Technique
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_ID
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_Description
stringclasses 79
values | Tactic
stringclasses 22
values | Tactic_Description
stringclasses 22
values | Mitigation Name
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description
float64 | MIT_ID
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description
stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4
stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013
stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019
stringclasses 22
values | References
stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link
stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET
stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source
stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level
stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links
stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links
stringclasses 79
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Change Operating Mode
|
T0858
|
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Execution, Evasion
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0858
|
Change Operating Mode
|
T0858
|
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Execution, Evasion
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0858
|
Change Operating Mode
|
T0858
|
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Execution, Evasion
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0858
|
Change Operating Mode
|
T0858
|
Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download. Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Execution, Evasion
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0858
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Command-Line Interface
|
T0807
|
Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments. Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0807
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Commonly Used Port
|
T0885
|
Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0885
|
Connection Proxy
|
T0884
|
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
| null |
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
| null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0884
|
Connection Proxy
|
T0884
|
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
| null |
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
| null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0884
|
Connection Proxy
|
T0884
|
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
| null |
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
| null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0884
|
Connection Proxy
|
T0884
|
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
SSL/TLS Inspection
| null |
M0920
|
Break and inspect SSL/TLS sessions to look at encrypted web traffic for adversary activity.
| null | null | null | null | null | null |
Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
| null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0920
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0884
|
Damage to Property
|
T0879
|
Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Mechanical Protection Layers
| null |
M0805
|
Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. [1]
| null | null | null |
1. A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith. (2004). APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY — IEC 61511. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0805
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879
|
Damage to Property
|
T0879
|
Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879
|
Damage to Property
|
T0879
|
Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Safety Instrumented Systems
| null |
M0812
|
Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition [1] . Ensure that all SISs are segmented from operational networks to prevent them from being targeted by additional adversarial behavior.
| null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0812
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0879
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Data Backup
| null |
M0953
|
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
|
CP-9
|
SR 7.3
|
CR 7.3
|
1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Data Backup
| null |
M0953
|
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
|
CP-9
|
SR 7.3
|
CR 7.3
|
1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Data Backup
| null |
M0953
|
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
|
CP-9
|
SR 7.3
|
CR 7.3
|
1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data Destruction
|
T0809
|
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0809
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Privileged Account Management
| null |
M0926
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Data from Information Repositories
|
T0811
|
Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases or local machines in the process environment, as well as workstations and databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, File: File Access
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0811
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Default Credentials
|
T0812
|
Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed.
|
Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0812
|
Denial of Control
|
T0813
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Data Backup
| null |
M0953
|
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
|
CP-9
|
SR 7.3
|
CR 7.3
|
1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813
|
Denial of Control
|
T0813
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Out-of-Band Communications Channel
| null |
M0810
|
Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2]
|
SC-37
| null | null |
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813
|
Denial of Control
|
T0813
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Redundancy of Service
| null |
M0811
|
Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys.
|
CP-9
| null | null |
1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0813
|
Denial of Service
|
T0814
|
Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Watchdog Timers
| null |
M0815
|
Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is unresponsive.
| null | null |
CR 7.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0815
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0814
|
Denial of Service
|
T0814
|
Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Watchdog Timers
| null |
M0815
|
Utilize watchdog timers to ensure devices can quickly detect whether a system is unresponsive.
| null | null |
CR 7.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0815
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0814
|
Denial of View
|
T0815
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Data Backup
| null |
M0953
|
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key systems to enable quick recovery and response from adversarial activities that impact control, view, or availability.
|
CP-9
|
SR 7.3
|
CR 7.3
|
1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815
|
Denial of View
|
T0815
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Out-of-Band Communications Channel
| null |
M0810
|
Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2]
|
SC-37
| null | null |
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815
|
Denial of View
|
T0815
|
Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Redundancy of Service
| null |
M0811
|
Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys.
|
CP-9
| null | null |
1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0815
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Authorization Enforcement
| null |
M0800
|
The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 62351 provides examples of roles used to support common system operations within the electric power sector [1], while IEEE 1686 defines standard permissions for users of IEDs. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
Detect Operating Mode
|
T0868
|
Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g., run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0868
|
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