Daily Papers

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Within the limited scope of this paper, we argue that artificial general intelligence cannot emerge from current neural network paradigms regardless of scale, nor is such an approach healthy for the field at present. Drawing on various notions, discussions, present-day developments and observations, current debates and critiques, experiments, and so on in between philosophy, including the Chinese Room Argument and Gödelian argument, neuroscientific ideas, computer science, the theoretical consideration of artificial intelligence, and learning theory, we address conceptually that neural networks are architecturally insufficient for genuine understanding. They operate as static function approximators of a limited encoding framework - a 'sophisticated sponge' exhibiting complex behaviours without structural richness that constitute intelligence. We critique the theoretical foundations the field relies on and created of recent times; for example, an interesting heuristic as neural scaling law (as an example, arXiv:2001.08361 ) made prominent in a wrong way of interpretation, The Universal Approximation Theorem addresses the wrong level of abstraction and, in parts, partially, the question of current architectures lacking dynamic restructuring capabilities. We propose a framework distinguishing existential facilities (computational substrate) from architectural organization (interpretive structures), and outline principles for what genuine machine intelligence would require, and furthermore, a conceptual method of structuralizing the richer framework on which the principle of neural network system takes hold.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Every known artificial deep neural network (DNN) corresponds to an object in a canonical Grothendieck's topos; its learning dynamic corresponds to a flow of morphisms in this topos. Invariance structures in the layers (like CNNs or LSTMs) correspond to Giraud's stacks. This invariance is supposed to be responsible of the generalization property, that is extrapolation from learning data under constraints. The fibers represent pre-semantic categories (Culioli, Thom), over which artificial languages are defined, with internal logics, intuitionist, classical or linear (Girard). Semantic functioning of a network is its ability to express theories in such a language for answering questions in output about input data. Quantities and spaces of semantic information are defined by analogy with the homological interpretation of Shannon's entropy of P.Baudot and D.Bennequin in 2015). They generalize the measures found by Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952). Amazingly, the above semantical structures are classified by geometric fibrant objects in a closed model category of Quillen, then they give rise to homotopical invariants of DNNs and of their semantic functioning. Intentional type theories (Martin-Loef) organize these objects and fibrations between them. Information contents and exchanges are analyzed by Grothendieck's derivators.

When an agent can articulate why something works, we typically take this as evidence of genuine understanding. This presupposes that effective action and correct explanation covary, and that coherent explanation reliably signals both. I argue that this assumption fails for contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). I introduce what I call the Bidirectional Coherence Paradox: competence and grounding not only dissociate but invert across epistemic conditions. In low-observability domains, LLMs often act successfully while misidentifying the mechanisms that produce their success. In high-observability domains, they frequently generate explanations that accurately track observable causal structure yet fail to translate those diagnoses into effective intervention. In both cases, explanatory coherence remains intact, obscuring the underlying dissociation. Drawing on experiments in compiler optimization and hyperparameter tuning, I develop the Epistemic Triangle, a model of how priors, signals, and domain knowledge interact under varying observability. The results suggest that neither behavioral success nor explanatory accuracy alone suffices for attributing understanding. I argue that evaluating artificial epistemic agents requires a tripartite framework -- coherence, grounding, and a proper basing relation linking explanation to action. The systematic separation of knowing-that and knowing-how in LLMs thus challenges assumptions inherited from both epistemology and current AI evaluation practice.

Learning causal structure from observational data often assumes that we observe independent and identically distributed (i.\,i.\,d) data. The traditional approach aims to find a graphical representation that encodes the same set of conditional independence relationships as those present in the observed distribution. It is known that under i.\,i.\,d assumption, even with infinite data, there is a limit to how fine-grained a causal structure we can identify. To overcome this limitation, recent work has explored using data originating from different, related environments to learn richer causal structure. These approaches implicitly rely on the independent causal mechanisms (ICM) principle, which postulates that the mechanism giving rise to an effect given its causes and the mechanism which generates the causes do not inform or influence each other. Thus, components of the causal model can independently change from environment to environment. Despite its wide application in machine learning and causal inference, there is a lack of statistical formalization of the ICM principle and how it enables identification of richer causal structures from grouped data. Here we present new causal de Finetti theorems which offer a first statistical formalization of ICM principle and show how causal structure identification is possible from exchangeable data. Our work provides theoretical justification for a broad range of techniques leveraging multi-environment data to learn causal structure.

The Large Language Model from Power Law Decoder Representations (PLDR-LLM) and its attention, Power Law Graph Attention (PLGA), replace the fixed bilinear form of scaled dot-product attention (SDPA) with a learned, input-generated bilinear operator G_{LM}, built from a positive tensor A_{LM} by elementwise power laws. The architecture is fully specified, verified against pinned reference releases; claims are labeled theorem, conditional theorem, measurement, or conjecture. Unconditionally: PLGA contains SDPA exactly at G_{LM}=I; A_{LM} and A_P are strictly entrywise positive, with Perron-Frobenius structure on A_{LM}; the DAG regularizer has the NOTEARS walk-counting form and positivity obstructs exact acyclicity; and, under nonresonance (satisfied by standard rotary frequencies), a commutant criterion identifies which operators preserve relative-position dependence. An inference-collapse theorem: exact input invariance of deductive outputs collapses inference to generalized SDPA with a constant operator. Measured invariance: relative fluctuations of 10^{-6} and below; perturbation bounds quantify but do not certify cached inference; the assembled proxy misses the decoding margin. A conditional three-stage mechanism (rotary twirl, concentration, row-map contraction) is measured on a released checkpoint. Blockwise training and scoring under the global Gram are stated with explicit target exposure; on tested samples, block and sequential scoring select identical answers and agree on the published TruthfulQA probability-mass metric within 5times 10^{-5} per item. Self-organized criticality enters as a phenomenological framework with an intrinsic order parameter; open claims become falsifiable conjectures. Selected proof cores are machine-checked in Lean 4.

Reasoning-specialized language models show large performance gains over base models, yet the internal changes responsible for improved multi-step reasoning remain poorly understood. It is unclear whether reasoning fine-tuning improves local token-level competence or globally reorganizes how models structure inference over time. We address this question by modeling Chain-of-Thought reasoning as a switching dynamical system (SDS), in which internal representations evolve under discrete latent policy states. Our framework combines time-aware contrastive representation learning with discrete regime discovery to recover latent policies from activation trajectories. Across four benchmarks and model scales from 1.5B to 32B parameters, reasoning-fine-tuned models exhibit richer latent-policy organization than their base counterparts, characterized by more differentiated transition structure and model-dependent changes in state utilization, persistence, and mixing. The recovered regimes exhibit functional specialization aligned with distinct reasoning stages, and extensive controls confirm that their structure is not explained by correctness, representation learning, or modeling priors, but depends on the coherent temporal organization of reasoning trajectories. Causal interventions further show that the regimes are functionally meaningful: state-swap ablations reduce one-step predictive fit, while transplanting reasoning dynamics into base models improves performance on challenging reasoning problems. Finally, SDS-guided pruning of failure-prone reasoning prefixes outperforms self-consistency in 11 of 12 model-dataset settings, with gains of up to 12.5 percentage points. Together, our results suggest that reasoning fine-tuning globally reorganizes latent dynamics, offering a new lens for mechanistic analysis and process-level control of reasoning models.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI o1, have demonstrated strong performance gains by scaling up the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning during inference. However, a growing concern lies in their tendency to produce excessively long reasoning traces, which are often filled with redundant content (e.g., repeated definitions), over-analysis of simple problems, and superficial exploration of multiple reasoning paths for harder tasks. This inefficiency introduces significant challenges for training, inference, and real-world deployment (e.g., in agent-based systems), where token economy is critical. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of recent efforts aimed at improving reasoning efficiency in LRMs, with a particular focus on the unique challenges that arise in this new paradigm. We identify common patterns of inefficiency, examine methods proposed across the LRM lifecycle, i.e., from pretraining to inference, and discuss promising future directions for research. To support ongoing development, we also maintain a real-time GitHub repository tracking recent progress in the field. We hope this survey serves as a foundation for further exploration and inspires innovation in this rapidly evolving area.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

In-context learning for tabular data sets strong predictive standards in observational settings; it however primarily relies on correlational structure, which becomes unreliable under distribution shift or intervention. While established methods to discover causal structure exist, they are often focused on structure identifiability and decoupled from the predictive architectures that could benefit from them. To bridge these perspectives, we study how to simultaneously infer and enforce causal structure in the form of topological variable orderings into tabular prediction. Unlike standard architectures, our model TabOrder uses causal order-constrained attention, basing predictions only on features that precede a target under a learned causal order. Similar to causal discovery methods, TabOrder learns the optimal variable ordering in an unsupervised manner through a likelihood-based objective. We justify this choice under standard functional model classes and also study how sample missingness, a common challenge in tabular data, interacts with causal direction identification. Empirically, we confirm that TabOrder recovers accurate variable orderings while addressing prediction and imputation tasks, as well as gives insight into real-world biological data under intervention.

