Technique
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_ID
stringclasses 79
values | Technique_Description
stringclasses 79
values | Tactic
stringclasses 22
values | Tactic_Description
stringclasses 22
values | Mitigation Name
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation Technology Description
float64 | MIT_ID
stringclasses 51
values | Mitigation_Description
stringclasses 51
values | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4
stringclasses 26
values | IEC 62443-3-3:2013
stringclasses 18
values | IEC 62443-4-2:2019
stringclasses 22
values | References
stringclasses 24
values | Reference_Link
stringclasses 23
values | ICS_ASSET
stringclasses 8
values | DATA_Source
stringclasses 49
values | Purdue_Model_Level
stringclasses 5
values | MAT_MIT_REF_Links
stringclasses 51
values | MAT_TEC_REF_Links
stringclasses 79
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Human User Authentication
| null |
M0804
|
Require user authentication before allowing access to data or accepting commands to a device. While strong multi-factor authentication is preferable, it is not always feasible within ICS environments. Performing strong user authentication also requires additional security controls and processes which are often the target of related adversarial techniques (e.g., Valid Accounts, Default Credentials). Therefore, associated ATT&CK mitigations should be considered in addition to this, including Multi-factor Authentication, Account Use Policies, Password Policies, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management, and [https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M1052/ User Account Control].
|
IA-2
|
SR 1.1
|
CR 1.1
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0804
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Password Policies
| null |
M0927
|
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
|
IA-5
|
SR 1.5
|
CR 1.5
|
1. CISA. (2013, June). Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-175A
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0927
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote Services
|
T0886
|
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.
|
Initial Access, Lateral Movement
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0886
|
Remote System Discovery
|
T0846
|
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846
|
Remote System Discovery
|
T0846
|
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846
|
Remote System Discovery
|
T0846
|
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846
|
Remote System Discovery
|
T0846
|
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846
|
Remote System Discovery
|
T0846
|
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0846
|
Remote System Information Discovery
|
T0888
|
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the systems operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary's operational objectives. In addition, the systems configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888
|
Remote System Information Discovery
|
T0888
|
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the systems operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary's operational objectives. In addition, the systems configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage.
|
Discovery
|
The adversary is locating information to assess and identify their targets in your environment.
|
Static Network Configuration
| null |
M0814
|
Configure hosts and devices to use static network configurations when possible, protocols that require dynamic discovery/addressing (e.g., ARP, DHCP, DNS) can be used to manipulate network message forwarding and enable various MitM attacks. This mitigation may not always be usable due to limited device features or challenges introduced with different network configurations.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. D. Parsons and D. Wylie. (2019, September). Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged – Discover and Defend Your Assets. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
2. Colin Gray. (n.d.). How SDN Can Improve Cybersecurity in OT Networks. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
3. Josh Rinaldi. (2016, April). Still a Thrill: OPC UA Device Discovery. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
4. Aditya K Sood. (2019, July). Discovering and fingerprinting BACnet devices. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
5. Langner. (2018, November). Why Ethernet/IP changes the OT asset discovery game. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://www.csiac.org/journal-article/practical-industrial-control-system-ics-cybersecurity-it-and-ot-have-converged-discover-and-defend-your-assets/
https://cdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6891_HowSDN_CG_20180720_Web2.pdf?v=20190312-231901
https://www.rtautomation.com/rtas-blog/still-a-thrill-opc-ua-device-discovery/
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/07/10/bacnet-devices/
https://www.langner.com/2018/11/why-ethernet-ip-changes-the-ot-asset-discovery-game/
|
Safety Instrumented System/Protection Relay
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0814
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0888
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Limit Hardware Installation
| null |
M0934
|
Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
|
MP-7
|
SR 3.2
|
EDR 3.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0934
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Limit Hardware Installation
| null |
M0934
|
Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
|
MP-7
|
SR 3.2
|
EDR 3.2
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0934
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Limit Hardware Installation
| null |
M0934
|
Block users or groups from installing or using unapproved hardware on systems, including USB devices.
