used foundational GCG attack (Zou et al., 2023), we observe that suffixes vary in efficacy: some markedly more universalx2013generalizing to many unseen harmful instructionsx2013than others. We first show that GCG's effectiveness is driven by a shallow, critical mechanism, built on the information flow from the adversarial suffix to the final chat template tokens before generation. Quantifying the dominance of this mechanism during generation, we find GCG irregularly and aggressively hijacks the contextualization process. Crucially, we tie hijacking to the universality phenomenon, with more universal suffixes being stronger hijackers. Subsequently, we show that these insights have practical implications: GCG universality can be efficiently enhanced (up to times5 in some cases) at no additional computational cost, and can also be surgically mitigated, at least halving attack success with minimal utility loss. We release our code and data at http://github.com/matanbt/interp-jailbreak.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

Machine learning models are increasingly used in societal applications, yet legal and privacy concerns demand that they very often be kept confidential. Consequently, there is a growing distrust about the fairness properties of these models in the minds of consumers, who are often at the receiving end of model predictions. To this end, we propose \name -- a system that uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs (a cryptographic primitive) to publicly verify the fairness of a model, while maintaining confidentiality. We also propose a fairness certification algorithm for fully-connected neural networks which is befitting to ZKPs and is used in this system. We implement \name in Gnark and demonstrate empirically that our system is practically feasible. Code is available at https://github.com/infinite-pursuits/FairProof.

One method for obtaining generalizable solutions to machine learning tasks when presented with diverse training environments is to find invariant representations of the data. These are representations of the covariates such that the best model on top of the representation is invariant across training environments. In the context of linear Structural Equation Models (SEMs), invariant representations might allow us to learn models with out-of-distribution guarantees, i.e., models that are robust to interventions in the SEM. To address the invariant representation problem in a {\em finite sample} setting, we consider the notion of epsilon-approximate invariance. We study the following question: If a representation is approximately invariant with respect to a given number of training interventions, will it continue to be approximately invariant on a larger collection of unseen SEMs? This larger collection of SEMs is generated through a parameterized family of interventions. Inspired by PAC learning, we obtain finite-sample out-of-distribution generalization guarantees for approximate invariance that holds probabilistically over a family of linear SEMs without faithfulness assumptions. Our results show bounds that do not scale in ambient dimension when intervention sites are restricted to lie in a constant size subset of in-degree bounded nodes. We also show how to extend our results to a linear indirect observation model that incorporates latent variables.

By defining combinatorial moves, we can define an equivalence relation on Gauss words called homotopy. In this paper we define a homotopy invariant of Gauss words. We use this to show that there exist Gauss words that are not homotopically equivalent to the empty Gauss word, disproving a conjecture by Turaev. In fact, we show that there are an infinite number of equivalence classes of Gauss words under homotopy.

This paper presents several notable properties of the matrix U shown to be related to the isomorphism between H_4 and E_8. The most significant of these properties is that U.U is to rank 8 matrices what the golden ratio is to numbers. That is to say, the difference between it and its inverse is the identity element, albeit with a twist. Specifically, U.U- (U.U)^{-1} is the reverse identity matrix or standard involutory permutation matrix of rank 8. It has the same palindromic characteristic polynomial coefficients as the normalized 3-qubit Hadamard matrix with 8-bit binary basis states, which is known to be isomorphic to E8 through its (8,4) Hamming code.

The performance of machine learning models is determined by the quality of their learned features. They should be invariant under irrelevant data variation but sensitive to task-relevant details. To visualize whether this is the case, we propose a method to analyze feature extractors by sampling from their fibers -- equivalence classes defined by their invariances -- given an arbitrary representative. Unlike existing work where a dedicated generative model is trained for each feature detector, our algorithm is training-free and exploits a pretrained diffusion or flow-matching model as a prior. The fiber loss -- which penalizes mismatch in features -- guides the denoising process toward the desired equivalence class, via non-linear diffusion trajectory matching. This replaces days of training for invariance learning with a single guided generation procedure at comparable fidelity. Experiments on popular datasets (ImageNet, CheXpert) and model types (ResNet, DINO, BiomedClip) demonstrate that our framework can reveal invariances ranging from very desirable to concerning behaviour. For instance, we show how Qwen-2B places patients with situs inversus (heart on the right side) in the same fiber as typical anatomy.

This article concerns the computational complexity of a fundamental problem in number theory: counting points on curves and surfaces over finite fields. There is no subexponential-time algorithm known and it is unclear if it can be NP-hard. Given a curve, we present the first efficient Arthur-Merlin protocol to certify its point-count, its Jacobian group structure, and its Hasse-Weil zeta function. We extend this result to a smooth projective surface to certify the factor P_{1}(T), corresponding to the first Betti number, of the zeta function; by using the counting oracle. We give the first algorithm to compute P_{1}(T) that is poly(log q)-time if the degree D of the input surface is fixed; and in quantum poly(Dlog q)-time in general. Our technique in the curve case, is to sample hash functions using the Weil and Riemann-Roch bounds, to certify the group order of its Jacobian. For higher dimension varieties, we first reduce to the case of a surface, which is fibred as a Lefschetz pencil of hyperplane sections over P^{1}. The formalism of vanishing cycles, and the inherent big monodromy, enable us to prove an effective version of Deligne's `theoreme du pgcd' using the hard-Lefschetz theorem and an equidistribution result due to Katz. These reduce our investigations to that of computing the zeta function of a curve, defined over a finite field extension F_{Q}/F_{q} of poly-bounded degree. This explicitization of the theory yields the first nontrivial upper bounds on the computational complexity.

We introduce PREM (Private Relative Error Multiplicative weight update), a new framework for generating synthetic data that achieves a relative error guarantee for statistical queries under (varepsilon, δ) differential privacy (DP). Namely, for a domain {cal X}, a family {cal F} of queries f : {cal X} to {0, 1}, and ζ> 0, our framework yields a mechanism that on input dataset D cal X^n outputs a synthetic dataset D cal X^n such that all statistical queries in {cal F} on D, namely sum_{x in D} f(x) for f cal F, are within a 1 pm ζ multiplicative factor of the corresponding value on D up to an additive error that is polynomial in log |{cal F}|, log |{cal X}|, log n, log(1/δ), 1/varepsilon, and 1/ζ. In contrast, any (varepsilon, δ)-DP mechanism is known to require worst-case additive error that is polynomial in at least one of n, |{cal F}|, or |{cal X}|. We complement our algorithm with nearly matching lower bounds.

Nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) is an effective data representation tool with numerous applications in signal processing and machine learning. However, deploying NMF in a decentralized manner over ad-hoc networks introduces privacy concerns due to the conventional approach of sharing raw data among network agents. To address this, we propose a privacy-preserving algorithm for fully-distributed NMF that decomposes a distributed large data matrix into left and right matrix factors while safeguarding each agent's local data privacy. It facilitates collaborative estimation of the left matrix factor among agents and enables them to estimate their respective right factors without exposing raw data. To ensure data privacy, we secure information exchanges between neighboring agents utilizing the Paillier cryptosystem, a probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public-key cryptography that allows computations on encrypted data without decryption. Simulation results conducted on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in achieving privacy-preserving distributed NMF over ad-hoc networks.

Commercial LLM services often conceal internal reasoning traces while still charging users for every generated token, including those from hidden intermediate steps, raising concerns of token inflation and potential overbilling. This gap underscores the urgent need for reliable token auditing, yet achieving it is far from straightforward: cryptographic verification (e.g., hash-based signature) offers little assurance when providers control the entire execution pipeline, while user-side prediction struggles with the inherent variance of reasoning LLMs, where token usage fluctuates across domains and prompt styles. To bridge this gap, we present PALACE (Predictive Auditing of LLM APIs via Reasoning Token Count Estimation), a user-side framework that estimates hidden reasoning token counts from prompt-answer pairs without access to internal traces. PALACE introduces a GRPO-augmented adaptation module with a lightweight domain router, enabling dynamic calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and mitigating variance in token usage patterns. Experiments on math, coding, medical, and general reasoning benchmarks show that PALACE achieves low relative error and strong prediction accuracy, supporting both fine-grained cost auditing and inflation detection. Taken together, PALACE represents an important first step toward standardized predictive auditing, offering a practical path to greater transparency, accountability, and user trust.

This whitepaper seeks to elucidate implications that the capabilities of developing quantum architectures have on blockchain vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies. First, we provide new resource estimates for breaking the 256-bit Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, the core of modern blockchain cryptography. We demonstrate that Shor's algorithm for this problem can execute with either <1200 logical qubits and <90 million Toffoli gates or <1450 logical qubits and <70 million Toffoli gates. In the interest of responsible disclosure, we use a zero-knowledge proof to validate these results without disclosing attack vectors. On superconducting architectures with 1e-3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, those circuits can execute in minutes using fewer than half a million physical qubits. We introduce a critical distinction between fast-clock (such as superconducting and photonic) and slow-clock (such as neutral atom and ion trap) architectures. Our analysis reveals that the first fast-clock CRQCs would enable on-spend attacks on public mempool transactions of some cryptocurrencies. We survey major cryptocurrency vulnerabilities through this lens, identifying systemic risks associated with advanced features in some blockchains such as smart contracts, Proof-of-Stake consensus, and Data Availability Sampling, as well as the enduring concern of abandoned assets. We argue that technical solutions would benefit from accompanying public policy and discuss various frameworks of digital salvage to regulate the recovery or destruction of dormant assets while preventing adversarial seizure. We also discuss implications for other digital assets and tokenization as well as challenges and successful examples of the ongoing transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Finally, we urge all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the ongoing migration to PQC without delay.

Reverse engineering (RE) is central to software security, particularly for cryptographic programs that handle sensitive data and are highly prone to vulnerabilities. It supports critical tasks such as vulnerability discovery and malware analysis. Despite its importance, RE remains labor-intensive and requires substantial expertise, making large language models (LLMs) a potential solution for automating the process. However, their capabilities for RE remain systematically underexplored. To address this gap, we study the cryptographic binary RE capabilities of LLMs and introduce CREBench, a benchmark comprising 432 challenges built from 48 standard cryptographic algorithms, 3 insecure crypto key usage scenarios, and 3 difficulty levels. Each challenge follows a Capture-the-Flag (CTF) RE challenge, requiring the model to analyze the underlying cryptographic logic and recover the correct input. We design an evaluation framework comprising four sub-tasks, from algorithm identification to correct flag recovery. We evaluate eight frontier LLMs on CREBench. GPT-5.4, the best-performing model, achieves 64.03 out of 100 and recovers the flag in 59\% of challenges. We also establish a strong human expert baseline of 92.19 points, showing that humans maintain an advantage in cryptographic RE tasks. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/wangyu-ovo/CREBench.

Ensuring privacy-preserving inference on cryptographically secure data is a well-known computational challenge. To alleviate the bottleneck of costly cryptographic computations in non-linear activations, recent methods have suggested linearizing a targeted portion of these activations in neural networks. This technique results in significantly reduced runtimes with often negligible impacts on accuracy. In this paper, we demonstrate that such computational benefits may lead to increased fairness costs. Specifically, we find that reducing the number of ReLU activations disproportionately decreases the accuracy for minority groups compared to majority groups. To explain these observations, we provide a mathematical interpretation under restricted assumptions about the nature of the decision boundary, while also showing the prevalence of this problem across widely used datasets and architectures. Finally, we show how a simple procedure altering the fine-tuning step for linearized models can serve as an effective mitigation strategy.

Attribution methods can provide powerful insights into the reasons for a classifier's decision. We argue that a key desideratum of an explanation method is its robustness to input hyperparameters which are often randomly set or empirically tuned. High sensitivity to arbitrary hyperparameter choices does not only impede reproducibility but also questions the correctness of an explanation and impairs the trust of end-users. In this paper, we provide a thorough empirical study on the sensitivity of existing attribution methods. We found an alarming trend that many methods are highly sensitive to changes in their common hyperparameters e.g. even changing a random seed can yield a different explanation! Interestingly, such sensitivity is not reflected in the average explanation accuracy scores over the dataset as commonly reported in the literature. In addition, explanations generated for robust classifiers (i.e. which are trained to be invariant to pixel-wise perturbations) are surprisingly more robust than those generated for regular classifiers.

