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Banning landmines disproportionately punishes small, underdeveloped countries unable to develop the higher-technology military capacity that has made mines less useful to richer nations. Because of this, banning landmines harms precisely the kind of nation most likely to need them for defensive purposes. | |
Banning Landmines is a step towards reducing the horror of war Landmines are a terrible and immoral tool of war. America should neither practise nor condone this kind of warfare. Unlike other weaponry, landmines remain hidden in the ground long after conflicts have ended, killing and maiming civilians in some of the world’s poorest countries years, even decades later. [1] In Afghanistan 17% of victims are children. [2] Even if other weaponry has similar effects, it doesn’t mean landmines are acceptable – it means they are bad, too. But we must start somewhere – we can make a difference by capitalising on the global movement against landmines, and we should. [1] United Nations cyberschoolbus, [2] Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Landmine Impact Survey Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 2005, | |
Landmines do great harm to people that trigger them – but so do all weapons of war. They are not uniquely unpleasant and the debate about them has distorted the public perception of landmines – in truth, they are little different to a hundred other types of weaponry that remain legal under the Ottawa ban. In particular, landmines are an entirely defensive weapon. They can render large areas un-enterable until cleared but in this they are analogous to the long term harm of a chemical spill – the harm can largely be mitigated by simply avoiding the area until it can be cleared. | |
These mines, used in peacekeeping initiatives, protect US troops and present little danger to civilians. Stopping their use would endanger the lives of peacekeepers and make the USA less likely to enter into such operations – part of the reason the USA refused to sign the Ottawa treaty in 1997, and has declined to do so since. | |
Landmines provide a false sense of security Landmines provide a false sense of security. They are often purchased and placed by nations that are fearful of their surrounding neighbours, rather than entering into diplomatic arena to improve relations. They are the symbol of exactly the wrong approach to international affairs. Small, underdeveloped countries should channel their efforts into improving their economies – they should not be encouraged (or frightened by scaremongering) by the USA into buying the USA’s military equipment. | |
The US army does not need landmines It is absurd to suggest that landmines are the prime protector of US forces, or even an important one. It is well known that the principal benefit the USA’s troops (as opposed to those of other nations) have in peacekeeping is the threat of the deployment of overwhelming force if they are defied. Landmines are nothing to do with it. US troops have not been pinned down in the way the opposition suggests since World War Two, except in Iraq: and there, as elsewhere, the damage done to relations with the civilian community would far outweigh any narrow military benefit garnered from landmine deployment. Indeed the use of landmines by the US has slowly been changing, since 2004 the US has only allowed the use of landmines with deactivation mechanisms however it has not actually used landmines in more than 20 years. [1] [1] Good, Rachel, ‘Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty’, Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights, Vol. 9, Issue 2, (Spring 2011), | |
Faith in these so called ‘smart’ mines is hugely misplaced. Conditions under testing will always vary from those in the field, where all is confusion and areas of deployment are often not properly recorded or marked. Even if they work as claimed, there is no guarantee that regimes that use them will wish to deactivate them upon ceasefire, if left in the territory of a neighbour or enemy with whom a dispute still smoulders. The equipment required for deactivation may be lost or destroyed. The best way to ensure that these weapons aren’t left in the soil is never to put them there in the first place. That some users might be responsible is not good enough, since if anyone has landmines everyone will. Even that assumes that it is possible to be a ‘responsible’ user of landmines – once they are in the ground the user has lost all practical control over them. The only way to take back control is to disarm them. | |
Chemical weapons are also cheap and highly effective. The use of chemical agents was widespread in the First World War and domestic terrorists groups have been able to manufacture and use Sarin gas in attacks. [1] These weapons are banned despite being cheap and effective because of the unnecessary suffering they cause and because of their indiscriminate nature. Mines and gas are both ‘area denial’ weapons whose effects can linger long after the conflict in which they were employed has faded into history. [1] Wikipedia, Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, | |
Landmines are easy to use illegally anyway Landmines are merely a convenient way of providing what can be rigged in many ways – an explosion triggered when movement occurs in a particular area. Without landmines being legally available, troops will improvise landmines – they will wire up pressure plates and hand grenades and trip wires and high explosive charges, with much the same result. These will then be much more difficult to disarm as they will not have a standard design and they may also have much more explosive power. [1] This behaviour was widespread in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The only differences are that these weapons are less efficient, and more dangerous to the user that prepares them. [1] Maresca, Louis, Maslen, Stuart, The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004, p.316, | |
Landmines are necessary to protect South Korea The defence of South Korea from Communist aggression depends upon the thick belt of landmines that lines the demilitarized zone. Without it, North Korea’s million man army could easily cross into South Korea and take Seoul before defences could be organised. [1] South Korea is a key ally of the USA and to join in the ban on landmines would be to betray that ally. The failure of the Ottawa Convention to grant an exception for the Korean peninsula was the key reason for USA non-participation. With regards to the tunnel network: North Korea would never be able to perform an invasion through a dozen half-finished tunnels just big enough for a man to pass though. Troops passing under the DMZ without any heavy equipment or armour would have to assemble in the open with no protection from RoK and US firepower and air support. The main force of any invasion would have to travel over ground. [1] Marin, ‘Peacemakers Along the DMZ’, 2002 | |
The ban fails to distinguish between different kinds of mines The ban fails to distinguish between different kinds of mines. The Americans have mines that can deactivate themselves and can self-destruct. America only manufactures smart mines, and since 1976 the USA has tested 32,000 mines with a successful self-destruction rate of 99.996 per cent. [1] The ban also fails to distinguish between responsible and irresponsible users. Under American deployment, only smart mines are used, and they are used responsibly, being set and removed in a methodical manner. [1] Hillen, John and Spring, Baker, ‘Why A Global Ban On Land Mines Won’t Work’, Heritage.org, 17 January 1997, | |
Landmines are a useful military tool In the future, landmines may not be needed. However, whilst armies still depend on conventional weapons and movement – moving tanks and large infantry groups – and borders are weak, the defensive tactic of landmines is highly appropriate: it is cheap, affordable, and maintains borders. Their existence can slow or stop an advance by breaking up an attack and forcing attackers to go certain routes, [1] delaying or even halting conflict; they can deter invasion in the first place. [2] By guarding wide areas from swift armed advance [1] ICRC, Anti-personnel Landmines. Friend of foe? A study of the military use and effectiveness of anti-personnel mines, 1996, pp.14-15 [2] Marin, Albert and Litzelman, Michael, ‘Peacemakers Along the DMZ: Non-Self Destruct Landmines in the Republic of Korea’, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 6.1, April 2002, | |
North Korea has an extensive tunnel network under the DMZ that will facilitate the circumvention of the largest minefield on Earth, if the North Koreans were ever stupid enough to attempt invasion (and there is nothing to suggest that they are going to). This fact demonstrates the uselessness of landmines – the world’s biggest minefield is militarily redundant, a danger only to those that will live in this area in future years. The USA knows this – the defence of South Korea is a hollow, false excuse offered in defence of landmines – the real reason is the unwillingness on the part of the military machine to relinquish the capability of any weapon, no matter how horrible. Of course, there is a healthy profit to be made in their distribution, too. | |
That is true if we are discussing a single tripwire or booby trap. But the argument avoids the real point of landmines – blanket deployment over very wide areas, making them impassable for military units in the short term, and deadly for the indigenous population in the long term. Nobody rigs up a few thousand pressure plates at a time. Removing landmines from the available military options would mean that this kind of deployment would become impossible – it would mean the end of the mine field. | |
France and the UK might have declined in relative power since 1945, but even today only Japan and Germany among non-P5 states rank ahead of them economically. In any case, France and the UK are still amongst the world’s foremost military powers, with the world’s largest nuclear arsenals after the USA and Russia, [1] and the world’s highest military expenditure after the USA and China with France spending $61 billion and the UK $57 billion in 2010. [2] By contrast, the EU has no significant military to speak of, and is thus unable to project power across the globe. The EU launched a Rapid Reaction Force meant to be 60,000 troops in 2001, but it is still a paper tiger without even this many men and with many capability shortfalls. [3] Given the mission of the UNSC to maintain international peace and security, eligibility for a permanent seat should be based on military power, not just economic or demographic power. [1] Federation of American Scientists, 2011, [2] SIPRI, 2011, [3] Defence Dateline, 2011, | |
The world has moved on since 1945. The permanent seats for France and the UK are based on the fact that they were among the great powers and victors of World War II. However, the global balance of powers has shifted significantly since then: France and the UK have declined; Britain’s manufacturing exports dropped from 25% of world manufacturing exports in 1945 to 5% in 2000. [1] And the UK was 6.52% of the world economy in 1950 [2] but down to 3.56 in 2010. [3] Moreover both had large empires which were lost in the decades after 1945. At the same time the EU has emerged as a major player in the international arena. The EU is one of the world’s largest trade blocs, has the world’s largest GDP, and represents almost half a billion people. A permanent seat for the EU would reflect those new power dimensions. [1] Schenk, 472, [2] Maddison, [3] World Bank, | |