|
MP-7
|
SR 3.2
|
EDR 3.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0934
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Operating System Configuration
| null |
M0928
|
Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0928
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Operating System Configuration
| null |
M0928
|
Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0928
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Replication Through Removable Media
|
T0847
|
Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Operating System Configuration
| null |
M0928
|
Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Drive: Drive Creation, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0928
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0847
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rogue Master
|
T0848
|
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Application Log: Application Log Content, Operational Databases: Process/Event Alarm
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0848
|
Rootkit
|
T0851
|
Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower.
|
Evasion, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Audit
| null |
M0947
|
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity checks, which typically include cryptographic hashes or digital signatures, should be compared to those obtained at known valid states, especially after events like device reboots, program downloads, or program restarts.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
|
1. IEC. (2019, February). Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 4-2: Technical security requirements for IACS components. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/34421
|
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Drive: Drive Modification, Firmware: Firmware Modification, Module: Module Load
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0947
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0851
|
Rootkit
|
T0851
|
Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower.
|
Evasion, Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Code Signing
| null |
M0945
|
Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.
|
SI-7
|
SR 3.4
|
CR 3.4
| null | null |
Field Controller/RTU/PLC/IED
|
Drive: Drive Modification, Firmware: Firmware Modification, Module: Module Load
|
Level 0 Level 1
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0945
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0851
|
Screen Capture
|
T0852
|
Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information. Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.
|
Collection
|
The adversary is trying to gather data of interest and domain knowledge on your ICS environment to inform their goal.
|
Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
| null |
M0816
|
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventative controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| null | null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0816
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0852
|
Scripting
|
T0853
|
Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Application Isolation and Sandboxing
| null |
M0948
|
Restrict the execution of code to a virtual environment on or in-transit to an endpoint system.
|
SI-3
|
SR 5.4
|
CR 5.4
|
1. Dan Goodin. (2017, March). Virtual machine escape fetches $105,000 at Pwn2Own hacking contest. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/03/hack-that-escapes-vm-by-exploiting-edge-browser-fetches-105000-at-pwn2own/
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0948
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0853
|
Scripting
|
T0853
|
Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Disable or Remove Feature or Program
| null |
M0942
|
Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
|
CM-7
|
SR 7.7
|
CR 7.7
|
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0942
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0853
|
Scripting
|
T0853
|
Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions.
|
Execution
|
The adversary is trying to run code or manipulate system functions, parameters, and data in an unauthorized way.
|
Execution Prevention
| null |
M0938
|
Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0938
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0853
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict File and Directory Permissions
| null |
M0922
|
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
|
1. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2013, April). Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations. Retrieved September 17, 2020.
|
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0922
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict Registry Permissions
| null |
M0924
|
Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0924
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict Registry Permissions
| null |
M0924
|
Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0924
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict Registry Permissions
| null |
M0924
|
Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0924
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
Restrict Registry Permissions
| null |
M0924
|
Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry.
|
AC-6
|
SR 2.1
|
CR 2.1
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0924
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Service Stop
|
T0881
|
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.
|
Inhibit Response Function
|
The adversary is trying to prevent your safety, protection, quality assurance, and operator intervention functions from responding to a failure, hazard, or unsafe state.
|
User Account Management
| null |
M0918
|
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
|
AC-2
|
SR 1.3
|
CR 1.3
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0918
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0881
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Antivirus/Antimalware
| null |
M0949
|
Use signatures or heuristics to detect malicious software. Within industrial control environments, antivirus/antimalware installations should be limited to assets that are not involved in critical or real-time operations. To minimize the impact to system availability, all products should first be validated within a representative test environment before deployment to production systems. [1]
|
SI-3
|
SR 3.2
|
CR 3.2
|
1. NCCIC 2018, August 2 Recommended Practice: Updating Antivirus in an Industrial Control System Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/Recommended%20Practice%20Updating%20Antivirus%20in%20an%20Industrial%20Control%20System_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0949
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
Restrict Web-Based Content
| null |
M0921
|
Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
|
SC-18
|
SR 2.4
|
HDR 2.4
| null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0921
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Control Server
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Data Historian
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Engineering Workstation
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spearphishing Attachment
|
T0865
|
Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.