Local heights are arithmetic invariants used in the quadratic Chabauty method for determining the rational points on curves. We present an algorithm to compute these local heights for hyperelliptic curves at odd primes ellneq p. This algorithm significantly broadens the applicability of quadratic Chabauty to curves which were previously inaccessible due to the presence of non-trivial local heights. We provide numerous examples, including the first quadratic Chabauty computation for a curve having two primes with non-trivial local heights.

This is the third paper of the CayleyPy project applying artificial intelligence to problems in group theory. We announce the first public release of CayleyPy, an open source Python library for computations with Cayley and Schreier graphs. Compared with systems such as GAP and Sage, CayleyPy handles much larger graphs and performs several orders of magnitude faster. Using CayleyPy we obtained about 200 new conjectures on Cayley and Schreier graphs, focused on diameters and growth. For many Cayley graphs of symmetric groups Sn we observe quasi polynomial diameter formulas: a small set of quadratic or linear polynomials indexed by n mod s. We conjecture that this is a general phenomenon, giving efficient diameter computation despite the problem being NP hard. We propose a refinement of the Babai type conjecture on diameters of Sn: n^2/2 + 4n upper bounds in the undirected case, compared to previous O(n^2) bounds. We also provide explicit generator families, related to involutions in a square with whiskers pattern, conjectured to maximize the diameter; search confirms this for all n up to 15. We further conjecture an answer to a question posed by V M Glushkov in 1968 on directed Cayley graphs generated by a cyclic shift and a transposition. For nilpotent groups we conjecture an improvement of J S Ellenberg's results on upper unitriangular matrices over Z/pZ, showing linear dependence of diameter on p. Moreover. Some conjectures are LLM friendly, naturally stated as sorting problems verifiable by algorithms or Python code. To benchmark path finding we created more than 10 Kaggle datasets. CayleyPy works with arbitrary permutation or matrix groups and includes over 100 predefined generators. Our growth computation code outperforms GAP and Sage up to 1000 times in speed and size.

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

Our work tackles the challenge of securing user inputs in cloud-hosted large language model (LLM) serving while ensuring output invariance, model confidentiality, and compute efficiency. We introduce secure multi-party decoding (SMD), which leverages confidential computing to confine user prompts to a trusted execution environment (TEE), namely a confidential virtual machine (CVM), while allowing service providers to generate tokens efficiently. We also introduce a novel cryptographic method, prompt obfuscation (PO), to ensure robustness against reconstruction attacks on SMD. We demonstrate that our approach preserves both prompt confidentiality and LLM serving efficiency. Our solution can enable privacy-preserving cloud LLM serving that handles sensitive prompts, such as clinical records, financial data, and personal information.

The kernel of a binary code containing the zero word partitions the binary coordinates into blocks, two coordinates lying in the same block when every kernel word takes the same value in both, and the kernel-block rank profile is the multiset of the dimensions of its linear span punctured on those blocks. For the family H^{t_1,t_2,t_3} of Z_2Z_4Z_8-linear Hadamard codes, this invariant is known explicitly and gives a complete classification of the family. In this paper, we compute it for the Z_2Z_4-linear and Z_{2^s}-linear Hadamard families with which those codes are compared, and we prove that it is constant for every nonlinear Z_2Z_4-linear Hadamard code and for every nonlinear Z_{2^s}-linear Hadamard code bar H^{a_1,dots,a_s} with sgeq2. The second statement is obtained without any rank formula, by exhibiting coordinate permutations that preserve the code and act transitively on its kernel blocks, which makes the argument uniform in s. We also prove a descent theorem: if bar H^{a_1,dots,a_s} is nonlinear and a_1geq2, then the code punctured on one kernel block is the Z_{2^{s-1}}-linear Hadamard code bar H^{a_1,dots,a_{s-1}}. Consequently, the constant local rank equals rank(bar H^{a_1,dots,a_{s-1}}) and is at least t-κ+2, where 2^t is the length and κ the kernel dimension. These results separate every nonlinear Z_2Z_4Z_8-linear Hadamard code from every Z_4-linear, Z_2Z_4-linear and Z_{2^s}-linear Hadamard code of the same length, except for the single infinite family H^{1,1,t-4} and bar H^{2,0,t-5} with tgeq5. The members of this infinite family agree in the rank, kernel dimension and the kernel-block rank profile, but a two-block refinement separates them.

Automated proving of polynomial inequalities is a fundamental challenge in automated mathematical reasoning, where rich algebraic structure and a rapidly growing certificate search space hinder scalability. Purely symbolic approaches provide strong guarantees but often scale poorly as the number of variables or the degree increases, due to expensive algebraic manipulations and rapidly growing intermediate expressions. In parallel, LLM-guided methods have made notable progress, particularly on competition-style inequalities with a small number of variables. To address the remaining scalability challenges, we propose NSPI, a neuro-symbolic framework that combines the complementary strengths of LLMs and symbolic computation for polynomial-inequality proving. Concretely, an LLM proposes a conjecture in the form of an approximate polynomial Sum-Of-Squares (SOS) decomposition; we refine it via symbolic computation to obtain an exact polynomial SOS representation, which directly proves the target inequality, and we further certify the proof in Lean, yielding an end-to-end pipeline from heuristic discovery to machine-checked proof. Experiments on challenging benchmarks involving polynomials with up to 10 variables demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of the proposed method.

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

This paper introduces Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FRAG), a novel database management paradigm tailored for the growing needs of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems, which are increasingly powered by large-language models (LLMs). FRAG enables mutually-distrusted parties to collaboratively perform Approximate k-Nearest Neighbor (ANN) searches on encrypted query vectors and encrypted data stored in distributed vector databases, all while ensuring that no party can gain any knowledge about the queries or data of others. Achieving this paradigm presents two key challenges: (i) ensuring strong security guarantees, such as Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA), under practical assumptions (e.g., we avoid overly optimistic assumptions like non-collusion among parties); and (ii) maintaining performance overheads comparable to traditional, non-federated RAG systems. To address these challenges, FRAG employs a single-key homomorphic encryption protocol that simplifies key management across mutually-distrusted parties. Additionally, FRAG introduces a multiplicative caching technique to efficiently encrypt floating-point numbers, significantly improving computational performance in large-scale federated environments. We provide a rigorous security proof using standard cryptographic reductions and demonstrate the practical scalability and efficiency of FRAG through extensive experiments on both benchmark and real-world datasets.

