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correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	80	https://the110club.com/khamtai-siphandone-1924-present-t28497.html	en	Khamtai Siphandone (1924	https://header.tapatalk-…png?v=1712216234	https://header.tapatalk-…png?v=1712216234	[ "https://d5nxst8fruw4z.cloudfront.net/atrk.gif?account=fdH3q1kx0820/9", "https://groups.tapatalk-cdn.com/static/image/logo_t.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Grunkle Stan" ]	2022-09-24T22:47:00+00:00	Laotian politician Khamtai Siphandone has been the oldest living state leader current of former since the death of Francisco Morales Bermudez this Jul	en	https://groups.tapatalk-cdn.com/favicon/2020798-1690912449.ico	The 110 Club	https://the110club.com/khamtai-siphandone-1924-present-t28497.html	2:16 PM - Feb 09#22024-02-09T14:16+00:00 7:14 AM - Feb 10#32024-02-10T07:14+00:00
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	99	http://countrylicious.com/laos/famous-people	en	Famous people of Laos	http://static.countrylicious.com/flags/480/LAO.jpg	http://static.countrylicious.com/flags/480/LAO.jpg	[ "http://countrylicious.com/logos/logo-share.png", "http://static.countrylicious.com/flags/480/LAO.jpg", "http://static.countrylicious.com/flags/48/LAO.jpg", "https://www.paypalobjects.com/en_US/i/scr/pixel.gif", "https://restifydb.com/stats/piwik.php?idsite=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "famous people" ]	null	[ "Daniel Chirita" ]	null	Famous people of Laos.	en	/favicon.ico	countrylicious	http://countrylicious.com/laos/famous-people	Famous people from Laos Here is a list of famous people from Laos. Curious if anybody from Laos made it our most famous people in the world list? Read the aformentioned article in order to find out. Vang Pao Military Person Vang Pao was a Lieutenant General in the Royal Lao Army. He was a leader in the Hmong American community in the United States. Ken Lo Martial Artist Ken Low Wai-kwong is a Hong Kong actor, martial artist, and stuntman. He was a member of the Jackie Chan Stunt Team. Boun Oum Politician H.H. Prince Boun Oum was the son of King Ratsadanay, and was the hereditary prince of Champassak and also Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos from 1948-1950 and again in 1960-1962. Chloe Dao Fashion Designer Chloe Dao is an American fashion designer of Vietnamese descent who lives and works in Houston, US. She was the winner of the second season of the reality show Project Runway with a collection of women's evening wear. Many of the pieces in her finale collection featured billowing, voluminous sleeves, removable shrugs and strong brocade prints. Choummaly Sayasone Politician Lieutenant General Choummaly Sayasone is General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. He was elected as Party General Secretary on 21 March 2006, in the aftermath of the Party's 8th Congress by the 1st plenum of the 8th Central Committee, succeeding Khamtai Siphandon, and he subsequently succeeded Siphandon as President on June 8, 2006. Choummaly was born in Attapu. He joined the Party's Politburo in 1991 and served as Minister of Defence from 1991 to 2001. Subsequently he was Vice President from 2001 to 2006. In March 2011, he was reelected to his position as party General Secretary at the 9th LPRP Congress. In June 2011, he was re-elected as President of Laos at the Seventh Lao National Assembly. Jerry Yang Professional Poker Player Xao "Jerry" Yang is an ethnic Hmong poker player from Temecula, California and the 2007 World Series of Poker Main Event champion. Yang started playing poker in 2005. An amateur player at the time, Yang entered the 2007 World Series of Poker after winning a $225 satellite at the Pechanga Resort and Casino in Temecula. Prior to the World Series, he had four cashes in local California events. At the final table, Yang went from starting eighth in chips to holding a big chip lead that he never relinquished. The process of accumulating this chip lead involved Yang knocking out seven of the eight other players at the final table. Heads-up against Tuan Lam, he won the title with 8♣ 8♦ against Lam's A♦ Q♦ when he hit a nine-high straight on the river after Lam had caught a queen on the flop on a board of 5♠ Q♣ 9♣ 7♦ 6♥. After a 12-hour final table, Yang had won $8,250,000 for the victory. As of 2009, the majority of his live tournament winnings, $8,263,393, have come from his win at the 2007 main event. Yang summarized his tournament strategy: "I study my opponents very carefully, and when I sensed something, when I sensed some weakness, I took a chance. Even if I had nothing, I decided to raise, reraise, push all-in or make a call....The only way that I could win this tournament was by being aggressive from the very beginning and that’s exactly what I did. And thank God I was also able to pick up some good cards at the same time." Once Yang was guaranteed a share of the prize money he pledged to donate 10% percent of his winnings to three charities, as well as his alma mater, Loma Linda University. Kaysone Phomvihane Politician Kaysone Phomvihane was the leader of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 1955, though Souphanouvong served in a figurehead role. He served as the first Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic from 1975 to 1991 and then as President from 1991 until his death a year later, in 1992. Souphanouvong Politician Prince Souphanouvong was, along with his half-brother Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Boun Oum of Champasak, one of the “Three Princes” who represented respectively the communist, neutralist, and royalist political factions in Laos. He was the figurehead President of Laos from December 1975 to August 1991. Souphanouvong was one of the sons of Prince Bounkhong, the last vice-king of Luang Prabang. Unlike his half-brothers, Souvanna Phouma and Phetsarath, whose mothers were of royal birth, his mother was a commoner, Mom Kham Ouane. Educated in France and Vietnam, he eventually became a supporter of Ho Chi Minh and joined the Indochinese communist movement. In August 1950, Souphanouvong convened the first congress of the Lao Freedom Front — more generally known as the Pathet Lao - which served as the vehicle for the communist challenge to French rule. He was the chairman of the Neo Lao Issara and Resistance Government. Nicknamed “The Red Prince”, he became the figurehead leader of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, and upon its successful seizure of power in 1975, he became the first President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, a position which he held until his retirement in 1986. After 1986, Phoumi Vongvichit Succeeded as president, Kaysone Phomvihane succeeded as president in 1991. Sisavang Vatthana Monarch Sisavang Vatthana or sometimes Savang Vatthana was the last king of the Kingdom of Laos. He ruled from 1959 after his father's death until his forced abdication in 1975. Savang Vatthana proved unable to manage a country in political turmoil. His rule ended with the takeover by the Pathet Lao in 1975, after which he and his family were sent to a re-education camp by the new government. Sisavang Vong Chivalric Order Member Sisavang Phoulivong, was king of Kingdom of Luang Phrabang and later Kingdom of Laos from 28 April 1904 until his death on 20 October 1959. Souvanna Phouma Politician Prince Souvanna Phouma was the leader of the neutralist faction and Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos several times from 1951–1954, 1956–1958, 1960 and 1962-1975. Phetsarath Rattanavongsa Deceased Person Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongsa was prime minister of Laos from 1942 to 1945, and was the first and last vice-king of the Kingdom of Laos. Thongsing Thammavong Politician Thongsing Thammavong is a Laotian politician who has been Prime Minister of Laos since 2010. He is a member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and has been a member of the LPRP Politburo since 1991. He currently serves in the National Assembly of Laos, representing Luang Prabang Province, and was the President of the National Assembly from 2006 to 2010. He became Prime Minister on 23 December 2010. Chai Vang Man Chai Soua Vang is a naturalized U.S. citizen and a Hmong immigrant from Laos. While on a hunting trip in northern Wisconsin, Vang shot eight people, who were also hunting in the area, on November 21, 2004. Six were killed and two were left wounded. According to court proceedings prior to his conviction, Vang acknowledged shooting the people, but challenged the chain of events that caused a dispute over a deer stand to become violent and escalate into multiple deaths. Vang, who lived in Saint Paul, Minnesota at the time of the shootings, is currently being held at Iowa State Penitentiary. Mee Moua Legislator Mee Moua, is the president and executive director of the Asian Americans Advancing Justice \| AAJC. Prior to her current post, she served as the vice president for strategic impact initiatives at the Asian & Pacific Islander American Health Forum, where she was the executive administrator of the Washington, D.C. office and managed the communications, government relations, policy analysis and research functions of the organization. Moua was the first Hmong American woman elected to a state legislature, where she served as a member of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party. She represented District 67 in the Minnesota Senate, which includes portions of the city of Saint Paul in Ramsey County, which is in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. On May 16, 2010, she announced that she would not run for a third term. Moua chaired the Judiciary Committee and held the highest office of any Hmong American politician. She also served on the senate's Taxes and Transportation committees, and was a member of the Finance subcommittee for the Public Safety Budget Division and the Transportation Budget and Policy Division, of the Judiciary Subcommittee for Data Practices, and of the Taxes Subcommittee for the Property Tax Division. Nguyen Dinh Thi Composer Nguyễn Đình Thi was a Vietnamese writer and a composer. Bouasone Bouphavanh Politician Bouasone Bouphavanh was Prime Minister of Laos from 2006 to 2010. He was officially appointed to the office by the National Assembly of Laos on June 8, 2006, during a major government reshuffle. He replaced Bounnhang Vorachith who became vice president. Bouasone had previously served as first deputy prime minister since October 3, 2003. Before that, he was third deputy prime minister and was president of the State Planning Committee. He ranks seventh in the Politburo. He was replaced as Prime Minister on 23 December 2010 by Thongsing Thammavong. He was educated at a primary school and secondary school in Salavan Province and Champasak Province from 1961 to 1974 and later at the Communist Party Institute in Moscow in the Soviet Union from 1986 to 1990. Appointed prime minister at the age of 52, Bouasone is part of a new generation of leaders in the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, signaling a possible shift in Laos' traditional firm reliance on its ties to Vietnam to increased reliance and cooperation with China. As part of the overhaul of Laos economy Bouphavanh has announced plans to increase foreign investment in Laos and open a Laotian stock exchange. In 1975, shortly before the fall of Vientiane to the Pathet Lao, he was a student activist who played a key role in protests against the previous regime. He is considered a protégé of former party leader Khamtai Siphandon. Visay Phaphouvanin Footballer Visay Phaphouvanin is Laotian footballer who plays for home town club Vientiane Capital as a striker. He is a member of Laos national football team, played at the 2010 AFF Suzuki Cup and 2014 FIFA World Cup qualifiers. Fa Ngum Deceased Person Somdetch Brhat-Anya Fa Ladhuraniya Sri Sadhana Kanayudha Maharaja Brhat Rajadharana Sri Chudhana Negara better known as Fa Ngum established the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang in 1354. Siluck Saysanasy Actor Siluck Saysanasy is a Laotian-Canadian television actor. Saysanasy is best known for playing "Yick Yu", a character from the Degrassi series. He went to high school at Vaughan Road Academy in Toronto, Ontario, in the Interact program. One of his real-life best friends is Pat Mastroianni, who played Joey Jeremiah on Degrassi. Lamnao Singto Footballer Lamnao Singto born 15 April 1988 in Luang Prabang, is a Laotian football player. He has played for Provincial Electricity Authority in the Thailand Premier League, the top division of the Thailand football League. In 2010 Lamnao moved to one of the top teams in Laos, YOTHA FC in the Lao League. He features in the most recent Beerlao TV advertisement for promoting the 2009 Southeast Asian Games which were held in Vientiane, Laos. Bounnhang Vorachith Politician Bounnhang Vorachith is the vice president of Laos. He served as deputy prime minister from 1996 to 2001, and then was appointed prime minister. He became vice president on June 8, 2006 when Bouasone Bouphavanh was appointed prime minister. He is member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Soulivong Savang Noble person Crown Prince Soulivong Savang, grandson of the last King of Laos Savang Vatthana, is the pretender to the Lao throne. Laos was a monarchy until 1975, when the communist Pathet Lao seized control of the nation, causing Savang Vatthana to abdicate his throne. Soulivong Savang lives in self-imposed exile in Paris. Bryan Thao Worra Author Bryan Thao Worra is a Laotian American writer. His books include On The Other Side Of The Eye, Touching Detonations, Winter Ink, Barrow and The Tuk Tuk Diaries: My Dinner With Cluster Bombs. He is the first Laotian American to receive a Fellowship in Literature from the United States government's National Endowment for the Arts. He received the Asian Pacific Leadership Award from the State Council on Asian Pacific Minnesotans for Leadership in the Arts in 2009. He was selected as a Cultural Olympian representing Laos during the 2012 London Summer Olympics. Khan Malaythong Olympic athlete Khan "Bob" Malaythong is an American badminton player. He qualified for the U.S. badminton team as a doubles competitor at the 2008 Summer Olympics. Malaythong moved to the United States at age 8. Malaythong teamed with Howard Bach in men's doubles. Malaythong graduated from William Jefferson Palmer High School in Colorado Springs, Colorado and Santa Ana College. Malaythong portrayed a Chinese badminton player in a Vitamin Water commercial starring David Ortiz and Brian Urlacher. Malaythong now currently coaches at the Royal Badminton Academy in Menlo Park, along with fellow Olympian and long-time friend, Raju Rai. Lee Lue Military Person Captain Lee Lue was a Laotian Hmong fighter bomber pilot notable for flying more combat missions than any other pilot in the Kingdom of Laos. Lee Lue flew continuously, as many as 10 missions a day and averaging 120 combat missions a month to build a total of more than 5,000 sorties. Lee Lue was the leader of the special group of Hmong pilots flying T-28Ds out of Long Tieng against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese positions. The group was funded by the CIA and was part of the regular Royal Lao Air Force, but took orders directly from MR2 Commander Gen. Vang Pao. He was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and killed over Laos near Muong Suoi on July 12, 1969. A motto attributed to him was "Fly 'til you die." He was posthumously promoted to Major. Zakarine Deceased Person King Zakarine, also known as Sakkarin, Sakharine, Sackarine, Zackarine, and Zacharine was the King of Luang Prabang from 1895 to 1904. Touby Lyfoung Politician Touby Lyfoung was a Hmong political and military leader. Born in 1917 in Nong Het, Laos, he became the first Hmong politician to achieve national prominence. During his long career, which began under French colonial rule and extended to the communist takeover in 1975, he supported the Royal Lao Government and American involvement in the Secret War. Phoui Sananikone Politician Phoui Sananikone was Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Laos on two occasions in 1950 to 1951 and again from 1958 to 1959, and also served as Foreign Minister on multiple occasions. Phoumi Vongvichit Politician Phoumi Vongvichit was a leading figure of the Pathet Lao and an elder statesman of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. He was born April 6, 1909 in Xieng Khouang, the son of a civil servant. He was educated in the Lao capital Vientiane, after which he joined the colonial civil service. After postings in Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang, he was promoted to district chief and served in Xieng Khouang and Vientiane. In January 1945 he was appointed governor of Houaphan where he remained until the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The following month, Phoumi cooperated with Free French forces when they briefly seized the town of Sam Neua, but subsequently he joined the anti-colonialist Lao Issara movement and worked closely with the Viet Minh to oppose the return of French authority in Indochina. In 1946, after the French reasserted their authority in Laos, Phoumi made his way to northern Thailand where for the next three years he was active in the Lao Issara. At the end of 1949, having refused to accept the offer of amnesty upon dissolution of the Lao Issara government-in-exile in Thailand, Phoumi was one of the handful of Lao who joined Souphanouvong in northern Vietnam. There he attended the founding congress of the Neo Lao Issara. Phoumi was nominated both Secretary-General of the Front, and Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister in the Pathet Lao Resistance government that the Front established in opposition to the Royal Lao government in Vientiane. The Resistance government gained no international recognition, but Phoumi nominally retained both positions until the Geneva Agreements of 1954 brought the First Indochina War to an end. Vong Phaophanit Artist Vong Phaophanit is an artist based in London. Phaophanit is best known for his large-scale installations which incorporate a wide range of materials including ash, silk, rice, rubber, wax and often light. Somsavat Lengsavad Politician Somsavat Lengsavad is a deputy prime minister of Laos. An ethnic Chinese, Chinese name: 凌绪光, who hails from Luang Prabang with ancestry from Hainan, he was a protégé of Kaysone Phomvihane. He became foreign minister in 1993 and served until June 8, 2006, when he was replaced by Thongloun Sisoulith. Cy Thao Legislator Cy Thao is a Laotian-born Hmong politician from Minnesota and a member of the Minnesota House of Representatives representing District 65A, which includes portions of the city of Saint Paul. A Democrat, he was first elected in 2002. He did not seek re-election in 2010, and left office on January 3, 2011. In 1975, Thao's family fled from Communists in Laos and lived in a refugee camp in Thailand until moving to the United States in 1980. Shortly thereafter, he joined the Boy Scouts of America and attained the rank of Eagle Scout. He credits Scouting with helping him blend into American society and teaching him the values of community obligation. Thao is a graduate of the University of Minnesota Morris. Thongloun Sisoulith Politician Thongloun Sisoulith is a Deputy Prime Minister of Laos, as well as the current Foreign Minister. He became Deputy Prime Minister and President of the State Planning Committee on March 27, 2001, and subsequently he was appointed as Foreign Minister on June 8, 2006, replacing Somsavat Lengsavad. He is a politburo member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, ranking fifth. Sisoulith was born in the Houaphan province of Laos, and he studied at Pedagogical College of Neo Lao Hak Sat in Houaphan from 1962 to 1969. He was further educated in the Soviet Union. In addition to Lao, he speaks Vietnamese, Russian and English. Throughout his years in government he has an extensive list of appointments. He was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1987 to 1992, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare from 1993 to 1997, and a member of the National Assembly from 1998 to 2000. Vong Savang Noble person Vong Savang was the Crown Prince to throne of the Kingdom of Laos. After the Laotian Civil War in 1975, he and his family were arrested by the Pathet Lao and sent to re-education camps, where they died. Oun Kham Deceased Person Oun Kham was King of Luang Prabang during 1872-1887 and a second time between 1889 and 1895. On 7 June 1887 the Lao royal capital was seized and sacked; the elderly ruler barely escaped with his life. Between his two ruling period he was exiled in Bangkok where he gave assistance to Auguste Pavie. The last two years of his reign ended with the establishment of a French protectorate over Laos. Khamphoui Family member Khamphoui was the Queen of Laos and consort to His Majesty Sisavang Vatthana, the second King of Laos. She was arrested with the rest of her family and reportedly died in a re-education camp in 1982. Ketsada Souksavanh Footballer Ketsada Souksavanh is a Laotian soccer player. Mai Neng Moua Woman Mai Neng Moua is a Hmong writer and a founder of the Paj Ntaub Voice, a Hmong literary magazine. She is also the editor of the first anthology of Hmong American writers, Bamboo Among the Oaks. She resides in Minnesota. When Moua was diagnosed with endstage renal disease as a junior at St. Olaf College, she searched for inspiration and comfort in writing by her fellow Hmong-Americans. This experience inspired Moua to publish the first edition of Paj Ntuab Voice and to edit Bamboo Among the Oaks. Predominantly a creative non-fiction writer, she has been published in How do I Begin?, Where One Voice Ends, Another Begins, Healing by Heart, Rehabilitation Counseling Bulletin, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, and We Are the Freedom People. Her literary awards include the Bush Artists Fellowship, the Minnesota State Arts Board Artist Initiative Grant, the Jerome Travel Grant, and the Loft Literary Center's Mentor Series. Moua has a B.A. from St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota and attended the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. She currently works for the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development as a Rapid Response Specialist. Her previous jobs include being the program coordinator for the Kellogg Action Lab at Fieldstone Alliance and the public policy coordinator for The Institute for New Americans. She has taught creative writing to youth through the Jane Addams School for Democracy, COMPAS, and Success Beyond the Classroom. Moua was also a pivotal figure in the creation of the Hmong American Institute for Learning, a non-profit organization based in Minnesota that focused on Hmong oral histories, the literary arts and the continued publication of the Paj Ntaub Voice Hmoob Literary Journal. Lormong Lo Man Lormong Lo was the first Hmong American to be appointed to a city council in the U.S, in 1994, to manage the largest metropolitan city of a state like Nebraska. He was re-elected in June 1997 to a second full-term from 1997 until June 2001. In June 1997, Lo is the first Hmong ever to become president of a city council in the U.S., Omaha City Council, who presided over the official meetings of the council. He is the first to ever hold the title of Acting Mayor of the City of Omaha starting in June 1997. Lo was the first Hmong American to ever become elected President of the Asian Pacific American Municipal Officials by his APAMO colleagues, a constituency group of the National League of Cities, in Washington, D.C.. He was selected to be Vice-Chair of both the Economic Development Committee and the Program Committee of NLC. In these positions, he helped write municipal policies, e.g., housing and economic development policies for the 15,000 cities in the United States and was responsible for its conference planning. He often lobbied the U.S. Congress and White House officials on policies of interest to the cities, especially credit, economic, housing and immigration policies. Soukaphone Vongchiengkham Footballer Soukaphone Vongchiengkham is a footballer who plays as a midfielder. He currently plays for Krabi in the Thai Division 1 League. He is a member of Laos national football team. Vilayphone Vongphachanh Olympic athlete Vilayphone Vongphachanh is a female Laotian Olympic freestyle swimmer. As a member of the Laos team she competed at the age of 15 in the 2004 Summer Olympics in the Women's 50m Freestyle. She also swam at the 2008 Olympics. In 2004, she had the slowest time out of all 73 women in the event. Her result was typical for Laos, which up to the 2004 games, has always placed last or next to last in every event it has competed in. In Laos, she was only able to train in a pool half the size of a standard Olympic size swimming pool, and like other Laotian athletes had limited times to do so. Sue Maci of Parade attributed the poor results to Laos being one of the ten poorest countries in the world. Previously, in 2003, she competed in the 2003 World Championships in Barcelona, Spain. She ranked 98 out of 100 in the 50m freestyle, and 57 out of 58 in the 50m breaststroke. As of 2006 Vilayphone Vongphachanh is a swimming judge for the FINA Masters Samane Vignaket Man Lieutenant General Samane Vignaket is a former President of the National Assembly of Laos, who was in charge of ideological and cultural works of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. He was a member of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Politburo of the LPRP. Vang Sue Military Person Major Vang Sue was a Laotian Hmong fighter pilot. Recipient of the USAF Distinguished Flying Cross. He flew over 4,000 combat missions as a T-28 bomber pilot. Vang trained briefly with Hmong fighter ace Lee Lue before Lee was shot down and became General Vang Pao's preeminent pilot after Lee's death. He frequently flew on 15 days consecutively, and often as much as 15 sorties in a day. Renowned for his daring and bombing accuracy, Vang was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and killed in October 1974. Phathana Inthavong Swimmer Phathana Inthavong is a Laotian swimmer specializing in freestyle. He competed in the 50 m event at the 2012 Summer Olympics. He also competed in the 100 m event at the 2013 World Aquatics Championships. Outhine Bounyavong Author Outhine Bounyavong was a Laotian writer, known especially for works of contemporary fiction. Born in 1942 in Xaignabouli Province, he grew up in the capital, Vientiane, where one of his early teachers was Somchine Nginn, author of the first novel in Lao. Outhine held a variety of jobs during the 1960s, and began to publish short fictional works in newspapers and magazines. He came to be associated with the group of writers who were the children of Maha Sila Viravong, an important Laotian scholar. Eventually he married one of this group, Duangdeuane Viravong, a prominent author in her own right. Outhine worked during the Laotian Civil War and, after the Communist victory in 1975, continued to write for the State Publishing House. Many of his stories celebrate traditional aspects of Laotian rural life, and at least one collection has been translated into English as Mother's Beloved. Steffinnie Phrommany Actor Steffinnie Phrommany is an actress. Sopha Saysana Soccer Midfielder Sopha Saysana is a Laotian footballer who plays for Thai club Nong Khai. He played for Laos national football team at the 2012 AFF Suzuki Cup. Soukthavy Soundala Soccer Soukthavy Soundala is a Laotian footballer who plays for Ezra. He played for Laos national football team at the 2012 AFF Suzuki Cup. Khonesavanh Sihavong Soccer Midfielder Khonesavanh Sihavong is a Laotian footballer who plays for Lao Police Club. He played for Laos national football team at the 2012 AFF Suzuki Cup. Phia Sing Author Chaleunsilp Phia Sing was royal chef and master of ceremonies to the kings of Laos, and in this capacity he worked at the Royal Palace in Luang Prabang. He was also, according to Alan Davidson, "physician, architect, choreographer, sculptor, painter and poet". In addition he was mentor to the Laotian princes Souvanna Phouma and Souvannavong, and accompanied them when they studied at the University of Hanoi in the 1920s. Shortly before his death Phia Sing wrote out in two notebooks the recipes used by him as royal chef. He entrusted them to prince Souvanna Phouma, who lent them to Alan Davidson in 1974. Davidson published some of the recipes in his Fish and Fish Dishes of Laos in 1975, and afterwards arranged for them to be translated in full by Phouangphet Vannithone and Boon Song Klausner. They were published in a bilingual edition, illustrated by Soun Vannithone, in 1981. Khampheng Sayavutthi Footballer Khampheng Sayavutthi born 19 July 1986 in Vientiane, is a Laotian football player, who has played for YOTHA FC in the Lao League, the top division of the Lao football League, and the Laos national team. He currently plays for Khonkaen in the Thai Division 1 League. He played 10 games and scored 2 goals for Khonkaen. Souliya Syphasay Soccer Defender Souliya Siphasay is a Laotian football player. Manolom Phomsouvanh Soccer Midfielder Manolom Phomsouvanh is a Laotian footballer who playing for Nong Khai in Thai Regional League Division 2. He is the member of Laotian national team, played at the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualification. Ouane Rattikone Military Person Ouane Rattikone, a Laotian general, was the commander-in-chief of the Royal Lao Armed Forces, the official military of the Royal Lao Government, during the 1960s. An ally of the United States during the Vietnam War, Ouane developed a close relationship with William H. Sullivan, the US ambassador, and Ted Shackley, the CIA station chief in Vientiane. Despite intense conflict amongst the FAR regional commanders, Ouane was pivotal in providing local military support against the North Vietnamese Army and the Pathet Lao in the northern regions of Laos. Ouane was also heavily involved in the trafficking of opium throughout Southeast Asia. Despite widespread conspiracy theories of CIA complicity in drug trafficking, an investigation by the US Senate found no evidence of CIA involvement. In his memoirs, Shackley unapologetically stated that the CIA essentially turned a blind eye to the drug trafficking because their resources were already being sapped by the war in Vietnam. Nakhone Keodara Actor Nakhone Keodara is an actor. Gary Yia Lee Man Gary Yia Lee is a Hmong anthropologist and author based in Australia. Lee was born in Ban Houei Kouang, Muong Mok, Xieng Khouang, Laos. In 1961, his family was displaced by the civil war and they joined other Hmong refugees in the city of Vientiane. He excelled in a Lao school system run by the French, and had hopes of attending college in France. In 1965, after winning a Colombo Plan scholarship, he traveled to Australia instead to finish high school Lee confesses that he was taken aback by a country and a schooling system so different from the French model under which he had been previously educated. Sports were emphasized and valued, he says, perhaps even more than academic skill. Nonetheless, upon finishing high school in 1969, Lee enrolled at the University of New South Wales. "I chose social work because every time I came home, there were all these poor, starving refugees with nowhere to go, and no food," said Lee in a 2005 interview. "I thought I might be able to do something for them, but . . . after I did two years of social work, it’s all about . . . case work, working on advising people on how to sort out their personal problems. And I thought, ‘How can I do this in Laos? There are thousands of starving people! I can’t just give advice—and nobody would employ me." As a result, Lee pleaded with his brother-in-law and his uncle Touby LyFoung to help him stay in Australia to earn a Master's degree in community development. Somsanith Vongkotrattana Politician Prince Somsanith Vongkotrattana was the Prime Minister of Laos. He was born in Luang Prabang, Laos. His mother, Sanghiemkham, was one of Prince Bounkhong daughters, married Souvannarath, would late become Prime Minister, making Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prince Souphanouvong, Prince Phetsarath and Prince Kindavong his step uncles. Keoviengphet Liththideth Soccer Midfielder Keoviengphet Liththideth is a Laotian football player who plays for Ezra in Lao League. He is a member of Laos national football team. Kilakone Siphonexay Olympic Track and field Athlete Kilakone Siphonexay is a Laotian runner who competed at the 2012 Summer Olympics in the 100 m event. He was the flag bearer of Laos during the opening ceremony. Khamla Pinkeo Soccer Defender Khamla Pinkeo is a Laotian footballer. He made his first appearance for the Laos national football team in 2010. Kanlaya Sysomvang Footballer Kanlaya Sysomvang in Laos is a footballer who plays as a Forward. He currently plays for Khonkaen in the Thai Premier League and the Laos national football team. Malichansouk Kouanchao Woman Malichansouk Kouanchao is an award-winning Lao American visual artist, web and interactive designer based in Minneapolis, Minnesota. She is the subject of a children's book Mali Under the Night Sky. Her multidisciplinary works explore the relationship between art, transformation, and communal healing. Keo Souvannavong Actor Keo Souvannavong is an actor. Saynakhonevieng Phommapanya Soccer Defender Saynakhonevieng Phommapanya is a Laotian soccer player. Seng Athit Somvang Soccer Goalkeeper Seng Athit Somvang is a Laotian soccer player. Soth Phetrasy Politician Soth Phetrasy was a leading official of the Pathet Lao, the communist guerrilla movement of Laos associated with the Lao People's Party, during the 1960s and 1970s. Chuefong Xiong Soccer Defender Chuefong Xiong is a Laotian football player. Sengphachan Bounthisanh Footballer Sengphachan Bounthisanh is a Laotian footballer playing for Vientiane in Lao League. He is a member of Laos national football team. Chintana Souksavath Soccer Goalkeeper Chintana Souksavath is a Laotian football player. He is a member of Laos national football team. Van Lam Vissay Actor Van-Lam Vissay is an actor and a singer. Laenly Phoutthavong Olympic athlete Laenly Phoutthavong is a Laotian runner who competed at the 2012 Summer Olympics in the 100 m event. Sourasay Keosouvandeng Soccer Goalkeeper Sourasay Keosouvandeng is a Laotian soccer player. Konekham Inthammavong Footballer Konekham Inthammavong born 10 July 1992 in Vientiane, is a Laotian football player, he is playing for Lao Bank FC in Lao League. He is a member of Laos national football team played at 2010 AFF Suzuki Cup. Vilayout Sayyabounsou Soccer Midfielder Vilayout Sayyabounsou is a Laotian soccer player. Viengsavang Sayyaboun Soccer Midfielder Viengsavang Sayyaboun is a Laotian soccer player. Phonepaseuth Sysoutham Soccer Midfielder Phonepaseuth Sysoutham is a Laotian footballer who plays as a midfielder. Khamphoumy Hanvilay Soccer Defender Khamphoumy Hanvilay is a Laotian football player who plays for Yotha. He is a member of Laos national football team. Kitsada Thongkhen Soccer Defender Kitsada Thongkhen is a Laotian soccer player. Lembo Saysana Soccer Midfielder Lembo Saysana is a Laotian soccer player. Daoneua Siviengxay Soccer Midfielder Daoneua Siviengxay is a Laotian footballer who plays for Vientiane. He played for Laos national football team at the 2012 AFF Suzuki Cup. Souksadakone Liapvisay Soccer Defender Souksadakone Liapvisay is a Laotian football player, he is playing for Yotha in Lao League. He is a member of Laos national football team. 1.70 Moukda Souksavath Soccer Defender Moukda Souksavath is a Laotian football player who plays for Vientiane. He is a member of Laos national football team. Sangvone Phimmasen Soccer Forward Sangvone Phimmasen is a Laotian football player. Kanya Kounvongsa Soccer Defender Kanya Kounvongsa is a Laotian football player who plays for Vientiane. He is a member of Laos national football team. Pangnasith Phettikone Soccer Midfielder Pangnasith Phettikone is a Laotian football player. He is a member of Laos national football team. Thothilath Sibounhuang Soccer Defender Thothilath Sibounhuang is a Laotian footballer who plays as a defender. Kita Sysavanh Football player Kita Sysavanh is a Lao professional football player. An attacking midfielder who plays on the wings, he is known for his long range shooting, crossing and passing. Sysavanh made his debut for Laos in 2007 and has since become a mainstay in the Laos midfield. Odien Syharlad Soccer Defender Odien Syharlad is a Laotian soccer player. Sompong Manivanh Soccer Midfielder Sompong Manivanh is a Laotian soccer player. Ole Bou Sa Ath Soccer Forward Ole Bou Sa Ath is a Laotian soccer player. Dao Khotsaya Soccer Midfielder Dao Khotsaya is a Laotian football player. Thierry Mekwattana Lead Vocalist Thierry Mekwattana is a singer, member of Carabao, Thai band.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	21	https://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Laos/sub5_3d/entry-2974.html	en	LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY—LAOS’S ONLY POLITICAL PARTY	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	[ "https://factsanddetails.com/themes/fad@site2020/images/logo.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Jeffrey Hays" ]	null		en	https://factsanddetails.…uch-icon_114.png		null	LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (LPRP) Ruling party: Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP, Choummali Saignason) is one of the last one-party regimes. Modeled after the Vietnamese Communist Party, it is now primarily Communist in name only. It issues Five Year Plans and announces shuffles in the leadership positions at party congresses held every five years. There are pro-Chinese, pro-Lao and pro-Vietnamese factions with in the LPRP. There is also some rivalry between between hardliners and reformers. Whereas communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have crumbled, in Laos, the ruling communist party, the Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party — LPRP has retained undiluted political control. The constitution, adopted in August 1991, notes simply in Article 3 that the LPRP is the "leading nucleus" of the political system. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] LPRP statutes, revised following the Fifth Party Congress held in 1991, leave no doubt regarding the dominant role of the party: The party is...the leading core of the entire political system, hub of intelligence, and representative of the interest of the people of all strata. The party formulates and revises the major lines and policies on national development in all spheres; finds solutions to major problems; determines the policies regarding personnel management, training of cadres, and supplying key cadres for different levels; controls and supervises activities of party cadres and members, state agencies and mass organizations. Origins of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) The LPRP has its roots in the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. (Ho Chi Minh led the struggle for Vietnamese independence and was the president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1945 until his death in 1969.) The ICP, composed entirely of Vietnamese members in its early years, formed the Committee for Laos (or a "Lao section") in 1936. Only in the mid-1940s did the Vietnamese communist revolutionaries step up active recruitment of Laotian members. In 1946 or early 1947, Kaysone Phomvihan, a law student at the University of Hanoi, was recruited, and Nouhak Phoumsavan, engaged in a trucking business in Vietnam, joined in 1947. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] In February 1951, the Second Congress of the ICP resolved to disband the party and to form three separate parties representing the three states of Indochina. However, it was not until March 22, 1955, at the First Party Congress, that Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party — LPP) was formally proclaimed. (The name LPRP was adopted at the Second Party Congress in 1972.) It seems likely that from 1951 to 1955, key Laotian former members of the ICP provided leadership for the "resistance" movement in Laos, under the tutelage of their Vietnamese senior partners. In 1956 the LPP founded the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front — LPF) the political party of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation, to act as the public mass political organization. Meanwhile, the LPP remained clandestine, directing the activities of the front. The Vietnamese communists provided critical guidance and support to the growing party during the revolutionary period. They helped to recruit the leadership of the Laotian communist movement; from its inception, the LPRP Political Bureau (Politburo) was made up of individuals closely associated with the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese furnished facilities and guidance for training not only the top leadership but also the entire Laotian communist movement. The Vietnamese assigned advisers to the party, as well as to the military forces of the LPF. Under the guidance of North Vietnamese mentors, LPRP leaders shaped a Marxist-Leninist party, political and mass organizations, and an army and a bureaucracy, all based upon the North Vietnamese model. * From their perspective, Laotian communists had not compromised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their dependence on Hanoi. During the revolutionary period prior to 1975, when LPRP leaders looked to the North Vietnamese for a sense of overall direction and cohesion, they found many common interests. Both parties faced the same enemies: first France and then the United States. They held a similar view of the world and of the desirable solution to its problems. In some cases, this affinity was strengthened by family relations (for example, Kaysone, whose Vietnamese father, Luan Phomvihan, had been a secretary to the French resident in Savannakhét) or marriage ties (Souphanouvong and Nouhak had Vietnamese wives). * Following the First Party Congress, it was seventeen years until the Second Party Congress was convened, in February 1972. The Third Party Congress met ten years later, in April 1982; the Fourth Party Congress convened in November 1986, and the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991. Development of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) The LPP steadily grew from its initial 300 to 400 members ("25 delegates representing 300 to 400 members" were said to have attended the founding congress of the party). By 1965 there were 11,000 members; by 1972, as it prepared to enter into the final coalition with the RLG, it had grown to some 21,000 members; by 1975, when the party seized full power, it claimed a membership of 25,000; and by 1991, at the convening of the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP claimed its membership had increased to 60,000. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] When the LPRP first revealed itself to the public in 1975, the Central Committee comprised twenty-one members and six alternates. By the Fourth Party Congress, its size had expanded to fifty-one members and nine alternates. The average age of a Central Committee member in 1986 was fifty-two, with the oldest seventy-seven and the youngest thirty-three. The number of women on the Central Committee rose from three to five, including Thongvin Phomvihan, then Secretary General Kaysone's wife, who was chair of the LPRP's People's Revolutionary Youth Union and, in 1982, the first woman appointed to the Central Committee. At the Fifth Party Congress, the Central Committee stabilized in size at fifty-nine members and took on a few younger, more educated men to replace deceased or retired members. At the time, the oldest member was seventy-seven, the youngest thirty-five, with 22 percent over sixty, 30 percent between fifty and fifty-nine, and 40 percent under forty-nine. Only two women are full members of the Central Committee, and two continue as alternates. Thongvin Phomvihan — who had ranked thirty-fifth in 1986 — was removed, accompanied by rumors of excessive political influence in her business activities. Notwithstanding this setback to Kaysone's family fortune, their son, Saisompheng Phomvihan, was appointed to the Central Committee, ranking forty-fifth, and was named governor of Savannakhét Province in 1993. This appointment inspired some private muttering about the emerging "princelings," referring as well to Souphanouvong's son, Khamsai Souphanouvong, number thirtyfour on the Central Committee, who became minister of finance. * At the Fifth Party Congress, the party abolished the nineperson Secretariat of the Central Committee and changed the designation of the head of the party (Kaysone) from secretary general to chairman. Until it was abolished, the Secretariat wielded influence second only to that of the Politburo. The Secretariat issued party directives and acted on behalf of the Central Committee when it was not in session, in effect managing the day-to-day business of the party. Khamtai Siphandon became party chairman in November 1992, but it is not certain whether he will accrue the same power and influence as his predecessor. * Structure of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) The LPRP has been organized in a manner common to other ruling communist parties, with greatest similarity to the Vietnamese Communist Party. As in other such parties, the highest authority is the party congress, a gathering of party cadres from throughout the country that meets on an intermittent schedule for several days to listen to speeches, learn the plans for future party strategy, and ratify decisions already taken by the party leadership. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] Next in the party hierarchy — since the elimination of the Secretariat in 1991 — is the Central Committee, the party elite who fill key political positions throughout the country. The Central Committee is charged with leading the party between congresses. In addition to members of the Politburo and former members of the Secretariat, the committee includes key government ministers, leading generals of the army, secretaries of provincial party committees, and chairpersons of mass organizations. Despite the party's rhetoric asserting ethnic equality, the Central Committee has been dominated by lowland Lao. Upland minorities remain sparsely represented at the highest levels of party leadership. Only four members of ethnic minority groups were reported on the Central Committee elected at the Fifth Party Congress. * The Central Committee is served by a number of subordinate committees. These committees include, most importantly, the Office of the Central Committee, and five other offices: Organization Committee; Propaganda and Training Committee; Party and State Control Committee; Administrative Committee of the Party and State School for Political Theory; and Committee for the Propagation of Party Policies. * Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower level are 112 districts (muang), further divided into subdistricts (tasseng), each with their own party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrictlevel party committees have also been abolished. At the base of the country's administrative structure are more than 11,000 villages (ban), only some of which have party branches. * Semisecrecy of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Unlike other communist regimes, the LPRP has long maintained a semisecrecy about its mode of operation and the identity of its rank-and-file members. However, the LPRP follows the standard communist practice of planting party members within all principal institutions of society — in government, in mass organizations, and, formerly, in agricultural collectives. These individuals serve as leaders and transmit party policy. They also act as the eyes and ears of the central party organization. Although party members are admonished not to reveal themselves, it is not difficult for knowledgeable persons to pick out the party members in their organization. In each ministry, for example, the key power wielders are party members. All party members do not, of course, hold positions of authority. Some occupy the lower ranks, serving, for example, as messengers, drivers, and maintenance personnel. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] By the late 1980s, some of the LPRP's semisecrecy had eroded. Party leadership lists, which, during revolutionary and early postrevolutionary days had been secret, were published. But a quasi-clandestine attitude remains among the party rank and file that can be explained by several factors. Clandestine behavior is an old habit that is not easily shed. Secrecy adds to the party's mystery, inspires anxiety and fear, and contributes to control. In view of its long history of revolutionary activity, party veterans fear infiltration and subversion. LPRP pronouncements during its first decade of rule frequently alluded to "CIA and Thaireactionary -inspired agents," and later, when relations with China grew tense, to the danger of "big power hegemonism." Moreover, party leaders appear to lack confidence in the quality of their membership, speaking from time to time about "bad elements" within the party. The LPRP is relatively small compared with other incumbent parties. For example, the 40,000 members that the party claimed in 1985 represented 1.1 percent of the population (estimating 3.5 million inhabitants). In 1979 the Vietnamese Communist Party had 1.5 million members in a population of 53 million, or approximately 3 percent. * Ideology of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party When LPRP leaders came to power in 1975 as victorious revolutionaries guided by Marxism-Leninism, they retained a zeal for creating a "new socialist society and a new socialist man." They declared their twin economic goals as the achievement of "socialist transformation with socialist construction." They asserted that in establishing the LPDR in 1975, they had completed the "national democratic revolution." (The national goal had been to expel the French colonialists and the United States imperialists. The democratic goal was to overthrow "reactionary traitors, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, reactionaries, feudalists and militarists...."). The LPRP claimed that it had won the national democratic revolution by winning a "people's war" with a "worker-peasant" alliance, under the secret leadership of the LPRP working through a national front. It proclaimed a commitment to "proletarian internationalism" and the "law of Indochinese solidarity" and at the same time defined Vietnam and the Soviet Union as friends and the "unholy alliance" among United States imperialism, Chinese "great power hegemonism," and Thai militarism as enemies. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] By the late 1980s, as communism was undergoing a radical transformation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kaysone and his colleagues on the Politburo still professed an adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but they emphasized the necessity for Laos to pass through a stage of "state capitalism." Following Mikhail Gorbachev's example of perestroika, Kaysone proclaimed in 1989 that state enterprises were being severed from central direction and would be financially autonomous. V.I. Lenin's New Economic Policy was frequently cited to legitimize the movement toward a market economy and the necessity to stimulate private initiative. By the early 1990s, even less of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric remained. The party has continued to move internally toward more free-market measures and externally toward reliance upon the capitalist countries and the international institutions on which they depend for investment and assistance. The "law" of Indochinese solidarity has been amended, and the LPDR's "special relations" with its former senior partner are no longer invoked, even though party spokesmen still insist that Laos retains a solid friendship and "all-round cooperation" with Vietnam. * Despite this erosion of communist ideology, retaining exclusive political power remains a primary goal of the party. In a speech in 1990, Secretary General Kaysone asserted the basis of legitimacy of the party: The party is the center of our wisdom. It has laid down the correct and constructive line, patterns, and steps compatible with realities in our country and hence has led the Lao people in overcoming difficulties and numerous tests to win victory after victory, until the final victory. History has shown that our party is the only party which has won the credibility and trust of the people. Our party's leadership in our country's revolution is an objective requirement and historic duty entrusted to it by the Lao multiethnic people. Other political parties which had existed in our country have dissolved in the process of historical transformation. They failed to win the control and support of the people because they did not defend the national interest or fight for the interests and aspirations of the people. Internal Stability of the LPDR and External Influences Since the LPDR was proclaimed in December 1975, its leadership has been remarkably stable and cohesive. The record of continuous service at the highest ranks is equaled by few, if any, regimes in the contemporary world. Laotian leaders have an equally impressive record of unity. Although outside observers have scrutinized the leadership for factions — and some have postulated at various times that such factions might be divided along the lines of MarxistLeninist ideologues versus pragmatists or pro-Vietnamese versus nationalists (or pro-Chinese), there is no solid evidence that the leadership is seriously divided on any critical issues. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] In 1975 the Laotian communist leaders, most of whom had spent the revolutionary decade from 1964 to 1974 operating from Pathet Lao headquarters in the caves of Sam Neua Province, came down from the mountains to Vientiane to direct the new government. At the outset of their accession to power, they were suspicious, secretive, and inaccessible, and lower-level cadres were maladroit in imposing heavy bureaucratic controls. Travel within the country was limited, personal and family behavior was monitored by newly organized revolutionary administrative committees, cadres were assigned to disseminate propaganda, and seminars were held to provide political education for all sorts of groups. During these early years, the party squandered much of the goodwill and friendly acceptance from a population tired of war and the corruption of the old regime. At first, Laotian communist leaders were committed to fulfilling their revolutionary goals of fundamentally altering society through "socialist transformation and socialist construction." After 1979 the regime modified its earlier zealous pursuit of socialism and pursued more liberal economic and social policies, in much the same manner as Vietnam. * For more than a decade after 1975, the Vietnamese continued to exercise significant influence upon the Laotian leadership through a variety of party, military, and economic channels. By the end of the 1980s, however — in particular following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in 1991 and diminishing assistance from the Soviet Union to Vietnam and Laos — Vietnam turned inward to concentrate on its own problems of development. This emboldened Laotians leaders to jettison even more of their socialist ideological baggage, abandon agricultural collectivization, and move toward a market economy. Laos was also free to pursue an independent foreign policy. The single most important vestige of the former communist system was the solitary ruling party, the LPRP. * Political Opposition in Laos Major opposition party: There are none. According to Lao Movement for Human Rights: “There is really no pro-democracy movement of any sort in Laos. The threat of re-education camps scared off many potential dissenting voice. Those who didn’t like the government escaped to Thailand across the Mekong River. After bogus elections in 2011, the Lao Movement for Human Rights asserted: “The great losers of these elections remain Liberty, Democracy and the Lao citizens. A people under the control of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), a people hostage of this single-state party, a people that can choose only on a list pre-established by the party. The ’’independent’’ candidates must also have the approval of the party.” [Source: Mouvement Lao pour les Droits de l’Homme (MLDH), Lao Movement for Human Rights, May 13, 2011] Over the centuries, residents of the Laotian Buddhist kingdom developed gentle techniques of accommodation, often searching for more powerful patrons either outside the country or within. Authorities governed during the early years after 1975 with little popular support, but most Laotians simply submitted to their authority because they had little alternative. However, the authorities were not harsh compared to other communist regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, most of which — by mid-1994 — have toppled. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] The relatively passive Laotian political culture inspires few direct challenges to one-party domination, and party authorities firmly assert the limits of political dissent. LPRP spokesmen invoke a litany of explanations to justify the party's monopoly of power — for example, the country is too underdeveloped and the people too little educated to permit more than one party. Further, there are too many ethnic groups, and open political participation would lead to disunity and chaos. Political stability, provided by the leadership of a single party, is said to be necessary for economic growth. The LPRP has also pointed out the corrupt multiparty system of the RLG. An abiding political reality, however, is that those who have power wish to retain it. Restrictions on political opposition do not appear to be a salient issue among a majority of the population, although a small number of educated Laotians in intellectual, student, and bureaucratic circles have raised a few protests. Despite the toll of age and failing health among the aged Politburo members, the leadership governs without active opposition. Even when communist leaders were unceremoniously dumped in Eastern Europe, vigorously challenged in the Soviet Union, and confronted by students in China, communist leaders in Laos retained their hold as they guided the regime into the uncharted realm of reform. It is not clear why there was so little challenge to these aging leaders. They maintained a cohesion among themselves, perhaps a product of their many years as comrades in revolution, living in caves and dodging United States bombs. They may have also sustained an enduring respect from party stalwarts who followed them during twenty-five years of revolution. Whether the government will encounter political opposition from a broader segment of Laotian society as it moves to a more market-oriented economy and increasingly opens its doors to Western influence remains to be seen. * Anti-Government Protests in Laos In October 1999, there was a pro-democracy demonstration in Vientiane, involving 50 university students and professors. The protest was small but people were shocked that it occurred at all. It was the first such demonstration since the Pathet Lao took power in 1975. In an open letter the demonstrators called for respect of human rights, the release of political prisoners, a multiparty political system and a real democratic election for a new National Assembly. Within minutes after the protest began the demonstrators were rounded up by security agents. A couple were able to escape to Thailand. Among those detained was Thingpaseuth Keuakoum, the founder of the Lao Student Movement for Democracy. Little was known the fate of the protesters after the event. At least five were in detention months later. They are believed to have been held in Vientiane’s Samkhe Prison. The government denies that the incident took place. Laotians interviewed sympathized with some of the issues the protesters were addressing but found their protests to be naive, futile and foolish. They said that they wanted economic rights but weren’t even sure with what was meant by human rights. Image Sources: Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Laos-Guide-999.com, Compton’s Encyclopedia, The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Global Viewpoint (Christian Science Monitor), Foreign Policy, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, NBC News, Fox News and various books and other publications. Last updated May 2014
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"https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/biia-2017-event-videos-banner.jpg", "https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/biia-2017-event-videos-banner.jpg", "https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/header-no-logo.jpg", "https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/header-no-logo.jpg", "https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/biia_long_logo.png", "https://www.biia.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/biia_long_logo.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Joachim Bartels" ]	null		en	/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/BIIA_favicon.png		https://www.biia.com/country-risk-climate-laos-worldbox-intelligence-risk-rating-august-2023/	Worldbox Intelligence Risk Rating August 2023 LAOS SUMMARY Political Risk – Stable at 7 Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh, who assumed office in March 2021, resigned in early January 2023 and was replaced by Sonexay Siphandone. Phankham has clearly paid the price for the economic woes that have beset the country in recent years. Sonexay’s premiership was widely anticipated within Laos. His father, Khamtay Siphandone, served for 14 years as the leader of the LPRP before stepping down in 2006. Sonexay’s government has taken a number of measures to try and combat inflation, including ordering all currency exchange shops to close, and banning the import of meat and agricultural products that are produced domestically. However, a long economic struggle lies ahead. Laos experienced relatively high levels of political stability for nearly 50 years, following the end of the Indochina conflict in 1975 and the takeover by the communist Pathet Lao movement. Laos remains a one-party state, under the control of the communist Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). There is little opposition to the party’s rule. National Assembly elections are held every five years but are not free or fair, while protests are banned. Since the late 1980s, the government has pursued a similar economic and political model to those of Vietnam and China. It has implemented market-based economic policies while maintaining a high degree of state control and welcoming foreign direct investment (FDI). This has proved highly successful in generating rapid economic growth. Over the decade prior to the pandemic, for example, annual growth averaged just under 8%, one of the highest levels in the world. A party congress at the beginning of 2021 heralded modest changes at the top of the party and reaffirmed Laos’s economic strategy, including its growing reliance on China. However, a significant turnover of personnel took place at lower levels, with new technocratic officials taking over from wartime officials and party apparatchiks. The move seems to recognize criticism relating to corruption and economic mismanagement. Economic Risk – Stable at 5 The Laotian economy had grown by nearly 8% a year over the decade leading up to the Covid pandemic. Accession into the World Trade Organization in 2013 and the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 precipitated significant reforms designed to improve the business and investment environment. Rapid economic growth in neighbouring countries such as China, Vietnam and Thailand has also boosted trade and FDI. China, Thailand and Vietnam are the country’s main trade and investment partners. Trade with China is growing particularly rapidly, aided by massive Chinese FDI and the China–Laos Railway project, which travels across Laos from the Chinese border to the capital Vientiane. Three Chinese-backed highway projects are also underway as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The railway project should have a significant impact on growth by encouraging FDI and attracting increasing tourism from China. It should also boost exports. The cost of shipments from Vientiane to Kunming, in the southern Chinese province of Yunnan, will be cut by 40–50%, along with a 20–40% cost reduction on domestic routes, according to a World Bank report. Exports from Laos to China were worth US$1.7 billion in 2019 and could expand by about 20% per year, according to the UN. However, there are growing concerns about Laos foreign debt. The country’s official debts have grown rapidly in recent years and now equal 88% of GDP, with 60% owed by the public sector and the remainder comprising public–private partnerships such as the Boten-Vientiane railway. The risk associated with this debt, largely denominated in dollars, increases during periods when the kip is depreciating, as was the case in 2022. Figures from the government and Fitch reveal that Laos has to make foreign-debt repayments of an average of $1.3 billion per year until 2026. That is around half of the government’s annual revenue, and the depreciating kip is undermining the country’s ability to make those debt repayments, since the foreign debt is priced in foreign currencies, such as the US dollar, the Thai baht, the Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen, the Korean won and the euro. Half of the external debt is owed to China, following its numerous investments in the country, including the US$5.9bn loan for the China–Laos high-speed train line and US$17.8bn for three highways, as well as loans for hydroelectricity projects. However, Toshiro Nishizawa, a professor at The University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy and fiscal advisor to the Laos government believes China will not allow Laos to default. Nishizawa wrote in August that China “does not want to become a creditor burdened with non-performing assets, nor does it want to look like an unreliable lender to developing Asia Pacific and indeed African nations”. He added that: “The Lao government could avoid default by seeking China’s support for deferrals and liquidity provision. On top of bilateral debt deferrals, China is inclined to accept equity investment, as seen in the power grid shareholding deal. (A reference to the March 2022 acquisition of a majority stake in Électricité du Laos for 25 years by China Southern Power Grid) This would help Laos secure foreign exchange for debt repayments and foreign capital for infrastructure development.” Commercial Risk – Stable at 4 Corruption is a significant challenge. Laos ranks 126th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s (TI) 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, moving up eight positions from its 2021 score. Laos is considered to be the third most corrupt country in the ASEAN region, behind Myanmar and Cambodia. The Laos Corruption Report by GAN also declares that corruption is a high risk for companies operating in Laos and deters foreign investment. GAN says that political patronage pervades all business sectors, and a culture of corruption has been perpetuated by senior LPRP leaders and by foreign investors willing to buy political support and pay off officials. It adds that companies are likely to encounter petty bribery when trading across borders, paying taxes or acquiring public services. In terms of the rule of law, GAN says that a weak and inefficient judiciary impedes the proper enforcement of anti-corruption laws and officials are rarely prosecuted. It adds that bribery is widespread in both civil and commercial cases, and the legal system is subject to political interference. August Bulletin Political Risk – Stable at 7 Political tensions in Laos have increased markedly over the past year with increasing protests against the government. There has also been a massive upsurge of virulently angry criticism of the government on social media. The severity of Laos’ economic downturn, means that many Laotians are willing to ensure the consequences of provoking the government’s ire. However, police are also arresting activists as they attempt to silence dissenting voices. However, a pickup in economic growth this year and declining inflationary pressures could bring some relief to the population this year, easing the potential for further public unrest. The May 2023 Lao Economic Monitor, published by the World Bank, reports, for example, that “household nominal incomes are expected to gradually improve, albeit undermined by high living costs.” Moreover, the new prime minister Sonexay Siphandone “appears willing to implement several measures that, if they are effective, might cool public anger.” That, at least, is the view of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an American think tank specializing in U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Sonexay’s agenda should find support among ordinary Laotians, including a poverty reduction program, a bailout from the Asian Development Bank and a renegotiation of the country’s debt. The CFR added that Sonexay’s pedigree, as the son of a former leaders of the LPRP, may have more credibility than his predecessor, given his background. That “might make him better positioned to push through the tough but necessary choices needed to get the economy back on track”. Economic Risk – Stable at 5 The economy grew by just 2.7% in 2022, the second-lowest level in over 30 years, while Laotians – already amongst the poorest people in Southeast Asia – are facing severe economic pressures. These include inflation, which amounted an annual pace of 40% in the year to April 2023. The soaring costs of energy and food stuffs are driving the hike in inflation, according to official figures. By the end of 2022, 64% of Lao families were living on the same or a lower budget than a year earlier, according to the Lao Economic Monitor. The depreciation of the kip is one of the main factors behind the surge of inflation Driven by persistent external imbalances, the kip depreciated sharply in 2022 and fell by 32% and 43% against the Thai baht and US dollar respectively in the year to April 2023. The exchange rate has recently stabilized, supported by tighter monetary policy. However, limited exchange liquidity and low reserves have resulted in foreign exchange rationing by commercial banks, driving the parallel exchange market. A loss of investor confidence that has sparked a sharp decline in the value of the kip has added to Laos’ woes, and undermined its ability to repay dollar denominated debt, and pay for imports. The Lao Economic Monitor published in May 2023 states that: “The economy is projected to grow at 3.9 percent in 2023 and accelerate to an average of 4.3 percent in the medium term, led by continued recovery in services and exports. External demand is expected to help sustain manufacturing and agriculture exports, while industry will benefit from investment in the power sector and special economic zones. However, growth is expected to remain below pre-COVID levels, weighed down by structural weaknesses. Inflation will remain elevated in 2023, partly due to high commodity prices and kip depreciation. If structural imbalances are addressed, the economy could recover faster.” Commercial Risk – Stable at 4 Counterparty risk, already difficult to assess (corporate financial information is rarely available and, when available, is usually unreliable), has almost certainly risen during the pandemic. The legal system continues to make debt collection very unpredictable. An official report into corruption published in April 2022 stated that the country has lost hundreds of millions of dollars to endemic corruption. The Lao State Inspection Authority said widespread graft had beset government-sponsored investment and development projects leading to a loss of US$767 million since 2016. A report by the Union of Catholic Asian News added, however, that locals are unimpressed by such government-sponsored reports, considering them to be part of an official whitewashing of rampant corruption. It added that numerous citizens who have voiced their concerns about corruption and malfeasance by communist officials have been arrested and tried in recent years. In October 2022 Fitch Ratings affirmed Laos’ Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at ‘CCC-‘, primarily, reflecting elevated external liquidity pressure from high commodity prices and tightening global financial conditions, as well as a challenging external debt repayment profile. The ratings agency also withdrew Laos’ Long- and Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDRs and Country Ceiling for commercial reasons. Environmental, Social and Governance Risk (ESG) – 4/10 (Outlook – negative) The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are recognized as a beneficial framework for responsible investment. The Sustainable Development Report from Cambridge University Press assesses the progress of all 193 UN Member States on the SDGs. It provides a useful means of ranking Southeast Asian countries on their ESG progress. Laos is ranked 115 out of 166 in the 2023 report with a score of 63.0. Environment – Laos suffers from various significant environmental problems, the most important of which are related to deforestation. Over the period 2020 to 2022, Laos lost over 7% of its tree cover. In addition, the construction of dams along the Mekong for hydroelectric generation have long been a cause for concern not just for Laos but other neighbouring countries. In recent years, the lower half of the Mekong, which runs through Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, has experienced a number of serious droughts that have sent water levels to all-time lows. This is partly due to climate change and the El Nino but dam construction also has an impact, according to ecologists. Social – Laos scores very lowly in this area. Key areas of concern include freedom of speech, association, and assembly; enforced disappearances; abusive drug detention centers; and repression of minority religious groups, according to Human Rights Watch. Workers have few rights and living standards are among the lowest in the world. Governance – Laos also rates very poorly in terms of governance with high levels of corruption and very weak rule of law as outlined in the commercial risk section. August Bulletin Environmental, Social and Governance Risk (ESG) – 4/10 (Outlook – negative) The myriad ESG challenges face Laos have been highlighted recently by high levels of air pollution and the building of dams on the Mekong. With the burning season (when farmers burn off crops, ready for the next planting season) in full spate, air quality in the country has deteriorated significantly in many areas. The government has recommended to avoid being outdoors and to the wearing of masks. Meanwhile, a proposed cascade of nine dams on the mainstream of the Mekong River is causing concern. There are fears the dams could change the ecological functions of the river basin by altering seasonal flows of water and sediment. They threaten to block key fish migration routes and otherwise impacting the Mekong’s abundant natural fisheries. The economic case for the dams appears unclear. Thailand, potentially the key buyer of the energy generated by the planned dams, has a high energy surplus. Latest economic data https://www.amro-asia.org/ https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021 https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/LAO https://www.adb.org/countries/lao-pdr/main https://asiatimes.com/ https://thediplomat.com/ https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lao/publication/lao-economic-monitor-may-2023-addressing-economic-uncertainty-key-findings About Worldbox Business Intelligence Worldbox Business Intelligence, headquartered in Switzerland, is a Global API data solution provider of business intelligence and used in data analytics. With the Global API solution Worldbox Business Intelligence enables clients and partners also a frictionless real time onboarding, KYC and compliance verification while rapid global investigations are provided, if needed. Worldbox Business Intelligence provides global data in a standardised structure to more than 200 Million companies worldwide. The global network of subsidiaries, branches and desks allows to precisely and efficiently collect data and target key territories for clients and partners.” “Worldbox Business Intelligence – Bringing Swiss Precision To Data“ Copyright (C) 2023 Worldbox Business Intelligence. All rights reserved. Our mailing address is:
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"https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/sizes/thumbnail/thediplomat_2022-05-05-140935.jpg 138w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/sizes/td-list-s-2/thediplomat_2022-05-05-140935.jpg 276w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/sizes/td-list-m-1/thediplomat_2022-05-05-140935.jpg 219w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/sizes/td-list-m-2/thediplomat_2022-05-05-140935.jpg 438w", "https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/thumbnail/thediplomat_2024-07-22-143113.jpg 138w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-s-2/thediplomat_2024-07-22-143113.jpg 276w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-m-1/thediplomat_2024-07-22-143113.jpg 219w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-m-2/thediplomat_2024-07-22-143113.jpg 438w", "https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/thumbnail/thediplomat_2024-07-22-135626.jpg 138w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-s-2/thediplomat_2024-07-22-135626.jpg 276w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-m-1/thediplomat_2024-07-22-135626.jpg 219w, https://thediplomat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/sizes/td-list-m-2/thediplomat_2024-07-22-135626.jpg 438w", "https://thediplomat.com/ads/magazine/cover/td-mag-s-1/issue_116_cover.jpg?v=1 138w, /ads/magazine/cover/td-mag-s-2/issue_116_cover.jpg?v=1 276w, /ads/magazine/cover/td-mag-m-1/issue_116_cover.jpg?v=1 219w, /ads/magazine/cover/td-mag-m-2/issue_116_cover.jpg?v=1 438w" ]	[]	[]	[ "Politics", "Southeast Asia", "Laos", "Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP)", "Laos", "Laos economy", "Laos politics", "Phankham Viphavanh" ]	null	[ "David Hutt" ]	2022-12-28T23:10:00+00:00	Phankham Viphavanh, who took office in early 2021, may be on the way out — hounded by scandal and a bad year for Laos’ economy.	en			https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/is-laos-prime-minister-on-his-way-out/	On December 30, the Lao National Assembly wraps up its current session. The country’s prime minister, Phankham Viphavanh, could be out of a job by then. Your columnist is hearing rumors from Vientiane that Phankham’s fate has already been sealed. Since becoming prime minister in early 2021, Phankham has overseen a woeful pandemic year; Laos officially recorded just 41 cases in the whole of 2020 (before Phankham), but more than 110,000 by the end of 2021. The Nikkei COVID-19 Recovery Index ranked Laos as the worst performer among more than 120 countries. 2022 has been even more dire. Inflation reached 38.4 percent year on year in November, one of the highest in all of Asia. The local currency, the kip, crashed in value by as much as 68 percent against the U.S. dollar, as of October. The economy is likely to grow at just 2.5 percent, says the World Bank. Worse, Phankham has been associated with scandal. In September, Thai authorities found the remains of a woman washed up on the Mekong. She had bullet holes in her head and was found stuffed in a suitcase. She was later identified as a Laotian millionaire, the chief executive of one of the biggest construction companies. Theories abounded. One has gained traction: She was Phankham’s mistress. Sources tell me that everyone in the capital has heard this accusation. Some aren’t dismissing it all too quickly. On top of that, there are rumors that the murdered woman’s young daughter is missing and, some say, she is Phankham’s illegitimate daughter. Added to that, there are also claims that the Chinese mafia had something to do with it, an angle that might be expected given how saturated Laos is with Chinese money (and not always legitimate Chinese money). It may be nothing, but Phankham was the former president of the Lao-Vietnam Friendship Association and isn’t considered the most pro-Beijing voice amongst Laotian politicians. None of this, of course, can be confirmed. It probably never will be. But the scandal seems to have stuck to Phankham and it’s difficult to see how the rather awkward but serious apparatchik can wash his image. Senior leaders have been “retired” in the past because they lost the trust of party grandees and bureaucrats. And it certainly doesn’t look good that whilst the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), the communist party, is touting its ability to crack down on corruption and organized crime, the prime minister is being publicly linked to such a scandal. There are also personal disputes at hand. Phankham, previously a state vice president, standing secretariat member and propagandist, leapfrogged several rivals to become the new number two (up from fifth) in the Politburo at the party’s National Congress in January 2021. One apparent loser from that congress was Sonexay Siphandone, a deputy prime minister and the son of still-influential powerbroker Khamtay Siphandone. Sonexay was rumored before the congress to be the frontrunner for prime minister. Instead, he was named only number nine in the Politburo. His fortunes have improved since. Earlier this year, he was appointed chair of an emergency task force on economic matters. He delivered the main economic report to the National Assembly last week. Dynasties remain important in Lao politics. Sonexay’s father, the 98-year-old Khamtay still retains influence within the party. Sonexay’s sister, Viengthong, rose rapidly at the 2021 party congress and is now head of the Supreme Court, a powerful position over the party-led judiciary. Analysts tell me that Sonexay, 56, is assured to become prime minister at some point. Even if Phankham survives into 2023, it’s by no means clear he’ll last the year. Laotian politicians tend to last their five-year mandates, although there is precedent for a prime minister resigning beforehand. Bouasone Bouphavanh resigned in December 2010 after four years in the job, ostensibly due to “family problems.” At the time, the analyst Martin Stuart-Fox noted that this was shorthand for “Bouasone’s recent divorce and growing resentment that his mistress had used her position to enrich herself and her family.” Many pundits speculated that Bouasone was forced out because of internal divisions within the party over policy. But, Stuart-Fox added, it was likely to do with personal rivalries. Thongsing Thammavong, who replaced Bouasone as prime minister, may have found the alliances needed to boot Bouasone out. (Perhaps, in kind, Sonexay has now found the allies needed to remove Phankham.) At the 2011 party National Congress, when the biggest decisions are made, Bouasone was also kicked out of the Politburo and Central Committee. Thongsing was bumped up to number two in the Politburo, second only to the reelected party General Secretary, Choummaly Sayasone. With some irony, Bouasone rose through the ranks thanks to patronage from Khamtay Siphandone, Sonexay’s father.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	14	https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/photographs/record-details/5133d00e-1162-11e3-83d5-0050568939ad	en	Prime Minister of Laos Khamtay Siphandone and wife Madam …			[ "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/watermark/picas_data/tn_pcd/19990000145-8262-3202-1746/img0038.jpg", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-av.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-govrec.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-maps.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-oh.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-photos.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-posters.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-speech.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-straits.webp" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	WELCOME CEREMONY FOR PRIME MINISTER OF LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE AT ISTANA Prime Minister of Laos Khamtay Siphandone and wife Madam …				null	Description Edited by NAS: Prime Minister of Laos Khamtay Siphandone and wife Madam Thongvanh being greeted by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Mrs Goh (both with back to camera) on arrival at Istana for ceremonial welcome. On the right is Minister of State for Education Sidek Saniff.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	41	https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/la/la006en.html	en	LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC PEACE INDEPENDENCE DEMOCRACY UNITY PROSPERITY ________________ Presidentâs Office No.04/PO 9 January 1990 DECREE of the PRESIDENT of the LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC On the Promulgation of the Penal Law Pursuant to the resolution dated 2 December 1975 of the peopleâs representatives of the country on the appointment of the President; Pursuant to the Law No. 4/SPA dated 19 April 1988 on the Supreme Peopleâs Assembly of the Lao Peopleâs Democratic Republic; [and] Pursuant to [the letter] No. 29/SPA, dated 23 December 1989, of the fourth session of second Supreme Peopleâs Assembly on the adoption of the Penal Law. The President of the Lao Peopleâs Democratic Republic Decrees That: Article 1. The Penal Law is hereby promulgated. Article 2. This decree shall enter into force on the date it is signed. Vientiane, 9 January 1990 The President of the Lao Peopleâs Democratic Republic [Seal and Signature] Phoumy VONGVICHIT Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC PEACE INDEPENDENCE DEMOCRACY UNITY PROSPERITY ________________ National Assembly No. 12/NA 9 November 2005 PENAL LAW GENERAL PART Chapter 1 General Principles Article 1. Role of the Penal Law The role of the Penal Law is to safeguard the political, economic and social system of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the property of the State, collectives and individuals, the life, health, rights and freedom of the people, and the national security and public order; to counter and prevent offences; and to educate all citizens to respect the laws.1 In order to implement this role, this law defines certain acts as offences2 and subjects the perpetrator to penalties. Article 2. (New) Basis of Penal Responsibilities An individual can only be charged with and punished for an offence based on intentional or negligent acts deemed dangerous for society as defined in the Penal Law or in other laws of the Lao People's Democratic Republic that define criminal penalties, and [such individual can be punished] only when a decision is rendered by a court. 1 For readability, the punctuation in this sentence has been modified. 2 The terms âoffenceâ and âinfractionâ are used to refer generally to criminal acts. There are three levels of such criminal acts as set out in Article 8. âMinor offenceâ, âmajor offenceâ and âcrimeâ are used specifically to refer to those three levels. The translators are aware that the Specific Part of the Penal Law does not in fact categorise offences into these three levels. Official Translation by National Assembly 1 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Chapter 2 Territorial Scope of Penal Law Article 3. (New) Application of Penal Law within the Territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic This law is binding in the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. An individual who commits an offence within the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic may be charged and punished in accordance with the Penal Law or other laws of the Lao People's Democratic Republic that define criminal penalties. In the event that diplomatic representatives or individuals benefiting from the diplomatic immunity conferred by international conventions commit offences in the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, these cases shall be solved through diplomatic channels. Article 4. Application of Penal Law outside the Territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic Lao citizens who commit offences outside the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be charged with and punished for such offences if they are defined [as offences under] the Penal Law of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Aliens and apatrids residing in the Lao People's Democratic Republic3 who commit offences outside the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall also be charged and punished. Foreign individuals who commit offences outside the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be charged and punished as provided in the Penal Law of the Lao People's Democratic Republic if such a case is provided for in international conventions. Article 5. [Period of Effectiveness of] the Penal Law This law enters into force on the day it is promulgated. Any new law calling for lighter penalties or eliminating any offence provided in former laws shall take retroactive effect. New laws stipulating new offences or calling for heavier punishment than that provided in an earlier law shall not take retroactive effect. 3 Readers may wish to refer to the Law on Lao Nationality for the distinction between citizens, foreign individuals, aliens and apatrids (i.e., persons unable to certify their nationality). 2 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Chapter 2 Offences and Offenders Article 6. (New) Definition of Offence All acts and abstentions deemed dangerous to the political, economic or social system of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, to the property of the State, collectives or individuals, to the lives, health, integrity, rights or freedom of the people, or to national security or public order as provided in the Penal Law or in other laws of the Lao People's Democratic Republic that define criminal penalties shall be considered offences. All acts or abstentions with all the components of offences but resulting in damage under 500,000 Kip shall not be considered offences, except for acts of recidivism or acts performed as a profession. Article 7. (New) Components of Offences The components of an offence [refer to] those objective and subjective characteristics of behaviour that the Penal Law defines as together constituting an offence.4 An offence consists of four components as follows: â¢ Material component5; â¢ Objective component; â¢ Subjective component; â¢ Actorâs component. The material component of an offence [refers to] the social relationship that is regulated by the Penal Law, and that is affected by the offence. The objective component of an offence [refers to] the external characteristics of the behaviour that has caused, or [is evidence of] an intention to cause, damage to a social relationship that is regulated by the Penal Law, including the time, location, vehicle6, equipment, circumstances and means used for committing the offence. 