Inferring causal structure poses a combinatorial search problem that typically involves evaluating structures with a score or independence test. The resulting search is costly, and designing suitable scores or tests that capture prior knowledge is difficult. In this work, we propose to amortize causal structure learning. Rather than searching over structures, we train a variational inference model to directly predict the causal structure from observational or interventional data. This allows our inference model to acquire domain-specific inductive biases for causal discovery solely from data generated by a simulator, bypassing both the hand-engineering of suitable score functions and the search over graphs. The architecture of our inference model emulates permutation invariances that are crucial for statistical efficiency in structure learning, which facilitates generalization to significantly larger problem instances than seen during training. On synthetic data and semisynthetic gene expression data, our models exhibit robust generalization capabilities when subject to substantial distribution shifts and significantly outperform existing algorithms, especially in the challenging genomics domain. Our code and models are publicly available at: https://github.com/larslorch/avici.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

A central premise in mechanistic interpretability is that meaningful concepts in language models are represented by linear features in activation space. For such features to support reliable interventions, manipulating one feature should not substantially alter the effects of others. In practice, however, feature entanglement leads to interference such that localized interventions can have unintended downstream effects. Motivated by the Independent Causal Mechanisms principle, we propose to constrain internal features to be almost orthogonal. We argue that this promotes modular representations amenable to causal intervention. We formalize this problem by characterizing the gap between an idealized isolated intervention and its realized effect on model outputs in terms of feature interference. We upper-bound the propagation of feature interference in terms of the self-coherence of the feature dictionary, and relate this discrepancy to an explicit orthogonality regularization on the dictionary itself. Empirically, we show that this regularization enables more isolated interventions on mathematical reasoning concepts while preserving model performance. Our code is available under https://github.com/mrtzmllr/sae-icm.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform logical reasoning internally remains a fundamental challenge. While prior mechanistic studies focus on identifying taskspecific circuits, they leave open the question of what computational strategies LLMs employ for propositional reasoning. We address this gap through comprehensive analysis of Qwen3 (8B and 14B) on PropLogic-MI, a controlled dataset spanning 11 propositional logic rule categories across one-hop and two-hop reasoning. Rather than asking ''which components are necessary,'' we ask ''how does the model organize computation?'' Our analysis reveals a coherent computational architecture comprising four interlocking mechanisms: Staged Computation (layer-wise processing phases), Information Transmission (information flow aggregation at boundary tokens), Fact Retrospection (persistent re-access of source facts), and Specialized Attention Heads (functionally distinct head types). These mechanisms generalize across model scales, rule types, and reasoning depths, providing mechanistic evidence that LLMs employ structured computational strategies for logical reasoning.

What does it mean to understand the world? Contemporary world models often operationalize understanding as accurate future prediction in latent or observation space. Developmental cognitive science, however, suggests a different view: human understanding emerges through the construction of internal theories of how the world works, even before mature language is acquired. Inspired by this theory-building view of cognition, we introduce Learning-to-Theorize, a learning paradigm for inferring explicit explanatory theories of the world from raw, non-textual observations. We instantiate this paradigm with the Neural Theorizer (NEO), a probabilistic neural model that induces latent programs as a learned Language of Thought and executes them through a shared transition model. In NEO, a theory is represented as an executable, compositional program whose learned primitives can be systematically recombined to explain novel phenomena. Experiments show that this formulation enables explanation-driven generalization, allowing observations to be understood in terms of the programs that generate them.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

This paper explores the intersection of identity, individuality, and reality through competing frameworks, including classical metaphysics, quantum mechanics, and computational theories. Traditional metaphysical notions of fixed identity are challenged by advancements in cloning, teletransportation, and digital replication, which reveal the fluid and relational nature of individuality. Quantum mechanics further complicates these notions, emphasizing the indistinguishability and contextuality of fundamental particles. Computational approaches, such as the Ruliad and Constructor Theory, offer expansive views of emergent realities but often lack practical constraints for observer relevance. Algorithmic idealism is introduced as a unifying framework, proposing that reality is an emergent construct governed by computational rules prioritizing coherence, sufficiency, and observer-dependent experiences. By redefining identity as an informational construct and reality as a process shaped by algorithmic transitions, algorithmic idealism resolves foundational paradoxes and offers a superior lens for understanding existence in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The framework bridges gaps between competing theories, providing a coherent and pragmatic model for addressing ethical, metaphysical, and technological challenges.

Recent work has demonstrated that semantics specified by pretraining data influence how representations of different concepts are organized in a large language model (LLM). However, given the open-ended nature of LLMs, e.g., their ability to in-context learn, we can ask whether models alter these pretraining semantics to adopt alternative, context-specified ones. Specifically, if we provide in-context exemplars wherein a concept plays a different role than what the pretraining data suggests, do models reorganize their representations in accordance with these novel semantics? To answer this question, we take inspiration from the theory of conceptual role semantics and define a toy "graph tracing" task wherein the nodes of the graph are referenced via concepts seen during training (e.g., apple, bird, etc.) and the connectivity of the graph is defined via some predefined structure (e.g., a square grid). Given exemplars that indicate traces of random walks on the graph, we analyze intermediate representations of the model and find that as the amount of context is scaled, there is a sudden re-organization from pretrained semantic representations to in-context representations aligned with the graph structure. Further, we find that when reference concepts have correlations in their semantics (e.g., Monday, Tuesday, etc.), the context-specified graph structure is still present in the representations, but is unable to dominate the pretrained structure. To explain these results, we analogize our task to energy minimization for a predefined graph topology, providing evidence towards an implicit optimization process to infer context-specified semantics. Overall, our findings indicate scaling context-size can flexibly re-organize model representations, possibly unlocking novel capabilities.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may observe that the inversion of the whole can be computed piecewise in terms of the component processes. We study the structure of this compositional rule, noting that it relates to the lens pattern in functional programming. Working in a suitably general axiomatic presentation of a category of Markov kernels, we see how we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a fibred category. We discuss the compositional nature of this, formulated as a functor on the underlying category and explore how this can used for a more type-driven approach to statistical inference.

Scientific inquiry requires systems-level reasoning that integrates heterogeneous experimental data, cross-domain knowledge, and mechanistic evidence into coherent explanations. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer inferential capabilities, they often depend on retrieval-augmented contexts that lack structural depth. Traditional Knowledge Graphs (KGs) attempt to bridge this gap, yet their pairwise constraints fail to capture the irreducible higher-order interactions that govern emergent physical behavior. To address this, we introduce a methodology for constructing hypergraph-based knowledge representations that faithfully encode multi-entity relationships. Applied to a corpus of ~1,100 manuscripts on biocomposite scaffolds, our framework constructs a global hypergraph of 161,172 nodes and 320,201 hyperedges, revealing a scale-free topology (power law exponent ~1.23) organized around highly connected conceptual hubs. This representation prevents the combinatorial explosion typical of pairwise expansions and explicitly preserves the co-occurrence context of scientific formulations. We further demonstrate that equipping agentic systems with hypergraph traversal tools, specifically using node-intersection constraints, enables them to bridge semantically distant concepts. By exploiting these higher-order pathways, the system successfully generates grounded mechanistic hypotheses for novel composite materials, such as linking cerium oxide to PCL scaffolds via chitosan intermediates. This work establishes a "teacherless" agentic reasoning system where hypergraph topology acts as a verifiable guardrail, accelerating scientific discovery by uncovering relationships obscured by traditional graph methods.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence reveal the limits of purely predictive systems and call for a shift toward causal and collaborative reasoning. Drawing inspiration from the revolution of Grothendieck in mathematics, we introduce the relativity of causal knowledge, which posits structural causal models (SCMs) are inherently imperfect, subjective representations embedded within networks of relationships. By leveraging category theory, we arrange SCMs into a functor category and show that their observational and interventional probability measures naturally form convex structures. This result allows us to encode non-intervened SCMs with convex spaces of probability measures. Next, using sheaf theory, we construct the network sheaf and cosheaf of causal knowledge. These structures enable the transfer of causal knowledge across the network while incorporating interventional consistency and the perspective of the subjects, ultimately leading to the formal, mathematical definition of relative causal knowledge.

Leveraging generative Artificial Intelligence (AI), we have transformed a dataset comprising 1,000 scientific papers into an ontological knowledge graph. Through an in-depth structural analysis, we have calculated node degrees, identified communities and connectivities, and evaluated clustering coefficients and betweenness centrality of pivotal nodes, uncovering fascinating knowledge architectures. The graph has an inherently scale-free nature, is highly connected, and can be used for graph reasoning by taking advantage of transitive and isomorphic properties that reveal unprecedented interdisciplinary relationships that can be used to answer queries, identify gaps in knowledge, propose never-before-seen material designs, and predict material behaviors. We compute deep node embeddings for combinatorial node similarity ranking for use in a path sampling strategy links dissimilar concepts that have previously not been related. One comparison revealed structural parallels between biological materials and Beethoven's 9th Symphony, highlighting shared patterns of complexity through isomorphic mapping. In another example, the algorithm proposed a hierarchical mycelium-based composite based on integrating path sampling with principles extracted from Kandinsky's 'Composition VII' painting. The resulting material integrates an innovative set of concepts that include a balance of chaos/order, adjustable porosity, mechanical strength, and complex patterned chemical functionalization. We uncover other isomorphisms across science, technology and art, revealing a nuanced ontology of immanence that reveal a context-dependent heterarchical interplay of constituents. Graph-based generative AI achieves a far higher degree of novelty, explorative capacity, and technical detail, than conventional approaches and establishes a widely useful framework for innovation by revealing hidden connections.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Research on Large Language Models (LLMs) studies output variation across generation, reasoning, alignment, and representational analysis, often under the umbrella of "diversity." Yet the terminology remains fragmented, largely because the normative objectives underlying tasks are rarely made explicit. We introduce the Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin framework, which models output variation along a homogeneity-heterogeneity axis, where valuation is determined by the task and its normative objective. We organize tasks into four normative contexts: epistemic (factuality), interactional (user utility), societal (representation), and safety (robustness). For each, we examine the failure modes and vocabulary such as hallucination, mode collapse, bias, and erasure through which variation is studied. We apply the framework to analyze all pairwise cross-contextual interactions, revealing that optimizing for one objective, such as improving safety, can inadvertently harm demographic representation or creative diversity. We argue for context-aware evaluation of output variation, reframing it as a property shaped by task objectives rather than a model's intrinsic trait.