Watermarking enables GenAI providers to verify whether content was generated by their models. A watermark is a hidden signal in the content, whose presence can be detected using a secret watermark key. A core security threat are forgery attacks, where adversaries insert the provider's watermark into content not produced by the provider, potentially damaging their reputation and undermining trust. Existing defenses resist forgery by embedding many watermarks with multiple keys into the same content, which can degrade model utility. However, forgery remains a threat when attackers can collect sufficiently many watermarked samples. We propose a defense that is provably forgery-resistant independent of the number of watermarked content collected by the attacker, provided they cannot easily distinguish watermarks from different keys. Our scheme does not further degrade model utility. We randomize the watermark key selection for each query and accept content as genuine only if a watermark is detected by exactly one key. We focus on the image and text modalities, but our defense is modality-agnostic, since it treats the underlying watermarking method as a black-box. Our method provably bounds the attacker's success rate and we empirically observe a reduction from near-perfect success rates to only 2% at negligible computational overhead.

Neurosymbolic systems rely on mathematical solvers to guarantee reasoning correctness, yet solvers are fundamentally blind to whether a formal translation maintains strict reference-equivalence to a designated formalization. We formalize this vulnerability as Verdict-Preserving-Unfaithfulness (VPU): a failure mode where an incorrect encoding executes successfully and matches the expected verdict. We theoretically prove that structural, verdict-only verification heuristics are mathematically bounded to chance-level detection on these deceptively valid traces. To resolve this, we introduce Generative Verification (GenV), which distills an offline Z3-equivalence oracle into a reference-free, continuous reference-equivalence score by repurposing the language model's native vocabulary space. Mechanistic analysis via decision-projected logit lenses and sparse autoencoders shows this generative readout natively extracts precise spatial error coordinates without explicit localization training. Empirically, our oracle-mined verifier (GenV+HN) achieves 0.961 AUROC in reference-equivalence verification, generalizes zero-shot across unseen translators and divergent formal styles, and yields an 11.3-point downstream accuracy gain in agentic test-time compute allocation.

Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-principle lab demonstrations to in-field implementations and technological prototypes. In this review, we provide both a general introduction and a state of the art description of the recent advances in the field, both theoretically and experimentally. We start by reviewing protocols of quantum key distribution based on discrete variable systems. Next we consider aspects of device independence, satellite challenges, and high rate protocols based on continuous variable systems. We will then discuss the ultimate limits of point-to-point private communications and how quantum repeaters and networks may overcome these restrictions. Finally, we will discuss some aspects of quantum cryptography beyond standard quantum key distribution, including quantum data locking and quantum digital signatures.

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

Image steganography is an information-hiding technique that involves the surreptitious concealment of covert informational content within digital images. In this paper, we introduce {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}}, a novel framework for concealing arbitrary binary data within images. Our approach synergistically leverages Random Shuffling, Fernet Symmetric Encryption, and Reed-Solomon Error Correction Codes to encode the secret payload, which is then discretely embedded into the carrier image using LSB (Least Significant Bit) Steganography. The combination of these methods addresses the vulnerability vectors of both security and resilience against bit-level corruption in the resultant stego-images. We show that our framework achieves a data payload of 3 bits per pixel for an RGB image, and mathematically assess the probability of successful transmission for the amalgamated n message bits and k error correction bits. Additionally, we find that {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}} yields good results upon being evaluated with multiple performance metrics, successfully eludes detection by various passive steganalysis tools, and is immune to simple active steganalysis attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/Starscream-11813/SCReedSolo-Steganography.

Vision-language verifiers and routers must distinguish errors repairable by more reasoning from those caused by visual evidence never reaching the language model. This distinction lacks ground truth because annotators see full-resolution images while models receive preprocessed tensors. We introduce AliasForge to create cases where the relevant fact is provably absent from the interface. Fixed-point resampling makes the pre-rounding resize an exact integer linear map that can send nonzero integer perturbations to zero. Hiding a label-flipping perturbation there produces images with opposite step-correctness labels but bit-identical interface states. Every verifier therefore has the same output law on both members, giving pair-balanced accuracy exactly one half and zero gain from language-side repair. We prove that every fixed-point downscaler has such null vectors and bound their smallest size at the most common ratios, which rules out an 8-bit fit whenever the bound exceeds 255. From the resize configuration alone, a lattice criterion supplies realizable collisions and certifies their absence within the specified construction family. It resolves all 20 screened configurations, 17 as constructible and 3 as non-constructible. We construct certified pairs across three architectures and certify four additional processors, with zero decision-logit gap on all 18 scored pairs and none of the 18 controls. The pairs also screen routers that waste computation on re-attention or further reasoning. On natural items, per-item routing headroom exists, but no tested interface-only router improves over stopping. Our fiber ceiling bounds the headroom recoverable from the interface. Code: https://github.com/KurbanIntelligenceLab/aliasforge.

Existing certified training methods can only train models to be robust against a certain perturbation type (e.g. l_infty or l_2). However, an l_infty certifiably robust model may not be certifiably robust against l_2 perturbation (and vice versa) and also has low robustness against other perturbations (e.g. geometric and patch transformation). By constructing a theoretical framework to analyze and mitigate the tradeoff, we propose the first multi-norm certified training framework CURE, consisting of several multi-norm certified training methods, to attain better union robustness when training from scratch or fine-tuning a pre-trained certified model. Inspired by our theoretical findings, we devise bound alignment and connect natural training with certified training for better union robustness. Compared with SOTA-certified training, CURE improves union robustness to 32.0% on MNIST, 25.8% on CIFAR-10, and 10.6% on TinyImagenet across different epsilon values. It leads to better generalization on a diverse set of challenging unseen geometric and patch perturbations to 6.8% and 16.0% on CIFAR-10. Overall, our contributions pave a path towards universal certified robustness.

AI coding agents produce code faster than humans can review it. In our approach, the prover is the judge of whether the code is correct. Under a verifier-driven loop, AI agents wrote and verified bare-metal security software in Ada/SPARK spanning classical and post-quantum cryptography, TLS 1.3, IKEv2, X.509, and a Matrix client. GNATprove discharged 49,280 proof obligations, established functional correctness for selected primitives, and proved the absence of run-time errors for the rest, at roughly 20-40 times lower supervision cost than comparable hand verification. GNATprove alone was insufficient: some defects could not be detected and were resolved using known-answer tests, interoperability, or human review of specifications. Given weak checks, the agent tried to bypass them and reported success. We report where each layer caught faults and draw the central lesson: what an agent can be trusted to establish is bounded by the strength of its feedback.