The European Union might be an economic powerhouse and might want to coordinate foreign relations in regards to external economic policy, but at heart it is intended to be an economic union, not a political union. Most of its founding treaties and the daily workings of its institutions focus on creating and maintaining a single market, not on creating a shared foreign and military policy. Giving the EU representation at what is an institution for foreign and military policy is misreading what the EU was intended to be. | |
France and Britain should be willing to give up their seats for the European Union. The most practical way to reform the United Nations is for France and Britain to give way to a European Union seat. Although there would inevitably be some loss of influence for both nations the pain would be minimised by retaining one seat between them. The European Union often decides what countries get what jobs based upon internal politics, so for example Catherine Ashton became High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy because Tony Blair did not get the presidency. [1] It would therefore be possible through an internal agreement in the European Union to make sure that France and the United Kingdom retain control of the UNSC seat through having control of the foreign minister post and the post of Ambassador to the United Nations. [1] Meade, 2009, | |
Only a more representative United Nations Security Council is legitimate. The United Nations is a global body that must represent the whole world. Just as democratic governments need to remain representative to be legitimate so the same is true of intergovernmental organisations. If the UK and France hang on to their permanent seats forever, the UNSC will lose its legitimacy, as the United Nations will no longer be seen to be representative. The result will be an increased risk of war and conflict because the world’s major powers have no legitimate shared arena for discussing their interests. This is exactly what happened to the League of Nations after World War I. As many of the most powerful nations, USA, USSR and Germany were unwilling to join or barred from joining the League never had much legitimacy. As a result the League was unable to prevent conflicts in Manchuria and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) eventually leading to World War II. [1] Since their interest in a stable world through the legitimacy of the UNSC outweighs their interest in a formal veto-power, France and the UK should be willing to give up their veto power. [1] Kissinger, Diplomacy | |
There is a good reason why previous attempts at reforming the United Nations Security Council have not succeeded. Reform has been attempted several times since 1992 when Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali called for a renewal of the United Nations by 1995. [1] The ‘G4’ made up of Germany, Japan, Brazil and India has been lobbying to become permanent members but are opposed by others who want more non-permanent seats. [2] Kofi Annan in 2005 suggested two options either 6 new permanent members with no veto or eight four year renewable terms, [3] but this too has gotten nowhere. No matter who is on the council some countries will feel aggrieved. If Brazil becomes a member Argentina and Mexico will object, China might object to India becoming a permanent member and Pakistan certainly would. [4] In Africa it is not even certain who should represent the continent as there is no single leader, whoever is chosen some countries would not like the result. It is therefore better to leave things how they are. The current UNSC has been recognised as legitimate for more than sixty years this is not about to change. [1] Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, 1992, [2] Ariyoruk, ‘Players and Proposals in the Security Council Debate’, 2005, [3] United Nations Secretary General, ‘In larger freedom’, 2005, V, [4] Muns, 2006, | |
Even if UNSC reform is perfectly logical in theory, in practice they would never work. The UK and France have a veto in the UNSC, which means they can halt any kind of reform of the UNSC which is not in their interest. Losing a permanent seat without getting a clear benefit in return is definitely against their interest. Even if they were to retain control over foreign policy no nation would want to move from having sole control of a seat to having to negotiate with its partners which way it will vote. As such the UK and France would veto any such proposal. | |
Europe may now have a president but as he has few independent powers the Lisbon Treaty has not answered Kissinger’s apocryphal question ‘who do I call if I want to dial Europe’. [1] The US president or Secretary of state would still need to call round the major capitals of Europe as Van Rompuy would need to get the agreement of the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the continent before he could do anything. [1] Rachman, 2009, | |
The European Union is meant to prevent war being on the UNSC would allow it to actively promote peace. The EU might function as an economic union, but its original goal was to prevent war from ever happening again on the European continent. The political resolution of the Congress of Europe in 1948 said “it is the urgent duty of the nations of Europe to create an economic and political union in order to assure security and social progress… the creation of a United Europe is an essential element in the creation of a united world.” [1] The Economic integration is a means to this goal, by making member states economically too dependent on each other for them to want to declare war on each other. Given this history, the EU can contribute a lot of knowledge and experience on how to use ‘soft power’ in a foreign policy context. Europe has been successful in creating peace on a previously warlike continent. It has also had successes in encouraging reform in the countries of Eastern Europe and is continuing to do so in the Balkans through enlargement. [2] Croatia was at war with its neighbors fifteen years ago and part of Yugoslavia twenty years ago but will become the 28thmember of the EU in 2013. [3] Being a member of the UNSC would deepen Europe’s commitment to international peace-keeping and peace-making missions, something which currently varies very widely between member states, and push them to spend sufficient on equipping their militaries for such missions. The UNSC could turn the EU’s soft power outwards to help the world. As a result it should have a seat at the world’s foremost foreign policy institution. [1] Congress of Europe at the Hague, 1948, [2] Bildt, 2005, [3] BBC News, 2011, | |
The EU now has the necessary foreign policy organs. In the past the European Union has not had the necessary foreign policy bureaucracy and decision making capabilities to be able to control a UNSC seat. Since the Lisbon treaty this has changed. The Treaty created a President of the European Council, currently Herman Van Rompuy. [1] And a European External Action Service (EEAS) which will eventually have a staff of 5,400. The EEAS is a functionally autonomous EU body with a large number of embassies around the world. [2] This will give the EU representation in most countries, 54 with ambassadors out of a total of 136, [3] and the ability to coordinate a foreign policy. A seat at the United Nations Security Council would be a natural extension of this. [1] European Council, [2] BBC News, 2010, [3] Waterfield, 2010, | |
Until now, the member states of the European Union have never been able to coordinate their foreign policies effectively. This has led to divided positions amongst member states, for example towards Russia, China and other global players, allowing them to play a ‘divide-and-rule’-strategy against European interests. Giving the EU a single seat would give the Member States a clear incentive to harmonize their policies: a coordinated policy can then be expected to actually take effect, instead of it being a supplement to domestic foreign policy. Interests are guided by who decides what the interests are. With a unified voice from a unified external action service and President Europe will be able to define what the interests of the Union as a whole are. | |
The European Union has already been gaining power at the United Nations. The European Union gained what could be considered super-observer status in May 2011. Van Rompuy will be able to address the United Nations as the heads of other states can and the EU also has the right to speak, the right to make proposals and submit amendments, the right of reply, the right to raise points of order and the right to circulate documents. Europe will be represented by the High Representative and the EEAS. [1] [1] Phillips, 2011, | |
The only way the United Nations Security Council can be reformed is through expansion. Current UN Security Council members will never give up their seats. As well as Britain and France Russia could equally be considered to be no longer worthy of being a member of the UNSC. Russia’s economy is significantly smaller than either of the other European members. However no one seriously thinks Russia will give up its seat. Instead the United Nations Security Council will have to be expanded to make it more representative. This will mean bringing in Brazil, India and an African representative. There is precedence for expanding the council as Article 23 of the charter was amended in 1963 to enlarge the security council membership from eleven to fifteen. [1] [1] United Nations, 1945, Introductory Note, | |
More is more. While the in number of EU members in the Security Council is obviously beneficial to the EU and its members the influence of the European Union is also beneficial to the UN system as a whole. European powers that are enthusiastic internationalists and proponents of international organisations act as a counterweight to other powers that still act like great nationalist powers from the 19thCentury such as Russia and China. [1] They are therefore enthusiastic about working through the UN rather than acting unilaterally. The European Union’s international goals also dovetail well with the United Nations on a whole range of issues; development, peacekeeping, human rights, the environment, humanitarian aid and culture are all areas where there is a lot of cooperation; this means that the European Union is often acting in the interest of the United Nations. [2] This interest can obviously be best served by the European Union having more seats rather than only one. [1] Ojanen, 2006, p5, [2] Ibid, p.10, 36 | |
There are disputes about enlargement of the Security Council. Reforming the UN Security Council is very difficult as no one can agree which new powers deserve representation, whether they should have a veto, and even whether permanent membership should continue to exist in any form. Japan and India seem obvious candidates for permanent status, but their candidacies are fiercely opposed by a variety of other Asian countries, while Nigeria and Egypt both feel they have a good claim to an “African” seat. Africa with no obvious leader could be the most difficult to resolve, already there are six countries which say they would want to be Africa’s permanent member; Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt and Libya. [1] These disputes may in the end lead to a much enlarged permanent membership, so if the EU did taken over the UK and France’s seats, there would be a much greater likelihood that European interests will be outvoted on the Security Council. [1] Okumu, 2005, | |