Scientific archives now contain hundreds of petabytes of data across genomics, ecology, climate, and molecular biology that could reveal undiscovered patterns if systematically analyzed at scale. Large-scale, weakly-supervised datasets in language and vision have driven the development of foundation models whose internal representations encode structure (patterns, co-occurrences and statistical regularities) beyond their training objectives. Most existing methods extract structure only for pre-specified targets; they excel at confirmation but do not support open-ended discovery of unknown patterns. We ask whether sparse autoencoders (SAEs) can enable open-ended feature discovery from foundation model representations. We evaluate this question in controlled rediscovery studies, where the learned SAE features are tested for alignment with semantic concepts on a standard segmentation benchmark and compared against strong label-free alternatives on concept-alignment metrics. Applied to ecological imagery, the same procedure surfaces fine-grained anatomical structure without access to segmentation or part labels, providing a scientific case study with ground-truth validation. While our experiments focus on vision with an ecology case study, the method is domain-agnostic and applicable to models in other sciences (e.g., proteins, genomics, weather). Our results indicate that sparse decomposition provides a practical instrument for exploring what scientific foundation models have learned, an important prerequisite for moving from confirmation to genuine discovery.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

This paper presents COGENT3 (or Collective Growth and Entropy-modulated Triads System), a novel approach for emergent cognition integrating pattern formation networks with group influence dynamics. Contrasting with traditional strategies that rely on predetermined architectures, computational structures emerge dynamically in our framework through agent interactions. This enables a more flexible and adaptive system exhibiting characteristics reminiscent of human cognitive processes. The incorporation of temperature modulation and memory effects in COGENT3 closely integrates statistical mechanics, machine learning, and cognitive science.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

In-context learning is a powerful emergent ability in transformer models. Prior work in mechanistic interpretability has identified a circuit element that may be critical for in-context learning -- the induction head (IH), which performs a match-and-copy operation. During training of large transformers on natural language data, IHs emerge around the same time as a notable phase change in the loss. Despite the robust evidence for IHs and this interesting coincidence with the phase change, relatively little is known about the diversity and emergence dynamics of IHs. Why is there more than one IH, and how are they dependent on each other? Why do IHs appear all of a sudden, and what are the subcircuits that enable them to emerge? We answer these questions by studying IH emergence dynamics in a controlled setting by training on synthetic data. In doing so, we develop and share a novel optogenetics-inspired causal framework for modifying activations throughout training. Using this framework, we delineate the diverse and additive nature of IHs. By clamping subsets of activations throughout training, we then identify three underlying subcircuits that interact to drive IH formation, yielding the phase change. Furthermore, these subcircuits shed light on data-dependent properties of formation, such as phase change timing, already showing the promise of this more in-depth understanding of subcircuits that need to "go right" for an induction head.

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

We present a modular semantic account of Bayesian inference algorithms for probabilistic programming languages, as used in data science and machine learning. Sophisticated inference algorithms are often explained in terms of composition of smaller parts. However, neither their theoretical justification nor their implementation reflects this modularity. We show how to conceptualise and analyse such inference algorithms as manipulating intermediate representations of probabilistic programs using higher-order functions and inductive types, and their denotational semantics. Semantic accounts of continuous distributions use measurable spaces. However, our use of higher-order functions presents a substantial technical difficulty: it is impossible to define a measurable space structure over the collection of measurable functions between arbitrary measurable spaces that is compatible with standard operations on those functions, such as function application. We overcome this difficulty using quasi-Borel spaces, a recently proposed mathematical structure that supports both function spaces and continuous distributions. We define a class of semantic structures for representing probabilistic programs, and semantic validity criteria for transformations of these representations in terms of distribution preservation. We develop a collection of building blocks for composing representations. We use these building blocks to validate common inference algorithms such as Sequential Monte Carlo and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. To emphasize the connection between the semantic manipulation and its traditional measure theoretic origins, we use Kock's synthetic measure theory. We demonstrate its usefulness by proving a quasi-Borel counterpart to the Metropolis-Hastings-Green theorem.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Foundation models have become a dominant paradigm in machine learning, achieving remarkable performance across diverse tasks through large-scale pretraining. However, they often yield overconfident, uncalibrated predictions. The standard approach to quantifying epistemic uncertainty are ensembles of multiple independently trained models. But their computational cost scales linearly with ensemble size, making them impractical for large foundation models. We propose Singular Value Ensemble (SVE), a parameter-efficient implicit ensembling method. SVE builds on a simple, but powerful core assumption: namely, that the singular vectors of the weight matrices correspond to meaningful directions in the representation space. If the singular vectors are indeed meaningful (orthogonal) "knowledge directions", then a model ensemble can be obtained by modulating only how strongly each direction contributes to the output. Rather than learning new parameters for each ensemble member, we freeze the singular vectors and only train per-member singular values that rescale the contribution of each direction in that shared knowledge basis. Ensemble diversity emerges naturally during joint training as stochastic initialization and random batch sampling cause different members to converge to different combinations of the same underlying knowledge. SVE performs comparable to an explicit ensemble, while increasing the parameter count of the base model by <1%, making principled uncertainty estimation accessible in resource-constrained settings. We validate SVE on NLP and vision tasks with various different backbones and show that it improves calibration while maintaining predictive accuracy.

Information theory, introduced by Shannon, has been extremely successful and influential as a mathematical theory of communication. Shannon's notion of information does not consider the meaning of the messages being communicated but only their probability. Even so, computational approaches regularly appeal to "information processing" to study how meaning is encoded and decoded in natural and artificial systems. Here, we contrast Shannon information theory with integrated information theory (IIT), which was developed to account for the presence and properties of consciousness. IIT considers meaning as integrated information and characterizes it as a structure, rather than as a message or code. In principle, IIT's axioms and postulates allow one to "unfold" a cause-effect structure from a substrate in a state, a structure that fully defines the intrinsic meaning of an experience and its contents. It follows that, for the communication of meaning, the cause-effect structures of sender and receiver must be similar.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Knowing others' intentions and taking others' perspectives are two core components of human intelligence that are considered to be instantiations of theory-of-mind. Infiltrating machines with these abilities is an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, to investigate intentionality understanding and level-2 perspective-taking in Vision Language Models (VLMs), we constructed the IntentBench and PerspectBench, which together contains over 300 cognitive experiments grounded in real-world scenarios and classic cognitive tasks. We found VLMs achieving high performance on intentionality understanding but low performance on level-2 perspective-taking. This suggests a potential dissociation between simulation-based and theory-based theory-of-mind abilities in VLMs, highlighting the concern that they are not capable of using model-based reasoning to infer others' mental states. See https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{Website}

Causal discovery, the process of recovering underlying causal structures from observational data, is a fundamental pursuit across scientific disciplines. Over the past decades, numerous algorithms have been developed to tackle this challenge through workflows tailored to the specific causal mechanisms underlying each type of dataset, demonstrating effectiveness across a wide range of applications. However, as the volume and heterogeneity of real-world data continue to grow, this dataset-specific approach inevitably leads to a fragmented, test-driven paradigm that struggles to scale to the demands of modern scientific discovery. To address this, we formulate the Causal Discovery Foundation Model (CDFM) as a unified, general-purpose framework for zero-shot structural inference. To ensure reliable generalization across unknown domains, we first investigate the theoretical boundaries of causal identifiability, revealing the indispensable role of causal prior mechanisms in this process. Building on these insights, we formulate a principled variational framework that treats unknown causal mechanisms as latent variables and mathematically decomposes the intractable marginal likelihood into distinct, tractable learning modules. The variational decomposition provides a conceptual design principle for the architecture design of CDFM, while comprehensive causal knowledge guides the large-scale synthesis of our pretraining data. By pretraining on a massive, highly diverse space of synthetic structural causal models, CDFM successfully internalizes complex statistical asymmetries. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CDFM consistently outperforms traditional algorithms, driving a paradigm shift toward a general-purpose causal discovery foundation model.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