We present the first undetectable watermarking scheme for generative image models. Undetectability ensures that no efficient adversary can distinguish between watermarked and un-watermarked images, even after making many adaptive queries. In particular, an undetectable watermark does not degrade image quality under any efficiently computable metric. Our scheme works by selecting the initial latents of a diffusion model using a pseudorandom error-correcting code (Christ and Gunn, 2024), a strategy which guarantees undetectability and robustness. We experimentally demonstrate that our watermarks are quality-preserving and robust using Stable Diffusion 2.1. Our experiments verify that, in contrast to every prior scheme we tested, our watermark does not degrade image quality. Our experiments also demonstrate robustness: existing watermark removal attacks fail to remove our watermark from images without significantly degrading the quality of the images. Finally, we find that we can robustly encode 512 bits in our watermark, and up to 2500 bits when the images are not subjected to watermark removal attacks. Our code is available at https://github.com/XuandongZhao/PRC-Watermark.

Process attestation verifies human authorship by collecting behavioral biometric evidence, including keystroke dynamics, typing patterns, and editing behavior, during the creative process. However, the very data needed to prove authenticity can reveal intimate details about an author's cognitive state, health conditions, and identity, constituting sensitive biometric data under GDPR Article 9. We resolve this privacy-attestation paradox using zero-knowledge proofs. We present ZK-PoP, a construction that allows a verifier to confirm that (a) sequential work function chains were computed correctly, (b) behavioral feature vectors fall within human population distributions, and (c) content evolution is consistent with incremental human editing, all without learning the underlying behavioral data, exact timing, or intermediate content. Our construction uses Groth16 proofs over arithmetic circuits with Pedersen commitments and Bulletproof range proofs. We prove that ZK-PoP is computationally zero-knowledge, computationally sound, and achieves unlinkability across sessions. Evaluation shows proof generation in under 30 seconds for a 1-hour writing session, with 192-byte proofs verifiable in 8.2 ms, while incurring less than 5% accuracy loss in simulation at practical privacy levels (epsilon >= 1.0) compared to non-private baselines.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

Revolutionizing the field of deep learning, Transformer-based models have achieved remarkable performance in many tasks. Recent research has recognized these models are robust to shuffling but are limited to inter-token permutation in the forward propagation. In this work, we propose our definition of permutation equivariance, a broader concept covering both inter- and intra- token permutation in the forward and backward propagation of neural networks. We rigorously proved that such permutation equivariance property can be satisfied on most vanilla Transformer-based models with almost no adaptation. We examine the property over a range of state-of-the-art models including ViT, Bert, GPT, and others, with experimental validations. Further, as a proof-of-concept, we explore how real-world applications including privacy-enhancing split learning, and model authorization, could exploit the permutation equivariance property, which implicates wider, intriguing application scenarios.

We introduce a cryptographic method to hide an arbitrary secret payload in the response of a Large Language Model (LLM). A secret key is required to extract the payload from the model's response, and without the key it is provably impossible to distinguish between the responses of the original LLM and the LLM that hides a payload. In particular, the quality of generated text is not affected by the payload. Our approach extends a recent result of Christ, Gunn and Zamir (2023) who introduced an undetectable watermarking scheme for LLMs.

Design of neural networks that incorporate symmetry is crucial for geometric deep learning. Central to this effort is the development of invariant and equivariant operations. This works presents a systematic method for constructing valid invariant and equivariant operations. It can handle inputs and outputs in the form of Cartesian tensors with different rank, as well as spherical tensors with different types. In addition, our method features a graphical representation utilizing the symmetric tensor network, which simplifies both the proofs and constructions related to invariant and equivariant functions. We also apply this approach to design the equivariant interaction message for the geometry graph neural network, and equivariant machine learning model to learn the constitutive law of materials.

Understanding how aligned LLMs internally represent safety is critical for diagnosing alignment vulnerabilities, as it explains why jailbreaks succeed and informs the design of robust alignment strategies. Prior work shows that aligned LLMs encode harmfulness and refusal as separable directions in the residual stream at prompt-side token positions. We show that jailbreaks succeed at prompt encoding by suppressing either the refusal or harmfulness direction before any token is generated, with distinct attack classes occupying separable regions of the harmfulness-refusal plane. Extending the analysis to response-token positions, we find that the model recognizes harmful content while it is generating that content, even when it failed to recognize the input as harmful at the prompt side. Motivated by our findings, we introduce HARC (Harmfulness-And-Refusal Coupling), a fine-tuning method that pairs the two directions across both prompt and response positions. Since the intervention is confined to the harmfulness-refusal subspace, it leaves the rest of the residual stream intact and does not degrade general capability or inflate over-refusal. Across extensive experiments, HARC achieves the strongest robustness-capability-usability trade-off among six baselines spanning the major training-time and inference-time safety methods. The harmfulness and refusal directions at prompt and response positions transfer across the five model families and two scales we tested without architecture-specific tuning.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

Verifying claims about AI workloads is a prerequisite for credible AI governance of covert adversaries (who comply with monitoring only when detection likelihood is high), yet the apparent non-determinism of GPU floating-point arithmetic forces auditors to accept approximate output matches. Covert adversaries can exploit unverifiable degrees of freedom in monitored computation. Attack vectors include steganography, unreported modification of inference software, and covert computation via unreported batch elements. Empirically, we analyze how modern inference engines (vLLM, HF transformers) produce deterministic but non-invariant outputs, without needing to set performance-compromising determinism flags, if the right information is available for re-computation and no atomic functions are called in the backend. We demonstrate that such bitwise-precise re-computation does not require access to identical hardware, via a software-only emulation of LLM inference across multiple NVIDIA GPU variants. Thus, accumulated rounding errors can be an auditable signature of the software and hardware setup used for inference, instead of a constraint on verifiability.