4 Although it only refers to the Penal Law, this provision is not intended to prohibit offences from being defined in other laws. 5 The translators understand that the idea of âmaterial componentâ is based on a socialist concept of materialism and refers to the social importance of the relationships (which may include the relationship between a person and property) to be regulated. 6 In the Lao language, the same word is used for âinstrumentsâ, âvehiclesâ and âmeansâ in their conceptual sense (e.g., âwords are the vehicles of meaningâ) and also to refer to physical, tangible instruments and vehicles. Generally, the translators have used the more neutral âmeansâ rather than âvehiclesâ, which is likely to be understood as tangible, motorised vehicles, unless the context clearly indicates that vehicles is intended. 3 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The subjective component of an offence [refers to] the characteristics of the attitude and state of mind of the offender regarding his act of offence, as expressed externally through the behaviour that constitutes the offence. The actorâs component of an offence refers to the fact that in order to be liable, the offender must be mentally competent, must not be insane, and must have reached the age of majority, that is, at least 15 years of age7. Article 8. (New) Categories of Offences Offences are divided into three categories: â¢ âMinor offencesâ8 are offences punished under the law by public criticism or fine; â¢ âMajor offencesâ9 are offences punished under the law by re- education without deprivation of liberty, and imprisonment from three months to ten years, and fines; [and] â¢ âCrimesâ10 are offences punished under the law by imprisonment from five years up to the death penalty. Article 9. Intentional Offences Intentional offences are voluntary acts or abstentions of the offender, which are undertaken with full knowledge of their dangerous nature for society and their consequences.11 Article 10. Negligent Offences Negligent offences are acts or abstentions of the offender undertaken carelessly with full knowledge that such acts or abstentions might be dangerous for society, and where the consequence is expected and possible to anticipate, although the offender [himself] does not believe or expect that such consequence would take place.12 7 The translators are aware that the specific age referred to in this article (15 years) is different from the age of majority specified in other laws. 8 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 9 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 10 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 11 For readability, the structure of this sentence has been modified. There are two principal requirements under this article â voluntariness and knowledge of consequences. 12 For readability, the structure of this sentence has been modified. 4 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 11. Offences Pertaining to Several Categories An offence pertaining to several categories refers to an act or several acts of infraction committed by an individual, [where such act or acts are] classifiable under two or more categories,13 transgress several articles of the Penal Law, and with respect to which a decision shall be rendered at the same time and in the same court. Article 12. Recidivism Recidivism refers to an intentional offence committed by an individual while he14 is still serving his sentence for a previous intentional offence, or an intentional offence committed by an individual within a period of five years after serving a sentence for the same or a similar intentional offence. Article 13. Preparation to Commit Offences âPreparation to commit an offenceâ15 refers to the preparation of materials, conditions or other factors in order to commit an intentional offence. Such preparation to commit an offence shall only be charged or punished if deemed dangerous for society, as provided in the specific part of this law. 16 Preparation to commit offences shall be punished according to the articles prescribing penalties for the offence itself. Article 14. Attempts to Commit Offences âAttempt to commit an offenceâ17 refers to the taking of intentional acts which are components of an offence but where the offence was not completed because of circumstances outside the control of the offender, making such acts not successful. 13 There is insufficient textual evidence to confirm whether this comma should be interpreted as âandâ or âorâ. 14 Readers should note that the Lao language does not distinguish between genders in pronouns. In this translation, a reference to a gender is a reference to all genders, unless the context requires otherwise (as is the case in some Articles). The translatorsâ decision to use the male gender pronoun as the default translation was made in the interests of simplicity and consistency. 15 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 16 Readers should not assume that all preparations and attempts to commit an offence are punishable. Rather, the articles in the specific part of this law specifically prescribe whether preparation or attempt of an offence is punishable. 17 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 5 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Such attempts to commit an offence shall only be charged or punished if deemed dangerous for society, as provided in the specific part of this law.18 Attempts to commit an offence shall be punished according to the articles prescribing penalties for the offence itself. Article 15. Voluntary Abandonment of Offences Any individual who voluntarily abandons the completion of an offence during its preparation or attempt shall not be charged or punished, unless [any act of preparation or attempt which he has taken] is itself a [separate] offence as provided in this law. Article 16. Definition of Offender An offender is an individual who has committed any acts or abstentions that cause danger to society and [where such acts or abstentions] satisfy all the components of an offence as provided in the laws. Article 17. (New) Participation in an Offence âParticipation in an offenceâ19 refers to intentional participation in an offence by two or more persons. Participants in an offence are: â¢ Authors; â¢ Implementers; â¢ Inciters; and â¢ Accomplices. The author is the one who has planned, organised or given instructions to commit the offence; The implementer is the one who has directly committed the offence; Inciters are persons persuading others to commit offences; [and] Accomplices are persons who have intentionally assisted in the offence, or who have previously agreed to hide the offender, to hide instruments and tools of the offence, to efface traces of the offence or to conceal any proceeds from the offence. 18 Ibid. 19 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 6 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Chapter 4 Exemption from Charge and Punishment Article 18. (New) Circumstances that Lead to Exemption from Penal Liability Circumstances that lead to exemption from penal liability are as follows: 1. Force and threat; 2. Legitimate defence; 3. State of necessity; 4. Performance of professional duty; 5. Implementation of order; 6. Playing of sports; 7. Offences against which complaints must be lodged by the damaged parties; 8. Expiration of the term of prosecution. Article 19. Force and Threat Any individual committing an offence under force or threat in circumstances where such force or threat could not have been avoided shall not be charged or punished. In the event that such offence is a crime, [the] force or threat shall only constitute extenuating circumstances regarding punishment. Article 20. Legitimate Defence Acts of âlegitimate defenceâ20 refers to acts taken by an individual to safeguard the interests of the State or society, [or to safeguard] his own or another individual's life, health, [or] legitimate rights and interests against acts of aggression dangerous for the society; but such acts of aggression must be truly existing and dangerous, and the acts of legitimate defence must be contemporaneous with and proportionate to the acts of aggression. Acts of legitimate defence are not considered offences. Article 21. State of Necessity [An act taken in a] âstate of necessityâ21 refers to an individualâs act which is necessary to avoid threats against the interests of the State or society, [or against] his own or another individual's life, health, [or] legitimate rights and interests, where such threats cannot be avoided by other methods and are 20 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 21 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 7 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR not created by such individual, and where the damage caused by such act is less than the damage that would have resulted from the threat. Acts taken in a state of necessity are not considered offences. Article 22. (New) Performance of Professional Duty The âperformance of a professional dutyâ22 shall be regarded as a circumstance that leads to exemption from penal liability if it meets the following criteria: 1. The act shall be within the scope of the rights and duties [of the actor]; 2. The act shall be in conformity with professionalism and with laws and regulations. Article 23. (New) Implementation of Order The âimplementation of an orderâ23 shall be regarded as a circumstance that leads to exemption from penal liability if it meets the following criteria: 1. [The actor] shall have received an order from a person who has the right and duty to issue the order; 2. The order shall be issued in conformity with laws and regulations; 3. The person implementing the order shall have the right and duty to implement such order; 4. The person implementing the order shall implement the order within the scope of the order and in conformity with laws and regulations. Article 24. (New) Playing of Sports The âplaying of sportsâ24 shall be regarded as a circumstance that leads to exemption from penal liability if the playing of sports is conducted within the rules of the sport. Article 25. Offences Against which Complaints Must be Lodged by the Damaged Parties No criminal proceedings may be brought [in respect of] offences that are not dangerous for society and [in respect of which] the damaged party does not lodge any complaint, including the following matters: physical violence between close relatives without serious injury or physical disability; libel, 22 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 23 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 24 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 8 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR slander, insult, and outrage to the body or the reputation of the dead; infraction of property rights of close relatives; and violation of domicile and privacy.25 The withdrawal of a complaint lodged by the damaged party shall terminate such criminal proceedings. Article 26. Effectiveness of Prosecution Prosecutions shall not be considered effective unless filed within: â¢ One year, in the case of minor offences; â¢ Seven years, in the case of major offences; â¢ Fifteen years, in the case of crimes. The [filing period for] effectiveness of a prosecution starts from the day the offence is committed. In the event a second offence is committed while legal proceedings are pending in respect of an earlier offence, the [filing period for] effectiveness of the [first] prosecution shall [re-start] from the day the later offence is committed. In the event of evasion of court proceedings, [the filing period for] effectiveness shall start from the day the offender presents himself or is arrested. Chapter 5 Penalties Article 27. Purposes of Penalties Penalties do not only aim to punish offenders, but also to re-educate punished individuals to bear a pure spirit towards work, to comply correctly and strictly with the laws, to respect the discipline of social life, and to avoid recidivism on the part of the punished offender and other individuals. Punishment does not aim to generate physical suffering or to outrage human dignity. Article 28. Categories of Punishment a /. Principal penalties 1. Public criticism; 2. Re-education without deprivation of liberty; 3. Deprivation of liberty; 4. Death penalty. 25 For readability, the punctuation and structure of this sentence have been modified. 9 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR b /. Additional penalties 1. Fines (in certain circumstances, it might become a principal penalty); 2. Confiscation of items [connected to the offence]; 3. Confiscation of property; 4. Deprivation of election rights; 5. House arrest. The confiscation of property and house arrest shall be inflicted on the offender only when such penalty is provided in the specific part of this Penal Law. [In addition to] the principal and additional penalties, the court can request relevant authorities to withdraw driving licenses or other permits, to relieve the offender from [performing] or forbid [the offender] to perform a function or duty, to withdraw orders, medals or titles, and to deport the offender. Article 29. Public Criticism Public criticism refers to the criticising of the offender in court. In necessary cases, the court's decision might be published in a newspaper or by other methods. Article 30. Re-education without Deprivation of Liberty Re-education without deprivation of liberty is a punishment inflicted upon the offender at his place of work or at other locations, [and pursuant to which] five to twenty per cent of his total salary is remitted to the State in accordance with the court's decision. A penalty of re-education without deprivation of liberty must not exceed one year. Article 31. Deprivation of Liberty Deprivation of liberty may be imposed for three months to twenty years or life imprisonment. Life imprisonment may not be imposed on offenders who are less than eighteen years old and on women in a state of pregnancy when the offence is committed. 10 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 32. Death Penalty The death penalty is the specific punishment to be imposed on offenders in especially serious cases as stated in the specific part of this law. The death penalty is carried out by shooting. It is forbidden to inflict a death sentence on offenders who are less than eighteen years old at the time of the offence, and on women who are in a state of pregnancy at the time the offence is committed, when the court makes its decision, or when the sentence is imposed. Article 33. Fines Fines are financial penalties determined by the court according to the cases26 and within the limits as stated by this Penal Law. The fine must be computed in accordance with the gravity of the offence on the basis of the offender's economic status. In the event that the offender does not have the capacity to pay the fine, the court may commute such fine into the penalty of re-education without deprivation of liberty. It is forbidden to commute a fine into deprivation of liberty and vice versa. Article 34. Confiscation of Property and [Connected Items] âConfiscation of propertyâ27 refers to the confiscation by the State of part or all of an offenderâs property without any compensation. A sentence of confiscation of property may only be imposed in serious cases as stated in the specific part of this law. In the event that the confiscation of all of the offenderâs property is imposed, exception must be made for property necessary for the livelihood of the offender and his family according to the list attached to this law. In the event that partial confiscation of property is imposed, the court must set up a clear list of the property to be confiscated. âConfiscation of items [connected to the offence]â refers to [the confiscation] by the State of items that were used in the offence or in the preparation for the offence, or that were obtained from an intentional offence. Items belonging to other individuals used in the offence shall be confiscated by the State if the owner lending them is not in good faith or if confiscation is deemed necessary for national security. 26 An offence under an Article may attract different levels of punishment or fine, depending on specified circumstances. For each offence, the Article sets out the different âcasesâ of circumstances and the respective punishments for such âcaseâ. 27 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 11 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Items belonging to the State or collectives shall not be confiscated but shall be returned to the relevant authorities. Article 35. Suspension of Right to Vote and to Be Elected Suspension of the right to vote and to be elected is inflicted on offenders committing crimes. [Where the offender has also been sentenced to deprivation of liberty,] the penalty of suspension of the right to vote and to be elected must not exceed five years from the day after he has finished serving his sentence. Article 36. House Arrest House arrest forbids the sentenced offender from leaving a place of residence or from entering other territories as assigned or forbidden by a decision of the court. [Where the offender has also been sentenced to deprivation of liberty,] house arrest must not exceed five years from the day after he has finished serving his sentence. The sentence of house arrest may not be imposed on offenders who are less than eighteen years old and on women in the state of pregnancy or women in charge of small children who are less than eight years old at the time the offence is committed. House arrest is defined in the specific part of this law. Chapter 6 Prescription of Penalties Article 37. General Regulations on the Prescription of Penalties The court prescribes penalties on the basis of legal provisions on the punishment of offences. In prescribing penalties, the court must consider the nature and degree of the social threat posed by the offence, the personality of the offender, and circumstances conducive to the reduction or the increase of penal responsibilities. Article 38. (New) Characteristics of Dangerous Offences An offence is characterised as dangerous based on the category [of the offence] and the method [used to commit] the offence. Article 39. (New) Levels of Danger of an Offence The level of danger of an offence depends on the resulting loss to life, health, integrity, and property caused by the intentional or negligent offence. 12 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR There are three levels of loss to property as follows: 1. Low level or minor loss is from 500,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip; 2. Medium level or medium loss is from more than 20,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip; 3. High level or high loss is from more than 50,000,000 Kip. Article 40. (New) Circumstances Conducive to the Reduction of Penal Responsibilities Circumstances conducive to the reduction of penal responsibilities are: 1. An offender is less than eighteen years old; 2. A female offenderâs state of pregnancy; 3. A legitimate defence; 4. An offence committed under the strong emotional shock generated by an illegal act of the victim; 5. An offence committed under force or threat; 6. An offender acts to prevent damage from being caused by his offence or compensates for the damage voluntarily and in good faith; 7. An offence committed because of the offender's own or of his family's seriously difficult situation; 8. An offender expresses remorse and surrenders to officials, and acknowledges and reveals offences committed by himself and others; 9. A first offence, if it does not cause serious danger to society; [and] 10. An offender has shown merit towards the nation. In the prescription of penalties, the court might take into consideration other factors not provided in this article but [which would commonly be considered relevant] to reduce penal responsibilities. Article 41. Circumstances Conducive to the Increase of Penal Responsibilities Circumstances conducive to the increase of penal responsibilities are 1. Recidivism; 2. Offences committed by organised groups; 3. Offences committed from greed; 4. Offences towards minors, aged persons, vulnerable persons, or persons materially or in other ways dependent on or under the charge of the offender; 5. Initiation of minors into committing or participating in offences; 6. Barbarous or outrageous acts of infraction towards the victim; 7. Offences with serious consequences; 8. Offences committed during calamities; 9. Offences committed through methods dangerous to the public; 13 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 10. Offences committed in a state of drunkenness or drug abuse, and based on the nature of the committed offences, the court has the absolute right to decide whether or not to increase the penal responsibilities; 11. Intentional imposition of guilt on honest persons; [and] 12. Offenders guilty of concealing other offences or using violence to escape. Article 42. Prescription of Penalties for the Preparation of and Attempts [to Commit] Offences Prescription of penalties for the preparation of and attempts [to commit] offences must take into consideration their nature and degree of social threat, the degree of implementation of the offender's ill intentions, and the causes of such unsuccessful offences. The court may impose sentences with lighter penalties than those legally prescribed. Article 43. (New) Prescription of Penalties for Accomplices to and Inciters of Offences Prescription of penalties for complicity in and incitement of offences must be considered on an equal basis as other forms of participation in such offences, but, taking into consideration the nature and degree of the complicity and incitement, the court may sentence lighter penalties than those prescribed. Article 44. Prescription of Penalties for Young Offenders Prescription of penalties for a child [offender] who was under 18 years of age at the time of the offence shall take into account the level28 and characteristics of such offence, [but] the court may prescribe penalties under the level that is defined by the laws. Article 45. Prescription of Penalties for Offences Pertaining to Several Categories Where the same act [or set of acts] constitutes an offence pertaining to several categories,29 the prescription of penalties must be made on the basis of the legal provision providing for the heaviest punishment. The prescription of a [total] penalty for several offences pertaining to several articles [in this law] must be made by adding the penalties for each separate offence, but the final result must not exceed the highest penalty that could have been imposed for the most serious offence among such offences. 28 The Lao word translated as âlevelâ in this article is not the same as the words that have been translated as âcategoryâ and âcaseâ in other articles. It may refer to the âlevel of dangerâ of an offence but this is not clear from the original text. 29 An âoffence pertaining to several categoriesâ is defined in Article 11. 14 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Additional penalties may be added to the principal penalties in the event that such additional penalty is provided for in the specific part of this law. In the event that a court decision has been issued and become final, or the offender has served the sentence in whole or in part, but it is determined that additional offences had previously been committed by the offender, the prescription of penalties must be made according to the above mentioned procedures. In the event that the offender commits an offence after a court decision has been issued and become final or while he is serving his sentence, the court may add the remaining part of the penalty which is still due to be executed in whole or in part to the newly sentenced penalty. Fines must be executed one by one, and are not subject to the above- mentioned procedures for adding and consolidating penalties. Article 46. Prescription of Penalties on Recidivism An offender guilty of recidivism in major offences shall be punished by adding half of the maximum penalty prescribed for major offences under this law to the penalty sentenced by the court for the current offence. Recidivism in crimes is conducive to an increase of penal responsibilities as stated in Article 41 of this law. Article 47. Stay of Execution of Penalty The âstay of executionâ30 of deprivation of liberty, re-education without deprivation of liberty or fines as the principal penalty, refers to the suspension of the execution of such penalties for a period of five years. If during such period, the offender is not convicted of any other intentional offence, the penalty shall be lifted. But in the event of a second intentional offence, if the offender is sentenced to be deprived of liberty and such a sentence is final, the offender must execute the new penalty in addition to the one which has been suspended. The suspension of the execution of a penalty can be in whole or in part. Recidivists, those offenders sentenced to three years of deprivation of liberty or more, or those sentenced for crimes cannot benefit from a stay of execution of penalties. Article 48. Inclusion of Preventive Custody in the Execution of the Penalty The total duration of preventive custody must be included [when] calculating the sanctions of deprivation of liberty or of re-education without deprivation of liberty. One day of preventive custody is equal to one day of 30 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 15 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR deprivation of liberty or three days of re-education without deprivation of liberty. Article 49. Exemption of Penalties by Sending Offenders to Administrative Authorities or Social Organisations for Re-education If it is determined that the offence constitutes a minor offence and that the offender's personality does not present any threat towards society, the court may send the offender to administrative authorities or social organisations for re-education. Chapter 7 Circumstances Conducive to Exemption of Penalties and Conditional Liberation before Term Article 50. Circumstances Conducive to the Exemption of Penalties Punishments shall be lifted in the following circumstances: â¢ Death of the offender; â¢ Expiry of the time limit for execution of the courtâs decision; â¢ Grant of pardon to the offender. Article 51. Limitation Period for Execution of the Court's Decision Penalties shall not be imposed by the court unless executed within the following limitation periods: â¢ One year for minor offences; â¢ Seven years for major offences; â¢ Fifteen years for crimes. The limitation period starts on the day the court's sentence becomes final. In the event that the offender commits a new offence, the limitation period for execution of the courtâs decision in respect of any previous unexecuted sentence shall re-start on the day the second offence is committed. In the event that the offender evades penalties during the period of effectiveness of the sentence, the limitation period shall re-start from the day the offender presents himself or is arrested. Article 52. Conditional Liberation before Term âConditional liberation before termâ,31 based on the suggestion of the reformatory centreâs responsible committee, may be granted to progressive, repenting, and exemplary working offenders, who have served half of their sentences in the case of offenders who were less than eighteen years old when the offence was committed, two thirds of the sentence in the case of adult offenders and fifteen years for offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. 31 The quotation marks have been added and are not in the original text. 16 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The local people's court executing the sanction of sentences is entitled to consider the grant of conditional liberation before term and to outline the conditions to be imposed upon the liberated offender. If within a period of five years, the offender who is granted conditional liberation before term has correctly complied with the outlined conditions and has not committed any further offences, the remaining punishment shall be lifted. In the event that the outlined conditions are not respected during such period [of 5 years], the offender who is granted conditional liberation before term [shall be liable] to serve the remaining sentence. In the event that a new offence is committed during such period [of 5 years], the offender [shall be] liable to serve the new sentence in addition to the former remaining sentence. Recidivist offenders or offenders sentenced to a death penalty commuted into imprisonment cannot be granted liberation before term. Chapter 8 The Courtâs Measures of Re-education and Medical Treatment Article 53. (New) Measures Towards Children For children under fifteen years of age who have committed an act that is dangerous to society, the following measures may be applied: 1. Require [the child] to request the damaged party's pardon by appropriate means; 2. Require the parents or guardians to pay civil compensation; 3. Send [the child] back to the person(s) having charge of the child for re-education; or 4. Send [the child] to administrative authorities and social organisations for re-education. The court may apply the above-mentioned measures to children between fifteen and eighteen years old who commit minor and major offences. Article 54. Measures Applied by the Court towards Mentally Disturbed Offenders Offenders committing offences under a state of mental disturbance or offenders in possession of their full conscience [during the offence who become] subject to mental disturbances before a sentence is imposed by the court or while serving the sentence, may benefit from measures pertaining to medical treatment, such as being sent to psychiatric hospitals or specific medical care centres. After recovering from such a disturbance to his state of mental health, the offender must be brought back and sentenced by the court or the sentence must be executed if the lodged complaint or the court's decision is still valid. 17 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR SPECIFIC PART Chapter 1 Offences against National Security And Social Orderliness Article 56. Treason to the Nation Any Lao citizen in contact and cooperating with foreigners or foreign organisations for the purpose of undermining the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, grand political causes, defence and security, economy, or culture and society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Any Lao citizen assigned by foreigners or foreign organisations to commit an offence under this article but [who] voluntarily reports the facts to the authorities in advance before such offence is committed shall not be punished. Article 57. Rebellion Any person participating in activities causing civil unrest in order to overthrow or weaken the administration shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 58. Spying Any foreign individual, alien, or apatrid gathering intelligence or State or official documents of a confidential nature for the purpose of damaging or undermining the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be punished by eight to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 300,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any individual gathering intelligence or State or official documents of a confidential nature for the purpose of relaying [them] to Lao rebels carrying 19 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR out activities undermining the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 200,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest. The acts of Lao citizens in gathering intelligence or State or official documents of a confidential nature for the purpose of relaying [them] to foreigners or foreign organisations for the purpose of damaging or undermining the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be considered treason against the nation and shall be punished as provided under Article 56 of this law. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 59. Territorial Violation Affecting National Security Any armed person violating the territory of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and thereby affecting the national security shall be punished by five to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 3,000,000 Kip to 150,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 60. (New) Physical Harm Against the Interests of National Security Any person causing physical harm to leaders of the Lao People's Democratic Republic with the purpose of undermining or weakening State authority shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 150,000,000 Kip. Where such physical harm results in death, the offender shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 150,000,000 Kip to 1,000,000,000 Kip or may be subject to the death penalty. Any person causing physical harm to representatives of the State, civil servants, or persons performing the activities of the State or social organisations with the purpose of undermining or weakening State authority shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Where such physical harm results in death, such person shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip, or shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and be fined from 150,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip, or shall be subject to the death penalty. Any person causing physical harm to leaders coming to visit the Lao PDR or members of their families or accompanying delegation, or to representatives of foreign countries or international organisations who are 20 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR working in the Lao PDR or members of the families of those representatives, with the purpose of causing division in or undermining international relations or causing acts of war shall be punished by five to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 150,000,000 Kip. Where such physical harm results in death, the offender shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 150,000,000 Kip to 1,000,000,000 Kip, or shall be subject to the death penalty. In addition to the above punishments, penalties may include the confiscation of property as provided under Article 34 of this law and house arrest. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 61. Destruction Any person who, with the intention of undermining or weakening the State or the national economy, commits any of the following acts shall be punished by eight to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip: destroying, damaging, or burning plants, factories, offices, agency buildings, roads, communication facilities, transport vehicles, telecommunication equipment or other facilities constituting the economic infrastructure[,] [or] releasing toxic chemicals or viruses among communities or animals.33 Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 62. Disruption of State or Social Undertakings Any person responsible for the disruption of industry, trade, transport, agriculture, finance, or other services constituting the economic infrastructure and activities of State and social organisations[,] through acts or failures to act or by using his position to cause division within or weaken the State and undermine the national economy[,] shall be punished by five to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 3,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. 33 For readability, the structure of this sentence has been modified. 21 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 63. Forgery of Bank Notes or Use of Forged Bank Notes Any person using printing equipment or other means to forge bank notes or foreign currencies[,] or importing forged bank notes for circulation in the Lao People's Democratic Republic[,] shall be punished by five to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 150,000,000 Kip. Any person forging bank notes or importing forged bank notes either through an organised group or in substantial quantity shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 20,000,000 Kip to 300,000,000 Kip. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished Any person knowingly making use of forged bank notes shall be punished by three months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Any person knowingly having forged bank notes in his possession but failing to notify the authorities shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Article 64. (New) Money Laundering Any person conducting activities in order to convert money or items derived from corruption, drug trafficking, human trafficking, trade in weapons of war or other offences into legal money by depositing them in banks, buying land, buying houses, lending to other persons or other means shall be considered as having engaged in money laundering, and shall be punished by one year to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined one third of the laundered amount. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Accomplices in money laundering shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined 1 percent of the laundered amount. Article 65. Propaganda against the Lao People's Democratic Republic Any person conducting propaganda activities against and slandering the Lao People's Democratic Republic, or distorting the guidelines of the Party and policies of the government, or circulating false rumours causing disorder by words, in writing, through print, newspapers, motion pictures, videos, photographs, documents or other media which are detrimental to the Lao People's Democratic Republic or are for the purpose of undermining or 22 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR weakening State authority shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 66. Division of Solidarity Any person dividing or causing resentment between ethnic groups and social strata with the intention of undermining national solidarity shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 67. Civil Commotion Any person who is enrolled in an armed organisation and who engages in attacking and destroying plants, factories, offices, or social organisations or taking civil servants and civilians as prisoners or killing them, or robbing State, collective, or individual property with the intention of undermining the foundations of social order shall be punished by five to twenty years of imprisonment and fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 68. Destruction or Attack of Detention and Reformatory Centres Any person using force to destroy or attack detention and reformatory centres with the intention to abduct or liberate accused persons and prisoners in such centres, or using violence to abduct accused persons or prisoners during transfer shall be punished by five to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Such person may also be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any person causing disorder in or undermining the internal regulations of detention and reformatory centres or enticing accused persons and prisoners to escape shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. 23 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 69. Joining the Enemy, Sheltering Persons Acting against the Revolution Any person who escapes34 to join the enemy in fighting the revolution shall be punished by three years to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Any person concealing, hiding, sheltering or assisting a person acting against the revolution shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Article 70. Offence against Friendly Countries Any person committing an offence under Article 56 to Article 69 of this law against a friendly country shall be punished by the penalties applicable to those offences as if they were committed against the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Article 71. Disclosure of State or Administrative Secrets Any person responsible for the safekeeping, preservation and use of documents pertaining to State secrets who discloses such secrets or allows the disclosure of such secrets or loses such documents shall be punished by three to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. In the case of administrative secrets,35 the offender shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 72. Gatherings Aimed at Causing Social Disorder Any person organising or participating in the gathering of groups of persons to conduct protest marches, demonstrations and others with the intention of causing social disorder, shall, where such action causes damage to the society, be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 73. Destruction and Removal of Boundary Markers Any person intentionally destroying or damaging any boundary marker,36 or intentionally removing any boundary marker in a manner that 34 The literal translation is âescapes the revolution to joinâ. 35 The phrase âadministrative secretsâ is a literal translation. The translators believe this may refer to secrets of administrative bodies below the central or State level, but there is insufficient textual evidence to depart from the literal translation. 24 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR does not comply with the laws, shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Article 74. Destruction and Denigration of the National Emblem or National Flag Any person destroying or denigrating the national emblem or the national flag in a manner which affects the honour and prestige of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Article 75. Mobilisation of Unlawful Migration or Immigration Any person publicly encouraging and misleading people into fleeing abroad, migrating or immigrating in contravention of the laws shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. In severe cases or in the event of recidivism, the offender shall be punished by six months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 2,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Article 76. Unlawful Production, Possession and Use of Weapons or Explosives Any person producing, possessing, keeping, wearing or using weapons of war37 or explosives in contravention of the laws shall be punished by six months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 77. Unlawful Trade in Weapons or Explosives Any person purchasing and selling weapons of war or explosives in contravention of the laws shall be punished by six months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Any person purchasing and selling weapons of war or explosives as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or in a substantial quantity, shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. 36 The phrase âboundary markerâ is a reference to marks (including physical signposts) that delineate the border of a territory. 37 Lao law makes a distinction between weapons for warfare and homemade weapons for hunting and legitimate personal use. 25 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 78. Theft, Misappropriation, Robbery of Weapons or Explosives Any person obtaining weapons of war or explosives through theft, misappropriation or robbery shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 2,000,000 Kip to 25,000,000 Kip. Any person obtaining weapons of war or explosives through theft, misappropriation or robbery as a regular profession, as a part of an organised group or in a substantial quantity, shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Article 79. Loss of Weapons or Explosives Belonging to the State or Collectives Any person negligently causing the loss of weapons of war or explosives belonging to the State or collectives shall be punished by three months to three years of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty, and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,500,000 Kip. Article 80. (New) Offence Relating to Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons consist of toxic or poisonous38 substances used for human destruction. Any person who engages in the production, sale, purchase, handing over, exchange, possession or transport of chemical substances for the production of chemical weapons shall be punished as follows: â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] under five thousand grams shall be punished by five years to six years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 6,000,000 Kip; â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] exceeding five thousand grams and up to ten thousands grams shall be punished by six years to eight years of imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 6,000,000 Kip to 8,000,000 Kip; â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] exceeding ten thousand grams shall be punished by eight years to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 8,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any person who engages in the production, sale, purchase, handing over, exchange, possession or transport of [chemical weapons], or in inciting or promoting the use of chemical weapons, shall be punished as follows: â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] under five thousand grams shall be punished by seven years to eight years of 38 The Lao word is a compound word: âtoxic-poisonousâ. 26 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000,000 Kip to 200,000,000Kip; â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] exceeding five thousand to ten thousands grams shall be punished by eight years to ten years imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 200,000,000 Kip to 300,000,000 Kip; â¢ [Any of the above acts involving chemical substances] exceeding ten thousands grams shall be punished by ten years to twelve years imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 300,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000Kip. Any person who engages in the use of chemical weapons shall be punished as follows: â¢ If [such use] results in minor damage, [such person] shall be punished by five years to twenty years imprisonment and shall be fined 700,000,000 Kip to 1,500,000,000 Kip; â¢ If [such use] results in medium damage, [such person] shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined 2,000,000,000 Kip to 5,000,000,000 Kip; â¢ If [such use] results in large damage, [such person] shall be punished by the death penalty. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 81. Unlawful Production and Possession of Radio Communication Equipment Any person producing, possessing or installing radio communication equipment in contravention of the laws shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Article 82. Performance of Medical Profession without License Any person treating patients without an official license for the purpose of generating gains shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Where the offender has caused a patient to become an invalid or to die, such offender shall be punished by three months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 83. Forbidden Gambling Any person indulging in forbidden gambling shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Any person consenting to the use of his house as a gambling premises or acting as the chief gambler or found to have engaged in [gambling] recidivism, shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment or 27 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 84. Hooliganism Any person breaching the rules and discipline of social life and making use of violence, threats, offensive language or other activities inconsistent with social orderliness shall be punished by public criticism and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. A recidivist shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 85. Violation of Traffic Security Any person intentionally damaging or obstructing roads, modifying or damaging traffic signs, signals, or kilometre marks, or using violence or threats against vehicle drivers, thereby causing a traffic accident, shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in severe injuries or physical disability, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in the loss of life, the offender shall be punished by six to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is committed negligently, the offender shall be punished by a fine of 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Where such an offence is committed negligently and results in severe injuries, injuries to several persons or physical disability, the offender shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is committed negligently and results in the loss of life, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is committed negligently and results in the loss of many lives, the offender shall be punished by five to eight years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. 28 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 85. Violations of Traffic Regulations Resulting in Accidents Any person violating any traffic regulations, thereby causing an accident and injury to other persons shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in severe injuries, injuries to several persons or physical disability, the offender shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in the loss of life, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 150,000 Kip to 700,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in the loss of many lives, the offender shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 86. Flight from the Scene of the Accident Any person who causes an accident and flees from the scene shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Chapter 2 Offences against the Life, Health and Honour of a Person Article 88. Murder Any person intentionally causing the death of another person shall be punished by ten to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Any person committing murder as a regular profession, committing a planned murder, committing a barbarous murder, murdering civil servants performing their duties, several persons, or a pregnant woman, or murdering a person to conceal another offence, shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 2,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such person may be placed under house arrest or sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any person committing murder due to severe moral outrage in response to the victim's unlawful act, where such outrage results in an unavoidable compulsion, shall be punished by three to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. 29 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 89. Death Caused Negligently Any person causing another person's death negligently or inadvertently39 shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in the death of several persons, the offender shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to Kip 2,000,000. Article 90. Battery Any person intentionally causing physical injury to another person shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 5.00,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in severe injuries or is committed by a group of persons, the offender shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 1,500,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes the victim to become an invalid or to die, the offender shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 700,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 91. Physical Injuries Caused Negligently Any person causing physical injury to another person negligently or inadvertently shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Where such an offence results in severe injuries, injuries to several persons or physical disability, the offender shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. 39 In this translation, ânegligenceâ is used in the sense set out in Article 10, while âinadvertentlyâ is used to describe actions which cause a result by accident where the offender may not have given any thought to the consequences (e.g., turning a corner, the driver knocks a pedestrian down without realising the pedestrian is there). 30 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 92. Unlawful Abortion Any person performing an unlawful abortion on another person shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where the offender performs an unlawful abortion or performs an abortion as a regular profession and the abortion results in the degradation of the mother's health or her death, the offender shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any woman performing an abortion on herself or unlawfully recruiting another person to perform such an operation shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 93. Failure to Provide Assistance to Persons in Danger Any person discovering another person in a life- or health-threatening situation, but failing to provide assistance although such assistance could have been provided, or failing to request the assistance of other persons, shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Any person who has a duty to provide assistance, but fails to perform his duty in providing assistance to persons in life- or health-threatening situations, shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 94. Defamation and Libel Any person severely damaging the honour of another person through written, oral or other means shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Any person libelling another person through written, oral or other means resulting in severe damage to the other person's honour40 shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. 40 The distinction between the two offences described in this Article is that in the first paragraph, the statements may be true; in the second, they are not. 31 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 95. Insults Any person using indecent language [(whether written or oral)] or indecent acts against another person to cause severe damage to the second person's honour shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Article 96. Denigration of Corpse or Reputation of a Deceased Any person using indecent acts or words towards the corpse, reputation, burial ground or stupa of a deceased person thereby affecting the public morale shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Chapter 3 Offences against Civil Rights and Freedoms Article 97. Duress Any person exercising duress against another person by using force or weapons or threats to compel such other person to act or to refrain from acting according to the offenderâs will but contrary to the compelled person's will and to the detriment of such compelled person shall be punished by three months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence involves hijacking cars, ships or aircraft, the offender shall be punished by three to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Article 98. (New) Violation of Safety Regulations Relating to Air [Transport], Airports and Harbours Any person using weapons or force to highjack, take control of or seize any air plane, ship or car, or to destroy any airport or harbour shall be punished by ten years to twenty years imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip; Where such an offence causes large damage to life, health or property, [the offender] shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000,000 Kip or may be punished by the death penalty. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. 32 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 99. Unlawful Arrest and Detention Any person unlawfully arresting or detaining another person shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes degradation to the health of the arrested or detained person, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 700,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes the arrested or detained person to become an invalid or to die, the offender shall be punished by five to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 7,000,000 Kip. Article 100. Trade and Abduction of Human Beings Any person engaging in the trade and abduction of human beings for ransom, sale or other purposes shall be punished by five to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Article 101. (New) Taking of Hostages Any person forcing, arresting or detaining another person as a hostage and threatening to kill, physically harassing or continuing to detain such person in order to force others, such as persons or organisations, to act or not to act as a condition to the release of the person held hostage, shall be punished from ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. When many persons are taken as hostage, tortured or physically harassed, suffer harm or are caused to die, [the offender] shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined from 150,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip or death penalty. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 102. Violation of Individual Freedom Any person breaching another personâs individual freedom to engage in lawful speech, writing, gathering, meetings and other [freedoms] shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Article 103. Trespass of Residence Any person committing unlawful trespass of residence through the use of force, threat or forged documents, by impersonating an official or otherwise 33 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 104. Violation of Personal Confidential Matter Any person disclosing another personâs confidential matter which has come to the offender's knowledge during the performance of his profession or duties, thereby causing damage to the other person, shall be punished by three to six months of imprisonment and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Any person opening another personâs letters, telegrams or other documents or listening in on a telephone conversation between other persons, thereby causing damage to other persons, shall be punished by three to six months of imprisonment and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Article 105. Obstruction of the Right to Vote and of Election Any person obstructing [another personâs] civil right to vote or to be elected to the National Assembly through the use of threats, bribery or misdirection shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 106. Forgery or Destruction of Election Documents Any person forging or destroying election documents, or forging or destroying ballots or the results of an election to the National Assembly, shall be punished by one to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Chapter 4 Offences against State and Collective Property Article 107. Robbery of State or Collective Assets Any person violently attacking or using a direct threat against another personâs life or health in order to take any State or collective asset41 shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Where such acts of robbery are performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group, or result in severe injuries or the loss of life or substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by ten to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property may be confiscated as provided under 41 The phrases âState assetâ, âcollective assetâ and their variants are used with the first term as an adjective, i.e., âassets belonging to the Stateâ. Readers may wish to refer to the Property Law for more information illustrating how these terms are typically used. 34 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 34 of this law, and such person may be placed under house arrest, sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 108. Theft and Forceful Misappropriation of State or Collective Property Any person misappropriating any State or collective asset by theft shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Any person misappropriating any State or collective asset by mugging42 shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 7,000,000 Kip. Where the theft is performed through forced entry, or by damaging fences, doors, cases43, cupboards and others, the offender shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 7,000,000 Kip. Where such theft or mugging is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group, or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by three to seven years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 109. Swindle of State or Collective Property Any person engaging in trickery by any means to cause a person in charge of any State or collective asset or other person to hand over [such asset] shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 7,000,000 Kip. Where the swindle is performed as a regular profession, by an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by three to seven years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 15,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 110. Embezzlement of State or Collective Assets Any person abusing any confidence in order to embezzle, appropriate or replace44 any State or collective asset which has been assigned to such 42 The word âmuggingâ is used in the sense of theft in the presence of other people. 43 The word âcasesâ is used in the sense of a trunk or other container for belongings. 35 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR person to keep, transport, use in construction, repair or for any other purpose shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 7,000,000 Kip. Where embezzlement is performed as a regular profession, by an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by three to seven years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 15,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 111. Intentional Destruction or Damage to State or Collective Property Any person intentionally destroying or damaging any State or collective asset by any means or in any manner shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes substantial damage or threatens the life or health of the public, the offender shall be punished by three to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 112. Destruction of Artefacts or Architecture of Artistic Value Any person destroying any artefact or architecture of artistic value, whether under collective or personal ownership, or exporting such objects without approval shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment or fined as provided under the regulations governing the preservation of artefacts. Any person destroying or damaging any stupa, sacred site or other object, or excavating a temple navel or destroying or selling Buddhist statues or other sacred objects shall be punished by two to seven years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 113. Negligent Damage to State or Collective Property Any person negligently causing substantial or non-substantial damage to any State or collective asset, where such damage affects the society or the economic infrastructure, shall be punished by three months to three years of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 1,500,000 Kip. 44 These three terms have the connotations of âto take in wholeâ, âto take in partâ and âto replace with something elseâ, respectively. 36 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 114. Lack of Responsibility in Managing State or Collective Property Any person who has the [direct] duty to manage any State or collective asset and who causes substantial damage to such asset due to the failure to abide by management regulations shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Article 115. Unlawful Possession of State or Collective Property Any person intentionally possessing any State or collective asset that he has acquired, gathered or exploited or that has been handed over to him by another person, and who does not notify the authorities45 shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Where such an offence involves State or collective property of high value or in substantial quantity, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 116. Concealment and Unlawful Trade of State or Collective Property Any person accepting, purchasing, preserving, concealing or selling any State or collective property with the knowledge that such property was acquired by robbery, theft, mugging, swindle, embezzlement or otherwise shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group, or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Article 117. Abuse of State or Collective Property Any persons using State or collective property for personal benefit, thereby causing substantial damage to the State or collective shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Chapter 5 Offences against Personal Property Article 118. Robbery of Personal Assets Any person violently attacking [another person] or using a direct threat against another personâs life or health in order to take such personâs property 45 The reader may wish to refer to the Property Law for the obligation to report the finding of lost property (whether belonging to the State or collectives, as covered in this Article, or to other persons, as covered in Article 123). 37 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR shall be punished by four to eight years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 800,000 Kip to 8,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is performed as a regular profession or as part of an organised group, or causes severe injuries or the loss of life or substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by eight to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 3,000,000 Kip to 15,000,000 Kip. Any preparation or attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 119. Theft and Mugging of Personal Property Any person appropriating another personâs property by theft[, that is,] without such other personâs knowledge, shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Any person appropriating another personâs property by mugging shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 150,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where theft is performed through forced entry or by damaging fences, doors, cases, cupboards and others, the offender shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where theft or mugging is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by three to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 8,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 120. Swindle of Citizens Any person engaging in trickery by any means to cause a person to hand over his asset shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where such swindle is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. 38 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 121. Embezzlement of Citizens' Assets Any person abusing any confidence in order to embezzle, appropriate or replace any property entrusted to him for keeping or for any other purpose shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 122. Intentional Destruction of or Damage to Citizensâ Property Any person intentionally destroying or damaging another person's property by any means or in any manner shall be punished by six months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes substantial damage or threatens the life or health of the people, the offender shall be punished by two to seven years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 123. Unlawful Possession of Property Any person intentionally possessing another person's property which he has found, collected, or exploited or which the other person has handed over by mistake, without notifying the authorities shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 200,000 Kip. Where such property is of high value or in substantial quantity, the offender shall be punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Article 124. Concealment and Unlawful Trade of Citizensâ Property Any person accepting, purchasing, preserving, concealing or selling any property with the knowledge that such property belongs to another person and was acquired by robbery, theft, mugging, swindle, embezzlement or otherwise shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence is performed as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or causes substantial damage, the offender shall be 39 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR punished by one to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 125. Loss of Assets to Fire Caused by Carelessness Any person who negligently or inadvertently starts a fire which causes substantial damage to houses, warehouses, shops or crops of other persons shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment or by re- education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Chapter 6 Breach of Marital and Family Relationships and of Customs Article 126. Adultery A married person having a sexual relationship with a third person shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. The partner in adultery shall be punished on the same charges. Article 127. Failure to Perform Obligations towards Minor Children, Parents or Spouse Any person failing to care for minor children,46 parents in poverty, or a disabled or sick spouse in accordance with a court decision shall be punished by public criticism and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Article 128. Rape Any person using force, armed threats, drugs or other [substances], or other means to place a woman in a state of helplessness in order to have sexual intercourse with the woman against her will, where such woman is not [the offenderâs] spouse, shall be punished by three to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,000,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Where the victim of such rape is a woman between fifteen and eighteen years of age, a woman dependent upon the offender's care, or a patient of the offender, the offender shall be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 2,000,000 Kip to 10,000,000 Kip. In the event of multiple rape47, rape of girls under fifteen years of age, battery during rape or a rape resulting in the victim becoming an invalid or 46 In this Article, the term âminor childrenâ is used in the sense of under the age of majority. 47 In this Article, the phrase âmultiple rapeâ is used in the sense of ârape by more than one personâ. 40 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR dying, the offender shall be punished by seven to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 5,000,000 Kip to 15,000,000 Kip. Where the offender rapes the victim and then murders the victim, such offender shall be punished by fifteen to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or subject to the death penalty. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. Article 129. Sexual Intercourse with a Child Any person engaging in sexual intercourse with a girl or boy under fifteen years of age shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 2,000,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 130. Sexual Act Committed by Monks Any monk or novice who commits a sexual act with a female or male person shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 3,000,000 Kip. Any female or male person who willingly commits a sexual act with a monk or novice shall be punished on the same charges. Article 131. Prostitution Any person engaging in prostitution shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or by re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Any person assisting or facilitating prostitution shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 300,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Article 132. Procuring Any person generating income through procuring prostitution in any manner whatsoever shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from Kip 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 Kip. Where procuring is performed as a regular profession or involves the prostitution of female minors48 or the forcing of a female person under the offender's guardianship into prostitution, the offender shall be punished by three to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip 48 In this article, the word âminorâ is used in the sense of under the age of majority. 41 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 133. (New) Forcing to Prostitution Any person forcing another person to prostitution shall be punished by five years to ten years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 20,000,000 Kip. Any person forcing another person who is under 18 years of age to prostitution shall be punished by ten years to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 20,000,000 Kip to 50,000,000 Kip. Article 134. (New) Human Trafficking Human trafficking means the recruitment, moving, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of any person within or across national borders by means of deception, threats, use of force, debt bondage or any other means49 [and using such person in] forced labour, prostitution, pornography, or anything that is against the fine traditions of the nation, or removing various body organs [of such person], or for other unlawful purposes. Any of the above-mentioned acts committed against children under 18 years of age shall be considered as human trafficking even though there is no deception, threat, use of force, or debt bondage. Any person engaging in human trafficking shall be punished by five years to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 10,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Where human trafficking is performed as a regular profession or in an organised group, where the victims are children, where there are two or more victims, where any victim is a close relative of the offender, or where any victim suffers serious injury or becomes an invalid or insane, the offender committing human trafficking shall be punished by fifteen to twenty years of imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 100,000,000 Kip to 500,000,000 Kip and his property shall be confiscated as provided in Article 34 of this law. When the offence causes the victim to be a lifetime invalid, to be infected with HIV, or to die, the offender in human trafficking shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be fined from more than 500,000,000 Kip to 1,000,000,000 Kip and his property shall be confiscated as provided in Article 34 of this law. For trafficking in women and children, provisions of the Law on the Development and Protection of Women may be used. Any attempt to commit such an offence shall also be punished. 49 The term translated as âby any other meansâ is literally âby other formsâ. 42 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 135. Incest Any person engaging in sexual intercourse with a biological parent, parent by adoption, step-parent, grandparent, parent in law, biological child, adopted child, step-child, grandchild or sibling shall be punished by six months to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. The partner in incest shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 300,000 Kip. Article 136. Pornography Any person who, in the presence of members of the public or in any public place, engages in an act of sexual intercourse or exposes his or her sexual organs shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment or re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 50,000 Kip to 200,000 Kip. Article 137. Outrage to Decency Except for the offences described in Article 128 of this law50, any person engaging in any act that causes embarrassment of a sexual nature to another person against such other person's will shall be punished by six months to three years of imprisonment or re-education without deprivation of liberty and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Article 138. Dissemination of Pornographic Objects and Objects Contrary to Fine Traditions51 Any person engaging in the widespread production, distribution, or dissemination of pornographic items, magazines, pictures, video cassettes and other materials contrary to fine traditions shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined from 200,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Chapter 7 Economic Offences Article 139. Destruction of Forests Any person engaging in tree-felling or forest-slashing inconsistently with forestry regulations, or who starts a forest fire or destroys any forest through any other means shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined as provided by forestry regulations. 50 Only Article 128 is mentioned here, even though the translators are aware that other articles in this part might also describe offences that ought to be excluded under this article. 51 The word âtraditionsâ connotes both traditions and customs. 43 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Where such an offence causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by one to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined as provided by forestry regulations. Article 140. Destruction of Crops Any person destroying any crops belonging to the State, collectives, social organisations or individuals shall be punished by a fine of 50,000 Kip to 500,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 2,000,000 Kip. Article 141. Illegal Hunting Any person engaging in hunting that is inconsistent with hunting regulations, such as the hunting of protected species, hunting during a restricted season or in prohibited places or hunting with prohibited tools and others shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined as provided by hunting regulations. Article 142. Illegal Fishing Any person engaging in fishing [or catching any other aquatic animal] inconsistently with fishing regulations, such as with the use of explosives, poisons, chemicals or other prohibited tools, shall be punished by three months to one year of imprisonment and shall be fined as provided by fishing regulations. Article 143. Unlawful Exploitation of Natural Resources Any person exploiting natural resources, such as metals, minerals, precious stones and ânon-timber forestry productsâ52 inconsistently with the laws shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. Where such an offence causes substantial damage, the offender shall be punished by two to five years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 144. Production and Sale of Consumer Goods and Medicines that are Hazardous to Health Any person producing or selling any drinks, meat, fish, fruits, vegetables or other consumer goods or medicines that are degraded or hazardous to health shall be fined from 100,000 Kip to 1,000,000 Kip. 53 52 The phrase ânon-timber forestry productsâ is a technical term used by the Department of Forestry to refer to crops like mushrooms, herbs, bamboo shoots, and rattan. 53 For readability, the structure of this sentence has been modified. 44 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Where such an offence is intentional, the offender shall be punished by three months to three years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 1,500,000 Kip to 5,000,000 Kip. Article 145. Sale of Prohibited Goods Any person selling any prohibited goods shall be punished by three months to two years of imprisonment and shall be fined as provided by customs regulations. Article 146. (New) Production, Trade, Consumption or Possession of Narcotics Any person who produces, trades, distributes, possesses, imports, exports, transports or causes the transit through the Lao People's Democratic Republic of narcotics such as: heroin, amphetamines, any ingredient used in the production of heroin or amphetamines, opium, and marijuana, shall be punished as follows: 1. Any person who produces, trades, distributes, possesses, imports, exports, transports or causes the transit of less than one hundred grams of heroin through the Lao People's Democratic Republic shall be punished by ten to fifteen years of imprisonment and shall be fined from 50,000,000 Kip to 100,000,000 Kip. Furthermore, such personâs property shall be confiscated as provided under Article 34 of this law. Any person who produces, trades, distributes, possesses, imports, exports, transports or causes the transit of heroin through the Lao People's Democratic Republic as a regular profession, as part of an organised group or in a quantity ranging between one hu
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	57	https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Lao-People-s-Democratic-Republic-GOVERNMENT.html	en	Lao People's Democratic Republic			[ "https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/bs/i/nations-sm.png", "https://a.advameg.com/matomo.php?idsite=4&rec=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			null	Under the constitution of 1947 (as subsequently amended), Laos was a parliamentary democracy with a king as the nominal chief executive. The monarch was assisted by a prime minister (or president of the Council of Ministers), who was the executive and legislative leader in fact. The prime minister and cabinet were responsible to the national assembly, the main repository of legislative authority, whose 59 members were elected every five years by universal adult suffrage. With the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in December 1975, governmental authority passed to a national congress made up of 264 delegates elected by newly appointed local authorities. The congress in turn appointed a 45-member Supreme People's Council to draw up a new constitution. Pending the completion of this task effective power rested with Kaysone Phomvihan, a longtime Pathet Lao leader who headed the government as chairman of the Council of Ministers and was also secretary-general of the Lao People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party. Prince Souphanouvong, the head of state and president of the Supreme People's Council since 1975, left office in October 1986 because of poor health. He was replaced first by Phoumi Vongvichit, a former vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, and later by Sisomphon Lovansay, a former vice president of the Supreme People's Council. The Lao national legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), adopted new election laws in 1988, and the first national elections under the current government took place in March 1989 (local elections were held in 1988). Kaysone Phomvihan was elected president and Khamtai Siphandon was named prime minister. The newly elected SPA set out to draft a constitution, which was finished in mid-1990, and adopted on 14 August 1991 by the SPA. Khamtai Siphandon was elected president in 1998, and reelected in 2001. The executive branch consists of the president, prime minister and two deputy prime ministers, and the Council of Ministers (cabinet) which are appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly. The legislative branch is the 109-member National Assembly which is elected by universal suffrage for a period of five years. The judicial branch is the Supreme People's Court Leaders. The constitution calls for a strong legislature elected by secret ballot, but most political power continues to rest with the party-dominated council of ministers, who are much aligned with the military.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	1	https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q360138	en	Khamtai Siphandon	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/220px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/footer/poweredby_mediawiki.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	former Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party	en	/static/apple-touch/wikidata.png		https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q360138	former Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Khamtai Siphandone edit
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	81	http://www.mofa.gov.la/index.php/activities/state-leaders/5610-70th-anniversary-of-the-establishment-of-diplomatic-relations-between-the-lao-pdr-and-the-france-republic	en	70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Lao PDR and the France Republic			[ "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/logo3.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/e-magazine_EN.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/evisa.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/pic02.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/laoGovern.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/law project.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/united nations.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/ltp.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/asean.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/70LaoFrance-remark.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/70LaoFrance-4.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/2021Leaders/Leaders2024/70LaoFrance-5.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/ASEAN2024/2024_ASEAN_Logo.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/party%20X.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	/templates/test15eng/favicon.ico		null	Remarks by H.E. Saleumxay KOMMASITH, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR at the reception on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Lao PDR and the France Republic, Vientiane, 17th November 2023 Son Excellence Mme Siv-Leng CHHUOR, Ambassadrice de la République Française auprès de le République Démocratique Populaire Lao, Mesdames et Messieurs les Ministres, Vice-Ministres, les Ambassadeurs et les membres du corps diplomatique, Mesdames et Messieurs, J’ai un grand honneur et plaisir de représenter le gouvernement lao d’assister et de commémorer avec madame l’ambassadrice le 70ème anniversaire de l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre Le Laos et La France, qui marque une autre étape importante dans les relations amicales de longue date et bonne coopération entre nos deux pays. Her Excellency Mrs. Siv-Leng CHHUOR, Ambassador of the France Republic to the Lao PDR, Excellencies Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Ambassadors and members of the Diplomatic Corps, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is my great honour and pleasure to represent the Lao Government at this reception to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Laos and France, which marks another important milestone in longstanding friendly ties and good cooperation between our two countries. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Laos and France share long-standing legacy and on 22nd October 1953 we signed a friendship treaty which was considered as a turning point of relations between Laos and France. Since then, the bilateral and friendly relation has entered a new era based on mutual respect, sovereignty and independence. In 1989, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement in the fields of science, technology and culture, which has extensively brought a lot of benefits to the Lao PDR. In the political and diplomatic area, the two countries have enhanced at the high level. The high-ranking officials between the two countries have the regular exchange of visits, such as: In 1991, H.E. Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane, former Prime Minister of the Lao PDR, visited the France Republic; and H.E. Mr. Jacques Chirac, governor of Paris, visited the Lao PDR in 1992; In 1997, H.E. Mr. Khamtai Siphandone, Prime Minister of the Lao PDR, also visited the French Republic; In 2012, H. E. Mr. François Hollande, former President of the French Republic visited the Lao PDR; And in 2013, His Excellency Choummaly Xayasone, former President of the Lao PDR, visited the French Republic. I myself when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs also visited the French Republic in 2019. At the same time, the two countries have also coordinated, collaborated and supported one another in both regional and international arenas, particularly in the framework of La Francophonie, UN, ASEM, ASEAN and other international organizations. Two countries Laos-France have increased socio-economic cooperation mainly in the areas: Trade-investment, Education, Heath, Energy, Agro-ecology, Sustainable tourism, culture and etc. The most welcome and please is the two countries have tried to promote trade and investment cooperation, in which the value of bilateral trade reached $38 million in 2022. French investments in Laos have 227 projects with a total value of 558 million dollars and France is ranked No. 8 of the foreign investments in Laos. These are qualified investment projects. Moreover, there is the relationship between people and people which can be seen that every year numerous peoples of two countries have travelled in each country, especially during the 9 months of 2023, according to tourism statistics, 26,794 French tourists visited Laos. All of these reflect our strong commitment to continuously strengthening the cooperation and relationship between the two countries. Ladies and Gentlemen, France is one of the important development partners of Laos. The assistance and support of France have significantly contributed to the socio-economic development of Lao PDR, poverty reduction and the improvement of the livelihood of Lao people. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Government of the Lao PDR, to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to the French Government for the support and valuable assistance provided to the Lao PDR in the past as well as the commitments to continue cooperation for the development of the Lao PDR in the future, in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks. I highly appreciate the development of Lao-French relations and stand ready to work closely with the French government to further enhance and bring our friendly relations and tangible cooperation into a new height for common benefits of our two peoples. Ladies and Gentlemen, To mark the historical 70th anniversary of Laos and France, the two countries organized many activities such as: the Lao Embassy in Paris organized the lecture on the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Laos and France at Sorbonne University; a meeting to promote and advertise Lao tourism, and also a Lao-France economic Forum. At the same time, the French Embassy in Vientiane also organized many crucial events such as the Laos and France Fashion Week, the festival France-Laos and a joint Laos-France friendship Tree planting at Chao Anouvong Park. Specifically, both countries launched the France-Laos Economic Forum which is the first meeting ever to gather the Lao companies and foreign investors to exchange their opinions on promoting the investment and trade cooperation in Laos. Thus, I would like to express my special congratulations to Ambassador, all staffs of the French Embassy as well as the parties concerned for the excellent arrangement of this meaningful event. Lastly, I wish Ambassador Siv-Leng CHHUOR, all colleagues from the French Embassy as well as all distinguished guests present here this evening good health, happiness and every success in your noble tasks. Thank you!