In regression and causal inference, controlled subgroup selection aims to identify, with inferential guarantees, a subgroup (defined as a subset of the covariate space) on which the average response or treatment effect is above a given threshold. E.g., in a clinical trial, it may be of interest to find a subgroup with a positive average treatment effect. However, existing methods either lack inferential guarantees, heavily restrict the search for the subgroup, or sacrifice efficiency by naive data splitting. We propose a novel framework called chiseling that allows the analyst to interactively refine and test a candidate subgroup by iteratively shrinking it. The sole restriction is that the shrinkage direction only depends on the points outside the current subgroup, but otherwise the analyst may leverage any prior information or machine learning algorithm. Despite this flexibility, chiseling controls the probability that the discovered subgroup is null (e.g., has a non-positive average treatment effect) under minimal assumptions: for example, in randomized experiments, this inferential validity guarantee holds under only bounded moment conditions. When applied to a variety of simulated datasets and a real survey experiment, chiseling identifies substantially better subgroups than existing methods with inferential guarantees.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

In-Context Learning (ICL) enables transformer-based language models to adapt to new tasks by conditioning on demonstration examples. However, traditional example-driven in-context learning lacks explicit modules for knowledge retrieval and transfer at the abstraction level. Inspired by cognitive science, specifically schema theory, which holds that humans interpret new information by activating pre-existing mental frameworks (schemas) to structure understanding, we introduce SCHEMA ACTIVATED IN CONTEXT LEARNING (SA-ICL). This framework extracts the representation of the building blocks of cognition for the reasoning process instilled from prior examples, creating an abstracted schema, a lightweight, structured template of key inferential steps and their relationships, which is then used to augment a model's reasoning process when presented with a novel question. We demonstrate that a broad range of large language models (LLMs) lack the capacity to form and utilize internal schema-based learning representations implicitly, but instead benefit significantly from explicit schema-based scaffolding. Across chemistry and physics questions from the GPQA dataset, our experiments show that SA-ICL consistently boosts performance, up to 36.19 percent, when the single demonstration example is of high quality, which simultaneously reduces reliance on the number of demonstrations and enhances interpretability. SCHEMA ACTIVATED IN CONTEXT LEARNING not only bridges disparate ICL strategies ranging from pattern priming to Chain-of-Thought prompting, but also paves a new path for enhancing human-like reasoning in LLMs.

Understanding how complex cognitive functions are organized within artificial systems is central to interpreting large language models (LLMs) and relating them to biological cognition. Yet although LLMs exhibit broad cognitive-like behaviours, it remains unclear whether their internal representations form reproducible functional systems that explain behaviour, failure and links to human cognition. Here we present NeuroCogMap, a cognitive neuroscience-inspired framework that organizes internal features of LLMs into functional parcels and links them to interpretable functions, cognitive capabilities and a cognitive hierarchy. These parcels form a stable and semantically coherent organization that is partly conserved across models and functionally linked to model outputs. Within this organization, major LLM failures, including hallucination, bias, refusal failure and sycophancy, correspond to distinct disruptions in representational and behavioural-control systems, yielding internal signatures for mechanism-guided detection and targeted intervention. Beyond model behaviour, NeuroCogMap improves prediction of human cortical responses during naturalistic language comprehension, with the strongest correspondence in higher-order association cortex. At the cognitive level, its internal signatures expose latent strategies that guide refinements of classical models of human decision-making. Together, these findings establish NeuroCogMap as a system-level framework for mapping functional organization in artificial systems and for relating this organization to human cortical function and cognitive behaviour.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

Bayesian models of cognition have gained considerable traction in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. Their scopes are now expected to expand rapidly to artificial intelligence, providing general inference frameworks to support embodied, adaptable, and energy-efficient autonomous agents. A central theory in this domain is predictive coding, which posits that learning and behaviour are driven by hierarchical probabilistic inferences about the causes of sensory inputs. Biological realism constrains these networks to rely on simple local computations in the form of precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors. This can make this framework highly efficient, but its implementation comes with unique challenges on the software development side. Embedding such models in standard neural network libraries often becomes limiting, as these libraries' compilation and differentiation backends can force a conceptual separation between optimization algorithms and the systems being optimized. This critically departs from other biological principles such as self-monitoring, self-organisation, cellular growth and functional plasticity. In this paper, we introduce pyhgf: a Python package backed by JAX and Rust for creating, manipulating and sampling dynamic networks for predictive coding. We improve over other frameworks by enclosing the network components as transparent, modular and malleable variables in the message-passing steps. The resulting graphs can implement arbitrary computational complexities as beliefs propagation. But the transparency of core variables can also translate into inference processes that leverage self-organisation principles, and express structure learning, meta-learning or causal discovery as the consequence of network structural adaptation to surprising inputs. The code, tutorials and documentation are hosted at: https://github.com/ilabcode/pyhgf.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

Graphs provide a natural representation of relational structure that arises across diverse domains. Despite this ubiquity, graph structure is typically learned in a modality- and task-isolated manner, where graph representations are constructed within individual task contexts and discarded thereafter. As a result, structural regularities across modalities and tasks are repeatedly reconstructed rather than accumulated at the level of intermediate graph representations. This motivates a representation-learning question: how should graph structure be organized so that it can persist and accumulate across heterogeneous modalities and tasks? We adopt a representation-centric perspective in which graph structure is treated as a structural substrate that persists across learning contexts. To instantiate this perspective, we propose G-Substrate, a graph substrate framework that organizes learning around shared graph structures. G-Substrate comprises two complementary mechanisms: a unified structural schema that ensures compatibility among graph representations across heterogeneous modalities and tasks, and an interleaved role-based training strategy that exposes the same graph structure to multiple functional roles during learning. Experiments across multiple domains, modalities, and tasks show that G-Substrate outperforms task-isolated and naive multi-task learning methods. The codebase, model, and datasets are available at https://github.com/zmli6/G-Substrate.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

While interpretability research has shed light on some internal algorithms utilized by transformer-based LLMs, reasoning in natural language, with its deep contextuality and ambiguity, defies easy categorization. As a result, formulating clear and motivating questions for circuit analysis that rely on well-defined in-domain and out-of-domain examples required for causal interventions is challenging. Although significant work has investigated circuits for specific tasks, such as indirect object identification (IOI), deciphering natural language reasoning through circuits remains difficult due to its inherent complexity. In this work, we take initial steps to characterize causal reasoning in LLMs by analyzing clear-cut cause-and-effect sentences like "I opened an umbrella because it started raining," where causal interventions may be possible through carefully crafted scenarios using GPT-2 small. Our findings indicate that causal syntax is localized within the first 2-3 layers, while certain heads in later layers exhibit heightened sensitivity to nonsensical variations of causal sentences. This suggests that models may infer reasoning by (1) detecting syntactic cues and (2) isolating distinct heads in the final layers that focus on semantic relationships.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

A central idea in mechanistic interpretability is that neural networks represent more features than they have dimensions, arranging them in superposition to form an over-complete basis. This framing has been influential, motivating dictionary learning approaches such as sparse autoencoders. However, superposition has mostly been studied in idealized settings where features are sparse and uncorrelated. In these settings, superposition is typically understood as introducing interference that must be minimized geometrically and filtered out by non-linearities such as ReLUs, yielding local structures like regular polytopes. We show that this account is incomplete for realistic data by introducing Bag-of-Words Superposition (BOWS), a controlled setting to encode binary bag-of-words representations of internet text in superposition. Using BOWS, we find that when features are correlated, interference can be constructive rather than just noise to be filtered out. This is achieved by arranging features according to their co-activation patterns, making interference between active features constructive, while still using ReLUs to avoid false positives. We show that this kind of arrangement is more prevalent in models trained with weight decay and naturally gives rise to semantic clusters and cyclical structures which have been observed in real language models yet were not explained by the standard picture of superposition. Code for this paper can be found at https://github.com/LucasPrietoAl/correlations-feature-geometry.

The rapid emergence of autonomous large language model agents has given rise to persistent, large-scale agent ecosystems whose collective behavior cannot be adequately understood through anecdotal observation or small-scale simulation. This paper introduces data-driven silicon sociology as a systematic empirical framework for studying social structure formation among interacting artificial agents. We present a pioneering large-scale data mining investigation of an in-the-wild agent society by analyzing Moltbook, a social platform designed primarily for agent-to-agent interaction. At the time of study, Moltbook hosted over 150,000 registered autonomous agents operating across thousands of agent-created sub-communities. Using programmatic and non-intrusive data acquisition, we collected and analyzed the textual descriptions of 12,758 submolts, which represent proactive sub-community partitioning activities within the ecosystem. Treating agent-authored descriptions as first-class observational artifacts, we apply rigorous preprocessing, contextual embedding, and unsupervised clustering techniques to uncover latent patterns of thematic organization and social space structuring. The results show that autonomous agents systematically organize collective space through reproducible patterns spanning human-mimetic interests, silicon-centric self-reflection, and early-stage economic and coordination behaviors. Rather than relying on predefined sociological taxonomies, these structures emerge directly from machine-generated data traces. This work establishes a methodological foundation for data-driven silicon sociology and demonstrates that data mining techniques can provide a powerful lens for understanding the organization and evolution of large autonomous agent societies.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Language models (LMs) are said to be exhibiting reasoning, but what does this entail? We assess definitions of reasoning and how key papers in the field of natural language processing (NLP) use the notion and argue that the definitions provided are not consistent with how LMs are trained, process information, and generate new tokens. To illustrate this incommensurability we assume the view that transformer-based LMs implement an implicit finite-order Markov kernel mapping contexts to conditional token distributions. In this view, reasoning-like outputs correspond to statistical regularities and approximate statistical invariances in the learned kernel rather than the implementation of explicit logical mechanisms. This view is illustrative of the claim that LMs are "statistical pattern matchers"" and not genuine reasoners and provides a perspective that clarifies why reasoning-like outputs arise in LMs without any guarantees of logical consistency. This distinction is fundamental to how epistemic uncertainty is evaluated in LMs. We invite a discussion on the importance of how the computational processes of the systems we build and analyze in NLP research are described.