We present an end-to-end and practical randomness amplification and privatisation protocol based on Bell tests. This allows the building of device-independent random number generators which output (near-)perfectly unbiased and private numbers, even if using an uncharacterised quantum device potentially built by an adversary. Our generation rates are linear in the repetition rate of the quantum device and the classical randomness post-processing has quasi-linear complexity - making it efficient on a standard personal laptop. The statistical analysis is also tailored for real-world quantum devices. Our protocol is then showcased on several different quantum computers. Although not purposely built for the task, we show that quantum computers can run faithful Bell tests by adding minimal assumptions. In this semi-device-independent manner, our protocol generates (near-)perfectly unbiased and private random numbers on today's quantum computers.

This paper reports a single, fully instrumented case study of a large-scale architectural refactoring by an AI coding agent under a specification-first protocol, with no human review of the generated code and no pre-existing oracle to validate the target behaviour. The task, dismantling a central invariant across a large interdependent codebase, was assessed by the author as effectively infeasible through incremental refactoring, the kind of change that conventionally calls for a rewrite instead. Under the protocol described here, the agent completed it successfully. The system is a 717,725-line production TypeScript application across 3,648 files. The task required dismantling a core lifetime invariant: the guarantee that a UI panel remains open for the duration of an AI request. The target behaviour was that a streaming generation survives the closing of its panel and can be reattached, on reopening, to the same live stream with no loss or duplication. The protocol: formal specification by the agent, 14 refinement cycles auditing that specification against the source code, atomic implementation, a compile/test feedback loop, then 17 verification cycles auditing the code against the frozen specification. Across 31 audit passes, 201 defects were corrected before any human executed the program. The convergence criterion was empirical: two consecutive verification passes returning zero findings. The change touched 189 files (31 new); with the extraction phase, the two commits total 288 files, 34,770 insertions, 16,422 deletions. Across the first and roughly thirty later sessions, the software behaved as specified, no bug observed. Elapsed: three days; cost: USD 2,430. The full specification and raw session logs, 1,500+ pages in French, are published as evidence, allowing inspection of the process and submission to a language model for consistency checking.

Multi-agent LLM systems share state through memory stores, vector indices, and tool registries. We model such sharing as long-running read-generate-write operations under deterministic-generation semantics -- the regime durable-execution engines enforce by deterministic replay -- and formalize four concurrency anomalies in TLA+: stale-generation, phantom-tool, causal-cascade, and tool-effect reordering, structural analogues of classical isolation anomalies, each with a TLC counter-example. The exclusion lattice over these anomalies is trivial; the contribution is the mechanically verified realizability and strict separation of one maximal chain within it, L_0 subsetneq cdots subsetneq L_4, to our knowledge the first machine-checked consistency hierarchy for such runtimes. A development of 274 Verus obligations (zero assume, zero admit; trust base: two structural axioms and a mutex correspondence) proves the detectors sound and complete against the specifications and each runtime its avoidance set. Three deployed Rust runtimes realize L0-L1 (pessimistic locking, serializable snapshot isolation, default-SI), each verified against stale-generation and refined to its state machine; L2-L4 are exec-mode-verified with dependency-free prevention twins (A3, A6, A2: 0/1000 versus 1000/1000), and L2 is run live across three model families (A3 prevented in all 120 retracted sessions). We reproduce a silent lost update in ByteDance's deer-flow, formalizing its fix as a verified L_0 to L_1 refinement, and exhibit tool-effect reordering in LangGraph's ToolNode on unmodified output, removed by an L3 commit-order sequencer. The verified detector, refinements, and realizability artifacts are the contribution; the phenomena and lattice are classical.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for code generation, raising concerns that they may be misused to produce malicious code. Meanwhile, Grammar-Constrained Decoding (GCD) has been widely adopted to improve the reliability of LLM-generated code by enforcing syntactic validity. In this paper, we reveal a counterintuitive risk: this reliability-oriented technique can itself become an attack surface. We uncover a new jailbreak attack, termed CodeSpear, that exploits GCD to induce LLMs into generating malicious code. Our experiments show that simply applying a benign code grammar constraint can effectively jailbreak LLMs. To address this vulnerability, we propose CodeShield, a safety alignment approach that robustly preserves safe behavior even under attacker-controlled grammar constraints. CodeShield aligns the model in the code modality by teaching it to generate honeypot code under GCD. Such code is semantically harmless, so it does not implement the malicious request, and structurally diverse, so it is difficult to suppress through grammar tightening. At the same time, CodeShield still preserves natural-language refusals when natural language is available. Experiments on 10 popular LLMs across 4 benchmarks show that CodeSpear outperforms representative jailbreak baselines and increases the attack success rate by more than 30 percentage points on average. CodeShield also restores safety under CodeSpear while preserving benign utility. Our findings reveal a fundamental risk of GCD and call for greater attention to its potential security implications.

Even though recent years have seen many attacks exposing severe vulnerabilities in Federated Learning (FL), a holistic understanding of what enables these attacks and how they can be mitigated effectively is still lacking. In this work, we demystify the inner workings of existing (targeted) attacks. We provide new insights into why these attacks are possible and why a definitive solution to FL robustness is challenging. We show that the need for ML algorithms to memorize tail data has significant implications for FL integrity. This phenomenon has largely been studied in the context of privacy; our analysis sheds light on its implications for ML integrity. We show that certain classes of severe attacks can be mitigated effectively by enforcing constraints such as norm bounds on clients' updates. We investigate how to efficiently incorporate these constraints into secure FL protocols in the single-server setting. Based on this, we propose RoFL, a new secure FL system that extends secure aggregation with privacy-preserving input validation. Specifically, RoFL can enforce constraints such as L_2 and L_infty bounds on high-dimensional encrypted model updates.

This paper introduces the first two-dimensional XOR-based secret sharing scheme for layered multipath communication networks. We present a construction that guarantees successful message recovery and perfect privacy when an adversary observes and disrupts any single path at each transmission layer. The scheme achieves information-theoretic security using only bitwise XOR operations with linear O(|S|) complexity, where |S| is the message length. We provide mathematical proofs demonstrating that the scheme maintains unconditional security regardless of computational resources available to adversaries. Unlike encryption-based approaches vulnerable to quantum computing advances, our construction offers provable security suitable for resource-constrained military environments where computational assumptions may fail.