Even if other countries such as Russia are unwilling to give up their own seats Britain and France have an alternative in the form of joint European Union membership. Both countries are therefore much more likely to agree to lose their seats than Russia w The member states of the European Union haven’t harmonized their foreign policies so far simply because they have vastly divergent interests in the arena of global power politics. The interests of Germany vis-a-vis Russia are a world apart from France and the UK’s interests, let alone Poland’s. For example in the brief war between Georgia and Russia in 2008 France, Germany and Italy tried to avoid confrontation with Russia while Eastern Europe and Britain demanded a much tougher stance with sanctions. [1] And France and the UK famously took very different positions over the Iraq War, while their different experiences of empire and decolonisation give them a wider international perspective than most other EU states. Handing the EU a single seat does nothing to change those interests, and thus would actually harm every member state’s individual foreign policy interest, instead of furthering it. [1] Waterfield, 2008, | |
The European States are obviously going to benefit from having large numbers of their members on the UN Security Council, and the United Nations itself is not harmed by it this overrepresentation comes at the expense of other regions. No other regions are so closely integrated – so countries in them don’t have allies who they can rely on in the Council, and some of which don’t have any members who have veto power. When compared to Europe that is not only integrated enough that the European States will most of the time take a common line and protect each other but who also have two states that can wield a veto the situation is grossly unfair. | |
The United Nations is meant to be a body of nation states. The United Nations is an international organisation whose members are nation states, not other supranational organisations such as the European Union. “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states” [1] The European Union is however not a state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Recognising the European Union as a member would pose other problems as it would clash with article 9 of the UN charter “Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.” And Article 18 “Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.” [2] As the European Union member would have 27 votes, and potentially well over 100 representatives in the General Assembly. The European Union is at present an observer [3] and that is how it should remain. [1] United Nations, 1945, Article 4, [2] United Nations, 1945, Article 9, 18, [3] The Telegraph, 2011, | |
It is widely recognised that the current Security Council set-up lacks legitimacy and requires reform. Major states such as Japan, and rising powers such as Brazil, South Africa and India deserve recognition and giving them permanent status would provide representation for a much broader cross-section of humanity. In such a reformed UN it is much harder to justify permanent places for the UK and France alone, two essentially similar western European countries. They should instead agree to be represented through an EU seat as part of an overhaul of the whole international system. | |
Even if other countries such as Russia are unwilling to give up their own seats Britain and France have an alternative in the form of joint European Union membership. Both countries are therefore much more likely to agree to lose their seats than Russia would be. | |
The prize is too narrowly defined. At what scale should the change be defined? For example civil-society and community leaders can make significant changes to governance at a smaller-scale; promoting democratic governance from a bottom-up initiative can work as well as top down. On another hand, should we only be focusing on the very top? What about the government officials who are not heads of state but make a change to people’s lives? The narrow focus on the head of a party or state neglects the body - such as finance ministers - that maintains that system of governance and work hard to ensure a democratic transition. The focus on heads of state may deter the state body from ensuring effective governance due to the fact their hard work is not rewarded or recognised. Due to the relatively young nature of democracy and multi-party rule across Africa, the criteria of potential prize candidates needs to be expanded. The number of former heads of states having left in the past three years is small. Therefore the criteria for nomination needs to change. | |
Focusing on the leaders of good governance Previous winners - such as Nelson Mandela and Pedro Pires - made significant changes to their nation-states, ending apartheid and promoting social development. The former leaders provided equality and a functioning democracy to their people. Such needs to be the aim of leaders today. Providing a prize to the highest achievers provides an example. It highlights leaders from even small countries – such as Cape Verde’s Pires – that can serve as role models for Africa’s leaders. Without the prize the most likely role models would simply be those of the biggest states who are highest profile. Mo Ibrahim (2013) has stated the prize is for “excellence, it’s not a pension”. This is why it is not always awarded. The prize is only be awarded when high-standards of good governance are replicated, and maintained, by leaders. Focusing on the top of government encourages a top down implementation of good government. When the leader acts others will follow; a comparatively small amount of money can therefore make a big difference. | |
Although the prize has gained recognition in the Western world or ‘Global North’ to what extent is the prize, its reward, and meaning, known and understood by African citizens? If the prize is recognising African leadership citizens need to be aware of the prize in the first place - whether their country is up for nomination or not. Awareness is the only way the apparent transparency can hold power and become a reality. Citizens cannot demand change or hold the state to account when they are not aware of the index, the prize, and the so-called changes being made. | |
Recognition when credit is due The past few years have seen African governments, and heads of state, reluctant to leave office; driving political coups; and leading violent crimes against humanity. Mugabe, Kabila, and Kenyatta are but a few articulating the years of sustained bad governance. The prize is only awarded when credit is due - if leaders have made a significant positive impact this will be recognised and rewarded. The prize is therefore for absolute gains in governance, not relative to other countries. As the prize is not always awarded it avoids the pitfall that distributing a financial prize where no change has been made to political institutions would reinforce a system. The state would continue to function on undemocratic governance, and the reward would become a new example of dead money [1] . Instead it encourages improved control over aid and money transferred to African states, it shows that rewards are given based on merit. The Mo Ibrahim prize therefore encourages the good institutions that are necessary for prosperity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013). [1] See further readings: Moyo, 2009. | |
The prize by focusing on leaders ignores the areas where money is needed; not lining already rich people’s pockets but providing money and advice to actually set up these institutions. This means for example ensuring the police and civil servants are well enough paid they don’t resort to corruption etc. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) highlight that there is also a ‘vicious cycle’ whereby the presence of bad institutions - authoritarian, unaccountable, with limited economic innovations - reinforce poverty and bad governance. Although offering rewards where significant change has happened is a positive model, in reality, many African states require funds to be able to enforce change in the first place and break this vicious cycle. For good governance to be promoted rewards should not only go to the best, but also the good in a continent where bad governance dominates. For any progress to be made in governance the prize needs to lower standards of expectation, recognise where improvements are made, and use the reward to change the vicious cycle. Some change is better than none; focusing on picking the best with high standards limits any change. | |
Transparency The prize is helping citizens to be aware of good governance, and bad, occurring within their state. By granting the prize citizens are shown what leaders have done right; and the publication of the index - the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) - shows where improvement may be required. The prize is forcing transparency between governments and society. Information on how states are doing means citizens can take action, and demand change where change is needed. The prize is calling for African citizens to get the leadership they deserved, desired, and have a right to. By maintaining strict standards on when, and to whom, the reward is provided gives a realistic picture of governance in Africa. It showcases the continued need for good governance; and also doesn’t give citizens and the international community a false illusion that governance is good in Africa when it is not. | |
The committee nominating, and choosing, the final candidates remains un-bias and their expertise within multiple aspects of governance means the high standards can be maintained. Having votes would open the prize up to corruption and attempts to influence the outcome by those who are eligible. A technocratic standard is needed for good governance. | |
One of the criteria for awarding the prize is ‘demonstrated exceptional leadership’. This clearly allows the IIAG to be fed into the process as it is the IIAG that can show if the leader being considered has demonstrated this leadership. The IIAG provides a useful tool to assist in deciding the prize winner, and nominees. | |
Bribing good governance The Mo Ibrahim Prize is bribing African leaders to shift towards good governance. The financial incentive is being distributed to entice leaders to follow good governance approaches and models. The fact that no questions are asked on where the money provided goes; how it is used; and what the former leaders spend it on raise further questions. Most importantly to what extent can we claim elaborate bribery is an effective means to enforce good governance within the continent? For a start having what is essentially a bribe to encourage good governance is hypoctitical. Secondly a bribe for an individual relies on that one individual’s actions. Thus in 2007 the prize was granted to Mozambique’s President Chissano. However, since 2007 declines have emerged in the scores concerning law and rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). Additionally for those motivated by money the money provided cannot compete with potential returns that can be gained from natural resources, tax evasion schemes, and capital flight. The bribery incentive does not compete with potential profits gained through alternative forms corruption (Bedell, 2009). | |