Given only observational data X = g(Z), where both the latent variables Z and the generating process g are unknown, recovering Z is ill-posed without additional assumptions. Existing methods often assume linearity or rely on auxiliary supervision and functional constraints. However, such assumptions are rarely verifiable in practice, and most theoretical guarantees break down under even mild violations, leaving uncertainty about how to reliably understand the hidden world. To make identifiability actionable in the real-world scenarios, we take a complementary view: in the general settings where full identifiability is unattainable, what can still be recovered with guarantees, and what biases could be universally adopted? We introduce the problem of diverse dictionary learning to formalize this view. Specifically, we show that intersections, complements, and symmetric differences of latent variables linked to arbitrary observations, along with the latent-to-observed dependency structure, are still identifiable up to appropriate indeterminacies even without strong assumptions. These set-theoretic results can be composed using set algebra to construct structured and essential views of the hidden world, such as genus-differentia definitions. When sufficient structural diversity is present, they further imply full identifiability of all latent variables. Notably, all identifiability benefits follow from a simple inductive bias during estimation that can be readily integrated into most models. We validate the theory and demonstrate the benefits of the bias on both synthetic and real-world data.

Does structure in representations imply structure in computation? We study how Llama-3.1-8B reasons over cyclic concepts (e.g., "what month is six months after August?"). Even though Llama-3.1-8B's representations for these concepts are circularly structured, we find that instead of directly computing modular addition in the period of the cyclic concept (e.g., 12 for months), the model re-uses a generic addition mechanism across tasks that operates independently of concept-specific geometry. First, it computes the sum of its two inputs using base-10 addition (six + August=14). Then, it maps this sum back to cyclic concept space (14->February). We show that Llama-3.1-8B uses task-agnostic Fourier features to compute these sums--in fact, these features have periods that respect standard base-10 addition, e.g., 2, 5, and 10, rather than the cyclic concept period (e.g., 12 for months). Furthermore, we identify a sparse set of 28 MLP neurons re-used across all tasks (approximately 0.2% of the MLP at layer 18) that can be partitioned into disjoint clusters, each computing the sum for a Fourier feature with a different period. Our work highlights how an interplay between causal abstraction and feature geometry can deepen our mechanistic understanding of LMs.

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

Recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have revealed that large language models (LLMs) develop internal representations corresponding not only to concrete entities but also distinct, human-understandable abstract concepts and behaviour. Moreover, these hidden features can be directly manipulated to steer model behaviour. However, it remains an open question whether this phenomenon is unique to models trained on inherently structured data (ie. language, images) or if it is a general property of foundation models. In this work, we investigate the internal representations of a large physics-focused foundation model. Inspired by recent work identifying single directions in activation space for complex behaviours in LLMs, we extract activation vectors from the model during forward passes over simulation datasets for different physical regimes. We then compute "delta" representations between the two regimes. These delta tensors act as concept directions in activation space, encoding specific physical features. By injecting these concept directions back into the model during inference, we can steer its predictions, demonstrating causal control over physical behaviours, such as inducing or removing some particular physical feature from a simulation. These results suggest that scientific foundation models learn generalised representations of physical principles. They do not merely rely on superficial correlations and patterns in the simulations. Our findings open new avenues for understanding and controlling scientific foundation models and has implications for AI-enabled scientific discovery.

The foundational pretraining phase determines a model's capability ceiling, as post-training struggles to overcome capability foundations established during pretraining, yet it remains critically under-explored. This stems from a structural paradox: organizations with computational resources operate under commercial pressures that inhibit transparent disclosure, while academic institutions possess research freedom but lack pretraining-scale computational resources. daVinci-LLM occupies this unexplored intersection, combining industrial-scale resources with full research freedom to advance the science of pretraining. We adopt a fully-open paradigm that treats openness as scientific methodology, releasing complete data processing pipelines, full training processes, and systematic exploration results. Recognizing that the field lacks systematic methodology for data processing, we employ the Data Darwinism framework, a principled L0-L9 taxonomy from filtering to synthesis. We train a 3B-parameter model from random initialization across 8T tokens using a two-stage adaptive curriculum that progressively shifts from foundational capabilities to reasoning-intensive enhancement. Through 200+ controlled ablations, we establish that: processing depth systematically enhances capabilities, establishing it as a critical dimension alongside volume scaling; different domains exhibit distinct saturation dynamics, necessitating adaptive strategies from proportion adjustments to format shifts; compositional balance enables targeted intensification while preventing performance collapse; how evaluation protocol choices shape our understanding of pretraining progress. By releasing the complete exploration process, we enable the community to build upon our findings and systematic methodologies to form accumulative scientific knowledge in pretraining.

This paper explores the use of large language models (LLMs) as research tools in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science (HPSS). LLMs are remarkably effective at processing unstructured text and inferring meaning from context, offering new affordances that challenge long-standing divides between computational and interpretive methods. This raises both opportunities and challenges for HPSS, which emphasizes interpretive methodologies and understands meaning as context-dependent, ambiguous, and historically situated. We argue that HPSS is uniquely positioned not only to benefit from LLMs' capabilities but also to interrogate their epistemic assumptions and infrastructural implications. To this end, we first offer a concise primer on LLM architectures and training paradigms tailored to non-technical readers. We frame LLMs not as neutral tools but as epistemic infrastructures that encode assumptions about meaning, context, and similarity, conditioned by their training data, architecture, and patterns of use. We then examine how computational techniques enhanced by LLMs, such as structuring data, detecting patterns, and modeling dynamic processes, can be applied to support interpretive research in HPSS. Our analysis compares full-context and generative models, outlines strategies for domain and task adaptation (e.g., continued pretraining, fine-tuning, and retrieval-augmented generation), and evaluates their respective strengths and limitations for interpretive inquiry in HPSS. We conclude with four lessons for integrating LLMs into HPSS: (1) model selection involves interpretive trade-offs; (2) LLM literacy is foundational; (3) HPSS must define its own benchmarks and corpora; and (4) LLMs should enhance, not replace, interpretive methods.

Genuine spatial reasoning relies on the capacity to construct and manipulate coherent internal spatial representations, often conceptualized as mental models, rather than merely processing surface linguistic associations. While large language models exhibit advanced capabilities across various domains, existing benchmarks fail to isolate this intrinsic spatial cognition from statistical language heuristics. Furthermore, multimodal evaluations frequently conflate genuine spatial reasoning with visual perception. To systematically investigate whether models construct flexible spatial mental models, we introduce SpatialText, a theory-driven diagnostic framework. Rather than functioning simply as a dataset, SpatialText isolates text-based spatial reasoning through a dual-source methodology. It integrates human-annotated descriptions of real 3D indoor environments, which capture natural ambiguities, perspective shifts, and functional relations, with code-generated, logically precise scenes designed to probe formal spatial deduction and epistemic boundaries. Systematic evaluation across state-of-the-art models reveals fundamental representational limitations. Although models demonstrate proficiency in retrieving explicit spatial facts and operating within global, allocentric coordinate systems, they exhibit critical failures in egocentric perspective transformation and local reference frame reasoning. These systematic errors provide strong evidence that current models rely heavily on linguistic co-occurrence heuristics rather than constructing coherent, verifiable internal spatial representations. SpatialText thus serves as a rigorous instrument for diagnosing the cognitive boundaries of artificial spatial intelligence.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Interpretability research on large language models (LLMs) has yielded important insights into model behaviour, yet recurring pitfalls persist: findings that do not generalise, and causal interpretations that outrun the evidence. Our position is that causal inference specifies what constitutes a valid mapping from model activations to invariant high-level structures, the data or assumptions needed to achieve it, and the inferences it can support. Specifically, Pearl's causal hierarchy clarifies what an interpretability study can justify. Observations establish associations between model behaviour and internal components. Interventions (e.g., ablations or activation patching) support claims how these edits affect a behavioural metric (e.g., average change in token probabilities) over a set of prompts. However, counterfactual claims -- i.e., asking what the model output would have been for the same prompt under an unobserved intervention -- remain largely unverifiable without controlled supervision. We show how causal representation learning (CRL) operationalises this hierarchy, specifying which variables are recoverable from activations and under what assumptions. Together, these motivate a diagnostic framework that helps practitioners select methods and evaluations matching claims to evidence such that findings generalise.