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	77	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Thongsing_Thammavong	en	Thongsing Thammavong	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	[ "https://wikiwandv2-19431.kxcdn.com/_next/image?url=https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2a/Thongsing_Thammavong.jpg/640px-Thongsing_Thammavong.jpg&w=640&q=50", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg/40px-Ambox_important.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/2a/Thongsing_Thammavong.jpg/220px-Thongsing_Thammavong.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9b/Thongsing_Thammavong_signature.png/107px-Thongsing_Thammavong_signature.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Thongsing Thammavong is a Laotian politician who was the Prime Minister of Laos from 2010 to 2016. He is a member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and has been a member of the LPRP Politburo since 1991. He currently serves in the National Assembly of Laos, representing Luang Prabang Province, and was the President of the National Assembly from 2006 to 2010. He became Prime Minister on 23 December 2010, and left office on 20 April 2016.	en	https://wikiwandv2-19431…icon-180x180.png	Wikiwand	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Thongsing_Thammavong	Thongsing Thammavong (Lao: ທອງສິງ ທຳມະວົງ; born 12 April 1944) is a Laotian politician who was the Prime Minister of Laos from 2010 to 2016. He is a member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and has been a member of the LPRP Politburo since 1991. He currently serves in the National Assembly of Laos, representing Luang Prabang Province (Constituency 6),[1] and was the President of the National Assembly from 2006 to 2010.[2] He became Prime Minister on 23 December 2010, and left office on 20 April 2016. Quick Facts Prime Minister of Laos, 7th Government ... Close
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	22	https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/laos/lprp-leaders.htm	en	Laotian Leadership			[ "https://www.globalsecurity.org/images/global-security.gif", "https://www.globalsecurity.org/_inc/images/ua-u24.png", "https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/laos/images/kaysone-phomvihan.jpg", "https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/laos/images/khamtai-siphandon.jpg", "https://cookie-cdn.cookiepro.com/ccpa-optout-solution/v1/assets/icon-do-not-sell.svg", "https://pixel.quantserve.com/pixel/p-6fJn-SHYjc8os.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "Military", "World", "Laos" ]	null	[ "John Pike" ]	null			/favicon.ico		null	Since the LPDR was proclaimed in December 1975, its leadership has been remarkably stable and cohesive. The record of continuous service at the highest ranks is equaled by few, if any, regimes in the contemporary world. Laotian leaders have an equally impressive record of unity. Although outside observers have scrutinized the leadership for factions--and some have postulated at various times that such factions might be divided along the lines of MarxistLeninist ideologues versus pragmatists or pro-Vietnamese versus nationalists (or pro-Chinese), there is no solid evidence that the leadership is seriously divided on any critical issues. The Lao People's Revolutionary Party eventually achieved the complete liberation of the country on December 2, 1975 with the foundation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the establishment of the Supreme People's Assembly by a nationwide People's Representatives Congress. Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn from the Central Committee. A small group of men--seven in 1972 and eleven by 1993--have provided the critical leadership of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary veterans. Kaysone was named secretary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. The Supreme People's Assembly First Legislature had 45 members, of whom four were women. The Standing Committee consisted of Prince Souphanouvong who was President of the Supreme People's Assembly, Sisomphone LOVANXAY, Sithon KOMMADAM and Faydang LOBLIAYAO who were Vice-Presidents and Khamsouk KEOLA who was Vice-President and Secretary General. On March 26, 1989 Lao people elected the People's Supreme Assembly Second Legislature, comprising of 75 members, of whom five were women. Nouhak PHOUMSAVANH was appointed President. At the Fifth Party Congress, the Central Committee stabilized in size at fifty-nine members and took on a few younger, more educated men to replace deceased or retired members. At the time, the oldest member was seventy-seven, the youngest thirty-five, with 22 percent over sixty, 30 percent between fifty and fifty-nine, and 40 percent under forty-nine. Only two women are full members of the Central Committee, and two continue as alternates. Thongvin Phomvihan--who had ranked thirty-fifth in 1986--was removed, accompanied by rumors of excessive political influence in her business activities. Notwithstanding this setback to Kaysone's family fortune, their son, Saisompheng Phomvihan, was appointed to the Central Committee, ranking forty-fifth, and was named governor of Savannakhét Province in 1993. This appointment inspired some private muttering about the emerging "princelings," referring as well to Souphanouvong's son, Khamsai Souphanouvong, number thirty-four on the Central Committee, who became minister of finance. Kaysone Phomvihan Kaysone Phomvihan was preeminent leader of both the party and the state until his death in November 1992. The Pathet Lao PPL's control of the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat NLHS) was ensured by an interlocking leadership extending from the top to the village level, a control pattern used in other communist-controlled countries. The PPL's secretary general, Kaysone Phomvihan, believed to be the most powerful figure in the Laotian communist movement, was at the same time the NLHS minister of defense, a presidium member, vice chairman of its Central Committee, and reportedly also a member of the Vietnam Worker's Party. Kaysone's unusual career of leadership had taken him through two decades of revolution and almost another two decades of independence. Born in 1920, Kaysone studied at the Faculty of Law at the University of Hanoi where, in 1942, he joined the struggle against the French colonialists, according to his official biography. Kaysone was known in Hanoi by his Vietnamese name Quoc. At the National Congress in December 1975, the political report on abolishing the monarchy and establishing a people's democratic republic was read by Kaysone, who was also on the congress presidium. For most of the world, it was the first look at the man who, for thirty years, had led the revolution in Laos from behind the scenes in Vietnam and in the caves of Houaphan. Kaysone presided at the December 2 session. He began by reading a motion to establish the Lao People's Democratic Republic, which was passed by acclamation. Since the signing in July 1977 of the treaty of friendship and cooperation,and strengthening of "special relations," with the Vietnam neighbor, Laos had entered more and more closely into Hanoi's orbit. Kaysone Phomvihane, the prime minister in the 1980s, was as far back as 1946 a member of the Indochinese Communist Party, the forerunner of the Vietnamese party. Yet, it was the vice chairman of the council of ministers, Nouhak Phoumsavanh, who was regarded in the 1980s as representing the pro-Hanoi tendency in the political bureau. For at least a decade after independence, Kaysone avoided contact with the masses, Western diplomats, and journalists, remaining heavily guarded and secretive, in some ways continuing an earlier shadowy revolutionary style. Kaysone's caution may have been influenced by concern for his safety because several attempts had been made on his life during the first few years of his rule. However, during 1989 and 1990, Kaysone moved about more freely in Laos and showed himself more openly to the outside world. For the first time, he made state visits to Japan, China, and Sweden. He gave interviews to Western journalists and was more available to meet with Western officials. His public statements suggested that he was impressed by the level of development he had seen in affluent nations and that he was open to new techniques to bring economic progress to Laos under the leadership of the LPRP. Although the political careers of most communist leaders in Europe and Asia had been terminated when fundamental new policies were introduced to their regimes, Kaysone continued his leadership without challenge, showing unusual political agility and ideological flexibility. Kaysone had long embraced Marxism- Leninism, following the pattern of his Vietnamese and Soviet mentors. When evidence of change in the communist world began to appear, Kaysone propounded the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, invoking Lenin, but soon moved control of state enterprises to autonomous firms, and by 1989 edged more deliberately toward a market economy. Kaysone appeared to be a pragmatic communist leader, open to the ideas of outsiders and zealous for--although unsuccessful at producing--economic growth. Khamtai Siphandon Upon Kaysone's death, the person who had been second in party Politburo rank as long as Kaysone had been first, Nouhak Phoumsavan, born in 1914, was passed over as party chairman -- presumably for reasons of age and ill health -- in favor of the third-ranking member, General Khamtai Siphandon. However, in keeping with the Laotian communist practice of maintaining continuity and honoring seniority, Nouhak was promoted from deputy prime minister to president of state. The new LPRP chairman, Khamtai, also retained his government post as prime minister, suggesting that he has consolidated his role as the preeminent political leader. Born in 1924 in Champasak Province, Khamtai is the youngest surviving member of the group that founded the Free Laos Front (Neo Lao Issara--see Glossary) in 1950 and the LPP in 1955. He was thought to have spent part of World War II (1939-45) in India and was employed as a postal worker in southern Laos after the war. He joined the Lao Issara (Free Laos) in 1946 and remained with the Pathet Lao group that split with the Lao Issara in 1949. Assigned to military and political functions in the southern Laos sector, Khamtai was elected to the Central Committee of the Free Laos Front in 1950. According to a biography published in the Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan (People) [Hanoi], Khamtai was appointed chief of staff of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) in 1954, and in 1957 he was elected to membership in the Central Committee of the LPP. He directed the party's propaganda and training functions during 1959 and 1960 and in 1961 was named supreme commander of the LPLA. In 1962 he was appointed to the Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee and named deputy secretary of the General Military Committee. Khamtai moved steadily forward in the LPRP Politburo to the third ranking position, serving as minister of national defense from 1975 to 1991 and as deputy prime minister before his elevation to the post of prime minister in 1991. Khamtai's background in the military establishment, which has been a conservative force in Laotian politics, is thought to make him particularly sensitive to security concerns. He has a reputation as a hardliner and appears to be more inclined toward secrecy than Kaysone. Before assuming the post of prime minister, he had little exposure to Westerners, although his contacts increased when he took on his new task. On 23 March 2006 Laos President Khamtay Siphandone resigned as chief of the LPRP as the partys 8th Congress ended, and was replaced by Vice President Choummaly Sayasone. The Congress also elected two new members to the Politburo, and expanded the size of the Central Committee from 53 to 55. The two new Politburo members are Vice President and Foreign Minister Somsavat Lengsavad and former Central Bank governor Pany Yathotou, who became the first woman to be admitted into the powerful Politburo. Choummaly replaced Khamtay as President of Laos, when it held national elections in April 2006. Other Leaders The deputy prime minister for foreign affairs in 1993 was Phoun Sipaseut, a veteran Politburo member who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for seventeen years. Below him, in the rank of minister of foreign affairs, is Somsavat Lengsavat, who ranked fifty-first in the LPRP Central Committee. In Kaysone's time, an "inner cabinet" of six party leaders carried the major decisionmaking responsibility for the government. Of this group, only three members were living as of mid-1994 -- Nouhak, Khamtai, and Phoun. It was uncertain whether Kaysone's successors would continue the inner cabinet, but there appears to be some generational conflict. A transition will be required from leaders who were educated by service in the secret revolutionary party to those who may have studied abroad -- very likely in France -- before 1975 and whose membership in the party came during a more open era. One of the vice ministers of foreign affairs in 1992, for example, studied in the French military academy, Saint Cyr, as did a former minister of external economic relations. The latter was dealing very adroitly in 1991 with foreign donors, and at the Fifth Party Congress, his rank on the Central Committee rose from twenty-sixth to sixteenth. His counterpart in the Ministry of Finance, however, a former provincial governor with more than three decades of service in the revolutionary movement, was propelled from forty-third to tenth in the Central Committee and gained membership in the Politburo.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	20	https://dbpedia.org/page/Sonexay_Siphandone	en	About: Sonexay Siphandone	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	[ "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/dbpedia_logo_land_120.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/virt_power_no_border.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/LoDLogo.gif", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/sw-sparql-blue.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/od_80x15_red_green.png", "https://www.w3.org/Icons/valid-xhtml-rdfa" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Sonexay Siphandone (Lao: ສອນໄຊ ສີພັນດອນ; born 26 January 1966) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). He is the son of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and brother of Viengthong Siphandone. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. He was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 8th National Congress, and to the LPRP Politburo at the 10th National Congress.			DBpedia	http://dbpedia.org/resource/Sonexay_Siphandone	dbo:abstract Sonexay Siphandone (Lao: ສອນໄຊ ສີພັນດອນ; born 26 January 1966) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). He is the son of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and brother of Viengthong Siphandone. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. He was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 8th National Congress, and to the LPRP Politburo at the 10th National Congress. (en) rdfs:comment Sonexay Siphandone (Lao: ສອນໄຊ ສີພັນດອນ; born 26 January 1966) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). He is the son of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and brother of Viengthong Siphandone. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. He was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 8th National Congress, and to the LPRP Politburo at the 10th National Congress. (en)
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	83	https://www.derbydeadpool.co.uk/deadpool2023/celebs_S.html	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	63	https://m.facebook.com/vientianetimesonline/posts/former-president-khamtay-siphandone-wants-authorities-in-three-southern-province/1352742994793150/	en	Bei Facebook anmelden	https://www.facebook.com…icon_325x325.png	https://www.facebook.com…icon_325x325.png	[ "https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/v3/y8/r/k97pj8-or6s.png", "https://facebook.com/security/hsts-pixel.gif?c=3.2" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Melde dich bei Facebook an, um dich mit deinen Freunden, deiner Familie und Personen, die du kennst, zu verbinden und Inhalte zu teilen.	de		Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/login/
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	95	https://archive.org/stream/jprs-report_jprs-sea-87-030-a/jprs-report_jprs-sea-87-030-a_djvu.txt	en	Full text of "Southeast Asia Report Tables of Contents JPRS			[ "https://archive.org/services/img/etree", "https://archive.org/services/img/librivoxaudio", "https://archive.org/services/img/metropolitanmuseumofart-gallery", "https://archive.org/services/img/clevelandart", "https://archive.org/services/img/internetarcade", "https://archive.org/services/img/consolelivingroom", "https://archive.org/images/book-lend.png", "https://archive.org/images/widgetOL.png", "https://archive.org/services/img/tv", "https://archive.org/services/img/911", "https://analytics.archive.org/0.gif?kind=track_js&track_js_case=control&cache_bust=1202758315", "https://analytics.archive.org/0.gif?kind=track_js&track_js_case=disabled&cache_bust=1243085158" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://archive.org/images/glogo.jpg		https://archive.org/details/jprs-report_jprs-sea-87-030-a	Full text of "Southeast Asia Report Tables of Contents JPRS-Sea-86-112, 1 July 1986- JPRS-Sea-86-165, 16 September 1986" See other formats JPRS-SEA-87-C30-A 4 MARCH 1987 Southeast Asia Report TABLES OF CONTENTS JPRS-SEA-86-112, 1 JULY 1986- JPRS-SEA-86-165, 16 SEPTEMBER 1986 [FBIS\| FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE JPRS-87-030-B, published separately, includes Tables of Contents from JPRS-SEA-86-166 (17 September 1986) to JPRS-SEA-86-223 (24 December 1986). NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreier newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Governmenc. PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In order- ing, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited. Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthlv Catalog or U.S. Governme:: Publications issued by the Superintenaenct or Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 5.C. 20402. Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procuremenc mav be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 2220’. JPRS-SEA-86-112 1 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS INDONESIA Soviets Urged To Er Genocide, Leave Afghanistan (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 19 May 86).......cceeceecccccccecess 1 Minister on Debt Service Ratio, Bank Credits (BUSINESS NEWS, 16 May 86)....- eeeee eeeeeer eee eee eeeeeeeeeee 2 Economic Cooperation Agreement Signed With GDR (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 17 May +) PPPPTTTTILTTTTTrrresrrseee 4 Plywood Sales Contract, Cooperation Agreement With Japan (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 21 May BS) cccccccccese eenereee eseneeeveee 5 Second Stage of Oil Sale to PRC Negotiated (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 23 May BS) cccccccccccccccccccceccces 7 Crude Exports to Japan Show Increase (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 13 May BS cccccccceccccccccccceccccs 8 Value of Nonoil Exports Drop During First Quarter (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 20 May BS) cccccccecccscccccceoce eee ee Q LNG Sales Contract With Taiwan Signed (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 23 May 86)......++0+65 eccccccccccces 10 Fewer ‘Guest Workers’ at Bontang LNG Refinery (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 13 May BS) ccccvccccccccccces eeeeeee . ll Minister Says East Timorese May Visit Australia (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 20 May BB) cccccccccsccccs eeneeeeeeneeee 12 IKADIN Only Bar Association To Be Permitted \ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 14 May BG) cccccccccccccccccecccccees 13 -a- l Minister Discloses Rise in Train Sabotage (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 20 May 86).........-see0e: cccccccces Ngurah Rai Airport Expansion Planned (BUSINESS NEWS, 23 May ia chubben0eneee00eedeseeseosenenss NU Chairman Explains ‘Muslim Fundamentalism’ (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 20 May 86) .................. —— NU Government Halts Subsidy for Kujang Fertilizer Plant (BUSINESS NEWS, 28 May Md eseesececeseseé ceoceooseseoeosess Pesticide Supply, Distribution, Prices Discussed (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 16 May 86)........ . .. .. . · · · · · · ·.... Briefs Projected Sugar Output Trade Expansion Talks With Czechoslovakia ROK Arny Chief of Staff Visit Peat Reserves Said Fourth Largest Commentazy Scores PRC, DK Peace Proposal (PASASON, 30 Apr 86) ..... .. . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ··. Saravane Economic Production, Security, Currency Flow EE, Sr ——— Briefs Champassak Rice Sales Electricity Production Saravane Coffee Harvest, Sales Saravane Lumber Price Quang Nam-Danang, Saravane Hydropower Work Sali Khamvongsao at Japanese Reception PHILIPPINES Statistics Show Foreign Investment Up in Worst Year (VERITAS, ll May __ ) PPPPTTTTITTTTTTTTrrreerrserrsrreresiryy — — Multinational Business Spokesman Urges Support for Aquino (MANILA BULLETIN, 6 May BS) ccccccccccccccccecccecceeecccess Agriculture Minister Vows Open Market System (MANILA BULLETIN, 3 May +) PPPTTTITITTTTrTrrrseeeesrresrereree — Manila To Repay Jakarta in Kind for Rice Imports (MANILA BULLETIN, 3 May BS occcccccdecceccccceccecccecccces MALAYA Publishes Text of Proclamation No 9 (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 25 Apr 86)....cccccecceeeeeeesevees ' yo ' 14 15 16 17 19 20 20 20 21 22 24 25 25 25 25 26 26 27 29 31 32 Commission Formed To Probe Aquino-Galman Trial (R.G. Panaligan; MANILA BULLETIN, 7 Jun 86)....... ccccsccece Deadlines Set for Multinational Firms To Pay Taxes (MINDANAO TIMES, 17-24 May 86)....... ecccccccccccoccccccoces Commentary Criticizes U.S. Influence, Funding (Radyo ng Bayan, 6 Jun 86)..... osecccce poccccccococceccoceoes Radyo ng Bayan Commentator Deplores Colonial Mentality (Abel Cruz; Radyo ng Bayan, 4 Jum 86)......ccceecceseccscces Swiss Operations of Customs Criticized (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 7 Jun 86)......cececcececes eccccece Commentary Urges Critics Cooperate With Aquino (Rafael Alunan; VERITAS, 11 May 86)......cesceccccccessceees Weekly Defends, Praises Aquino Cabinet (VERITAS, ll May BOP cccccccccecesccccocoes seneneevee eeneeee eere Editorial Supports Officials’ ‘Uncompromising Stand‘ (ANG PAHAY AGANG MALAYA, 13 May BB) cccccccccccccccccccccccese Business Columnist Hits Aquino Government (Jake Macasaet; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 22 Apr 86 ....... eee MALAYA Column Criticizes Aquino Press Freedom Remark (Luis R. Mauricio; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 3 Jun 86)......... KB Tacloban Rally Calls for Marcos Return (Ted Marcos; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 7 May 86)........eeeee8% Government Retains KKK Programs, Changes Staff (Ellen Tordesillas; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 21 Apr 86)...... ; Romualdez Managing Firms Through Local Attorney (MANILLA BULLETIN, 3 May __ ) PPPTTTTLITTTTTTTrryrres+ererreeey eee Orders by Phone From Hawaii Firms Listed Attorney on Cojuangco Businesses, Wish To Return Home (BUSINESS DAY, 10 Jun 86; Radyo ng Bayan, 10 Jun 86)........ ‘Willing’ To Answer Charges Offers To Help Recover Marcos’ Wealth Columnists, Editorials React to Police, Loyalists Violence (Various sources, 10 Jum 96) ..ceccccseccseereeeesseseseseeee NEWS HERALD Criticizes ‘Loyalists’ DAILY EXPRESS Blames Both Sides Valencia: ‘Minimum Tolerance’ Exercised, by Teodoro F. Valencia Bigornia: Use of Force ‘Traditional’, by Jesus Bigornia -C¢ 3 34 35 36 39 41 43 46 48 49 52 53 54 54 55 56 56 57 58 58 59 60 60 Mayor Limits Rally Permits 61 Columnist on KBL Critics, "Bold’ Films, Marcos Forces’ Tanks (Red Batario; VERITAS, 11 Ty Bev cccoecccocesceces pecccoooce 62 Northern Luzon Church-Based Group Denies Military Charges (VISAYAN HERALD, 29 Apr RP as fe ef © . 64 Balweg Discusses Break With CPP, Plan for Cordilleras (Roy S. De Guzman; MR. & MS., 9-15 May 86)........eeeeeeees 65 South Cotabato Governor Woos NPA, MNLF to Talks (Edwin Mercurio; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 4 May 86).......... 69 Durano Surrenders 22 ‘Assorted Firearms’ (VISAYAN HERALD, 20 Apr ebb eeecsesonsacsebeceecoceeeooeoe 70 Reportage on Dimaporc Aras ‘Surrender’ in Mindanao (AFP, 10 Jun 86; Far East Broadcast Company, 10 Jun 86).... 71 ‘Vintage’ Firearms Surrendered 71 Official Hits Failure To Disarm ‘Warlords’ 72 Dimaporo Threatens General 72 MNLF Camp Visitor Reports Firearms (Manny Velasco; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 9 May 86)........... 74 Cagayan NPA Air Sentiments to Camp Visitor (Federico Cleto; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 13 May 86)......... 76 Further Details on NPA Purge Against Suspected Infiltrators (Jose de Vera; MANILA BULLETIN, 13 May 86).......seeeeeeees 78 NPA Disowns Bicol Extortion Activities (Precy M. Yadan; MANILA BULLETIN, 13 May 86)......--eeee0++ 79 Alliance Protests Ceasefire Negotiations With CPP (MANILA BULLETIN, 7 Jun BS) ccccccccccccccsccccccscceceeeers 80 Coast Guard Voices Alarm, Strengthens Fight Against Piracy (MANILLA BULLETIN, 4 May BS) ccccccccccccccccccceccceeeeeeecs 81 Briefs Aircraft Sale Approved 82 Benedicto Plantations Sequestered 82 Militiaven Kill Moros 82 Armed Men Rob, Burn Bus 83 23 Killed in NPA Attack 83 Government to Sell Aircraft 83 ede VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Pham Hung Speaks at Hanoi Security Conference (Pham Hung; NHAN DAN, 23 May 86)......... cccccccccccce Nam Dinh Municipal Police's Achievements (Nguyen Van Bieu; HA NAM NINH, 26 Feb 86)........... ee PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Criticism, Self-Criticism Promoted To Raise Party Quality (Nguyen Van Bieu; NHAN DAN, 29 Apr 86).......ssseeeeee% HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION Editorial Calls for Realignment of Construction Projects (NHAN DAN, 29 Apr 76)... ere e ee eee eeeeereeee ee eeeeeenee Briefs Pha Lai Power Plant POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Hai Pau Ready To Move 5,000 to NEZ (Phan Thanh Phuong; HA NAM NINH, 26 Feb 86)........+.+- Briefs NEZ Building /6539 eff © 84 coves 91 —XRX 94 JPRS-SEA-86-113 2 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Hurford Says Indonesia Visit Went ‘Very Well’ (Melbourne Overseas Service, 21 May 86)......ccsccccseeeees Briefs Keating Defends Economic Policy Opposition to French Nuclear Tests Indonesian Military Paper's Criticism Soviet Tractors More Aid for Solomon Islands Ban on Dumping Radioactive Waste Reportage on Lange Visit to Europe (AFP, 29, 30 May 86)... ccccccccccceeseeeeeseeeeeeseseeseeees Accuses France of ‘Terrorism’ Calls for Cooperation With EEC PHILIPPINES Four Cabinet Members Accused of ‘Sticky Fingers’ (Serafin C. Ledesna; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 31 May 86).... Newspapers View Aquino's Achievements as Questionable (Various sources, various dates)... i cccccccccccceceeeeeeeees First Two Stepa Deserve Encouragement, Editorial U.S. Assessment Seen as Unfavorable, Editorial Commentary Questions Aquino's Decisions, by Hector R.R. Villaneuva wwwnn wv ee Ombudsman Forms Special Investigation Groups (J.P. Fenix; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 2 Jun 86)....... eee Editorial Criticizes Aquino's Concom Choices (PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 27 May 86)........ —XRX Leader Describes Ideology of Socialist Group (BUSINESS DAY, 9 Feb Dep cceesocoooe eee 8 © ver ee eeeeeeeeree . Reportage on Activities of Good Government Commission (AFP, - Jun 86; BUSINESS DAY, 10 Jun Be pecccecooceesecooes $729.4 Million in Marcos Assets Sequestered Commission Turns Over Assets Legal Panel Set Up Former Marcos ‘Cronies’ Talking Cardinal Appeals for Release of Kidnapped Priest (AFP, 10 Jun 86; PNA,'11 Jun 86)....ccccccccccccccccececees Marcos Believed Involved MNLF Member Suspected Manila Turns Down Tan's Offer on Return of Marcos Wealth (THE NEWS HERALD, BE FUR GOpcccccccececccococeeceecceeooces Salonga Returns With P250 Million From Former Marcos Associate (Ding Marcelo; MANILA BULLETIN, 1 Jun BSc cccccccecccecocos Ministry Claims Recto Acting as Marcos’ Agent (BUSINESS DAY, 10 Jun — ) PPYTTTITITITITITTTrrererresrerrretir te Ramos Discusses ‘Loyalists’ Positions in New AFP (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 2 Jun 86)......seeeeees Loyalist Tabloid Promises 14 More Papers (Joel D. Lacsamana; NEW DAY, 2 Jum 86)....ceeeceeecceeeeees Ilocos Group Claims Loyalists in Traéuing, Receiving Arms (Carmel Pizarro; BUSINESS DAY, 11 Jum 96).....ecseeeeeceees Militant Labor Leadership Sceptical Over May Day Benefits (Soniz G. Dipasupil; WE FORUM, 6-12 May 86 ...... . Bishops Named as Possible Mediators in Ceasefire Talks (Raul Alibutud; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 2 Jun 86)....... Editorial Criticizes U.S. Military Advice (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 26 May BG) ccccccccccccccccccccces obo 12 13 15 17 17 18 19 19 21 21 22 23 24 32 33 35 37 89 Dead in NPA Clashes With Army, Cult Group (AFP, 26 May 86) see ereeeeeeeee seer eeeeeeeeneneeeeeneeeeeeeeeeee « Terrorists Burn Strike-Ridden Firm's Equipment (Bay Castillo; THE DAILY SAN PEDRO EXPRESS, 21 May 86)..... Board Investigates 6 Major Arms Suppliers (Joel D. Lacsamana; BUSINESS DAY, 28 May 86).......-ssee00- Editorial Hopes Enrile, Dimaporo Avoid Bloodshed (WE FORUM, 20-26 May Dep ccceceoescccocees eee ee ee * eee eee ee Daily Details Ver-Led Blackmarketing Ring (Joel D. Lacsamana; BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jun 86).......seeeeeess Buscayno Discusses Tribal Role in Insurgency (Bernabe Buscayno Interview; WE FORUM, 20-26 May 86)... ... Government Incurs P25 Billion Budget Deficit (Conrado R. Bana]: BUSINESS DAY, 30 May 86)......-sseeeeees Finance Minister Discusses Peso Exchange Rate ( MANILA BULLETIN, ll Jun 86; AFP, 13 Jun 86)... cues — — ——2— "Slight Adjustment’ Predicted, by Juanito Concepcion Peso Drops Slightly After Imports Freed "Economic Indicator’ Column Reports on Reserve Deficiency (BUSINESS DAY, ? Jun BO) cocccscccccccocceeoeeeese see © se ee © 1986 First Quarter Exports Drop 4.3 Percent (BUSINESS DAY, 12 Jun _ ) PPPTTTITTTTTTTTITTrTTererrrrriirrrt Tee Bank of Ph‘ lippine Islands Registers Largest Deposits, Assets (THE NEWS HERALD, 28 May )/PPPTTTTPTITITiITresererrirrrerrrr eee Power Corporation Seeking Additional Funds (Ellen Samaniego; MANILA BULLETIN, 10 Jun 86)......eeseeees Agriculture Ministry Outlines Rural Recovery Plan (BUSINESS DAY, 12 Jun BS docccccececcceceeseeeeeceeeces se ee © Professor's Report Urges Policy Reforms for Recovery (Juiia C. Del Castille: BUSINESS DAY, 10 Jun 86)......+.++. Customs Commissioner Urges Dropping Use of Swiss Firm (Ellen P. Samaniego; MANILA BULLETIN, ll Jun BOpccccccccces Government Lifts Import Restrictions on Purther 441 Items (Corrie Salientes; THE NEWS HERALD, 28 May 86)......ssee06: - ¢c¢ - 45 51 53 55 57 62 65 67 Manila Bus Firms Lift ‘Sympathy Strike’ (Gethsemane M. Selirio, et al.; BUSINESS DAY, 28 May 86)... Flour Mills Allowed To Import U.S. Wheat (BUSINESS DAY, 10 Jun 86)... ..csccccccccccccccccccccecesess Paper Reports on Banana Workers Strike in Davavo (Buddy Ramos; THE NEWS HERALD, 30 May 86)............es0-- International Sugar Meeting Held in Bacolod Briefs VIETNAM (Romy Marinas; WE FORUM, 20-26 May 66)........cceecececeees Loyalist Victim of Muslis Youth Official on Terrorist Infiltration Memo With U.S. Lawyers Rebel Deaths Probed Generals Summoned on Wealth Charges $54 Million Bond Issue Crony To Pay $12 Million Commercial Banks’ Assets Growth Counterinsurgency Air Raids Arms for Anti-Logging Personnel INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID Ministry Statement Condems South Africa Attack (Hanoi Domest ic Service, BO Jum GE)ccccccecccccccccecovecece QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Condemns RSA's ‘Piratical Moves’ CVNA, 12 Jum 86). ccccccecccccccceesereeeeeeeeeeseseseeeeere Paris Paper Views Frenco-Vietnamese Ties (LE FIGARO, 6 Jum 86). .cccccccccesceeeeeeeeseeseeeeeseeeees Army Paper Scores Reagan's ‘War of Intervention’ (Hanoi Domestic Service, 12 Jun BB) cocccccecccccecocoeeooes Engineering Group Conducts Activities in Cambodia Briefs (Hanoi Domest ic Service, DV Octgoing FRC Envoy Hanoi Exhibit on Romanian Cr Film Agreement With Cuba Envoy in Sri Lanka Friendship Society With Italy AAPSO Message to ANC Bulgarian CPCC Lecturer Visite Aid to PRK Reservoir Kien Giang-Kampot Cooperat ion ga 10 71 73 81 /6539 AGRICULTURE Hanoi Reports on Grain Procurment in Nam Bo (Hanoi Domeetic Service, 15 Jun 856)....ccecccccecccssscsecses Hanoi Reports on Crop Damage by Weather, Pess (Hanoi International Service, 12 Jun 86)...-.ccccecccesecess Periodic Review of Agricultural Activities (Hanoi Domestic Service, 10 Jun Bepccececececocceooosoesoese Briefs Darlac Growing Coffee Production Livestock Breeding Report Thai Binh Rice Pests HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION VNA Reports on Small Hydroelectirc Power Stations (VNA, 13 Jun (\|) PPPPPPPTT TTT TIT TTTriiTrrrrrierrrirrrrresrTeT el SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Technological Development Strategy Plan Discussed 93 95 97 97 97 98 (VNA, 13 Jun BG) ccccccccccsecccccccccccccsseseceeseseeseseces 99 11 12 JPRS-SEA-86-114 3 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS Ministry Condemns RSA ‘Aggression’ Against Angola CPL.» 7 Jum 06) cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccces Report on Construction of SRV-Aided Dam in Louang Namtha (K. Khunbusai; KONGTHAP PASASON LAO, 27 Mar 86)........+.++- Champassak Army Unit Uperates Against Thai-Based Enemy (P Sat; KONGTHAP PASASON LAO, 10 Apr B86) ........... ........ Guerrilla, Self Defense Force Expands, Best Units Cited (K Khunbusai; KONGTHAP PASASON LAO, 27 Mar 86)............. PASASON Commentary Views BANGKOK POST ‘Slanders' (KPL, 16 Jun +) PPPUTTTTTITTITTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTrTeTerierrreereereee PASASON Editorial Hails Ti«s With Cambodia (KPL, 16 Jun 86).. ‘_ePeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeee eee Briefs Souphanouvong Greetings to Waldheim Vietnamese Aid Japanese Aid Aid Fron Vatican Hanoi Economic, Cultural Delegation Swedish Reception Hanoi Delegation Visits Vientiane Rural Development Project Collectivization in Champassak Province Sugar Plant Construction - a= 13 MALAYSIA Razaleigh Hedges on Running for Top UMNO Post (Manja Ismail; BERITA HARIAN, 28 Apr 86)........+.++- ecccce Briefs China Welcomes Malaysian Investment Chinese Warned About PAS PHILIPPINES Women's Activist Group Condemns U.S. Foreign Policy (Red Batario; VERITAS, 27 Apr PEEP O PTT TTT TTT TTT Tr Ifugaos Fear Lumauig Connection in OIC Imposition (Bernardo v. Lopez; MR.&MS., 25 Apr-l May BO) ccccccccececces Visayas KBL Leaders Form ‘Alayon,' Cut Durano Ties (Elias L. Espinoza; SUN STAR DAILY, 12 May 86)...........+.. Cebu NPA Activities Reported ‘in Broad Daylight' (Leo Ss. Enriquez; SUN STAR DAILY, 14 May PPT TT TT TTT Former MNLF Commander, Marcos Loyalist Returns to Hills (DAVAO STAR, 1-44 May ) PPPPPTTTITTTT TTT TTT TTTrirrirreerrirrriTe — — Bernas Column Analyzes Aquino Labor Policy (Joaquin G. Bernas; VERITAS, 27 Apr 86)...sssessesecssevsees 1.5 Metric Tons Gold Sold in 4 Months (DAVAO STAR, 1-4 May BS) cccccccccecccccccccccccccececccccocs THAILAND Daily Views Change of U.S. Agricultural Attache (MATICHON, 17 Jun BB) ccccccccccccccccccccccccccceseseseeeese Parties, Officials Continue Election Planning (THE NATION, various dates; BANGKOK POST, yarious dates).... Han Welcomes Prem Decision Chawalit Scraps Army Poll Monitoring Small Parties Hire ‘Ghosts’, ‘Bandits’, by Ampha Santimethanidon, Nattaya Chetchotirot Coup Defendants To Run Mobile Police Units To Handle Violence Election Campaign Begins in Bangkok 4 Parties Fail Candidacy Requirements SAP To Revamp Fiscal Policy Army Radio on Athit-Chawalit Ties, SRV Shelling (Bangkok lst Army Division Radio, 5 Jun 86) .... .. · · · · · · ·· ·- oboe 14 12 13 13 15 16 20 21 22 23 25 26 ee Planned Reshuffle To Strengthen Athit (SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN, 8 Jun 86).......ccccsccccccccccces 36 Athit Denies Issuing Election Center Order, Chides Press (SIAM RAT, 12 Jun Did Ait abe e ne. neseeonaaene see eeee eff © 38 Paper Scores Minimum Candidacy Election Law (Editorial; SIAM RAT, 16 Jun Bee cececooceeoces see eeeeeeeee 40 Editorial Expresses Concern Over Political Defections (SLAM RAT, 7 Jun ES a eee 4l Bangkok Views Piracy Problem in Gulf of Thailand (Bangkok Domestic Service, 14 Jun 86).....cceccceccccceces 42 Briefs Trade Figures With Laos 44 Finnish Ambassador Designate a4 Economic Development Minister Blasts U.S. Aid Policy (THE SAMOA TIMES, 9 May -) PPPPTTTTITITTTTTTTrTiTiiTTereTrrTrTeT Te 45 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Foreign Ministry Statement Condemns South Africa (SPK, 13 Jun ) PPPTTTTTTTTTTTrTTrryeerrreyrrrreresrrsererree re 47 Briefs Returnees in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey 48 Greetings to Cuban Defense Minister 48 Cooperation With Bulgaria 48 Development of Youth Union 49 Returnees in Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey 49 VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Readers Complai About Contraband Goods, Reward Seekers (NHAN DAA, 15 May BG) ccccccccccsccccccccccccccceeceececees 50 Briefs Illegal Trade Control 51 PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT NHAN DAN Finds Negative Tendencies in Criticism Drive (Ben Nghe; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 24 Apr BG) ccccccccccccccceccs 52 - ¢ = /6539 Retaliation Claimed for Criticism of Subward Leaders (Chau Ai; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 25 Apr Sepoccoces se ee eee eee eeee ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Do Muoi Speaks on Economic Arbitration Mission (Do Muoi; NHAN DAN, 8 May 86)......-sceeeceeees cccccece occcce LIGHT INDUSTRY Thai Binh Stresses Development of Small Industry-Handicrafts (Do Nguyen Phuong; NHAN DAN, 15 May Dep ccecceceoooeoecoocces HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Doctor Discusses Importance of Family Planning (Tran Phi Liet; HA NAM NINH, 18 Mar BOP cccccccoccecoccococces My Hung Village Stresses Family Planning, Lowers Birth Rate (Vu Ngoc Phac; HA NAM NINH, 18 Mar 86)......ccccccccecsecees POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Briefs Volunteers to New Economic Zones PUBLICATIONS Table of Contents of TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC March 1986 (TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC, Mar BS) cccccccccccccccccceccece ade 16 55 61 70 71 JPRS-SEA-86-115 9 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Opposition to White South African Migrants Reported (Nic Van Cudtshoorn; SUNDAY TIMES, 8 Jun 86) .......seeeee: 1 LAOS Agreement Signed for Ho Chi Minh City Factory Aid (VLENT LANE MAI, 28 Apr 86) eeeeeeeetreeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 2 Capital State Trade Sector, Relations With Private Sector, SRV (VIENTIANE MAI, 28 Mar 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3 Nouhak Order on Rice Sales Seeks Competition With Private Sector (VIENTLANE MAI, 28 Apr 86) eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 7 Vientiane District LPRP Chief on Organization, Security Problems (VIENT LANE MAI, 1 Apr 86) see eeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ll Briefs SRV Experts Depart After 4-Month Tour 13 District LPRP Strength, Combat 13 Luang Prabang Bank Deposits 14 SRV-Aided Road Construction 14 Xieng Khouang Trade Co-ops, National Totals 14 Electric Wire, Battery Plant Production 14 PHILIPPINES Cotabato Editor Criticizes IMF Advice (Patricio P. Diaz; THE MINDANAO CROSS, 10 May 86) ......... 15 Cotabato Editorial Hits Failure of Reconciliation (THE MINDANAO CROSS, 24 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee 16 - a= 17 New Mindanao Group Bats for ‘Unity of Filipino People’ (THE MINDANAO CROSS, 24 May 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Church Pastoral Letter Urges Participation in Con-Com (THE MINDANAO CROSS, 17 May 86) ere eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Paper Lauds Cotabato Church-Government Cooperation (Editorial; THE MINDANAO CROSS, 17 May 86) .......eeeeeeees Maguindanao OIC Sets Priorities on Roads, Trade Zone (THE MINDANAO CROSS, 24 May 86) eseneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Sultan Kudarat OIC Cites Need for Roads (THE MINDANAO CROSS, 24 May 86) ese enreeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Two Commanders, Followers Bolt NPA Over ‘Severe’ Policies ( THE MINDANAO CROSS, 24 May 86) eeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeee ee Swedish Know-How, Equipment for Improvement in Civil Defense (Sune Olofson; SVENSKA DAGBLADET , 29 May 86) eee eeeeeeeeeee COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA VONADK Interviews Former DK Envoy to PRC (Pich Cheang Interview; Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 15, 16 Jun 86) ..cceccccecceccceseces Views Battlefield Situation Discusses ‘Fraternal Cambodian Soldiers’ VOK Doubts SRV Can Control Cambodia Politically (Voice of the Khmer, 16 Jum 86) ..ccccccccccccccecccssesees VODK Discusses Strategy in Fighting Against SRV Forces (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 4 Jum 86) ...ccceeccscseees VOK Raps SRV Reasoning for Occupation (Voice of the Khmer , 12 Jun 86) see ereeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee DK's Khieu Samphan Praises ‘Overseas Compatriots' (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 12 Jun 86) .....ceeeeeseees VOK Reports on CGDK, SRV Military Activities (Voice of the Khmer, 14 Jun 86) ese eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee VODK on Increased Opposition Against SRV Aggressors (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 10 Jun 86) ...cceccccececes VODK Commentary on Unity of CGDK Factions \| (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 Jun 86) ............... -b- 18 18 19 21 23 24 25 26 28 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 VOK Reports SRV Troop Movements in May (Voice of the Khmer, 9 Jun 86) eee eeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeee YONADK Says Chhuk District Seat Attacked 29 May (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 4 Jun 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeer eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeere eee CGDK Spokesman Condemns South Africa, Apartheid (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 14 Jun 86) sere ereervreeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeereeeeeeeee DK Red Cross Condemns SRV Shelling, Practices (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 5 Jun 86) eeerereeeeee eer eeeereeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee CGDK Defense Committee Meets 28 May (Voice of the Khmer , 30 May 86) eeeereeeeeee ee eee eeetbeoeeeeee VOK Denounces SRV ‘Lies’ on Camp Shelling (Voice of the Khmer, 9 Jun 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Roundup of VONADK Battle Reports (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 30 May-5 Jun, 6-12 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Khieu Samphan Sends Greetings to Philippines’ Laurel (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 12 Jun 86) seer eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee cee eeeeeeeereeeer eee eee ee eee Briefs Hasani Thanks Sihancuk Samphan Returns From African Tour CGDK Attacks on SRV Troops USSR, SRV Chemical Weapons Charge SRV Troop Movements, Corvee Labor SRV, Heng Samrin <croop Movements PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Bou Thang Attends Children's Day Get-Together (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 5 Jum 86) ..cccccccceccceces Chea Both Addresses Goods Inspection Meet ing (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 17 Jun 86) ..ccccccesecceees Kim Yin Receives Hungarian Television Equipme:t (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 5 Jun 86) ..ccccccceccceeces ‘PHACHEACHON Explains Distribution of Farm Materials (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 11 Jun 86) ..cccccceccceeees 19 47 48 49 50 52 53 55 58 59 59 59 60 60 61 62 63 65 /9986 Reports Issued on Agricultural Developments (Cambodian Media Monitored, 2-8 Jun, 9-15 Jun 86) ......... Briefs Combat Success in Phnum Sruoch District Returnees in Kratie Province SRV Inspection Commission Delegation Military Success in Siem Reap KPRP Group on SRV Tour Receipt of Pham Van Dong Thanks VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Central Highland Military-Political School Trains Ethnic Cadres (Nguyen Phuc Am; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 17 Apr 86) ....seeeeee. PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Guidelines for Criticism, Self-Criticism Indicated (Chau Ai; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 18 Mar 86) eeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeee Enrollment of New Party Members in Ha Nam Ninh Reported (HA NAM NINH, 4 Feb 86) eeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Ha Nam Ninh Socioeconomic Goals for 1986 (HA NAM NINH, 4 Feb 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Misuse of Recommendation Lettecis Disclosed (Phuong Thao; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 19 Mar 86) ....ceceeceeees Table of Contents of TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Feb 86 (TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Feb 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee LIGHT INDUSTRY Phu Khanh Produces Agar for Export (Le Quang Khanh; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 17 Apr 86) .....eeeeees LABOR Nationwide Labor Distribution Since 1976 Reviewed (Anh Phu; TAP CHI KE HOACH HOA, Feb 86) eee eee ee ee eee eeee POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Family Planning Achievements in Ha Nam Ninh Reported (HA NAM NINH, 28 Jan 86) SOHSHOSSHSHSSSSSSSCOHSSSSSSOSSSGSSSESeosses -@- 20 67 72 72 72 72 73 73 74 75 78 79 82 83 85 JPRS-SEA-86-116 11 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Government Reaffirms Stance on Nuclear Ships (Melbourne Overseas Service, 12 Jum 86) .......cccccccccccces 1 Reportage on Reaction to U.S. Destroyer Visit (Melbourne Overseas Service, 14, 15 Jun 86).......ccecceeees 3 Ship Arrives in Sydney 3 Nine Charged in Sydney Protest 3 Briefs Review Planned Hawke Criticizes UK Stand Trade Figurec for May sa = SRV, PRK Delegations Present at Vientiane Congress (VIENTIANE MAI, 25 Mar ee eeee see eneeeeeeeeeeeee 5 Sisavat Keobounphan Meets Delegates 5 PRK Trade Agreement 5 Delegations Return Home 6 Agricultural Sector Achievement, Weakness Noted Before Congress (VIENTIANE MAI, 31 Mar ee eeeee eee ee eeeeee 7 Briefs District Military Recruitment, Combat 9 21 New Zealand Paper Views Australian Defenses? Report (Editorial; THE EVENING POST, 7 Jun 86)......... cccccce cccoe 10 Lange Confirms Asking Perer de Cuellar to Mediate (AFP, By Gu Geocccoocoeooeoceooooooooceoecese eee ee eee eee 12 PHILIPPINES Columnist Views Communist Pressure To Remove U.S. Bases (Melchor P. Aquino; MANILA BULLETIN, 15 Jun 86)............. 1% Paper Warns on Loss of U.S. Support if Coalition Formed (THE MANILA EVENING POST, BD GED GEdocccccccceccoccceeeececes 15 Editorial Praises Aquino's Independence Day Speech (MANILA BULLETIN, 14 Jum 86)... ...ccccccccccccccccccseseseeee LZ Columnist Questions U.S. ‘Interest,’ ‘Real Intention’ (Jesus C. Sison; THE NEW PHILIPPINE DAILY EXPRESS, BD GD Geo cceccccceseSer 3660ů6006000 00 6 18 Columnist Comments on Issue of New Elections (Ninez Cacho-Olivares; BUSINESS DAY, 16 Jun 86).......6s66++ 20 Aquino Urged To Intervene in Company's Problem (THE MEWS HERALD, 18 Jum 86)... . cc cccccccccccecccsseceeeeees 23 Editorial Criticizes Attitude Toward Marcos Loyalists (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 13 Jum 86)... ccccccccccccccseccecee z5 Reportage on Westinghouse Nuclear Plant Payments (PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 15 Jun 86; AFP, 17 Jun 86)...... 26 Editorial Attacks Company 26 Westinghouse Denies Irregularities 27 Three Arrested in Plot To Kill Manila Police Chief (Marc Logan; THE NEWS HERALD, 17 Jum 86).....ecsccccseeeeeee 29 Prosecution Pane] To Investigate Escalante Massacre (Lindablue F. Romero; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 13 Jun 86). 30 Editorial Urges Care in Disarming Werlord (THE NEWS HERALD, 16 Jun — ) PPPTTTITITITITITITITITTITTTT rte 31 Paper Examines ‘Queer Situation’ After Magno Promotion (Ben Gamog THE NEWS HERALD, BS Jum GE) ccccccccccececcececese 32 obc« 22 Daily Express Laapoons NAFP, Dimaporo Over Guns (Editorial; THE NEW PHILIPPINE DAILY EXPRESS, 14 Jan 86)... Dimaporo Urges Routine Since Dispute ‘Settled’ (Ed T. Suarez; MANILA BULLETIN, 18 Jun 86)........scseeee0> Editorial Views New Constitution's Provisions (MANILA BULLETIN, BD Gee GePococccoeocoocececoecooeooeooees MALAYA Columnist Skeptical of Foreign Aid Requested (Renato Constantino; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 6 Jun 86)...... State Likely To Fully Implement Import Liberalization (Silen P. Samaniego; MANILA BULLETIN, 16 Jun 86)..... eeccce Paper Reveals Government Outlay to Financial Institutions (Nile U. Mulles; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 14 Jun 86)..... Comelec Releases International Group's Poll Report (BUSINESS DAY, 16 Jun DEP coccdccccceoonceeeeoececeeeoeeeeees Government To Borrow Social Security System Funds (THE MANILA EVENING POST, BF FER GE) cccccccccecocecceeococe Manila Raises $525 Million From Foreign Sources (MANILA BULLETIN, BD FUR GE cccccccccccecccecceccecooeoocce Sin Appeals to Moslem Kidnappers to Free Priest (AFP, 16 Jun ) PPPTTTITITITITITTTTTITiTirirrrereerrrerreT eee Government Planning 5 Programs for Unemployed Editorial Welcomes Low Inflation Rate (MANILA BULLETIN, 3G Fam GE) cccccccececceceeccccceccecccess Economist Predicts Significant Growth Beginning in 1987 (Bernardino Ronquillo; MANILA BULLETIN, 16 Jun 86)......... Government Approves Sale of Homg Kong San Miguel Brewery (HONG KONG STANDARD, 18 Jum 86)...cccccccccececeeceeeeeeees Government Set To Reduce Taxes on 4 Oil By-Products (THE NEWS HERALD, 17 Jeam GE) cccccccccccccccccccccccsesesess Bank Advisory Body To Discuss Loans (MANILA BULLETIN, 18 Jum 86)... ccccccccccccceeeeeeeeeeeenee "Economic Indicator’ Column Reports on Copper Production (BUSINESS DAY, 18 Jum 86) nc cccccccccccceeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeees 23 35 37 41 43 45 47 49 51 52 55 "Economic Indicator’ Reports Growth in Silver Production (BUSINESS DAY, 17 Jun Dep ocecucccoecoceoececcooces “eee ee eee Briefs Dimaporo on Marcos Supporters Surrender Feelers From NPA THAILAND Farmer Advocate Sees Little Hope in Election (Phayap Panketu; MATICHON, 22 May 86)..........se6- eccccece Sources Describe Parliament Vote-Buying Scheme (MATICHON SUT SAPDA, 25 May 86)... ...cccccccccccccncccecees Columnist Scores Police Raid, Smear of Candidate (Aphichat Sakdiset ; MATICHON, 6 Jum 86)... ..ccccccccccuccees Kriangeak Party Hiring Students To Run in Election (MATICHON, 29 May 86)... ccc ccccccccccccccceeeeceees ccccccee Party Picks Ex-Soldiers To Erase ‘Leftist’ Image (NAEO NA, 25 May _ -) PPPPTTT TTT TTT TTT TTT TTT TTT TTT Tee Democrats Resist Khaisaeng Candidacy, Fear Red-Baiting (NAEO NA, 24 May __ ) PPPPTTTT TTT TTT TT TTT TTT TT TTT TTT Tree Sitthi Sawetsila Discusses Relations With SAP Defectors (Sitthi Saweteila Interview; MATICHON SUT SAPDA, 8 Jun 86). Briefs Thirayuth Bunmee on Military, Politicians Uthai: Public Fed Up With Domocracy, Poverty VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Editorial Stresses Need for Strong Economy, Defense (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 30 Apr 86).....cceeeunes —X— Gambling Activities Reported, Local Cadres Said To Be Involved (Pham Vu; HA NAM NIFH, 8 Apr BS) ccccccccccccccescccccecesces Efforts To Curb Destruction of Landlines Reported (Huy Canh; HA NAM NINH, ll Apr BS cccccccccccecccecccesesces PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Party Organization: Expand Criticism Campaign, improve Economy (HA NAM NINH, 8 Apr 86)... . cc *** 24 62 63 65 67 69 71 73 74 81 81 82 85 87 ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Ho Chi Minh City Issues Guidelines on Price Subsidies (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 16 Apr Diebnasecconbesbooanececeoseeses TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS Transportation Sector Lagging Behind in First Quarter (Editorial; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 3 Apr BEd ccccccccccccccecocees New Computers Installed at Hanoi Posts, Telecommunications Center (Nguyen Doan; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 29 Apr BO cccceccccceccoecs LABOR Stipulations on Fulfilling Annual Labor Obligation Reported (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 17 Apr BS) ccoccoccccceceeoecocccooceecces Improvement Seen in Ho Chi Minh City Labor Operations (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 24 Apr _ ) PPPPTITTITTTTTTrrerrereyrrerereree POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Vanished Beauty of Hanoi Lamented (Tran Huu Tong; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 26 Apr 86).....sseeeeeees First Quarter Statistics on People Leaving for Nez Reported (Nguyen Viet Cu, et al.; HA NAM NINH, 11 Apr B6) · · · · · ·· ··· · Briefs Gia Vien Residents to Nez 25 91 93 95 99 100 102 103 26 JPRS-SEA-86-117 16 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Victoria Labor Conference Rejects Economic Policy (Melbourne Overseas Service, 22 Jun 86) ...cccceccccecccccs Briefs Irian Jayans Refugec Status [Irian Jayan, Afghan Refugee Aid Food Aid to Africa Missile Repair, Maintenance Plan LAOS Commentary Blasts U.S. as ‘International Terrorist‘ (PASASON, 13 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeuveeeeeeeeeae eee Bokeo Returnee Blames Catholics, Praises LPDR Generosity (Ch. Paseut; PASASON, 13 May 86) eeeeneeeeeoeeeee ee eeeeeee ee Briefs Vientiane Women's Organization Aid to Army Route 13, Feeder Road Construction MALAYSIA Reexamination of NEP Urged by Merchants’ Federation Leader (KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS , 28 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Gerakan Secretary General Criticizes NEP (KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS , 28 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee DAP Refuses To Consider Forming Government With PAS (SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA, 3 May 86) eeeeeoeaeeeeeaeeeeeeeeeee 27 NNN 10 12 Keng Yaik Issues Warning on Effect of PAS in Power (SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA, 10 May 86) eeeeseeoeeeeeeeeeeeeee Anwar Urged To Abolish Education Act Article 21(2) (SIN CHEW JIT POH MALAYSIA, 9 May 86) ....ccecececcceccess Briefs Chinese TV Broadcast Trivled NEW ZEALAND Terms of Trade ‘Wallowing in A 40-Year Low' (Tony Garnier; THE EVENING POST, 17 Jun 86) ....ccccceeses Briefs Lange Comments on ANZUS PHILIPPINES President Aquino on Role of Church, Poor (VERITAS, 29 May-1 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Enrile Admission of February Coup, Junta Designs (Luis R. Mauricio; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 15 May 86) ..... Columnist Views Defense Minister's Ambitions (A, 0. Flores; MANILA BULLETIN, 16 May 86) eeerereeneeneeeneeee Street Parliamentarians View Struggle, Tasks Ahead (Patricia L. Adversario; VERITAS, 22-25 May 86) .......... Bernas Column Views ‘Reunion of Heroes,’ Con-Com Makeup (Joaquin G. Bernas; VERITAS, 29 May-1 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeee Weekly Views Status of Marcos Loyalists Role in AFP Reform (Bert Clemena; VERITAS, 22-25 May 86) —, ——,— —,: —,— —— ————————— VERITAS Analyzes Country's New Political Dimension in ASEAN (P. N. Abinales; VERITAS, 4 May 86) eeeeeeeeeoeeeevreeeeeeee Threats to Region XI Peace, Civil-Military Tension Assessed (Carolyn 0. Arguillas; VERITAS, 22-25 May 86) ....seeeeees Daily Reports NPA Laguna Activities Increase (Leonie Manipol; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 14 May 86) ....... NAFP-NPA Clash Over Davao Gold Mines Looming (Benjie Guevarra; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 16 May 86) ...... Enrile Links Liberation Theology to Rebels’ Destabilizing Try (SUN STAR DAILY, 28 Apr 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ohe« 28 13 15 16 17 20 23 26 27 31 32 36 40 41 42 Activist Leaders View Current Situation, Plans (Rina Jimenez David; VERITAS, 22-25 May 86) ....eeeeeeee++- 43 Mitra Alleges Central Bank Chief ‘Derailing’ Rural Plan (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 16 May 86) eeeeeeoeoeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeee 47 Rice Farmers Want Food Authority Chief Ousted (Benjie Guevarra; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 15 May 86) ....... 48 Cement Industry Borrowing Toughened (MANILA BULLETIN, 16 May 86) eeeeeeoeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 49 Air Force Colonel Linked to Cable Theft (Efren Molina; MANILA BULLETIN, 2 May 86) eeeeseeoeeeeeeeeeee¢ 51 Briefs Dissolution of CHDF Opposed 52 Army Ultimatum Defied 52 Cronies To Help Recover Wealth 52 THALLAND Relations With Laos, Burma in Chiang Rai Described (Pratya Sawetvimon; THE NATION, 15 Jun 86) ...cceeceeeeeees 53 FRG Telecommunications, Training Aid to Army Described (Sinfah Tunsarawuth; THE NATION, 23 May 86) ...ceeeeeceeees 55 Chamlong Supports Army Reinstatement of Coup Suspects (THE NATLON, 29 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 57 Koson Party Allies Complain of Army Harassment (THE NATION, 4 Jun 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 58 Phuket Protest Leader Sermsak Piyatham Profiled (Mayuree Rattanawanathip; THE NATION, 8 Jun 86) ......++++- 60 Central Bank Intervenes To Aid Money Fund Liquidity (THE NATION, 20 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee 62 Editorial Warns of Philippine Destabilization (THE NATION, 10 Jun 86) eeeeeeevreeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee 64 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Hun Sen Attends KPRAF Museum Opening Ceremony (SPK, 16 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeeeee ee 65 Chea Sim Receives Indian Charge D'affairs (SPK, 10 Jun 86) eeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeee 66 — ¢@ 29 Briefs Delegation Returns From GDR 67 Returnees in Battambanz 67 Fallen Combatants’ Families Visited 67 Meeting With Lao Ambassador 67 Conference at Agronomy Institute 68 VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID Briefs Indochinese Ministerial Conference 69 PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Preliminary Results in From Thach Ha District Criticism Drive (Thanh Phong; NHAN DAN, 30 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeree 70 Writer: People Afraid To Criticize Themselves, Superiors (Tran Hoang; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 10 May 86) .....eseeeeeeess 74 Need To Make frank, ticnest Criticism, Self-Criticism Discussed (Tran Minh; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 14 May 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 76 Measures To Help Party Members Correct Mistakes Discussed (Nguyen Van Bieu; NHAN DAN. 16 May 86) ..ccccccceccccceeees 78 ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Ho Chi Minh City Strengthens Price Discipline (QUAN DOL NHAN DAN, 20 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeneeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeee 81 Fighting Against Crimes, Negative Aspects in Economy (Hong Hai; TRIET HOC, No 4, Dec 85) eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeee 83 AGRICULTURE Ways To Revive, Expand Silkworm Industry Discussed (Tran Hoang; QUAN DOL NHAN DAN, 16 May 86) seer eeeeeeeeeeee 91 Agricultural Unit Issu. sotice on Rice Pests (Hanoi Domestic Service, 19 Jun 86) ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeee 94 HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION Readers Ask Investigations of Tin Mine, Rock Quarry Misuse (MHAN DAN, 16 May 86) eee eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee 95 30 LABOR Ho Chi Minh City Finds Jobs for Over 1 Million in Past 10 Years (NHAN DAN, 30 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaeeeeeeeeeeeeee 97 BLOGRAPHIC Information on Vietnamese Personalities. ...---escecescecseeseeseces 99 PUBLICATIONS Table of Contents cf TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC, April 1986 (TAP CHl HOAT DONG KHOA HOC, Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 103 /9986 31 32 JPRS-SEA-86-118 17 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Weekly Hits U.S. Wheat, Rice "ndercutting in YAR, PNG (Philip Bate, Bruce Mills; THE LAND, 1 May 86).....ccseees Editorial Urges Canberra Match Changing Ties With U.S. (THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 5 May 86)...cccscscccccecccess Paper: Tokyo Summit Fails To Deliver on Canberra Interests (Simon Holberton; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 7 May 86).... Tokyo Summit Praised on Currency Coordination (Editorial; THE AUSTRALIAN, 8 May BB) cccccccccccccccccccce EC Meat Ban Prompts Canberra, London Concern (THE SYDNEY MOURNING HERALD, 3 May BB) cccccccccccccccsccecce China Cools on Joint Steel Production Plan (Mary-Louise O'Callaghan; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 3 May DPPPTTTTITITITITITITITITITITITITTTTTTTiiiT iii. Right Wing Group Claims Links to South Africa (Nic Van Oudtshoorn; SUNDAY TIMES, 8 Jun 86)...sccceeceses Further Details on Antinuclear Bill Before Parliament (Ross Peake; THE AUSTRALIAN, 7 May BB) cccccccccccccccccccs Farmers End Militant Stage, Seek Urban Support (Greg Roberts; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 8 May 86)....... 10 ll Editorial on Lessons of BLF Deregistration (Editorial; THE AGE, 5 May BB) ccccccccccccccccecececcocece 12 Daily Concerned Over New French Policy Toward New Caledonia (Editorial; THE AGE, 5 May BO cccccccceccecooecoeoecccceses 13 Daily Views Murphy Case Impact on Government Image (Editorial; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 8 May 86).....ss00- 14 NEW ZEALAND U.S. Envoy Remarks on Nuclear Policy ‘Tolerance’ Reported (THE NEW ZEALANJ. HERALD, 9 May BD cccccccccccccocecsoescee 15 Editorial on ‘Hyprocrisy’ of Allied Terrorism Policy (THE EVENING POST, 8 May 05) .ccccccccceccccccccccccceccecs 16 Daily Concerned Over Vanuatu Ties to Libya (Editorial; THE EVENING POST, 9 May BB) ccoccccccccccccococe 17 Indonesian Interest in CNG Technology Reported (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 8 May BB) cccccccccccccccccccocccs 18 Maoris Attack Energy Ministry Geothermal Announcement (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 9 May BB) cocccccccccccccceccccece 19 Expert Cites Failings of Local Electronics Industry (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 8 May BB) cccccccccccccccccccccccs 20 Public Support for Government Increases (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 9 May BB) cccccccccccccccccececese 21 SUP Organ Reports Federation of Labor Changes (NEW ZEALAND TRIBUNE, 5 May BB) ccccccccceccccccccccccceces 22 May Walkout Highlights Split in FOL Ranks (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 9 May BO ccccccccccccoccccccccece 25 Editorial Views FOL, Government Positions (Editorial; THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 9 May BB) ccccccccccees 26 Government Advantage Analyzed in FOL Relationship (THE EVENING POST, 10 May _ )PPPTTTTITITT TTT TTT TTT TTT TTT 27 PHILIPPINES U.S. Navy Ships Allegedly Used by Drug Syndicate (Jerry Lacuarta; MANILA BULLETIN, 16 Jun 86). .cccccssecees 2A NBI: Clark-Subic Syndicate Illegally Selling Cars (L. Catapusan, Mario Casayuran; MANILA BULLETIN, 18 Jun — —— 29 -b- 34 Official Procures IBRD Road Improvement Loan (DAVAO STAR, 29-31 May Be cccccccccccosooesooocooccoeooocs Leyte NDF Spokesman Alleges U.S. Dividing Rebels (Danny Cc. Petilla; BUSINESS DAY, 19 May BB) cccccccccccccce Daily Reports Conflict Over Surrendered Rebel's Identity (THE MINDANAO DAILY MIRROR, 25 May Bpccccccccccececccccecs Witness Claims Ver Masterminded 1971 Bombing (Jun Bandayrel; MANILA BULLETIN, 19 Jun Bb) cccccccccccccce Sison Urges Foreign Policy Based on National Sovereignty (Rocel C. Felix; BUSINESS DAY, 19 May 86)....sssseseseeees NISA Clearance No Longer Required in Civil Appointments (DAVAO STAR, 29-31 May BB) cccccccccccccccocccecccesoeccees Pimentel Alleges Military Support for KBL Overstayers (THE MINDAKAO DAILY MIRROR, 28 May BB cccccccccccoccccccce Davao Paper Urges Government Halt ‘Vendetta’ Against KBL (Editorial; THE MINDANAO MAIL, 24 May BO) cccccccccccccccce Davao OIC Orders Moves Against Squatters (DAVAO STAR, 29-31 May BB ccccccccccccccceccccceccecececcs Enrile Lifts Sequestration of Gambling, TV Companies (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 19 Jun 86)....eseeeees Briefs Citizenships May Be Invalidated Extra Military Vehicles To Provinces Alleged Corpuz Promotion Refuted NPA Commanders Reported Ready to Surrender Probe on Pending Naturalization Applications Violence in Bulacan Marcos Supporter Protests Charges MILF Faction Awaits Negotiations Military Checks Illegal Logging NPA Rebels Captured Metro Cebu Daily Violence Ministry of Information Centers THAILAND Ministry To Protest Lao Attack on Refugees ( BANGKOK POST, 18 Jun BB) cccccccccccccccccoccccccececceees Ministry Planning Organization Against Protectionism (Walailak Kiratiphiphatphong; BANGKOK’ POST, 16 Jun 86).... -C- 35 35 37 Democrat Leader Interviewed on Foreign Policy, Border Trade (Phichai Rattakum Interview; BANGKOK POST, 13 Jun 86)..... Tycoon Denies Involvement in Ousting Prem Cabinet (THE NATION, 13 Jun BB ccccccccccccccccccecccocecccecceccs Government To Restrict Activities of Some Diplomats (THE NATION, 18 Jun BO) ccccccccccccccccceocccoeeoceeseecce Boost in Trade Ties With Planned (BANGKOK POST, 18 Jun BB pecce scccece s@eeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeee Former ‘Young Turk’ Leader Wants Trade With Indochina (THE NATION, 16 Jun BB) ccccccccccccepccceccoeceesocesecess Cabinet Approves Boost in Domestic Borrowing To Offset Gap (BANGKOK POST, 18 Jun BB) occcccccccccccccccccccccccccocess Commercial Bank Problems To Persist (Choopong Maninoi; BANGKOK POST, 23 May 86)...cesececseees Central Bank To Get Partial Control of Local Bank ( BANGKOK POST, 31 May BB) ccccccccccccccccccccccccccececess Banks’ Problem Loans, Central Bank Intervention Reported (BANGKOK POST, 6 Jun BB) cccccccccccccccccccccccccccocccess Increase in Tin Mine Closures Reported ( BANGKOK POST, 14 Jun BB) ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccecoss Progressive Party Efforts, Policies Reviewed (Uthai Pimchaichon Interview; BANGKOK POST, 4 Jun 86)..... Mass Party Chief Chalerm on Prospects (Chalerm Yubamroong Interview; BANGKOK POST, 2 Jun 86).... General Discusses Campaign Against Communists in South ( BANGKOK POST, 17 Jun BB) ccccccccccccccccccccccecccccecose Briefs Chawalit Allows Interviews Rockets, Ammunition Seized Students Protest U.S. Drug Proposal Fifteen Laotians Arrested Handbill Distributors Probed ate 36 VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID Ha Tuyen Red Cross Meeting Condemns PRC Shelling (Hanoi International Service, 17 Jum 86)..cccccccccceceees 74 Hanoi Views Cambodian Workers, Villagers (Kanh Toan; Hanoi Domestic Service, 16 Jun 86)....sscseees 75 Mozambique Leader Greeted on National Day (VNA, 24 Jun BB) ccccccccccescccecccccessseseesesesesesess 78 SRV-Mongolia Ties Anniversary Hailed (VNA, 25 Jun PPT TTT TTT TTT TTT TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT TT Tee 79 Briefs Cambodian Military Attache Reception 80 Van Tien Dung PRK Performance 80 PRK Envoy's Comments 80 Envoy's Condemnation of Apartheid 81 Italian Envoy Farevell . 81 Cooperation Accord With MPR Ministry 81 PRK Denfense Minister Visit 81 Cuban Construction Delegation Visits 82 Indian Health Care Delegation 82 Japanese Red Cross Delegation 82 First Lao Class in Quang Nae-Danang 82 PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Historian Explores Question of Vietnamization of Indochina (Thai Quang Trung; POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, 1986)........ 83 WHAN DAN Carries Resolution on Youth Role (NHAN DAN, 2 Jun _ )PPPTTTTTITITITITITTTiTrT Tee seeeeeeeeee 93 Briefs Provincial Official's Trial 97 AGRICULTURE Rainfall Reported in Northern Delta, Midlands (Hanoi Domest ic Service, 19 Jun BB) cccccccccccccccoccccces QR Periodic Review of Agricultural Production Reported (Hanoi Domest ic Service, 20 Jun BB) ccccccccccccccccccceccs 99 Briefs Hai Hung Spring Rice 102 Grain Procurement in Dong Thap . 102 Northern Spring Rice ‘ 102 /12675 \| —-e- 37 38 JPRS-SEA-86-119 ® 18 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT . CONTENTS INDONESIA PDI Chairman Surjadi Profiled, Background Given {SINAR HARAPAN, ll May 86) eeeeeeeeeeee ee ee eee eeeeee ee eeeee 1 PHILIPPINES 2 Labor Unrest at Subic Base After Sackings (Johnny P. Reyes; BUSINESS DAY, 26 Jun 86) ..cscccccceseees 5 Editorial on Inevitability of ‘Conditional Aid' (THE NEWS HERALD, 29 Jun 86) eeeeeoeaevoeeee ee eee eee eeeeeeeeeee 8 INQUIRER Columnist Proposes New Bases Agreement (David Sycip; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 23 Jun 86) ....... 10 Laurel Termed ‘Naive’ on U.S. Nuclear Weapons (Danilo M. Mariano; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 29 Jun 86) 13 Customs Seizes Arms Shipments From U.S, (Hilario D. Embrado; MANILA BULLETIN, 30 Jun 86) ....eee+++ 14 Customs Unit Stops Ammunition Reloader, Arms (PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 27 Jun 86) .ecccccecesceeeecess 15 Former Justice Accused of Suppressing Aquino Evidence (Lindablue F. Romero; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 28 Jun 86) 16 KBL Leaders React to Aquino Claims About Marcos (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 21 Jun 86) ....ceeeeees 18 Aquino Case Lawyers Seek Marcos Return for Testimony (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jun 86) ...ceeeeeees 19 - a= 39 KBL Calls for Holding Elections ‘Immediately' (MANILA BULLETIN, 23 Jun 86) eeeeeoeeceeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene Editorial Urges Holding Early Elections (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 23 Jun 86) ....eecceces Dimaporo Denies ‘Malicious’ Press Agency Report (THE MANILA TIMES, 27 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeeeeeeeeen © Editorial on Degree of Presidential Powers (MANILA BULLETIN, 1 Jul 86) (nt Ec NE GM ee Oe Editorial Opposes Proposed Bicameral Legislature (MANILA BULLETIN, 29 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeveeee ee New Group Seeks Ouster of Labor Minister (MANILA BULLETIN, 24 Jun 86) eeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © Marcos Loyalists Denounce Manila Mayor (Marichu Villanueva; THE NEWS HERALD, 21 Jun 86) .......... Paper Blasts Government, Media Dismissal of Loyalists (Editorial; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 20 Jun 86) ....ceeeees Columnist Examines Violence at Pro-Marcos Rallies (Emilio H. Serrano; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 27 Jun 86) ... Concom Reaches Consensus on February Elections (Melchor Parale; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 28 Jun 86) eeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eevee eeeeeee ee Ex-Speaker Predicts Concom To Miss 2 Sep Deadline (THE NEWS HERALD, 30 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Paper Opposes ‘National Language’ Measures (Editorial; THE NEWS HERALD, 27 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Legal Action Expected Over PCGG Takeover of UCPB (AFP, 1 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ‘Tentacles’ of Good Government Commission Viewed (Editorial; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 30 Jun 86) Columnist Condemns Commission's Expanded Powers (Val Abelgas; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 30 Jun 86) eeeeeeeceoee eee eee eeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Deadline Given for Recommendation of CHDF (Jose de Vera; MANILA BULLETIN, 27 Jun 86) ..ccccccsecceces 40 21 22 23 24 25 27 28 32 37 38 39 41 43 Local Police Supervision To Start in Manila (Renato Reyes; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 21 Jun 86) Paper Concerned Over Officials’ Bodyguards, Firearms (Marites Danguilan-Vitug; NEW DAY, 30 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeee Committee To Reexamine ‘Citizenship by Decree’ (THE NEWS HERALD, 29 Jun 86) eeeeeeoeceaeoeoeoeeoee ee eeeeeeeeeeeee Development Plan ‘Terrifying Beyond Description’ (Editorial; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 27 Jun 86) eeenseeeeeee Agapito Aquino Reports on Talks With Balweg (Manila Far East Broadcasting Company, 22 Jun 86) .......... Paper Examines Study of Commitment of Communist Party (Joel D. Lacsamana; NEW DAY, 30 Jun 86) eeeeeeeecoeeeeeeeeeee Commission Urged To Investigate NPA Atrocities (Ariel Alamis; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 23 Jun 86) Four NPA Members Killed in Clash With Government Troops (Abe Licayan; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 30 Jun 86) ........ Sison Comments on Advantages of Truce (Jose Ma Sison; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 14 Jun 856) .......... Survey Shows Manilans Favor Ceasefire Talks (Monica Feria; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 21 Jun 86) ........... Paper Urges More ‘Popular Consultation’ (Editorial; PHILIPPINES DAILY INQUIRER, 28 Jun 86) ......... Merger of Mindanao Autonomous Regions Opposed (F. V. Maragay; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 23 Jun 86) eeeeeeeoeeeaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeeeeeeeee Government To Pump’ Prime Economy, Stimulate Demand (Daniel Cc. Yu; BUSINESS DAY, 20 Jun 86) eeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeee Talks With IMF ‘Hanging’ Due to Deficit (Jun Concepcion; MANILA BULLETIN, 22 Jun 86) .......... ..... Problems Anticipated in WB Loan Negotiations (Junaito C, Concepcion; MANILA BULLETIN, 28 Jun 86) .....+.. First Quarter Trade With Japan Up by 10 Percent (MANILA BULLETIN, 25 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee CB Opposes Limit on President's Foreign Borrowing Power (Tara Singh; BUSINESS DAY, 27 Jun 86) COCR EEO Eee — ¢ — 41 52 53 56 58 59 62 66 67 69 71 73 74 Centrai Bank Figures Show Manufactures Exports Drop (BUSINESS DAY, 26 Jun 86) eeeeeeoeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Manila To Lift Corn Import Ban, Raise Tariff Rates (BUSINESS DAY, 24 Jun 86) eeeeeeeoeoeeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeeeee Private Sector Fears Import Surge Possible (BUSINESS DAY, ll Jul 86) eeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeee eevee eeeeeeeee Tourist Receipts Rise 7.13 Percent in First Quarter (Ibarra C. Gutierrez; BUSINESS DAY, 30 Jun 86) ....sccecees Gold Production Dips 1.52 Percent in First Quarter (BUSINESS DAY, 23 Jun 86) eeeeeoeeceeo ee eee eeeeeeeeee ee eee ene Manila Wholesale Price Index Declines \| (BUSINESS DAY, 1 Jul 86) eeeeeoeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee May CPI Shows ‘Modest’ 1.29 Percent Rise (BUSINESS DAY, 24 Jun 86) eeeeoeoeaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee Commercial Bank: Assets Decline in May (THE NEWS HERALD, 28 Jun 86) eeeeeoeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Budget Ministry on Debt Amortization (MANILA BULLETIN, 27 Jun 86) eeeeeoeveeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee SEC Reports Number of Company Closures Down (BUS INESS DAY, 27 Jun 86) eeeeeeoeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Loan Program for Small Businesses Launched ‘(PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 27 Jun 86) ..ceccceececececsees Chamber of Commerce Criticizes New Economic Program (AFP, 27 Jun 86) eeeeeeeer eee eeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Cabinet Plan To Scrap Nuclear Plant Reaffirmed (Manila Far East Broadcasting Company, 30 Jun 86) ......... Government Defends Delegates to ILO Conference (Gethsemane M. Selirio; BUSINESS DAY, 24 Jun 86) .......... Briefs Budget Cuts Threaten Subic Jobs New Positions for Locsin, Saguisang 1985 Massacre of Demonstrators Businessman-Activist Named to Bank Board -@- 42 75 77 78 82 86 91 93 95 96 99 99 99 100 VIETNAM /9986 HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION Oil Refinery-Petrochemical Production Plant Discussed (Hoang Trong Yem; DOC LAP, 14 May 86) eseeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Vietnamese Scientists Working in Siberia (Secgay Lakusin; DOC LAP, 14 May 86) eeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeee -e- 43 101 103 44 JPRS-SEA-86-120 21 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS INDONESIA NU Chairman Comments on Indonesian Democracy Party (KOMPAS, 5 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee l NU Chairman's Views on Muslim Radicals (SURABAYA POST, 22 Apr 86) eeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3 Continued Rift in PPP Reported (SINAR HARAPAN, 2 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 5 Justice Ministry Employee Suspensions for PKI Ties Reported (TEMPO, 3 May 86) eeeeeeveeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee 7 Taiwan LNG Talks Nearing Conclusion (KOMPAS , 2 May 86) CC O0O6eC OC CSCS 10 Assessment of Investment Climate Reported (SINAR HARAPAN, 2 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © 12 Biographic Information on Indonesian Personalities ...sescseeereee 14 Taiwan, Thailand Granted Fishi’ig Rights in EEZ (SINAR HARAPAN , 3 May 66) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 19 Land Earmarked for Transmigration-PIR (PELITA, 22 Apr 86) eeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeee eee 21 Riau Transmigration Project Delayed (SINAR HARAPAN , 3 May 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee eee 23 Accord on Inkoperindo Signed, Name Changed to Inkopar (SINAR HARAPAN , 10 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 25 - a- 45 Irrigation Projects in Kalimantan (KOMPAS, 23 Apr 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 27 Chance of Kodeco Pulling Out of Offshore Oilfields Reported (KOMPAS, 23 Apr 86) eereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeer ee eeeeeeeeeeee 29 Lawyer Withdraws Appeal on Disbarment (SUARA KARYA, 26 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 30 Briefs Newsmen Involved in G.30.S/PKI 31 New Army Engineer Organizations 31 PHILIPPINES Editorials Not Impressed by Newest U.S. Aid Plan (Editorials; various sources, 25, 26 Jun 86). ..ceeeecseeess 32 ES" Dubious Status Hit 32 Review of ‘Special’ Relations Urged 33 "Redefinition' of Links Urged 34 Deputy Foreign Minister Says Country Needs 12 Years of Aid ( THE MANILA EVENING POST, 25 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeee % Aquino Makes New Government Appointments (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jun 86) ....ceeeeese 37 Salonga Defends Position of ‘Good Government’ Body (BUSINESS DAY, 25 Jan 86 ) eeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 38 Con-Com Proposes Multiparty System To Include CPP (AFP, 25 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeervreereeee ee eeeeeeeeeee 40 Representatives at Con-Com Ras Balweg, Present Demands (Mel Parale; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jun 86) 41 Home Defense Forces Said Causing Misamis Exodus (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jun 86) ....ceeeeess 43 Columnist on Military's Dimaporo Problem (Luis R. Mauricio; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 17 Jun 86) ...... 