Technique stringclasses 79
values | Technique_ID stringclasses 79
values | Technique_Description stringclasses 79
values | Tactic stringclasses 22
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values | Mitigation Name stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description float64 | MIT_ID stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013 stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019 stringclasses 22
values | References stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links stringclasses 79
values |
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Loss of Availability | T0826 | Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Redundancy of Service | null | M0811 | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. | CP-9 | null | null | 1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877 | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0826 |
Loss of Control | T0827 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827 |
Loss of Control | T0827 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827 |
Loss of Control | T0827 | Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Redundancy of Service | null | M0811 | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. | CP-9 | null | null | 1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877 | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0827 |
Loss of Productivity and Revenue | T0828 | Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-s... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0828 |
Loss of Protection | T0837 | Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | No Mitigation | null | M0000 | This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0837 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0837 |
Loss of Safety | T0880 | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Mechanical Protection Layers | null | M0805 | Utilize a layered protection design based on physical or mechanical protection systems to prevent damage to property, equipment, human safety, or the environment. Examples include interlocks, rupture disk, release values, etc. [1] | null | null | null | 1. A G Foord, W G Gulland, C R Howard, T Kellacher, W H Smith. (2004). APPLYING THE LATEST STANDARD FOR FUNCTIONAL SAFETY — IEC 61511. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://www.icheme.org/media/9906/xviii-paper-23.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0805 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880 |
Loss of Safety | T0880 | Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Safety Instrumented Systems | null | M0812 | Utilize Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) to provide an additional layer of protection to hazard scenarios that may cause property damage. A SIS will typically include sensors, logic solvers, and a final control element that can be used to automatically respond to an hazardous condition [1] . Ensure that all SISs are s... | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0812 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0880 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Redundancy of Service | null | M0811 | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. | CP-9 | null | null | 1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877 | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Loss of View | T0829 | Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view ... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Redundancy of Service | null | M0811 | Redundancy could be provided for both critical ICS devices and services, such as back-up devices or hot-standbys. | CP-9 | null | null | 1. M. Rentschler and H. Heine. (n.d.). The Parallel Redundancy Protocol for industrial IP networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6505877 | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0811 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0829 |
Manipulate I/O Image | T0835 | Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Mitigation Limited or Not Effective | null | M0816 | This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. | null | null | null | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Device Alarm | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0835 |
Manipulation of Control | T0831 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control p... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0831 |
Manipulation of Control | T0831 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control p... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0831 |
Manipulation of Control | T0831 | Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control p... | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | null | null | null | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0831 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | null | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | null | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Data Backup | null | M0953 | Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [1], including the management of 'gold-copy' back-up images and configurations for key ... | CP-9 | SR 7.3 | CR 7.3 | 1. Department of Homeland Security 2009, October Developing an Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Incident Response Capability Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/final-RP_ics_cybersecurity_incident_response_100609.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0953 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Engineering Workstation | null | Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | null | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Manipulation of View | T0832 | Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | Impact | The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment. | Out-of-Band Communications Channel | null | M0810 | Have alternative methods to support communication requirements during communication failures and data integrity attacks. [1] [2] | SC-37 | null | null | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | null | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0810 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0832 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Control Server | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Execution Prevention | null | M0938 | Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking. | SI-3 | SR 3.2 | CR 3.2 | null | null | Control Server | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Execution Prevention | null | M0938 | Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking. | SI-3 | SR 3.2 | CR 3.2 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Restrict File and Directory Permissions | null | M0922 | Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts. | AC-6 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Control Server | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Masquerading | T0849 | Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and nam... | Evasion | The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses. | Restrict File and Directory Permissions | null | M0922 | Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts. | AC-6 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0849 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Segmentation | null | M0930 | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network acces... | AC-3 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Segmentation | null | M0930 | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network acces... | AC-3 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Segmentation | null | M0930 | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network acces... | AC-3 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Segmentation | null | M0930 | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network acces... | AC-3 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Network Segmentation | null | M0930 | Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network acces... | AC-3 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | Software Process and Device Authentication | null | M0813 | Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs. | IA-9 | SR 1.2 | CR 1.2 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Device Configuration/Parameters | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | No Level Identified | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Alarm Settings | T0838 | Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and ... | Inhibit Response Function | The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state. | User Account Management | null | M0918 | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. | AC-2 | SR 1.3 | CR 1.3 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0838 |
Modify Controller Tasking | T0821 | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. | Execution | The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | File: File Modification, Asset: Software/Firmware | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821 |
Modify Controller Tasking | T0821 | Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. | Execution | The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | File: File Modification, Asset: Software/Firmware | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0821 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Control Server | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Human-Machine Interface | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 1 Level 2 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Parameter | T0836 | Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a prog... | Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Authorization Enforcement | null | M0800 | The device or system should restrict read, manipulate, or execute privileges to only authenticated users who require access based on approved security policies. Role-based Access Control (RBAC) schemes can help reduce the overhead of assigning permissions to the large number of devices within an ICS. For example, IEC 6... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 3. MITRE. (2020, June). CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - API Abuse. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/227.html | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Device Alarm, Asset: Device Configuration/Parameters | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0800 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0836 |
Modify Program | T0889 | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and pro... | Persistence | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | File: File Modification, Asset: Software/Firmware | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889 |
Modify Program | T0889 | Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and pro... | Persistence | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | File: File Modification, Asset: Software/Firmware | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0889 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Access Management | null | M0801 | Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent acc... | AC-3 | SR 2.1 | CR 2.1 | 1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Audit | null | M0947 | Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic... | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | 1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Boot Integrity | null | M0946 | Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms. | SI-7 | null | CR 3.14 | 1. N/A. (n.d.). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. ESET Research Whitepapers. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Intel. (n.d.). Intel Hardware-based Security Technologies for Intelligent Ret... | https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/security-technologies-4th-gen-core-retail-paper.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0946 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Boot Integrity | null | M0946 | Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms. | SI-7 | null | CR 3.14 | 1. N/A. (n.d.). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. ESET Research Whitepapers. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Intel. (n.d.). Intel Hardware-based Security Technologies for Intelligent Ret... | https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/security-technologies-4th-gen-core-retail-paper.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0946 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Code Signing | null | M0945 | Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing. | SI-7 | SR 3.4 | CR 3.4 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Communication Authenticity | null | M0802 | When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections. | SC-8; SC-23 | SR 3.1 | CR 3.1 | 1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003 | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Encrypt Network Traffic | null | M0808 | Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications. | SC-8 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Encrypt Sensitive Information | null | M0941 | Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption. | SC-28 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Encrypt Sensitive Information | null | M0941 | Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption. | SC-28 | SR 4.1 | CR 4.1 | 1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020. | https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Filter Network Traffic | null | M0937 | Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowli... | AC-3; SC-7 | SR 5.1 | CR 5.1 | 1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17 | https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Human User Authentication | null | M0804 | Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the targ... | IA-2 | SR 1.1 | CR 1.1 | null | null | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
Module Firmware | T0839 | Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment. | Persistence, Impair Process Control | The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes. | Network Allowlists | null | M0807 | Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic... | AC-3 | null | null | 1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020. | https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf | Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay | Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow | Level 0 Level 1 | https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807 | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0839 |
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