Technique
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_ID
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_Description
stringclasses 79
values | Tactic
stringclasses 22
values | Tactic_Description
stringclasses 22
values | Mitigation Name
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description
float64 | MIT_ID
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description
stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4
stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013
stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019
stringclasses 22
values | References
stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link
stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET
stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source
stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level
stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links
stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links
stringclasses 79
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Control Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Data Historian
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Human-Machine Interface
| null |
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Input/Output Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Control Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Data Historian
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
| null |
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Control Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Data Historian
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
| null |
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Supply Chain Management
| null |
M0817
|
Implement a supply chain management program, including policies and procedures to ensure all devices and components originate from a trusted supplier and are tested to verify their integrity.
|
SA-12
| null | null |
1. Robert A. Martin. (2021, January). TRUSTING OUR SUPPLY CHAINS: A COMPREHENSIVE DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH. Retrieved April 12, 2021.
|
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-20-01465-37-trusting-our-supply-chains-a-comprehensive-data-driven-approach.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0817
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Control Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Data Historian
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
| null |
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Control Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Data Historian
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Human-Machine Interface
| null |
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Input/Output Server
| null |
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
Supply Chain Compromise
|
T0862
|
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Vulnerability Scanning
| null |
M0916
|
Vulnerability scanning is used to find potentially exploitable software vulnerabilities to remediate them.
|
RA-5
| null | null |
1. OWASP. (n.d.). Top 10 Web Application Security Risks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
| null |
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0916
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0862
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Boot Integrity
| null |
M0946
|
Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
|
SI-7
| null |
CR 3.14
|
1. N/A. (n.d.). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. ESET Research Whitepapers. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Intel. (n.d.). Intel Hardware-based Security Technologies for Intelligent Retail Devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/security-technologies-4th-gen-core-retail-paper.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0946
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Boot Integrity
| null |
M0946
|
Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
|
SI-7
| null |
CR 3.14
|
1. N/A. (n.d.). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. ESET Research Whitepapers. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Intel. (n.d.). Intel Hardware-based Security Technologies for Intelligent Retail Devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/security-technologies-4th-gen-core-retail-paper.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0946
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Boot Integrity
| null |
M0946
|
Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
|
SI-7
| null |
CR 3.14
|
1. N/A. (n.d.). Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Summary. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. ESET Research Whitepapers. (2018, September). LOJAX First UEFI rootkit found in the wild, courtesy of the Sednit group. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Intel. (n.d.). Intel Hardware-based Security Technologies for Intelligent Retail Devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-Summary_04292008.pdf
https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ESET-LoJax.pdf
https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/white-papers/security-technologies-4th-gen-core-retail-paper.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0946
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Network Traffic
| null |
M0808
|
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.
|
SC-8
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Network Traffic
| null |
M0808
|
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.
|
SC-8
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Network Traffic
| null |
M0808
|
Utilize strong cryptographic techniques and protocols to prevent eavesdropping on network communications.
|
SC-8
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0808
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Input/Output Server
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
System Firmware
|
T0857
|
System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network.
|
Persistence, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Firmware: Firmware Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0857
|
Theft of Operational Information
|
T0882
|
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Data Loss Prevention
| null |
M0803
|
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) technologies can be used to help identify adversarial attempts to exfiltrate operational information, such as engineering plans, trade secrets, recipes, intellectual property, or process telemetry. DLP functionality may be built into other security products such as firewalls or standalone suites running on the network and host-based agents. DLP may be configured to prevent the transfer of information through corporate resources such as email, web, and physical media such as USB for host-based solutions.
| null |
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
| null | null | null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0803
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0882
|
Theft of Operational Information
|
T0882
|
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0882
|
Theft of Operational Information
|
T0882
|
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Operational Information Confidentiality
| null |
M0809
|
Deploy mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other intellectual property (IP).
| null |
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
| null | null | null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0809
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0882
|
Theft of Operational Information
|
T0882
|
Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations. In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data.
|
Impact
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your ICS systems, data, and their surrounding environment.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
| null | null | null |
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0882
|
Transient Cyber Asset
|
T0864
|
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Flows, Network Traffic: Network Connections, Asset: Asset Inventory
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0864
|
Transient Cyber Asset
|
T0864
|
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Flows, Network Traffic: Network Connections, Asset: Asset Inventory
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0864
|
Transient Cyber Asset
|
T0864
|
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Encrypt Sensitive Information
| null |
M0941
|
Protect sensitive data-at-rest with strong encryption.
|
SC-28
|
SR 4.1
|
CR 4.1
|
1. Keith Stouffer. (2015, May). Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Retrieved March 28, 2018.
2. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdfc
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Flows, Network Traffic: Network Connections, Asset: Asset Inventory
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0941
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0864
|
Transient Cyber Asset
|
T0864
|
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Flows, Network Traffic: Network Connections, Asset: Asset Inventory
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0864
|
Transient Cyber Asset
|
T0864
|
Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis. Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Update Software
| null |
M0951
|
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. Software updates may need to be scheduled around operational down times.
|
SI-2
| null |
CR 3.10
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Flows, Network Traffic: Network Connections, Asset: Asset Inventory
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0951
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0864
|
Unauthorized Command Message
|
T0855
|
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact.
|
Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855
|
Unauthorized Command Message
|
T0855
|
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact.
|
Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855
|
Unauthorized Command Message
|
T0855
|
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact.
|
Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855
|
Unauthorized Command Message
|
T0855
|
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact.
|
Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855
|
Unauthorized Command Message
|
T0855
|
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact.
|
Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process History/Live Data, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0855
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
User Execution
|
T0863
|
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0863
|
Valid Accounts
|
T0859
|
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way.
|
Persistence, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Control Server
|
Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859
|
Valid Accounts
|
T0859
|
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way.
|
Persistence, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Data Historian
|
Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859
|
Valid Accounts
|
T0859
|
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way.
|
Persistence, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold in your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Access Management
| null |
M0801
|
Access Management technologies can be used to enforce authorization polices and decisions, especially when existing field devices do not provided sufficient capabilities to support user identification and authentication. [1] These technologies typically utilize an in-line network device or gateway system to prevent access to unauthenticated users, while also integrating with an authentication service to first verify user credentials. [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. McCarthy, J et al.. (2018, July). NIST SP 1800-2 Identity and Access Management for Electric Utilities. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1800-2
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0801
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0859
|
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