44 ASEAN Consultatives Committee Formed (Abrino Aydinan; BUSINESS DAY, 24 Jun 86) eeeeeeneeneeeeeeeeee 47 Statistics Office Publishes Figures on ‘Lackluster' Trades (BUSINESS DAY, 25 Jun 86) eee epeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 49 Central Bank To Overhaul Import Rules (Conrado R. Banal; BUSINESS DAY, 25 Jun 86) ..ccccecceessee 51 = b- 46 Good Governme 1t Commission To Seize Bank Shares (Rudy V. Brul; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 26 Jun 86) 53 PCGG Actions Annoy Central Bank Officials (THE NEWS HERALD, 25 Jun 86) see eeeeeeeereeeeenereeeeeeeeeeeere 55 Briefs Committee on Rural Development 57 VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Truong Chinh Sends Greetings to Artillery Corps (Hanoi Domestic Service, 29 Jum 86) .cccccccccccccccceceees 58 Meeting Marks Artillery Corps Anniversary (Hanoi Domestic Service, 29 Jun 86) c.ccsccccecccecececesss 60 Contents of May 1986 TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, May 86) Seer sereseeresresesesees 61 Briefs Crackdown on Illegal Business 62 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID AFP: Officials ‘In Private’ Doubt PRK Can Fight (AFP, 21 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeee eee 63 Hanoi Commentary Denounces ‘Slanderous’ Thai Campaign (Hanoi International Service, 20 Jun 86) ..ccccecccceseeess 65 Cities, Provinces’ Cooperation With Cambodia Reported (VNA, 24 Jun 86) eeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeereeeee ee © 67 ASEAN's Manila Joint Communique Closes (Hanoi International Service, 26 Jun 86) .ccccccceseeceeees 69 Radio Feature Raps ASEAN Ministers’ Conference (Vu Dinh; Hanoi Domestic Service, 26 Jun 86) ..cccceeceeees 71 Hanoi Reviews CEMA Aid to National Construction (Hanoi Domestic Service, 29 Jum 86) .cccccccccccccceveseses 73 NHAN DAN Marks USSR Patriotic War Anniversary (VNA, 22 Jun 86) see eeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeer eee eeeeeeee eee 74 Briefs Joint Amity Association Presidium Meets 75 U.S. Congress Aid to Contras 75 = ¢& © 47 /9987 Cambodian Party's Anniversary Friendship Association Renamed LPRP Journal Delegation Visit Soviet Gift to Journalists MPR Friendship Treaty Celebration Ambassador Meets With Mugabe USSR Satellite Station Madagascar Leader Congratulated Outgoing FRC Ambassador Working Program Signed PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Briefs National Assembly Session ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Briefs New Town in Quang Ninh Area Private Industries Registered Farm Produce for Export AGRICULTURE Briefs Workshop on ‘Floating Rice’ Rice Transplanting Completed HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTLON Briefs USSR Oil, Gas Venture "SAIGON 86° New Car Series POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE NHAN DAN on Central Highlands’ Potentials (Nguyen Duc Hung, Nguyen Hai Van; NHAN DAN, 2 Jun 86) ..... Briefs Cao Bang Town Enlarged 48 75 76 76 76 77 77 77 77 77 78 79 SSs 82 82 83 83 89 JPRS-SEA-86-121 22 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Hawke Warns of Need for New Accord (Robert Hawke Interview; THE NATIONAL TIMES, 30 May-5 Jun 86). USSR ‘Threat’ in South Pacific Analyzed (Peter Young; THE AUSTRALIAN, 14 May 86).... ... Editorial on ‘Disturbing’ Vanuatu Ties to Libya (THE AUSTRALIAN, 13 May —ÿ 3 TTT TTT TTT Tee PRC Buys 10 Percent of Aluminum Smelter (Paul Austin; THE AUSTRALIAN, 21 May +) PPPTTTTT TTT TT TTT TTT Reportage on Six Month Economic Reversal (THE AGE, THE AUSTRALIAN, 30 May 86) eee eee eee ee eee eee eee eee Keating Remarks, by Russell Barton OECD Predicts Further Decline, by Anthony Boyd Income, Expense Graphed Impact of Economic Figures, by Michelle Grattan Positive Aspects Viewed, Editorial Rural Issues Paper Urges Action on Economy (Editorial; THE LAND, 15 May BG) wc cccccccecesesesesesssesesess Hawke Using Low Strike Figures To Hit Opposition's Policy (Liz Glasgow: THE AUSTRALIAN, 13 May 86)........seseeeeeeees Employer Group Challenges ACTU To Abandon Accord (Paul Molloy; THE AUSTRALIAN, 29 May BG) cccccccccessccsccese 49 13 14 Sugar Industry Surrenders to Federal Price Support Terms (Matt Robbins; THE AUSTRALIAK, 22 May 86)... -cccccccccecccess Weekly Views Impact of U.S. Wheat Trade War (Bruce Mllls, Phillip Bate; THE LAND, 8 May 86)............. Grains Spokesman Opposes Freeing Wheat Market (Vernon Graham; THE LAND, 29 May 86)........cseeeeceeceecees Government Popularity Falls in Late May (THE AUSTRALIAN , 21 May Be coccocccecoceeoooccoeccesoooeeees VOPB Carries Reports of Combat Engagements ' (Voice of the People of Burma, 12, 14 May 86)........seee6. People's Army Attack Attacks in Shan State Briefs Autralian Patrol Boats Foreign Ministry Scores Pretoria's Aggression (Vient jane Domestic Service, 28 May BB) ccccccccccccccoceces Vientiane Says Athit-Led Group Harming Relations (Vientiane Domestic Service, 7 Jum 86). ...ccccccccccceeeees Vientiane Reports ‘Dismissal’ of Athit Kamlang-EK (Vientiane Domestic Service, 28 May BS) cccccccccececceccccs Phoun Sipaseut Sends Greetings to PRK's Hun Sen (Vient iane Domest ic Service, 14 Jun BS) cccccccccccccccececs Former Defense Spokesman Grants Interview (Vientiane Domestic Service, 13 Jur Briefs Meeting on PRK Army Day Khamtai Siphandon to Phnom ru Delegation Returns From PRK Maps From USSR Greetings on Philippine National Day Public Health Delegation Returns Souphanouvong Attends Tree Planting ob « 50 15 16 17 18 21 22 23 25 26 28 Daily on International Impact of Antinuclear Policy (Editorial; THE EVENING POST, 28 May 86).......cssseecceeees Labor Party Council Challenges Government Policy (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 26 May 86)......-.ccccscccccecceees Labor Rebel Anderton Plans Own Economic Study Labor Party, Government Policy Contradiction Viewed (Simon Collins; THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 31 May 86).......... Trade Minister Assured of UK Support (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 26 May 86) .....ccccccccccscecceeees Government Resists Ministers on Expenditure Review (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 30 May BOP ccccccceccocceccooeccoees Economic Development Group Predicts Zero Growth (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 30 May 86).....cccccccccscecceceees Opposition Views Rural Impact on Business (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 26 May 86) .....cccccccccccseceecces Farmers Lose on Lamb Export to Iran (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 30 May 86). ...cccccccccceccceeecees Study Shows Average Meat Farm Losing Money (THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD, 31 May BS) ccccccccccccccececeesesces PHILIPPINES Troops Stand By During Danao Transition (SUN STAR DAILY, 30 May 86; VISAYAN HERALD, 21 May 86)....... Durano, Supporters Resent Troops Durano-OIC Ties Alleged, by Eam R. Espina, Doody Basilisco Cebu Columnist Urges Nation Back Aquino (Eddie Adlawan; VISAYAN HERALD, 31 May BS) cccccccccccccccces Cebu Daily Lampoons PDP-LABAN-UNIDO Fights (Mel B. Libre; VISAYAN HERALD, 27 May BS) cccccccccsceccccese TUCP, Herrera Hit Over Sanchez Ouster Bid (VISAYAN HERALD, 31 May BS) ccccccccccsccesce se ef © seeeeeeeeeee - ¢- 51 33 35 37 39 40 4) 42 43 43 ua 45 46 Cardinal Vidal Says Church ‘Unhappy’ in Power (SUN STAR DAILY, 19 May 86)...........cseeeeeeecuee ee ke Cebu Archdiocese Official Alleges Underground Funding (SUN STAR DAILY, 20 May 86)... ...ccccccccccccscccccuceseees Cebu Columist Urges Retention of Information Ministry (Godofredo M. Roperos; SUN STAR DAILY, 30 May 86).......... Cebu Columist Bats for ‘Reform’ of CHDF (Godofredo M. Roperos; SUN STAR DAILY, 26 May 86).......... Monetary Authority To Reform Stock Exchange (BEANAMA, BD Gan Ge cocccccoocooeeeoosoccooceeeesooes see ee © © SIAM RAT Bangkok Poll Shows Democrat's Strength (SLAM RAT, 25 Jun TTT TT TTT TTT TTT TT TTT 4000066006 Columnist Speculates on Postelection Scenario (Thahan Kao; SLAM SAT, BD Jum GBdcccccccccccccccoccoccscccs Chawalit Orders ISOC To Stay Neutral on Polls (SLAM RAT, 2D DER GB) ccccccccccccecccececccces reef fF © seer ef © Chawalit Sets Up Panel To Consider Aray Shuffle (Phongsak Sisot; THE NATION, 13 Jur 86)....cccccccwwccceees Military Official Comments on Border Situation (Bangkok Domest ic Service, 19 Jun BS) cccccccccccccccceccecs Foreign Trade Official on Rising Rice Prices (MATICHON, 19 Jun +) PPP TTTTT TTT TTT TTTirirrresrreerrrrireTy — Briefs Ukrit Receives Soviet, Iraqi Officials Ukrit Receives Bulgarian Envoy Cambodian Border Situation SRV Shelling, Incursion Reported Briefs ADB Approves Loans, Grants VANUATU Prime Minister Addresses Foreign Policy Lesues (VANUATU WEEKLY, 26 May 86). cccccccccccceveees sere een eeeeeeee ~~ 52 49 53 55 57 59 62 63 65 67 67 69 COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA VODK Reports DK Delegate Address at UN Meeting (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 19 Jun 86)........seeeeeeees VODK Says Soviet Delegation Visit Heralds ‘Threat’ (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 20 Jun 86)........eseeeeeees VOK Discusses SRV Economy, Change in Leadership (Voice of the Khmer, 17 Jun 86)......ccccccccccccccscecceees VODK Says SRV Bringing in 7-8 Million Settlers (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 23 Jun 86).......sseeeeeeees VODK Says SRV Deceiving World on Troop Pullout (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 24 Jun 86)........seeeeeeees VODK Commentary on Vietnam's Economic Crisis (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 25 Jun 86)........ occccccecce VOK Urges All Khmers To Defend Nation, People (Voice of the Khmer, 14 Jun \| EF PPPPTTTTTITTrTrrrrrryrrrey VONADK Interviews Former DK Envoy to PRC, Part 2 (Pich Cheang Interview; Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 16 Jun 86)....cccecccccccccsseesseeees VOK Reports CGDK Military Activities Early June (Voice of the Khmer, 17 Jun 86)....cccscccccccccsccssecees see VONADK Broadcasts Battle Reports for June (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, various TT. ) PPPTTTTTLTTPTTTTTTITTTTrirereesereeeseeserseresrerseeerie eel Reports for 13-19 June Reports for 20-26 June Briefs SRV Families to Kompong Chhnang Revolting Troops Take SRV Tanks 150 Soldiers Said To Revolt SRV Regiment Ambushed ANS Attack in Oddar Meanchey SRV Moves Residents From Border Area PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Deputy Premier Criticizes Law Society as Political (THE STRAITS TIMES, 14 Jun BS) cccccccccccccecccccceceecceccs 71 73 75 77 78 80 82 91 Nguon Whel Attends Youth Union Day Meeting (SPK, 17 Jun i Lao Reporter Discusses Situation in Poipet (Vientiane Domestic Service, 14 Jun 86)........cccccccceees PRK, SRV, Lao Artists Perform for Officails (SPK, 20 Jun ——— abeoeee esenereeneeeee eeneeeeeee SRV Troops Said Moving Villagers From Thai-Cambodian Border (AFP, 23 Jun 86)... eees een ee eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene eeeeee Briefs KPRAF Officers, Soldiers Defect Cuban Minister Sends Message to Bou Thang Chea Sim Greets GDR Counterpart SPK Reports Thai Violations VIETNAM /6539 PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Cartoons Illustrate Hazards in Criticism, Self-Criticism Plans (DAI DOAN KET, 7 May 86; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 13, 20 Jun 86). ‘Acceptance’ of Campaign ‘Unfair’ Criticism Campaign in Operation HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION Oil Exploitation Begins at White Tiger Block (Tran Sinh; VIETNAM COURIER, Apr 86).......+.+. eccccce eeccce 54 92 93 95 98 98 100 100 100 101 102 JPRS-SEA-86-122 23 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Briefs Pretoria Diplomat Expelled National Pay Raise Hayden Accuses EEC International Borrowing Democrats Leader Announces Retirement TNDONESIA Muhammadiyah Directives on Participation in Next Election (KOMPAS , 16 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee Islamic Student Association Chairman Clarifies His Election (TEMPO, 12 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Investment Board Chief Discusses Relaxation of Rules (PELITA, 14 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Domination of PDI by Former PNI Members Discussed (SINAR HARAPAN , 9 Apr 86 ) eseeeeevreeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Bar Association Takes Up Buyung Nasution Issue (SUARA KARYA, 5 Apr 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeceeeee eee eee eeeee Minister of Religion Describes Islam in Indonesia (KOMPAS , 8 Apr 86) TEREREEELELELELELEELELELELIE Ee ABRI Participation Said To Reduce Project Costs (SINAR HARAPAN, 15 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Objections Voiced To Use of PRC Cargo Surveyor (SINAR HARAPAN , 9 Apr 86) eseeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee - a- 55 NN ee — 11 13 15 17 19 Private Transport Group Handed Over to Government Control (VIENT LANE MAI, 13 May 86) eeeeeeeeoeee eevee ee ee eee eeeeeeeeee 21 Letters Column Refutes VOA Charges of Human Rights Violations (NOUM LAO, 15-21 Feb 86) eeeeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene® 22 Hydropower, Mineral Resources Discussed (NOUM LAO, 8-14 Feb 86) eeeeeeeoee ee eee eeee eee eee eeeeeeeeeee 24 Briefs Purchase-Sale Co-Ops Planned (KPL) 26 Luang Prabang Military Operations ) 26 District LPRP Ethnic Composition 26 SRV-Aided Hospital (KPL) 27 Wages, Benefits Paid to Construction Workers 27 MALAYSIA MCA Officers Debate PAS-Chinese Consultative Committee Counterparts (KIN KWOK DAILY NEWS, 12 May 86) eeeeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 28 NEW CALEDONIA Djibaou Interviewed New French Plan (Merzak Meneceur; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 23-29 May 86) ..... 32 NEW ZEALAND Partisan Use of Australian Defense Plan Viewed (Roger Mackey; THE EVENING POST, 16 Jun 86) eeneeeveeeeeeeeeee 35 Briefs Australian Supporters Greet Lange 40 PHILIPPINES Radical Weekly Discusses Captured U.S. Troops (Nora Gamolo; WE FORUM, 6-12 May 86) eeeeee ere eee eee eee tees 41 Reporters Analyze, Categorize Marcos Loyalists (Manny Velasco, Jun Lopez; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 24- 25 Apr 86) eeeereer eee eee eee eee ee eee ee eeeeeeee eee eee eee ee eeee 44 Ex-Ambassador Calls for U.S. Sugar Quota Restoration (THE NEWS HERALD, 15 Jun 86) see eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eeeee 48 Further Reportage on Constitutional Commission Proceedings (MANILA BULLETIN, var ious dates) esreeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 49 Warned Against ‘Prohibitive Provisions’, by Rod L. Ville 49 Receives Opinions From Urban Areas, by Rod L. Villa 51 May Cut PCGG Powers 52 - b= 56 Daily Reports Details, Views of ‘Top Level’ CPP Shake-Up (Monica Feria; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 1-2 Jun 86) .......++- 54 Continuing Military Abuses in the North Reported (Tinna Mauricio; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 14 Jun 86) ........ 58 Sworn Statements Testify to NPA Atrocities (Manila Far East Broadcasting Company, 20 Jun 86) .......-. 59 Aquino Confident of Clean Elections When Held (AFP, 21 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeee ee ee eee ee eee e eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeee 60 Report Analyzes Government's New Tax Measures (Conrado R. Banal; BUSINESS DAY, 19 Jun 86) ..ccsccccesesss 61 State To Allow Foreign Investors To Buy Promissory Notes (AFP, 21 Jun 86) eeeeeeee eee e ee eeeeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeee 64 Audit Commission Uncovers Navy Contract Irregularities (F. V. Maragay; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 21 Jun 86) eeeeeeeoeeee eee eeeeee ee eeeeeeeaeee en eeeeeeeeeeeeee 66 Power Corporation Named Nation's Top Earner (Rudy Brul; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 21 Jun 86) 69 Value of Coconut Products Exports Drops (BUSINESS DAY, 16 Jun 86) eeeeeeeee eee ee eee eeeee ee eeeeeeeee 71 THA LLAND Editorials Fault Prem Decision Not To Run (Various sources, various dates) ..cscccccccccecccseseeeees 73 Future Problems Seen, by Rattana Yawapraphat 73 Prem Use of Military Support Cited, Editorial 74 Failure of Political System Seen, Editorial 74 Wanted: Elected Prime Minister, Editorial 75 Athit Discusses Politics, RTA Classes, Budget (Athit Kamlangek Interview; KHAO PHISET, 2-8 Jun 86) ...... 76 VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID NHAN DAN Supports Korea's Anti-U.S. Struggle (VNA, 25 Jun 86) eevee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeee eee 84 Briefs Talk on Korea 85 /7310 PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Ho Chi Minh City CPV Committee Issues Guidelines on Criticism (SAIGON GIAI PHONG , 13 Apr 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee- ft eeeeee Citizen Appeals for Truth, Completeness in News (Nguyen Vinh Phat; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 20 Apr 86) ......... Municipal Party Committee Vice Chairman Discusses Criticism (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 22 Apr 86) eer eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Need To Reform Cadre, Party Ranks Discussed (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 24 Apr 86 ) ———— Writer: Purge Those Who Oppose New Policy Line (Nguyen Dang Trung; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 25 Apr 86) ........ Harsh Comments on Abuses by Party Members (Nguyen Quang Hai; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 8 May 86) .......... Abilities, Qualities of Cadres, Party Members Discussed (Hong Long; NHAN DAN, 21 May 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Criticism Drive Described as Going Slow in Youth Union (SAIGON GIAI PHONG , 20 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Obtaining Good Results From Self-Criticism/Criticism Period (NHAN DAN, 21 May 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee ee eeeeeeee ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Efforts in Stable Commodity Procurement Discussed (Tran Dinh Ba; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 7 May 86) eeeereeeeeeeeee AGRICULTURE Reasons for Destruction of 91 Hectares of Tobacco Discussed (Ng yen Oanh; NHAN DAN, 14 May 86) COP Briefs Summer Rice Crop Readied TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS Briefs New Telephone Line Sea-River Transportation POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Van Ninh Redistributes Labor, Lowers Population Density (Le Hoan; NHAN DAN, 21 May 86 ) seer ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee o@- 58 93 95 100 103 105 107 110 Lil 114 116 120 121 121 122 JPRS-SEA-86-123 24 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Canberra Removing Import Barriers for Pacific Forum States (Melbourne Overseas Sdrvice, 1 Jul 86) .................... 1 Briefs New South Wales Premier New Labor Party President Landrovers for Army NN NY INDONESIA Daily Says ASEAN Should Consider PNG's Wish To Join (Editorial; SINAR HARAPAN , 27 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 3 Rice Self-Sufficiency May Be Shortlived (AFP, 5 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeo eee eeee eee ee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 5 Weekly Reviews Changing Face of Military (TEMPO, 21 Jun 86) eeeeeeveeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 6 Briefs Mokhtar Regrets Australian Decision 10 PHILIPPINES UP Drafts Constitution for Concom Consideration (Brenda P. Tuazon; MANILA BULLETIN, 22 May 86) ..cceseseeee Il MALAYA Views Interest Groups’ Pressures on Concom (Ed, L. Santoalla; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 1 Jun 86) ....... 13 Weekly Analyzes Post-Aquino Presidential Bets (Rene Pastor; WE FORUM, 27 May~-2 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 17 - a= 59 Trade Minister Emphasizes Export Role (D. Siytangco; MANILA BULLETIN, 22 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Finance Ministry Agency To Be Funded From Loans (MANILA BULLETIN, 23 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee International Firm Offers To Buy Excess Sugar (Fred Lobo; MANILA BULLETIN, 23 May 86) eeeeeveeeernreeeeeeee Central Bank Limits Quedan Financing (MANILA BULLETIN, 29 May 86) e@eeeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeneneeeeeeenee Bankers, Businessmen Unaffected by Raps Against CB Head (MANILA BULLETIN, 23 May 86) sbbabotosedbseseccesesévoceses Government Reorganization Plan Targets 199 Firms (Ellen P. Samaniego; MANILA BULLETIN, 31 May 86) eeeeeeeeee Jayme Outlines Plans for PNB Rehabilitation (MANILA BULLETIN, 30 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Rural Banks, Cooperatives To Regain Tax Exemptions (MANILA BULLETIN, 21 May 86) SCC CCC EEE Plans Revealed on Sale of NDC Assets (MANILA BULLETIN, 31 May 86) eeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeetceeee eee Food Minister Excuses ‘Marcos Crony' From Beef Investigation (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 1 Jun 86) eeeseeeeeeeeeeeeee ee ee eeeee Troops Escort, Drive Buses, End Transportation Strike (Fred Lobo; MANILA BULLETIN, 28 May 86) ..cccccscceseeceees MANILA BULLETIN Backs Denial of Teachers’ Hike (Editorial; MANILA PULLETIN, 29 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Government Company Negotiates Hotel Sales (MANILA BULLETIN, 31 May 86) eeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Former MP Elected Nacionalista Secretary General (ANG PAHAY AGANG MALAYA, 1 Jun 86) COOPER ORR TEE EE HEHEHE ee Ople Reported Unfazed by PNP Desertion (ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 2 Jun 86) Seeder eereeeeeeeereeeeeeee Sison Analyzes New Factionalism in Military (Nora 0. Gamolo; WE FORUM, 27 May~2 Jun 86) ..csccccecceccs Northern Luzon NPA Commander Interviewed (Nora 0. Gamolo; WE FORUM, 13-19 May 86) ....... . 60 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 Military Commanders Air Views of Cagayan Fight (WE FORUM, 13-19 May 86) eeeeeeee eee eee eeeer eee eeeeee eee eeee WE FORUM Views CPP ‘Rectification’ Moves (Nick v. Quijano; WE FORUM, 27 May-2 Jun 86) eeeeeereeeeeeee THALLAND Sitthi Interviewed by Chinese Language Daily (ZHONG HUA RIBAO, 29 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeoee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeee Foreign Minister Receives PRC Delegation, Views Ties (ZHONG HUA RIBAO, 1 Jul 86) eeeeeeceesseoeseeaeeseseeeeeeeeeee Snoh May Get IMF Post, Finance Vacancies Noted (NAEO NA, 21 May 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee Cabinet Economic Decision-Making Brought To Halt (NAEO NA, 30 May 86) eeeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeeeeee "Young Turks’ Political Moves, Chawalit Ties Viewed (SLAM RAT, various dates) eeeeeeee ee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Current Vocations, Links With Politicians Chawalit Believed Sympathetic Chamlong, Aides Comment Amplification of Chawalit Interview on Assuming CINC Job (KHAO PHISET, 2-8 Jun 86) eevee eeeeeeeee eve ce eee eeeeeeeeeee General Phichit Status After Athit Firing Discussed (su ANAKHOT , 3-9 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 4th Army Officer on CPM, Separatist Problem in South (NAEO NA, 22 May 86) eeeeeeveeeeeeee ee eee eee eeeeeeeeer ee eeeeee Rice Prime Guarantee Scheme To End, Exports Drop (NAEO NA, 31 May 86) eee eeeee ee eeeee ee ee eee eeeeeee ee eeeeeee Socialist Leader on Background, Views, Electoral Prospects (Manu Chanyong; SU ANAKHOT, 9-15 Jun 86) ..cccccccccceeeees Briefs Rice-Weapons Barter With ROK PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Hun Sen Receives SRV Inspection Delegation (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 19 Jun 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 61 43 45 57 61 65 69 70 Foreign Military Delegations’ Activities Reported (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 19 Jun 86) ...ccccccccscseees Visit Infantry School, Army Museum Attend Art Performance Visit Monument on Army Day Report on Agricultural Developments 16-22 June (Various sources, 16-22 Jun 86) eeeeeee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeee Brie’ - don Sen Gets MPR Thanks Siem Reap Security Forces Operations 310 Enemy ‘Out of Action’ Rice Seed Selection Center Communications Delegation Returns From SRV VIETNAM /9987 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID NHAN DAN Commentary Views U.S. Globalism (Hanoi Domestic Service, 24 Jun 86) ..ccccccccccceceseceses PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT District Secretary Interviewed on Cooperatives, Conditions (Nguyen Van Thang Interview; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 23 Apr 86) Precinct Leaders Interviewed on Economic, Social Problems (Nguyen Van Hanh Interview; SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 25 Apr 86) Reader Joins Drive Seeking ideas for Next Party Congress (SAIGON GIAL PHONG , 22 Apr 86) eseeee eevee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeee HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Status of Domestic Nuclear Medicine Surveyed (Phan Van Duyet; NHAN DAN, 26 Feb 86 ) eee ee ee eee eee eeee POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE Editorial Calls for Greater Efficiency in Cultural Work (NHAN DAN, 26 Feb 86) eee ee ee eeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eeeeeeee eee Column Aske for Stricter Enforcement of Law, Regulations (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 22 Apr 86) eseeeeeeee eee eeeeeereeeeee eee 62 71 71 71 72 73 75 75 75 75 76 77 87 93 101 104 JPRS-SEA-86-124 24 JULY 1936 southeast Asia Report TABLES OF CONTENTS JPRS-SEA-86-001, 3 JANUARY 1986- JPRS-SEA-86-111, 30 JUNE 1986 [FBIS] FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE 63 64 JPRS-SEA-86-125 25 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS INTER-ASIAN AFFAIRS Rithaudden-Sitthi Discuss Economic Cooperation (BERNAMA, 26 Jun 86) seer ereeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eer eeeeer ee 1 ASEAN Summit To Discuss Nuclear Free Zone Iesue (THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 5 Jul 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 2 Rithaudden Meets Abe on Japan's ASEAN Investment (Kuala Lumpur International Service, 26 Jun 86) .....ceeees 3 Hayden Meets ASEAN Ministers on World Trade (PRA, 26 Jun 86) eeeeeee eee eee eeeeee eee eee eee ee eee ee eee ee ee 4 ASEAN Urges More Trade, Investment With Australia (AFP, 26 Jun 86) see e ee ee ee eeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeere 5 AUSTRALIA Hayden ‘Disappointed’ Over U.S. Aid to Contras (Melbourne Overseas Service, 2 Jul 86) ccccccccccseceeeeees 6 Government Regrets Comments on U.S. Wheat Sale (Melbourne Overseas Service, 4 Jul 86) cccccccccccecceeeese 7 Briefs Argentina's Alfonsin To Visit 8 Unions To Strike Over Superannuation 8 Laos Rejects Thai Border Incursion ‘Fabrications’ (VNA, 20 Jun 86) eseeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eee eee ee © 9 AFP Reports Emigration to Thailand Hurting Business (Michael Adler; AFP, 17 Jun 84) see ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeree 10 — @& = 65 Briefs Souphanouvong Greets CDR's Zindermann 12 Souphanouvong Congratulates CDR's Honecker 12 Phomvihan Greets GDR's Willi Stoph 12 Peace Delegation Returns Home 12 Cooperation Pact Signed With Hanoi 13 American Aid 13 Kaysone Phomvihan Receives French Envoy 13 Reception Marks KPRAF Anniversary 13 MALAYSIA Radio Commentary on Relations With Britain (Kuala Lumpur International Service, 3 Jul 86) ..cccccceees WS ‘Snags’ in Direct PRC Trade Being ‘Ironed Out’ (BERNAMA, 6 Jul Re ) eee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeee 16 UK Minister Calls on Highway Projects Works Minister Vellu (BERNAMA, 2 Jul Re) eee eee eeeeeeeee eee eeeeeeeeeerer ee eeeeeee 18 PHILIPPINES Marcos’ ‘Loyalists’ Warn of Rebel Attacks (Fil Viduya; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 4 Jul 86) 19 Landoil Management Reveals Marcos Shareholdings (MANILLA BULLETIN, 2 Jul 86) eeee eee ee eee e eee eer eee eee eeeeeee 21 Ver Reportedly ‘Fallen’ From Favor With Marcos (Antero F. Soriano; THE NEW PHILIPPINES SUNDAY EXPRESS, 29 Jun 86) eeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeneeeeee ee eee eee 23 Ople on Dangers of Sharing Power With Communists (MANILLA BULLETIN, 3 Jul 86) serene ee eee eeeeeee eee ee eee eeereeee 24 Editorial Views Problems Confronting Government (THE MANILLA CHRONICLE, 1 jul 86) see eee eee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeee 26 Japanese Journalist Comments on Altered Agrava Testimony (BUS INESS DAY, 3 Jul BH) sere eee eee eee eeeeee ee eee eee eee eeee 28 ‘Majority’ Prefers Presidential-Type of Government (Teddy Owen; THE NEWS HERALD, 1 Jul 86) ..ccccccccccccccess 30 Education Minister Threatens To Join Teachers’ rike (BUS INESS DAY, 3 Jul 86) eseeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © 32 Former RUC 3 Chief Reportedly Departs for United States (THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 30 Jun 86) ..cccccccces 33 Editorial on Issue of U.S. Bases in Constitution (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 1 Jul 86) cece: -ccccccccscceses Alleged U.S. Interference in Concom. Charged (Ben Evardone; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 17 Jun 86) .......++- Concom Makes Decisions on Powers, Limits (BUSINESS DAY, l Jul 86) eee eevee eeeeeee eee eeeeeneeeeeeeeeeee Concom Decides Church-State Relationship (BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) eeeeeee ee eee ee ee eee eeeeeee eee eeeee Concom . May Be Unable To Meet Deadline (Vitug; THE MANILA CHRONICLE, l Jul 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeneeee Official Discusses Economic Policies, fast Abuses (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 30 Jun 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Government Seeks Further Freeze in Repayment of Foreign Loans (THE NEWS HERALD, 3 Jul 86) eeeeeeveee ee ee eeeeeeeneeeeeeeeee Debt Repayment in Pesos; Loans for Sale (Conrado R. Banal; BUSINESS DAY, 1 Jul 86) ...ccccccceccees Government Central Bank Borrowings ‘Drastically Reduced' (Oscar Quiambao; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 26 Jun 86) .... Tourism Added to Ministries To Be Abolished (Cristina del Carmen-Pastor; THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 3 Jul 86) eee eeeee ee eee ee ee eee eeeeee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee ee Cotabato Described as Counter Insurgency Success Story (Anselmo S. Roque; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 27 Jun 86) Ousted Tribal Leader Demands ‘New Province’ (AFP, 2 Jul 86) eeeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Muslim Groups Favor Autonomy for Mindanao (Bing Formento; PHILIPPINES DAILY INQUIRER, 30 Jun 86) .... Armed Forces To Manage Arms Manufacturers (Joel D. Lacsamana; BUSINESS DAY, 27 Jun 86) ....ceeeeeeess $42 Million Needed for Thermal Plant Repairs (Marianne Go; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 1 Jul 86) ....eeee0- Export Duties Abolished on All Products Except Logs (Manila Far East Broadcasting Company, 2 Jul 86) ...eeeeees NPA Rebels Burn Logging Equipment in Cagayan (BUSINESS DAY, 3 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeeee eee sos Ee © 67 35 38 40 42 46 48 50 52 55 57 59 61 63 Briefs First Quarter Trade Deficit 66 Constitution Panel ‘Independent’ 66 NPA Leader Killed 67 New Manila Airport Manager 67 New Envoy to New Zealand 67 NBI Agents to Surrender Orders 68 Sin Urged To Oppose Overtures 68 Coconut Authority Resignations 68 Japanese Delegation Arrives 69 Group Opposes Cordillera Autonomy 69 Move To Increase President's Salary 69 Concom [fo Abolish Death Penalty 70 Editorial on Media Constraints 70 Deputy Trade, Industry Ministers 71 Air Force To Purchase 24 Jets 71 Human Rights Instruction 71 Argentine President To Visit 71 Former CPP Leader Gets Award 72 THALLAND Army Calls Candidate Koson a Communist (S LAM RAT, 5 Jun 86) ese ee eee eeeeaeeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeee 73 Farmers Meet Prince: No Party, No Policies Announced (SLAM RAT, 2 Jun 86) eeeeeereee eee eer eee eee eeee ee eeer eee eeeeeee 75 Briefs Foreign Ministry Talks With Libyan Envoy 77 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA Ambassador Delivers Address on KPRP Anniversary (Tep Henn; Hanoi Domestic Service, 28 Jun 86) .............. 78 VIETNAM MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY Defense of Coastal Border District Described (VNA, 6 Jul 86) eevee eeeeeeee ee eee eeeeeeeee ee eee ee ee eee ereee 81 Briefs Infantry Institute's Anniversary 83 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID Vietnamese-Soviet Labor Cooperation Agreement Is 5 Years Old (HALPHONG, 3 Apr 86) eeeeeeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee ee B4 o@- 68 PRK Military Attache Makes Statement on Army Day (Hing Lang; Hanoi Domestic Service, 18 Jun 86) ....eceeeees VNA Carries SPK Commentary on ASEAN Conference (VNA, 8 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eee eeee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeee Briefs Sports Teams to Moscow Soviet Legal Workers Visit Congratulations to Mongolian Officials Agricultural Deiegation to Czechoslovakia Algerians Greeted on National Day Japanese History Distortion Condemned Greetings to Albania KPRP Propaganda Cadres Delegation UN Envoy Condemns U.S. Contra Aid Pham Van Dong Message to Asian Conference PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT Directive on Party's Leadership of Youth Work Issued (HAI PHONG, 26 Mar 86) eee eeeveeeeeeeeeeee eee eee eeeeeeeeeee Briefs Qui Nhon Municipality Party Resolution Implementation Reviewed Provincial Agriculture Lauded ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE Briefs Credit Cooperatives Nationwide Lam Dong Economic Zone New Economic Zone in Phu Khanh AGRICULTURE Hanoi Reviews Late June Agricultural Activities (Hanoi Domestic Service, 30 Jun 86) .ccccccccccceccececeees Briefs Kien Giang Rice Procurement Northern Provinces Grain Delivery Tay Ninh Winter-Spring Rice Thanh Hoa Grain Thai Binh Winter-Spring Rice HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION Briefs Vung Tau Oil Well 69 87 99 99 101 103 103 103 103 104 105 /9987 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS Ceremony Marks 20th Anniversary of Maritime College (HAIPHONG, 3 Apr 86) see eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeree LABOR Trade Unions Circular Marks Anniversary (Hanoi Domestic Service, 2 Jul 86) .ccccccccccccccccecceces SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Conference Reviews Scientific, Technical Work (Hanoi Domestic Service, 5 Jul 86) .cccccccccccccccccccesces CHRONOLOGY Chronology Given for 16 Feb-15 Mar 86 (VIETNAM COURIER, Apr 86) sere eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeef 70 106 108 109 110 JPRS-SEA-86-126 28 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA Expanding USSR Fishing Agreements in Pacific Prompt Concern (Editorial, THE AUSTRALIAN, 21-22 Jun 86) eee ee eee eee eeee Former RAN Officer on Risks of U.S. Ship Visits (Edmund Doogue; THE ACE, 26 Jun 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeer eee Ambassador Urges U.S. To Respect Canberra's Interests (Samuel Washington; THE AUSTRALIAN, 30 Jun 86) .......++5. Hayden Calls for Tribunal To Judge Pol Pot (Cameron Forbes; THE AUSTRALIAN, 27 Jun 86) seeneeeeeeeeeee Party Factionalism, Unions Threaten PM's Economic Strategy (Paul Austin; THE AUSTRALIAN, 23 Jun 86) eeeeeeneeeneeeeneere Hawke Adviser Interviewed on ALP Factionalism (Graham Richardson Interview; THE WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN, 28-29 Jun 86) see eeaeaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeee eee Role, Impact of Socialist Forum Analyzed (Paul Austin; THE AUSTRALIAN, 23 Jun 86) eeeereeeeeeeeeeeee Educator Hits ‘New Right’ Threat Against Unions (Alex carey; THE AUSTRALIAN, 27 Jun 86) eeeneeretceeeeeeneneneeee Military Objections to OTH Radar Reported (Peter Young; THE AUSTRALIAN, 23 Jum 86) .. Defense Establishment Criticizes Dibb Report (Peter Young; THE AUSTRALIAN, 25 Jum 86) ..scceeeeeeeeeees Finance Department Figures Show $800 Million Deficit Growth (Robert Garran; THE AGE, 21 Jun 86) see eveaeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 71 13 16 18 22 Federal Treasurer Outlines Long-Term Economic Strategy (Paul Keating; THE AUSTRALIAN, 21-22 Jun 86) ere ee eee eeeee Editorial Urges Industry To Resist Protectionism (THE AGE, 20 Jun 86) eee eer ee eee wwe eee eee eee ee ee eee ee ee eee WA Premier's Economic Measures Analyzed, Lauded (Editorial; THE AUSTRALIAN, 25 Jun 86) se ere eeeeeee ese eeeee Coal Cancellation Cuts Exports to Israel by 66 Percent (Douglas Davis; THE AUSTRALIAN, 25 Jun 86) ......... occcce PHILIPPINES Ople Writes About Good Government Commission (Blas F. Ople; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 1 Jul 86) ........ Columnist on Critical Period for Aquino Government (Amando Doronila; THE MANILA CHRCNICLE, 1 Jul 86) ........ Solicitor General Produces Evidence of Marcos Graft (Gerry N. Zaragoza; BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) ......eeeee-s Commission Denies Request on Marcos Return (Gerry N. Zaragoza; BUSINESS DAY, 4 Jul 86) ...cseeeccecns Local Government Officials’ Terms Expire (Rey G. Panaligan; MANILA BULLETIN, 1 Jul 86) .......500: Columnist on Military's Power Over Civilians (Amando Doronila; THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 2 Jul 86) ........ Graft, Smuggling Reported in Customs Bureau (BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) eee eee eee ee eee eee eee eer eer eee eee Government Agrees To Lift All Import Restrictions (Daniel Cc. Yu; BUSINESS DAY, 27 Jun 86) eee epeeeeeeeeeeeeee Government To Retaliate Against Import Controls (THE MANILA TIMES, 27 Jun 86) “ee eeeeeeeeeeneeeeeneeeeeeeeee Business Sees No Change in Economic Policy (Daniel C. Yu; BUSINESS DAY, 1 Jul 86) ...cceeeseeess TITT Coconut Planters Bank Elects New Board (Ramon R. Isberto; BUSINESS DAY, 1 Jul 846) se eee eee see eeee Lack of Coconut Export Taxes Could Reduce Revenue (Carol E. Espiritu; BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) ...... —RXX Coconut Authority Seeks Cocofed Sequestration (BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) eeeneaeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeee se eereeeeeee » bec 72 24 29 31 32 35 37 39 41 44 46 51 53 57 59 61 Article Reviews Dispute Over Coconut Bank (Ramon R. Isberto; BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) eseeeeeeeeneneeeeee 63 24 Corporations Petition Supreme Court Over Sequestration (R. Panaligan; MANILA BULLETIN, 2 Jul 86) ......ceeceeeee++ 66 "Economic Indicator’ Column on Central Bank Loans (BUSINESS DAY, 2 Jul 86) see ereeneeneeneeneneneeeneneeeneeeneeneeneneeeese 68 Drop in Peso to Dollar Rate, Averages Reported (BUSINESS DAY, 3 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeneeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 70 COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA VODK Commentary Hails Control of Angkor Wat Area (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 19 Jun 86) .....eeeeeeeeees 73 Sihanouk Army Official Discusses Resistance (Jacques Bakaert; BANGKOK POST, 27 Jun 86) .....eeeeeseeees 75 VODK Applauds ICK Ad Hoc Committee Statement (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 29 Jun 86) .........-. ecccece 78 VODK: 300 SRV Troops Desert From Sisophon Battlefield (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 29 Jun 86) ......eeeeeeeees 80 VODK Condemns SRV Rejection of ASEAN's Call (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 1 Jul 86) ........+.. scoccce§8= 6 GS VONADK Rounds Up SRV Casualties for June (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 1 Jul 86) seeeeeeeneneeneneneeneneneeeeeneeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee se ee © 83 Roundup of VONADK Battle Reports 26 Jun-3 Jul (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 27 Jun-3 Jul 86) eee eeneeeeeneneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee © 85 VODK Reviews DK Forces’ Activities in Kompong Thom (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 5 Jul 86) eeeeeaeeeeeeeeeeee 87 VODK Cites UN Official Blaming SRV Stubbornness (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 6 Jul 86) ...ccececeseeeses 89 VODK Reviews DK Forces’ Rainy Season Activities (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 7 Jul 86) ...ceccceceeseeee YI VODK Commentary on Coming Nonaligned Summit (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea, 8 Jul 86) ...ceccccceeseeee 93 SFRY's Mojsov Sends Message of Thanks to Khieu Samphan (Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, 8 Jul 86) eevee eee eee eee eee e eee eee eee eee eeeee eee eee eeeeenee 95 - ¢C¢ = 73 briefs VONADK: Soldiers Mutiny 96 VONADK: SRV Convoy Ambushed 96 VONADK: Sandan District Capital Hit 96 VIETNAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE, AND AID USSR Journal Interviews Nguyen Co Thach (PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, No 5, May 86) ...cceeseeeeees 97 /7310 JPRS-SEA-86-127 29 JULY 1986 SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT CONTENTS AUSTRALIA . Increasing Food Importation Prompts Official Concern (THE LAND, 26 Jun 86) eseeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © 1 Prime Minister's Appeal, by Vernon Graham l Editorial Offers Lessons 2 Weekly on U.S. Penetration of Wheat Market (Peter Hemphill; THE LAND, 26 Jun 86) ..ccccccccccccceecess 4 Elders Plans for BHP Bid Revealed (Graham Reilly; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 27 Jun 86) ..... 5 CRA Backs Away From BHP Stake (Christopher Webb; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 28 Jun 86) 6 Status of Union-Employer Superannuation Talks (Matthew Moore; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 28 Jun 86) ..... 7 Current Industrial Harmony Analyzed (Peter Hartcher; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 28 Jun 86) .... J Rural Role of National Party, Farmers’ Federation Analyzed (Peter Hartcher; THE SYDNEY MORNING FERALD, 28 Jun 86) .... 10 Paper's Quarterly Economic Update ‘Gloomy’ for Government (Peter Freeman; THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 28 Jun 86) ..... 12 U.S. Investment Firm's Economic Policy Endorsement Lauded (lan Cassie; TPE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 28 Jun 86) ......4. 4 75 INDONESIA Suharto Meets With SCS Executives (ANTARA WEWS BULLETIN, 3 Jun 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeereeere 15 Governor Says Transmigration Improves Welfare of Irianese (ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN, 4 Jun 86) seer eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeee 17 Suharto Calls for Diversification of People's Diet (BUSINESS NEWS , 6 Jun 86) eseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 18 More Business Sectors Open for Investment in 1986 (BUSINESS NEWS, 6 Jun 86) eeee ee ee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeereeeee 20 Briefs Counter-Purchase Trade Expansion 22 Pertamina Meets Domestic Oil Needs 22 Increased Australian Mining Investment 23 Bank Credit for Foreign Companies 23 PHILIPPINES MANILA TIMES Examines Philippine-American Friendship Day (Editorial; THE MANILA TIMES, 4 Jul 86) eee eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 24 Philippine-American Friendship Day ‘Aberration’ (Editorial; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 4 Jul 86) ..ccceeeeeese 25 ‘Specialness’ of Relations With U.S. Questioned (Danilo-Luis M. Mariano; PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, 4 Jul 86) eseeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeeeeeee ee ee eee eereeeee ee eee ee eee 26 Editorial Sees Tradeoffs in Aquino's U.S. Visit (THE MANILA EVEN ING POST, 5 Jul 86) eseeeeereereeeeeeeeeeeeeee 28 U.S. Military Bases Termed Major Issue (THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 5 Jul 86) eseeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee © 29 Government, Sabah To Sign Joint Venture Agreement (Mike Alunan; MANILA BULLETIN, 8 Jul 86) sere eeereeeeereeeee 31 Enrile Resigns Coconut Bank Chairmanship (Noel D. de Luna; BUSINESS DAY, l Jul 86) see eeeeeeeeeeeeee 33 Laurel Appeals to Multilateral Institutions (Dave M. Gomez; THE NEWS HERALD, 4 Jul 86) ..cccccccccceees§ 35 Columist on ‘Cult’ of Marcos Loyalists (Petronilo Bn. Daroy; THE MANILA CHRONICLE, 5 Jul 86) ..... 37 Marcos Claims Welcome in Three African Countries (AFP, 5 Jul 86) serene eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseseeeeeeeeee eee eee ee 49 = b o@ 76 Loyalists Accuse Aquino of ‘Fear’ Over Marcos’ Return (Fil Viduya; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 5 Jul 86) Columnist Calls for Presidential Elections (Gerry S. Espina; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 5 Jul 86) ...... PCGG Commissioner Discusses Former ‘Oligarchs' (Ellen Tordesillas; ANG PAHAYAGANG MALAYA, 29 Jun 86) ..... PCGG Ownership, Voting Authority Increased (Rodolfo V. Brul; THE NEW PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS, 28 Jun 86) eeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee eee e eee eee e eee ee eee eeeeeeee Ople Condemns Commission's Expanded Powers (BUS LNESS DAY, 30 Jun 86) see eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee ee eeeeee Paper Examines New Powers Granted to PCGG (Stella Marie R. Tirol; BUSINESS DAY, 30 Jun 86) .......+.- Employers, KBL Concerned Over PCGG Powers (Manila Far East Broadcasting Company, 2 Jul 86) ......64+. Columnist Questions PCGG Actions Against UBPC (Mat Defensor; THE MANILA EVENING POST, 4 Jul 86) ......+.:. Editorial Questions Unicameral Body Vote (THE MANILA EVENING POST, 7 Jul 86) eseeeeeeereeeeeeeeeeeeeee Paper Examines Public Forums on Constitution (Editorial; THE NEWS HERALD, 7 Jul 86) seer eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee Editorial on Banning Torture of Rebels (MANILA BULLETIN, 5 Jul 86) eeeeeeeeeeereee eee eeeeeee ee eeree Editorial Attacks NPA ‘Intransigence' (PHILIPPINE DALLY INQUIRER, 5 Jul 86) Cee eee eee Report Views Re
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	4	https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/laos-1954-present/	en	37. Laos (1954-present)	https://uca.edu/news/fil…8/02/fb-logo.jpg	https://uca.edu/news/fil…8/02/fb-logo.jpg	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=774198289621670&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=1071138966728264&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://uca.edu/politicalscience/wp-content/themes/ursidae/images/logo.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://uca.edu/politicalscience/wp-content/themes/ursidae/images/favicon.ico		https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/asiapacific-region/laos-1954-present/	Crisis Phase (December 29, 1954-July 27, 1959): Laos formally achieved its independence from France on December 29, 1954. The International Commission on Supervision and Control (ICSC-Laos I) chaired by India, which was established on August 11, 1954, continued to oversee and report on the implementation of the Geneva Accords. The ICSC-Laos I consisted of 96 military and civilian personnel from Canada (32), Poland (32), and India (32). Legislative elections were held in December 1955, and the Laotian Progressive Party (LPP) won 22 out of 39 seats in the National Assembly. The Laotian Independent Party (LIP) headed by Phoui Sananikone won seven seats in the National Assembly. The Pathet Lao (Lao Homeland) claimed election fraud. The French government provided military assistance (military advisors and training) to the government beginning in January 1955. The U.S. provided economic and military assistance to the government beginning in January 1955. The Lao People’s Party (LPP), later renamed the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), was established with Kaysone Phomvihane as General-Secretary on March 22, 1955. Prince Souvanna Phouma was selected as prime minister by the National Assembly on August 25, 1957. The Neo Lao Hak Sat was established in 1957. Legislative elections were held on May 4, 1958, and the Rally of the Lao People (Lao Luam Lao), which was formed as a result of a merger of the Laotian Nationalist Party (LNP) and the LIP, won 36 out of 59 seats in the National Assembly. The ICSC-Laos I was disbanded on July 20, 1958. The Neo Lao Hak Sat won nine seats in the National Assembly. Prime Minister Phouma resigned on July 23, 1958, and Phoui Sananikone formed a government as prime minister on August 19, 1958. North Vietnamese government troops intervened in support of the Pathet Lao in December 1958. The U.S. government provided military assistance (military technicians) to the government beginning in January 1959. Conflict Phase (July 28, 1959-June 12, 1962): Pathet Lao rebels and North Vietnamese troops launched a military offensive against government troops (Royal Lao Army – RLA) in northern Laos beginning on July 28, 1959. The government declared a state-of-emergency in Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces on August 4, 1959. On September 3, 1959, the Laotian government accused North Vietnam of aggression after Pathet Lao rebels and North Vietnamese troops captured several villages in northern Laos. The Laotian government referred the matter to the United Nations (UN) Security Council on September 4, 1959. The UN Security Council established a four-member commission of inquiry (Argentina, Italy, Japan, Tunisia) headed by Shinichi Shibusawa of Japan on September 7, 1959. King Sisavang Phoulivong (Sisavang Vong) died on October 29, 1959, and Crown Prince Savang Vatthana was formally proclaimed King on November 4, 1959. The UN commission of inquiry issued a report on November 6, 1959, which suggested that it could not find evidence that North Vietnamese troops had crossed the border into Laos. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold appointed Sakari Tuomioja of Finland as special envoy to the country on November 15, 1959. Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone resigned on December 31, 1959, and Kou Abhay formed a government as prime minister on January 7, 1960. Edouard Zellweger of Switzerland replaced Sakari Tuomioja as the UN special envoy on March 1, 1960. Legislative elections were held on April 24 and May 8, 1960, and right-wing candidates won 59 out of 59 seats in the National Assembly. Prime Minister Kou Abhay resigned on May 30, 1960, and Prince Tiao Somsanith formed a coalition government as prime minister on June 2, 1960. Prime Minister Nosavan was overthrown in a military rebellion led by Captain Kong Le on August 9, 1960. In opposition to the military rebellion, General Phoumi Nosavan declared martial law on August 10, 1960. UN Special Envoy Edouard Zellweger mediated an agreement among the political factions on August 31, 1960, which resulted in the formation of a government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma on September 2, 1960. Government troops and right-wing rebels commanded by General Phoumi Nosavan clashed near Paksane on September 20-22, 1960, resulting in the deaths of 30 rebels and one government soldier. General Phoumi Nosavan’s troops bombarded the capital of Vientiane on December 13-15, 1960, resulting in the deaths of some 500 civilians and 17 soldiers under the command of Captain Kong Le. Captain Kong Le’s troops withdrew from Vientiane on December 16, 1960. The Soviet Union provided military assistance (44 transport aircraft and military supplies) to Captain Kong Le’s faction in December 1960. A coalition consisting of Captain Kong Le’s neutralist troops and Pathet Lao rebels launched a military offensive against government troops in northern Laos on January 1, 1961. The government of Thailand provided military assistance (T-6 military aircraft) to the government beginning on January 3, 1961. Prince Boun Oum formed a government as prime minister on January 4, 1961. The Chinese government provided military assistance (weapons and ammunition) to Pathet Lao rebels beginning in 1961. The U.S. government provided additional military assistance (T-6 observation planes and helicopters) to the government on January 9, 1961. Pathet Lao rebels captured Ta Viang on January 14, 1961, and government troops captured Vang Vieng on January 16-17, 1961. President John Kennedy of the US appealed for a ceasefire on January 22, 1961. Pathet Lao rebels launched a military offensive against the government on March 9, 1961. Britain and the Soviet Union jointly appealed for a ceasefire on April 24, 1961. The US provided additional military assistance (emergency airlift of weapons) in support of the government on April 26, 1961. On May 1, 1961 the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC – Laos II) was established to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos. ICSC – Laos II consisted of 22 military personnel from Canada, India, and Poland. The Laotian government and Pathet Lao agreed to a cessation of military hostilities on May 13, 1961. U.S. President John Kennedy mobilized naval ships in a display of military force in the Gulf of Siam, and mobilized some 5,000 troops in Thailand on May 12, 1962. The Swiss government facilitated negotiations involving 14 countries (Britain, France, Soviet Union, US, China, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Burma, India, Thailand, Canada, and Poland) chaired by Britain and the Soviet Union in Geneva, Switzerland beginning on May 16, 1962. Government and Pathet Lao representatives signed a peace agreement in Khang Khay on June 12, 1962, which provided for the formation of a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. Some 5,000 individuals were killed during the conflict. Post-Conflict Phase (June 13, 1962-April 26, 1964): The Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos was signed by the participants of the 14-nation conference on July 23, 1962, which provided for the neutrality of Laos and the withdrawal of troops from Laos to be monitored by the ICSC-Laos II. U.S. troops began withdrawing from Laos on September 17, 1962, and some 800 U.S. military advisors and technicians completed their withdrawal from the country on October 7, 1962. Prince Souvanna Phouma formed a provisional government as prime minister in 1962. Neutralist troops commanded by General Kong Le and Pathet Lao rebels clashed in the Plaine des Jarres region on March 30-April 13, 1963, resulting in the deaths of 200 individuals. The British, Soviet, and U.S. governments appealed for a ceasefire in April 1963. Pathet Lao rebels captured Ban Kosi on April 16, 1963. Pathet Lao rebels and right-wing troops clashed in Savannakhet province on April 25, 1963, resulting in the deaths of 20 rebels. The North Vietnamese government provided military assistance (weapons and military advisors), and deployed some 67,000 troops in support of the Pathet Lao beginning in January 1964. Pathet Lao rebels and right-wing troops clashed in north-central Laos on January 3, 1964, resulting in the deaths of 128 government soldiers. Pathet Lao rebels and North Vietnamese troops captured Na Kay from neutralist troops on January 23-31, 1964. The coalition government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma was overthrown in a right-wing military rebellion led by General Kouprasith Abhay on April 19, 1964, resulting in the deaths of two individuals. The British, French, and U.S. governments expressed opposition to the military rebellion on April 19, 1964, and the Soviet government condemned the military rebellion on April 20, 1964. Some 500 individuals were killed in political violence between May 1961 and April 1964. Conflict Phase (April 27, 1964-February 22, 1973): Pathet Lao rebels resumed military hostilities against the government on April 27, 1964. The governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union appealed for a ceasefire on April 29, 1964. The governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union jointly condemned the military rebellion on May 1, 1964. Prince Souvanna Phouma was restored as prime minister on May 2, 1964. The US deployed military aircraft against Pathet Lao rebels beginning in May 1964, and some 1,000 US military advisors were deployed in support of the government in May 1964. The Chinese government provided some 70,000 logistical and construction troops in support of the Pathet Lao from 1964 to 1975, and some 21,000 Chinese troops (anti-aircraft artillery forces) were deployed in support of the Pathet Lao from August 1969 to November 1973. South Vietnam provided military assistance and troops in support of the Laotian government. The government of Thailand provided military assistance in support of the Laotian government, and deployed some 15,000 troops in support of the Laotian government. France facilitated negotiations between government and Pathet Lao representatives in Paris in 1964, and the parties ended negotiations in Paris in October 1964. Government troops and Pathet Lao rebels resumed military hostilities on October 15, 1964. Government troops suppressed a right-wing military rebellion led by Colonel Bounleuth Sykosy on January 31-February 16, 1965, resulting in the deaths of 79 individuals. The U.S. government expressed support for the government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma on February 7, 1965. The government of Indonesia provided military assistance to the Laotian neutralist troops led by General Kong Le beginning on August 11, 1965. Legislative elections were held on July 18, 1965, and the National Assembly convened on August 16, 1965. The National Assembly was dissolved on October 7, 1966. The Laotian government suppressed a military rebellion led by Brigadier-General Thao Ma on October 21-22, 1966, resulting in the deaths of some 30 individuals. Government troops, supported by U.S. Air Force planes, attacked Pathet Lao troops in the Plaine des Jarres and Xieng Khoang regions. Some 200 U.S. military personnel were killed in Laos between January 1959 and December 1969, and some 270 Chinese soldiers were killed in Laos from 1964 to 1975. Pathet Lao rebels and North Vietnamese troops launched a military offensive against government troops in the Plaine des Jarres region on February 11, 1970. Laotian government troops and U.S. military aircraft launched a military offensive against Pathet Lao rebels in the Plaine des Jarres region on January 7, 1972. Laotian government and Pathet Lao representatives held negotiations beginning on October 17, 1972. Laotian government and Pathet Lao representatives signed a ceasefire agreement in Vientiane on February 21, 1973, and the ceasefire went into effect on February 22, 1973. Some 25,000 individuals were killed, and some 400,000 individuals were internally-displaced during the conflict. Post-Conflict Phase (February 23, 1973-December 31, 1975): Government troops suppressed a military rebellion led by Brig.-General Thao Ma on August 20-21, 1973, resulting in the deaths of some 20 individuals. The 12-member Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) headed by Prime Souvanna Phouma and the 42-member Joint National Political Council (JNPC) headed by Prince Souphanouvong were established on April 5, 1974. Thai troops completed their withdrawal from the country on June 1, 1974. U.S. government military advisors completed their withdrawal from the country on June 3, 1974. ICSC-Laos II was disbanded on June 30, 1974. The government decided to dissolve the National Assembly on July 10, 1974, but the National Assembly was not dissolved until April 13, 1975. King Savang Vatthana abdicated on November 29, 1975. The Kingdom of Laos was abolished, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Laos (PDRL) was proclaimed with Prince Souphanouvong as president on December 2, 1975. Kaysone Phomvihan, secretary-general of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), formed a government as prime minister on December 4, 1975. The U.S. government imposed economic sanctions (trade embargo) against the government in December 1975. Some 200,000 Hmong tribesmen fled as refugees to Thailand. Conflict Phase (January 1, 1976-January 31, 1992): Hmong tribesmen launched an insurgency against the government beginning in January 1976. Government troops, supported by some 40,000 Vietnamese troops, launched military offensives against Hmong tribesmen in Xieng Khouang province from October 1977 to November 18, 1978, resulting in the deaths of some 5,000 individuals. The World Bank provided reconstruction assistance to the government between December 27, 1977 and June 30, 1997. Former Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone and other right-wing exiles established the Royal Government of Free Laos in Perpignan, France on October 14, 1978. Some 350,000 Laotians fled as refugees to Thailand and other countries between 1975 and 1982. The Chinese government provided military assistance (arms and military training) to the Hmong tribesmen in 1979 and 1980. The London-based human rights non-governmental organization, Amnesty International, condemned the Laotian government on April 16, 1980. General Vang Pao, a member of the Hmong tribe, established the Lao National Liberation Front (LNLF) in 1981. The UNLF headed by General Phoumi Nosavan formed the Royal Lao Democratic Government in Bangkok, Thailand on August 18, 1982. Hmong insurgents attacked and killed some 40 Vietnamese and government soldiers in Saravane province in southern Laos on May 14, 1984. President Souphanouvong stepped down due to ill health, and Phoumi Vongvichit was appointed as Acting President on October 31, 1986. Elections for district councils were held on June 26, 1988, and elections for provincial councils were held on November 20, 1988. Legislative elections were held on March 26, 1989, and the LPRP won 55 out of 79 seats in the Supreme People’s Assembly. Some Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from the country in 1988. The National Assembly adopted a new constitution, and elected Kaysone Phomvihan as president on August 14, 1991. Laotian government troops and Hmong insurgents clashed near Vientiane in January 1992. Some 100,000 Hmong tribesmen died as a result of government policies between 1975 and 1992. Post-Conflict Phase (February 1, 1992-present): President Phomvihan died on November 21, 1992, and Nouhak Phoumsavan was elected president by the National Assembly on November 25, 1992. Legislative elections were held on December 20, 1992, and the LPRP won 85 out of 85 seats in the National Assembly. A new constitution went into effect in 1994. Former president, Prince Souphanouvong, died on January 9, 1995. The U.S. government lifted economic sanctions (trade embargo) against the Laotian government in 1995. Legislative elections were held on December 21, 1997, and the LPRP won 99 out of 99 seats in the National Assembly. General Khamtai Siphandon of the LPRP was elected president by the National Assembly on February 24, 1998, and Sisavath Keobounphanh was approved as prime minister on February 24, 1998. Hmong tribesmen killed three individuals in Paxai district in Xieng Khouang province in October 1998. On July 3, 2000, Hmong insurgents attacked a government customs office in Vang Tao, resulting in the deaths of six insurgents. Legislative elections were held on February 24, 2002, and the LPRP won 108 out of 109 seats in the National Assembly. Hmong tribesmen killed ten individuals south of Vientiane on February 6, 2003. Hmong tribesmen killed twelve individuals on the border of Luang Prabang province and Viengchan province on April 20, 2003. Hmong tribesmen killed six individuals in northern Laos on June 7, 2003. Legislative elections were held on April 30, 2006, and the LPRP won 113 out of 115 seats in the National Assembly. The National Assembly elected Choummaly Sayasone as president on June 8, 2006. President Choummaly Sayasone appointed Bouasone Bouphavanh as prime minister on June 8, 2006. [Sources: Associated Press (AP), March 27, 2000, July 3, 2000, August 7, 2000, June 27, 2003; Banks and Muller, 1998, 520-524; Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997, 93; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997, 183-185; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), July 2, 2003; Butterworth, 1976, 240-246, 345-348; Clodfelter, 1992, 1127-1131; Degenhardt, 1988, 207-208; Donelan and Grieve, 1973, 106-111; Facts on File, January 1-11, 1961, January 12-18, 1961, April 27-May 3, 1961, June 7-13, 1962, October 11-17, 1962, April 4-10, 1963, April 11-17, 1963, January 9-15, 1964, January 30-February 5, 1964, April 16-22, 1964, April 23-29, 1964, May 14-20, 1964, January 28-February 3, 1965, February 4-10, 1965, August 26-September 1, 1965, October 20-26, 1966, February 18-24, 1973, August 19-25, 1973; Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), January 1, 1970; Jessup, 1998, 416-418; Keesing’s Record of World Events, July 25-August 1, 1959, September 12-19, 1959, December 5-12, 1959, December 26, 1959-January 2, 1960, February 6-13, 1960, June 11-18, 1960, October 29-November 5, 1960, August 24-31, 1963, December 3-10, 1966, July 18-25, 1970, May 29-June 5, 1971, April 16-22, 1973, April 22-28, 1974, August 18-24, 1975, January 30, 1976, November 20, 1981, March 1989, August 1991, November 1992, December 1992, December 1997, February 1998; Langer, 1972, 1332-1334; LeBar and Suddard 1960; New York Times, May 27, 1984; San Francisco Chronicle, June 14, 2003; Rovine, 1970, 305-309; Time Magazine, April 28, 2003; Wainhouse, 1966, 390-393, 501-512; Weisburd, 1997, 179-182; Zhang, 2002, 1141-1166.] Selected Bibliography Adams, Nina S. 1970. “Patrons, Clients, and Revolutionaries: The Lao Search for Independence, 1945-1954,” In Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, editors. Laos: War and Revolution. New York and London: Harper & Row, Publishers. LeBar, Frank M. and Adrienne Suddard, editors. 1960. Laos: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. New Haven, CT: Hraf Press. Zasloff, Joseph J. and Leonard Unger. 1991. Laos: Beyond the Revolution. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	78	https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Lao-People-s-Democratic-Republic-HISTORY.html	en	Lao People's Democratic Republic			[ "https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/bs/i/nations-sm.png", "https://a.advameg.com/matomo.php?idsite=4&rec=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			null	Although archaeological evidence indicates that settlers along the Mekong had learned agriculture, metallurgy, and pottery making by 3000 BC , little is known about the early history of the land that today bears the name of Laos. The lowland Lao are believed to be the descendants of Thai tribes that were pushed southward in the 8th century. According to tradition, the kingdom called Lan Xang ("a million elephants") was established in 756 by King Thao Khoun Lo. In 1353, it was reunified by Fa-Ngoum, who had been raised at the court of Angkor in Kampuchea and returned with a force of Khmer troops. He is also credited with the introduction of Hinayana Buddhism into Laos. Lan Xang waged intermittent wars with the Khmers, Burmese, Vietnamese, and Thai and developed an effective administrative system, an elaborate military organization, and an active commerce with neighboring countries. In 1707, internal dissensions brought about a split of Lan Xang into two kingdoms, Luangphrabang in the north (present-day upper Laos) and Vientiane in the south (lower Laos). Strong neighboring states took advantage of this split to invade the region. Vientiane was overrun and annexed by Siam (Thailand) in 1828, while Luangphrabang became a vassal of both the Chinese and the Vietnamese. In 1893, France, which had already established a protectorate over what is now central and northern Vietnam, extended its control to both Vientiane and Luangphrabang, and Laos was ruled by France as part of Indochina. Although French control over Luangphrabang took the nominal form of a protectorate, the French colonial administration directly ruled the rest of Laos, legal justification being ultimately provided in the Lao-French convention of 1917. During World War II, Laos was occupied by Japan. After the Japanese proclaimed on 10 March 1945 that "the colonial status of Indochina has ended," the king of Luangphrabang, Sisavang Vong, was compelled to issue a declaration of independence. The nationalist Free Lao (Lao Issarak) movement deposed the monarch soon after, but French forces reoccupied Laos, and on 27 August 1946, France concluded an agreement establishing him as king of Laos and reimposing French domination over the country. In May 1947, the king established a constitution providing for a democratic government. On 19 July 1949, Laos nominally became an independent sovereign state within the French Union. Additional conventions transferring full sovereignty to Laos were signed on 6 February 1950 and on 22 October 1953. All special economic ties with France and the other Indochinese states were abolished by the Paris pacts of 29 December 1954. In the meantime, Vietnamese Communist (Viet-Minh) forces had invaded Laos in the spring of 1953. A Laotian Communist movement, the Pathet Lao (Lao State), created on 13 August 1950 and led by Prince Souphanouvong, collaborated with the Viet-Minh during its Laotian offensive. Under the Geneva cease-fire of 21 July 1954, all Viet-Minh and most French troops were to withdraw, and the Pathet Lao was to pull back to two northern provinces, pending reunification talks with the national government under the leadership of Souvanna Phouma (Souphanouvong's half-brother). The negotiations were completed on 2 November 1957, and the Pathet Lao transformed itself into a legal political party called the National Political Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat). However, a political swing to the right that led to the ouster of Souvanna Phouma as prime minister, coupled with the refusal of the Pathet Lao forces to integrate into the Royal Lao Army, led to a renewal of fighting in May 1959. A bloodless right-wing coup in January 1960 was answered in August by a coup led by paratroops, under the command of Capt. Kong Le; in the ensuing turmoil, Souvanna Phouma returned to power. After a three-day artillery battle that destroyed much of Vientiane, right-wing military elements under Gen. Phoumi Nosavan and Prince Boun Oum occupied the capital on 11 December. A new right-wing government under Prince Boun Oum was established, but further military reverses, despite a heavy influx of US aid and advisers, caused the government to ask for a cease-fire in May 1961. An international conference assembled in Geneva to guarantee the cease-fire. All three Laotian political factions agreed on 11 June 1962 to accept a coalition government, with Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. On 23 July, the powers assembled at Geneva signed an agreement on the independence and neutrality of Laos, which provided for the evacuation of all foreign forces by 7 October. The United States announced full compliance, under supervision of the International Control Commission (ICC), set up in 1954. Communist forces were not withdrawn. Fighting resumed in the spring of 1963, and Laos was steadily drawn into the role of a main theater in the escalating Vietnam war. The Laotian segment of the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail emerged as a vital route for troops and supplies moving south from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), also known as North Vietnam, and was the target for heavy and persistent US bombing raids. While the Vientiane government was heavily bolstered by US military and economic support, the Pathet Lao received key support from the DRV, which was reported to have 20,000 troops stationed in Laos by 1974. Efforts to negotiate a settlement in Laos resumed with US backing in 1971, but a settlement was not concluded until February 1973, a month after a Vietnam peace agreement was signed in Paris. On 5 April 1974, a new coalition government was set up, with equal representation for Pathet Lao and non-Communist elements. Souvanna Phouma, 73 years old and in failing health, stayed on as prime minister, while Prince Souphanouvong was brought closer to the center of political authority as head of the newly created Joint National Political Council. The Pathet Lao had by this time asserted its control over three-fourths of the national territory. Following the fall of the US-backed regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia in April 1975, the Laotian Communists embarked on a campaign to achieve complete military and political supremacy in Laos. On 23 August, Vientiane was declared "liberated" by the Pathet Lao, whose effective control of Laos was thereby secured. On 2 December 1975, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) was established, with Prince Souphanouvong as president and Kaysone Phomvihan as prime minister. King Savang Vatthana abdicated his throne, ending the monarchy that had survived in Laos for 622 years. Elections for a new National Assembly were called for April 1976; however, voting was put off indefinitely, amid reports of civil unrest and sabotage. A Supreme People's Council was convened, meanwhile, with Prince Souphanouvong as chairman, and was charged with the task of drafting a new constitution. During the late 1970s, the Communists moved to consolidate their control and socialize the economy. Private trade was banned, factories were nationalized, and forcible collectivization of agriculture was initiated. "Reeducation" camps for an estimated 40,000 former royalists and military leaders were established in remote areas; as of 1986, the government maintained that almost all the inmates had been released, but Amnesty International claimed that about 5,000 remained. A 25-year friendship treaty with Vietnam, signed in July 1977, led to closer relations with that country (already signaled by the continued presence in Laos of Vietnamese troops) and with the former USSR, and also to the subsequent dismissal from Laos of all Chinese technicians and advisers. China, for its part, began to give support and training to several small antigovernment guerrilla groups. With the economy in 1979 near collapse, in part because of severe drought in 1977 and flooding in 1978, the Laotian government slowed the process of socialization and announced a return to private enterprise and a readiness to accept aid from the non-Communist world. Throughout the 1980s armed opposition to the government persisted, particularly from the Hmong hill tribe rebels. At the Fourth Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), in December 1986, a "new economic management mechanism" (NEM) was set up, aiming at granting increased autonomy in the management of formerly state-run enterprises to the private sector. In 1988 the Lao national legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), adopted new election laws and the first elections since the formation of the LPDR in 1975 were held. Local and provincial elections were held in 1988, and on 27 March 1989 national elections took place for an enlarged Supreme People's Assembly. In March 1991 the Fifth Party Congress of the LPRP changed Kaysone Phomvihan's title from prime minister to president, elected a new 11-member politburo, pledged to continue economic reforms in line with free-market principles while denying the need for political pluralism, and changed the national motto by substituting the words "democracy and prosperity" for "socialism." The newly elected SPA drafted a constitution adopted on 14 August 1991. The constitution provided for a national assembly functioning on principles of "democratic centralism," established the LPRP as the political system's "leading organ," created a presidency with executive powers, and mandated a market-oriented economy with rights of private ownership. President Kaysone Phomvihan, longtime LPRP leader, died on 21 November 1992. A special session of parliament on 24 November 1992 elected hard-line Communist Nouhak Phoumsavan as the next president. Gen. Khamtai Suphandon, who had been prime minister since 15 August 1991, remained in that post. National Assembly elections were held in December 1992. One day before these elections, three former officials who called for a multiparty democracy and had been detained in 1990 were sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. The National Assembly convened in February 1993 and approved government reorganization designed to improve public administration. On 9 January 1995, longtime leader Prince Souphanouvong died, unofficially marking an end to Laos' long dalliance with hard-line Marxism. Although the NEM had initiated an opening up to international investment and improved relations with the rest of the world, there remained elements of the old guard in positions of power. With the death of Souphanouvong, the only old-time hard-line Marxist still in power as of 1996 was the country's president, Nouhak Phoumsavan. Khamtai Siphandon, prime minister and party chief, was more powerful than Nouhak and is largely credited with exerting a moderating influence on the hardliner. Nonetheless, there remains a strongly conservative mindset among the politboro members that still pulls the government back from economic flexibility or any hint of political liberalization. Laos has actively improved its already "special relations" with Vietnam and Cambodia, while always seeking to improve relations with Thailand, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the United States. Periodic meetings are held to promote the cooperative development of the Mekong River region by Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Laos and the People's Republic of China restored full diplomatic relations in 1989 and are now full-fledged trading partners. Mutual suspicions, characterizing the relationship between Laos and Thailand, improved with agreements to withdraw troops and resolve border disputes, and agreements between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to repatriate or resettle nearly 60,000 Lao refugees in Thailand. Laos has cooperated with the United States in recovering the remains of US soldiers missing in action in Laos since the Vietnam War and in efforts to suppress drug-trafficking. The US Department of State objects to Laos' restrictions on free speech, freedom of assembly and religious freedom. US Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth commented in March 2000 that Laos is unlikely to gain Most Favored Nation trading status unless it accounts for the fate of two naturalized US citizens, Hmong activists who disappeared in Laos during 1999. The debate over whether to grant Laos normal trade relations status was ongoing as of early 2003. On 26 February 1998, Khamtai Siphandon was elected president, and he was reelected in March 2001. Beginning in 2000, Vientiane was hit by a series of bomb blasts, attributed to anti-government groups based abroad. Beginning in the late 1990s, tensions emerged between rival groups of ethnic Hmong in the highlands. Triggered by Thailand's closing of refugee camps on its side of the Laos-Thai border, tens of thousands of exiles were forced to return home. Most were expected to be jailed or executed for their anti-government activities, but instead, the government encouraged their peaceful settlement among the lowland population. Certain right-wing guerrilla factions among the Hmong, long fighting the Pathet Lao, subsequently reacted violently to the government's pacification efforts to integrate moderate Hmong villagers. On 6 February 2003 near Vang Vieng, a bus and 2 Western bicyclers were attacked by gunmen, who killed twelve people. Militant Hmong were blamed for the attack. On 24 February 2002, parliamentary elections were held, but all but one of the 166 candidates were from the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). The LPRP won 108 of 109 seats in the National Assembly.