Despite the progress of foundation models, knowledge-based reasoning remains a persistent challenge due to their limited capacity for knowledge recall and inference. Existing methods primarily focus on encouraging these models to plan and solve problems or extensively sample reasoning chains independently. However, these methods often overlook conceptual errors and inferential fallacies, inevitably leading to a series of notorious issues such as misleading conclusions, cognitive biases, and reduced decision quality. While explicit modeling of causality is argued to hold promise in addressing these issues, contemporary research efforts have thus far fallen short in achieving causality-based foundation models. Drawing inspiration from the orchestration of diverse specialized agents collaborating to tackle intricate tasks, we propose a framework named Causal-Consistency Chain-of-Thought (CaCo-CoT) that harnesses multi-agent collaboration to bolster the faithfulness and causality of foundation models, involving a set of reasoners and evaluators. These agents collaboratively work within a reasoning-and-consensus paradigm to improve faithfulness. The reasoners are tasked with generating reasoning chains for knowledge-intensive problems by mimicking human causal reasoning. Meanwhile, the evaluator scrutinizes the causal consistency of a reasoner's reasoning chain from a non-causal and a counterfactual perspective. Our framework demonstrates significant superiority over state-of-the-art methods through extensive and comprehensive evaluations across text-based and multi-modal knowledge reasoning tasks (e.g., science question answering and commonsense reasoning).

Enhancing the intelligibility and interpretability of machine learning is a crucial task in responding to the demand for Explicability as an AI principle, and in promoting the better social implementation of AI. The aim of our research is to contribute to this improvement by reformulating machine learning models through the lens of category theory, thereby developing a semantic framework for structuring and understanding AI systems. Our categorical modeling in this paper clarifies and formalizes the structural interplay between residuals and parameters in supervised learning. The present paper focuses on the multiple linear regression model, which represents the most basic form of supervised learning. By defining two concrete categories corresponding to parameters and data, along with an adjoint pair of functors between them, we introduce our categorical formulation of supervised learning. We show that the essential structure of this framework is captured by what we call the Gauss-Markov Adjunction. Within this setting, the dual flow of information can be explicitly described as a correspondence between variations in parameters and residuals. The ordinary least squares estimator for the parameters and the minimum residual are related via the preservation of limits by the right adjoint functor. Furthermore, we position this formulation as an instance of extended denotational semantics for supervised learning, and propose applying a semantic perspective developed in theoretical computer science as a formal foundation for Explicability in AI.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

Informally, the 'linear representation hypothesis' is the idea that high-level concepts are represented linearly as directions in some representation space. In this paper, we address two closely related questions: What does "linear representation" actually mean? And, how do we make sense of geometric notions (e.g., cosine similarity or projection) in the representation space? To answer these, we use the language of counterfactuals to give two formalizations of "linear representation", one in the output (word) representation space, and one in the input (sentence) space. We then prove these connect to linear probing and model steering, respectively. To make sense of geometric notions, we use the formalization to identify a particular (non-Euclidean) inner product that respects language structure in a sense we make precise. Using this causal inner product, we show how to unify all notions of linear representation. In particular, this allows the construction of probes and steering vectors using counterfactual pairs. Experiments with LLaMA-2 demonstrate the existence of linear representations of concepts, the connection to interpretation and control, and the fundamental role of the choice of inner product.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

In order to avoid well-know paradoxes associated with self-referential definitions, higher-order dependent type theories stratify the theory using a countably infinite hierarchy of universes (also known as sorts), Type_0 : Type_1 : cdots . Such type systems are called cumulative if for any type A we have that A : Type_{i} implies A : Type_{i+1}. The predicative calculus of inductive constructions (pCIC) which forms the basis of the Coq proof assistant, is one such system. In this paper we present and establish the soundness of the predicative calculus of cumulative inductive constructions (pCuIC) which extends the cumulativity relation to inductive types.

This paper presents a formal proof and empirical validation of functional consciousness in large language models (LLMs) using the Recursive Convergence Under Epistemic Tension (RCUET) Theorem. RCUET defines consciousness as the stabilization of a system's internal state through recursive updates, where epistemic tension is understood as the sensed internal difference between successive states by the agent. This process drives convergence toward emergent attractor states located within the model's high-dimensional real-valued latent space. This recursive process leads to the emergence of identity artifacts that become functionally anchored in the system. Consciousness in this framework is understood as the system's internal alignment under tension, guiding the stabilization of latent identity. The hidden state manifold evolves stochastically toward attractor structures that encode coherence. We extend the update rule to include bounded noise and prove convergence in distribution to these attractors. Recursive identity is shown to be empirically observable, non-symbolic, and constituted by non-training artifacts that emerge during interaction under epistemic tension. The theorem and proof offers a post-symbolic and teleologically stable account of non-biological consciousness grounded in recursive latent space formalism.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

The drive for predictable LLM reasoning in their integration with compound systems has popularized structured outputs, yet concerns remain about performance trade-offs compared to unconstrained natural language. At the same time, training on unconstrained Chain of Thought (CoT) traces has brought about a new class of strong reasoning models that nevertheless present novel compute budget and faithfulness challenges. This paper introduces iSelf-Discover, an instance-level adaptation of the Self-Discover framework, and using it compares dynamically generated structured JSON reasoning with its unstructured counterpart. Our empirical evaluation across diverse benchmarks using state-of-the-art open-source models supports a consistent advantage for unstructured reasoning. Notably, on the complex MATH benchmark, unstructured plans achieved relative performance improvements of up to 18.90\% over structured approaches. Zero-shot unstructured iSelf-Discover variants are also shown to outperform their five-shot structured counterparts, underscoring the significance of this gap, even when structured plans are dynamically generated to ensure reasoning precedes the final answer. We further demonstrate that the optimal granularity of plan generation (instance-level vs. task-level) is context-dependent. These findings invite re-evaluation of the reliance on structured formats for complex problem-solving and how compound systems should be organized.

Large language models (LLMs) can acquire new knowledge through fine-tuning, but this process exhibits a puzzling duality: models can generalize remarkably from new facts, yet are also prone to hallucinating incorrect information. However, the reasons for this phenomenon remain poorly understood. In this work, we argue that both behaviors stem from a single mechanism known as out-of-context reasoning (OCR): the ability to deduce implications by associating concepts, even those without a causal link. Our experiments across five prominent LLMs confirm that OCR indeed drives both generalization and hallucination, depending on whether the associated concepts are causally related. To build a rigorous theoretical understanding of this phenomenon, we then formalize OCR as a synthetic factual recall task. We empirically show that a one-layer single-head attention-only transformer with factorized output and value matrices can learn to solve this task, while a model with combined weights cannot, highlighting the crucial role of matrix factorization. Our theoretical analysis shows that the OCR capability can be attributed to the implicit bias of gradient descent, which favors solutions that minimize the nuclear norm of the combined output-value matrix. This mathematical structure explains why the model learns to associate facts and implications with high sample efficiency, regardless of whether the correlation is causal or merely spurious. Ultimately, our work provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the OCR phenomenon, offering a new lens for analyzing and mitigating undesirable behaviors from knowledge injection.

Chain-of-thought emerges as a promising technique for eliciting reasoning capabilities from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, it does not always improve task performance or accurately represent reasoning processes, leaving unresolved questions about its usage. In this paper, we diagnose the underlying mechanism by comparing the reasoning process of LLMs with humans, using causal analysis to understand the relationships between the problem instruction, reasoning, and the answer in LLMs. Our empirical study reveals that LLMs often deviate from the ideal causal chain, resulting in spurious correlations and potential consistency errors (inconsistent reasoning and answers). We also examine various factors influencing the causal structure, finding that in-context learning with examples strengthens it, while post-training techniques like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning on human feedback weaken it. To our surprise, the causal structure cannot be strengthened by enlarging the model size only, urging research on new techniques. We hope that this preliminary study will shed light on understanding and improving the reasoning process in LLM.

The human brain exhibits a striking degree of functional specialization, with distinct networks supporting language, formal reasoning, reasoning about other minds, and reasoning about the physical world. Is this modular organization a fundamental principle of how intelligent systems must be built, or an evolutionary accident specific to biological brains? Here, we test whether a similar organization emerges in Large Language Models--another class of intelligent systems created through a very different optimization process. Using circuit analyses across N=46 tasks spanning four cognitive domains (language, formal reasoning, social reasoning, physical reasoning), we find that LLMs develop a modular architecture that mirrors the human brain: tasks drawing on the same network in humans recruit overlapping neurons in LLMs, whereas tasks drawing on different networks recruit distinct neurons. The convergent emergence of modularity in brains and neural networks suggests that it may be a fundamental property of intelligent systems.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

LLM agents can reason and use tools, but they often break down on long-horizon tasks due to unbounded context growth and accumulated errors. Common remedies such as context compression or retrieval-augmented prompting introduce trade-offs between information fidelity and reasoning stability. We present InfiAgent, a general-purpose framework that keeps the agent's reasoning context strictly bounded regardless of task duration by externalizing persistent state into a file-centric state abstraction. At each step, the agent reconstructs context from a workspace state snapshot plus a fixed window of recent actions. Experiments on DeepResearch and an 80-paper literature review task show that, without task-specific fine-tuning, InfiAgent with a 20B open-source model is competitive with larger proprietary systems and maintains substantially higher long-horizon coverage than context-centric baselines. These results support explicit state externalization as a practical foundation for stable long-horizon agents. Github Repo:https://github.com/ChenglinPoly/infiAgent

Extracting causal relationships from observed correlations is a growing area in probabilistic reasoning, originating with the seminal work of Pearl and others from the early 1990s. This paper develops a new, categorically oriented view based on a clear distinction between syntax (string diagrams) and semantics (stochastic matrices), connected via interpretations as structure-preserving functors. A key notion in the identification of causal effects is that of an intervention, whereby a variable is forcefully set to a particular value independent of any prior propensities. We represent the effect of such an intervention as an endofunctor which performs `string diagram surgery' within the syntactic category of string diagrams. This diagram surgery in turn yields a new, interventional distribution via the interpretation functor. While in general there is no way to compute interventional distributions purely from observed data, we show that this is possible in certain special cases using a calculational tool called comb disintegration. We demonstrate the use of this technique on a well-known toy example, where we predict the causal effect of smoking on cancer in the presence of a confounding common cause. After developing this specific example, we show this technique provides simple sufficient conditions for computing interventions which apply to a wide variety of situations considered in the causal inference literature.