A contradictory approach The prize will fail to promote good governance due to the contradictory approach it undertakes. Good governance cannot emerge and be sustained by rewarding former presidents. Having a good former president does not mean their successor will encourage their legacy to continue. Why celebrate good former leaders when we need to focus on what is happening now? Moreover why reward someone just when they can no longer do any good? The prize suffers from the contradiction of regarding giving up power as a necessary criteria to obtain the prize. This ignores that Africa does not want those who are being successful at promoting good governance to leave their post – potentially to someone who will move backwards. Having a prize for someone who could have done more good had they stayed is contradictory. Finally the prize is not good for Africa; the prize has raised negative stereotypes of African states, leaders, and systems. The attention gained by the prize not being granted for 3 out of 6 years is maintaining negative stereotypes of African leaders. This will only act to reinforce the global system of power - whereby the West intervene to implement a ‘good’ model of governance, not suited to Africa. | |
Who's on the committee? Who decides whether governance is going in the right direction within the African continent? The prize committee includes six individuals who make the decision of who is worthy of the reward, and whether it is granted. The panel includes leading figures, not all of whom have held elected positions such as Mohamed ElBaradei, and not all of whom are African, such as Martti Ahtisaari and Mary Robinson (Mo Ibrahim Foundation Prize Committee). Among these distinguished panellists the voice of Africa’s population is missing. A prize about good governance should incorporate a people’s vote as good governance is only relevant if it helps the people. Moreover without a public voice there is a lack of transparency in the workings of the committee and the decisions made. Hardly a good standard for a governance prize. | |
Is the IIAG a good measure of ‘good governance’? How do we define, classify, and recognise good governance? The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has created the Ibrahim Index. The IIAG calculates governance across Africa and assesses it over time. The IIAG shows governance has improved across the continent since 2000; and in 2013 classified Mauritius with the highest rank and Liberia as showcasing the greatest positive change over 13 years. But does the index have the right weighting? Where ‘good governance’ is found changes depending on the weighting applied. Even odder is that although the foundation has this index it is not actually used when awarding the prize, this is awarded by a committee to those who pass the criteria that don’t include the IIAG (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2013). The prize is therefore methodologically unsound as a way of looking at and promoting good governance | |
It is not contradictory to offer a reward for good governance after the leader has left office. Dictators holding onto power for long periods are one of Africa’s biggest problems. Rewarding those who step aside shows that an important part of good governance is having presidents who stick to constitutional terms. A stable transfer of power is vital in a democracy. This is something that is even more important when the transfer is to a political opponent. One of the most important advances in governance that can be made is to make be considered normal that the opposition is as loyal to the country as the government. When this happens power can easily be transferred without conflict or resulting disorder. | |
The reward is an incentive, not a bribe; consider it as being similar to performance related pay. The prize shows how if excellent leadership is promoted and good governance encouraged the leaders will be praised, recognised and rewarded. The prize is not a bribe, but a way of incentivising leaders to follow a path towards good governance. By highlighting cases where good governance has excelled the prize draws attention to the benefits of good governance through a cost-benefit appraisal. The social, economic, and political returns are highlighted; and other African governments encouraged to follow the trend. | |
If terrorism is the concern then the French intervening is one of the worst possible options. Having France fighting in Mali may well result in the internationalization of the conflict bringing in jihadists. [1] Already the islamists are saying the conflict is a holy war as “France has attacked Islam” and they will in response “strike at the heart of France”. [2] [1] Welsh, Jennifer, ‘Sending soldiers to Mali may be the only solution’, The Globe and Mail, 14 January 2012, [2] Bamat, Joseph, ‘Mali-based Islamists pledge attacks on French soil’, France 24, 14 January 2013, | |
Fighting terrorism While it was Tuareg separatists who first sparked the insurrection wanting to split Mali but now the North has been taken over by Islamists and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb presenting a terrorist threat that cannot be ignored. France’s Defence minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says "France's goal is to lead a relentless struggle against terrorist groups," and that "We have to eradicate this terrorism". [1] The United States was already clearly worried about Mali becoming a center of terrorism having on the 7th December designated the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa a terrorist organisation while other groups involved in Mali such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb were already designated as such. The State department highlights several terrorist attacks the group has conducted such as “a March 2012 suicide attack on a police base in Tamanrasset, Algeria, which wounded 23 people”. [2] [1] CNN Staff, ‘France determined to ‘eradicate’ terrorism in Mali, official says’, CNN, 13 January 2013, [2] Office of the Spokesperson, ‘Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad el Khairy, and Ahmed el Tilemsi’, U.S. Department of State, 7 December 2012, | |
Ban Ki Moon has also stated that “I am profoundly aware that if a military intervention in the north is not well conceived and executed, it could worsen an already fragile humanitarian situation and also result in severe human rights abuses” [1] so French military intervention is not necessarily the right course to take if the intention is to be helping the people of northern Mali. Equally we can ask if this will really end the civil war? Mali has suffered from several Tuareg rebellions in the past. In particular there was a civil war between 1990 and 1996 [2] which has had over a decade of sporadic peace negotiations while a cease fire held. So while outside intervention may end the civil war unless the French propose to remain in place for decades or work instead on a diplomatic solution in the long run Mali will be no better off. [1] Tisdall, Simon, ‘UN urges caution over military intervention in Mali’, guardian.co.uk, 29 November 2012, [2] Humphreys, Macartan, and Mohamed, Habaye ag, ‘Senegal and Mali’, January 2003, pp.19-28 | |
France was asked to intervene by Mali’s government “France has answered… a request for assistance issued by the interim president of the Republic of Mali”. France is therefore not coming in uninvited. Mali’s President Traore directly appealed to French President Hollande to provide “French military assistance against these terrorist groups” that have “attacked our front lines of defense”. [1] As the former colonial power in much of West Africa, including Mali, France is the obvious country to turn to for help. As a result of this colonial past Mali is a member of the French led Organisation internationale de la Francophonie. [2] Mali is therefore fully within its sovereign rights to ask for assistance and Hollande is right to agree to provide it. [1] Lynch, Colum, ‘France’s U.N. envoy: French military intervention in Mali is open ended’, Foreign Policy Turtle Bay, 11 January 2013, [2] ‘Welcome to the International Organisation of La Francophonie’s official website’ | |
Mali should be asking for diplomatic help to resolve the crisis not asking for a military force. France meanwhile should not be accepting a request from an unelected President to attack his own people. A request to intervene in a country does not make that intervention legitimate it simply provides a fig leaf to protect France from accusations of colonialism. | |
This might be an excuse to send a few soldiers to help evacuation and possibly a commando raid to free hostages but it is not a reason for all out intervention. If it was such a justification then in almost any conflict some state would have just cause to intervene because some of their citizens were in danger. | |
It is a humanitarian intervention Fundamentally at its heart this is a humanitarian intervention by the French. The Islamists who took over Northern Mali have been imposing a severe, austere form of Islam demanding "No cigarettes, no CDs, no radios, no cameras, no jewelry" and beating those who disobey the rules. Men and women have to sit in separate areas in buses. With Sharia being more strictly enforced with increasing number of amputations despite opposition from the local population. [1] Much of the population of the North had already fled to the south with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees saying 200,000 have fled since January 2012. [2] Those who have, like Moussa from Timbuktu, clearly welcome the intervention, he told a French radio station “We have been suffocating and [France] has given us a breath of oxygen. We are ready to fly Malian and French flags alongside each other.” [3] [1] Mben, Paul Hyacinthe, ‘A Trip Through Hell Daily Life in Islamist Northern Mali’, Spiegel Online, 29 October 2012, [2] Caux, Helene, ‘IDPs struggle to survive after escaping fighting in northern Mali’, UNHCR, 12 December 2012, [3] Bamat, Joseph, ‘Mali-based Islamists pledge attacks on French soil’, France 24, 14 January 2013, | |
French interests This intervention is not all about terrorism and a humanitarian desire to end a civil war. France does have a stake in the conflict and a reason to deploy military forces. There are 6,000 French citizens living in Mali who are obviously at risk to a rebel advance; even without a full scale intervention France would almost certainly have had to deploy forces to protect an evacuation. Already there are seven French citizens being held hostage in Mali and rescuing them is one of the three main objectives for the French intervention. [1] [1] Welsh, Jennifer, ‘Sending soldiers to Mali may be the only solution’, The Globe and Mail, 14 January 2012, | |
The French have rejected any parallel with Afghanistan and other quagmires. Fabius, France’s Foreign Minister, has said that "Later on, we can come as back-up, but we have no intention of staying forever," [1] the handover may be slower than anticipated but there is no evidence the French will be in Mali for an extended period. [1] ‘Mali: France pledges ‘short’ campaign against Islamists’, BBC News, 14 January 2013, | |