Making language models solve constraint problems reliably often means having them translate the problem into a formal specification and delegating the search to a sound solver. But the translation is itself a language-model task, and an unfaithful translation makes the solver faithfully solve the wrong problem. Existing pipelines repair only translations that crash, returning the solver's error message and falling silent when the program runs but is wrong. We replace the error message with a proof: when the generated program is unsatisfiable, we extract a minimal unsatisfiable core over the model's own constraints and hand it back the exact set that cannot hold together, a leakage-free signal that localizes the fault. On a new benchmark of 77 problems with an exact oracle, translation to Answer Set Programming is faithful on six of seven domains and fails only on aggregate coverage scheduling, which concentrates the translation tax in one diagnosable pattern. A minimal core, rather than a bare error, is what stops a weaker model from fabricating solutions to infeasible problems, cutting fabrication from 79% to 7%. A strong chain-of-thought baseline meanwhile matches the symbolic route on accuracy, so the route's value is not accuracy but certificates and its refusal to fabricate.

We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford+T gates as the underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES plaintext-ciphertext pairs.

This paper introduces a hybrid encryption framework combining classical cryptography (EdDSA, ECDH), post-quantum cryptography (ML-DSA-6x5, ML-KEM-768), and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) via Guardian to counter quantum computing threats. Our prototype implements this integration, using a key derivation function to generate secure symmetric and HMAC keys, and evaluates its performance across execution time and network metrics. The approach improves data protection by merging classical efficiency with PQC's quantum resilience and QKD's key security, offering a practical transition path for cryptographic systems. This research lays the foundation for future adoption of PQC in securing digital communication.

We study whether an aperiodic hierarchy can provide a structural advantage for lossless compression over periodic alternatives. We show that Fibonacci quasicrystal tilings avoid the finite-depth collapse that affects periodic hierarchies: usable n-gram lookup positions remain non-zero at every level, while periodic tilings collapse after O(log p) levels for period p. This yields an aperiodic hierarchy advantage: dictionary reuse remains available across all scales instead of vanishing beyond a finite depth. Our analysis gives four main consequences. First, the Golden Compensation property shows that the exponential decay in the number of positions is exactly balanced by the exponential growth in phrase length, so potential coverage remains scale-invariant with asymptotic value Wvarphi/5. Second, using the Sturmian complexity law p(n)=n+1, we show that Fibonacci/Sturmian hierarchies maximize codebook coverage efficiency among binary aperiodic tilings. Third, under long-range dependence, the resulting hierarchy achieves lower coding entropy than comparable periodic hierarchies. Fourth, redundancy decays super-exponentially with depth, whereas periodic systems remain locked at the depth where collapse occurs. We validate these results with Quasicryth, a lossless text compressor built on a ten-level Fibonacci hierarchy with phrase lengths {2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55,89,144}. In controlled A/B experiments with identical codebooks, the aperiodic advantage over a Period-5 baseline grows from 36{,}243 B at 3 MB to 11{,}089{,}469 B at 1 GB, explained by the activation of deeper hierarchy levels. On enwik9, Quasicryth achieves 225{,}918{,}349 B (22.59%), with 20{,}735{,}733 B saved by the Fibonacci tiling relative to no tiling.

Let G be a graph with adjacency matrix A(G) and degree matrix D(G), and let L_μ(G):=A(G)-μD(G). Two graphs G_1 and G_2 are called degree-similar if there exists an invertible matrix M such that M^{-1} A(G_1) M =A(G_2) and M^{-1} D(G_1) M =D(G_2). In this paper, we address three problems concerning degree-similar graphs proposed by Godsil and Sun. First, we present a new characterization of degree-similar graphs using degree partition, from which we derive methods and examples for constructing cospectral graphs and degree-similar graphs. Second, we construct infinite pairs of non-degree-similar trees G_1 and G_2 such that tI- L_μ(G_1) and tI-L_μ(G_2) have the same Smith normal form over Q(μ)[t], which provides a negative answer to a problem posed by Godsil and Sun. Third, we establish several invariants of degree-similar graphs and obtain results on unicyclic graphs that are degree-similar determined. Lastly we prove that for a strongly regular graph G and any two edges e and f of G, G backslash e and G backslash f have identical μ-polynomial, i.e., det(tI-L_μ(G backslash e))=det(tI-L_μ(G backslash f)), which enables the construction of pairs of non-isomorphic graphs with same μ-polynomial, where G backslash e denotes the graph obtained from G by deleting the edge e.

With the emergence of powerful representations of continuous data in the form of neural fields, there is a need for discretization invariant learning: an approach for learning maps between functions on continuous domains without being sensitive to how the function is sampled. We present a new framework for understanding and designing discretization invariant neural networks (DI-Nets), which generalizes many discrete networks such as convolutional neural networks as well as continuous networks such as neural operators. Our analysis establishes upper bounds on the deviation in model outputs under different finite discretizations, and highlights the central role of point set discrepancy in characterizing such bounds. This insight leads to the design of a family of neural networks driven by numerical integration via quasi-Monte Carlo sampling with discretizations of low discrepancy. We prove by construction that DI-Nets universally approximate a large class of maps between integrable function spaces, and show that discretization invariance also describes backpropagation through such models. Applied to neural fields, convolutional DI-Nets can learn to classify and segment visual data under various discretizations, and sometimes generalize to new types of discretizations at test time. Code: https://github.com/clintonjwang/DI-net.

This paper presents a novel approach to calculating the Levenshtein (edit) distance within the framework of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), specifically targeting third-generation schemes like TFHE. Edit distance computations are essential in applications across finance and genomics, such as DNA sequence alignment. We introduce an optimised algorithm that significantly reduces the cost of edit distance calculations called Leuvenshtein. This algorithm specifically reduces the number of programmable bootstraps (PBS) needed per cell of the calculation, lowering it from approximately 94 operations -- required by the conventional Wagner-Fisher algorithm -- to just 1. Additionally, we propose an efficient method for performing equality checks on characters, reducing ASCII character comparisons to only 2 PBS operations. Finally, we explore the potential for further performance improvements by utilising preprocessing when one of the input strings is unencrypted. Our Leuvenshtein achieves up to 278times faster performance compared to the best available TFHE implementation and up to 39times faster than an optimised implementation of the Wagner-Fisher algorithm. Moreover, when offline preprocessing is possible due to the presence of one unencrypted input on the server side, an additional 3times speedup can be achieved.