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	17	https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90t01298r000200290001-1	en	THE SOVIET SUCCESSION			[ "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Glyph-FOIA.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Menu-Close-NoBorder.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/modules/contrib/print/icons/print_icon.png", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/IG.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fb.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Tw.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Li.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/YT.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fl.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/favicon.ico		https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90t01298r000200290001-1	Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 29 March 1985 FB 85-10015 RRQ ud@ n(@P@A The Soviet Succession I1:I:CRO (NUMBER) I COPY m NON= MICROFILMED For D ?la EJ syy?y hm'up o Qoa&W huoQmUm 4gdo (C Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 This analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components. Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The Soviet Succession Foreword This is the second of two reports examining aspects of the transfer of the lead- ership of the Soviet Communist Party to Mikhail Gorbachev following CPSU General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's death on 10 March. Analysis Report FB 85-10009 of 11 March 1985, "Gorbachev: A Political Profile," reviewed the new general secretary's public statements and activities over the past 15 years to sketch a profile of his political views. This report focuses on the initial days of the new regime. Major portions of the foreign policy section of this report were compiled from articles previously published in the FBIS Trends of 13, 20, and 27 March 1985. The section on the new regime's treatment of China and Beijing's response appeared under separate cover as Analysis Report FB 85-10013 of 26 March 1985, "Sino-Soviet Relations: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change." Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Contents Highlights ........................................................................................................ 1 Emergence of Gorbachev ................................................................................ 2 Transfer of Power ............................................................................................ 4 Timing of Succession: Leadership Moves With Unusual Speed............ 4 CPSU Plenum: Nominating Speech Breaks With Past ........................ 5 Military Eclipse: The Symbols Were Missing ........................................ 8 New Regime .................................................................................................... 9 Leadership Rankings: Continuity on Top, Confusion Below ................ 10 Building a Coalition: Gorbachev's Allies and Opponents ...................... 11 Military Role: Evidence of Decline ........................................................ 15 New Dynamism in Foreign Policy .................................................................. 16 United States: Moderate Stance ............................................................ 18 West Europe: Stress on Improved Relations .......................................... 21 Japan: Evidence of Strains Predominates .............................................. 24 East Europe: Positive Image Projected .................................................. 26 China: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change .............................. 28 Indochina: Gorbachev Reassures Hanoi ................................................ 43 Korea: Pyongyang Seeks Improved Ties ................................................ 48 Cuba: New Signs of Strain Apparent .................................................... 50 Nicaragua: Cautious Support for Sandinista Regime ............................ 52 Nonruling Parties: Dissident Communists Cultivated .......................... 54 South Asia: Concern Over Afghan Conflict .......................................... 56 Middle East: Low Profile ........................................................................ 57 Africa: Ties With Allies Highlighted .................................................... 59 Media Behavior After Chernenko's Death ....................................................... 61 i Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1. Leadership Rankings at Lying-in-State ......................................... I... 63 2. Leadership Rankings at Chernenko Funeral in Red Square ............ 64 3. Meetings With Foreign Leaders ........................................................ 65 4. Full Names and Titles of Leaders ...................................................... 68 5. Media Behavior After Deaths of Chernenko, Andropov, and Brezhnev ..............................................................................................73 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 The Soviet Succession Highlights By all appearances, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected general secretary of the CPSU without any serious opposition at a CPSU plenum on 11 March. His el- evation closed the books on a long period of uncertainty during which the health of his predecessors and the succession question seemed to dominate Soviet domestic politics. The succession differed from the previous ones in significant respects-the speed with which it took place, the unusual nature of the speech by Foreign Minister Gromyko nominating Gorbachev, and the low profile of the military in the proceedings. The elevation of the youngest member of the Politburo to the post of general secretary is a major watershed in the transfer of power from the generation of Soviet leaders that rose in the party leadership under Stalin. Over the past three years most of the inner core of the leadership that ruled the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev regime has passed from the scene. In overseeing the completion of this transition, Gorbachev appears to be in a favorable position to build a solid base of power and move on to address domestic problems that his predecessors were unable to tackle. Despite the obligatory reaffirmation of continuity in foreign policy, Gorbachev gave early hints that he was prepared to try to accelerate changes begun under Chernenko and to take new initiatives in some areas that have long been neglected. At the same time, Gorbachev exhibited an energetic leadership style by meeting with an unprecedented number of foreign dignitaries at the Chernenko funeral. Gorbachev's most dramatic move was his meeting with the Chinese represen- tative-the first such meeting in more than 20 years. The new regime also in- dicated that it was prepared to look for ways to improve relations with the West and with former adversaries in the communist movement. Gorbachev's rhetorical restraint and the Soviet media's nonpolemical coverage of his meeting with Vice President Bush suggested that Moscow will continue the ef- fort begun under Chernenko to ease tensions with the United States. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Emergence of Gorbachev Mikhail Gorbachev rose to the post of general secretary in part by being at the right place at the right time, and he does not appear to have an independent base of political power. After serving as a full Politburo member for only two years and working only in agriculture, he emerged as a contender for the lead- ership of the party during the regime of Yuriy Andropov, who apparently turned to Gorbachev as one of the few young members of the Politburo and Secretariat who could help him gain control over the party apparatus. The public record of Gorbachev's advancement during this period suggests that Andropov relied increasingly upon the younger man as his own health deteriorated: ? In April 1983 Gorbachev's name began to appear with those of other senior Politburo members on obituaries for a wide range of officials, and he delivered the annual Lenin Day speech-an honor given to Andropov in 1982 and Chernenko in 1981. ? By June, when he helped install a new party leader in Leningrad and a new RSFSR premier, it was evident that he had assumed responsibility for the key area of personnel matters. ? In August 1983, shortly before Andropov was removed from public life by his illness, the general secretary symbolically gave Gorbachev special attention among the leaders of the new generation. Andropov and Gorba- chev were the only party leaders that addressed a meeting of older cadres at which Andropov made a special plea for orderly transfer of power and authority to younger leaders. When Andropov died in February 1984, the party leadership again put off handing over power to a member of the younger generation and turned instead to 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko, the senior-ranking member of the Secretariat. The transfer of power nevertheless involved another big boost for Gorbachev, who assumed most of the responsibilities Chernenko had been exercising as second secretary under Andropov without giving up any of his previous duties: ? He took over supervision of ideological matters from Chernenko, for example, succeeding him as chairman of the Politburo commission on education reform. 2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 ? He began playing a lead role in economic planning, addressing meetings on long-term planning in mid-1984. ? He succeeded Chernenko as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union and made a widely publicized trip to Britain in December 1984. By contrast, Grigoriy Romanov, the only other full Politburo member also in the Secretariat, and Gorbachev's chief rival in the succession, apparently assumed no new responsibilities outside his sphere of secu- rity matters and heavy industry. More- over, despite the vacancies in the Secretar- iat, no new secretaries were named, leaving Gorbachev a free hand. Gorbachev speaking at Chernenko funeral. (Soviet televi- sion 13 March 1985) Under Chernenko there were persisting signs that some members of the leadership were trying to slow Gorbachev's rise. There were inconsistencies in his ranking in the leadership throughout the period, and although he was ranked third-after Chernenko and Tikhonov-on many im- portant occasions, he sometimes appeared below Kremlin elders Gromyko, Ustinov, and Grishin. During October and November signs of resistance to Gorbachev increased, and for a brief period it appeared that Romanov was being advanced at Gorbachev's expense. At an 18 October award ceremony attended by the Politburo, Gorbachev appeared in an unusually low ranking position, while Romanov stood in Gorbachev's usual spot. During the same period Romanov played a much more active public role, while Gorbachev was conspicuously absent from several key leadership meetings. Gorbachev resumed a high profile in early December, and by the time of Chernenko's death on 10 March he was the best placed to succeed him. He was the second-ranking party secretary and was already exercising oversight responsibility for most key areas of party work. Foreign Minister Gromyko re- vealed in his nominating speech that Gorbachev had "led" the Secretariat and chaired Politburo sessions in Chernenko's absence. 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 The option of again turning to a member of the older generation had largely disappeared: Defense Minister Ustinov died in December; Premier Tikhonov is almost 80; 75-year-old Foreign Minister Gromyko has had no experience in domestic affairs; 70-year-old Moscow party leader Grishin, a more likely candidate, has never worked in the central party apparatus. Moreover, the deaths of Ustinov and Chernenko had significantly reduced the voting power of the older generation in the Politburo. Transfer of Power Departures from precedent during the leadership transition reveal something of the politics and character of the new regime. The transition took place much faster than after the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov, projecting an image of efficiency and suggesting that there was no serious opposition to Gorbachev's selection. Gromyko's unusual nominating speech was marked by a personal tone totally unlike the set-piece nominating addresses delivered at the two earlier plenums. The meager role of the military in the transition was also a break with the past. Timing of Succession: Leadership Moves With Unusual Speed The current transfer of power was faster than previous transitions in .a number of respects.' The announcement that Gorbachev would head Chernenko's funeral commission came earlier than the comparable announcements after the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov. In all three cases the person who would be named general secretary headed the commission, suggesting that the Politburo had discussed the decision about the new general secretary before the announcement was released. The CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev was convened hastily, the day after Chernenko's death, with the result that many Central Committee members not already in Moscow probably were unable to attend. Not even all the Politburo members were present- Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy was leading a parliamentary delegation to the United States and did not return to Moscow until the day af- ter the plenum. The plenum had been held one day later following the deaths of Brezhnev in 1982 and Stalin in March 1953, and three days later following Andropov's death last year. Chernenko's funeral was also held one day earlier than the ceremonies for Brezhnev and Andropov. ' Table 5 provides details on the timing of the last three Soviet successions. 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 CPSU Plenum: Nominating Speech Breaks With Past Gromyko phrased his nominating address in direct, colorful idiom totally unlike that normally used on formal party occasions. Unlike the nominating speeches for Andropov and Chernenko, delivered respectively by Chernenko and Tikhonov, Gromyko's speech was not publicized in Soviet mass media, al- though it was published in a pamphlet on the proceedings of the plenum, released on 14 March. Its intriguing statements about Gorbachev aside, the unique character of Gromyko's speech is apparent in the ways it differed from the nominating speeches in 1982 and 1984: ? Gromyko did not once mention Chernenko. By contrast, Tikhonov devoted half of his speech to praising Andropov before he nominated Chernenko, and Chernenko spent more than half of his nominating speech for Andropov praising former General Secretary Brezhnev. ? Gromyko claimed to be revealing the "content" and "atmosphere" of the Po- litburo meeting that selected Gorbachev to replace Chernenko. Previous nominating speeches included stock phrases about the Politburo's belief in the worthiness of the candidate, but otherwise did not purport to reflect the discussions among the top party leaders. Gromyko's accolades for Gorbachev were far different from the dry records of party service and qualities of character that were marshaled in speeches nominating Andropov and Chernenko. His emphasis on pragmatic qualities of intelligence and reason was so atypical of Soviet statements that it may have reflected his personal enthusiasm for Gorbachev. Other areas discussed in the speech-Gorbachev's abilities and attitudes in foreign affairs and security matters-may have been stressed by Gromyko not only because of his own ex- pertise in these fields but also because Gorbachev's public record and experience are so thin in these areas. Outlining what he presented as the view of the Politburo, Gromyko praised Gorbachev as a "man of principle" who speaks his mind directly, has a "keen profound intellect," and approaches problems analytically. Noting that poli- tics will "just stand still" without more than analysis, he also maintained that Gorbachev had demonstrated "many a time" in the Politburo and Secretariat that he also had the ability to draw conclusions. Appearing to suggest that Gorbachev would not be dogmatic, Gromyko maintained that he does not see 5 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 issues in terms of "black and white" but in "intermediate colors." At the same time, Gromyko described Gorbachev as a man of "strong convictions" who "states his position frankly," whether or not others agree. He also said the Po- litburo agreed that Gorbachev was gifted in organizational and communica- tion skills. ---- In the area of foreign policy, Gromyko spoke in more personal terms and used language apparently designed to allay mis- givings about Gorbachev's experience. He stated that by virtue of his own service it might be "clearer" to him than to "certain other comrades" that Gorbachev "grasps very well and rapidly the essence of the processes taking place outside our coun- try," and he added that Gorbachev had repeatedly drawn "correct, party conclu- sions" in foreign affairs. Gromyko also offered assurances about Gorbachev's views on defense, asserting that Gorbachev had argued at Politburo sessions that the Soviet Union must "keep its powder dry" Foreign Minister Gromyko at Cher- and that defense must be kept "at the nenko funeral. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985) necessary level." Going unusually far in acknowledging Soviet concern about the impact of the succession on world opinion, Gromyko also warned that the world was watching, looking for "cracks of some kind in the leadership." He affirmed that the Politburo was unanimous in the opinion that the leadership "will not allow our political opponents any satisfaction on this score." The Election In reporting the election of Gorbachev, the plenum communique published in Pravda used an unusual term in characterizing the decision as unanimous. Rather than the term used to describe the elections of Andropov and Chernenko, yedinoglasno (a unanimous vote), the communique used the less precise term yedinodushno, implying full agreement. Yedinodushno had been used to describe Brezhnev's reelection as general secretary at the plenums in 1971, 1976, and 1981 but has rarely been used in accounts of plenums in recent years. The implications of this terminology are not clear. The two terms have appeared to be used interchangeably on some occasions in the past-for example, at the conclusion of the 1981 CPSU congress Pravda on 4 March 6 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 used both terms to describe Brezhnev's election. At other times, there appears to have been a distinction: An account of the June 1983 Central Committee plenum contained in the plenum's stenographic report suggests that yedino- dushno means approval by acclamation rather than by vote. Chernenko, who was chairing the plenum, used both terms in describing approval for a draft resolution on the nomination of Andropov as Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman. Chernenko characterized the "stormy applause" that greeted the resolution as "unanimous (yedinodushnoye) acceptance" of the resolution. But he added, "In view of the importance of the question, I consider it advisable to have a vote." The plenum then approved the resolution yedinoglasno. Gorbachev's Gorbachev's plenum speech was more conventional Acceptance than Gromyko's nominating speech, assuring his audi- Speech ence of his commitment to collective decisionmaking and the maintenance of Soviet defense capabilities, as Chernenko and Andropov had done in their speeches to the plenums that elected them: ? On collectivity, Gorbachev pledged to implement policies "elaborated collectively" and appealed to the rest of the leadership, saying he was "counting on the support and active help of the Politburo members, candidate members, and Central Committee secretaries and of the party's Central Committee as a whole." Chernenko, in his acceptance speech, had similarly pledged that he would "exert every effort" to work "together" with other members of the leadership and would further advance "by collective efforts" the work initiated by Andropov. Andropov's acceptance speech is not known to have been publicized by Soviet media, but in his opening speech to the plenum he observed that "the collective wisdom of the party, its collective leadership" must play an important role in policymaking. ? On defense, Gorbachev pledged to maintain Soviet defenses "at a level such that any aggressors" will recognize that attempts to encroach on the security of the USSR or its allies "will be met with a crushing retaliatory strike." To accomplish this, he said, the armed forces would continue to receive "everything necessary." Chernenko had similarly pledged to "further see to it that our country's defense capability is strengthened so that we should have enough means to cool the hot heads of belligerent adventurists," calling this "a very substantial prerequisite for preserving peace." Andropov paid direct tribute to "the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces" as the 7 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Military leaders stand honor guard at Chernenko lying-in-state ceremony; left to right: Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev, Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Kulikov, General Staff Chief Akhromeyev, Defense Minister Sokolov. (Soviet television, 12 March 1985) only means of defending peace and implicitly promised to continue Brezhnev's policy of ensuring that defense capability meets "present-day requirements." Military Eclipse: The Symbols Were Missing The military played a sharply reduced role compared with the two previous transitions. Given the highly symbolic implications of the ceremonies sur- rounding successions, it is unlikely that the changes in the protocol of the fu- neral can be explained merely by the fact that the defense minister is no longer a member of the Politburo or by Chernenko's lack of military rank. The exclusion of the military comes in the wake of earlier indications of reduced military influence in the political leadership. The military's role in the public ceremonies has declined successively in each of the last three transfers of power: ? The military was most prominent at Brezhnev's funeral in November 1982 when Defense Minister Ustinov delivered a eulogy and was the only 8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Politburo member other than General Secretary Andropov to speak. The next four ranking senior officers-First Deputy Defense Ministers Ogarkov, Kulikov, Sokolov, and Main Political Directorate Chief Yepishev-were also present on the mausoleum with party leaders and the members of the funeral commission. ? At Andropov's funeral in February 1984, the military was given less symbolic importance. Ustinov shared the limelight with Foreign Minister Gromyko as supporting speakers at the funeral. Ogarkov, Kulikov, and Yepishev again stood on the mausoleum, but Sokolov was apparently away from Moscow. ? Military leaders had no role at Chernenko's funeral. Only civilians stood on the mausoleum and delivered eulogies. Defense Minister Sokolov was not even named to the funeral commission. (Ustinov was on the commissions for Brezhnev and Andropov along with all the other Moscow-based Politburo members.) By contrast, in 1953 Defense Minister Vasilevskiy was named to Stalin's funeral commission even though he was not a Politburo member. The military leaders' only public role during the Chernenko funeral was a brief appearance in the honor guard during a lying-in-state ceremony shown on television on 12 March. New Regime Gorbachev is in a highly favorable position to influence the composition of the top leadership. Additions to the Politburo and Secretariat over the past three years have not kept pace with departures, bringing the size of both bodies to their lowest levels in two decades; other leaders can be expected to depart soon.' In addition, Ustinov's replacement as defense minister is 73 and clearly intended to be an interim choice. As the party prepares for the 27th CPSU Congress in the coming year, Gorbachev will also be able to influence the composition of the Central Committee and the regional party leadership. An early indication of Gorbachev's political strength could be the handling of the chairmanship of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. When Gorbachev nominated Chernenko for the post in April 1984 he linked the 2 In the past three years nine Politburo and Secretariat members have died or resigned: Suslov, Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Rashidov, Kiselev, Pelshe, Andropov, Ustinov, and Chernenko. Many of the remaining members are old: Kuznetsov is 84, Ponomarev is 80, Tikhonov is 79, and Gromyko is 75; Kunayev, Solomentsev, Grishin, and Kapitonov are all in their early 70's. 9 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY office with that of general secretary, stating that it was in the national interest for the same person to hold both posts. He maintained that the Central Committee, proceeding from the interests of Soviet society and government, "recognized the necessity" for Chernenko to hold both posts and that this arrangement had "great significance" for the conduct of foreign policy. Having thus made an institutional case for linking the two positions, Gorbachev would suffer an important loss of prestige if he were not also elected head of state, an office held by Brezhnev (since 1977), Andropov, and Chernenko. Leadership Rankings: Continuity on Top, Confusion Below There were no signs of change in the power relationships among top leaders in the immediate aftermath of Chernenko's death. Aside from Gorbachev's rise to the top spot, the senior Politburo members remained in their presuccession order during all the formal lineups connected with Chernenko's funeral, with Tikhonov coming first, followed by Gromyko, Grishin, and Romanov. Roma- nov was in a more prominent position during graveside ceremonies where the ranking was less formal, standing on one side of Gorbachev while Tikhonov stood on the other. Leadership lineup at lying-in-state; left to right: Romanov, Grishin, Gromyko, Tikhonov, Gorbachev. (Soviet television, 12 March 1985) 10 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Vorotnikov, Gorbachev, Tikhonov (left to right) at lying-in- state. (Soviet television, 11 March 1985) In contrast to the clear lineup of the top five, the rankings of other members of the Politburo and Secretariat were inconsistent. There were nine lineups during the lying-in-state and funeral ceremonies, and no two were alike.' At least one anomaly may have some significance: Vorotnikov, who normally appears in last place among full Politburo members, had a more prominent spot at the 11 March lying-in-state ceremony following the plenum when he stood on one side of Gorbachev, while Tikhonov and the other top leaders stood on the other. Gorbachev's appearance in this same position at a lying-in- state ceremony following the plenum that elected Chernenko apparently reflected his increased status, but it is too early to tell if the parallel will hold true for Vorotnikov. aniildinng a Coalition: Gorbacbev's Allies and Opponents Among the elders in the Politburo, Gromyko and Grishin have given Gorbachev the strongest public show of support-Gromyko with his impas- sioned nominating speech and Grishin by referring to Gorbachev as the head ' See Tables 1 and 2 of this report. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY of the Politburo in a speech reported in Moskovskaya Pravda on 19 March. Gorbachev may get his firmest backing from the younger members of the leadership brought in under Andropov: Vorotnikov, Ligachev, and Ryzhkov. Several other leaders, including Romanov, Shcherbitskiy, and Dolgikh, may pose obstacles to his consolidation of power. Vorotnikov The leader with a public record closest to Gorbachev's on economic issues is 59-year-old Politburo member and RSFSR Premier Vitaliy Vorotnikov, who had the most meteoric rise of any leader under Andropov. For reasons that are unclear, Vorotnikov was removed as RSFSR first deputy premier and exiled as ambassador to Cuba in 1979. He was brought back into domestic politics in mid-1982 when Andro- pov's KGB campaign against corruption brought down Krasnodar First >,,,,._ 7111M,,_11111 Secretary Medunov, an apparent crony of Brezhnev; Vorotnikov was installed in his place and carried out a vigorous purge of local officials. In June 1983 he was elected premier of the RSFSR, after being nominated by Gorbachev, and candidate member of the Politbu- ro. He was promoted to full membership in the Politburo with unusual speed in December 1983. Like Gorbachev, Vorotnikov has publicly stressed a need to stimulate initiative through economic incen- tives and administrative decentralization. As RSFSR premier, he has vigorously shaken up the republic ministries and promoted economic management reforms, including a major economic experiment in the services sector that is designed to reduce planning controls and stimulate initiative and quality work. In a speech in Turkmeni- stan, reported in the 23 December 1984 Pravda, Vorotnikov called for a new approach to solving economic problems at all levels, "from the worker and kol- khoznik to the minister." According to the 27 November 1984 Zarya Vostoka, he "highly praised" economic experiments being conducted in Georgia during a November 1984 visit to the republic and stated that this ex- perience should be "disseminated in other parts of the country." In recent years Gorbachev has also shown more interest in Georgia's economic experi- ments than any other national-level leader. 12 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Ligachev Yegor Ligachev, 64, is Gorbachev's direct subordinate in the leadership. He was brought to Moscow to head the Central Committee's Party Organization Work Department in April 1983, and by June 1983 there were clear signs that Gorbachev was overseeing this department. Ligachev was raised to Central Committee secretary at the Yegor Ligachev December 1983 plenum and succeeded Gorbachev as chairman of the Council of the Union's Legislative Proposals Commission in April 1984, when Gorbachev moved up to chairman of the council's Foreign Affairs Commission. Prior to Chernenko's death Gorbachev seemed to be relying on Ligachev to fill some gaps in the Secre- tariat. Ligachev appeared to be taking on duties in the agricultural sector as Gorbachev assumed more and more responsibilities. For example, in January this year in a keynote address to a conference in Leningrad, Ligachev kicked off a campaign called for by Gorbachev to introduce the collective contract system of labor organization throughout the country's farms. On two occasions he also intruded into police activity, a sphere supervised by Romanov, most recently attending a 4 March conference of internal affairs ministers as the only representative of the leadership. Ryzhkov Nikolay Ryzhkov, a 55-year-old economic specialist, has probably also been working directly under Gorbachev. In November 1982 he became a CPSU secretary-and head of the Central Committee's new Economics Department and became involved in Nikolay Ryzhkov efforts to work out changes in the methods of planning and management. During 1984 Gorbachev apparently took over supervision of this department. Ryzhkov and Gorbachev's subordinate Ligachev were the only party secretaries to attend Gorbachev's February 1985 elec- tion speech. Ryzhkov also appears to support changes in economic management. Like Gorbachev and Vorotnikov, he has visited Georgia to observe economic experiments. Ac- cording to the 24 September 1983 Zarya Vostoka report on his visit, he praised innovations in the republic as a positive example for other areas. In speeches in February 1984 and February 1985 Ryzhkov praised national economic experiments begun in 1983 that increase the independence of enterprises. 13 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Romanov As the only other senior CPSU secretary, 62-year-old Grigoriy Romanov is Gorbachev's most obvious rival for political power. As overseer of the military-industrial complex and machine-building sector he is the chief spokesman for defense interests and will be a key actor in debates over allocation of resources. Even before he as- sumed this role Romanov was one of the strongest advocates in the leadership for the defense sector. If he is not constrained by political rivalry, Romanov may side with Gorbachev in efforts to change economic policy. He has long pressed for economic incentives and promoted many economic experiments. Shcherbitskiy Noted for his obvious ambition and his strong opin- ions, 67-year-old Ukrainian party leader and Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy may have sharp conflicts with Gorbachev. Shcherbitskiy has been outspoken in upholding defense interests and has often taken a hard line in foreign policy matters. In two September 1984 speeches he lobbied for beefing up defense, criticized reliance on trade with the West, and urged a big effort to develop Soviet technology independent of the West's. Shcherbitskiy's sharpest disagreement with Gorbachev may be in the sphere of economic policy. In a November 1984 Kommunist (No. 17) article he took po- sitions which appeared opposed to Gorbachev's calls for transferring more rights to plants and increasing "self-management." He argued that any weakening of central planning and turn to market forces would disrupt economic production, would be conducive to the "restoration of capitalism," and could not be called "genuine people's self-management." Shcherbitskiy has not opposed all changes in economic management, however. In fact, he has cultivated an image of innovator in experimenting with new methods of advancing scientific and technological development. Dolgikh As a Politburo candidate member and the third or fourth ranking secretary (after Gorbachev, Romanov, and perhaps Ponomarev), 60-year-old Vladimir Dolgikh also is an important political figure. He has been most closely associated with Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Chernenko. Although Dolgikh was the ranking secretary for economic questions when Andropov took over, Andropov bypassed him, naming Ryzh- kov secretary for economic planning and later bringing in Romanov to be senior secretary for industry, outranking Dolgikh. Dolgikh has not been an enthusiastic advocate of economic innovation and may not share Gorbachev's approach to improving economic performance. 14 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Military Role: Evidence of Decline Initial indications are that the military's influence in political matters will be minimal in the Gorbachev regime. This was suggested by the military's exclusion from a prominent role in the transition, against the background of apparent efforts by the party leadership to reduce the influence of the military under Chernenko. Gorbachev's own views on the military are largely un- known: He has no experience in military affairs, having never even served in the army, and has not taken clear public positions on defense matters. The most significant reduction of military influence in the leadership was produced by the death of Defense Minister and Politburo member Ustinov in December 1984 and the selection of a replacement who seemed to have been chosen precisely because he would be relatively weak and ineffectual. Ustinov's successor, 73-year-old Sergey Sokolov, was the oldest and least controversial of the three first deputy defense ministers and cannot be expected to rise to a position of power comparable to Ustinov's. Before too long, Gorbachev will probably have an opportunity to influence the choice of a new defense minister. The change in the Ministry of Defense came against the background of other indications of reduced military influence during the Chernenko regime. With the demotion of Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov three months before Ustinov's death, the party leadership removed a forceful advocate for defense interests from contention for the post of defense minister. Ogarkov's removal on 6 September was accompanied by the appearance of a formula in editorials in Pravda and the military paper Krasnaya Zvezda that asserted that funds would not be diverted from the consumer to meet defense needs, suggesting that a key resource decision that went against military interests had just been made. 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 New Dynamism in Foreign Policy Like Andropov and Chernenko before him, Mikhail Gorbachev began his tenure as general secretary by vowing to continue the broad outlines of foreign policy that he had inherited. While his public statements and actions during his first days in power supported this pledge in many key areas of Soviet inter- national relations, including U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, there were also a number of signs that he will impart a more dynamic style to foreign pol- icy and that he may be significantly more open to changes in Soviet policy than his predecessor. Gorbachev's energetic leadership style was most evident in the unprecedented number of meetings he held with foreign dignitaries attending Chernenko's funeral.' Whereas Chernenko had met separately with 13 heads of state delegations at Andropov's funeral and Andropov with only seven at Brezh- nev's, Gorbachev met individually with 25 heads of state delegations as well as with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and the heads of delegations from the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties. In addition, like Chernenko in February 1984, he met collectively with the six leaders of the other Warsaw Pact member-states. In a further indication of personal style and willingness to bend protocol, Gorbachev spent more time than planned with several foreign leaders, according to Western press accounts, forcing reshuffling of the schedule. Despite repetitions of the usual pledge of continuity in foreign policy, the new Soviet regime has given hints that it might both accelerate changes begun un- der Chernenko and take new initiatives in some neglected areas of foreign re- lations. In its most dramatic move to date, the Gorbachev regime made an im- portant symbolic gesture toward China when the new general secretary met with the Chinese representative at the funeral-the first such meeting in 20 years. Soviet actions in other key areas have contrasted less sharply with previous practice, but nevertheless have created an impression of movement toward both improved relations with the West and closer ties with several former adversaries in the communist movement: ? Gorbachev's conciliatory statements and nonpolemical Soviet press reporting of his meeting with Vice President Bush suggest that Moscow may want to give new impetus to the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations that began during the last few months of Chernenko's rule. ' For a list of meetings between the Soviet general secretary and foreign heads of delegations at the Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko funerals, see Tables 3 and 4. 16 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 ? The Soviet media's positive portrayal of Gorbachev's meetings with West European leaders, including West Germany's Chancellor Kohl, may reflect Gorbachev's interest in cultivating even stronger ties to the region. ? The breakthrough with China and an apparent effort to court the Yugoslavs suggest that higher priority will be given to improving Soviet relations with ruling communist states and parties outside the Soviet bloc. ? Gorbachev's meeting with the heads of delegations from the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties also raises the possibility that the new general secretary will push for a more accommodating approach toward dissident nonruling parties. Chernenko's passing may have little immediate effect on the conduct of Soviet foreign policy: ? In the authoritative tributes paid to him during the funeral period, Chernenko was credited with a comparatively minor role in the formulation of foreign policy, suggesting that Moscow wants to give the impression that Gorbachev and others in the present leadership were involved in and committed to the foreign policies followed over the past year. This character- ization may be genuine, given the high level of activity the Soviet leadership, particularly Gromyko, maintained during Chernenko's final period of grave illness and incapacitation. ? Gorbachev has relatively little experience in foreign affairs and may rely heavily on more experienced advisers, such as Foreign Minister Gromyko. Soviet media publicized Gromyko's presence at an overwhelming majority of Gorbachev's meetings with foreign leaders. Moscow has not yet identified any Gorbachev personal aide for international affairs although Andrey Aleksandrov, a foreign policy aide to every general secretary since 1966, and Viktor Sharapov, a specialist in relations with communist countries original- ly added to the general secretary's staff by Andropov, were judging by pictures shown on Soviet television-also involved in most of Gorbachev's meetings. In the previous two successions, Soviet media at comparable meetings explicitly identified aides to the general secretary. Despite the continuity lent by Gromyko's presence in the foreign affairs leadership, however, there are signs that continuity may be less in vogue than 17 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 it was in the previous two changes of general secretary. Pravda's handling of the question as well as remarks by a highly placed commentator point to the new regime's greater receptivity to change: ? An alteration in Pravda's handling of the question of continuity in its two editions on 13 March suggested a desire to avoid overplaying that theme in either domestic or foreign policy. In a sentence that in the first edition said Gorbachev's election had been seen both at home and abroad "as yet more proof of the CPSU's unshakable loyalty to the Leninist course of creation and peace and as evidence of complete continuity in the party's policy," the second edition deleted the word "complete." ? Izvestiya political observer Aleksandr Bovin, a member of the party's Central Auditing Commission and an influential foreign affairs journalist who is widely reported to have close contacts with the Soviet leadership, also appeared to indicate that continuity would not be accentuated as heavily under Gorbachev. Bovin told listeners to a domestic radio discussion program on 24 March that the regime's rhetorical devotion to "consistency, continuity, and stability" should not be interpreted as "immobility." No foreign policy can be immobile "if it wants to be effective," he said. Moscow's commitment to "stability of principles" does not rule out but "presupposes," he argued, "flexibility and the ability to alter one's actions depending on changing circumstances." United States: Moderate Stance Gorbachev adopted a moderate public posture toward the United States during his first days in power and reaffirmed Moscow's interest in arms control negotiations, particularly the U.S.-Soviet talks that opened in Geneva two days after Chernenko's death. Soviet leadership treatment of the United States traditionally has been circumspect in the early days of a new regime, but Gorbachev has been more restrained than Andropov was in 1982 and Chernenko in 1984. Gorbachev's first statement on foreign policy as general secretary, in his 11 March speech to the CPSU Central Committee, seemed calculated to reinforce the warming trend in U.S.-Soviet relations in recent months. He echoed positive statements about detente that had been made in two of the last 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 public statements attributed to Chernenko and avoided even the indirect criticism of the West that had marked early speeches by Andropov and Chernenko: ? Gorbachev used powerful images of U.S.-Soviet cooperation that had been invoked in Chernenko's 22 'February RSFSR Supreme Soviet election address and his 28 February reply to U.S. war veterans. He endorsed the "success of detente achieved in the 1970's," affirmed that the Soviet Union was "prepared to participate in a continuation of the process of establishing peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation between states," and added that "new steps in this direction" would be a fitting commemoration for the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. ? In arguing for arms control, Gorbachev warned that a "frightful threat" faces mankind but did not go on to blame the West explicitly for the problem. Both Andropov and Chernenko had been more critical on similar occasions, although both, like Gorbachev, had avoided any direct reference to the United States. In his funeral eulogy for Brezhnev, Andropov had accused the "forces of imperialism" of trying to "push mankind onto the road of hostility and military confrontation." Chernenko, in his speech to the extraordinary plenum that elected him, had denounced the "threat created today to humanity by the reckless, adventurist actions of imperialism's aggressive forces." Arms Control Gorbachev signaled that arms control will be given a high priority by devoting more attention to the subject in his 11 March plenum speech than to any other foreign policy issue. He said that "the only sensible way out of the present situation is an accord between the forces opposed to each other on the immediate cessation of the arms race," particularly regarding nuclear and space arms. In describing Moscow's approach to the U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva, he adopted the formulation used in Chernenko's election speech last month, saying that the Soviet Union does not seek "unilateral advantages," wants a "termination" rather than "contin- uation" of the arms race, and endorses a mutual "freeze" on future nuclear missile deployments and a "real and major cutback" in stockpiled armaments on both sides. In keeping with the traditional constraints of the occasion, Gorbachev did not raise questions about U.S. earnestness toward the Geneva negotiations, as he had done in his election speech last month, but simply called on Washington to reciprocate the Soviet approach to the talks. 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 The attention devoted to arms control in Gorbachev's speech stands in marked contrast to the treatment of the issue in Chernenko's plenum acceptance speech in February 1984, at a time when Moscow was refusing to return to the negotiating table in Geneva. Chernenko spoke only in general terms of Soviet readiness for peaceful settlements of all disputed international problems through "serious, equal, and constructive talks" and, without naming the United States, complained that "some leaders" in the West "do not realize or do not wish to realize" the unprecedented need for cooperation to limit armaments. Vice President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz meet in the Kremlin with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985) Meeting With Vice Soviet media took a slightly more positive approach to President the United States in coverage of the general secre- tary's 13 March meeting with Vice President Bush than they had taken during the two previous successions. The authoritative TASS report on the meeting said that Gorbachev had "noted the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations" and expressed Moscow's "readiness, provided the U.S. side also was ready, to work in practice to improve them." TASS also re- ported that the Vice President similarly expressed Washington's desire to "have better relations with the Soviet Union." In contrast, the TASS reports on the similar meetings with Chernenko and Andropov had not cited views 20 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 expressed by Vice President Bush, reporting only remarks by the Soviet leaders. Both Chernenko and Andropov were said to have insisted that bilateral relations be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in internal affairs, and Chernenko had implied that U.S. failure to adhere to these principles was the key obstacle to an improvement in relations. Soviet media took the unusual step of calling attention to optimistic remarks by the Vice President after his meeting with Gorbachev and gave some indirect signals that Moscow may be receptive to the idea of a summit meeting between Gorbachev and President Reagan. A TASS dispatch from New York, quoted on Soviet television on 14 March, cited UPI in reporting that the Vice President had brought away from his conversation with Gorbachev "a hope for an improvement" in relations and had expressed the opinion, which he said was shared by President Reagan, that a summit would be "useful." Soviet me- dia discussion of the possibility of a summit meeting has been rare in the re- cent past and has adhered to the position articulated by Gromyko in June 1983 that any such meeting must be adequately prepared in advance and that certain prerequisites must be met, including some degree of mutual understanding on major questions. West Europe: Stress on Improved Relations The Kremlin's treatment of West Europe during and immediately after the Chernenko funeral suggests that Moscow will continue to encourage improved ties with most West European countries and to promote opposition to U.S. de- fense policies. Soviet coverage of West German Chancellor Kohl's meeting with Gorbachev was markedly less critical than Moscow's accounts of other recent Soviet-West German meetings.. Following the example set by Chernenko at the time of Andropov's funeral, Gorbachev met with the delegation heads, of the major West European countries, including Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and West Germany. Authoritative TASS reports on these meetings avoided polemics and appeared to, reinforce' the effort to improve relations that characterized Gorbachev's December 1984 trip to Great Britain and Gromyko's' recent visits to Italy and Spain. 21 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 France As at the time of Andropov's funeral, Moscow re- served its warmest comments for the 13 March meet- ing between the new general secretary and the head of the French delegation. Gorbachev was quoted by TASS as referring in the meeting with President Mitterrand to the "traditional sentiments of friendship and affection" between the Soviet and French peoples, and both leaders were cited as endorsing the "extension of political dialogue" between them as an important factor affecting "the political climate in Europe and elsewhere." Italy The official Soviet account of the new Soviet leader's meeting with Italian President Pertini and Foreign Minister Andreotti was somewhat warmer than the TASS report on their meeting with Chernenko in February 1984, avoiding criticism of Italy's support for NATO's INF deployments. As in the report on the Soviet-French meeting, it affirmed that Italy and the USSR intended to broaden their political contacts "so as to promote the restoration of detente in Europe." Spain The reception Moscow gave the Spanish delegation indicated Soviet interest in strengthening ties with Madrid. Last year Spain sent a lower ranking delegation, headed by a deputy prime minister, which was not received by any of the top leadership. This year Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez journeyed to Moscow for the funeral and was received by the new general secretary. As in Soviet media treatment of Gromyko's recent visit to Madrid, the TASS report on Gorbachev's meeting with Gonzalez portrayed Spain as siding with the USSR in opposing the arms race "in space," even though the Spanish Government has not adopted a formal public position on this issue. Great Britain Gorbachev's remarks to British Prime Minister Thatcher paralleled his statements during his visit to Great Britain last December and seemed designed to encourage improved relations. The report on the post-funeral Gorbachev-Thatcher meeting credit- ed both sides with an interest in "political dialogue" and in stepping up cooperation in economic, scientific, and other fields. As he had done in Britain, the new Soviet leader was reported by TASS as expressing opposition to the "arms race in space ... and on earth," and he called on London to "make a contribution toward changing the world situation for the better." Like the TASS description of the Soviet and British leaders' meeting after Andropov's funeral last year, the TASS report on the Gorbachev-Thatcher conversation did not mention INF. 22 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko pose with West German Chancellor Kohl prior to their Kremlin meeting. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985) West Germany Although Moscow aired a sterner depiction of Chan- cellor Kohl's 14 March meeting with Gorbachev than of any of the other meetings with West European leaders, the Soviet account was notably milder than Moscow's characterization of other Soviet-West German meetings over the past year: Last year, Moscow signaled its irritation with Bonn in its treatment of the Chernenko-Kohl meeting that took place after Andropov's funeral. Cher- nenko, according to TASS, drew attention to West Germany's support for NATO's missile deployments and restated the USSR's "principled" opposi- tion to them. By contrast, the report on the 14 March meeting between Gor- bachev and Kohl failed even to mention the INF issue. The contrast was even more striking between Moscow's treatment of the Gorbachev-Kohl meeting and its description of the meeting 10 days earlier between Foreign Minister Gromyko and West German Foreign Minister Genscher during his 4 March visit to Moscow. The latter report cited Gromyko as calling for an end to U.S. missile deployments in West Germany and warning Bonn that its cooperation with the United States in strategic defense research would lead the USSR to regard it as an 23 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 "accomplice in the violation of the treaty on antiballistic missile defense." The TASS account of Gorbachev's remarks to Kohl failed to mention either the strategic defense issue or U.S. missile deployments in the FRG. TASS added, however, that the Soviet side emphasized that the "decisive" element in Moscow's posture toward Bonn was West German policy on matters concerning the "security interests" of the USSR and its allies. ? Although Soviet leaders have referred sporadically to West German "revan- chism" in their speeches over the last 10 months, the TASS account of Gorbachev's talks with Chancellor Kohl made no mention of this subject. This was in line with the official Soviet pronouncements on other leadership- level exchanges with the West Germans since last spring, when the "revanchism" campaign got under way. However, judging by the communi- que issued after East German Foreign Minister Fischer's 19-20 March visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union is still determined to impress on its East European allies-and particularly East Germany-its concern over the contacts with Bonn. The communique pointedly noted that the Soviet Union, the GDR, and "all the fraternal socialist states" are determined to deal the "most resolute rebuff" to "manifestations of revanchism" in West Germany. Japan: Evidence of Strains Predominates Moscow's account of Gorbachev's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, the first between a Japanese prime minister and a Soviet general secretary since 1973, provided no evidence that Gorbachev is more flexible than his predecessors about the longstanding substantive differences between Moscow and Tokyo. Gorbachev's reception of Nakasone on 14 March represents an elevation in Soviet treatment of Japanese delegations compared with the previous two successions. In 1982 then Prime Minister Suzuki attended Brezhnev's funeral but was not received by any Soviet leader, although Gromyko received then Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi. In 1984 Gromyko met with Foreign Minister Abe, who led the Japanese delegation to the Andropov funeral. Despite the change in the level of the meeting, it is not clear that the Soviets were eager to raise bilateral contacts to the top level. According to Japanese press reports citing Nakasone himself, Moscow agreed to the meeting only 24 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Gromyko together with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone at 13 March reception. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985) after the Japanese prime minister refused to meet with Prime Minister Tikhonov, as the Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed, and threatened to go home without meeting any Soviet leader unless Gorbachev received him. The authoritative TASS report on the Gorbachev-Nakasone meeting suggests that Moscow is maintaining its critical, inflexible position on Soviet-Japanese relations. The report, one of the sternest of the many TASS reports on Gorbachev's,meetings with foreign visitors, indicated that the Soviet side had dismissed Nakasone's expression of good will toward the Soviet Union and "stressed" that Japan was "artificially" creating "difficulties and limitations" in bilateral relations. "Japan's pursuit of a peace-loving policy in practice would undoubtedly be conducive to improving relations and good-neighborli- ness," the Soviet side was reported to have added. This year's TASS report was similar in tone to that of the TASS report at the time of Gromyko's meeting with Abe at the Andropov funeral. That report had said the Soviet side had expressed regret that there was "no sign" of Japa- nese readiness to reciprocate a Soviet desire for relations of "good-neighborli- ness and cooperation." 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 East Europe: Positive Image Projected Gorbachev moved swiftly to underscore ties with Moscow's East European allies and to encourage cordial relations with Yugoslavia. His meeting with Warsaw Pact leaders on 13 March was portrayed as more substantive than a similar gathering following Andropov's funeral in 1984. The TASS report on the meeting, which it said took place in an atmosphere of "cordiality and un- animity," indicated that many domestic and international topics were dis- cussed and that participants expressed determination to improve cooperation. They also emphasized a need to "strengthen unity and cohesion" and "step up coordination of action in the international arena." By contrast, the report on the 1984 meeting noted only a "cordial, fraternal" atmosphere and said nothing about the content of the discussion. Warsaw Pact Most congratulatory messages to Gorbachev from Countries Warsaw Pact countries did not differ significantly from comparable messages sent to his predecessors, but those from the GDR and Poland were notable: ? Possibly in an effort to dispel tensions that arose last year when GDR party chief Honecker canceled a visit to the FRG under Soviet pressure, Honecker departed from past protocol to assure Gorbachev that the GDR is Moscow's "loyal" and "reliable" ally and a "firm member" of the socialist community. No such assurances were included in Honecker's messages to Chernenko a year ago and to Andropov in November 1982. ? The message from Polish leaders Jaruzelski and Jablonski assured the new Soviet leader that the Polish party and government would "do everything possible to increase Poland's contribution to our joint cause"-a statement that could be taken as a response to complaints in recent years that Poland was not fulfilling its CEMA obligations. Perhaps acknowledging Gorba- chev's relative lack of experience, the message omitted a statement con- tained in messages to Andropov and Chernenko that those leaders "under- stood Poland's problems." East European media comment on the succession revealed differing views on the new Soviet leader: ? A Prague radio commentary on the 17th seemed to reflect apprehension in its defensive insistence that Soviet domestic and foreign policy would not 26 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 change under Gorbachev and that Western conjectures on this score were "only wishful thinking." ? By contrast, effusive Hungarian comment seemed to reflect relish for the prospect of change. An article in the trade union daily Nepszava on 12 March described at length what it claimed was Gorbachev's "expert" interest in new Hungarian agricultural and industrial methods during a 1983 visit. The party paper Nepszabadsag on the 16th, in a dispatch from a Moscow correspondent entitled "Continuity and Dynamism," portrayed Gorbachev as having energy, aptitude, and "composure and openness" and described his speeches as presaging a "needed decisive change" in the Soviet economy. Yugoslavia Gorbachev's apparent desire to improve relations with the Yugoslavs was underlined by a 12 March Belgrade radio report that he had personally telephoned the Yugoslav delegation that day to express thanks for their attendance at the funeral and for their condolences. Soviet and Yugoslav reports on the delegation's meeting with Gorbachev on the 13th noted a cordial and friendly atmosphere and the readiness of both countries to promote further all-round cooperation. The Tanjug account of the talks reported that "both sides stressed that Yugoslav-Soviet relations are developing successfully based on the principles of the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and the Moscow Statement of 1956, which were also confirmed in subsequent joint Yugoslav-Soviet documents at meetings at the highest level." Moscow, as on past occasions, avoided reference to the specific agreements, with TASS noting only that cooperation between the two countries and two parties would be based on "joint documents and accords." TASS also omitted the information, supplied by Tanjug, that Gorbachev had accepted an invitation to visit Belgrade and extended a similar invitation to the Yugoslav leadership to visit the Soviet Union. No meeting between Chernenko and the Yugoslav delegation was reported a year ago, although Andropov had met with the Yugoslavs at the time of Brezhnev's funeral. The descriptions of the atmosphere of the 1982 meeting were similar to the present one, although the reports on the meeting were much shorter. The Yugoslav message to Gorbachev appeared to reflect a warmer climate than at the time of the previous successions. Yugoslav party leader Sukrija's message implied that bilateral relations were good by voicing the "conviction" 27 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 that ties would "continue to develop successfully." Yugoslav messages in 1984 and 1982, by contrast, had expressed Belgrade's readiness to improve relations. Yugoslav media comment on Gorbachev was less restrained than that following the accessions of Andropov and Chernenko. Stressing that Gorba- chev's work style differs from that of his two predecessors, Tanjug's Moscow correspondent on the 17th said that the new Soviet leader's initial speeches and meetings with foreign visitors showed him to be a "modern-concept politician." The daily Politika on the 13th enthused that Gorbachev has a "statesman's personality" marked by "resoluteness, clarity, and authority." Albania Following past practice, Albania briefly reported with- out comment the death of ~ Chernenko and election of Gorbachev. Presumably to project an image of Soviet collusion with the United States, however, Tirana radio on the 14th reported that "the Kremlin's new boss, Mikhail Gorbachev," met with Vice President Bush. In 1982 Tirana waited almost a month to comment on Andropov's rise to pow- er. A 7 December article in the Albanian party paper declared that Albania had no relations with Khrushchev or Brezhnev and would have none with Andropov "or anyone else who might come to lead the revisionist Soviet Union." Gorbachev gave special attention to Albania last year in a speech at an anniversary celebration in Sofia, published in Pravda on 10 September, in which he affirmed that the Soviet Union "favors normalization of relations with the Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania." Although his statement reflected official Soviet policy, he was breaking with convention by raising the issue explicitly. No ' other 'Soviet leader has directly discussed the question of relations with Albania since Brezhnev, in a speech to a 25 October 1976 CPSU plenum, affirmed that the Soviet Union was prepared to restore relations with Albania. Tirana is not known to have commented on Gorba- chev's remark at the time. China: Ground Prepared for Fundamental Change The Soviet succession, provided the stage for a historic drama in Sino-Soviet relations, as. Gorbachev broke with two decades of precedent to meet the Chinese delegation to the funeral and Beijing, laid, aside its doctrine of 18 years 28 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY General Secretary Gorbachev accepts condolences from Vice Premier Li Peng at Kremlin reception. (Soviet television, 13 March 1985) Meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev, with Foreign Minister Gromyko to his right and Vice Premier Li Peng, second from left. (Soviet television, 14 March 1985) by referring publicly to the Soviet Union as a socialist country. While both sides unmistakably signaled their desire to accelerate the.pace of improving ties, it is not yet clear whether these important symbolic actions presage fundamental changes in relations. Neither side has acknowledged a departure from past policy or articulated a rationale to explain a departure. Particularly on the Chinese side, such a rationale will be necessary to justify further moves 29 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY toward reestablishment of party relations. Any radical change in doctrine or relations may provoke controversy and opposition in either party. Moscow Gorbachev set forth policy on China with a simple declaration in his 11 March CPSU plenum address: "We would like a serious improvement in relations with the PRC and consider that, given reciprocity, this is fully possible." He underlined his apparent seriousness three days later when he met with Chinese delegation head Vice Premier Li Peng. It was the first such meeting between a Soviet general secretary and a Chinese official since Brezhnev met with Zhou Enlai in November 1964, when the Chinese premier came to Moscow following the ouster of Khrushchev to explore the possibility of overcoming differences with Moscow., Gorbachev's formulation of policy toward China was more positive than any used by Chernenko during his tenure as general secretary. While Chernenko had expressed hope for improved relations, his statements tended to be linked with criticism of the Chinese or qualified with assertions that the interests of "third countries" could not be prejudiced. Gorbachev avoided such a link, but did reflect similar concerns in his conversation with the Vietnamese delegation to the funeral on 14 March. In an implicit reference to China, reported by So- viet media, he offered support to Vietnam's struggle against "the intrigues of imperialism and those who abet it." (Emphasis added) Pravda gave the authoritative TASS report on the 14 March Gorbachev-Li Peng meeting the prominent treatment that accorded with such a significant meeting and with an effort to improve relations. It published the report of the meeting on page one together with reports on meetings with such Soviet friends and allies as Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Angola, South Yemen, and Mozambique. The report on Aliyev's meeting with Wan Li in February 1984 appeared on page two of Pravda between reports on leadership meetings with the delegations from Malta and Japan. The report on Gromy- ko's meeting with Huang Hua in November 1982 was on page four, isolated from other reports on bilateral meetings. Beijing sent State Councillor and Foreign Minister Huang Hua to Brezhnev's funeral in 1982, and he was received by his counterpart, Gromyko. To represent China at Andropov's fu- neral in 1984, Beijing sent Vice Premier and Politburo member Wan Li, a leader of state rank equivalent to Huang Hua but of considerably greater political stature. Wan received less favorable treatment, however, meeting with Geydar Aliyev, who held comparable government and party posts but was lower in stature than Gromyko. 30 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The TASS report on the Gorbachev-Li Peng talks indicated that the general secretary had reiterated his plenum formulation on relations. Otherwise, the report followed the pattern of accounts of Sino-Soviet meetings in 1982 and 1984, conveying little of the substance of the meeting beyond noting that the Chinese side had also expressed an interest in improving relations. Four days later, however, Pravda printed excerpts of a much warmer Chinese report. Not only did Pravda note that Li had "agreed with the statement made by Comrade Gorbachev" at the CPSU plenum about the desirability of improving relations, but it recorded the key Chinese statements that reflected Beijing's willingness to grant the Soviet Union socialist status and to communicate informally between party leaders. Citing the Chinese party paper Renmin Ribao, Pravda reported that Li Peng had conveyed congratula- tions to Gorbachev from Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, had referred to the Soviet Union as a "socialist" country, and had "stressed" that China was prepared to assist the further development of relations in the "political" as well as other spheres. Moscow may see China's gestures in this regard as responding to Soviet sensitivities expressed late last year in an article written under pseudonyms as- sociated with the USSR Foreign Ministry. Appearing in the prominent foreign policy journal Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International fairs) under the names "I. Alekseyev" and "F. Nikolayev," the article chided Beijing for refusing to recognize the USSR as "socialist." By publishing the markedly different accounts of the meeting without further explanation, Moscow reinforced a public appearance of uncertainty about China policy: Earlier, Pravda and Izvestiya had omitted Gorbachev's state- ment on China in their otherwise thorough reviews of his plenum address in their 13 March editorials. Pravda included a reference to the "authoritative statement" at the plenum calling for better relations in its followup editorial three days later, but the formulation was not cited in similar editorial reviews of the speech in Izvestiya on the same day or in the military daily Krasnaya Zvezda on the 15th, 16th, and 21st or in the Russian republic paper Sovetskaya Rossiya on the 15th. Despite these mixed signals, there are tentative signs of central direction to Soviet media to soften their treatment of China-a tactic employed on many occasions by Moscow in the past to encourage an improved atmosphere in re- lations. There has been little critical comment on China, and the TASS 31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY report on U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost's 17-19 March visit to China failed to mention that Sino-Soviet relations were discussed. Moscow also encouraged the impression that efforts on normalization would continue to move forward, reporting on such bilateral contacts as Gromyko's 22 March meeting with the Chinese ambassador, First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov's meeting on 21 March with a Chinese economic official and on the 26th with the Chinese ambassador, and First Vice President Vasiliy Kuznet- sov's meeting on 12 March with a Chinese parliamentary delegation. Accord- ing to a Soviet television news report on Gromyko's reception of the PRC am- bassador, both sides expressed an interest in normalization, and the Soviet side again "drew attention" to Gorbachev's plenum statement on relations. In addition, a Soviet expert on China, Lev Delyusin, in an interview with the Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun, published on 23 March, encouraged the restoration of CPSU-CPC relations. Delyusin said he did not think the issue could be "solved right away," but he noted that the Gorbachev-Li Peng meeting showed that party leaders on both sides were "concerned about the development of friendly, comradely" party relations and that it did not make sense for relations between "two socialist countries" to improve while their party relations remained frozen. Background There is nothing in Gorbachev's record of public statements on China that anticipated his initiative to meet with Li Peng or that might have prompted Beijing's effusive response. He is not known to have ever made a public statement on relations with China. The few statements in which he mentioned China were delivered at formal party occasions abroad-such as the Vietnamese Communist Party congress in March 1982-and offered only conventional Soviet criticism of Chinese policies. Judging by published reports, he said nothing about China in his RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech last month. Despite the meager Gorbachev record on the China question, his apparent ties with Andropov and Gromyko associate him with a perspective that has given more priority to improving relations than did Chernenko. Different approach- es to the China issue may explain some of the twists and turns in Soviet policy and behavior since Brezhnev's call in March 1982 for improved relations and his affirmation that China had a "socialist system": ? Polemical attacks on China were dropped from Soviet media in September 1982 shortly before Brezhnev's death that November, and Andropov 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 reaffirmed Moscow's interest in better relations with China in a plenum speech 10 days after becoming general secretary. Andropov referred to China as "our great neighbor" and said that the USSR pays "great attention to every positive response" to Soviet efforts to "overcome the inertia of prejudices." The November 1982 speech did not criticize China, and all Soviet leaders refrained from direct polemical attacks on Beijing during Andropov's tenure, although Soviet media did resume lower level criticism by the end of 1983-at a time when Andropov's terminal illness may have reduced his influence. ? Chernenko was less positive than Andropov in his first public remarks on China after becoming general secretary in February 1984. In his 2 March USSR Supreme Soviet election speech, he affirmed an interest in improving relations but noted that "differences on a number of questions of principle" remain and ruled out any agreements that would "prejudice the interests of third countries." Moreover, while stating that "the Soviet Union stands for the level of contacts being raised," he added that this should take place "to the extent acceptable to both sides." ? By April 1984 low-level criticism of China was becoming more serious, and on 4 May Moscow released an authoritative TASS statement excoriating Chinese "military provocations" on the Sino-Vietnamese border. ? An effort at higher level contacts was aborted in May, when Moscow postponed a scheduled visit to Beijing of First Deputy Premier Arkhipov-a move seemingly designed to demonstrate displeasure with Chinese policies toward Indochina and the United States. ? In June Chernenko publicly attacked Chinese policy in Southeast Asia during visits by Vietnamese and Lao party leaders, condemning Beijing in stronger terms than had been used by any Soviet leader since October 1982. ? By the fall of 1984 Soviet media had toned down their attacks on China, al- though criticism still appeared in scholarly journals. ? Chernenko was also milder in his rhetoric in remarks during a visit of a Mongolian delegation in October. In his first comment on China since June, using the most positive language that he employed during his tenure as general secretary, he stressed the importance of normalization of relations 33 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 and asserted that "we always keep open the door to constructive talks with China." His only criticism of China was implied when he stressed that socialist countries must "hold clear-cut class positions in international affairs." ? Gromyko, who has a consistent record of temperate formulations on China in recent years, was even more positive in his 6 November address marking the anniversary of the October Revolution. He stated that the Soviet Union's commitment to "normalizing and improving" relations with China "has repeatedly been confirmed by us, even at the very highest level," and added that "we consider a continuation of contacts between representatives of the two countries useful and important." ? In December the Arkhipov visit to Beijing was revived amid signs that Beijing was attempting to mollify Moscow on issues that had led to postponement of the visit the previous spring. Both Beijing and Hanoi renewed publicity for clashes on the Sino-Vietnamese border as Vietnam's dry season offensive in Cambodia began, but the level of Beijing's protests was distinctly lower and their tone more restrained than they had been the previous April. While Arkhipov was in Beijing in late December, Beijing conspicuously avoided previously routine denunciations of Moscow on the anniversary of Moscow's intervention in Afghanistan, marking the occasion only in early January. ? From late January to mid-February 1985, Soviet media increased criticism of China in the wake of the visit to the PRC of Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Vessey. Much of the Soviet criticism was pegged to a Kabul protest about alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan conflict. A 14 February article in Izvestiya by "I. Alekseyev" also complained about the "ambiguous" Chinese leadership approach to the Soviet Union. It noted that Beijing had "verbally" declared its desire to normalize relations and allowed limited progress but was raising preconditions, had undertaken action "harmful to the interests of world socialism," and was even posing a "threat to the security of socialist states." The article advocated bilateral dialogue and normalization of relations and observed: "We would like to believe that common sense and a correct understanding of the Chinese people's interests will sooner or later gain the upper hand in Beijing." ? The last speech attributed to Chernenko-a 22 February USSR Supreme Soviet election address that was read for him because he was too ill to ap- pear-was positive about the need for normalization of relations and noted 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 there should be "efforts by both sides," but again pointed to "serious political differences" dividing Moscow and Beijing. Beijing In marking Chernenko's death and welcoming Gorba- chev's succession, Beijing violated strictures against confusing party and state relations with Moscow that it had scrupulously observed for nearly two decades. Taken together, these departures from precedents and practices rigidly observed in the past appear intended to convey dramatically a new Chinese assessment of the potential for fundamen- tal change in Sino-Soviet ties: ? Beijing extended congratulations to Gorbachev on his succession as CPSU general secretary. The congratulations were extended not only by a Foreign Ministry spokesman on 12 March, according to Xinhua that day, but also personally by several Chinese leaders. As recorded by Xinhua, these include National People's Congress (NPC) Chairman Peng Zhen in his condolence call at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing on the 12th, Vice Premier Li Peng di- rectly to Gorbachev in Moscow, and CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang, as conveyed to Gorbachev by Li Peng. At the time of Andropov's and Chernenko's successions, Beijing observed constraints in place since the break in CPC-CPSU ties in 1967 and did not extend congratulations of any sort-either from party or state spokesmen. ? On meeting Gorbachev at the reception for foreign delegations attending Chernenko's funeral on the 13th, according to Xinhua the same day, Li Peng wished the USSR well in "socialist construction." In his meeting with Gorbachev the next day, by Xinhua's account, Li described China and the USSR as "great neighbors and socialist countries." These references to the "socialist" character of the Soviet Union are the first in authoritative Chinese public statements in at least 18 years. The closest Beijing had come to such an acknowledgment appeared in Xinhua's account of CPC Politburo Standing Committee member Chen Yun's meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhipov last December, in which Chen observed that China and the USSR "practice economic planning and are neighbors." ? In his meeting with Gorbachev on the 14th, Li expressed Beijing's readiness to improve relations in the "political" sphere as well as in the economic, technical, and cultural fields. Although Beijing has routinely in the past three years indicated a readiness to improve cooperation in these latter 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Li Peng meeting Gorbachev and Gromyko in the Kremlin on 13 March. (Renmin Ribao, 15 March 1985). fields, it has not previously done so in the "political" arena. The closest it has come to doing so also emerged from Arkhipov's visit to China last December, when, according to Xinhua, Premier Zhao Ziyang suggested that "problems in the political relations" between the PRC and USSR should "not be difficult to solve" if both sides took the same "positive" ap- proach that they have adopted in cooperation in other areas. In reporting Peng Zhen's call at the Soviet Embassy on the 12th, Xinhua's English-language report cited the Soviet ambassador's expression of grati- tude for Chinese congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Reports on the same event by Beijing radio and by Xinhua's Chinese service, as published in Renmin Ribao, went even further, citing Peng Zhen himself as extending congratulations to "Comrade" Gorbachev. Since the break in party ties, PRC media ordinarily have shunned reference to Soviet leaders as "comra- des," regardless of the speaker. The only known exception again emerged from Arkhipov's visit to Beijing last December, when Chinese media repeatedly cited Chinese leaders calling Arkhipov "comrade." Judging by the context in which they were made, these references appear intended to convey Beijing's gratitude for Arkhipov's contributions to the PRC's development as supervisor of Soviet aid to China during the heyday of Sino- Soviet cooperation in the 1950's. 