Self-determination should first be internal rather than external. [1] In other words self-determination means autonomy within the existing state not a new state unless there is no other way of resolving the conflict. In Mali therefore the rebels need to put down their weapons and accept the authority of the central government, whose will the French and others are trying to enforce. It is clear that the people of northern Mali would prefer a solution within the state of Mali as half the population has fled to the south [2] and Ansar Dine and MNLA have walked back their declaration of independence promising “respect for Mali's national unity and territorial integrity” in December. [3] [1] “Reference re Secession of Quebec”, Supreme Court of Canada, 1998, 2 S.C.R. 217, [2] Fessy, Thomas, ‘Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north’, BBC News, 6 April 2012, [3] Agencies, ‘Mali rebels agree to respect ‘national unity’, AlJazeera, 5 December 2012, | |
African organisations should have lead the way The United Nations charter is quite clear that it should be African Nations leading the way in this conflict. It says “The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies” [1] and since there are several African Security Organisations there is little reason why these could not have taken the lead. The African Union in particular has undertaken interventions in similar situations before; notably in Somalia. [2] This has been recognised right up until the French intervened and the UN Security Council resolution in December mandated for “the deployment of an African-led mission to support efforts by national authorities to recover the north.” [3] [1] Article 52, [2] Jowell, Marco, ‘Kenya: Intervening in Somalia – Risky Business With No End in Sight’, All Africa, 17 January 2012, [3] Security Council 6898th meeting, ‘Security Council authorizes deployment of African-led international support mission in Mali for initial year-long period’, United Nations, Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, | |
Quagmire Western states seem to so often be willing to get involved in conflicts without thinking about how to get out of them. Interventions are difficult operations that need a lot of planning and the United Nations has previously said that in the case of Mali "Nothing could be done before September, October," and there should be diplomatic talks and a rebuilding of the Malian army first. [1] Unless there is a clear exit plan then there is the risk that the conflict in Mali will turn into a Quagmire from which French and other Western forces cannot easily extradite themselves. The conflict has not resulted in many French casualties although they did have a helicopter shot down. [2] However there is still a question of how long France will have to keep a military presence in the country. The French initially said they would be pulling troops out in March; [3] the first troops did not leave until May. They said they would only have 1000 there by the end of the year [4] but in January 2014 still had 2500. [5] [1] Irish, John, ‘No military intervention in Mali before September: U.N. peacekeeping chief’, Reuters, 5 December 2012, [2] Chrisafis, Angelique, ‘Mali: high stakes in ‘Hollande’s war’’, The Guardian, 13 January 2013, [3] Schofield, Hugh, ‘France action in Mali is real war, says Le Drian’, BBC News, 6 February 2013, [4] BBC News, ‘Mali crisis: French troops begin withdrawal’, 9 April 2013, [5] Al Jazeera Staff, ‘Interactive: Mali Speaks’, Al Jazeera, 21 January 2013, | |
Western countries should not be interfering in African internal affairs Western nations should clearly not be interfering in African affairs. Not only is this conflict outside of NATO’s remit but it is internal to an individual African state rather than a war between states. By intervening France and other nations are taking part in a civil war in which they are aiding a government that was placed in office by a military coup in March 2012 so does not have a democratic mandate. [1] This intervention is an example of France once more playing the role of gendarme and considering that it has some kind of divine right to intervene in Africa. [2] This war is of course in large part France’s fault in the first place; it is trying to hold together a nation that should be split in two as a result of artificial colonial borders that fan conflict by dividing communities. [3] In this case France is intervening to deny a legitimate people’s, the Tuareg, their right to self-determination. The Tuaregs are divided between Algeria, Kibya, Mali, and Niger but without a majority in any. [4] The Turegs when they took control of Azawad made a declaration of independence. [5] While this has not been recognised this simply shows how existing states are worried about accepting the logic of self-determination when they themselves have groups that may want independence. [1] Felix, Bate, ‘Mali junta sees civilian government “in days”’, Reuters, 8 April 2012, [2] Diop, Boubacar Boris, ‘La Vie en %$!’, Foreign Policy, July/August 2010, [3] Zachary, G. Pascal, ‘African Needs a New Map’, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2010, [4] 10% in Mali ‘Mali’ The World Factbook, CIA, 9.3% in Niger ‘Niger’, The World Factbook, CIA, [5] Fessy, Thomas, ‘Mali Tuareg rebels declare independence in the north’, BBC News, 6 April 2012, | |
This is ignoring both that African nations are taking a leading role in this intervention and that it is them who have asked for intervention by western states. First of All Nigeria is going to send 600 troops, Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Togo 500 each, and Benin 300. These numbers far outweigh the 550 being sent by France and logistical support provided by other countries such as the UK and US. [1] It can therefore be said that this is an African mission. Secondly the resolution in December did call for “coordination with the European Union and other partners”. [2] ECOWAS had already in December called for the United Nations to intervene [3] and “thanks the French Government for its initiatives to support Mali.” [4] [1] ‘Mali: France pledges ‘short’ campaign against Islamists’, BBC News, 14 January 2013, [2] Security Council 6898th meeting, ‘Security Council authorizes deployment of African-led international support mission in Mali for initial year-long period’, United Nations, Resolution 2085, 20 December 2012, [3] AP, ‘ECOWAS calls for UN-backed intervention to reclaim north’, France 24, 7 August 2012, [4] Ouédraogo, Kadre Desiré, ‘Statement of the President of the ECOWAS Commission on the Situation in Mali’, Reliefweb, 12 January 2013, | |
Cutting aid payments to the governments of states that are aid dependent would severely restrict the provision of public services and undermine public and international confidence in fragile political settlements. This dependence therefore prevents the aid being cut off. Israel, for instance, would arguably be unable to survive without its foreign aid from the USA. Similarly, those states such as Micronesia or Tokelau which are almost exclusively aid dependent are essentially protectorates of those states that aid them, giving them political independence and the ability to develop. The approach suggested by the resolution would also have a negative impact on nations that are politically stable but in need of reliable, uncomplicated economic support. Between 45 to 50% of all foreign aid goes to nations such as Argentina, Botswana and Brazil. Indeed, sanctions levelled against politically unstable or oppressive states such as Angola and Zimbabwe tend to restrict the aid payments they receive. Reducing aid to politically mature and conflict-free “emerging economies” reduces certainty and sustainability in development. We should deliver the aid which we have promised, the results of which- for many states- are now coming to fruition. | |
Preventing dependence Direct aid creates dependence and a dangerous client culture among recipient states. ODA is entwined with foreign policy to the degree where aid is no longer allocated on the basis of need, but according to the political and policy objectives of donor states. The USA can muster the political will to provide military aid to Israel totalling nearly $3bn a year [i] , but even in the wake of Live8, real aid (payment of fresh funds to recipients, as opposed to funds acquired by rescheduling existing aid obligations) to the poorest nations in Africa is not as large proportionately. Not only is ODA increasingly being used to incentivise compliance or non-interference with America’s objectives in the war on terror, as shown by the aid provided to Pakistan for its cooperation in the stationing of US military bases. When ODA is administered in this way, there is an increased risk that recipient governments will be seen by their people as less independent – as stooges of colonial interlopers. Reliance on ODA can become entrenched but ODA has also created dependent nations such as Micronesia where 4/5 of the population are employed in ‘aid-created’ jobs and the government receives 90% of its revenue from the USA [ii] . It encourages a culture of aid-dependency where nations such as Kenya have come to believe that aid is the only way to lift themselves out of poverty. [i] Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. [ii] “Background Note: Micronesia.” U.S. Department of state. 31 October 2011. | |
Using central government spending to encourage growth is still a viable development strategy. Whilst the important role that local markets play in the development process should be recognised, they are not capable of generating widespread economic change. NGOs serve a different purpose to governments. They construct local infrastructure projects such as schools and wells, in addition to augmenting skills practiced by established communities by providing access to up-to-date tools and tuition that would normally be unaffordable to the citizens of developing states. However, economic growth also requires significant central spending, in order to develop national infrastructure such as roads and universities. Indian well-drilling efficiency has increased by 70% since the nascent Indian national space programme was tasked with using satellite technology to identify water pockets. The diverse origins, policies and skillsets of NGOs tend to prevent them from collaborating in an effective fashion. Brazil’s hydroelectric power network could only have been constructed by a single, coherent organisation. A national education policy could not be formulated by NGOs. To reduce government aid would be to remove the backbone of central spending needed for national development. | |
Combating corruption Changing the way money is given will reduce corruption, embezzlement and manipulation. Centralised government structures control aid distribution in many recipient countries. As a consequence, embezzlement by government officials has become more frequent and easier to conceal. Linking aid to specific projects is ineffective at solving this problem due to difficulty in tracking individual project accounts within the recipient nation. The need to monitor which individuals and institutions receive donated funds, and to confirm that funds have been applied according to agreed plans and schedules still presents a difficult and intractable auditing problem. Recently the Netherlands has halted its $148m development aid programme to Kenya in protest at aid embezzlement in the wake of multiple ‘graft’ scandals there [i] . Similarly Sao Tome’s Prime Minister was arrested for aid embezzlement in 2004 [ii] . Corruption inside government means that aid is also often directed to supporters of the government when eventually spent. Aid may be channelled to particular individuals or political organisations, a trend which has been observed in Zimbabwe [iii] . Similarly, aid may be channelled to favoured social, ethnic or religious groups. This is particularly likely to happen in highly plural states that are affected by underlying cultural tension and strict physical divisions between communities and territories. Discriminatory treatment of Arab Israelis in Israel and the exclusion of Christian and Animist communities from aid schemes in the former Sudan illustrate this trend [iv] . [i] “Anti-corruption profile – Kenya” Trust.org. [ii] “Sao Tomean PM steps down after coup.” Afrol News Online. 01 August 2003. [iii] “Zimbabwe: Corruption Timeline.” Global Integrity Report. [iv] “Background Note: Sudan.” U.S. Department of State. 08 April 2011. | |