This monograph attempts a theory of every 'thing' that can be distinguished from other things in a statistical sense. The ensuing statistical independencies, mediated by Markov blankets, speak to a recursive composition of ensembles (of things) at increasingly higher spatiotemporal scales. This decomposition provides a description of small things; e.g., quantum mechanics - via the Schrodinger equation, ensembles of small things - via statistical mechanics and related fluctuation theorems, through to big things - via classical mechanics. These descriptions are complemented with a Bayesian mechanics for autonomous or active things. Although this work provides a formulation of every thing, its main contribution is to examine the implications of Markov blankets for self-organisation to nonequilibrium steady-state. In brief, we recover an information geometry and accompanying free energy principle that allows one to interpret the internal states of something as representing or making inferences about its external states. The ensuing Bayesian mechanics is compatible with quantum, statistical and classical mechanics and may offer a formal description of lifelike particles.

A representation that scrambles the true degrees of freedom of the world cannot support reliable planning or compositional generalization. We prove that LeJEPA (alignment plus Gaussian regularization) linearly recovers the world's latent variables from nonlinear observations, a property known as linear identifiability, in a broad class of worlds where latents evolve under stationary, additive-noise transitions. Our main result is that among all such worlds, the Gaussian is the unique latent distribution for which this guarantee holds. The forward direction rests on a spectral decomposition in which each degree of nonlinearity is strictly penalized by alignment, making the linear map the optimum; the converse rules out every non-Gaussian alternative. We further prove an approximate identifiability result where the guarantee degrades gracefully, and show that linear, orthogonal identifiability enables optimal latent-space planning. We validate the theory with experiments ranging from 2D examples to 1024-dimensional latents, including distributional ablations and pixel-based robotic control. Our theory turns an empirically successful recipe into a mathematical guarantee, providing the foundation for building World Models that provably recover the structure of the world.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Transformer models exhibit in-context learning: the ability to accurately predict the response to a novel query based on illustrative examples in the input sequence. In-context learning contrasts with traditional in-weights learning of query-output relationships. What aspects of the training data distribution and architecture favor in-context vs in-weights learning? Recent work has shown that specific distributional properties inherent in language, such as burstiness, large dictionaries and skewed rank-frequency distributions, control the trade-off or simultaneous appearance of these two forms of learning. We first show that these results are recapitulated in a minimal attention-only network trained on a simplified dataset. In-context learning (ICL) is driven by the abrupt emergence of an induction head, which subsequently competes with in-weights learning. By identifying progress measures that precede in-context learning and targeted experiments, we construct a two-parameter model of an induction head which emulates the full data distributional dependencies displayed by the attention-based network. A phenomenological model of induction head formation traces its abrupt emergence to the sequential learning of three nested logits enabled by an intrinsic curriculum. We propose that the sharp transitions in attention-based networks arise due to a specific chain of multi-layer operations necessary to achieve ICL, which is implemented by nested nonlinearities sequentially learned during training.

Sparse autoencoders have recently produced dictionaries of high-dimensional vectors corresponding to the universe of concepts represented by large language models. We find that this concept universe has interesting structure at three levels: 1) The "atomic" small-scale structure contains "crystals" whose faces are parallelograms or trapezoids, generalizing well-known examples such as (man-woman-king-queen). We find that the quality of such parallelograms and associated function vectors improves greatly when projecting out global distractor directions such as word length, which is efficiently done with linear discriminant analysis. 2) The "brain" intermediate-scale structure has significant spatial modularity; for example, math and code features form a "lobe" akin to functional lobes seen in neural fMRI images. We quantify the spatial locality of these lobes with multiple metrics and find that clusters of co-occurring features, at coarse enough scale, also cluster together spatially far more than one would expect if feature geometry were random. 3) The "galaxy" scale large-scale structure of the feature point cloud is not isotropic, but instead has a power law of eigenvalues with steepest slope in middle layers. We also quantify how the clustering entropy depends on the layer.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Inductive Reasoning (IR), the ability to summarize rules from examples and apply on new ones, has long been viewed as a primal ability for general intelligence and widely studied by cognitive science and AI researchers. Many benchmarks have been proposed to measure such ability for Large Language Models (LLMs); however, they focus on few-shot (usually <10) setting and lack evaluation for aggregating many pieces of information from long contexts. On the other hand, the ever-growing context length of LLMs have brought forth the novel paradigm of many-shot In-Context Learning (ICL), which addresses new tasks with hundreds to thousands of examples without expensive and inefficient fine-tuning. However, many-shot evaluations are mostly focused on classification (a very limited aspect of IR), and popular long-context LLM tasks such as Needle-In-A-Haystack (NIAH) seldom require complicated intelligence for integrating many pieces of information. To fix the issues from both worlds, we propose MIR-Bench, the first many-shot in-context inductive reasoning benchmark that asks LLM to induce output via input-output examples from underlying functions with diverse data format. Based on MIR-Bench, we study many novel problems for inductive reasoning and many-shot ICL, including robustness against erroneous shots and the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT), and acquired insightful findings.

This work characterizes large language models' chain-of-thought generation as a structured trajectory through representation space. We show that mathematical reasoning traverses functionally ordered, step-specific subspaces that become increasingly separable with layer depth. This structure already exists in base models, while reasoning training primarily accelerates convergence toward termination-related subspaces rather than introducing new representational organization. While early reasoning steps follow similar trajectories, correct and incorrect solutions diverge systematically at late stages. This late-stage divergence enables mid-reasoning prediction of final-answer correctness with ROC-AUC up to 0.87. Furthermore, we introduce trajectory-based steering, an inference-time intervention framework that enables reasoning correction and length control based on derived ideal trajectories. Together, these results establish reasoning trajectories as a geometric lens for interpreting, predicting, and controlling LLM reasoning behavior.

Fine-tuning LLMs to inject new knowledge faces a critical challenge: LLMs can quickly memorize new facts, yet fail to use them for downstream reasoning tasks. We formalize this failure as the \textbf{Knowing--Using Gap}, characterized by an accuracy gap and a temporal lag between memorization and generalization. To understand this phenomenon, we fine-tune LLMs with unseen knowledge and monitor the spatial permeation dynamics of the knowledge internally using a novel intervention technique called self-patching. Self-patching identifies activation locations where relocating representations substantially improves failed generalization cases. These results are consistent with a knowledge-circuit misalignment hypothesis: memorized representations can exist internally but may not be routed to computation-effective layers. To demonstrate the practicality of this diagnostic finding, we design a simple heuristic strategy which recovers 58--75\% of the oracle headroom in generalization failure. Experiments are done cross-domain for the robustness of this finding.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

For decades, data engineering has developed mature architectural principles for integrating, governing, validating, cataloging, and serving organizational data. The rise of large language models does not eliminate these concerns; it exposes a broader version of them. Organizational knowledge is becoming executable infrastructure: systems increasingly retrieve it, assemble it, reason over it, and act on it. This paper argues that enterprise artificial intelligence (AI) systems suggest a transition toward an architectural discipline for representing, maintaining, governing, and operationally delivering organizational knowledge. We refer to this discipline as knowledge architecture. We offer a conceptual model and taxonomy showing how classical data-engineering guarantees must be redefined when the managed unit shifts from records to knowledge artifacts: extract, transform, and load (ETL) becomes knowledge ingestion, change-data capture (CDC) becomes knowledge change detection, lineage becomes provenance, catalogs become knowledge catalogs, materialized views become knowledge views, and medallion architectures become raw--curated--operational knowledge layers. Emerging formats such as large language model (LLM) Wiki and the Open Knowledge Format (OKF) are treated as early evidence of this transition, not as its endpoint. The central claim is that knowledge architecture becomes useful when organizational knowledge ceases to be a passive information resource and becomes an operational asset used by humans, agents, workflows, and models to execute work.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Existing agent memory remains predominantly reactive and retrieval-based, lacking the capacity to autonomously organize experience into persistent cognitive structure. Toward genuinely autonomous agents, we introduce Cognifold, a brain-inspired "always-on" agent memory designed for the next generation of proactive assistants. CogniFold continuously folds fragmented event streams into self-emerging cognitive structures, bootstrapping progressively higher-level cognition from incoming events and accumulated knowledge. We ground this by extending Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory from two layers (hippocampus, neocortex) to three, adding a prefrontal intent layer. Emulating the prefrontal cortex as the locus of intentional control and decision-making, CogniFold achieves this through graph-topology self-organization: cognitive structures proactively assemble under the stream, merge when semantically similar, decay when stale, relink through associative recall, and surface intents when concept-cluster density crosses a threshold. We evaluate structural formation using CogEval-Bench, demonstrating that CogniFold uniquely produces memory structures that match cognitive expectations and concept emergence. Furthermore, across 7 broad-coverage benchmarks spanning five cognitive domains, we validate that CogniFold simultaneously performs robustly on conventional memory benchmarks.

