Technique stringclasses 79
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values | Tactic stringclasses 22
values | Tactic_Description stringclasses 22
values | Mitigation Name stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description float64 | MIT_ID stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 stringclasses 22
values | References stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links stringclasses 79
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Account Use Policies | null | M0936 | Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, etc. | IA-5 | SR 1.11 | CR 1.11 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0936 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Active Directory Configuration | null | M0915 | Configure Active Directory to prevent use of certain techniques; use security identifier (SID) Filtering, etc. | null | null | null | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. (2015, August). Understanding When to Use LDAP or RADIUS for Centralized Authentication. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Application%20Notes/AN2015-08_20150817.pdf? | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0915 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Application Developer Guidance | null | M0913 | This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. | AT-3 | null | null | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0913 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Multi-factor Authentication | null | M0932 | Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. Within industrial control environments assets such as low-level controllers, workstations, and HMIs have real-time operational control and safety requiremen... | IA-2 | SR 1.7 | CR 1.7 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0932 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Password Policies | null | M0927 | Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. | IA-5 | SR 1.5 | CR 1.5 | 1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | Privileged Account Management | null | M0926 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0926 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Control Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Data Historian | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Engineering Workstation | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Input/Output Server | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Valid Accounts | T0859 | Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the netwo... | Persistence, Lateral Movement | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Input/Output Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Input/Output Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation | null | M0806 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. [1] To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. [2] | SC-40 | SR 1.6 | CR 1.6 | 2. DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/saver-msr-rf-detection_cod-508_10july2019.pdf | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation | null | M0806 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. [1] To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. [2] | SC-40 | SR 1.6 | CR 1.6 | 2. DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/saver-msr-rf-detection_cod-508_10july2019.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation | null | M0806 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. [1] To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. [2] | SC-40 | SR 1.6 | CR 1.6 | 2. DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/saver-msr-rf-detection_cod-508_10july2019.pdf | Input/Output Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Compromise | T0860 | Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device. Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as t... | Initial Access | The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Input/Output Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0860 |
Wireless Sniffing | T0887 | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates th... | Discovery, Collection | The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0887 |
Wireless Sniffing | T0887 | Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates th... | Discovery, Collection | The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal. | Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation | null | M0806 | Wireless signals frequently propagate outside of organizational boundaries, which provide opportunities for adversaries to monitor or gain unauthorized access to the wireless network. [1] To minimize this threat, organizations should implement measures to detect, understand, and reduce unnecessary RF propagation. [2] | SC-40 | SR 1.6 | CR 1.6 | 2. DHS National Urban Security Technology Laboratory. (2019, April). Radio Frequency Detection, Spectrum Analysis, and Direction Finding Equipment. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/saver-msr-rf-detection_cod-508_10july2019.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0806 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0887 |
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