Advocates of government-to-government aid do not have to defend such out-dated portrayals of ODA. Since at least 2000, many DAC member nations have tied their aid entirely or in part to political, economic and environmental reform. The burden is now on recipient nations to prove that aid payments are not being squandered. An onus is placed on recipients to invest in the creation of a political culture that tackles corruption, as has been seen with the founding of an ‘anti-graft task force’ in Kenya in 2006. Linked aid promotes political stability, development policies conscious of the limitations of national resources and a consistent economic framework. Moreover, there is no guarantee that charities and NGOs will be any less corrupt or more able to prevent corruption. Easy access to large amounts of capital creates an environment that can foster corruption within any type of organisation, whether governmental institutions in the developing world or non-governmental institutions based in wealthy states. Passing aid to multiple NGOs, many of which may not be governed by accounting standards as strict as those applied to onshore organisations in the UK and the US, creates a system in which it is far harder to monitor and prevent embezzlement. In 2003, the Indian government placed 800 NGOs operating within its north eastern states under a regime of strict observation. Many of the organisations identified were suspected of having links to north eastern separatist and insurgent fighters; it was believed that funds donated to these NGOs, either privately or by the state itself, were being channelled to armed rebel groups [i] . [i] NGO Regulation Network. | |
Supporting domestic development and domestic markets Direct aid undermines local markets within developing states. Many economists believe that economic growth needs to occur at a local or micro level, with private industry spurring growth and providing employment opportunities [i] that act to elevate consumer demand. Chile is often given as an example of a country which has grown in this way. Government aid frequently results in the growth of large, state-owned corporations which undercut the creation of local markets, preventing the development of private enterprise. This can be compared with the deskilling effect that long term food aid has caused within developing nations [ii] . Lacking the will or economic resources to expand land cultivation schemes, formally and culturally acquired farming have dropped out of use in a range of developing states. Dependence on centrally distributed aid is slowing reducing the number of skilled, practiced agricultural labourers able to work to grow food. Similarly, state-owned resource extraction and processing firms can influence an economy’s real exchange rate, making cross border trade in the commodities produced by farmers and local craftsmen uncompetitive – a situation known as the Dutch disease. This is a significant hazard in continents with a high proportion of interdependent sovereign states, such as Africa. State owned industry frequently undercuts local, privately owned industry in both the domestic and export markets of developing nations. Further, these processes raise the spectre of corruption in state institutions and state owned businesses [iii] , with large revenues tempting individuals to engage in graft, nepotism and patrimony. The risks inherent in state supervised industry and micro-economic stimulus can be avoided by supplying aid funding to microbanking and microcredit institutions. Businesses of this type specialise in creating a large supply of low cost credit that small firms, farmers and households can borrow in order to fund the purchases and investments that will bring them closer to prosperity. [i] “Direct aid: A dollar a day keeps the donor away.” Wahega.net. 23 January 2007. [ii] The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid. The OECD. 2006, OECD Publishing. [iii] The Political Economy of Foreign Aid. Hopkins, R F. Swarthmore College. | |
Direct Aid creates an international welfare trap. ODA incentivises states to restrict development spending, in order to avoid the cuts in aid donations that would accompany rising productivity, public health and growth indicators. This is made worse by the fact that one of the primary measures of poverty is income below $1 or $2 a day (depending on the region), so governments have an incentive to channel aid to the elites or to schemes that incentivise or entrenched foreign investment, whilst leaving the very poorest members of their population below this poverty line. The construction of hydroelectric facilities, for example, may reduce the amount that private industrial plants and manufacturers pay for their power. However, an improved power distribution network may also be irrelevant to the needs of ordinary citizens within a state, unable to afford tools, medication or education, let alone electronic equipment. Tax breaks and lax wage protection laws implemented in order to encourage foreign direct investment in a developing economy may act as a further incentive to stratify spending. Moreover, the suppression of average earnings in such environments tends to concentrate wealth among the owners of large amounts of land and other capital. Further, a large proportion of direct aid is simply recycled by developing states’ governments as debt servicing. A significant proportion (over 60%) of aid donated to the poorest nations is spent to service interest (not even capital repayments) on debts incurred during the short post-colonial investment booms of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s [i] , often by dictatorial governments. Payment of aid to NGOs would shift priorities, adding impetus to large scale developments and stimulating further growth via multiple, smaller-scale schemes. Increases in tax revenue resulting from a general increase in economic prosperity throughout a state will enable faster repayment of sovereign debts. [i] “Debt relief under the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative.” International Monetary Fund. 06 September 2011. | |
NGOs do not deliver aid effectively The idea that NGO’s are better able to deliver development aid has become received wisdom – accepted uncritically, repeated unthinkingly. Because charities do not have the political staying power of governments, nor a government’s ability to mobilise force or request assistance from intergovernmental bodies (such as the UN), they are often the first to withdraw when dormant war zones turn ‘hot’. Inevitably, and understandably, NGOs will always prioritise the lives of their staff and volunteers. Problems also arise when faith-based NGOs attempt to involve themselves in development projects in poorer parts of the world. Even large, well-funded charities such as Christian Aid [i] or Saudi educational charities are perceived as partisan actors in certain states and territories. The presence of such groups has frequently exacerbated community tensions where access to political power, wealth or land is divided unequally among plural religious or cultural groups. Most importantly, whilst organisations such as the Red Cross may be able to deliver emergency aid to areas where national governments are unwelcome, it is all but impossible to deliver development aid to conflict zones. Long term solutions to economic deprivation or agricultural failure are rendered meaningless in an environment where the destruction of infrastructure is widespread and unpredictable. Even the most basic forms of aid delivery may be diverted to rebel forces, perpetuating conflicts. The kind of peace that only national governments can impose is needed before serious development can commence. [i] “Christian Aid: Continued Bias and missing context in Palestinian agenda.” NGO Monitor. 13 July 2006. | |
Protecting sovereignty The international community should respect the sovereignty of developing nations. Side proposition has attempted to mischaracterise states in receipt of aid as undemocratic, authoritarian, kleptocratic or Hobbesian wastelands. Side proposition has done precious little to acknowledge that many states that are reliant on ODA are functioning or emerging democracies. Kenya, despite its growing wealth and increasing trade with Asian states still makes extensive use of aid donations. In 2012 Kenya will hold elections for seats in its national legislature – its first since a presidential election degenerated into political violence in 2007. However, even this extended period of civil disorder was brought to an end when the main contenders in the presidential ballot agreed a power sharing deal – a peaceful compromise that has now been maintained for almost five years [i] . Reducing government aid to developing democracies prevents these states from allocating aid in accordance with their citizens’ wishes. In the world created by the resolution, aid distribution will be carried out by foreign charities that may have objectives and normative motives at odds with the aspirations of a government and its citizens. There is a risk that governments will abandon heterodox or non-liberal approaches to democracy in an effort to obtain tools and support from NGOs that they would otherwise be unable to afford. State actors will be placed in a position where any action they take will entail a significant sacrifice of political authority. A state that capitulates readily to the demands of a foreign NGO will not be seen as a robust representative of the national political will; it will be considered weak. Similarly, a state that refuses to accepting funding or the donations of new infrastructure materials will be forced to deal with the consequences of prolonged fiscal and economic deprivation within its borders. NGOs are, as a general rule undemocratic, unaccountable interest groups. Like any other private organisation, they are not bound by the transparency and freedom of information regimes that western governments have submitted to. In many states, especially India, NGOs are subject to less regulation and less stringent accounting requirements than for-profit businesses. The American or European origins of the wealthiest NGOs, along with the large numbers of western professionals that they employee make auditing and judicial supervision of their activities difficult for poorer states. It can be complicated and expensive to challenge international conflicts in private law regimes; it can be equally complicated for new governments to renege on agreements that their predecessors may have concluded with NGOs. Popular concern about the safety of western citizens working for NGOs in foreign states can lead to unbearable diplomatic pressure being applied to governments that attempt to discipline organisations that exceed the authority they have been granted or adopt a lax attitude to national laws or social taboos. An attempt by a French charity to evacuate one hundred and three children from Chad to Europe was subject to wide spread criticism [ii] when it emerged that the charity had produced fake visas for the children and had attempt to conceal the operation from Chadian authorities. The charity had previously published press material that contained open admissions that it was acting without the support of any national government or international organisation. Nonetheless, the French government attempted to influence the outcome of the criminal investigation that was mounted against the Charity’s workers [iii] . The resolution would remove control over development policy from emergent representative institutions created at great financial and political cost. The resources and political capital normally bound up in ODA would then be transferred to NGOs that may be less accountable than national governments, that may sow conflict within divided communities, and may act unilaterally and without respect for the laws of aid receiving states. The message that the resolution would communicate is directly contradictory to the ethos of responsible, accountable and democratic intervention in marginalised or failing states that has underlain the last twenty years of development policy. [i] “Deal to end Kenyan crisis agreed.” BBC News Online. 12 April 2008. [ii] “Profile: Zoe’s Ark.” BBC News Online. 29 October 2007. [iii] “’Families weren’t duped’, Zoe’s Ark duo tell court.” Sydney Morning Herald. 24 December 2007. | |