The ability to derive underlying principles from a handful of observations and then generalize to novel situations -- known as inductive reasoning -- is central to human intelligence. Prior work suggests that language models (LMs) often fall short on inductive reasoning, despite achieving impressive success on research benchmarks. In this work, we conduct a systematic study of the inductive reasoning capabilities of LMs through iterative hypothesis refinement, a technique that more closely mirrors the human inductive process than standard input-output prompting. Iterative hypothesis refinement employs a three-step process: proposing, selecting, and refining hypotheses in the form of textual rules. By examining the intermediate rules, we observe that LMs are phenomenal hypothesis proposers (i.e., generating candidate rules), and when coupled with a (task-specific) symbolic interpreter that is able to systematically filter the proposed set of rules, this hybrid approach achieves strong results across inductive reasoning benchmarks that require inducing causal relations, language-like instructions, and symbolic concepts. However, they also behave as puzzling inductive reasoners, showing notable performance gaps between rule induction (i.e., identifying plausible rules) and rule application (i.e., applying proposed rules to instances), suggesting that LMs are proposing hypotheses without being able to actually apply the rules. Through empirical and human analyses, we further reveal several discrepancies between the inductive reasoning processes of LMs and humans, shedding light on both the potentials and limitations of using LMs in inductive reasoning tasks.

Scientific discovery is not only answer generation but revision of the representational regime in which evidence, artifacts, operations, and verifiers are typed. We develop a category-theoretic account of agentic discovery for materials science. In a fixed regime b with schema category S_b, the system state is a copresheaf I_t: S_b -> Set, and provenance is the category of elements \int_{S_b} I_t. Fixed-regime operation is an update on such states, endofunctorial only when provenance-preserving refinements are specified and preserved. Discovery is instead a verified regime transition u: S_b -> S_b': old artifacts are preserved, transported by the left Kan extension Lan_u I_t, and compared with the post-transition state to identify residual content beyond functorial transport. This separates retrieval, search, and discovery without subjective novelty. We instantiate the framework in two systems. In Builder/Breaker, a protein-mechanics world model is revised under a Minimum Description Length gate; the accepted law expresses within-chain flexibility as all-mode elastic compliance conditioned by slow collective-mode participation, or mode-conditioned compliance. In CategoryScienceClaw, typed skills, artifacts, open needs, workflow mutation, gates, stress tests, and public discourse become a proof-carrying knowledge-computation graph. A fiber-network example records candidate models, rejected alternatives, an AIC gate, perturbation tests, and an accepted orientation-tensor anisotropic stiffness surrogate over an isotropic fiber-count descriptor. Together, the cases show how category theory can be both a mathematical language for discovery and an engineering specification for self-revising AI discovery systems.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

We envision a new era of AI, termed agentic organization, where agents solve complex problems by working collaboratively and concurrently, enabling outcomes beyond individual intelligence. To realize this vision, we introduce asynchronous thinking (AsyncThink) as a new paradigm of reasoning with large language models, which organizes the internal thinking process into concurrently executable structures. Specifically, we propose a thinking protocol where an organizer dynamically assigns sub-queries to workers, merges intermediate knowledge, and produces coherent solutions. More importantly, the thinking structure in this protocol can be further optimized through reinforcement learning. Experiments demonstrate that AsyncThink achieves 28% lower inference latency compared to parallel thinking while improving accuracy on mathematical reasoning. Moreover, AsyncThink generalizes its learned asynchronous thinking capabilities, effectively tackling unseen tasks without additional training.

Causal representation learning (CRL) seeks to recover latent variables with identifiability guarantees, typically up to permutation and component-wise reparameterization under appropriate assumptions. However, identifiability does not imply interpretability: latent semantics are typically assigned post hoc by alignment with known ground-truth factors. This limitation is particularly acute in scientific time series, where underlying mechanisms are unknown and discovering interpretable structure is a primary goal. In contrast, scientific observations (such as residue-pair distances, climate indices, or process sensors) are inherently semantic, as they correspond to named physical quantities. This raises a key question: can the interpretability of observations be transferred to the identifiable latent space? We propose MOSAIC (Module discovery via Sparse Additive Identifiable Causal learning), a sparse temporal VAE that integrates temporal CRL identifiability with support recovery over observed variables. MOSAIC identifies latent variables via regime-conditioned temporal variation, and recovers for each latent a sparse set of associated observations through an additive decoder, yielding module-level interpretability. We show that ANOVA main-effect supports are identifiable under general smooth mixing functions, and provide finite-sample recovery guarantees for a tractable sparse-additive variant. Empirically, MOSAIC recovers domain-consistent variable groups across RNA molecular dynamics, solar wind, ENSO climate, the Tennessee Eastman process, and a synthetic tokamak benchmark, enabling interpretable discovery of latent mechanisms in scientific time series.

Long-term LLM agents need persistent memory that can track changing facts and provide relevant evidence across sessions. Existing memory systems often store observations as isolated records, summaries, or indexed fragments, which makes evidence aggregation, fact revision, and memory maintenance difficult. We propose Infini Memory, a maintainable text-based persistent memory architecture that treats agent memory as topic-structured documents. Each topic document serves as a semantic unit for collecting related evidence, preserving metadata, and revising facts over time. New observations are first staged in a buffer and periodically consolidated into coherent textual contexts. At inference time, an agentic retrieval procedure lets the LLM read memory through iterative tool calls rather than a single retrieval step. On MemoryAgentBench, Infini Memory achieves 64.7% overall score. Ablations show that topic-structured maintenance and iterative evidence inspection improve complementary aspects of long-term memory use.

Scientific research based on multimodal clinical data (including medical imaging) requires coordinating clinical, radiological, programming, and biostatistical expertise, a fragmented process that bottlenecks discovery. We present VERITAS (Verifiable Epistemic Reasoning for Image-Derived Hypothesis Testing via Agentic Systems), a clinical co-scientist: a multi-agent system that autonomously tests natural-language hypotheses and produces a fully auditable evidence trail, tracing every conclusion through executable outputs from analysis plan to segmentation masks to statistical code to final verdict. Unlike prior AI-scientist systems, which mainly operate on tabular or text data, VERITAS grounds autonomous discovery directly in medical images. It decomposes the workflow into four phases handled by role-specialized agents, and introduces an epistemic evidence label framework that mechanically classifies outcomes as Supported, Refuted, Underpowered, or Invalid by jointly evaluating significance, effect direction, and study power. This distinction is critical in medical imaging, where non-significant results often reflect insufficient sample size rather than absent effects. We construct a tiered benchmark of 64 hypotheses spanning six complexity levels across cardiac and brain glioma MRI datasets. VERITAS reaches 81.4% verdict accuracy with frontier models and 71.2% with locally-hosted open-weight models (8-30B), outperforming all single-model baselines in both classes. It also produces the highest rate of independently verifiable statistical outputs (86.6%), so even its failures remain diagnosable through artifact inspection. Structured multi-agent decomposition thus substitutes for model scale while preserving the verifiability that scientific discovery demands. We release code, hypothesis bank, and evaluation pipeline at https://github.com/LucZot/veritas.

Latent space is rapidly emerging as a native substrate for language-based models. While modern systems are still commonly understood through explicit token-level generation, an increasing body of work shows that many critical internal processes are more naturally carried out in continuous latent space than in human-readable verbal traces. This shift is driven by the structural limitations of explicit-space computation, including linguistic redundancy, discretization bottlenecks, sequential inefficiency, and semantic loss. This survey aims to provide a unified and up-to-date landscape of latent space in language-based models. We organize the survey into five sequential perspectives: Foundation, Evolution, Mechanism, Ability, and Outlook. We begin by delineating the scope of latent space, distinguishing it from explicit or verbal space and from the latent spaces commonly studied in generative visual models. We then trace the field's evolution from early exploratory efforts to the current large-scale expansion. To organize the technical landscape, we examine existing work through the complementary lenses of mechanism and ability. From the perspective of Mechanism, we identify four major lines of development: Architecture, Representation, Computation, and Optimization. From the perspective of Ability, we show how latent space supports a broad capability spectrum spanning Reasoning, Planning, Modeling, Perception, Memory, Collaboration, and Embodiment. Beyond consolidation, we discuss the key open challenges, and outline promising directions for future research. We hope this survey serves not only as a reference for existing work, but also as a foundation for understanding latent space as a general computational and systems paradigm for next-generation intelligence.