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 ? The condolence message sent by President Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen on behalf of the NPC on the 11th, Peng Zhen's remarks in his call at the Soviet Embassy and comments by the Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 11th and 12th, as reported by Xinhua, all praised Chernenko for his work as an "outstanding" and "supreme leader" of both the Soviet party and state. By contrast, comparable authoritative statements had called Brezhnev "an outstanding statesman of the Soviet Union" and Andropov "supreme leader of the Soviet Union." ? The party newspaper Renmin Ribao on the 12th carried on its front page pictures of both Chernenko and Gorbachev together with Xinhua's reports on the condolence message sent by Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen and on the CPSU plenum that elected Gorbachev. NPC condolences on Brezhnev's and Andropov's deaths and Xinhua reports on Andropov's and Chernenko's successions were also carried on Renmin Ribao's front page, but there were no pictures. Chernenko's picture was also framed in black-treatment that the Chinese press normally reserves only for the CPC's own leaders and for leaders of ruling foreign communist parties. Other Gestures These departures from longstanding practice indicate that China has begun to apply to the Soviet Union some of the protocol trappings it ordinarily confers on socialist countries, but other signs suggest that it has not yet resumed party links with the CPSU. Li Xiannian and Peng Zhen's condolence message, for example, was sent only in the name of the NPC to the USSR Supreme Soviet and not also in the name of the CPC Central Committee, as was the practice before 1967. Chinese media also were scrupulous about referring to Li Peng as head of a Chinese government delegation. The PRC-owned Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao on 16 March cited a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's comment, not reported in PRC media, that Hu's greetings to Gorbachev as conveyed by Li do not mean that CPC-CPSU relations have been formally resumed. The highly suggestive changes in Chinese practice do, however, appear designed to convey to Moscow the potential for fundamental change in Sino- Soviet ties. The gestures were complemented by other Chinese signals in the same direction. At no time in statements and comment on the Soviet leadership succession did Beijing raise the three "obstacles" that it long has insisted block fundamental change in bilateral relations-Moscow's military buildup along the Soviet and Mongolian border with China, the Soviet 37 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 .AnRR=X54 api x NA?Em~gR+xfX qi' a# k}XEQ RZP n ~Nfl fAeX.A siaxn}REE.A 71N amiAnnanen F7 ieiF}a-4f... i:nxntomu`-m -~ fl.MtanR?mW ii.....%a.W RYW.@wa., imXRt .tf. x..? ?ea ;a tttt~a ~ af.l. t -.....w...Y RaltFa. ?t t.a.Y@4xn;! A.,aNt\A+rt.f..aw. . v ttvw y~.atswl.>f.aaaA .aa.x. a. fa..lN>..Y.\.-a..wt'f. .........N?rt .ARfM.A.... A ..... lv%A. ...... V.B E.t!?\!f #tR ?lE.Y#a.tti# YisIII A}ktf Ri@YARRR . .A .nA-.ART. .#A Rfn.fl Ae\ ..u ? ...... ............ ~ to v}ARt.A-fs. .+nWX}Yn... 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(Renmin Ribao, 6 May 1980) 38 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 intervention in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. By contrast, Xinhua cited Vice Premier Wan Li raising them in his meeting with Soviet Deputy Premier Aliyev after attending Andropov's funeral last year. Beijing's choice of leaders to attend the funeral in Moscow and to convey con- dolences at the Soviet Embassy in Beijing seems calculated to convey a cautiously positive message. In terms of state rank-which in view of the gap in party relations is the only protocol strictly appropriate-both choices were marginally lower in level than the leaders chosen when Andropov died.' However, in both cases Beijing may have had reason to believe that the Soviets would be pleased with the selection: ? Although Li is marginally outranked by Wan Li in state protocol and vastly in terms of party level (Wan is a full Politburo member, Li is not), his selec- tion is important symbolically in terms of his youth and education. Li was promoted to vice premier as part of Deng Xiaoping's reform effort to invigorate the Chinese party and state apparatus with a successor generation of leaders competent technically and administratively to guide PRC modern- ization. In his early 50's, Li is of the same generation as Gorbachev. Li, ac- cording to the biography Xinhua publicized when he was promoted in 1982, was also educated in the Soviet Union and presumably speaks Russian. ? Although marginally outranked by Ulanhu in state protocol, Peng Zhen far outranks Ulanhu in party stature. Peng is normally listed among the four veteran Politburo members named after the Politburo Standing Committee members and ahead of the rest of the Politburo members. Ulanhu falls among the latter. Judging by his public statements-during Arkhipov's China visit, for example-Peng may also be more flexible in his views on Sino-Soviet relations than others in the Chinese leadership. Implications Beijing's readiness to treat the USSR as a socialist country effectively overthrows two decades of pessi- mistic media assessments about the potential for positive change in Soviet state and society. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism" (Beijing's term for Moscow's abandonment of class struggle in both the foreign 6 Li Peng and Wan Li are both vice premiers of the State Council, but Wan Li as a veteran is always named ahead of Li in lists of public appearances by state leaders. Similarly, Peng Zhen as NPC chairman ordinarily follows PRC Vice President Ulanhu-who led the leaders paying respects at the Soviet Embassy on Andropov's death last year-in name lists following strict state protocol. 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 and domestic spheres under Khrushchev) and its pursuit of "social-imperia- lism" (the harnessing of the resources of a society organized formally along so- cialist lines to pursue imperialist aggression externally) saw little possibility of fundamental change because Soviet leadership policies drew on attitudes embedded in Soviet society itself and on predilections deeply rooted in Russia's tsarist past. Soviet leaderships could come and go, according to this critique, but there was little prospect of fundamental changes in policy. Public acknowledgment of the "socialist" character of the USSR implies, conversely, that Soviet policies can change for the better, particularly when the Soviet leadership chooses to do so. By the same token, the revised placement of the USSR in Beijing's political taxonomy introduces a deep cleavage in the foundations of China's foreign policy, which long has included the principle that a socialist country cannot also be "hegemonist." As Deng Xiaoping moved in recent years to dismantle Mao's ideological legacy on China's domestic scene, he attempted to remove the same ideologi- cal constraints from PRC foreign policy, and particularly as applied to the USSR, while still upholding Mao's anti-Sovietism. From this process of demaoification emerged a new body of ideological principles that Beijing has used to distinguish real socialist parties and states from false ones. In recent years Beijing's rare public analyses of the origins of Soviet foreign policy have reaffirmed the pessimism of the Maoist critique on prospects for change. The traditional Maoist critique of Soviet "revisionism" was aban- doned not because of a changed attitude toward the USSR, but clearly because of Beijing's reassessment of the role of class struggle under socialism in its own domestic context. In its place there emerged a Dengist critique of Soviet social imperialism based on an analysis of Soviet "hegemonism." These changes are recorded in the CPC's most authoritative documents. The landmark resolution on party history adopted by the Central Committee in 1981, for example, reaffirmed China's "just struggle" against Soviet "big- nation chauvinism" in the 1950's and 1960's, the formulation of the "correct strategy" of the "three worlds theory," and the PRC's pursuit of "genuine in- ternationalism," and not hegemonism, as "indelible contributions" of Mao Zedong and the party leadership. The prevailing CPC constitution, adopted at the party congress in 1982, formally enjoins the party to unite with all progressive parties and groups in the world on the basis of proletarian internationalism in the "common struggle" against hegemonism. 40 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90T01298R000200290001-1 Approved For Release 2010/03/29: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200290001-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Although Beijing since Mao's death has moved gradually to reestablish ties with foreign communist parties, it has done so on the basis of a series of four principles that together, according to Beijing comment, advance its struggle against Soviet hegemonism. These four principles are mutual respect, equality, independence, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other parties. As Beijing has articulated and applied them in resuming ties with parties it once dismissed as revisionist-as in Yugoslavia and West Europe-or in exploring the possibility of ties with those it formerly regarded as Soviet pawns-as in East Europe-the emphasis has been to encourage independence from Mos- cow and its "hegemonic" ambitions within the international communist movement. As applied to the CPSU itself, the new critique of Soviet hegemonism-and the four principles Beijing has enunciated on that basis for interparty ties- has provided the foundation for continued explicit criticism. On the basis of the four principles, Beijing says it is no longer appropriate for China to criticize Soviet domestic policies, but asserts that it remains obliged to criticize Soviet hegemonism in the international communist movement and in international affairs generally. Hu Yaobang was cited by Xinhua in 1983, for example, dismissing the CPSU's claim to being a socialist party in view of Moscow's pursuit of hegemonism in Afghanistan, citing Lenin's observation that a proletariat that inflicts the slightest degree of coercion on another nation cannot be a "socialist proletariat." With respect to state relations, Soviet hegemonism as a "difference in principle" between the two countries is embodied in the "three obstacles" that Beijing asserts impede full Sino-Soviet normalization. Beijing's recent public treatment of the USSR as a socialist country, therefore, appears to be fundamentally inconsistent with the ideological framework of its appr
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	15	https://worldwide-politics.fandom.com/wiki/President_of_Laos	en	President of Laos	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/7/78/Emblem_of_Laos.png/revision/latest?cb=20240115082821	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/7/78/Emblem_of_Laos.png/revision/latest?cb=20240115082821	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20221007190047", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/7/78/Emblem_of_Laos.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/350?cb=20240115082821", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/c/c4/Thongloun_Sisoulith.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/350?cb=20231118205218", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/1/1e/Souphanouvong.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115084126", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/3/3e/Phoumi_Vongvichit.png/revision/latest?cb=20240115084111", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/7/71/Kaysone_Phomvihane.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115084035", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/8/86/Nouhak_Phoumsavanh.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115084006", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/a/a9/Khamtai_Siphandon.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115083943", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/6/6b/Choummaly_Sayasone.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115083914", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/b/bd/Bounnhang_Vorachit.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20240115083832", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/worldwide-politics/images/c/c4/Thongloun_Sisoulith.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/180?cb=20231118205218", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6a181c72-e8bf-419b-b4db-18fd56a0eb60", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6c42ce6a-b205-41f5-82c6-5011721932e7", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/464fc70a-5090-490b-b47e-0759e89c263f", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/f7bb9d33-4f9a-4faa-88fe-2a0bd8138668" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Worldwide Politics Wiki" ]	2024-07-03T16:38:30+00:00	The president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic is the head of state of Laos. The current president is Thongloun Sisoulith, since 22 March 2021. He was previously elected as the General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Laos' most powerful position in January 2021, ranking...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	Worldwide Politics Wiki	https://worldwide-politics.fandom.com/wiki/President_of_Laos	The president of the Lao People's Democratic Republic is the head of state of Laos. The current president is Thongloun Sisoulith, since 22 March 2021. He was previously elected as the General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Laos' most powerful position in January 2021, ranking him first in the Politburo. History[] Background[] The office of the President of the People's Democratic Republic traces its lineage back to Prince Souphanouvong, the first President of the People's Democratic Republic, a member of the deposed royal family and one of the Three Princes, who became President when the former Kingdom of Laos was overthrow by the Pathet Lao in 1975, at the end of the Laotian Civil War. Duties and rights[] Term limits[] The president is elected by the National Assembly for a term of five years, with no term limits. A candidate must receive at least two-thirds support from lawmakers present and voting in order to be elected. Role and authority[] The president represents Laos internally and externally, supervises the work as well as preserving the stability of the national governmental system and safeguards the independence and territorial integrity of the country. The President appoints the prime minister, vice president, ministers and other officials with the consent of the National Assembly. Additionally, the President is the commander-in-chief of the Lao People's Armed Forces. However, as Laos is a one party communist state. The highest and the most powerful political position is the general secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, not the President. The general secretary controls the Politburo and the Secretariat, Laos' top decision-making bodies, making the officeholder as de facto leader of Laos. However, the offices have often been held concurrently. Since Laos is a one-party state, all the presidents of the People's Democratic Republic have been members of the party while holding office. List of presidents[] No. Portrait Name (Birth–Death) Term of office Election Prime minister(s) Took office Left office Time in office 1 Souphanouvong (1909–1995) 2 December 1975 29 October 1986 10 years, 331 days - Kaysone Phomvihane – Phoumi Vongvichit (1909–1994) - Acting 29 October 1986 15 August 1991 4 years, 290 days 2 Kaysone Phomvihane (1920–1992) 15 August 1991 21 November 1992 1 year, 98 days 1991 Khamtai Siphandon 3 Nouhak Phoumsavanh (1910–2008) 25 November 1992 24 February 1998 5 years, 91 days - Khamtai Siphandon 4 Khamtai Siphandon (born 1924) 24 February 1998 8 June 2006 8 years, 104 days 1996 2001 Sisavath Keobounphanh Bounnhang Vorachith 5 Choummaly Sayasone (born 1936) 8 June 2006 20 April 2016 9 years, 317 days 2006 2011 Bouasone Bouphavanh Thongsing Thammavong 6 Bounnhang Vorachit (born 1937) 20 April 2016 22 March 2021 4 years, 336 days 2016 Thongloun Sisoulith 7 Thongloun Sisoulith (born 1945) 22 March 2021 Incumbent 2 years, 297 days 2021 Phankham Viphavanh Sonexay Siphandone See also[]
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	59	https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9075	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	49	https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Lao-People-s-Democratic-Republic-GOVERNMENT.html	en	Lao People's Democratic Republic			[ "https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/bs/i/nations-sm.png", "https://a.advameg.com/matomo.php?idsite=4&rec=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			null	Under the constitution of 1947 (as subsequently amended), Laos was a parliamentary democracy with a king as the nominal chief executive. The monarch was assisted by a prime minister (or president of the Council of Ministers), who was the executive and legislative leader in fact. The prime minister and cabinet were responsible to the national assembly, the main repository of legislative authority, whose 59 members were elected every five years by universal adult suffrage. With the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in December 1975, governmental authority passed to a national congress made up of 264 delegates elected by newly appointed local authorities. The congress in turn appointed a 45-member Supreme People's Council to draw up a new constitution. Pending the completion of this task effective power rested with Kaysone Phomvihan, a longtime Pathet Lao leader who headed the government as chairman of the Council of Ministers and was also secretary-general of the Lao People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party. Prince Souphanouvong, the head of state and president of the Supreme People's Council since 1975, left office in October 1986 because of poor health. He was replaced first by Phoumi Vongvichit, a former vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, and later by Sisomphon Lovansay, a former vice president of the Supreme People's Council. The Lao national legislature, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), adopted new election laws in 1988, and the first national elections under the current government took place in March 1989 (local elections were held in 1988). Kaysone Phomvihan was elected president and Khamtai Siphandon was named prime minister. The newly elected SPA set out to draft a constitution, which was finished in mid-1990, and adopted on 14 August 1991 by the SPA. Khamtai Siphandon was elected president in 1998, and reelected in 2001. The executive branch consists of the president, prime minister and two deputy prime ministers, and the Council of Ministers (cabinet) which are appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly. The legislative branch is the 109-member National Assembly which is elected by universal suffrage for a period of five years. The judicial branch is the Supreme People's Court Leaders. The constitution calls for a strong legislature elected by secret ballot, but most political power continues to rest with the party-dominated council of ministers, who are much aligned with the military.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	6	https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/photographs/record-details/5145c7d8-1162-11e3-83d5-0050568939ad	en	Prime Minister of Laos Khamtay Siphandone and wife Madam …			[ "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/watermark/picas_data/tn_pcd/19990000145-8262-3202-1746/img0072.jpg", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-av.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-govrec.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-maps.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-oh.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-photos.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-posters.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-speech.webp", "https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/style/photographs/content/images/categories/icon-straits.webp" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	PRIME MINISTER OF LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE CALLS ON PRESIDENT ONG TENG CHEONG AND FIRST LADY AT ISTANA STATE ROOM Prime Minister of …				null	Unedited Description Supplied by Transferring Agency: PRIME MINISTER OF LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE CALLS ON PRESIDENT ONG TENG CHEONG AND FIRST LADY AT ISTANA STATE ROOM Description Edited by NAS: Prime Minister of Laos Khamtay Siphandone and wife Madam Thongvanh, who arrive in Singapore for a four-day visit, calling on President and Mrs Ong Teng Cheong at Istana State Room Covering Date: 24/04/1995 Media - Image No: 19990000145 - 0072 Negative No: CL2275/05/17 Conditions Governing Access: Viewing permitted. Use and reproduction require written permission from copyright owner.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	50	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	en	New Lao PM inherits multiple poison chalices	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	[ "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AT-logo-wide-banner-1.png?fit=706%2C104&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1", "https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/?s=80&d=mm&r=pg", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Sonexay-Siphandone-Laos-2022.jpg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Laos-Laos-China-Railway-Poster-Facebook-e1556077338457.jpg?resize=780%2C401&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Third-Plenum.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/China-Yuan-Currency.jpeg?resize=1200%2C900&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/SE-Asia-Shadow-Puppet.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Phankham-Viphavanh.jpg?resize=780%2C468&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-28T104904Z_2030712917_RC138B6E0030_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-UN.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Fuel-Line-Inflation-May-2022.jpg?resize=780%2C486&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Hong-Kong-skyline-e1571882091566.jpg?resize=780%2C472&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Laos-Khamtay-Siphandone.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/071524_thomas_crooks_web-copy.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-EW.jpg?fit=1200%2C799&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/10-Facts-About-Child-Labor-in-Africa.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/AFP__20240720__364M8G9__v4__HighRes__TopshotYemenPalestinianIsraelConflict.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/trump-photo-for-web-669318769b60c.jpg?fit=1200%2C677&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/hq720.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Xi-Jinping-Global-South-copy.jpg?fit=1200%2C713&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Nvidia-AI-Processor.jpg?fit=1200%2C811&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/United-States-Flag.jpeg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Submarines-China-Flag.jpg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "David Hutt" ]	2023-01-02T13:49:16+00:00	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the	en	https://asiatimes.com/wp…ATLogo-192px.png	Asia Times	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the unexpected early resignation of his predecessor. After weeks of rumors about whether he would go, Phankham Viphavanh offered his resignation as on December 30, the last day of a National Assembly sitting. He goes down as the shortest-serving prime minister in the communist era, in the job just shy of 24 months. Under his tenure, Laos had a particularly poor Covid-19 response in 2021 and then was hit by economic crises on multiple fronts last year. He’s also at the center of several scandals that have tainted the image of a formerly straight-cut apparatchik. “I am 72 years old, and am no longer in good health,” Phankham said before the assembly. “Because of this, I feel that I can no longer carry the heavy burdens our country is facing.” Sonexay, a former deputy prime minister and investment minister, received a near-unanimous vote from the National Assembly to become the next prime minister. Aged 56, he is one of the youngest premiers in recent history. “I understand deeply that this will be a difficult and challenging role,” he told the National Assembly. Indeed, Laos has one of Asia’s highest rates of inflation, a fast depreciating currency, and there’s no certainty it won’t default on its external debts, much of which is owed to key partner China, not least for a high-speed railway project connecting the two countries. Sonexay’s most important and immediate task will be to convince Beijing to give debt deferrals on loans owed at a time it can barely afford interest repayments. Beijing, for its part, won’t want another key Belt and Road Initiative partner to default. Sonexay hails from one of Laos’ two most important political dynasties. His father Khamtay Siphandone was a former prime minister and state president in the 1990s, and aged 98 still exerts big influence over the party. “Sonexay, as a next-generation leader entrusted by the senior party leaders, is expected to lead those technocrats in crucial cabinet positions who are also from mainstream clans and close to dynasties,” says Toshiro Nishizawa, a University of Tokyo professor and a former adviser to the Lao government. “Sonexay’s ascension might reflect accelerated leadership rejuvenation attempts with the party’s inner circle consensus led by Thongloun Sisoulith,” the state president and communist party chief, Nishizawa added. Given the dynastic source of power, some analysts doubt whether Sonexay is much of a “technocrat”, although he has occupied key government posts and was made chair of a special economic task force set up in mid-2022. It “may represent a step backwards for any ‘good governance’ initiatives in Laos, such as they are,” says an analyst who requested anonymity. Indeed, the Siphandone family is known for being close to corrupt officials and involvement in the shady world of Laos’ extractive resources. An analyst noted that Khamtay “oversaw the peak of the logging boom in Laos in the 1990s.” The mood in Laos is mixed, even though rumors had been circulating for weeks that Phankham would retire. One Lao resident told Asia Times that they’re hopeful Sonexay can shake up the government and was pleasantly surprised that the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which would have directly managed the power transfer, had even accepted it. Some analysts had doubted rumors in recent weeks that Phankham would resign because they believed it would be an explicit admission of personnel and policy failure by the party. Even though Phankham used the excuse of poor health, which may or may not be true, many Laos reckon he was forced out. But another resident of Vientiane says that “most people are just resigned to how things are now. Most of the rural youth have already left for work in Thailand, the educated try for scholarships.” Sonexay’s assumption of the premiership is a major victory for the Siphandone clan, whose power base lies in the south of the country. His sister, Viengthong Siphandone, rose quickly through the ranks at the party’s last National Congress in early 2021 to become the new chair of the Supreme Court. She was formerly head of the State Audit Organization. Viengthong is married to Khampheng Saysompheng, a former minister of Labor and Social Welfare, and then minister of Industry and Commerce (he was replaced in June). He is “widely seen as one of many corrupt high-level government officials,” stated an analyst writing in 2015. As well as Viengthong, ranked 18th in the Central Committee, two other members of the Siphandone clan sit on the party’s decision-making body: Viengsavath (ranked 52nd) and Athsaphangthong (64th). Sonexay first made it into the Central Committee in 2006 after serving as governor of Champasak province, in southwestern Laos. A decade later he was elected onto the Politburo for the first time and made a deputy prime minister and head of the prime minister’s office, a position that put him in close contact with Thongloun Sisoulith, the prime minister at the time. Thongloun is now state president and general secretary of the communist party. As well as a deputy prime minister, Sonexay also in 2019 became Minister of Planning and Investment, one of the most powerful positions in the cabinet as it confers close cooperation with influential investors from China and Vietnam, as well as direct access to the governments in Beijing and Hanoi. Because of his family pedigree and fast rise through the party ranks, some analysts suspected that Sonexay might have been named prime minister at the last quinquennial power reshuffle in early 2021. But months before the National Assembly made its announcement, he only received the ninth rank in the Politburo during the party’s National Congress, a sign he wasn’t about to land the premiership. Instead, that post went to Phankham, who arguably took over at the wrong possible moment. After experiencing hardly any cases of Covid-19 in 2020, infection and death rates spiked in the months after Phankham became prime minister in March 2021. At one point last year, Laos sat at the bottom of the Nikkei Asia Covid-19 Recovery Index. Then came the economic crisis of 2022. Inflation has topped nearly 40%. The local currency, the kip, crashed in value by as much as 68% against the US dollar, as of October. About a fifth of the workforce is unemployed, reckons the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Worse, Laos’ debt-service obligations will average US$1.3 billion per year from next year until 2026, roughly the same amount the state had in official foreign reserves in June. It isn’t clear if Laos can continue making these payments or if it will receive further debt deferrals from China, its main external creditor. A default could be on the cards, many analysts reckon. Phankham may have been the public face of these crises, but Sonexay played an active role after being appointed head of the government’s special economic task force in June. He delivered the economic report at the latest sitting of the National Assembly in December. Phankham was also dogged by scandals. He has come under criticism for allegedly granting too many concessions for mining exploitation in the north of the country and over his government’s failure to adequately tackle corruption, Radio Free Asia reports. During his resignation speech, Phankham claimed that he was stepping down because of reaching the retirement age and “health problems”, although there is much skepticism about the claim. In addition, there are rumors that the Siphandone family advanced their power move because Khamtay, the 98-year-old patriarch, is currently in poor health. But a Lao source told Asia Times that Sonexay’s promotion may have come earlier than desired since Lao prime ministers are rarely re-elected. Sonexay is a “compromise figure” within the ruling communist party, the source added. It isn’t clear that Sonexay will entirely benefit from this early reshuffle, and that it might have been politically wiser for him if Phankham had continued for another 12 months or so in the job and then staged a reshuffle when the worst of the economic crisis is expected to be over. Most analysts expect a slightly better economic situation next year although the major problems will persist, as Asia Times reported last week the World Bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) growth of around 3.8%, compared to just 2.5% in 2022. Sonexay’s premiership could be helped in that his promotion comes as China races down the path of reopening from “zero-Covid.” Greater numbers of Chinese tourists are expected to visit Laos this year, boosting the important but depleted sector and delivering more foreign currency reserves to the state coffers. More Chinese investment and trade with Laos is also expected in 2023. Sonexay’s father, Khamtay, was the leader of the party’s military wing in the 1970s and 1980s, and is suspected of having opposed many of the pro-market reform ideas being led by party founding secretary-general Kaysone Phomvihane. However, Khamtay oversaw many economic reforms during his premiership in the early 1990s, although he strongly opposed political reform. Laos remains one of the most repressive states in Asia, with no free press or allowances for dissent. Sonexay isn’t expected to lead any major shift in foreign policy for Laos, which tries to balance between China and Vietnam, its main trade and political partners. Phankham was seen by some as being closer to the Vietnamese side, as he was the former president of the Laos-Vietnam Friendship Association. In November 2000, President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese head of state to visit Laos, following an invitation by then-Lao president Khamtay Siphandone. As investment minister, Sonexay was deeply involved in several Chinese-led projects, including the $6 billion China-Lao railway. He also has ties with Vietnam and Thailand. In October 2017, he led a delegation to Hanoi to meet Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Vietnamese prime minister Pham Minh Chinh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sonexay on his ascension to the premiership. US Ambassador to Vientiane Peter Haymond also offered his congratulations. “The United States is committed to our Comprehensive Partnership with the Lao PDR, and we look forward to working with the Prime Minister and his government to support Laos’ continued economic recovery,” he said in a statement.
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correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	44	https://soc.culture.laos.narkive.com/fm35iKt6/khamtai-siphandone	en	khamtai siphandone	https://narkive.net/favicon.ico	https://narkive.net/favicon.ico	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			https://narkive.net/favicon.ico		null	jimsouk Post by mosphena is he the most smart lao commu who knows how to treat lao people and let the country to prosper, or kaison does. can someone tell me khamtai and kaison whom you think produce more lao educated era? THE ANSWER IS NO !!!!!, HE IS NOT NOR KAISON, BUT THE SMARTEST PERSON DOES NOT WANT TO DO THIS JOB, SO HE TAKES AND DOES IT. THE SMARTEST LAO INDIVIDUAL IS Dr. JIMSOUK AND HE IS LIVING OUTSIDE LAOS FOR GOOD OF LAOS AND LAOTIANES. mosphena i think i am good getting out of laos before starving to death or kaison will send me to see god even ifmy time has arrived yet. but kaison taught all lao higher rank officials of the manipulative strategy rounding up all educated but lack of the keenest of talent to control the country letting the babarian kaison who has nothing just simply the trick talk get all the old lao folk listened to him blindfoldly and think that peace will go without a single bullet. this will teach my kids about political governance the system to stay alive with the manipulative talk.... laophuan Post by mosphena is he the most smart lao commu who knows how to treat lao people and let the country to prosper, or kaison does. can someone tell me khamtai and kaison whom you think produce more lao educated era? THE ANSWER IS NO !!!!!, HE IS NOT NOR KAISON, BUT THE SMARTEST PERSON DOES NOT WANT TO DO THIS JOB, SO HE TAKES AND DOES IT. THE SMARTEST LAO INDIVIDUAL IS Dr. JIMSOUK AND HE IS LIVING OUTSIDE LAOS FOR GOOD OF LAOS AND LAOTIANES. mosphena --------------------- Hmosphena, if you question and answer by your self or joke and laugh for your self, Khonlao think you have problem with your mentality, Yeah smart Lao/Hmong should be in the jungle of Laos, dummy Lao/Hmongs own the hotel-restaurant in the city of Laos, good luck! Laophuan!
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	26	https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/politics-of-laos-35932866/35932866	en	Politics of Laos	https://cdn.slidesharecd…t=640&fit=bounds	https://cdn.slidesharecd…t=640&fit=bounds	[ "https://public.slidesharecdn.com/images/next/logo-slideshare-scribd-company.svg?w=128&q=75 1x, https://public.slidesharecdn.com/images/next/logo-slideshare-scribd-company.svg?w=256&q=75 2x", "https://cdn.slidesharecdn.com/profile-photo-HistoryExpert006-48x48.jpg?cb=1549907088", "https://image.slidesharecdn.com/politicsoflaos-140616133333-phpapp01/85/Politics-of-Laos-1-320.jpg 320w, https://image.slidesharecdn.com/politicsoflaos-140616133333-phpapp01/85/Politics-of-Laos-1-638.jpg 638w, https://image.slidesharecdn.com/politicsoflaos-140616133333-phpapp01/75/Politics-of-Laos-1-2048.jpg 2048w" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2014-06-16T13:33:33+00:00	Politics of Laos - Download as a PDF or view online for free	en	https://public.slidesharecdn.com/_next/static/media/favicon.7bc3d920.ico	SlideShare	https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/politics-of-laos-35932866/35932866	1. POLITICS OF LAOS BENEDICT GOMBOCZ 2. OVERVIEW • THE POLITICS OF LAOS FUNCTIONS IN THE STRUCTURE OF A SINGLE-PARTY SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. • THE LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (LPRP) IS THE ONLY LEGAL POLITICAL PARTY. • PRESIDENT CHOUMMALY SAYASONE, ALSO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE LPRP, IS THE HEAD OF STATE. • PM THONGSING THAMMAVONG IS THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. • THROUGH THE NINE-MEMBER POLITBURO OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY AND THE 49-MEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE PARTY DECIDES ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES. • VITAL GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ARE VETTED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. • THE FISCAL YEAR 2000 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET PLAN WANTED A PROFIT OF $180 MILLION AND PAYMENTS OF $289 MILLION, SUCH AS CAPITAL PAYMENTS OF $202 MILLION. 3. MAJOR LEADERS OF LAOS MAJOR LEADERS OF LAOS • GOVERNMENT SINGLE-PARTY MARXIST-LENINIST SOCIALIST REPUBLIC • PRESIDENT CHOUMMALY SAYASONE • PRIME MINISTER THONGSING THAMMAVONG • PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PANY YATHOTU • PRESIDENT OF CONSTRUCTION SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH • LEGISLATURE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LAOS 4. POLITICAL MAP OF LAOS 5. POLITICAL CULTURE • THE FIRST MONARCHICAL CONSTITUTION OF LAOS, WRITTEN IN FRENCH, WAS ADOPTED ON MAY 11, 1947, AND DECLARED LAOS INDEPENDENT WITHIN THE FRENCH UNION. • EVEN THOUGH THE AMENDED CONSTITUTION OF MAY 11, 1957 DID NOT REFER TO THE FRENCH UNION, CLOSE EDUCATIONAL, HEALTH, AND TECHNICAL LINKS TO THE ONCE COLONIAL POWER REMAINED. • THE 1957 CONSTITUTION WAS ABOLISHED ON DECEMBER 3, 1975, WHEN A COMMUNIST PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC WAS DECLARED. • IN 1991, A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS APPROVED AND PRESERVED A “LEADING ROLE” FOR THE LPRP. • IN 1992, ELECTIONS TOOK PLACE FOR A NEW 85-MEMBER NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITH MEMBERS ELECTED THROUGH SECRET BALLOT TO FIVE-YEAR TERMS. • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH FUNDAMENTALLY SERVES A RUBBER STAMP FOR THE LPRP, ADOPTS ALL NEW LAWS, BUT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HOLDS POWER TO ISSUE BINDING DECREES. • THE MOST RECENT ELECTIONS WERE IN APRIL 2006. • MEMBERSHIP IN THE ASSEMBLY WAS EXPANDED TO NINETY-NINE MEMBERS IN 1997; IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS, THE ASSEMBLY HAD 115 MEMBERS. 6. INSURGENCY • IN THE EARLY 2000S, THERE WERE BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH SMALL EXCHANGES OF FIRE, ACROSS LAOS. • SEVERAL DIFFERENT GROUPS, SUCH AS THE COMMITTEE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN LAOS AND LAO CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, HAVE TAKEN ACCOUNTABILITY. 7. EXECUTIVE BRANCH MAIN OFFICE HOLDERS • OFFICE: PRESIDENT • NAME: CHOUMMALY SAYASONE • PARTY: LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY • SINCE: 8 JUNE 2006 • OFFICE: PRIME MINISTER • NAME: THONGSING THAMMAVONG • PARTY: LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY • SINCE: 23 DECEMBER 2010 POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTS THE PRESIDENT TO A FIVE-YEAR TERM. • THE PRESIDENT APPOINTS THE PM AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY’S APPROVAL FOR A FIVE-YEAR TERM. • ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE FOUR DEPUTY PMS; AS OF A JUNE 8, 2006 CABINET REARRANGEMENT, THEY ARE MAJOR GENERAL DOUANGCHAY PHICHIT (ALSO DEFENSE MINISTER), THONGLOUN SISOULITH (ALSO FOREIGN MINISTER), SOMSAVAT LENGSAVAD, AND MAJOR GENERAL ASANG LAOLY. • THE 28-MEMBER CABINET ADDITIONALLY INCLUDES ONECHANH THAMMAVONG AS LABOUR MINISTER, CHALEUAN YAPAOHER AS JUSTICE MINISTER, NAM VIGNAKET AS INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE MINISTER, SITAHENG LATSAPHONE AS AGRICULTURE MINISTER AND SOMMATH PHOLSENA AS TRANSPORT MINISTER. 8. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (SAPHA HENG XAT) IS MADE UP OF 115 MEMBERS, ELECTED TO A FIVE-YEAR TERM. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LAOS 9. POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS • SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LAOS ELECTION RESULTS, 30 APRIL 2011: • LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PHAK PAXAXÔN PATIVAT LAO) – 128 SEATS • NON-PARTISANS – 4 • TOTAL: 132 10. JUDICIAL BRANCH • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTS THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE’S SUPREME COURT ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE’S SUGGESTION. • THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE NOMINATES THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE’S SUPREME COURT AND THE JUDGES. 11. ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS • LAOS IS DIVIDED INTO SEVENTEEN PROVINCES (KHOUENG, SINGULAR AND PLURAL) AND ONE MUNICIPALITY, MARKED WITH A * (KHOUENG, SINGULAR AND PLURAL): ATTAPU, BOKEO, BORIKHAMXAY, CHAMPASSACK, HOUAPHAN, KHAMMOUANE, LOUANG NAMTHA, LUANGPHABANG, OUDOMXAY, PHONGSALY, SARAVANE, SAVANNAKHET, SAYSOMBOUNE, SEKONG, VIENTIANE*, VIENTIANE, SAYABOURY, XIENG KHOUANG. MAP 12. LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY • COMMUNIST PARTY THAT HAS RULED LAOS SINCE 1975. • THE POLITBURO, SECRETARIAT, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ARE THE POLICY- MAKING BODIES. • A PARTY CONGRESS TAKES PLACE EVERY FIVE YEARS AND ELECTS MEMBERS TO THE POLITBURO AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE. • THE CONGRESS ALSO ONCE ELECTED A SECRETARIAT, BUT THIS BODY WAS DISSOLVED IN 1991. • OF THE 115 MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 113 BELONGED TO THE LPRP IN 2007. FLAG OF THE LPRP 13. CHOUMMALY SAYASONE CHOUMMALY SAYASONE • BORN 6 MARCH 1936 IN ATTAPU. • GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (LPRP) AND PRESIDENT OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. • WAS ELECTED AS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY ON 21 MARCH 2006 FOLLOWING THE PARTY’S 8TH CONGRESS BY THE 1ST PLENUM OF THE 8TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE; SUCCEEDED KHAMTAI SIPHANDON, AND LATER SUCCEEDED SIPHANDON AS PRESIDENT ON JUNE 8, 2006. • JOINED THE PARTY’S POLITBURO IN 1991, SERVING AS DEFENSE MINISTER FROM 1991-2001; SUBSEQUENTLY SERVED AS VICE PRESIDENT FROM 2001-2006. • WAS RE-ELECTED TO HIS POST AS PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY AT THE 9TH LPRP CONGRESS IN MARCH 2011. • WAS LATER RE-ELECTED AS PRESIDENT OF LAOS DURING THE SEVENTH LAO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN JUNE 2011. PICTURE 14. THONGSING THAMMAVONG THONGSING THAMMAVONG • BORN 12 APRIL 1944. • PM OF LAOS SINCE 23 DECEMBER 2010. • MEMBER OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (LPRP) AND MEMBER OF THE LPRP POLITBURO SINCE 1991. • CURRENTLY SERVES IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF LAOS AND REPRESENTS LUANG PRABANG PROVINCE (CONSTITUENCY 6). • ALSO SERVED AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM 2006-2010. PICTURE 15. SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH • BORN 1 MAY 1928. • SERVED AS VICE PRESIDENT OF LAOS FROM 1996-1998 AND AS THIRD CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (PM) OF LAOS FROM 1998-2001; WAS SUCCEEDED BY BOUNGNANG VORACHITH. • WAS ALSO PRESIDENT OF THE LAO FRONT FOR NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION FROM 2001-2011; WAS SUCCEEDED BY PHANGDOUNGCHIT VONGSA. • MEMBER OF THE LAO PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. PICTURESISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	4	https://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Laos/sub5_3d/entry-2973.html	en	LEADERS, LEGISLATURE, ELECTIONS, BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION IN LAOS	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	[ "https://factsanddetails.com/themes/fad@site2020/images/logo.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Jeffrey Hays" ]	null		en	https://factsanddetails.…uch-icon_114.png		null	HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LAOS The most powerful position is the head of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Power is concentrated in the party. In most cases the leader of the party is the President. The President is the leader of the country and also head of the armed forced. He is technically chosen by the National Assembly but in truth is the most powerful member of the Politburo, which is selected through a mysterious process by Laos’s communist party . He has the power to rule by decree. Laos also has a Prime Minister. He is appointed by the President and is in charge of the running the government administration along with the Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Chairman of Committees (the equivalent of Ministries). Cabinet ministers are appointed by president and approved by National Assembly. Executive branch: chief of state: President Lt. Gen. Choummali Saignason (since 8 June 2006); Vice President Bounn-Gnang Volachit (since 8 June 2006). Head of government: Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong (since 24 December 2010); First Deputy Prime Minister Maj. Gen. Asang Laoli (since May 2002), Deputy Prime Ministers Maj. Gen. Douangchai Phichit (since 8 June 2006), Somsavat Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998), and Thongloun Sisoulit (since 27 March 2001). [Source: CIA World Factbook] The president of the country is elected by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly for a term of five years. One surprising constitutional provision transforms the presidency from a ceremonial position into an important political power. The president appoints and can dismiss the prime minister and members of the government, with the approval of the National Assembly — parliamentary responsibility that has not yet occurred in the short life of the current constitutional regime. He also presides over meetings of the government, "when necessary," and appoints and dismisses provincial governors and mayors of municipalities as well as generals of the armed forces, upon the recommendation of the prime minister. In addition, the president receives and appoints ambassadors and declares states of emergency or war. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] The powers accorded to the president grew perceptively during the drafting process of the constitution, but the sudden death of Kaysone, who had moved from prime minister to state president after the promulgation of the constitution, temporarily introduced doubts regarding the relative power potential of the two offices. Nonetheless, the president of state heads the armed forces and has the right and duty to promulgate laws and issue decrees and state acts. The primary organization for administration is the government, which consists of the prime minister — its head — and deputy prime ministers, ministers, and chairs of ministry-equivalent state committees. The prime minister, appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly, serves a five-year term. Duties of this office include the guidance and supervision of the work of government ministries and committees, as well as of the governors of provinces and mayors of municipalities. The prime minister appoints all the deputies at these levels of government, as well as the local district chiefs. * Politburo and Central Committee Laos is ruled by 11-member Politburo (Political Bureau), which operates in secret and is accountable to no one and does not make public any of its policy decisions. The members of the Laos Politburo are widely regarded as corrupt, inept and unable to make decisions. They are technically supposed to be chosen by the Central Committee but in reality are selected through a process known only to them directed primarily from the top. Other important bodies include the 61-member Central Executive Committee (or Central Committee) and the Council of Ministers (comprised of more than a dozen ministry heads) of the Laotian People’s Revolutionary Party. Since the elimination of the Secretariat in 1991, the Central Committee is the second highest body in the party hierarchy after the Politburo and made up of party elite who fill key political positions throughout the country. The Central Committee is charged with leading the party between congresses. In addition to members of the Politburo and former members of the Secretariat, the committee includes key government ministers, leading generals of the army, secretaries of provincial party committees, and chairpersons of mass organizations. * Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn from the Central Committee. A small group of men — seven in 1972 and eleven by 1993 — have provided the critical leadership of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary veterans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secretary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of common experience, appears to have developed. In addition to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise additional political power — perhaps even more than in most other communist systems — through important posts within the governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo members also held seats on the Secretariat. Many top members and leaders in the Laotian People’s Revolutionary Party are in their 70s and 80s. As of 2000, the youngest member of the eight-member Politburo was 69. Vietnam’s influence in Laos remains strong primary based on the ties of these old timers and their mentors in Vietnam. National Assembly: the Legislature of Laos Legislative branch: unicameral National Assembly (132 seats; members elected by popular vote from a list of candidates selected by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party to serve five-year terms). elections: last held on 30 April 2011 (next to be held in 2016)election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - LPRP 128, independents 4. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The National Assembly was formerly named the Supreme People’s Assembly. It had 107 members in the mid 2000s. Before 2002 it had 99 members. All but maybe one or two deputies are members of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. The Lao assembly debates very little and serves more as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the powerful 11-member politburo, propped up by a highly cohesive 61-member central committee, modelled largely on neighbouring Vietnam, its biggest political ally, which in turn is modeled on the assembly in the former Soviet Union. Laos’s National Assembly has its own Standing Committee, which is lead by a Chairman and Vice-Chairman. It convenes in ordinary sessions twice a year. Its main purpose is to rubber stamp policy made by the politburo. According to Martin Stuart Fox, a professor of history at the University of Queensland: “The National Assembly is just a rubber stamp and will continue to be one as long as Laos is a single-party authoritarian state", "Everything it decides on has already been determined by the party hierarchy ... What is debated is again determined by the party.’’ Although basically a rubber-stamp institution, the National Assembly representatives have become more critical on social and economic issues.” Although basically a rubber-stamp institution, the National Assembly representatives have become more critical on social and economic issues. According to the Voice of America: “On paper it is a body of lawmakers chosen by and for the people. But analysts say in reality, the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, a communist party, selects the candidates, who serve at its convenience. Stuart-Fox says the role of the National Assembly is to lend the party a pretense of democratic legitimacy. He says its duties are supposed to include passing laws and choosing government leaders. [Source: Voice of America, April 28, 2011] Official Duties of the National Assembly of Laos The national assembly passes votes on most laws and is be tasked with choosing a president and approving his choice of prime minister. The National Assembly, the country's supreme legislative body, is to be elected every five years. Significantly, this designation was used in RLG and French colonial times, before the introduction of the title "Supreme People's Assembly" in late 1975. It is located in a new building, far larger than the previous structure built in colonial times, and contains an auditorium seating 800 persons. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] The National Assembly makes decisions on fundamental issues and oversees administrative and judicial organs. Its most significant powers include electing and removing the president of state, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and the prosecutor general, "on the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing Committee." Its prestige has been further enhanced by the constitutional mandate to "make decisions on the fundamental issues of the country" and to "elect or remove the President of state and the Vice President of state", by a two-thirds vote, and to approve the removal of members of the government on the recommendation of the president of state. Its powers encompass amending the constitution, determining taxes, approving the state budget, endorsing or abrogating laws, and electing or removing the two top judicial figures in the system. Members of the National Assembly have the "right to interpellate the members of the government." The National Assembly also ratifies treaties and decides questions of war and peace. These powers may prove to be limited, however, by a provision in the constitution that the National Assembly will generally meet in ordinary session only twice a year. The Standing Committee meeting in the interim may convene an extraordinary session if it deems necessary. The constitution does not specify the number of members in the National Assembly, whose candidates are screened by the LPRP. The 1989 election placed seventy-nine members in this body, representing districts of between 40,000 and 50,000 persons each. The election campaign lasted two months, and candidates appeared before voters at night in local schools or pagodas. Voting consisted of crossing out unfavored candidates, and every ballot contained at least two candidates. The number of party members elected by this process was officially placed at sixty-five. * Between sessions, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, consisting of the president and the vice president elected by the National Assembly and an unspecified number of other members, prepares for future sessions and "supervise[s] and oversee[s] the activities of the administrative and judicial organizations." It is empowered to appoint or remove the vice president of the Supreme People's Court and judges at all levels of the lower courts. Its supervisory role can be reinforced by National Assembly committees established to consider draft laws and decrees and to help in the supervision and administration of the courts. The special National Assembly Law passed March 25, 1993, specifies five substantive areas for National Assembly committees: secretarial; law; economic planning and finances; cultural, social, and nationalities; and foreign affairs. The membership of the committees includes not only National Assembly members but also chiefs and deputy chiefs, who "guide the work," and technical cadres. * Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party In March 2011, Amelie Bottolier-Depois of AFP wrote: “The ruling communist party of Laos opened its five-yearly congress, an event analysts say will see a power struggle between rival pro-Vietnam and China camps. Red banners are on display throughout the capital Vientiane, where 576 delegates of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) are gathered until March 21 to choose members of the ruling Politburo, according to state media. Representing more than 191,700 party members, delegates are to decide who will take the key post of general secretary, currently occupied by 75-year-old Choummaly Sayasone, who is expected to stay in the job. [Source: Amelie Bottolier-Depois, AFP, March 17, 2011] The congress — described by the Vientiane Times as "the most significant event in the country's political life" — is the traditional venue for the redistribution of powers. But in a surprise move in December, Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh quit to be replaced by National Assembly president Thongsing Thammavon. Analysts say his appointment points to a realignment of power in favour of the party's pro-Vietnamese factions and those wary of major Chinese investments pouring into the country. "Some people saw in this a victory for the pro-Vietnamese over pro-Chinese members," said one foreign observer, who declined to be named. The reshuffle allowed the party — which has ruled since 1975 — to maintain strong ties with Vietnam's communists, according to Martin Stuart-Fox, a Laos expert at Australia's University of Queensland. "Political ties between Laos and Vietnam have always been strong, and Thongsing as a good Party man has been closer to Vietnam than Bouasone was," he said. According to Laos government: On March 17, 2011, the 9th National Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) convened at the Meeting room of the Party Central Committee Office, kilometer 6 in Vientiane with the participation of 576 delegates representing more than 191,700 party members nationwide. The congress took place under the theme:"Enhancing cohesive solidarity of the Lao nation and unity within the Party, upholding the leadership role and capacity of the Party, Devising breakthrough approach for the implementation of the renovation policy, Creating solid basis for lifting our nation from underdevelopment by 2020, and Advancing further towards Socialism destination". [Source: The National Assembly of the Lao PDR, 2011] Former Party General Secretary Khamtay Siphandone and the state and government leaders as well as members of the diplomatic corps and some international organizations also attended the opening session of the congress. In his opening speech, Politburo member and Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong expressed limitless gratitude and respectful commemoration to late beloved President Kaysone Phomvihane who found the Lao People's Army, Lao People's Revolutionary Party, a new regime and starting the principle based renovation policy in the Lao PDR. Comrade Thongsing Thammavong noted that the Congress took place at an important time, when the country received a great number of achievements in the cause of national defence and construction made in the past 35 years. Party General Secretary Choummaly Sayasone presented the VIII Party Central Committee's report at the opening session, while Mr. Somsavat Lengsavad, Politburo member and head of the Secretariat for the IX Party Congress presented the Seventh five year socio-economic development plan ( 2011-2015). The five day congress will consider and approve the political report of the VIII Party Central Committee to the IX Party Congress, the Seventh five year socio-economic development plan ( 2011-2015), and the amended rule of the Party. The Party Congress will make comments to the leadership review report of the VIII Party Central Committee and then there will be the election of the IX Party Central Committee. The representatives from line central and local Party Committees as well as role -model sectors will present their report, make inputs to different documents of the Party Congress. AFP reported: “The gathering choose members of the ruling Politburo as well as decided who will lead the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in the post of general secretary, Khenthong Nuanthasing told AFP. Choummaly Sayasone currently holds the joint position of party chief and president, making him the most powerful figure in the one-party state. He is eligible for another term. The Congress follows the surprise resignation in December of Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh, who was replaced by Thongsing Thammavong, 66-year-old president of the communist-dominated National Assembly. [Source: AFP, February 21, 2011 -] “At the party's last meeting in 2006, almost 500 delegates gathered to represent about 150,000 party members. They selected an 11-member Politburo and 55 members of the Central Committee, another key leadership body. Legislators for the communist-dominated National Assembly are to be elected by the public on April 30, after which a new government will be formed.” -\ Elections in Laos Elections in Laos for the National Assembly (NA) are held every five years. The last one was held on April 30, 2011. Seats by party : Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP): 128, independents 4. The next is to be held in 2016. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The election in 2002, was one year earlier than had originally been planned. In the election in February 2002, there were some new better-educated faces, including more women, few significant resulted from the election. Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal. According to the constitution those over 18 can vote and those over 21 can run for office. The president and vice president are elected by National Assembly for five-year terms. The prime minister nominated by the president and elected by the National Assembly for five-year term. Recent National Assembly election results: Choummali Saignason elected president; Boun -Gnang Volachit elected vice president. The percent of National Assembly vote for these elections is not available. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The law provides for a representative national assembly, elected every five years in open, multiple-candidate, fairly tabulated elections, with voting by secret ballot and universal adult suffrage. However, the constitution legitimizes only the LPRP; all other political parties are outlawed. Election committees, appointed by the NA, must approve all candidates for local and national elections. Candidates do not need to be LPRP members, but in practice almost all were. The most recent NA election, held in 2006, was conducted under this system. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] The NA chooses members of the Standing Committee, generally based on the previous Standing Committee's recommendations. Upon such recommendations, the NA elects or removes the president and vice president. The Standing Committee has the mandate to supervise all administrative and judicial organizations and the sole power to recommend presidential decrees. It also appoints the National Election Committee, which has powers over elections, including approval of candidates. Activities of the Standing Committee were not fully transparent. The NA, upon the president's recommendation, formally elects the prime minister and other government ministers.^^ Laotian Parliamentary Election in 2011 In late April 2011, Laos held elections for its national assembly today. Reuters reported: The five-yearly poll offered citizens a rare say in the running of one of Asia’s most secretive and tightly controlled countries but struggled to generate much excitement among Laos’s people, most of whom see the election as a formality, with candidates hand-picked and vetted by the only legal political party in what is one of the world’s last remaining socialist states. But there are some subtle changes this time that the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) says reflects the country’s diversity and offers greater representation to ethnic groups, women and rural communities, which constitute 70 per cent of the population. [Source: Reuters, April 30, 2011] “Because of its poor infrastructure, Laos will transport ballot boxes by air from five far-flung provinces inaccessible by road to speed up the vote count. An estimated 2.5 million eligible voters have a chance to elect 132 representatives from among the 190 candidates vying to become assembly members and “approve the fundamental issues of the nation”, according to state media. “ Lao Movement for Human Rights reported: “The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) announced the results of the legislative elections of April 30, 2011, by underlining the success and “the joyful atmosphere’’ of these elections, proclaiming ’the democratic rights of the Lao multi-ethnic people’’, ’’ in exercising their political rights’’, , while the international press qualified these elections as "pure rubber stamp’’ ’, ’’a recording room ’’ in a country where the opposition is not tolerated and peaceful demonstrations in favour of human rights each time severely repressed. The official press stated that 99.6 percent of the population participated at these mandatory votes (3.23 million out of 3.24 million registered voters). [Source: Mouvement Lao pour les Droits de l’Homme (MLDH),Lao Movement for Human Rights, May 13, 2011 ~~] As for the seats distribution, 4 out of 132 are not representatives of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). Women have not increased in number (25 percent). Among 38.6 percent issued from the ethnic minorities (51), 9 percent are Khmu (12) and only 5.3 are Hmong (7). Faced with this pretence of an election, the only goal of which was to enable the totalitarian regime to boast about its legitimacy to the donors and the international community, the Lao Movement for Human Rights solemnly demands that the Lao authorities give the power back to the people, so that it can choose its leaders freely, in accordance with a multiparty system. ~~ Professor Martin Stuart-Fox, a specialist on Laos at the University of Queensland in Australia, told the Voice of American the communist party controls all elections in Laos. "Overwhelmingly, the people who stand for the National Assembly elections are members of the party," he says. "A few independents are allowed to stand, but they have been checked out by the party." [Source: Voice of America, April 28, 2011 \|=\|] "But the names and who will serve have already been determined by the party. So, all the assembly does is simply to rubber stamp the decisions that the party has already made." Nonetheless, Stuart-Fox says the party has allowed a slight improvement in the body’s internal discussions. He says while in the past there was no real debate on issues, the National Assembly now, on occasion, addresses problems such as corruption, a growing concern. "And, this has been debated within the assembly without naming names, and, of course, nothing comes out of it in terms of prosecutions," he says. "But, it does signal the government's disquiet over the level of corruption." \|=\| Women and Minorities in the Laos Government There were 29 women in the 115-seat NA, including two on the nine-member Standing Committee, and three women were members of the 13-member Supreme Court. The 55-seat LPRP Central Committee included four women, one of whom was also a member of the 11-member Politburo and president of the National Assembly. Of 12 ministers in the Prime Minister's Office, two were women. The minister of labor and social welfare also was a woman. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] While 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas and the village chief and village council handled most everyday matters, fewer than 1 percent of the village chiefs were women. The LWU — the LPRP mass organization focused on women's issues with a presence in every village and at every government level — is the only organization that has representation in every village; however, only one member of the LWU represented women in each village council.^^ There were seven members of ethnic minorities in the LPRP Central Committee, including two in the Politburo. The NA included 23 members of ethnic minorities, while three of the 28 cabinet ministers were members of ethnic minority groups. The new president of the National Assembly was also a member of an ethnic minority. One SPC justice was a member of an ethnic minority.^^ Welfare, Taxes and Local Government in Laos Laos is made up of provinces, municipalities, districts, and villages. Local government is set up on the district and village level. Provincial governors and mayors of municipalities are appointed by the President. Deputy provincial governors, deputy mayors and district chiefs are appointed by the Prime Minister. Lack of funds severely limits government services Local divisions: 16 provinces and one municipality (Vientiane). Capital: Vientiane (Viangchan). Administrative divisions: 16 provinces (khoueng, singular and plural) and 1 capital city* (nakhon luang, singular and plural); Attapu, Bokeo, Bolikhamxai, Champasak, Houaphan, Khammouan, Louangnamtha, Louangphabang, Oudomxai, Phongsali, Salavan, Savannakhet, Viangchan (Vientiane), Viangchan, Xaignabouli, Xekong, Xiangkhouang. Independence: 19 July 1949 (from France). [Source: CIA World Factbook ++] Provinces are subdivied into districts (“muang” ), subdistricts (“taseng” ) and villages (“baan” ). Administration at the village level is conducted by local elected village chiefs and village councils. Munag officials appointed by the national or provincial government are responsible for important administrative duties such as tax collection, school supervision and agriculture projects. The constitution gives no clear guidance on provincial and district responsibilities except to specify that the leaders at each echelon must ensure the implementation of the constitution and the law and must carry out decisions taken by a higher level. In spite of the party's inclination to centralize decision making, provinces and localities have enjoyed a surprising degree of autonomy in shaping social policy. This independence is partly due to limited resources and poor communications with Vientiane. But the central government has also encouraged direct contacts along the borders with China, Thailand, and Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring jurisdictions. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower level are 112 districts (muang), further divided into subdistricts (tasseng), each with their own party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrictlevel party committees have also been abolished. At the base of the country's administrative structure are more than 11,000 villages (ban), only some of which have party branches. * A) Taxes and other revenues: 22.3 percent of GDP (2012 est.); country comparison to the world: 138. B) Budget: revenues: $2.066 billion; expenditures: $2.258 billion (2012 est.). Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-): -2.1 percent of GDP (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 83. Laos initiated a VAT tax system in 2010. ++ The government does not maintain a social welfare system, but the National Committee for Social Welfare and War Veterans operates a number of "orphan's schools" in some province centers and administers retirement pay to government officials. This retirement pay, however, is as insignificant as their salaries were before retirement. Orphans, handicapped persons, and elderly persons living in rural villages are usually supported and cared for by their relatives, although the level of support depends on the economic resources of the caretakers. Lowland Lao are traditionally tolerant of mentally handicapped members of their community, and these persons, although not economically productive, are allowed to live with their families and move around the village at will. This family approach to social welfare operates in the towns as well, often on a neighborhood basis but particularly relying on extended kinship networks. As a consequence, urban beggars were unknown between 1975 and about 1987, although a small number appeared in Vientiane after that date, perhaps reflecting the increase in urban economic differentiation as much as any increase in acute poverty. [Source: Library of Congress] Corporate tax rate: 22 percent, compared to 17 percent in Singapore and 35.6 percent in Japan. [Source: Yomiuri Shimbun] Bureaucracy in Laos The bureaucracy is under the control of the Council of Ministers (comprised of more than a dozen ministries). Technically it implements the Constitution, laws and resolutions adopted by the National Assembly and decrees and acts of the President. Committees are the equivalent of Ministries. In 1990s, bureaucrats earned $20 to $30 a month. Many grew their own rice and vegetables. The historical evolution of Laos created identifiable layers of bureaucratic behavior. Traditional royal customs and Buddhist practices set the foundation. Next, there was an overlay of French influence, the product of colonial rule from 1890 to 1954. During this period, several generations of Laotian bureaucrats were trained and often placed in subordinate rank to French-imported Vietnamese civil servants. The administration used French as the official language and followed French colonial administrative practices. From 1954 to 1975, there was an increase in United States influence, and the United States provided training and educational opportunities for future bureaucrats as well as employment in United States agencies. Because of its brevity, however, the United States impact was far less pervasive than the French. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] When the communists seized power in 1975, a new layer of bureaucrats — strongly influenced by North Vietnam and the Soviet Union and its allies — was added. Many of the French-trained and United States-influenced bureaucrats fled across the Mekong River. Of those who stayed, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 were sent to seminar camps or reeducation centers. The few Westerntrained bureaucrats who remained possessed French- or Englishlanguage skills and the technical competence needed to deal effectively with the Western foreign aid donors so critical to the economy. The Western-trained bureaucrats were essential because not many of the new revolutionary cadres who moved into key positions of bureaucratic authority had much formal education, knowledge of a foreign language, or competence in the technical and managerial skills necessary to run a national economy. The few cadres in each ministry who were capable of managing the economy were often unavailable because there were so many demands for their services: for example, meeting with visiting foreign delegations, traveling to international meetings, and attending political training sessions. Since its inception, the LPDR bureaucracy has been lethargic and discouraged individual initiative. It has been dangerous to take unorthodox positions. Some officials have been arrested on suspicion of corruption or ideological deviation: for example, "pro-Chinese" sentiment. Initiative has been further constrained by the lack of legal safeguards, formal trial procedures, and an organized system of appeal. The beginnings of a penal code, which the SPA endorsed in 1989, and the promulgation of a constitution in 1991, however, may solidify the system of justice and provide a clear definition as to what constitutes a crime against socialist morality, the party, or the state. * The lethargy of the bureaucracy is understandable within the cultural context of Laos. As a peasant society at the lower end of the modernization scale, the LPDR has adopted few of the work routines associated with modern administration. Foreign aid administrators frequently point out that Laotian administrators have difficulty creating patterns or precedents, or learning from experience. Laotians are known for their light-hearted, easy-going manner. This bo pinh nyang (never mind — don't worry about it) attitude is reflected in the languid pace of administration. Official corruption has also been acknowledged as problematic. * Kaysone acknowledged the bureaucracy's low level of competence. In his report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986, he chided those in authority who gave "preference only to (their friends) or those from the same locality or race; paying attention to only their birth origin, habits and one particular sphere of education." Patronage is but one area that has come under scrutiny and resulted in admonishments to strengthen inspection and control. Kaysone further railed against "dogmatism, privatism, racial narrowmindedness , regionalism and localism." Corruption in Laos The government of Laos is widely regarded as very corrupt but determining how corrupt is difficult because it is so secretive. There is probably less corruption than their could be based on the fact that few people is Laos are rich and there are not many foreign companies operating there. But on the other hand, the government brings in little money from income taxes or other revenues and bureaucrats and officials get paid so little they all must rely to some degree on corruption to bring in money. Many high level leaders and officials are said to be more interested in enriching themselves than in helping their poverty stricken country. Ordinary Laotians generally believe that people who have money are somehow connected with the government and those who don’t have money as having no connections with the government. Wages of all government officials were extremely low; and many officials, such as police, had broad powers that they could easily abuse. Many police officers used their authority to extract bribes from citizens. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] Some civil servants and high level government officials live in surprisingly nice villas despite $20 to $30 a week salaries. It can be argued that the low salaries are what drives them to become corrupt in the first place. But corruption seems to have gotten a bit out of control with as much as 40 percent of foreign aid going directly to the government while only 20 percent of the government budget goes education and health and other social welfare programs.. This particularly hypocritical as the Communists came to power with the promise of stamping out corruption from the previous regime. Low level corruption includes bureaucrats accepting “tips” to give a license, speed up paperwork and turning their back on smuggling. Many foreign operations in Laos employ a “fixer” that helps them navigate through the bureaucracy and pay bribes where they are expected. High-level corruption may include things like taking kick backs from logging companies and contractors involved in road and the dam projects. According to Lonely Planet: “Corruption remains a major problem. Far too much of the country’s limited resources finds its way into the pockets of a small political-economic elite, who pay little or no taxes. Smuggling of timber and wildlife threatens declared ‘bio-diversity areas’ (national parks where some people still live). Laws are flouted because the legal system is not independent, but under the control of the Party. [Source: Lonely Planet] Combating Corruption in Laos The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Corrupt officials reportedly were seldom punished. Police were trained at the National Police Academy, but the extent to which the academy's curriculum covered corruption was unknown. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] In theory the government's National Audit Committee has responsibility for uncovering corruption in all government ministries, including the MoPS, but in practice its investigative activities were minimal. Authorities arrested and administratively punished lower-level officials on occasion for corruption. There were no reports of criminal cases being brought to trial. The government-controlled press rarely reported cases of official corruption.^^ Central and provincial inspection organizations responsible for enforcing laws against corruption lacked defined roles and sufficient powers as well as adequate funding, equipment, and legal support from the government.^^ Prior to taking their designated positions, senior officials were required by party policy to disclose their personal assets to the LPRP's Party Inspection Committee. The committee inspects the officials' assets before and after the officials have been in their positions. However, the LPRP used its control of government authorities and media to block public censure of corrupt officials who were party members.^^ There are no laws providing for public access to government information, and in general the government closely guarded the release of any information pertaining to its internal activities, deeming such secrecy necessary for "national security."^^ Former Laotian prime minister Bouasone Bouphavanh vowed to tackle graft but resigned, analysts said, because he had failed to build a large enough powerbase in his communist party. Image Sources: Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Laos-Guide-999.com, Compton’s Encyclopedia, The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Global Viewpoint (Christian Science Monitor), Foreign Policy, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, NBC News, Fox News and various books and other publications. Last updated May 2014