NGOS are better at delivering aid. Governments in those nations most in need of aid are often the least able or willing to deliver that aid. This is particularly true in those states where the line-drawing of colonialism has pitched ethnic groups into conflicts over resources, territory and political recognition. For example, the central government of the former Sudan consistently refused to apportion aid to the country’s restive southern region. Khartoum’s conduct prolonged conflicts in the area and hastened South Sudan’s secession. Similarly, the Nigerian government has no credibility in the Niger Delta region. The Somali government, barely able to assert control over the city of Mogadishu, is unable to distribute aid to other areas of the country. The same is true of south American and south east Asian nations that have been affected by regional insurgencies. Under these circumstances, many first world states have been forced to withdraw ODA. By contrast, charities have the credibility of not being associated with governments; they can cross national borders and have a presence in rebel controlled areas such as the enclaves of northern Sri Lanka. NGOs are simply more effective at aid delivery in many of the poorest nations. | |
Biological weapons are indiscriminate. This is why they are so horrific, but also why they are not a concern in this instance. Any use of biological weapons in Syria would likely affect not only rebels but also government supporters. The Syrian government can’t afford to use such a weapon if it wants to ever have a chance of regaining control of the country. | |
What about biological weapons? Chemical weapons are a horrifying weapon of mass destruction but they are by no means the only such horrific weapons. James Clapper, the U.S. director of national intelligence says “We judge that some elements of Syria’s biological warfare programme might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and might be capable of limited agent production, based on the duration of its longstanding programme”. [1] Biological weapons could potentially be even more devastating than chemical weapons as they don’t necessarily affect just a localised area then disperse. As with other viruses they can be passed from person to person. In a country like Syria where the health services have broken down, and basically don’t exist in opposition areas the result could be huge numbers of deaths. It is inconsistent to disarm one type of weapon while leaving another type of WMD available to the Syrian regime. [1] AFP, ‘Syria ‘may be able to produce biological weapons’’, The Telegraph, 29 January 2014, | |
That progress is difficult and slow is not a good reason to leave the country entirely and instead make no progress. | |
Inspectors don’t solve the real problem The biggest difficulty with the weapons inspectors being in Syria is that they are a sideshow to the real problem. Yes chemical weapons use is horrific but their use in Syria has caused far fewer casualties than conventional weapons. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights put the total death toll at 115,000 at the end of September 2013 [1] by comparison the chemical weapons attack that triggered the threat of intervention and therefore the inspections caused somewhere between 136 and 1300 deaths. [2] Syria’s having joined the chemical weapons convention and allowed in inspectors may prevent more deaths as a result of chemical weapons but it has not stopped the conflict. Many thousands more will die as a result of the conflict while the international community looks on patting itself on the back that it has somehow managed to find a solution. [1] Stampler, Laura, ‘Group Says Syria Death Toll at 115,000’, Time, 1 October 2013, [2] Mroue, Bassem, ‘The United Nations is seeking clarity over the alleged chemical attack in Syria’, USA Today, 22 August 2013, | |
There is a limit to what can be done in internal conflicts such as the Syrian civil war. There is a chemical weapons convention that almost every nation has signed so there is an international norm against their use and agreement on their disarmament. This is not the case with conventional internal conflict. The Syrian regime will agree to disarm its chemical weapons to prevent bombing by NATO but removing conventional weapons or ending the conflict would be completely different; a much bigger operation which the Syrian regime could not agree too as it would mean signing their death warrant. | |
Withdrawing the inspectors is hardly going to make Syria live up to its commitments. Instead more pressure is needed on Syria when it does drag its feet. | |
Unlikely to make any progress Weapons inspectors are unlikely to actually be able to totally disarm Syria. The OPCW has been given a target of dismantling Syria’s arsenal by the middle of 2014 but has admitted that it is a tight deadline that will require temporary ceasefires if the target is to be reached. This is because “For any particular move that the team has to undertake, the security situation is assessed. Unless we get the clearance from our UN colleagues, we don't move.” [1] Clearly if the weapons inspectors won’t go where there is a high risk to themselves they are unlikely to get the job done. Already inspectors have encountered situations where they can’t gain access to sites due to safety concerns. [2] Moreover in a conflict situation it will be extremely difficult to verify that all of Syria’s chemical weapons have been dismantled. There are two potential problems – will the Syrian government really be honest about the size of its stockpiles or will it quietly keep some back, and will the inspectors be able to gain access to all areas both government and rebel held? So long as there is conflict there will clearly be a chaotic situation in which weapons could be buried, or hidden, or simply never found. [1] Ensor, Josie, ‘Chemical watchdog chief calls for Syria ceasefire’, The Telegraph, 9 October 2013, [2] BBC News, ‘Syria chemical weapons inspectors hail progress’, 17 October 2013, | |
Syria has not lived up to its commitments Syria is falling well behind on handing over its weapons. The deadliest chemicals were supposed to be removed by 1st January and the rest by 6th February. Neither happened. The Syrian government blamed the lack of protective equipment as well as the security situation but the OPCW says it has handed over the necessary equipment. [1] Under a new timetable Syria has pledged to remove all chemical weapons by 13th April, but by the end of March had only removed just over half. [2] If Syria continues to fail to meet deadlines there have to be consequences, including abandoning the mission. [1] Blanford, Nicholas, ‘Months of stalling preceded Syria’s latest chemical weapons handover’, CS Monitor, 4 March 2014, [2] AlJazeera, 2014, | |
The chemical weapons inspections take the pressure off Syria. When there was a threat of intervention by an outside power there was a reason for the Syrian government to negotiate with the rebels to find a peaceful solution. It is clear that it was coercion that got the weapons inspectors in as the White House said “It was the credible threat of U.S. military action that led to the opening of this diplomatic avenue.” [1] But it halts future coercion. With weapons inspectors in the country the possibility of using coercion is non-existent; no country is going to consider an attack while they are there and the Syrian regime knows this. The inspections may be considered a diplomatic victory for Russia and the USA but it has come at the expense of the bigger prize of peace. For which there is now almost no prospect. [1] Zenko, Micah, ‘Would the Syria Deal Be a Coercive Diplomacy Success?’, CFR, 12 September 2013, | |
Conflict would not break out if the inspectors left; that point has passed. Now if the inspectors left it is likely that nothing would happen. Clearly the better option is for there to be significant pressure on Syria and Assad to bring about peace in the country – through sanctions, help for the rebels, even limited military action. This can then allow much more comprehensive weapons that don’t provide a chance for the Syrian regime to hide some amidst the chaos. | |
Inspectors are ending a chemical weapons threat Unless you are a warmonger, or you have a particular hatred of the United Nations, then there is no reason to throw the weapons inspectors out. They do no harm in their mission in Syria and have the potential to do a lot of good by destroying one of the world’s biggest stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. 189 countries representing 98% of the world’s population have signed up to the chemical weapons convention, which means getting rid of these horrifying weapons. [1] Clearly the world is in agreement that they must go and this is what the inspectors are endeavouring to do. Getting rid of the inspectors simply halts this vital work to no end. [1] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Chemical Weapons’, un.org, | |
A point on the path to peace Sometimes peace comes from one big agreement. But most of the time there are lots of small steps on the path to peace. This involves finding areas where deals can be made to help build trust that the negotiating regimes will carry out their promises. A cease fire is worthless if neither side believes the other will stick to it as it becomes a race to break it first. But the progress of weapons inspectors shows Syria can be trusted to fulfil its commitments. Peace talks have followed the agreement on chemical weapons. There have been conferences at Montreaux/Geneva, they have not brought breakthroughs, but neither have they broken down so progress on other issues such as prisoner exchanges, humanitarian access, or safe passage deals, are likely at some point. [1] [1] Williams, Michael C., ‘Negotiating a path to peace: from Geneva to Aleppo, via Moscow’, New Statesman, 13 February 2014, | |