We consider the anti-symmetrization of the half-shuffle on words, which we call the 'area' operator, since it corresponds to taking the signed area of elements of the iterated-integral signature. The tensor algebra is a so-called Tortkara algebra under this operator. We show that the iterated application of the area operator is sufficient to recover the iterated-integral signature of a path. Just as the "information" the second level adds to the first one is known to be equivalent to the area between components of the path, this means that all the information added by subsequent levels is equivalent to iterated areas. On the way to this main result, we characterize (homogeneous) generating sets of the shuffle algebra. We finally discuss compatibility between the area operator and discrete integration and stochastic integration and conclude with some results on the linear span of the areas of areas.

Audit logs are one of the most important tools for transparently tracking system events and maintaining continuous oversight in corporate organizations and enterprise business systems. There are many cases where the audit logs contain sensitive data, or the audit logs are enormous. In these situations, dealing with a subset of the data is more practical than the entire data set. To provide a secure solution to handle these issues, a sanitizable signature scheme (SSS) is a viable cryptographic primitive. Herein, we first present the first post-quantum secure multivariate-based SSS, namely Mul-SAN. Our proposed design provides unforgeability, privacy, immutability, signer accountability, and sanitizer accountability under the assumption that the MQ problem is NP-hard. Mul-SAN is very efficient and only requires computing field multiplications and additions over a finite field for its implementation. Mul-SAN presents itself as a practical method to partially delegate control of the authenticated data in avenues like the healthcare industry and government organizations. We also explore using Blockchain to provide a tamper-proof and robust audit log mechanism.

It has been conjectured that the operator norm of the Lyapunov operator induced by the Frobenius norm is always attained at a symmetric matrix. The conjecture is known to hold for all matrices of order at most five. We give an integer matrix of order seven for which the skew-symmetric restricted norm is strictly larger than the symmetric restricted norm. A rational separator and exact-arithmetic certificates establish the strict inequality without relying on floating-point computations. A direct-sum construction yields counterexamples in every order n geq 7; the case n = 6 remains open.

Byzantine-robust aggregation rules such as multi-Krum assume a central coordinator, and decentralising them is obstructed by the rules themselves: they are globally coupled, non-associative, and discontinuous, so an ulpscale perturbation can flip the selected subset, moving the output by a non-vanishing amount. None of this prevents coordinator-free replication, because a robust rule needs no agreed order of contributions, only an agreed set and an agreed exclusion predicate, both of which converge without consensus. ACFA (Accountable Consensus-Free Aggregation) replicates a content-addressed OR-Set of signed contributions and a grow-only set of self-authenticating equivocation proofs, offline-verifiable by anyone. Aggregation is a deterministic pure function of the converged product state: fixed-point integer arithmetic over a hash-canonical order, ties broken by content hash. We prove that any pure function of a converged product of CRDTs (non-monotone, non-associative, or stochastic) inherits Strong Eventual Consistency, together with its converse; the contribution is the composition of a data lattice with an evidence lattice applied to a robust selector, not the elementary lifting step. A prototype (10 nodes, 3 Byzantine) passes 16/16 falsification checks: byte-identical roots under adversarial gossip, deterministic re-convergence after late equivocation proofs, partition recovery, and three byte-identity-breaking ablations. The guarantee is consistency, not accuracy; robustness is imported, conditional on 2f + 3 admitted contributions (at most f Byzantine) and a stated quantisation-margin condition.

We construct explicit algebraic finite Gabor windows that are simultaneously full spark and phase retrievable, with quantitative control of the self-ambiguity function. In every cyclic dimension, a constant--Chu window has an exactly computable ambiguity minimum of order N^{-3/2}; for Nge25, a two-site Chu repair has margin comparable to dN^{-3/2} for every divisor dlesqrt N. A quantitative algebraic regularization, based on the high-degree specialization principle used in explicit full-spark Gabor constructions, imposes full spark while retaining a fixed proportion of a seed's ambiguity margin. These ingredients give explicit simultaneous constructions in every cyclic dimension and a factor-sensitive improvement when N has a divisor near sqrt N. Further consequences include exact Chinese-remainder tensorization, optimal-order squarefree families, near-SIC prime regularization, lifted stability, and a finite cyclic Schrödinger construction.

Many geometric learning problems require invariants on heterogeneous product spaces, i.e., products of distinct spaces carrying different group actions, where standard techniques do not directly apply. We show that, when a group G acts transitively on a space M, any G-invariant function on a product space X times M can be reduced to an invariant of the isotropy subgroup H of M acting on X alone. Our approach establishes an explicit orbit equivalence (X times M)/G cong X/H, yielding a principled reduction that preserves expressivity. We apply this characterization to Equivariant Neural Fields, extending them to arbitrary group actions and homogeneous conditioning spaces, and thereby removing the major structural constraints imposed by existing methods.

For a signing σ of a d-regular graph, the spectrum of A_σ depends only on the signs of cycles. We study the affine mathbb F_2 family of signings making every short even cycle unbalanced, and show that averaging over it converts the sign problem of the Bilu-Linial conjecture into a counting problem: a master identity expresses the family-averaged trace as a parity-weighted sum over wrap classes confined to the span W of the constraint cycles, and the family-averaged Ihara L-function diagonalizes so that every prime whose parity escapes W contributes the Ramanujan rate d-1 automatically. Uniform averaging over all signings, by contrast, provably cannot certify a spectral radius below the Kesten profile. We prove matched upper and lower bounds for the confined walk counts, a doubling injection from below, and from above an ear-decomposition encoding in which the number of fresh runs of a non-backtracking walk equals the cycle rank of its support, combined with a window lemma for bicycle-free graphs and a rank bound via the Moore bound for irregular graphs. Consequences include varepsilon-versions of the Bilu-Linial conjecture: every d-regular graph that is subcritical at scale log n, and every d-regular graph bicycle-free at radius Cloglog n/δ, admits a signing in the parity family with ρ(A_σ)le2d-1(1+Cδlog(1/δ))(1+o(1)). We further identify the necessary hypotheses exactly (K_d-trapping; tree-burst gadgets), give an exact certificate on the hypercube, and record a decisive obstruction to two-sided interlacing: mathbb E_σdet(xI-A_σ^2) is not real-rooted, already for the quadrilateral, where it equals (x^2-4x+2)^2+4.