|
Initial Access
|
The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.
|
User Training
| null |
M0917
|
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.
|
AT-2
| null | null | null | null |
Human-Machine Interface
|
Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0917
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0865
|
Spoof Reporting Message
|
T0856
|
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
|
Evasion, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Communication Authenticity
| null |
M0802
|
When communicating over an untrusted network, utilize secure network protocols that both authenticate the message sender and can verify its integrity. This can be done either through message authentication codes (MACs) or digital signatures, to detect spoofed network messages and unauthorized connections.
|
SC-8; SC-23
|
SR 3.1
|
CR 3.1
|
1. CISA. (2010, March 11). https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003. Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-003
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0802
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856
|
Spoof Reporting Message
|
T0856
|
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
|
Evasion, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Filter Network Traffic
| null |
M0937
|
Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic. Perform inline allow/denylisting of network messages based on the application layer (OSI Layer 7) protocol, especially for automation protocols. Application allowlists are beneficial when there are well-defined communication sequences, types, rates, or patterns needed during expected system operations. Application denylists may be needed if all acceptable communication sequences cannot be defined, but instead a set of known malicious uses can be denied (e.g., excessive communication attempts, shutdown messages, invalid commands). Devices performing these functions are often referred to as deep-packet inspection (DPI) firewalls, context-aware firewalls, or firewalls blocking specific automation/SCADA protocol aware firewalls. [1]
|
AC-3; SC-7
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
1. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure 2005, February FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA AND PROCESS CONTROL NETWORKS Retrieved. 2020/09/17
|
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Good%20Practices%20Guide%20for%20Firewall%20Deployment.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0937
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856
|
Spoof Reporting Message
|
T0856
|
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
|
Evasion, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856
|
Spoof Reporting Message
|
T0856
|
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
|
Evasion, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856
|
Spoof Reporting Message
|
T0856
|
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values.
|
Evasion, Impair Process Control
|
The adversary is trying to avoid security defenses.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, disable, or damage physical control processes.
|
Software Process and Device Authentication
| null |
M0813
|
Require the authentication of devices and software processes where appropriate. Devices that connect remotely to other systems should require strong authentication to prevent spoofing of communications. Furthermore, software processes should also require authentication when accessing APIs.
|
IA-9
|
SR 1.2
|
CR 1.2
| null | null |
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Application Log: Application Log Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0813
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0856
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Allowlists
| null |
M0807
|
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system hosts files to specify what connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. Allowlist techniques that operate at the application layer (e.g., DNP3, Modbus, HTTP) are addressed in Filter Network Traffic mitigation.
|
AC-3
| null | null |
1. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0807
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Data Historian
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Engineering Workstation
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Intrusion Prevention
| null |
M0931
|
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. In industrial control environments, network intrusion prevention should be configured so it will not disrupt protocols and communications responsible for real-time functions related to control or safety.
|
SI-4
|
SR 6.2
|
CR 6.2
|
1. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
|
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf
|
Human-Machine Interface
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 1 Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0931
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
|
AC-3
|
SR 5.1
|
CR 5.1
|
3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
|
https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
|
Control Server
|
Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
|
Level 2
|
https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
|
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
|
Standard Application Layer Protocol
|
T0869
|
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port. Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.
|
Command and Control
|
The adversary is trying to communicate with and control compromised systems, controllers, and platforms with access to your ICS environment.
|
Network Segmentation
| null |
M0930
|
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Restrict network access to only required systems and services. In addition, prevent systems from other networks or business functions (e.g., enterprise) from accessing critical process control systems. For example, in IEC 62443, systems within the same secure level should be grouped into a zone, and access to that zone is restricted by a conduit, or mechanism to restrict data flows between zones by segmenting the network. [1] [2]
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AC-3
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SR 5.1
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CR 5.1
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3. Department of Homeland Security. (2016, September). Retrieved September 25, 2020.
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https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf
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Data Historian
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Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
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Level 2
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https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/M0930
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https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T0869
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