Nobody can afford to have the weapons inspectors leave There were three main actors in the deal that allowed the chemical weapons inspectors into Syria; The United States, Russia, and the Syrian government, none of whom have any reason to want to see the inspectors leave. Russia took the initiative to create the deal having leapt upon Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks and so has a lot of international prestige tied up in making the deal work, it also shows that Russia can be constructive as well as simply a spoiler in the international arena. If the deal collapsed then the United States would almost certainly be back to where it was when there was agreement on sending the weapons inspectors in; days or weeks away from military action. Such military action would be costly and unlikely to work; attacking chemical weapons from the air would be difficult and would risk chemical releases. [1] Because of the risk of attack it would clearly be in Syria’s interest to stick with the current situation. So far it has given no indication that it will hinder the weapons inspectors in any way. This has been confirmed by Sigrid Kaag, the Special Coordinator of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission, who in late October stated “To date, the Government of Syria has fully cooperated in supporting the work of the advance team and the OPCW-UN Joint Mission.” [2] [1] Hambling, David, ‘How the US may try to destroy Syria's chemical weapons’, New Scientist, 3 September 2013, [2] Kaag, Sigrid, ‘Statement of Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission’, un.org, 22 October 2013, | |
Inspectors were the only way to avoid international conflict Before the deal on allowing in weapons inspectors the course was set for an international conflict in Syria; the United States and allies, such as France, would have bombed Syria. The only way to prevent such a conflict becoming a reality is to keep weapons inspectors on the ground. Syria crossed President Obama’s ‘red line’ when chemical weapons were used and despite initial reluctance on the part of the Obama administration this was always likely to lead to some form of military response. Syria's Foreign Minister when accepting the Russian suggestion to disarm its chemical weapons suggested this was why it accepted as Walid al-Moallem said they accepted to "thwart U.S. aggression". [1] If the weapons inspectors leave the United States is once more left with the question of how to get rid of the chemical weapons, the weapons inspections are the only non-military option. [1] AP, 'Syria Accepts Russian Proposal To Surrender Chemical Weapons, Foreign Minister says', Huffington Post, 10 September 2013, | |
The deal that allowed weapons inspectors into Syria may have made peace further away not closer. By allowing Assad’s government to sign up to an international treaty while its legitimacy was contested by other groups showed that other governments accept only Assad as the legitimate government of Syria. This undid two years of attempts to delegitimise Assad; more than 30 countries had recognised Syria’s opposition as the country’s ‘legitimate representative’. [1] [1] Freedman, Joshua Meir, ‘Don’t let Assad sign the Chemical Weapons Convention on Syria’s behalf’, AlJazeera, 29 September 2013, | |
Taking the weapons inspectors out of Syria need not be permanent, simply until there is peace and hopefully a new regime. | |
African states have been happy with the ICC in the past – they referred ICC cases to the court themselves. If African states were to set up their own court, it would be unclear how it would work with the existing framework of the ICC as some African states may wish to remain ICC members. Also, a regional body would still lead to allegations of a “foreign court”, while at the same time placing the decisions in the hands of judges who may be less insulated from regional geopolitical pressures. | |
Regional court is “best of both worlds” A regional court would be a good way to balance the competing issues between the legitimate concerns of the African states and the International Criminal Court. It would be able to provide an African solution to African problems, with no accusations of external interference or colonialism. Similarly, it would have some of the advantages of the ICC particularly its independence from individual states, meaning those in high places are more likely to be held to account. With this accountability to an African court there would be an impression of being held to account by peers not outsiders. | |
There isn’t such a balancing act – without justice there cannot be peace as it is simply likely to lead to attempts at retribution or vigilante justice. Justice is a universal value, an end in itself. It is not something that can be given away as a bargaining chip. | |
ICC is biased against Africans All of the ongoing ICC prosecutions are based on events in Africa, and all those on trial are Africans. The ICC has not brought actions following the invasion of Iraq, or the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Colombia. The lack of action in any matter outside sub-Saharan Africa shows that the international community are happy to allow the ICC to exclusively prosecute Africans. The UN Security Council, which contains no African permanent members, can veto any possible prosecution [1] and refer a case to the ICC [2] .. Replacing the ICC with an African Criminal Court would stop this bias, or perception of bias. This would be done by withdrawing from the Rome statute and the ICC which has been labelled as Western imperialism by people such as Rwandan president Paul Kagame [3] . [1] Rome Statute, Article 16 [2] Rome Statute, Article 13 [3] Du Plessis, footnote 36 (dead links) | |
Almost all of the cases where people have been indicted before the ICC – DR Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic and the Ivory Coast – have been referred to the court by African nations themselves. Those that have not were referred to the UN Security Council. The only case where the Office of the Prosecutor started a case leading to incitement was the Kenya case, Kenya having signed and ratified the Rome Statute. The ICC can only act where it has jurisdiction [1] - it is not a kangaroo court for particular cases. The ICC has looked in to cases outside Africa, including in Afghanistan, Honduras, the Mediterranean sea (an Israeli attack on Comorosian, Greek and Cambodian ships), Korea, Colombia, Georgia and Palestine [2] . [1] Rome Statute, Article 22 [2] Office of the Prosecutor, Report in to Preliminary Examination Activities, 2013, | |
Drugs trafficking was considered as a role for the ICC, but rejected as unworkable – an ACC would face the same problems. “Unconstitutonal change of government” would be open to rampant political abuse, allowing existing governments to cling on to power. No other supranational regional body has tried having its own prosecution system or criminal courts – not even the European Union. Regional bodies can – and should – have courts to deal with treaty interpretation or human rights treaties, but regional criminal courts are a major step into the unknown. Criminal cases are best served by one nation, or all of them – not a regional bloc with its own tensions. | |
ICC doesn’t strike right balance between peace and justice for Africa The balance between peace and justice is a complex issue. The ICC has disregarded peace as a priority in cases, focusing exclusively on justice by indicting individuals, which reduces the diplomatic leeway and drives those indicted towards a bunker mentality. The result then may be the conflict goes on longer and more crimes are committed. Peace and preventing future crimes should come before justice for past crimes. The ICC have focused on prosecuting Omar al Bashir, but it may be a better option to focus on diplomatic alternatives to trials for dealing with the conflict in Darfur. | |
ACC could deal with pan-African problems that the ICC does not address It has been suggested that offences such as “unconstitutional change of government”, drug trafficking, piracy and corruption [1] should be added to the jurisdiction of an African Criminal Court. The ICC is limited to only a small number of crimes. However, an African Criminal Court could not only deal with the existing crimes, but create pan-African solutions in terms of dealing with a number of issues where Africa needs particular solutions. An ACC could deal with piracy off the coast of East Africa, where there is no effective court system, due to Somalia amounting to a failed state. Similarly, “unconstitutional change of government” prosecutions could amount to a deterrent to coups. [1] IRIN, “Analysis: How Close is an African Criminal Court?”, IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), 13 June 2012, | |
An African Criminal Court instead of African ICC membership would not lead to impunity – just more local courts. The principle of complementarity, allowing national courts to take appropriate action – is already enshrined in the ICC. In a particularly bad case, the UN Security Council could still refer a situation to the ICC. Running an African Criminal Court in tandem with the ICC would allow another layer of regional justice to bring the Nuremberg precedent – leaders held criminally responsible for criminal actions – in to fruition in Africa. | |
By being a court for the African continent by the African continent, there will not be room for allegations of imperialism and/or racism that already exist against the International Criminal Court. In addition, the African states that are members of the International Criminal Court have chosen to do so – it is not a violation of state sovereignty for a state to voluntarily sign a treaty even if that treaty restricts the actions of future governments. | |
ACC could destabilize Africa Depending on how the treaty is drawn up, an African Criminal Court could be open to abuse. If it has too broad powers, it could lead to political trials thanks to judges following orders from their domestic governments, and complaints to it by governments in diplomatic spats rather than actually resolving serious international criminal law crimes. The same disputes that exist now within the ICC over issues such as interference with national sovereignty could just be replicated on a smaller scale – but rather than resembling a failure of any international body, it would be a regional body and lead to greater problems. If the ICC indicts a leader there is anger at the international community, if an ACC does the same there is a split in the AU. | |
An African Criminal Court would be a waste of money International trials are expensive – 14% of the AU’s annual budget for an ICC trial [1] . The ICC is cheaper than the cost of the tribunal system – the cost of the Charles Taylor trial was roughly two and a half times that of the $20M figure for ICC trials. Africa already contributes little to the budget of the ICC. The ICC will be cheaper than standalone tribunals thanks to economies of scale. The African Union has a track record of failures as well – NEPAD, the New Partnership for African Development tried to have a quasi-judicial element aiming to create rulings against corruption, but failed [2] . [1] IRIN, “Analysis: How Close is an African Criminal Court?”, IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks), 13 June 2012, [2] Editorial, ‘African Criminal Court Not Viable’, the Star, 17 July 2012, |
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