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	68	https://academia-lab.com/encyclopedia/khamtai-siphandon/	en	Khamtai siphandon			[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Wikidata-logo.svg/20px-Wikidata-logo.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg/15px-Commons-logo.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Wikidata-logo.svg/20px-Wikidata-logo.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg/15px-Commons-logo.svg.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Khamtai Siphandon (February 8, 1924) is a Laotian politician and soldier. He was president of Laos from February 24, 1998 until June 8, 2006, when he was officially succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone. He was also secretary general (leader) of the communist-oriented Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the only legal party in the country, from November 24, 1992 to March 21, 2006 when he was replaced by Choummaly. He was previously a military leader of the Pathet Lao. After coming to power in 1975, he was appointed defense minister, army chief and deputy prime minister. After the creation of the Presidential Republic in 1991 he became prime minister, succeeding party leader Kaysone Phomvihane, who became president. After the latter's death, he became the party's leader and later became president, replacing Nouhak Phoumsavanh.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	91	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	en	New Lao PM inherits multiple poison chalices	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	[ "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AT-logo-wide-banner-1.png?fit=706%2C104&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1", "https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/?s=80&d=mm&r=pg", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Sonexay-Siphandone-Laos-2022.jpg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Laos-Laos-China-Railway-Poster-Facebook-e1556077338457.jpg?resize=780%2C401&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Third-Plenum.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/China-Yuan-Currency.jpeg?resize=1200%2C900&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/SE-Asia-Shadow-Puppet.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Phankham-Viphavanh.jpg?resize=780%2C468&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-28T104904Z_2030712917_RC138B6E0030_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-UN.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Fuel-Line-Inflation-May-2022.jpg?resize=780%2C486&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Hong-Kong-skyline-e1571882091566.jpg?resize=780%2C472&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Laos-Khamtay-Siphandone.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/071524_thomas_crooks_web-copy.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-EW.jpg?fit=1200%2C799&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/10-Facts-About-Child-Labor-in-Africa.jpg?fit=1200%2C900&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/AFP__20240720__364M8G9__v4__HighRes__TopshotYemenPalestinianIsraelConflict.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/trump-photo-for-web-669318769b60c.jpg?fit=1200%2C677&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/hq720.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Xi-Jinping-Global-South-copy.jpg?fit=1200%2C713&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Nvidia-AI-Processor.jpg?fit=1200%2C811&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/United-States-Flag.jpeg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-Submarines-China-Flag.jpg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "David Hutt" ]	2023-01-02T13:49:16+00:00	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the	en	https://asiatimes.com/wp…ATLogo-192px.png	Asia Times	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the unexpected early resignation of his predecessor. After weeks of rumors about whether he would go, Phankham Viphavanh offered his resignation as on December 30, the last day of a National Assembly sitting. He goes down as the shortest-serving prime minister in the communist era, in the job just shy of 24 months. Under his tenure, Laos had a particularly poor Covid-19 response in 2021 and then was hit by economic crises on multiple fronts last year. He’s also at the center of several scandals that have tainted the image of a formerly straight-cut apparatchik. “I am 72 years old, and am no longer in good health,” Phankham said before the assembly. “Because of this, I feel that I can no longer carry the heavy burdens our country is facing.” Sonexay, a former deputy prime minister and investment minister, received a near-unanimous vote from the National Assembly to become the next prime minister. Aged 56, he is one of the youngest premiers in recent history. “I understand deeply that this will be a difficult and challenging role,” he told the National Assembly. Indeed, Laos has one of Asia’s highest rates of inflation, a fast depreciating currency, and there’s no certainty it won’t default on its external debts, much of which is owed to key partner China, not least for a high-speed railway project connecting the two countries. Sonexay’s most important and immediate task will be to convince Beijing to give debt deferrals on loans owed at a time it can barely afford interest repayments. Beijing, for its part, won’t want another key Belt and Road Initiative partner to default. Sonexay hails from one of Laos’ two most important political dynasties. His father Khamtay Siphandone was a former prime minister and state president in the 1990s, and aged 98 still exerts big influence over the party. “Sonexay, as a next-generation leader entrusted by the senior party leaders, is expected to lead those technocrats in crucial cabinet positions who are also from mainstream clans and close to dynasties,” says Toshiro Nishizawa, a University of Tokyo professor and a former adviser to the Lao government. “Sonexay’s ascension might reflect accelerated leadership rejuvenation attempts with the party’s inner circle consensus led by Thongloun Sisoulith,” the state president and communist party chief, Nishizawa added. Given the dynastic source of power, some analysts doubt whether Sonexay is much of a “technocrat”, although he has occupied key government posts and was made chair of a special economic task force set up in mid-2022. It “may represent a step backwards for any ‘good governance’ initiatives in Laos, such as they are,” says an analyst who requested anonymity. Indeed, the Siphandone family is known for being close to corrupt officials and involvement in the shady world of Laos’ extractive resources. An analyst noted that Khamtay “oversaw the peak of the logging boom in Laos in the 1990s.” The mood in Laos is mixed, even though rumors had been circulating for weeks that Phankham would retire. One Lao resident told Asia Times that they’re hopeful Sonexay can shake up the government and was pleasantly surprised that the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which would have directly managed the power transfer, had even accepted it. Some analysts had doubted rumors in recent weeks that Phankham would resign because they believed it would be an explicit admission of personnel and policy failure by the party. Even though Phankham used the excuse of poor health, which may or may not be true, many Laos reckon he was forced out. But another resident of Vientiane says that “most people are just resigned to how things are now. Most of the rural youth have already left for work in Thailand, the educated try for scholarships.” Sonexay’s assumption of the premiership is a major victory for the Siphandone clan, whose power base lies in the south of the country. His sister, Viengthong Siphandone, rose quickly through the ranks at the party’s last National Congress in early 2021 to become the new chair of the Supreme Court. She was formerly head of the State Audit Organization. Viengthong is married to Khampheng Saysompheng, a former minister of Labor and Social Welfare, and then minister of Industry and Commerce (he was replaced in June). He is “widely seen as one of many corrupt high-level government officials,” stated an analyst writing in 2015. As well as Viengthong, ranked 18th in the Central Committee, two other members of the Siphandone clan sit on the party’s decision-making body: Viengsavath (ranked 52nd) and Athsaphangthong (64th). Sonexay first made it into the Central Committee in 2006 after serving as governor of Champasak province, in southwestern Laos. A decade later he was elected onto the Politburo for the first time and made a deputy prime minister and head of the prime minister’s office, a position that put him in close contact with Thongloun Sisoulith, the prime minister at the time. Thongloun is now state president and general secretary of the communist party. As well as a deputy prime minister, Sonexay also in 2019 became Minister of Planning and Investment, one of the most powerful positions in the cabinet as it confers close cooperation with influential investors from China and Vietnam, as well as direct access to the governments in Beijing and Hanoi. Because of his family pedigree and fast rise through the party ranks, some analysts suspected that Sonexay might have been named prime minister at the last quinquennial power reshuffle in early 2021. But months before the National Assembly made its announcement, he only received the ninth rank in the Politburo during the party’s National Congress, a sign he wasn’t about to land the premiership. Instead, that post went to Phankham, who arguably took over at the wrong possible moment. After experiencing hardly any cases of Covid-19 in 2020, infection and death rates spiked in the months after Phankham became prime minister in March 2021. At one point last year, Laos sat at the bottom of the Nikkei Asia Covid-19 Recovery Index. Then came the economic crisis of 2022. Inflation has topped nearly 40%. The local currency, the kip, crashed in value by as much as 68% against the US dollar, as of October. About a fifth of the workforce is unemployed, reckons the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Worse, Laos’ debt-service obligations will average US$1.3 billion per year from next year until 2026, roughly the same amount the state had in official foreign reserves in June. It isn’t clear if Laos can continue making these payments or if it will receive further debt deferrals from China, its main external creditor. A default could be on the cards, many analysts reckon. Phankham may have been the public face of these crises, but Sonexay played an active role after being appointed head of the government’s special economic task force in June. He delivered the economic report at the latest sitting of the National Assembly in December. Phankham was also dogged by scandals. He has come under criticism for allegedly granting too many concessions for mining exploitation in the north of the country and over his government’s failure to adequately tackle corruption, Radio Free Asia reports. During his resignation speech, Phankham claimed that he was stepping down because of reaching the retirement age and “health problems”, although there is much skepticism about the claim. In addition, there are rumors that the Siphandone family advanced their power move because Khamtay, the 98-year-old patriarch, is currently in poor health. But a Lao source told Asia Times that Sonexay’s promotion may have come earlier than desired since Lao prime ministers are rarely re-elected. Sonexay is a “compromise figure” within the ruling communist party, the source added. It isn’t clear that Sonexay will entirely benefit from this early reshuffle, and that it might have been politically wiser for him if Phankham had continued for another 12 months or so in the job and then staged a reshuffle when the worst of the economic crisis is expected to be over. Most analysts expect a slightly better economic situation next year although the major problems will persist, as Asia Times reported last week the World Bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) growth of around 3.8%, compared to just 2.5% in 2022. Sonexay’s premiership could be helped in that his promotion comes as China races down the path of reopening from “zero-Covid.” Greater numbers of Chinese tourists are expected to visit Laos this year, boosting the important but depleted sector and delivering more foreign currency reserves to the state coffers. More Chinese investment and trade with Laos is also expected in 2023. Sonexay’s father, Khamtay, was the leader of the party’s military wing in the 1970s and 1980s, and is suspected of having opposed many of the pro-market reform ideas being led by party founding secretary-general Kaysone Phomvihane. However, Khamtay oversaw many economic reforms during his premiership in the early 1990s, although he strongly opposed political reform. Laos remains one of the most repressive states in Asia, with no free press or allowances for dissent. Sonexay isn’t expected to lead any major shift in foreign policy for Laos, which tries to balance between China and Vietnam, its main trade and political partners. Phankham was seen by some as being closer to the Vietnamese side, as he was the former president of the Laos-Vietnam Friendship Association. In November 2000, President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese head of state to visit Laos, following an invitation by then-Lao president Khamtay Siphandone. As investment minister, Sonexay was deeply involved in several Chinese-led projects, including the $6 billion China-Lao railway. He also has ties with Vietnam and Thailand. In October 2017, he led a delegation to Hanoi to meet Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Vietnamese prime minister Pham Minh Chinh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sonexay on his ascension to the premiership. US Ambassador to Vientiane Peter Haymond also offered his congratulations. “The United States is committed to our Comprehensive Partnership with the Lao PDR, and we look forward to working with the Prime Minister and his government to support Laos’ continued economic recovery,” he said in a statement.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	29	https://dbpedia.org/page/Viengthong_Siphandone	en	About: Viengthong Siphandone	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	[ "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/dbpedia_logo_land_120.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/virt_power_no_border.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/LoDLogo.gif", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/sw-sparql-blue.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/od_80x15_red_green.png", "https://www.w3.org/Icons/valid-xhtml-rdfa" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Viengthong Siphandone (Lao: ວຽງທອງ ສີພັນດອນ; born ?) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). She is the daughter of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and sister of Sonexay Siphandone. She currently serves as President of State Audit Organization. She was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 10th National Congress, and to the LPRP Secretariat at the 11th National Congress. She is the wife of Khampheng Saysompheng.			DBpedia	http://dbpedia.org/resource/Viengthong_Siphandone	dbo:abstract Viengthong Siphandone (Lao: ວຽງທອງ ສີພັນດອນ; born ?) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). She is the daughter of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and sister of Sonexay Siphandone. She currently serves as President of State Audit Organization. She was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 10th National Congress, and to the LPRP Secretariat at the 11th National Congress. She is the wife of Khampheng Saysompheng. (en) rdfs:comment Viengthong Siphandone (Lao: ວຽງທອງ ສີພັນດອນ; born ?) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). She is the daughter of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and sister of Sonexay Siphandone. She currently serves as President of State Audit Organization. She was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 10th National Congress, and to the LPRP Secretariat at the 11th National Congress. She is the wife of Khampheng Saysompheng. (en)
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	1	https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-simple.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/220px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Crystal_Clear_app_Login_Manager.png/20px-Crystal_Clear_app_Login_Manager.png", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/poweredby_mediawiki.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2014-02-26T23:49:45+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	General Khamtai Siphandon (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924) is a Laotian politician. He was President of Laos[1] from 24 February 1998, until 8 June 2006, when he was officially replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He also served as Prime Minister of Laos from 15 August 1991 to 24 February 1998.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	47	https://market.sec.or.th/public/ipos/IPOSGetFile.aspx%3FTransID%3D46648%26TransFileSeq%3D83	en	Block Response			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	92	https://www.scribd.com/document/632490573/Chinese-Grand-Strategy-and-Maritime-Power-Routledge-2014	en	Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power-Routledge (2014)	https://imgv2-1-f.scribdassets.com/img/document/632490573/original/1238f45c79/1721887626?v=1	https://imgv2-1-f.scribdassets.com/img/document/632490573/original/1238f45c79/1721887626?v=1	[ "https://s-f.scribdassets.com/webpack/assets/images/shared/gr_table_reading.9f6101a1.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Kebede Michael" ]	null	Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power-Routledge (2014) - Free ebook download as PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read book online for free. Navy	en	https://s-f.scribdassets.com/scribd.ico?a248c1029?v=5	Scribd	https://www.scribd.com/document/632490573/Chinese-Grand-Strategy-and-Maritime-Power-Routledge-2014
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	64	https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/geos/la.html	en	The World Factbook			[ "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/ciaseal.gif", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/fblogo.gif", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/flags/la-flag.jpg", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/maps/la-map.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Executive branch: chief of state: President Gen. KHAMTAI Siphandon (since 26 February 1998) and Vice President Lt. Gen. CHOUMMALI Saignason (since NA March 2001) head of government: Prime Minister BOUNGNANG Volachit (since NA March 2001); Deputy Prime Ministers THONGLOUN Sisolit (since NA March 2001), SOMSAVAT Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998) cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president, approved by the National Assembly elections: president elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term; election last held 21 December 1997 (next to be held NA 2002); prime minister appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly for a five-year term election results: KHAMTAI Siphandon elected president; percent of National Assembly vote - NA% Economy - overview: The government of Laos - one of the few remaining official communist states - began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. The results, starting from an extremely low base, were striking - growth averaged 7% during 1988-97. Reform efforts subsequently slowed, and GDP growth dropped an average of 3 percentage points. Because Laos depends heavily on its trade with Thailand, it was damaged by the regional financial crisis beginning in 1997. Government mismanagement deepened the crisis, and from June 1997 to June 1999 the Lao kip lost 87% of its value. Laos' foreign exchange problems peaked in September 1999 when the kip fell from 3,500 kip to the dollar to 9,000 kip to the dollar in a matter of weeks. Now that the currency has stabilized, however, the government seems content to let the current situation persist, despite limited government revenue and foreign exchange reserves. A landlocked country with a primitive infrastructure, Laos has no railroads, a rudimentary road system, and limited external and internal telecommunications. Electricity is available in only a few urban areas. Subsistence agriculture accounts for half of GDP and provides 80% of total employment. For the foreseeable future the economy will continue to depend on aid from the IMF and other international sources; Japan is currently the largest bilateral aid donor; aid from the former USSR/Eastern Europe has been cut sharply.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	84	https://ameliaday.wordpress.com/asean-media/	en	ASEAN	https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/57df10870a4f7e82d8fd3b868a7e9d6f3e99a7c2f85967acb5a7360141701758?s=200&ts=1721655236	https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/57df10870a4f7e82d8fd3b868a7e9d6f3e99a7c2f85967acb5a7360141701758?s=200&ts=1721655236	[ "https://1.gravatar.com/avatar/442f1fc5cac4e248ea9306ec812e0bbeca8d2cf3934a5b47fa92b365a8cef6c6?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://1.gravatar.com/avatar/442f1fc5cac4e248ea9306ec812e0bbeca8d2cf3934a5b47fa92b365a8cef6c6?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://1.gravatar.com/avatar/442f1fc5cac4e248ea9306ec812e0bbeca8d2cf3934a5b47fa92b365a8cef6c6?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://1.gravatar.com/avatar/442f1fc5cac4e248ea9306ec812e0bbeca8d2cf3934a5b47fa92b365a8cef6c6?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/6a3ad4c26649d35cb30611e5541fc46d38a55fa16f4d927312adc4a7a954e7f5?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/6a3ad4c26649d35cb30611e5541fc46d38a55fa16f4d927312adc4a7a954e7f5?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/c0a0dfc06ca908c16694f5f1c6401a28e6d5ccb1524baf20aa0d8c42fa671935?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/212789ee31c5b0d06cfa3b675da24f679bf649b72d65a13451e1ad9a04b28aa5?s=70&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/528e97b242be6daed2c4c7a3892d3fa31405571028f6329b636006c6954bc78e?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/b97e6f98c5721d4215fc8dfb75a489b31587b8e15143ddd2120d6145b6f80307?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://1.gravatar.com/avatar/d326ec127fe6e971b235d9f6f05a8eeb9ba405c675e0378eda3aca9c28e077ec?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/0c9b256431c5d9506ae518bd4a86deed756eab7ca8a0e8f2947c65f0e74dd8a7?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/0c9b256431c5d9506ae518bd4a86deed756eab7ca8a0e8f2947c65f0e74dd8a7?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://0.gravatar.com/avatar/f13df579ed1955522519e4a4a146734f7270219477b18323a396b850269874b5?s=48&d=identicon&r=G", "https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/57df10870a4f7e82d8fd3b868a7e9d6f3e99a7c2f85967acb5a7360141701758?s=50&d=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.wp.com%2Fi%2Flogo%2Fwpcom-gray-white.png", "https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/57df10870a4f7e82d8fd3b868a7e9d6f3e99a7c2f85967acb5a7360141701758?s=50&d=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.wp.com%2Fi%2Flogo%2Fwpcom-gray-white.png", "https://pixel.wp.com/b.gif?v=noscript" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Josaphat Tetuko Sri Sumantyo" ]	2007-09-26T10:40:56+00:00	Kerjasama ASEAN dan Jepang: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi yang Komprehensif untuk Pengembangan Ekonomi Produksi Kawasan di Masa Depan oleh : Amelia DayDesember 2006 Daftar isi: ABSTRAKSI 1. Pembukaan 2. Tren politik di setiap negara 3. Tren ekonomi dan ASEAN Economic Community 4. KRITISI ATAS KERJASAMA ASEAN DAN JEPANG: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi 5. REKOMENDASI: TRANSFER…	id	https://secure.gravatar.com/blavatar/57df10870a4f7e82d8fd3b868a7e9d6f3e99a7c2f85967acb5a7360141701758?s=32	public policy, media & me	https://ameliaday.wordpress.com/asean-media/	Kerjasama ASEAN dan Jepang: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi yang Komprehensif untuk Pengembangan Ekonomi Produksi Kawasan di Masa Depan oleh : Amelia DayDesember 2006 Daftar isi: ABSTRAKSI 1. Pembukaan 2. Tren politik di setiap negara 3. Tren ekonomi dan ASEAN Economic Community 4. KRITISI ATAS KERJASAMA ASEAN DAN JEPANG: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi 5. REKOMENDASI: TRANSFER TEKNOLOGI DALAM PROSES PRODUKSI UNTUK MASA DEPAN ASEAN (SEBUAH PROSES INSIDE-OUTSIDE DAN OUTSIDE-INSIDE) a. Inside-outside process of tech transfer b. Outside-inside process of tech transfer 6. Penutup 7. Bibliografi 8. Lampiran a. Japan’s export to ASEAN and China by commodity (2005) b. Japan’s import from ASEAN and China by commodity (2005) c. Discussion document: Technology transfer and national innovation (IIPI, University of Campinas, Sao Paolo, Brasil, 2004) d. Technology Transfer and Commercialization (US Department of Commerce 2003 Report) – executive summary e. Trends in Japanese Textile Technology (US Department of Commerce 1996 Report) Abstraksi ASEAN adalah perkumpulan negara-negara sedang berkembang yang mempunyai peran penting dalam pertumbuhan ekonomi di Asia-Pasifik. Stabilitas politik dan pertumbuhan ekonomi di negara-negara ASEAN beberapa tahun terakhir bisa membuktikan kekuatan ekonomi di masa depan. Sayangnya, ASEAN hanya menjadi satu pasar besar yang belum belajar dari kesalahan masa lalu: tiadanya tranfer teknologi dari negara-negara maju di dunia. Pasca-Restorasi Meiji, Jepang adalah negara yang mengadopsi teknologi yang berkembang di Eropa. Percepatan adopsi teknologi di negara ini kemudian terlaksana setelah Perang Dunia Pertama. Perang Dunia Pertama juga mendorong Korea Selatan mengadopsi teknologi yang dikembangkan Jepang. Dalam tempo tiga puluh tahun terakhir ini, Cina juga mampu mangadopsi teknologi di segala lini dengan cepat. Motor Cina (mocin) sebagai satu contohnya. Untuk itu, kerjasama ASEAN dengan India, Cina, Jepang, Korsel, Australia dan Selandia Baru dalam East Asia Summit, ataupun kerjasama ASEAN dengan 3 negara (ASEAN+3: Jepang, Korsel, dan Cina) harus menjadi satu ajang yang lebih dari sekadar proses perdagangan barang dan jasa. Seharusnya juga negara-negara tersebut di atas membantu ASEAN dalam proses transfer teknologi di semua sektor yang diperdagangkan. Di samping itu, kesiapan institusi ASEAN untuk memberikan insentif bagi warga negaranya juga harus diperjuangkan secara paralel. Kerjasama ASEAN dan Jepang: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi yang Komprehensif untuk Pengembangan Ekonomi Produksi Kawasan di Masa Depan 1. PEMBUKAAN Jepang, Korea Selatan, dan Cina adalah tiga negara di Asia Pasifik yang hari ini menjadi barometer perkembangan ekonomi dunia. Pasca-restorasi Meiji, Jepang berkembang pesat mengadopsi teknologi yang terlebih dahulu dikembangkan di Eropa. Setelah Perang Dunia Kedua, Korea Selatan juga bangkit mengembangkan teknologinya: mobil hingga barang elektronik dan perangkat telepon seluler menjadi andalan negara ini. Cina negara berpenduduk terbesar di dunia kemudian juga lebih cepat lagi mengadopsi inovasi negara-negara yang telah terlebih dahulu berinovasi. Kurang dari 30 tahun, Cina kini siap industri otomotif tak kalah canggih. Dari daftar negara-negara anggota ASEAN-6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapura, Filipina, Thailand, dan Brunei), hanya Malaysia yang membangun ibukota baru yang hi-tech (Cyberjaya untuk komersial, dan Puterajaya untuk pemerintahan). Singapura juga memposisikan dirinya sebagai hub atau pintu gerbang industri berteknologi tinggi yang menghubungkan titik-titik perkembangan dunia seperti India, Cina, Jepang, dan Australia. Thailand juga maju dengan perkembangan teknologi di sektor agrikultur. Melihat progres perkembangan teknologi dalam negerinya, Indonesia, Filipina dan Brunei mungkin termasuk sejajar dengan negara ASEAN-4 (Myanmar, Laos, Kamboja dan Viet Nam). Walau sesungguhnya perkembangan di Viet Nam beberapa tahun terakhir ini juga cukup mencengangkan. Faktor “T” dalam proses produksi di Indonesia dan beberapa negara anggota ASEAN ini memang terhitung rendah. Keunggulan komparatif produk-produk dari negara-negara ini masih jauh di bawah produk Cina atau Jepang. Bahkan, Thailand yang mampu mengembangkan inovasi-inovasi pertaniannya mampu menciptakan buah-buahan yang memasok banyak negara. Perdagangan lintas-negara anggota ASEAN memang tidak besar bahkan cenderung tersendat. Salah satu alasannya adalah bahwa di antara negara anggota ASEAN adalah produsen barang yang sama, atau pengguna bahan yang sama. Alasan lain yang juga tak kalah pentingnya adalah pengembangan serta transfer pengetahuan/teknologi antar-negara anggota ASEAN tidak terlalu signifikan. Kalaupun ada, terkesan seakan ada keengganan para negara anggota untuk saling berbagi pengetahuan. Daftar Produk Ekspor/Impor ASEAN dan GPD 2004 Brunei Darussalam Major Industry: Oil and gas, textiles, food and beverages, building materials Major Export: Oil and gas, ready-made garments Transport equipment and machinery, manufactured goods, food chemimals GDP: US$ 5,4626.6 million Cambodia Major Industry: Textiles and Garments, Beverages, Food, Wood Processing Major Export: Garments, Textile Product Sawn, Wood Furniture, Rubber Major Import: Transport equipment and machinery, manufactured goods, food chemical GDP: US$ 4,215 million Indonesia Major Industry: Pulp and paper, cement, basic metals and fertilizer, power generation, telecommunication, transportation Major Export: Textile, electronic goods, footwear, oil & gas, plywood, sawn timber Major Import: Chemical and pharmaceutical, fertilizer, cotton yarns, textile fabric, machines, motor vehicles GDP: US$ 208,625 million Lao PDR Major Industry: Garment industry, wood-based and processing industries, electricity Major Export: Coffee, electricity, clothing, wood and forest product and Gypsum Major Import: Industrial machinery, chemicals, iron, electrical machinery and parts, oil, construction material and consumption goods GDP: US$ 12,043 thousands Malaysia Major Industry: Electronic & electrical goods, textiles, clothing & footwear, chemicals and metal products and rubber Major Export: Electronic & electric machinery, petroleum & LNG, textiles, clothes, oil, sawn timber Major Import: Manufacturing inputs, machinery & transport equipment GDP: US$ 103,737 million Myanmar Major Industry:Agro-based industries, textiles industries, steel mills Major Export: Rice, teak, beans & pulses, rubber, coffee, minerals, gems marine products Major Import: Power tillers, hand tractor, fertilizer, diesel oil, cement, dumper, loader, spare parts, water pumps, hydraulic excavator GDP: US$ 9,605 million Singapore Major Industry: Electronics, chemicals, banking and finance, real estate, tourism Major Export: Petroleum products, industrial machines, radio & television receivers, electronic component & parts, clothing, beverages & tobacco Major Import: Crude petroleum, iron & steel, industrial machines, electric generators, electronic component and parts GDP: US$106,818 million Thailand Major Industry: Electronics, gems/jewelry, footwear, textiles, clothing Major Export: Textiles, computer & components, integrated circuits and parts, gems and jewelry, footwear Major Import: Industrial machinery, iron & steel electrical machinery & parts, chassis body GDP: US$ 143,303 million The Philippines Major Industry: Priority sectors: construction materials, electronics, food, giftware and holiday decor, home furnishings, IT & IT-enabled services, marine products, motor vehicle parts and components, organic and natural products, wearables Major Export: Electronic products; garments; ignition wiring set and other wiring set in vehicles, aircrafts, and ships; coconut oil; woodcrafts and furniture; products manufactured from materials imported on consignment basis petroleum products; metal components; cathodes and sections of cathodes of refined copper; fresh bananas Major Import: Electronic products; mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials; industrial machinery and equipment; transport equipment; iron and steel, cereal and cereal preparations; textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and related products; telecommunications equipment and electrical machines, plastics in primary and nonprimary forms; organic and inorganic chemicals GDP: US$86,123 million (2004) at current market prices Viet Nam Major Industry: Agriculture, forestry, fishery, industrial construction Major Export: Crude oil, coal, chromium, tin, cements, woolen carpet, jute carpet, rich cinnamon, marine products Major Import: Motors, petroleum products, diesel oil, fertilizers GDP: US$ 39,021 million Data diambil dari http://www.ASEANSEC.org 2. Tren politik di setiap negara Tahun 2006 ini, Thailand mengalami fase khusus: kudeta damai pasukan militer Thailand terhadap Perdana Menteri Thaksin Sinawatra. Selain itu, masalah selatan masyarakat Islam di selatan Thailand yang terus menjadi satu masalah lain. Negara anggota ASEAN lain juga terus mencari format demokrasi yang terbaik bagi negara dan bangsanya. Menjalani perubahan demokrasi terstruktur, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, dan Abdullah Badawi juga Lee Hsien Loong tetap harus menghadapi masalah terorisme. Salah satu upaya untuk menyelesaikan masalah bersama, yaitu counter-terrorism efforts, tiga negara Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapura menyelenggarakan patroli bersama di Selat Malaka. Hal ini juga untuk memberantas pembajak laut yang meresahkan pengguna jalur laut di sana.[1] Selain itu, ada beberapa catatan khusus selama setahun terakhir: – Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi dan reformasi politik, – Brunei Darussalam: Sultan Bolkiah dan “kehadiran” Badan Legislatif yang vakum semenjak 1962, – Kamboja: pengesahan pemimpin baru, Raja Norodom Sihamoni yang masih muda dan kontroversi dia sebagai mantan penari balet Kerjasama counter-terrorism ini juga didukung oleh Amerika Serikat, Australia, Cina, Jepang, dan India. Tim Huxley (2005) menyatakan bahwa di bawah permukaan kerjasama keamanan ini adalah “keamanan suplai minyak” dari negara-negara di ASEAN. Untuk itu, kerjasama keamanan antara negara-negara ASEAN dan beberapa negara lain tersebut di atas kemudian meningkat menjadi kerjasama ekonomi di berbagai sektor. 3. Tren ekonomi DAN ASEAN Economic Community Pasca-krisis 1998, negara-negara ASEAN berbenah diri di bidang politik. Di bidang ekonomi, tidak semua negara anggota cepat mengadopsi perubahan. Indonesia dan Filipina adalah dua di antara yang berjalan lamban dibanding Viet Nam, Malaysia, dan Singapura. Membaiknya situasi politik dan ekonomi di negara-negara anggota ASEAN menjadi penentu utama dalam proses integrasi ekonomi ASEAN (yang akan diwujukan dalam ASEAN Charter 2020 dan diajukan menjadi 2015). Sesungguhnya tujuan dari ASEAN Economic Community (salah satu pilar ASEAN Charter 2020) adalah “common market minus”, yang disampaikan oleh Laporan ASEAN-ISIS 2003 “Towards an ASEAN Economic Community”. Jika ASEAN-ISIS mengusung istilah “common market minus”, Kajian ISEAS 2003 tentang “Concept Paper on the ASEAN Economic Community” mengajukan konsep “FTA-plus”[2]: However, as it stands, ASEAN governments are not even prepared to create a customs union let alone a European-style common market… Given the different degrees of opennes and stages of economic development among ASEAN countries, forming a customs union would be extremely difficult to achieve by the given deadline… [it] would be more realistic to envisage the end-goal of the AEC as an “FTA-plus” arrangement that covers a zero-tariff ASEAN free trade area and some elements of a common market. An “FTA-plus” AEC by 2020 would have the following characteristics: * Free movement of goods, services, investments, and capital. This would include achieving a zero-tariff free trade area and the elimination of all non-tariff barriers; * An attractive regional production platform that would be a magnet for FDI; * Free movement of skilled labour and creative talent; * Free movement of tourists from all ASEAN countries; * Harmonization of customs procedures and minimization of customs requirements; * Harmonization of standards that are consistent with international standards, and; * A well-developed innstitutional and legal infrastructure to facilitate the economic integration of ASEAN. Menggarisbawahi “different degrees of opennes and stages of economic development”, saya juga melihat bahwa fondasi hukum dan politik setiap negara yang terlampau beragam. Untuk itu, diperlukan sebuah alternatif kerjasama ASEAN yang lebih feasible. Hubungan ASEAN dan negara-negara lain di Asia-Pasifik seperti Korea Selatan, India, Cina, Jepang, Australia dan Selandia Baru bisa jadi sebuah alternatif yang menguatkan perdagangan internasional ASEAN tanpa harus “membabat” struktur hukum dan politik setiap negara anggota. Kerjasama ASEAN+3 atau negara-negara ASEAN dan Cina, Jepang, Korea Selatan kemudian menjadi keharusan. Hal ini mengingat bahwa beberapa tahun terakhir pertumbuhan ekonomi ketiga negara tersebut terakhir naik pesat. Beberapa tahun ini, investasi Jepang dan Korsel di Cina meroket, Cina menjadi trading partner terbesar bagi Jepang, dan Korsel menjadi eksportir besar dunia. Jika tidak sigap, ASEAN akan berada di titik kritis perekonomian dunia, atau setidaknya di kawasan Asia-Pasifik. Konsep ASEAN+3 berasal dari proposal Mahathir Mohamad “East Asia Economic Group” di saat kunjungan pemimpin Cina Li Peng akhir tahun1990 ke Malaysia. Baru pada tahun 1997, Malaysia sebagai konseptor ini dan tuan rumah informal pertemuan ASEAN+3 mempertemukan pemimpin Jepang, Korsel dan Cina dengan petinggi negara anggota ASEAN. Pertemuan terakhir di Malaysia tahun 2005 adalah meningkatkan ASEAN+3 kemudian ditingkatkan menjadi pertemuan tingkat tinggi East Asia Summit yang juga mengikutsertakan Australia, Selandia Baru, dan India. Secara bertahap, negara-negara ini mendalami kerjasama Asia Timur. Di tahun 1998, Presiden Korea Kim Dae Jung mengusulkan pembentukan East Asia Vision Group untuk mengkaji “concrete ways to nurture East Asia into a single community of cooperation, serving as the basis for the countries of the region to start the discussion on the related issues in earnest.”[3] Perkembangan politis dalam kerangka peningkatan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara-negara anggota ASEAN harus disikapi lebih kritis lagi. Salah satu kasus yang akan saya ambil sebagai contoh awal kritisi kerjasama ini adalah melihat kerjasama ASEAN dan Jepang secara khusus. 4. KRITISI ATAS KERJASAMA ASEAN DAN JEPANG: Sebuah Kajian Transfer Teknologi Saya akan memfokuskan pada kerjasama ASEAN-Jepang. Beberapa alasannya adalah: * Jepang merupakan negara pengadopsi teknologi Eropa paling awal di Asia-Pasifik. * Jepang merupakan negara pertama yang mempunyai standar transfer teknologi universitas dan dunia industrinya. * Informasi yang tersedia tentang transaksi perdagangan Jepang-ASEAN terbuka untuk publik, melalui situs http://www.ASEAN.or.jp. Kritisi atas kerjasama ASEAN dan Jepang ini tidak harus sebatas statistik inflows dan outflows dari setiap negara anggota ASEAN. Transfer teknologi-satu frasa yang telah diterapkan di negara Eropa dan Amerika semenjak 1995-harus ditemukenali dalam diplomasi kerjasama kedua pihak. Syarat “perkembangan teknologi” mutlak menjadi faktor pembangunan sebuah kawasan ASEAN yang bisa berkembang secara berkelanjutan di tengah kompetisi global yang kian tajam. Be hi-tech, or be left behind. Namun, melihat sifat umum orang Jepang yang “pelit berbagi ilmu dan teknologi”, saya pesimis kerjasama ASEAN-Jepang ini akan berbuah menjadi pertumbuhan ekonomi yang berkelanjutan bagi negara anggota ASEAN. Jepang hanya melihat ASEAN sebagai sumber dari migas, pasar ekspor, relokasi industri manufaktur. Sumber daya alam dan manusia yang melimpah akan habis dikuras oleh industrialis seperti Jepang, namun pertumbuhan ekonomi yang diraih negara-negara ASEAN mungkin tidak akan meningkat secara signifikan. Sebagian besar negara anggota ASEAN seakan melupakan faktor “T” atau teknologi dalam segenap proses produksi di dalam negerinya. Oleh karenanya, produk-produk dari negara ASEAN belum bisa berkompetisi dengan produk berkualitas yang dihasilkan Jepang, misalnya produk elektronik dan tekstil. Produk tekstil Jepang, misalnya, bahkan dikaji secara khusus oleh negara adidaya Amerika Serikat. Tahun 1996 Pemerintah Amerika Serikat menegaskan: [report of] Trends in Japanese Textile Technology shows that the emergence of a worldclass textile technology in Japan resulted from close cooperation among all segments of the industry, including producers of fibers and yarns, fabrics, apparel, and processing equipment. All the producers are driven by a relentless attention to product quality. Japan is working hard to maintain its technical leadership by increasing the pace of process innovation and expanding longer-range fundamental research in both materials and manufacturing.[4] Proses produksi dengan menekankan pada efisiensi dan efektivitas ditunjang dari berbagai penjuru: Practically every facet of the industry is covered from technological advances in fiber and yarn manufacturing, fabric making, apparel design and production, and the development of related equipment to the economics of offshore production and the role of government.[5] Penekanan pada inovasi teknologi ini juga ditegaskan oleh ilmuwan Jepang yang meneliti tentang produksi dan pasar ASEAN. Ushiyama (2005) meneliti keunggulan kompetitif dari produk tekstil dan aparel Cina dan Jepang dibanding dengan produk tekstil/aparel ASEAN. The quotas [of Multilateral Fiber Agreement], however, are to be eliminated entirely by January 1, 2005 according to the rules established by World Trade Organization (WTO). With this, trade in textiles and apparels will be completely liberalized, and China and India is likely to further increase their presence in the US and European markets, which combinedly account for some 40 percent of world textile product imports, as the two countries have higher overall competitiveness including manufacturing cost, scale and product quality than other exporters. There is even a forecast for an increase in US import market share of China to 50 percent, compared with 16 percent in 2002.[6] Tekstil dan produk-produk unggulan lain dari Cina dan Jepang memang telah masuk ke Indonesia dan negara-negara ASEAN tanpa kecuali. Sedangkan ekspor Jepang ke ASEAN adalah ekspor produk-produk hi-tech (lihat lampiran), seperti: 1. Machinery other than electric – power generating machinery – computer and units – parts of computer – metalworking machinery – pumps and centrifuges – construction and mining machinery – mechanical handling equipment – heating and cooling equipment – textile machines; 2. Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances – thermionic, valves, tubes, semiconductor devices, IC, etc. – visual apparatus (VCR, TV broadcast receivers) – audio apparatus – parts of audio and visual apparatus – electric power machinery – telecommunication apparatus – electrical measuring and controlling instruments – batteries and accumulators; 3. Transport equipment – road motor vehicles excl. cycles, – passenger motor cars, – buses, trucks and special purpose lorries, – parts of road motor, vehicles. 4. Others – scientific, medical, optical instruments – photographic and cinematographic supplies – blank/recorded media Selain keempat kategori besar di atas, ada empat kategori lain yaitu food stuff, raw materials, mineral fuels, chemicals manufactured goods classified. Hanya saja, produk-produk hi-tech dari Jepang ke ASEAN ini menempati porsi besar: 72,4%! Produk-produk yang diekspor oleh ASEAN ke Jepang atau negara lain akan kalah bersaing mengingat kualitas yang kian tertinggal, seperti yang ditegaskan oleh Ushiyama. Selain hambatan perdagangan yang diciptakan WTO (MFA atau Multilateral Fiber Agreement) yang memberi kuota terhadap tekstil dari negara-negara berkembang ke Eropa dan Amerika, pasar yang kian sempit ini akhirnya harus memberi jalan ke tekstil Cina yang lebih murah atau tekstil Jepang yang lebih berkualitas. Satu contoh yang mengalami kerugian dari keadaan ini adalah Kamboja. Ekspor aparel (baju dan celana) dari Kamboja adalah sebesar 80% dari total nilai ekspornya[7]. Hantaman terhadap Kamboja ini, sebagai contoh, bisa dipertimbangkan untuk pencarian/pencapaian solusi negara anggota ASEAN secara keseluruhan dalam pertemuan East Asia Summit yang akan datang. Saya merekomendasikan juga, bahwa sesungguhnya ada solusi lebih konkret yang harus menjadi pertimbangan institusional ASEAN secara internal. Negara-negara ASEAN yang belum mempertimbangkan faktor “T” secara serius dalam proses produksinya wajib menekankan hal ini ke dalam negeri masing-masing (inside-outside process). Kemudian saya juga mengusulkan negosiasi dengan negara-negara non-anggota ASEAN yang terkait dalam East Asian Summit nanti untuk dapat membantu proses transfer teknologi ke ASEAN. 5. REKOMENDASI: Transfer teknologi dalam Proses Produksi untuk Masa Depan ASEAN (sebuah proses inside-outside dan outside-inside) Ada dua hal yang bisa dikaji. Proses inside-outside serta outside-inside. Penguatan institusi ASEAN dengan perangkat transfer teknologi antar-negara anggota adalah proses inside-outside. Sedangkan, kerjasama East Asia Summit harus menjadi satu ajang untuk mempertimbangkan proses outside-inside (dari negara maju untuk ASEAN) agar kerjasama antar-pihak ini adalah kerjasama mutualisma dan berkelanjutan. a. Inside-outside process of tech transfer Telah lama negara-negara Eropa dan Amerika Serikat merintis proses transfer teknologinya secara internal. Transfer teknologi yang dimaksud adalah proses riset teknologi segala sektor di universitas, yang bisa dipakai langsung untuk pengembangan dunia industri mereka. Khususnya Amerika Serikat, universitas sebagai pusat riset teknologi adalah keharusan setiap negara bagian. Semenjak tahun 1995, mekanisme donor/fund dan insentif untuk universitas telah menjadi aturan hukum federal di sana. Board of Regents Policy dari Universitas Minnesota telah menetapkan paket insentif terhadap peneliti di sana. Paket insentif ini diambil dari pemasukan dari intelellectual property yang dibayarkan oleh industri yang menggunakan penemuan atau inovasi milik universitas tersebut. Perhitungannya adalah[8]: – 33,3% untuk kreator – 33,3% untuk Office of the Vice President of Research untuk mendukung riset yang lain – 8% untuk administrasi sekolah tempat riset dilakukan, dan – 25,3% untuk administrasi fakultas atau pusat kajian tempat riset dilakukan. b. Outside-inside process of tech transfer Jepang dengan ketergantungan pasokan minyak, gas, dan kandungan mineral lain yang cukup tinggi terhadap negara ASEAN harus bisa memahami kerjasama mutualisma ini. Sebaliknya, ASEAN juga harus bisa memposisikan diri sama tinggi dengan Jepang, atau negara lain yang tergabung dalam East Asia Summit ini. Untuk itu, diplomasi ASEAN adalah menjamin adanya transfer teknologi. Kekuatan hukum “transfer teknologi” menjadi penting, karena Pemerintah Cina dipermasalahkan oleh industri elektronik di Eropa karena copycat standar digital DVB (digital video broadcasting) tanpa membayar royalti atas paten[9] DVB. 6. PENUTUP: Insentif terhadap Transfer Teknologi Di saat perusahaan melakukan “merging, acquiring, leaving, dying, entering, growing, downsizing, outsourcing, and spinning off”, transfer teknologi menjadi satu obat mujarab. ASEAN memang belajar dari kesalahan kerjasama perdagangan yang ada di dunia. Di lain pihak, proses pembelajaran atas produksi yang lebih efisien dan efektif di tengah persaingan global ini, menjadi keharusan pembenahan institusi. Payung hukum dan paket insentif yang jelas untuk pengembangan teknologi dan transfer teknologi di internal ASEAN harus segera dituntaskan. Ada satu contoh konkret insentif atas riset yang berguna langsung terhadap industri: seorang peneliti warga negara Indonesia mengajar dan melakukan riset di Universitas Chiba, tempatnya menyelesaikan program S2 hingga S3. Sayangnya, temuan Josaphat Tetuko Sri Sumantyo PhD, sang peneliti ini, yang berupa antena satelit ringan dan tembus pandang, telah dipatenkan atas nama almamaternya: Antena ini bisa dipasang pada setiap laptop sehingga langsung bisa berkomunikasi dengan satelit atau diselipkan di balik atap mobil sehingga ke manapun mobil itu pergi, ia akan bisa berkomunikasi. Tiada lagi blank spot. “Sebuah produsen mobil di Jepang sudah membayar hak paten untuk memproduksi antena itu sebagai perangkat komunikasi standar di setiap mobil buatannya.” (Kompas, 2 Januari 2007, halaman 16) Artinya kemudian, penemuan Josaphat tidak menjadi milik negeri kelahiran peneliti ini, yaitu Indonesia. Sistem insentif yang tidak jelas, atau penghargaan/perlindungan terhadap intellectual property yang dihasilkan oleh peneliti seperti Josaphat ini yang juga belum jelas di negeri kelahirannya menjadi satu kendala pengembangan teknologi di Indonesia. Untuk langkah-langkah pembelajaran selanjutnya di Indonesia atau negara-negara anggota ASEAN sebagai developing countries, harus dikembangkan faktor “T” dalam proses produksi segala lini, horizontal ataupun vertikal. Teknologi dan pengembangannya-untuk langsung digunakan dan dikembangkan oleh industri dalam negeri-harus segera menjadi paket kebijakan khusus, baik dalam institusi ASEAN itu sendiri, ataupun dalam pertimbangan kontrak kerjasama ASEAN+3 hingga kerjasama East Asian Summit di masa mendatang. 7. Bibliografi a. Buku Aaron Chaze. India: An investor’s Guide to The Next Economic Superpower. John Wiley & Sons. Singapore, 2006. Denis Hew (ed.). Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Studies (ISEAS) Publication. Singapore, 2005. John E. Berkowitch. Trends in Japanese Textile Technology. Laporan untuk U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, Asia-Pacific Technology Program. Washington DC, 1996. K. Kesavapany, Chin Kin Wah, Daljit Singh, dan Dayaneetha De Silva (ed.). Southeast Asian Affairs 2005. Institute of Southeast Studies (ISEAS) Publication. Singapore, 2005. Rudolfo C. Severino. Southeast Asia in Search of An ASEAN Community. Institute of Southeast Studies (ISEAS) Publication. Singapore, 2006. Ryuichi Ushiyama. Textile Trade Liberalization: Concerns about Widening Gaps among ASEAN Nations. Japan Center for Economic Research. Kyoto, 2005. Samuel Bassey Okposin, Abdul Halim Abdul Hamid, dan Ong Hway Boon. The Changing Phases of Malaysian Economy. Pelanduk Publications Sd Bhd. Selangor Darul Ehsan, 2005. Saw Swee-Hock dan K. Kesavapany. Singapore-Malaysia Relations. Institute of Southeast Studies (ISEAS) Publication. Singapore, 2006. b. Situs dan media cetak Kliping harian Kompas, 2 Januari 2007 The Economist, The World in 2007 http://www.abu.org.my http://www.asean.or.jp http://www.umn.edu http://www.wikipedia.org Footnote [1] Tim Huxley, Southeast Asia in 2004, Stable but Facinf Major Security Challenges, ISEAS, Singapore, 2005:3. [2] Denis Hew, Southeast Asian Economies: Towards Recovery and Deeper Integration, Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, ISEAS, Singapore, 2005:57. [3] Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of An ASEAN Community, ISEAS, Singapore, 2006:267. [4] John E. Berkowitch, Trends in Japanese Textile Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Polic, Asia-Pacific Technology Program, 1996:5. [5] Ibid, halaman 7. [6] Ryuichi Ushiyama, Textile Trade Liberalization: Concerns about Widening Gaps among ASEAN Nations Japan Center for Economic Research, 2005:1. [7] Ibid,, halaman 7. [8] http://www.umn.edu [9] http://www.abu.org.my, posting tertanggal 12 Desember 2006 Data per January 4, 2007 ASEAN Broadcasting Landscape Brunei Negara Brunei Darussalam Head of State: His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah Capital: Bandar Seri Begawan Type of Government: Monarchy Land area: 5,765 sq.km Population: 357,800 (2004) Language: Malay, English Religion: Islam Currency: B$ (Bruneian Dollar). (on par with the Singapore dollar) US$ exchange rate On 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = B$ 1.69 GDP: US$ 5,4626.6 million (2004) at current market prices Major Industries: Oil and gas, textiles, food and beverages, building materials Major Exports: Oil and gas, ready-made garments Major Imports: Transport equipment and machinery, manufactured goods, food chemimals Brunei is divided into four districts, called Daerah: – Belait – Brunei and Muara – Temburong – Tutong A sub-division of a district, province, is called Mukim. Brunei consists of two unconnected parts; 97% of the population lives in the larger western part, only about 10,000 live in the mountainous eastern part, the district of Temburong. Major towns are the capital Bandar Seri Begawan (about 46,000 inhabitants), the port town Muara and the oil producing districts of Seria and Kuala Belait. TELEVISION in Brunei TV adspend: no data Total TV households: 216,223 (2000) Total Radios: 362,712 (2000) Free-TV penetration: no data Satellite TV: no data TV channels: 2 Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: Radio Television Brunei (RTB) 1 and 2 Local license: no data Total cable channels: no data Cable operators: National (or network) license: no data Local license: no data DTH operators: no data Satellite operators: none Regulatory Agencies: 1. Ministry of Communications 2. The Telecommunications Regulating Authority Laws, Regulations: Law of Brunei Chapter 180 Broadcasting (Revised Edition 31 October 2000) Special remarks: none specific CAMBODIA Preăh Réachéanachâkr Kâmpŭchea Head of State: His Majesty King Norodom Sihamoni Head of Government: Prime Minister Hun Sen Capital: Phnom Penh Type of Government: Parliamentary democracy with constitutional monarchy Land area: 181,035 sq.km Population: 14,131 thousands (2004) Language: Khmer Religion: Buddhism Currency: Riel US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 4,290 riel GDP: US$ 4,215 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Textiles and Garments, Beverages, Food, Wood Processing Major Exports: Garments, Textile Product Sawn, Wood Furniture, Rubber Major Imports: Transport equipment and machinery, manufactured goods, food chemical Cambodia is divided into 20 provinces (khett, singular and plural) and 4 municipalities (krong, singular and plural). It is also divided by District (srok), Communion (khum), Great districts (khett), and also Islands (koh). 1. Municipalities (Krong): Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville (Kampong Som), Pailin, Kep 2. Province (Khett): Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Kandal, Koh Kong, Kratié, Mondulkiri, Oddar Meancheay, Pursat, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Ratanakiri, Siem Reap, Stung Treng, Svay Rieng and Takéo 3. Islands (Koh): Koh Sess, Koh Polaway, Koh Rong, Koh Thass, Koh Treas, Koh Traolach, Koh Tral, Koh Tang Cambodia has an area of about 181,040 km2, sharing an 800 kilometer border with Thailand on the north and west, a 541 kilometer border with Laos on the northeast, and a 1,228 kilometer border with Vietnam on the east and southeast. It has 443 kilometers of coastline along the Gulf of Thailand. TELEVISION in Cambodia TV adspend: no data Total TV households: no data Free-TV penetration: 57% Satellite TV: 1. Bayon TV, 2. CTN National, 3. CTN International, 4. TV 5 Cambodia, 5. KTV TV channels: 7 Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: 1. Bayon TV, 2. Cambodia TV (CTV 9), 3. Cambodian TV Project Channel 21 (CTN), 4. KTV, 5. Aspara TV, 6. TV 3, 7. TV 5 Cambodia Local license: no data Total cable channels: no data Cable operators: National (or network) license: none Local license: Cambodia Cable TV, Phnom Penh Municipal Cable TV DTH operators: none Satellite operators: none Regulatory Agencies: 1. Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication 2. Ministry of Information 3. Ministry of Interior Laws, Regulations: Law on Copyright and Related Rights (Section 4: Rights of the Broadcasting Organizations) Special remarks: none INDONESIA Republik Indonesia Head of State: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Capital: Jakarta Type of Government: Presidential; based on amended 1945 Constitution Land area: 1,890,000 sq.km. Population: 215,960 thousands (2004). Language: Bahasa Indonesia Religion: Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism Currency: Rupiah US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = Rp 10,040 GDP: US$ 208,625 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Pulp and paper, cement, basic metals and fertilizer, power generation, telecommunication, transportation Major Exports: Textile, electronic goods, footwear, oil & gas, plywood, sawn timber Major Imports: Chemical and pharmaceutical, fertilizer, cotton yarns, textile fabric, machines, motor vehicles Indonesia borders Malaysia on the island of Kalimantan, Papua New Guinea on the island of Papua, and East Timor on the island of Timor. Singapore borders with Indonesia’s Batam Island. In addition to the capital city of Jakarta, principal cities of high population include Surabaya, Bandung, Medan, Palembang, and Semarang. Currently, Indonesia has 33 provinces (of those, 2 are special territories and 1 special capital region). The provinces are subdivided into regencies and cities, which are in turn split up in subdistricts. The provinces are: Bali, Bangka-Belitung, Banten, Bengkulu, Central Java, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, East Java, East Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, South Sumatra, Gorontalo, Jambi, Lampung, Maluku, North Maluku, North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, Papua, Riau, Riau Kepulauan, South East Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, West Irian Jaya, West Java, West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, West Sulawesi, West Sumatra. TELEVISION in Indonesia TV adspend: US$ 774 million Total TV households: 56 million Free-TV penetration: 84% Cable households: 600,000 Free-TV channels: over 100 nationwide Terrestrial stations: Free-to-air national (or network) license: 1. RCTI, (together with TPI and TVG) is owned by Bimantara Tbk, a public company owned by Bhakti Investama Tbk. Bimantara, through its SPV, MNC (Media Nusantara Citra), is progressively acquiring radio stations (with target 100 stations by 2007) 2. SCTV, is owned by Sariaatmadja family, in close relations with John Singleton of Australia. 3. TPI. See RCTI. 4. Indosiar, is owned by Salim Group, whose sister company is Elshinta Radio, a 24-hour news radio network all across Indonesia. 5. ANTV, recently its 20% share is purchased by Star TV Hongkong, is owned by Bakrie Group and managed by Anindya Bakrie, son of today’s Coordinating Minister of State Welfare. 6. Metro TV, owned by Surya Paloh, closely related to the late head of state, Soeharto, is the only one of 24-hour news station. Paloh also owns Media Indonesia, the national newspaper. 7. Trans TV, – Trans TV is owned by Chaerul Tanjung, who also owns Bank Mega. Today, Trans TV leads Jakarta with in house production. 8. TV7, – TV7 is closely related with Kompas-Gramedia Group, Indonesia’s top-ranked print media corporation. 9. Lativi, is owned by Abdul Latief, the former Minister of Human Resources (during Soeharto’s era), who also owns the department store Pasaraya. 10. TVG. See RCTI. 11. TVRI 1 National, a state-owned station, in prepation for being a public television station. 12. TVRI 2 Local, a state-owned station, in prepation for being a public television station. Local license Java 1. MQTV, is owned by moslem leader Abdullah Gymnastiar. 2. Bandung TV, is owned by local West Java businessmen. 3. JTV, is closely related with Jawa Pos newspaper, a leading newspaper mogul in East Java. 4. Daai TV, is closely related with religious Buddhist foundation, Tzu Chi. Also operated in Medan. 5. Space Toon, positions itself as children station, that is owned by Sukoyo, a former shrimp trader closely related to Kompas-Gramedia Group. 6. O Channel, is closely related to the radio network Hard Rock FM and MTV Sky who also owns franchised magazines (MRA Group). 7. Jak TV, is partly owned by Erick Tohir, owner of Republika the national newspaper (Mahaka-Masima Group). 8. Elshinta TV, Jakarta. See Indosiar. 9. Bogor TV, Bogor. 10. Cahaya Banten TV, Banten. 11. Ganesha TV, Bandung. 12. STV, Bandung. 13. BMS TV, Purwokerto. 14. Tegal TV, Tegal. 15. Karesidenan TV, Magelang. 16. TA-TV, Semarang. 17. Reksa Birama TV (RBTV), Yogya. 18. TV Borobudur, Semarang. 19. TV-E (Surabaya, Semarang, etc.) 20. TV Anak, Surabaya. Bali 21. Bali TV, is owned by Bali Post, a local Bali newspaper. Sumatera 22. Palembang TV, is owned by Sumatera Express, local Sumatra leading newspaper. 23. Riau TV, is closely related with Jawa Pos newspaper, a leading newspaper mogul in East Java. 24. Deli TV, is owned by local businessman. 25. Batam TV, is closely related with Jawa Pos newspaper, a leading newspaper mogul in East Java. 26. Sri Gemilang TV, Riau. 27. SAM TV, Riau. 28. Urban TV, Batam. 28. Semenanjung TV, Batam. Sulawesi 29. Makassar TV, Makassar. 30. Bunaken TV, Manado. 31. Manado TV, Manado. Kalimantan 32. Tarakan TV, Tarakan. 33. PK TV, Bontang. Maluku 34. Ambon TV 35. Maluku TV Total terrestrial-local channels: 89 (still growing) Total cable channels: 58 (with 7 local channels and growing) Cable operators: National (or network) license 1. Kabelvision, is owned by Lippo Group. 2. Telkomvision is a company under PT Telkom Indonesia, state-owned telecommunication company. 3. Indosat M2, is owned by PT Indosat Tbk, a listed telecommunication company who also owns and operates satellite Palapa-C2 4. Metra, is a company under PT Telkom Indonesia Tbk, state-owned telecommunication company, with PT Indosat Tbk, a satellite and telecommunication company. 5. Sky-Net, is a company broadcasting most channels from countries at northern part of Asia. Local license 1. Astabel Samarinda (of total 47 small operators) 2. Astabel Balikpapan (of total 36 small operators) 3. Makassar operators (of total 300 small operators South Sulawesi) DTH operators: 1. Indovision, is owned by PT Bimantara Tbk, who is using satellite Cakrawarta-1 (will be dysfunction in 2007) 2. Telkomvision, is a company under PT Telkom Indonesia, state-owned telecommunication company, who is using satellite Telkom-1 and Telkom-2. 3. Astro Nusantara, is half-owned by Kabelvision and half-owned by Astro Malaysia, whose license is still in dispute up till Q1 of 2006. Satellite Bird operators: 1. Indosat/Satelindo (Palapa C 2) 2. Media Citra Indostar (Cakrawarta 1) 3. Telkom Indonesia (Telkom 1, Telkom 2) 4. Pasifik Satelit Nusantara (Garuda 1) Regulatory Agencies: 1. Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission) Principal Office and 33 Provincial Offices: to regulate broadcasting independently, content to the structure of nationwide broadcasting system. 2. Department of Communications and Informatics: to regulate technical issues regarding frequencies allocation. 3. Film Censorship Board: to execute censorship before airng the drama programmes, including advertising materials. It remains under the supervision of Department of Communications and Informatics. 4. Commission for Supervision of Business Competition: to regulate firms in any sector, also regarding broadcasting and cable competition. Laws, Regulations: 1. Constitution 1945, Article (28) Letter (f) 2. Broadcasting Law 2002 3. Telecommunication Law 1999 4. Prevention of monopoly Law 2000 5. Provincial Government Law 2004 LAO PDR Sathalanalat Pasathipatai Pasason Lao Head of State: President Khamtai Siphandon Head of Government: Prime Minister Bounnhang Vorachith Capital: Vientiane Type of Government: Socialist republic Next election: Early 2007 (for the National Assembly) Early 2006 (for the LPRP Congress) Land area: 236,800 sq.km Population: 5,758 million (2004) Language: Lao Religion: Buddhism Currency: Kip US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 10,880 kip GDP: US$ 12,043 thousands (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Garment industry, wood-based and processing industries, electricity Major Exports: Coffee, electricity, clothing, wood and forest product and Gypsum Major Imports: Industrial machinery, chemicals, iron, electrical machinery and parts, oil, construction material and consumption goods Laos is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia and the thickly forested landscape consists mostly of rugged mountains, the highest of which is Phou Bia at 9,242 feet (2,817 m), with some plains and plateaus. The Mekong River forms a large part of the western boundary with Thailand, whereas the mountains of the Annamite Chain form most of the eastern border with Vietnam. Laos is divided into 16 provinces (khoueng), 1 municipality* (kampheng nakhon), and 1 special zone** (khetphiset): 1. Attapu 2. Bokeo 3. Borikhamxay 4. Champassack 5. Houaphan 6. Khammouane 7. Louang Namtha 8. Louangphabang 9. Oudomxay 10. Phongsaly 11. Saravane 12. Savannakhet 13. Vientiane * 14. Vientiane Province 15. Sayaboury 16. Saysomboun ** 17. Xekong 18. Xieng Khouang China has recently allowed its citizens to travel more freely to Laos. As such, Chinese tourists are expected to account for 25% of the total number of visitors to Laos (up from only a few percent) in 2006. Pressures to modernize tourist infrastructure, particularly to cater to package tourism, are expected to significantly impact Luang Prabang and other culturally important Laotian cities. TELEVISION in Lao TV adspend: no data Total TV households: 52,000 (1997) Free-TV penetration: no data Satellite TV: none Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: 1. Lao National Television (LNTV), 2. Lao Television Channel 2 3. Lao Television Channel 3 4. Lao Television Channel 4 Local license: none Total cable channels: none Cable operators: National (or network) license: none Local license: none DTH operators: none Satellite operators: none Regulatory Agencies: 1. Ministry of Communications, Transport, Post, and Construction 2. Ministry of Information dan Culture 3. Ministry of Interior Laws, Regulations: none specific Special remarks: The Government controls all radio, television, and newspaper thus reacts harshly to expressions of political dissent. Content is therefore severly restricted. Satellite dishes are legal on payment of a fee to the Government. MALAYSIA رسكوتوان مليس-Persekutuan Malaysia Head of State: DYMM Seri Paduka Baginda Yang Dipertuan Agung Tuanku Syah Almarhum Tuanku Syed Putra Jamalullail Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Capital: Kuala Lumpur Type of Government: Federated parliamentary democracy with constitutional monarch Next election: March 2009 Land area: 330,257 sq.km Population: 23,671 thousand (2004). Language: Melayu, English, Chinese, Tamil Religion: Islam, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Christianity Currency: Malaysian Ringgit US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = RM 3.78 GDP: US$ 103,737 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Electronic & electrical goods, textiles, clothing & footwear, chemicals and metal products and rubber Major Exports: Electronic & electric machinery, petroleum & LNG, textiles, clothes, oil, sawn timber Major Imports: Manufacturing inputs, machinery & transport equipment Malaysia is divided into two types of political divisions: states (negeri) and Federal Territories (Wilayah Persekutuan) that collectively have the status of a state. Eleven states are situated on Peninsular Malaysia, two on Borneo Island. Nine peninsular states are monarchies (hereditary sultanates unless otherwise mentioned): Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan (which has an elected hereditary Yang di-Pertuan Besar), Pahang, Perak (like Malaysia itself, a system of revolving monarchy with three royal families), Perlis (the only Raja), Selangor, and Terengganu. Malacca and Penang, both on the peninsula and formerly part of the Straits Settlements under direct British control, as well as Sabah and Sarawak, both on Borneo, each have a federally appointed titular Governor or Yang di-Pertua Negeri. Two federal territories Kuala Lumpur (the legislative capital; often called “KL”) and Putrajaya (the new administrative capital) are located on the Malay Peninsula, while the third, Labuan, is an island off the coast of Sabah. TELEVISION in Malaysia TV adspend: no data Total TV Households: 4,093,000 Free-TV penetration: 97% Free Satellite TV: TV3, 8TV Satellite households: 1,400,000 Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: 1. Radio Televisyen Malaysia 1 (RTM-1), 2. Radio Televisyen Malaysia 2 (RTM-2), 3. TV3 – Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd, Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad (STMB) or TV3 was incorporated in 1983 as Malaysia’s first commercial television station. It is part of Media Prima group of companies. Also called ‘TV Tiga’ (its name in Malay), it began broadcasting in the Klang Valley, (the area surrounding Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia’s largest city) on June 1, 1984. It soon increased coverage nationwide, and today can be received in neighbouring countries, either as a terrestrial channel or via satellite. In Singapore, the channel ran into controversy because it broadcast programmes in Cantonese. The Singapore government prevented local newspapers and magazines from carrying listings for the channel, even though these were available for the other Malaysian channels, and TV3 is not available on StarHub, Singapore’s only cable TV operator. 4. Natseven TV (NTV7), After being in operation since 1998, ntv7 is proud of its achievement in building a strong following amongst Malaysian television audiences. So much so that the public’s perception is that the Station has been around for much longer than this.Broadcast signals go through a network of 10 transmitters dotted around the country. Daily transmission begins at 9.00 am until past midnight. In October 2005, Media Prima Berhad announced its acquisition of ntv7. Media Prima also owns 3 other private TV stations in Malaysia – TV3, 8TV & Channel 9 as well as a controlling stake in The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd. 5. Metropolitan TV (8TV), 6. CH-9 media (Channel 9), Channel 9 was a Malaysian private-owned television station which started operations in 2003 and started taking a break since February 1, 2005. Test transmission started on April 1, 2006, airing music videos mostly in Malay. On April 22, 2006, Channel 9 will be relaunch as TV9 after being sold to Media Prima, Malaysia’s largest media company with the new slogan, ‘Dekat Di Hati’. TV9 will air programmes mainly in Malay. Local license: (network-subsidiary license) Television broadcast stations: 27 (plus 15 high-power repeaters) (1999) Total cable channels: 58 Cable operators: National (or network) license: none specific Local license: none specific DTH operators: Astro Malaysia Pay TV operators: 1. Astro Malaysia, Astro is a subscription-based multi-channel satellite TV service in Malaysia and also Brunei, the service is also available in some parts of Indonesia. It was launched in 1995, after the Malaysian government eased its ban on private ownership of satellite dishes. The service uses a ku-Band satellite, which requires a smaller size dish to receive the signal – larger satellite dishes are still banned. The signal itself is in DVB-S form and is encrypted. Channels carried on the Astro platform are still subject to editorial control or censorship, although Western news channels like BBC World have been able to secure carriage on it, in spite of previous disagreements with the Malaysian government. Astro’s own News Channel carries programming from the Arabic language news channel Al Jazeera, dubbed in Malay, as well as from Australia’s ABC Asia Pacific, which has not yet been able to secure carriage on Astro. 2. Fine TV 3. MiTV, MiTV Corporation Sdn Bhd is Malaysia’s second paid television operator. It was launched in September 2005 after having obtained all the necessary approvals from the censorship board on its broadcast contents. The company is offering over 40 channels from content providers worldwide. MiTV Corporation broadcasts up-to-date 24-hour channels from around the world, including channels such as MGM (English Movies), MATV (Hong Kong Movies), Arirang (Korean) and ZOOM (Bollywood). The subscription fee is RM30 a month. One of MiTV’s distinguishing traits from Astro (satellite TV), the only other paid television operator in Malaysia, is that it uses a standard UHF television antenna instead of a satellite dish to receive broadcasts. As a result, some of Astro’s major caveats, such as disruption of service under bad weather conditions, do not apply to MiTV users. MiTV is largely owned by Tan Sri Vincent Tan, boss of Berjaya Group. Satellite operators: Media Prima (Measat 1, Measat 2, Measat 3) Regulatory Agencies: 1. Ministry of Water, Energy, and Communications 2. Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) Laws, Regulations: Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 Special remarks: The Act consists of 282 sections regulating from ministerial powers and procedures, licences, MCMC powers and procedures, economic and technical regulations to consumer and social protections. MYANMAR Pyi-daung-zu Myan-ma Naing-ngan-daw Union of Myanmar Head of State: Senior General Than Shwe Head of Government: Prime Minister Lt. Gen. Soe Win Capital: Yangon Type of Government: Military Next election: Currently suspended Land area: 676,577 sq.km Population: 54,745 thousands (2004) Language: Myanmar Religion: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam Currency: Myanmar Kyat US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 1,180 kyat (parallel market rate) US$ 1 = 6.72 kyat (official rate) GDP: US$ 9,605 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Agro-based industries, textiles industries, steel mills Major Exports: Rice, teak, beans & pulses, rubber, coffee, minerals, gems marine products Major Imports: Power tillers, hand tractor, fertilizer, diesel oil, cement, dumper, loader, spare parts, water pumps, hydraulic excavator Myanmar is located between Bangladesh and Thailand, with China to the north and India to the north-west, with coastline on the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. The country has a total area of 678,500 square kilometres (261,970 mi²), of which almost half is forest or woodland. In the north, the Hengduan Shan mountains form the border with China. The fertile plains of the Ayeyarwady and Thanlwin Rivers are in the central lowlands of Myanmar. Most of the country’s population lives in this central lowland. The Shan Plateau lies east of Mandalay. In the south, the Ayeyarwady River fans out into a wide and fertile delta. Many crops are grown in this region, which borders the Andaman Sea. The Gulf of Martaban also indents the southern coast of Myanmar. It drains into the Andaman Sea. Myanmar is divided into states and divisions. Divisions are predominantly Bamar. States, in essence, are divisions in which particular ethnic minorities exist. There are 7 divisions and 7 states in the country. The administrative divisions are further subdivided into townships, wards, and villages. Major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay have larger metropolitan areas. Therefore, townships in the suburbs of such cities are designated as myo-thit (New Town). Upon reaching the government’s installed development markers, the New Towns become townships. Within the states, there are ethnic-based movements for self-autonomy and independence. Divisions – Ayeyarwady Division (Irrawaddy Division) – Bago Division (Pegu Division) – Magway Division – Mandalay Division – Sagaing Division – Tanintharyi Division (Tenasserim Division) – Yangon Division (Rangoon Division) States – Chin State – Kachin State – Kayin State (Karen State) – Kayah State (Karenni State) – Mon State – Rakhine State (Arakan State) – Shan State TELEVISION in Myanmar TV adspend: no data Total TV households: 260,000 (1997) Free-TV penetration: 82% (only out of 324 towns, total 266 tows are receiving telecast) Total cable channels: none Satellite TV: MRTV3 International Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: 1. TV Myanmar channel 6, state-run, operated by Myanmar TV and Radio Department – broadcasts in Burmese, Arakanese, Shan, Karen, Kachin, Kayah, Chin, Mon and English 2. MRTV-3, state-run international TV service 3. MRTV-4, pay TV service(only available in Yangon) 4. TV Myawady, army-run network Local license: no data Cable operators: National (or network) license: no data Local license: no data DTH operators: none Satellite operators: none Regulatory Agencies: MRTD (Myanmar Radio Television Department) Myanmar Television & Radio Department Laws, Regulations: none specific Special remarks: none specific SINGAPORE Republic of Singapore – Republik Singapura – சிங்கப்பூர் குடியரசு Head of State: President S R Nathan Head of Government: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong Capital: Singapore Type of Government: Parliamentary democracy Next election: 2007 Land area: 697.1 sq.km Population: 4.198 million (2004) Language: English, Malay, Mandarin, Tamil Religion: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Taoism and Hinduism Currency: Singapore Dollar (S$) US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = S$ 1.69 GDP: US$106,818 million (2004) at current market prices Major Industries: Electronics, chemicals, banking and finance, real estate, tourism Major Exports: Petroleum products, industrial machines, radio & television receivers, electronic component & parts, clothing, beverages & tobacco Major Imports: Crude petroleum, iron & steel, industrial machines, electric generators, electronic component and parts Singapore is a diamond-shaped island separated from the Peninsular Malaysia by the Tebrau Straits. (details) Singapore is a diamond-shaped island with surrounding smaller islands. There are two connections from Singapore to the Malaysian state of Johor – a man-made causeway known as the Causeway to the north, crossing the Tebrau Straits, and Tuas Second Link, a bridge in the western part of Singapore that connects to Johor. Jurong Island, Pulau Tekong, Pulau Ubin and Sentosa are the largest of Singapore’s many smaller islands. The highest point of Singapore is Bukit Timah Hill, with a height of 166 metres (538 ft). TELEVISION in Singapore TV adspend: no data Total TV households: 1.33 million (1997) Free-TV penetration: 99% Free satellite TV: Channel NewsAsia (AsiaSat 3S) Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: Television broadcast stations (as of March 2006): 6 free-to-air(analogue) + 1 digital channel (TV Mobile) 1. Channel 5, MediaCorp TV’s Channel 5 is a 24-hour, English-language television channel based in Singapore. Programmes on Channel 5 normally includes English dramas, variety shows, news, current affairs and game programmes and general adaption of overseas productions, such as Singapore Idol and Who Wants to be a Millionaire?. 2. Channel 8, MediaCorp TV’s Channel 8 (八频道, Bā Píndào) is a 24-hour, Chinese-language television channel. The highest-rated channel in Singapore, it has Chinese dramas, variety shows, news and current affairs programmes. Special events like “NKF Charity Show”, “Star Search” and “Star Awards” are broadcasted on this channel. 3. Central & Suria, 4. Channel NewsAsia, Channel NewsAsia (Simplified Chinese: 亚洲新闻台; Traditional Chinese: 亞洲新聞台; Hanyu Pinyin: Yàzhōu Xīnwén Tái; abbreviated CNA) is a pan-Asian news channel based in Singapore and owned by Mediacorp. Started in 1 March 1999, it has since grown into a major Asian news broadcaster with programmes telecast to 16.3 million homes and hotels in 20 Asian territories today. It is available on the Asiasat 3S satellite. Channel NewsAsia Singapore’s feed is available on the free to air network in Singapore as well as on MediaCorp’s TV Mobile service on SBS Transit public buses & selected locales. 5. Channel U, MediaCorp TV’s Channel U (U频道; pinyin: U Pīn Dào) is the second Chinese-language channel in Singapore which commenced broadcast on 1 January 2005 (although it had been broadcast since 6 May 2001 under SPH Mediaworks). Taking over the channel from SPH Mediaworks as a result of the media merger, it aims to target the younger generations of Singaporeans as an alternative to the more mainstream and established Channel 8 with its new tagline, Leading Asia’s Trends 带动亚洲流行. 6. Channel i Local license: none Remarks: MediaCorp TV: Channel 5, Channel 8, Channel U, TVMobile MediaCorp TV12: Suria, Central, Arts Central, Kids Central, Vasantham Central, MediaCorp News: Channel NewsAsia Stations From Overseas: Due to Singapore’s close proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia, many Singaporeans are able to enjoy a variety of TV programmes from the following overseas stations which are broadcasting on VHF and UHF bands: RTM 1 (http://www.rtm.net.my/) aka “TV1” (Malaysia) RTM 2 (http://www.rtm.net.my/) aka “TV2” (Malaysia) TV3 (http://www.tv3.com.my/) (Malaysia) NTV7 (http://www.ntv7.com.my/) (Malaysia) 8TV (http://www.8tv.com.my/) (Malaysia) TVRI (http://www.tvri.co.id/) (Indonesia) Batam TV (Indonesia) TPI (http://www.tpi.tv/) (Indonesia) RCTI (http://www.rcti.tv/) (Indonesia) SCTV (http://www.sctv.co.id/) (Indonesia) ANTV (http://www.an.tv/) (Indonesia) Total cable channels: 41 Cable/broadband operators: National (or network) license: StarHub, SingTel, Anytime, Tivit Local license: none DTH operators: none Satellite operators: AsiaSat 2, AsiaSat 3S AsiaSat 4 Regulatory Agencies: 1. Ministry of Information, Communication, and The Arts (MITA) 2. Multimedia Development Authority (MDA) & Information Development Authority (IDA): to regulate the use of receiving satellite dishes, ensures public service broadcasting obligations by broadcasting licensees, establishes guidelines on programme quality and balance in subject matter and censorship, collects licence fees from households, vehicle owners and broadcasters, and liaises with foreign broadcasters to promote and market Singapore as a regional hub. Laws, Regulations: Broadcasting Act 2003 (revised edition) Special remarks: Radio and television stations are all government-owned entities. All seven television channels are owned by MediaCorp; its only other competitor, SPH Mediaworks closed its television channel on January 1, 2005. Due to the proximity of Singapore to Malaysia and Indonesia, almost all radios and television sets in Singapore can pick up broadcast signals from both countries. Private ownership of satellite dishes is banned, but most households have access to the StarHub cable TV network. As of 1997, there were 1.3 million televisions in Singapore. All radio stations are operated either by MediaCorp, the Singapore Armed Forces Reservist Association (SAFRA) or UnionWorks. As of 1997, there were 2.5 million radios in Singapore. The print media is dominated by Singapore Press Holdings which publishes The Straits Times. Daily newspapers are published in English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. THAILAND ราชอาณาจักรไทย Racha-anachakra Thai Kingdom of Thailand Head of State: His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej Head of Government: Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont Capital: Bangkok Type of Government: Parliamentary democracy with constitutional monarch Next election: Upper House (due in April 2006) Lower House (due in February 2009) Land area: 513,254 sq.km Population: 64,470 thousands (2003) Language: Thai Religion: Buddhism, Islam Currency: Baht US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 41.24 baht GDP: US$ 143,303 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Electronics, gems/jewelry, footwear, textiles, clothing Major Exports: Textiles, computer & components, integrated circuits and parts, gems and jewelry, footwear Major Imports: Industrial machinery, iron & steel electrical machinery & parts, chassis body Thailand is home to several distinct geographic regions, partly corresponding to the provincial groups. The north of the country is mountainous, with the highest point being Doi Inthanon at 2,576 m. The northeast consists of the Khorat Plateau, bordered to the east by the Mekong river. The centre of the country is dominated by the predominantly flat Chao Phraya river valley, which runs into the Gulf of Thailand. The south consists of the narrow Kra Isthmus that widens into the Malay Peninsula. Thailand is divided into 75 provinces (จังหวัด, changwat), which are gathered into 5 groups of provinces by location. There are also 2 special governed districts: the capital Bangkok (Krung Thep Maha Nakhon in Thai) and Pattaya. However Pattaya is still part of Chonburi Province. Some Thai people still count Bangkok as one province, making Thailand a 76-province country. Each province is divided into smaller districts – as of 2000 there are 795 districts (อำเภอ, amphoe), 81 sub-districts (กิ่งอำเภอ, king amphoe) and 50 districts of Bangkok (เขต, khet). However, some parts of the provinces bordering Bangkok are referred to as Greater Bangkok (ปริมณฑล, pari monthon). These Provinces include Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon. The name of each capital city (เมือง, mueang) is the same as that of the province: for example, the capital of Chiang Mai province (changwat Chiang Mai) is amphoe Mueang Chiang Mai. The 75 provinces are as follows: North Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Kamphaeng Phet, Lampang, Lamphun, Mae Hong Son, Nakhon Sawan, Nan, Phayao, Phetchabun, Phichit, Phitsanulok, Phrae, Sukhothai, Tak, Uthai Thani, Uttaradit Northeast Amnat Charoen, Buri Ram, Chaiyaphum, Kalasin, Khon Kaen, Loei, Maha Sarakham, Mukdahan, Nakhon Phanom, Nakhon Ratchasima, Nong Bua Lamphu, Nong Khai, Roi Et, Sakon Nakhon, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Ubon Ratchathani, Udon Thani, Yasothon East Chanthaburi, Chon Buri, Prachin Buri, Rayong, Sa Kaeo, Trat Central Ang Thong, Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Chai Nat, Kanchanaburi, Lop Buri, Nakhon Nayok, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Phetchaburi, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Ratchaburi, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Samut Songkhram, Saraburi, Sing Buri, Suphan Buri South Chumphon, Krabi, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Narathiwat, Pattani, Phang Nga, Phatthalung, Phuket, Ranong, Satun, Songkhla, Surat Thani, Trang, Yala Special Governed Districts Krung Thep Maha Nakhon (Bangkok), Mueang Pattaya (Pattaya) TELEVISION in Thailand TV adspend: no data Total TV households: 17,520,000 Free-TV penetration: 98% Cable households: 427,000 DTH households: 436,193 Broadband households: 1 million Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: Thailand’s six terrestrial TV stations are based in Bangkok and are relayed to all parts of the country through repeaters. Although Thailand has experimented with digital terrestrial television on a trial basis, the delays in establishing the NBC will likely slow the conversion from analogue to digital broadcasting technology. 1. ITV/Independent TV, public company limited, operated by concessionaire. 2. TV 3/Thai TV Color Channel 3, owned by MCOT and operated by concessionaire. 3. TV 5, owned by Royal Thai Army TV and operated by the Army itself. 4. BBTV/Bangkok Broadcasting Television TV7, owned by Royal Thai Army TV and operated by concessionaire. 5. TV 9/Thai TV Color Channel 9, owned by MCOT, became a public company listed in the Thailand Stock Market November 2004. 6. TVT/TV 11/Television of Thailand, owned by Public Relations Department, and it is non-commercial. Local license: 28 rebroadcast of TV7, and 21 of TV 11 Total cable channels: 106 Cable operators: National (or network) license: 1. UBC 2. Thaistar TV Local license: 86 companies DTH operators: UBC (United Broadcasting Corporation) Satellite operators: Thaicom 1, Thaicom 2, Thaicom 3 Free-to-air channels (via satellites) : 19 Regulatory Agencies: 1. National Public Relations Committee (NPRC) 2. National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) March 1992 – issue licenses for new commercial free-to-air and satellite stations – permit to operate radio and TV broadcasting business both for cable and/or non-cable – regulate and control according to technical license condition 3. Mass Communication Organisation of Thailand (MCOT) – regulating and monitoring the pay TV business activities, e.g. pricing of progamming packages, ads on channels – granting, renawal, termination of licenses known as BTO (build transfer operate) concessions to allow operation of pay TV business – other decisions, e.g. change of the interpretation of existing regulations by courts or regulators Laws, Regulations: 1. The Thailand Constitution 1997, Section 40 2. The Telecommunications Act 2001 3. The Broadcasting Act 2000 4. The Trade Competition Act 1999 5. The Foreign Business Act 1999 Special remarks: – NPRC and NBC supervise the reception of foreign broadcasts and approve broadcasting policy. – All of 6 terrestrial stations are government-owned. Only Channel 3, Channel 7, and ITV are allowed for concessions provided by private sectors THE PHILIPPINES Republika ng Pilipinas Republic of the Philippines Head of State: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Capital: Manila Type of Government: Presidential democracy Next election: May 2010 Land area: 76,946 thousand in 2000 (actual); 85,237 thousand in 2005 (projected) Population: 82,664 thousands (2004) Language: Filipino, English, Spanish Religion: Christianity (Catholicism, Protestantism, Philippine Independent Church, Iglesia ni Kristo); Islam Currency: Peso US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 54.15 peso GDP: US$86,123 million (2004) at current market prices Major Industries: Priority sectors: construction materials, electronics, food, giftware and holiday decor, home furnishings, IT & IT-enabled services, marine products, motor vehicle parts and components, organic and natural products, wearables Major Exports: Electronic products; garments; ignition wiring set and other wiring set in vehicles, aircrafts, and ships; coconut oil; woodcrafts and furniture; products manufactured from materials imported on consignment basis petroleum products; metal components; cathodes and sections of cathodes of refined copper; fresh bananas (August 2005) Major Imports: Electronic products; mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials; industrial machinery and equipment; transport equipment; iron and steel, cereal and cereal preparations; textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, and related products; telecommunications equipment and electrical machines, plastics in primary and nonprimary forms; organic and inorganic chemicals, (August 2005) The Philippines constitutes an archipelago of 7,107 islands with a total land area of approximately 300,000 square kilometres. It borders the Philippine Sea on the east, on the South China Sea the west, and the Celebes Sea on the south. The island of Borneo lies a few hundred kilometers southwest and Taiwan directly north. The Moluccas and Sulawesi are to the south, and Palau is to the east beyond the Philippine Sea. The islands are commonly divided into three island groups: Luzon (Regions I to V, NCR & CAR), Visayas (VI to VIII), and Mindanao (IX to XIII & ARMM). The busy port of Manila, on Luzon, is the country’s capital and second largest city after it’s suburb Quezon City. Regions – Ilocos Region (Region I) – Cagayan Valley (Region II) – Central Luzon (Region III) – CALABARZON (Region IV-A) ¹ ² – MIMAROPA (Region IV-B) ¹ ² ³ – Bicol Region (Region V) – Western Visayas (Region VI) ³ – Central Visayas (Region VII) – Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) – Zamboanga Peninsula (Region IX) – Northern Mindanao (Region X) – Davao Region (Region XI) – SOCCSKSARGEN (Region XII) ¹ – Caraga (Region XIII) – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) – Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) – National Capital Region (NCR) (Metro Manila) The Philippines is divided into a hierarchy of local government units (LGUs) with the 79 provinces as the primary unit. Provinces are further subdivided into cities and municipalities, which are in turn composed of barangays. The barangay is the smallest local government unit. The Philippines is divided into 17 regions with all provinces grouped into one of 16 regions for administrative convenience. The National Capital Region however, is divided into four special districts. Most government offices establish regional offices to serve the constituent provinces. The regions themselves do not possess a separate local government, with the exception of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. TELEVISION in The Philippines TV adspend: US$ 562,54 with 59% shares of TV (2002) Total TV households: 3,7 million (1997) Free-TV penetration: 96% Cable penetration: 20% of population DTH households: 30,000 Cable TV channels: 100+ Terrestrial stations: National (or network) license: VHF Stations 1. ABS-CBN on channel 2 2. NBN on channel 4 3. ABC on channel 5 4. GMA on channel 7 5. RPN on channel 9 6. QTV on channel 11 7. IBC on channel 13 UHF Stations 1. SBN on channel 21 2. Studio on channel 23 3. Net on channel 25 4. Citynet on channel 27 5. RJTV on channel 29 6. UNTV on channel 37 7. MTV on channel 41 8. 3ABN on channel 45 Local license: see below NOTES: 1. ACQ Kingdom Broadcasting Network is the 24-hour service of broadcasting arm of a Philippine television evangelist, Pastor Apollo C. Quiboloy. Based in Davao, it is available via terrestrial broadcast, cable, and satellite. Its single television channel of a dozen self-produced religious programs in English and Tagalog (www.kingdomofjesuschrist.org/subcontents/kbn_acq_programs.htm). ACQ-KBN also maintains a network of radio stations under the name “Sonshine Network”. Licensed in late 2003 by the Philippine government to operate thirty-eight broadcast channels, they now claim to operate thirty with plans to operate six more. However, on June 23, 2005 the Philippine National Telecommunications Commission ordered their Davao channel 43 shut down due to interference with another channel. 2. ABS-CBN Channel 2, launched at June 13, 1946 (parent company); October 23, 1953 (television network). The network’s main broadcast facilities are located at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center in Mother Ignacia St., Diliman, Quezon City. The network has also introduced its second terrestrial Channel, Studio 23 (UHF network), as well as cable channels MYX (a music channel), ABSCBN News Channel (a cable news channel), CinemaOne Global (movie channel), Cinema One (movie cable channel, Lifestyle Network (home and lifestyle channel), Pinoy Central TV (regionally produced shows) and Hero (the country’s first Tagalog-dubbed Anime Channel). The network’s radio stations include DWRR 101.9 (FMManila) and DZMM 630-khz (AM-Manila). ABS-CBN has established regional stations and news bureaus to handle operations in different areas throughout the Philippines. It also broadcasts to locations all over the world via The Filipino Channel, managed by ABSCBN International. Shows are also available for live viewing and subscription via the Internet through ABS-CBN Interactive’s ABS-CBNNow! service. The ABS-CBN Regional Network Group is the provincial network of ABS-CBN. It is responsible for live/pretaped relay of shows aired in Manila throughout the country. The ABS-CBN Regional Network Group has several stations in each region all over the country. This group also delivers news in each region and the fiestas in the cities. Through the group, ABS-CBN has the following regional stations in the Philippines: Antipolo City (ABS-CBN Antipolo) Bacolod City (ABS-CBN Bacolod) Baguio City (ABS-CBN Baguio) Baler, Aurora (ABS-CBN Baler) Batangas City (ABS-CBN Batangas) Botolan, Zambales (ABS-CBN Botolan) Bukidnon (ABS-CBN Bukidnon) Bulacan (ABS-CBN Bulacan) Butuan City (ABS-CBN Butuan) Cabanatuan City (ABS-CBN Cabanatuan) Cagayan De Oro City (ABS-CBN Cagayan De Oro) Cebu City (ABS-CBN Cebu) Cotabato City (ABS-CBN Cotabato) Daet, Camarines Norte (ABS-CBN Daet) Dagupan City (ABS-CBN Dagupan) Davao City (ABS-CBN Davao) Dipolog City (ABS-CBN Dipolog) Dumaguete City (ABS-CBN Dumaguete) General Santos City (ABS-CBN General Santos) Iligan City (ABS-CBN Iligan) Iloilo City (ABS-CBN Iloilo) Isabela (ABS-CBN Isabela) Jagna, Bohol (ABS-CBN Jagna, Bohol) Kalibo, Aklan (ABS-CBN Kalibo) Koronadal City (ABS-CBN Koronadal) Laoag City (ABS-CBN Laoag) Legaspi City (ABS-CBN Legaspi) Lipa City (ABS-CBN Lipa) Lucena City (ABS-CBN Lucena) Naga City (ABS-CBN Naga) Olongapo City (ABS-CBN Olongapo) Pagadian City (ABS-CBN Pagadian) Pampanga (ABS-CBN Pampanga) Puerto Princesa City (ABS-CBN Puerto Princesa) Roxas City (ABS-CBN Roxas) San Pablo City (ABS-CBN San Pablo) Surigao City (ABS-CBN Surigao) Tacloban City (ABS-CBN Tacloban) Tarlac City (ABS-CBN Tarlac) Tuguegarao City (ABS-CBN Tuguegarao) Zamboanga City (ABS-CBN Zamboanga) 2. GMA Channel 7, (Global Media Arts) Network, Incorporated) is one of the largest broadcast networks in the Philippines. Launched at June 14, 1950 (Radio Broadcasts) and October 29, 1961(Television Broadcasts), it provides news and entertainment programs through its 44 fully-owned television relay stations, 3 affiliate television stations and 34 radio stations throughout the Philippines. The network also offers its shows outside the Philippines through GMA Pinoy TV. Its headquarters, the GMA Network Center, is located at EDSA corner Timog Ave., Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Atty. The channels are: GMA Channel 7, GMA Pinoy TV (Worldwide), Quality TeleVision Channel 11, Citynet channel 27, and RGMA TV Nationwide. 3. ABC – Associated Broadcasting Corporation, was launched at June 19, 1960. ABC is a Philippine television network, with main broadcast facilities in Novaliches, Quezon City, Metro Manila. It is the third oldest television network in the country, and currently is the third largest television network. It is currently owned by businessman Antonio Cojuangco, former Chairman of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) and owner of Dream Satellite Broadcasting and Bank of Commerce, among others. Its main station is DWET-5 (ABC-5) in Metro Manila. It also operates a radio station, Dream 106 FM, in Metro Manila. a. ABC-TV Stations Nationwide: ABC-5 Manila ABC-2 Laoag ABC-28 Baguio ABC-32 Bacolod ABC-21 Cebu ABC-29 Zamboanga ABC-21 Cagayan De Oro ABC-2 Davao ABC-12 General Santos b. ABC Cable Television Station: SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila on Channel 10 Global Destiny Cable Makati City on Channel 10 SunVision Cable Taguig City on Channel 10 c. Radio Stations Nationwide: DWET 106.7 MHz-Manila DWTE 106.7 MHz-Laoag DXET 106.7 MHz-Davao DXER 93.5 MHz-General Santos 4. National Broadcasting Network is the official government TV station in the Philippines launched in 1974. The country’s only government television network began operations in 1974 as GTV-4. It was renamed Maharlika Broadcasting System in 1980 and following the People Power Revolution in 1986, became People’s Television 4. On March 26, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Republic Act 7306 turning PTV Network into a government corporation known formally as People’s Television Network, Inc. NBN studios and transmitter are located at Broadcast Complex, Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City with the power of 40,000 watts. As provided for in its charter, PTNI is mandated to give its viewers a balanced mix of news, public affairs, educational, cultural and sports programs. a. NBN Stations Nationwide: DWGT TV-4 Manila DZZM TV-8 Baguio DWAE TV-4 Vigan DZZV TV-11 Laoag DZZN TV-4 Ilagan, Isabela DZNN TV-13 Tuguegarao DYGS TV-4 Puerto Princesa DYMM TV-13 Romblon DWMA TV-8 Naga DZPN TV-8 Legaspi DZGA 4 Goa, Camarines Sur DWLG TV-2 Sorsogon DZZV TV-7 Caramoran, Catanduanes DZVZ TV-9 Panganiban, Catanduanes DZVV TV-2 San Miguel, Catanduanes DYYB TV-2 Iloilo DYDY TV-2 Guimaras DYTL TV-2 Bacolod DYPT TV-11 Cebu DYMY TV-10 Dumaguete DYCP TV-8 Tacloban DYWP TV-12 Calbayog DXAA TV-8 Kidapawan DXMI TV-4 Marawi DXBN TV-9 Butuan DXBC TV-6 Cagayan De Oro DXNP TV-11 Davao DXVC TV-7 Zamboanga DXPT TV-11 Pagadian DXXM TV-11 Dipolog DXGN TV-5 General Santos b. NBN Cable Television Station: SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila on Channel 06 Global Destiny Cable Makati City on Channel 08 SunVision Cable Taguig City on Channel 06 5. IBC 13, Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation is a VHF Television Station of the Government Communications Group headed by the Press Secretary. It was launched in 1975 by a Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto after sequestering the original channel 13 owned by the late Andres Soriano. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, all of the stocks and assets of IBC-13, RPN-9 and BBC-2 were sequestered by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG). President Corazon Aquino awarded BBC-2 through an executive order to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation. IBC-13 and RPN-9 and were turned over to the Government Communications Group. There were plans to auction the TV frequency rights currently in use by IBC-13 and RPN-9 in the future. In 1993, IBC became a 100% government owned station by virtue of a compromise agreement between PCGG and Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto, management and marketing were returned to the IBC Board of Directors. Programming remained at a standstill in preparation for the launching of a new image. IBC 13 studios is located at Broadcast City Capitol Hills Diliman, Quezon City and transmitter at San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. a. IBC TV Stations Nationwide: DZTV TV-13 Manila (VHF Network) DWCS TV-13 Laoag (VHF Network) DWHB TV-6 Baguio (VHF Network) TV-13 Naga (VHF Network) TV-5 Daet, Camarines Norte (VHF Network) DYXX TV-2 Roxas (VHF Network) DYJB TV-12 Iloilo (VHF Network) DYTV TV-13 Cebu (VHF Network) TV-12 Tacloban (VHF Network) TV-13 Puerto Princesa (VHF Network) DXZB TV-13 Zamboanga TV-13 Ozamis (VHF Network) DXCC TV-10 Cagayan De Oro (VHF Network) DXTV TV-13 Davao (VHF Network) TV-10 General Santos (VHF Network) TV-10 Agusan Del Sur (VHF Network) TV-8 Surigao Del Sur (VHF Network) TV-13 Butuan (VHF Network) b. IBC Cable Television Station: SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila on Channel 15 Global Destiny Cable Makati City on Channel 11 SunVision Cable Taguig City on Channel 15 c. IBC Radio Stations Nationwide: DWLW 675 kHz-Laoag DWDW 1017 kHz-Dagupan DWNW 756 kHz-Naga DWGW 684 kHz-Legaspi DYRG 1251 kHz-Kalibo, Aklan DYJJ 1287 kHz-Roxas DYBQ 981 kHz-Iloilo DXAM 1278 kHz-Maramag, Bukidnon DXWG 855 kHz-Iligan 6. New Era Television (commonly known as Net 25) is the UHF Television network of Eagle Broadcasting Corporation (EBC), the broadcast division of the Philippine religious group, Iglesia ni Cristo. Founded at July 27, 1999, it supplements EBC’s national network of five AM stations and an FM station (DZEC Radyo Agila 1062 & DWDM 95.5 Manila with Radyo Agila Stations on: DZEL 1053 Lucena, DWIN 1080 Dagupan, DYFX 1305 Cebu, and DXED 1224 Davao) located at 887 Maligaya Bldg. II, EDSA, Diliman, Quezon City. NET 25 boasts of the Philippines’ first trilon TV tower that soars to 907 feet above sea level. NET 25 also has an all-digital production facility complete with studios and editing suites for in-house and post-productions. It is on Channel 25 on terrestrial TV and is carried by major cable operators in the country led by Skycable Gold & Silver and Destiny Cable. NET 25 reaches TV audiences on the East Coast, United States and Hawaii and the whole of Asia including Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, China as well as Australia. 7. GMA New Media Inc.,(GMA-NMi) established in 2000 by the GMA Network, placed its bet on converging technologies and developed a business out of enabling different media such as Internet, mobile phones, radio and TV to speak to one another. It produces interactive brands in GMA shows and fully interactive TV show on free TV. The company also actively engages in web development and creative services. GMA New Media, Inc. provides interactivity to all media assets of GMA Network, Inc. such as its television programs, radio stations, websites and possibly UHF and cable TV. Through its subsidiary Digital Kitchen, Inc., GMA-NMi offers end-to-end broadcast solutions and corporate software solutions, using converging technologies and innovative strategies that guarantee results. GMA New Media also provided election updates and information through text messages, according to Abrogar, while Rufino said INQ7 would serve as the Internet arm that would provide updates to overseas Filipino workers. 8. SBN (Southern Broadcasting Network) began operations in 1970 as single proprietor with its first AM station in the southern city of Davao. SBN Manila is the first UHF TV Station in Manila began in May,1992. SBN Studios are located at 22nd floor, Strata 2000 Bldg, F. Ortigas Jr. Road (formerly Emerald Ave.), Ortigas Center, Pasig City, Philippines. SBN currently operates the following broadcast stations: a. Television Stations: DWCP-TV 21 Manila (UHF Network) DWJP-TV 21 Legaspi (UHF Network) DYLP-TV 5 Bacolod (VHF Network) DYCP-TV 6 Cebu (VHF Network) DYJP-TV 22 Tacloban (UHF Network) DXJP-TV 27 Zamboanga (UHF Network) DXSS-TV 7 Davao (VHF Network) b. On Cable Television Station: SkyCable Gold and Silver Metro Manila on Channel 16 Global Destiny Cable Makati City on Channel 95 SunVision Cable Taguig City on Channel 21 c. SBN Mom’s Radio Stations: DWSN-FM 97.9 MHz-Laoag DWIS-FM 98.9 MHz-Vigan DZMC-FM 91.1 MHz-Tarlac DYCP-FM 90.3 MHz-Bacolod DYAP-FM 88.3 MHz-Cebu DYJP-FM 101.5 MHz-Tacloban DXJP-FM 101.9 MHz-Zamboanga DXNY-FM 107.9 MHz-Cagayan De Oro 9. Quality TeleVision (QTV) is the VHF Television network owned by ZOE Broadcasting Network of Eddie Villanueva and currently operated by GMA Network. The station was formally known as ZOE-TV 11. It was renamed QTV-11 after GMA Network and ZOE-TV entered to an agreement for leasing the entire TV airtime block of the station. The station was relaunched on November 11, 2005 QTV Channel 11 airs a lineup geared mostly towards women and women’s concerns. The TV station started way back 1960s. It was established by Manila Broadcasting Co. naming MBC-11. But in 1972, MBC-11 forced to close due to Martial Law. After 26 years, Channel 11 was revived with a joint venture of the influential religious groups El Shaddai headed by Mike Velarde and Jesus Is Lord Movement headed by Eddie Villanueva in mid 1990s. QTV Stations Nationwide a. On Free TV DZOE TV-11 Manila DWDB TV-27 Manila DZLS TV-27 Laoag DWRA TV-24 Baguio DWNJ TV-28 Naga DWCW TV-27 Legaspi DYMK TV-28 Iloilo DYLS TV-27 Cebu DXMJ TV-21 Zamboanga DXNL TV-27 Cagayan De Oro DXRA TV-27 Davao b. On Radio: DZLV 1458 kHz CALABARZON (signal is very weak in most parts of Metro Manila) c. On Cable SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila channel 11 (channel 19 in CAMANAVA area) Global Destiny Cable Makati City on channel 16 SunVision Cable Taguig City on Channel 63 10. RPN, Radio Philippines Network (RPN 9) is a Philippines flagship VHF television network of the Government Communications Group headed by the Press Secretary. RPN launched in the late 1960s as Kanlaon Broadcasting System, under Roberto S. Benedicto. Kanlaon is a volcano in the Philippine island of Negros, the home province of Mr. Benedicto. After the late President Ferdinand Marcos sequestered the rights of CBN-9 of the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr., he awarded the Channel 9 frequency through a Presidential Decree. After the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, all of the stocks and assets of RPN-9, IBC-13 and BBC-2 were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). President Corazon Aquino awarded BBC-2 through an executive order to ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation headed by the late Eugenio Lopez, Jr.. RPN-9 and IBC-13 assets and equipments were turned over to the Government Communications Group. There were plans to auction the TV frequency rights currently in use by RPN-9 and IBC-13 in the future. a. RPN TV Stations Nationwide: DZKB-TV 9 Manila DZRB-TV 12 Baguio DWKI-TV 10 Iriga DYKB-TV 8 Bacolod DYKC-TV 9 Cebu DXXX-TV 5 Zamboanga DXKO-TV 5 Cagayan De Oro DXWW-TV 9 Davao b. RPN Seen on CABLE TV Station Special: SkyCable Gold and Silver Metro Manila Channel 14 Global Destiny Cable on Makati City Channel 14 Sun Cable Silver CAMANAVA Area on Channel 14 Sun Cable Silver RIZAL Antipolo City on Channel 14 SunVision Cable on Taguig City Channel 15 c. RPN TV Relay Stations: TV-7 Bayombong TV-2 Legaspi DYKW-TV 6 San Jose, Antique DYSC-TV 4 Bagacay, Iloilo DYSC-TV 4 Caluya, Antique TV-5 Puerto Princesa TV-8 Dumaguete TV-5 Tacloban TV-5 Pagadian TV-10 Cotabato TV-7 General Santos TV-12 Butuan TV-4 Surigao TV-9 Jolo, Sulu d. Radyo Ronda Stations Nationwide: DZRL 639 kHz-Batac, Ilocos Norte DZBS 1368 kHz-Baguio DZTG 621 kHz-Tuguegarao DZKI 1332 kHz-Iriga DYKB 1404 kHz-Bacolod DYKW 936 kHz-Binalbagan, Negros Occidental DYKC 675 kHz-Cebu DXXX 1008 kHz-Zamboanga DXKP 1377 kHz-Pagadian DXKD 1053 kHz-Dipolog DXKO 1368 kHz-Cagayan De Oro DXKT 1071 kHz-Davao DXDX 693 kHz-General Santos DXKS 1080 kHz-Surigao 11. RJTV 29 is a UHF, free to air television channel, owned and operated by Rajah Broadcasting Network, inc. RJTV 29 broadcast in the greater Metro Manila area, and is on a ‘must carry basis’ on cable service providers. RJTV 29 began its test broadcast in June 1994, with station produced programming which was entertaining mix of music oriented shows, local news, talk show, and the very first local Home TV Shopping program. In 1995, RJTV 29 went into niche programming and timeless television series, shopping and animation programs for children. At the time, the target market was kids during the day, and baby boomers at night. In 1997, due to the emergence of UHF competitors such as Studio 23 and CTV 31, RJTV 29 went form traditional TV programming to specialized programs such as direct response companies and Religious sectors. RJTV 29 recognized the advent of specialized television – niche markets that identify specific needs of focused sectors. RBN is located at Ventures I Bldg., Makati Ave. cor. Gen. Luna St. Makati City and at the 3/F Save-A-Lot Mall 2284 Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati City. With transmitter is located at Sitio Halang, Brgy. San Roque, Purok 19, San Lorenzo Ruiz St., Antipolo City. In addition, Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. also owns and operates 10 radio stations nationwide in the following cities. – Manila (2), Cebu, Davao, Baguio, Cagayan De Oro, Tuguegarao, Iloilo, Bacolod, and Iligan. List of RJ stations a. TV Stations: DZRJ-TV 29 Manila DWRJ-TV 9 Tuguegarao DYNJ-TV 40 Iloilo DYRJ-TV 33 Cebu DXRJ-TV 31 Cagayan De Oro DXDJ-TV 23 Davao b. AM Stations: DZRJ-AM 810 kHz-Manila DXRJ-AM 1476 kHz-Iligan c. FM Stations: DZRJ-FM 100.3 MHz-Manila DWRJ-FM 96.5 MHz-Tugegarao DWDJ-FM 91.1 MHz-Baguio DYNJ-FM 98.3 MHz-Iloilo DYFJ-FM 99.9 MHz-Bacolod DYRJ-FM 100.3 MHz-Cebu DXRJ-FM 88.5 MHz-Cagayan De Oro DXDJ-FM 100.3 MHz-Davao d. Cable TV Special METRO MANILA, Camanava & Rizal Station: SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila Channel 19 Global Destiny Cable Makati City Channel 79 SUN CABLE Silver Channel 65 SUN CABLE Silver CAMANAVA Area Channel 53 SUN CABLE Silver RIZAL Antipolo City Channel 60 e. Cable TV Special Provincal Areas Station: SkyCable Baguio City Channel 45 SkyCable Cebu Channel 6 SkyCable Leyte channel 23 Colorview Cable CATV Zambales Channel 40 Colorview Cable CATV La Union Channel 38 SkyCable Dagupan City Channel 44 SkyCable Camarines Sur Channel 06 SkyCable Albay Channel 6 SkyCable Isabela Channel 18 12. unTV Channel 37 is a UHF television channel in the Philippines operated by the Progressive Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), the same company that operates the NU 107 network of FM stations, with the standard for good taste in music amongst the youths. Owned and operated by the Progressive Broadcasting Corporation, DWNU 107.5FM was the brainchild of banker/ businessman Atom L. Henares, and radio veteran Mike N. Pedero. It exposed a police rubout on November 7, 2005 when it became the only media company to cover a police rubout incident right in front of its broadcast building. UNTV’s footage became a vital evidence for a case filed on the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights. PBC Stations Nationwide a. On free TV Station: UNTV DWNU TV-37 Manila (UHF Network) UNTV DYNY TV-40 Iloilo (UHF Network) UNTV DYNU TV-41 Cebu (UHF Network) UNTV DXNY TV-37 Cagayan De Oro (UHF Network) UNTV DXNU TV-41 Davao (UHF Network) b. On Radio Station: DWNU 107.5 Manila DYNY 107.9 Iloilo DYNU 107.5 Cebu DXNY 107.9 Cagayan De Oro DXNU 107.5 Davao DXUN 107.9 General Santos c. On Cable Television Station Interactive: SkyCable Gold and SkyCable Silver Metro Manila Channel 21 Global Destiny Cable on Makati City Channel 51 Cable Star (UNTV 37 is Now Available Cable Cast through Cable Star – Iloilo Channel 67) 13. The Three Angels Broadcasting Network, or 3ABN for short, is an American television and radio network which primarily focuses on Christian programming. The network’s sign on occurred on November 23, 1986, after two years of planning and construction of a satellite uplink site in Thompsonville, Illinois. Initially focusing on satellite broadcasting for the United States, 3ABN has since taken several affiliates on, which broadcast directly into television markets on VHF and UHF stations worldwide. The network makes claim to a successful weekly program in Russia, begun in 1993. It also expanded into radio and satellite television in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in approximately 1999-2000. The 3ABN radio network is growing rapidly in affiliates due to the FCC allowing for low power FM stations. The president of the network throughout its existence has been Danny Shelton, 54, who hosts the network’s flagship program, 3ABN Today. Shelton co-founded the ministry with his wife at the time, Linda Shelton. Danny and Linda Shelton were divorced in June 2004. Danny Shelton married Brandy Lynn Elswick, 33, on March 8, 2006 on the set of 3ABN Presents in a nonbroadcast ceremony. Programming overall on the network is Christian and health oriented, and broadcasts 24 hours a day. The ministry is independently owned and operated. 14. Studio 23 is the UHF television network fully owned and managed by Amcara Broadcasting Network, Inc. an affiliate of ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation. Its main broadcast center is located at the Eugenio Lopez Communications Center (ABS-CBN Broadcast Center) located at Mother Ignacia St., Sgt. Esguerra Ave., Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. Launched at October 12. 1996, Studio 23 up with foreign broadcast companies yet maintaining to be a wholly owned subsidiary of its mother network, ABS-CBN. May 1996, Studio 23 again closed deals with suppliers and distributors in exhibitions held at Los Angeles, California. These deals closed at the L.A. Screenings were for new products intended for the launch of the station in October the same year. 15. MTV Philippines or (Music Television Network Philippines) is MTV Networks’ Asia franchise in the Philippines. Its first incarnation was a partnership with ABS-CBN and IBC, where MTV was seen at certain hours on their UHF channel Studio 23. It also the partner of the GMA Network in broadcasting, advertisements and exchanging celebrities. MTV has since tied up with the Nation Broadcasting Corporation which is located at NBC Tower, Jacinta Bldg. II, EDSA Guadelupe, Makati City and at the MTV Studios at Unit C, The Fort Entertainment Center, Bonifacio Global City, Taguig City and is now currently a 24-hour UHF channel , seen in: DZRU TV-41 Metro Manila DYBC TV-44 Bacolod City Channel 29 Cebu Channel 29 Cagayan De Oro Channel 29 Davao NBC Radio Stations Nationwide: a. Sonshine Radio Stations: DZAR 1026 kHz-Manila DWRI 819 kHz-Laoag DZRD 981 kHz-Dagupan DZYI 711 kHz-Ilagan, Isabela DZYT 765 kHz-Tuguegarao DWSI 864 kHz-Santiago DWYI 1332 kHz-Cabanatuan DWTT 1368 kHz-Tarlac DZSP 864 kHz-San Pablo DYCB 765 kHz-Cebu DXYZ 963 kHz-Zamboanga DXCL 1098 kHz-Cagayan De Oro DXRB 873 kHz-Butuan DXRD 711 kHz-Davao DXBL 801 kHz-Bislig, Surigao Del Sur DXRE 837 kHz-General Santos DXRO 945 kHz-Cotabato DXRI 837 kHz-Iligan b. Rhythms Stations Nationwide: DWRU 92.3 Manila DZYB 102.3 Baguio DZMC 91.1 Tarlac DWJY 94.3 San Pablo DZRB 95.9 Naga DWMR 97.9 Legaspi DYBC 102.3 Bacolod DYNC 101.9 Cebu DXTY 101.1 Zamboanga DXRL 101.5 Cagayan De Oro DXFM 101.9 Davao DXOO 97.5 General Santos DXRI 98.3 Iligan DXEY 96.7 Butuan Soon in: Baguio, Naga, Legaspi, Ilo, Dumaguete, Tacloban Zamboanga, Cagayan De Oro, Iligan, Butuan 16. Citynet, a subsidiary of GMA Network, Citynet Channel 27 is the UHF television station owned and operated by GMA Network, Inc. The station became the first UHF TV station operated by a major radiotelevision network. It attempted to broadcast programming from the old Martial Law GMA 7 days. Transmitting on a 30,000-watt power capacity with an effective radiated power of up to 60,000 watts, Citynet’s telecast on channel 27 covers the Greater Manila Area and its neighboring provinces in Bulacan, Laguna, and Cavite. Launched at August 27, 1995, the station was later reformatted to a video music channel and was renamed EMC 27 (Entertainment Music Channel). In 1999, GMA Network and STAR Network entered a joint venture to launch a local version of Channel [V] in the Philippines. EMC was later renamed Channel [V] Philippines and started operations on December 15, 1999. Sometime in July 2001, Channel [V] Philippines shut down operations. Rumors said that the fate of Channel [V] Philippines has been murky since the announcement of the acquisition of a controlling stake in GMA Network by telecom giant PLDT was made. While GMA operated Channel [V] Philippines, the PLDT company Nation Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) runs rival music video network MTV Philippines. This in turn is a joint venture between MTV Asia and NBC involving a 24-hour terrestrial broadcast of MTV Asia over UHF Channel 41 (and piped to Philippine cable networks) and the development of more Philippine-oriented programming. In 2005, GMA Network Inc. used again Citynet 27 to broadcast their new VHF channel QTV11 also in UHF Band partnership with ZOE Broadcasting Network Incorporated. QTV Channel 11 can be watched through Channel 11 in VHF Band with 100kw transmitter and in UHF Band with a more clearer but darker reception. Citynet Stations: DWDB TV 27 Manila DYMK TV 28 Iloilo DXNL TV 27 Cagayan de oro Cable operators: 1. Beyond Cable 2. Global Destiny Cable Cable distributors: Accion, Cable Boss, Solar Entertainment DTH operators: 1. Dream Broadcasting System (Dream) 2. SkyCABLE is a Direct-To-Home Cable TV Subscription Service, established by the Lopez Group of Companies. SkyCABLE is the Leading Cable TV Company in the Philippines, they are serving almost all Major Cities in Metro Mania and have affiliates almost all-around the Philippines. Satellite operators: Agila 2 Regulatory Agencies: 1. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC): to developan integrated plan for a nationwide transmission system in accordance with national and international telecommunications services requirements, including-among others-relay of radio and television broadcasts, leased channel services, and data transmission. 2. National Telecommunication Commission (NTC): to exercise jurisdiction over the supervision, adjudication, and control over all telecommunications services throughout the country. It remains under the administrative supervision of th DOTC. 3. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB): to approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying, distribution, sale, lease exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion pictures, television programmes, and publicity materials. 3. KBP – Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (self-regulatory body of the industry) Laws, Regulations: 1. 1987 Constitution Section 24, Article II: “The state recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.” 2. Republic Act (RA) August 10, 1963: 3846, An act providing for the regulation of radio stations and radio communications in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes. 3. Presidential Decree (PD) Number 1986 (created the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board [MTRCB] on 05 October 1985) 4. Presidential Decree (PD) Number 1987 (created the Videogram Regulatory Board [VRB] on 05 October 1985) 5. RA No. 9239 or the Optical Media Act was passed. It changed the VRB into the Optical Media Board (OMB) 6. RA 9171 or Muslim Radio Act, issued on 22 July 2002. Special remarks: Muslim Radio Act granted the Muslim Development Multipurpose Cooperative a franchise to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain radio broadcasting stations in the Philippines. VIET NAM Cộng Hòa Xã Hội Chủ Nghĩa Việt Nam Socialist Republic of Vietnam Head of State: President Tran Duc Luong Head of Government: Prime Minister Phan Van Khai Chairman, National Assembly: Nguyen Van An Capital: Ha Noi Type of Government: Socialist republic; a one-party centralized state that increasingly decentralizes administration and devolves decision-making power to the provinces Next election: By second quarter 2006 (Communist Party) By mid-2007 (National Assembly) Land area: 330,363 sq.km Population: 82,222 thousand (2003) Language: Vietnamese Religion: Buddhism, Christianity Currency: Dong US$ exchange rate on 1 December 2005: US$ 1 = 15.910 dong GDP: US$ 39,021 million (2003) at current market prices Major Industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishery, industrial construction Major Exports: Crude oil, coal, chromium, tin, cements, woolen carpet, jute carpet, rich cinnamon, marine products Major Imports: Motors, petroleum products, diesel oil, fertilizers Vietnam’s capital is Hanoi. There are also four municipalities existing at provincial level: Can Tho, Da Nang, Hai Phong, and Ho Chi Minh City (Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh). Ho Chi Minh City was formerly known as Saigon. The remainder of Vietnam consists of 59 provinces (see main article for more information). Land boundaries: Total: 4,639 km. Border countries: Cambodia 1,228 km; China 1,281 km; AND Laos 2,130 km. The country is approximately 331,688 square kilometres in area, which is slightly larger than New Mexico and slightly smaller than Germany. The topography consists of hills and densely forested mountains, with level land covering no more than 20 percent. Mountains account for 40 percent, hills 40 percent and forests 75 percent. The northern part of the country consists of highlands and the Red River Delta. Phan Xi Păng, located in Lào Cai province, is the highest mountain in Vietnam at 3,143 metres. The south is divided into coastal lowlands, Dai Truong Son (central mountains) with high plateaus, and the Mekong River Delta. The climate is tropical and monsoonal; humidity averages 84 percent throughout the year.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	27	https://insidestory.org.au/family-problems/	en	Family problems • Inside Story	https://insidestory.org.…headforyoast.png	https://insidestory.org.…headforyoast.png	[ "https://insidestory.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2011-01-laos.jpg", "https://insidestory.org.au/wp-content/uploads/soekarno_salim_small-336x336.jpg", "https://insidestory.org.au/wp-content/uploads/wong_f1_small-336x336.jpg", "https://insidestory.org.au/wp-content/uploads/thieu_large-336x336.jpg", "https://insidestory.org.au/wp-content/uploads/dynasty2-336x336.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Administrator" ]	2011-01-19T06:04:00+00:00	In the wake of the resignation of prime minister Bouasone Bouphavanh, Martin Stuart-Fox looks at politics and corruption in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic	en	https://insidestory.org.…cons/icon-32.png	Inside Story	https://insidestory.org.au/family-problems/	THE surprise resignation of the Lao prime minister, Bouasone Bouphavanh, two days before Christmas brought about a transfer of power in Laos every bit as efficiently as the replacement of Kevin Rudd by Julia Gillard – but with none of the accompanying press speculation and commentary. The Lao News Agency, KPL, simply reported that Bouasone had resigned in a statement to the National Assembly, which then unanimously endorsed the assembly president, Thongsing Thammavong, as his successor. The English-language Vientiane Times added that Bouasone had resigned because of “family problems,” but provided no other information. Thongsing, for his part, said only that his appointment would improve “implementation of the state’s roles and duties,” thereby ensuring continuing “political stability and basic social security.” The mention of “family problems” was a reference to Bouasone’s recent divorce and growing resentment that his mistress had used her position to enrich herself and her family. The fact that no previous Lao leader has been forced to resign for such peccadilloes has generated alternative explanations – that Bouasone had failed to assert control over his cabinet, for example, or that he had allowed the budget deficit to blow out, or that he had failed to act promptly to deal with the “security problems” during last year’s celebrations of the 450th anniversary of the founding of the national capital, Vientiane. Some optimists even suggested that pressure for a change of leadership had come from the “democratically elected” National Assembly, which wanted more competent government. None of these suggestions is convincing. Revenue has never been sufficient to cover more than recurrent expenditure in Laos, which has long relied on foreign aid to fund development projects. And to suggest that the National Assembly brought pressure to bear disregards the fact that all but two deputies are members of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, or LPRP. Power within the party resides with the Central Committee, and specifically with the eleven top-ranking members who constitute the Politburo. So one thing is certain: Bouasone was replaced because powerful figures in the party hierarchy wanted him out. But why? One clue lies in the timing of his ousting, three or four months before the Ninth Party Congress (for which no firm date has yet been announced). The five-yearly congresses do two things: they determine membership of the all-powerful Politiburo and Central Committee, and they endorse the next five-year plan. But position trumps policy. Intense politicking to decide the membership of the Politburo and rankings in the Central Committee goes on for months within the highly secretive LPRP; at the congress itself, these decisions are simply rubber-stamped. There is little doubt that Bouasone’s replacement is part of the jockeying for position prior to the congress. Bouasone owed his own elevation at the previous congress in 2006 to support from outgoing party and state president Khamtai Siphandone. Bouasone was Khamtai’s long-time personal secretary, and rose in the party on his patron’s coattails. Both men are southerners, and Khamtai wanted his man in a position of power to protect his fiefdom in southern Laos. This Bouasone did, but once in power he also needed to develop his own patronage network of support within the party. Had he been able to do so it is unlikely he would have lost his job. Who wanted Bouasone out? Given the inscrutability of Lao politics, this is more difficult to determine. The current party and state president is Choummaly Sayasone, a former general and close comrade of Khamtai, who is also a southerner. Choummaly may have agreed to get rid of Bouasone as the price for retaining his position at the Ninth Congress. Two other generals in their eighties – including Samane Vignakhet, who ranks number two in the Politburo – are expected to step down. The third-ranking member, Thongsing, is a northerner and a one-time mayor of Vientiane who has built a powerful support base within the party: for years he headed the committee responsible for managing internal party affairs. He may well have resented the appointment of Bouasone, whom he outranks, as prime minister. Thongsing’s appointment is likely to have had the support of state vice-president Boungnang Vorachit, a former prime minister and another one-time mayor of Vientiane, who was closely associated, like Thongsing, with the veteran revolutionary Nouhak Phoumsavan. Support may also have come from the minister of foreign affairs, Thongloun Sisoulith, a northerner who was also passed over as prime minister in 2006. Personal antagonism and resentment within the upper echelons of the leadership usually get put aside for the good of the party. Competition between regional interests carries more weight, and it may be that Bouasone’s replacement is indicative of a shift in the balance of advantage between southern and northern interests. Such competition becomes more intense before party congresses for the simple reason that who gets into the Politburo, or jumps up in the rankings in the Central Committee, influences opportunities to build political patronage and gain a greater share of the spoils of office. Foreign observers frequently cite another factor at play in Lao politics: the competition between China and Vietnam for political influence. The LPRP depends on support from the communist parties of its far more powerful neighbours, both of which have significant economic interests in Laos. Traditionally, Vietnam has enjoyed closer party-to-party ties, but China has greater economic power and has invested heavily in infrastructure in Laos; the investments are part of Beijing’s involvement in the Greater Mekong Subregion project, which will link southern China with the states of mainland Southeast Asia (including roads and a proposed rail link between China and Thailand to run through Laos). The Lao political leadership has been proficient in balancing friendly relationships with both China and Vietnam, and there is broad agreement that this balance must be maintained – just as there is general agreement that Laos should also maintain friendly relations with other ASEAN states, notably Thailand; with Japan, still the principal donor of foreign aid; and with the West. For a while the former foreign minister Somsavat Lengsavad, himself an ethnic Chinese from Luang Phrabang, was suspected of favouring Beijing over Hanoi. Somsavat, a northerner, may well have thrown his support behind Thongsing, but we should be wary of seeing this as reflecting Chinese involvement. In the intense jockeying for places in the Politburo, Bouasone might not even retain his place. Among those ambitious for entry are three members of the Central Committee who jumped several places in the rankings at the 2006 Congress, among them the current security minister. They too may have reasons to back Thongsing, as may the woman who stepped into his shoes as president of the National Assembly, Pany Yathotu, the only Hmong in the Politburo. BUT one issue more than any other is likely to have solidified opposition to Bouasone, and that is the threat of reduced opportunities for gain, both personal and for the extended family and patronage networks of powerful party leaders. Bouasone had promised to crack down on these “negative phenomena,” as he euphemistically put it. He maintained the embargo on exporting whole logs from Laos’s disappearing forests, though the military took little notice. And he followed this up with an embargo on land concessions, and another on new mining concessions. Bouasone was under intense pressure from foreign aid donors and financial institutions to announce these embargoes. Though there was little rigorous enforcement, they did limit lucrative sources of graft for senior party members, threatening the interests of all those determined to exploit their positions in the way others had done before them. Significantly, Thongsing has said nothing about limiting corruption, though he has vowed to improve government efficiency in order “to ensure state activities are timely, transparent, united and harmonious” – whatever that might mean. Corruption is the ogre in the woodpile of Lao politics. It extends throughout the bureaucracy and the police and security forces. Much of this is at a petty level, but much is harmful – and not just to the reputation of the party. Environmental laws are flouted as officials are paid to turn a blind eye to the smuggling of timber (mostly to Vietnam by the military) and endangered wildlife (mostly to China). Taxes and customs dues are “negotiated” – reduced in return for a consideration paid to officials – to the detriment of state revenues. In Transparency International’s corruption index for 2010, Laos came in at number 154 out of 178 countries. The pervasiveness of corruption is due in large part to the example set by political leaders. Members of the Politburo and their families have become excessively rich. They have built vast villas, drive luxury cars, and hold lavish parties. Marriages between children of the political elite are occasions for the display of wealth, with political favours paid off in the form of envelopes stuffed with cash. Children of the elite are immune to the law in a country where legal disputes are often decided on the basis of who pays the judge the biggest bribe. Businesses pay bribes for government contracts and for political protection (obtained by placing prominent party members on their boards). Foreign-owned businesses pay off party officials and tax assessors. Chinese mining companies reportedly pay to avoid undertaking environmental impact assessments. Probably the worst corruption, however, occurs over land. Large areas in Laos have been given over to foreign, mainly Chinese, companies on long leases for plantation forestry and agriculture. As land outside the urban areas legally belongs to the state, even where it has traditionally been used by villagers for collection of forest products or slash-and-burn farming, local and central government officials can and do accept substantial payments to sign off on leases and forcibly remove anyone who objects. In a country where expenditure on social services is abysmally low, corruption chronically depletes revenue. Yet the government proclaims its intention to lift the country out of the UN’s least-developed category by 2020. Tourism is a major industry, but the principal resource industries capable of topping up government coffers are mining and hydropower. Mines pay dues and royalties, and hydropower is sold to neighbouring countries. The huge US$1.45 billion Nam Theun II hydro dam in central Laos, officially inaugurated in December, generates 1070 megawatts of electricity, over 90 per cent of which will be sold to Thailand, netting the government around US$80 million a year. Several other dams are under construction on tributaries of the Mekong, while others – including on the main channel of the upper Mekong – are on the drawing board. Warnings about possible environmental damage go unheeded. Given the “leakage” that occurs through corruption in every government program and foreign aid project, from building a school to maintaining an irrigation system, it remains to be seen whether income from resource industries will be sufficient to cover the increased expenditure required to meet the government’s development plans. Laos does have an anti-corruption law, but unlike China and Vietnam, no senior official has ever been indicted. Nor is this likely to change, Laos’s patrimonial political culture needs to be constantly oiled through the disbursement of wealth and favours, and corruption provides the means. Changing prime ministers in the lead-up to the Ninth Party Congress is not going to change that. •
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	71	https://countrystudies.us/laos/85.htm	en	Lao People's Revolutionary Party			[ "http://www.google.com/images/poweredby_transparent/poweredby_FFFFFF.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos" ]	null	[]	null					null	Laos Table of Contents Whereas communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have crumbled, in Laos, the ruling communist party, the Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party-- LPRP has retained undiluted political control. The constitution, adopted in August 1991, notes simply in Article 3 that the LPRP is the "leading nucleus" of the political system. LPRP statutes, revised following the Fifth Party Congress held in 1991, leave no doubt regarding the dominant role of the party: The party is...the leading core of the entire political system, hub of intelligence, and representative of the interest of the people of all strata. The party formulates and revises the major lines and policies on national development in all spheres; finds solutions to major problems; determines the policies regarding personnel management, training of cadres, and supplying key cadres for different levels; controls and supervises activities of party cadres and members, state agencies and mass organizations. Origins of the Party The LPRP has its roots in the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. (Ho Chi Minh led the struggle for Vietnamese independence and was the president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 1945 until his death in 1969.) The ICP, composed entirely of Vietnamese members in its early years, formed the Committee for Laos (or a "Lao section") in 1936. Only in the mid-1940s did the Vietnamese communist revolutionaries step up active recruitment of Laotian members. In 1946 or early 1947, Kaysone Phomvihan, a law student at the University of Hanoi, was recruited, and Nouhak Phoumsavan, engaged in a trucking business in Vietnam, joined in 1947. In February 1951, the Second Congress of the ICP resolved to disband the party and to form three separate parties representing the three states of Indochina. However, it was not until March 22, 1955, at the First Party Congress, that Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party--LPP) was formally proclaimed. (The name LPRP was adopted at the Second Party Congress in 1972.) It seems likely that from 1951 to 1955, key Laotian former members of the ICP provided leadership for the "resistance" movement in Laos, under the tutelage of their Vietnamese senior partners. In 1956 the LPP founded the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front--LPF) the political party of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation, to act as the public mass political organization. Meanwhile, the LPP remained clandestine, directing the activities of the front. The Vietnamese communists provided critical guidance and support to the growing party during the revolutionary period. They helped to recruit the leadership of the Laotian communist movement; from its inception, the LPRP Political Bureau (Politburo) was made up of individuals closely associated with the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese furnished facilities and guidance for training not only the top leadership but also the entire Laotian communist movement. The Vietnamese assigned advisers to the party, as well as to the military forces of the LPF. Under the guidance of North Vietnamese mentors, LPRP leaders shaped a Marxist-Leninist party, political and mass organizations, and an army and a bureaucracy, all based upon the North Vietnamese model. From their perspective, Laotian communists had not compromised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their dependence on Hanoi. During the revolutionary period prior to 1975, when LPRP leaders looked to the North Vietnamese for a sense of overall direction and cohesion, they found many common interests. Both parties faced the same enemies: first France and then the United States. They held a similar view of the world and of the desirable solution to its problems. In some cases, this affinity was strengthened by family relations (for example, Kaysone, whose Vietnamese father, Luan Phomvihan, had been a secretary to the French resident in Savannakhét) or marriage ties (Souphanouvong and Nouhak had Vietnamese wives). Following the First Party Congress, it was seventeen years until the Second Party Congress was convened, in February 1972. The Third Party Congress met ten years later, in April 1982; the Fourth Party Congress convened in November 1986, and the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991. Party Structure The LPP steadily grew from its initial 300 to 400 members ("25 delegates representing 300 to 400 members" were said to have attended the founding congress of the party). By 1965 there were 11,000 members; by 1972, as it prepared to enter into the final coalition with the RLG, it had grown to some 21,000 members; by 1975, when the party seized full power, it claimed a membership of 25,000; and by 1991, at the convening of the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP claimed its membership had increased to 60,000. The LPRP has been organized in a manner common to other ruling communist parties, with greatest similarity to the Vietnamese Communist Party. As in other such parties, the highest authority is the party congress, a gathering of party cadres from throughout the country that meets on an intermittent schedule for several days to listen to speeches, learn the plans for future party strategy, and ratify decisions already taken by the party leadership. Next in the party hierarchy--since the elimination of the Secretariat in 1991--is the Central Committee, the party elite who fill key political positions throughout the country. The Central Committee is charged with leading the party between congresses. In addition to members of the Politburo and former members of the Secretariat, the committee includes key government ministers, leading generals of the army, secretaries of provincial party committees, and chairpersons of mass organizations. When the LPRP first revealed itself to the public in 1975, the Central Committee comprised twenty-one members and six alternates. By the Fourth Party Congress, its size had expanded to fifty-one members and nine alternates. The average age of a Central Committee member in 1986 was fifty-two, with the oldest seventy-seven and the youngest thirty-three. The number of women on the Central Committee rose from three to five, including Thongvin Phomvihan, then Secretary General Kaysone's wife, who was chair of the LPRP's People's Revolutionary Youth Union and, in 1982, the first woman appointed to the Central Committee. At the Fifth Party Congress, the Central Committee stabilized in size at fifty-nine members and took on a few younger, more educated men to replace deceased or retired members. At the time, the oldest member was seventy-seven, the youngest thirty-five, with 22 percent over sixty, 30 percent between fifty and fifty-nine, and 40 percent under forty-nine. Only two women are full members of the Central Committee, and two continue as alternates. Thongvin Phomvihan--who had ranked thirty-fifth in 1986--was removed, accompanied by rumors of excessive political influence in her business activities. Notwithstanding this setback to Kaysone's family fortune, their son, Saisompheng Phomvihan, was appointed to the Central Committee, ranking forty-fifth, and was named governor of Savannakhét Province in 1993. This appointment inspired some private muttering about the emerging "princelings," referring as well to Souphanouvong's son, Khamsai Souphanouvong, number thirtyfour on the Central Committee, who became minister of finance. Despite the party's rhetoric asserting ethnic equality, the Central Committee has been dominated by lowland Lao. Upland minorities remain sparsely represented at the highest levels of party leadership. Only four members of ethnic minority groups were reported on the Central Committee elected at the Fifth Party Congress. The Central Committee is served by a number of subordinate committees. These committees include, most importantly, the Office of the Central Committee, and five other offices: Organization Committee; Propaganda and Training Committee; Party and State Control Committee; Administrative Committee of the Party and State School for Political Theory; and Committee for the Propagation of Party Policies. Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn from the Central Committee. A small group of men--seven in 1972 and eleven by 1993--have provided the critical leadership of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary veterans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secretary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of common experience, appears to have developed. In addition to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise additional political power--perhaps even more than in most other communist systems--through important posts within the governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo members also held seats on the Secretariat. At the Fifth Party Congress, the party abolished the nineperson Secretariat of the Central Committee and changed the designation of the head of the party (Kaysone) from secretary general to chairman. Until it was abolished, the Secretariat wielded influence second only to that of the Politburo. The Secretariat issued party directives and acted on behalf of the Central Committee when it was not in session, in effect managing the day-to-day business of the party. Khamtai Siphandon became party chairman in November 1992, but it is not certain whether he will accrue the same power and influence as his predecessor. Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower level are 112 districts (muang), further divided into subdistricts (tasseng), each with their own party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrictlevel party committees have also been abolished. At the base of the country's administrative structure are more than 11,000 villages (ban), only some of which have party branches. Semisecrecy of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Unlike other communist regimes, the LPRP has long maintained a semisecrecy about its mode of operation and the identity of its rank-and-file members. However, the LPRP follows the standard communist practice of planting party members within all principal institutions of society--in government, in mass organizations, and, formerly, in agricultural collectives. These individuals serve as leaders and transmit party policy. They also act as the eyes and ears of the central party organization. Although party members are admonished not to reveal themselves, it is not difficult for knowledgeable persons to pick out the party members in their organization. In each ministry, for example, the key power wielders are party members. All party members do not, of course, hold positions of authority. Some occupy the lower ranks, serving, for example, as messengers, drivers, and maintenance personnel. By the late 1980s, some of the LPRP's semisecrecy had eroded. Party leadership lists, which, during revolutionary and early postrevolutionary days had been secret, were published. But a quasi-clandestine attitude remains among the party rank and file that can be explained by several factors. Clandestine behavior is an old habit that is not easily shed. Secrecy adds to the party's mystery, inspires anxiety and fear, and contributes to control. In view of its long history of revolutionary activity, party veterans fear infiltration and subversion. LPRP pronouncements during its first decade of rule frequently alluded to "CIA and Thaireactionary -inspired agents," and later, when relations with China grew tense, to the danger of "big power hegemonism." Moreover, party leaders appear to lack confidence in the quality of their membership, speaking from time to time about "bad elements" within the party. The LPRP is relatively small compared with other incumbent parties. For example, the 40,000 members that the party claimed in 1985 represented 1.1 percent of the population (estimating 3.5 million inhabitants). In 1979 the Vietnamese Communist Party had 1.5 million members in a population of 53 million, or approximately 3 percent. Ideology of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party When LPRP leaders came to power in 1975 as victorious revolutionaries guided by Marxism-Leninism, they retained a zeal for creating a "new socialist society and a new socialist man." They declared their twin economic goals as the achievement of "socialist transformation with socialist construction." They asserted that in establishing the LPDR in 1975, they had completed the "national democratic revolution." (The national goal had been to expel the French colonialists and the United States imperialists. The democratic goal was to overthrow "reactionary traitors, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, reactionaries, feudalists and militarists...."). The LPRP claimed that it had won the national democratic revolution by winning a "people's war" with a "worker-peasant" alliance, under the secret leadership of the LPRP working through a national front. It proclaimed a commitment to "proletarian internationalism" and the "law of Indochinese solidarity" and at the same time defined Vietnam and the Soviet Union as friends and the "unholy alliance" among United States imperialism, Chinese "great power hegemonism," and Thai militarism as enemies. By the late 1980s, as communism was undergoing a radical transformation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kaysone and his colleagues on the Politburo still professed an adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but they emphasized the necessity for Laos to pass through a stage of "state capitalism." Following Mikhail Gorbachev's example of perestroika, Kaysone proclaimed in 1989 that state enterprises were being severed from central direction and would be financially autonomous. V.I. Lenin's New Economic Policy was frequently cited to legitimize the movement toward a market economy and the necessity to stimulate private initiative. By the early 1990s, even less of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric remained. The party has continued to move internally toward more free-market measures and externally toward reliance upon the capitalist countries and the international institutions on which they depend for investment and assistance. The "law" of Indochinese solidarity has been amended, and the LPDR's "special relations" with its former senior partner are no longer invoked, even though party spokesmen still insist that Laos retains a solid friendship and "all-round cooperation" with Vietnam. Despite this erosion of communist ideology, retaining exclusive political power remains a primary goal of the party. In a speech in 1990, Secretary General Kaysone asserted the basis of legitimacy of the party: The party is the center of our wisdom. It has laid down the correct and constructive line, patterns, and steps compatible with realities in our country and hence has led the Lao people in overcoming difficulties and numerous tests to win victory after victory, until the final victory. History has shown that our party is the only party which has won the credibility and trust of the people. Our party's leadership in our country's revolution is an objective requirement and historic duty entrusted to it by the Lao multiethnic people. Other political parties which had existed in our country have dissolved in the process of historical transformation. They failed to win the control and support of the people because they did not defend the national interest or fight for the interests and aspirations of the people. Leadership Internal Stability and External Influences Since the LPDR was proclaimed in December 1975, its leadership has been remarkably stable and cohesive. The record of continuous service at the highest ranks is equaled by few, if any, regimes in the contemporary world. Laotian leaders have an equally impressive record of unity. Although outside observers have scrutinized the leadership for factions--and some have postulated at various times that such factions might be divided along the lines of MarxistLeninist ideologues versus pragmatists or pro-Vietnamese versus nationalists (or pro-Chinese), there is no solid evidence that the leadership is seriously divided on any critical issues. In 1975 the Laotian communist leaders, most of whom had spent the revolutionary decade from 1964 to 1974 operating from Pathet Lao headquarters in the caves of Sam Neua Province, came down from the mountains to Vientiane to direct the new government. At the outset of their accession to power, they were suspicious, secretive, and inaccessible, and lower-level cadres were maladroit in imposing heavy bureaucratic controls. Travel within the country was limited, personal and family behavior was monitored by newly organized revolutionary administrative committees, cadres were assigned to disseminate propaganda, and seminars were held to provide political education for all sorts of groups. During these early years, the party squandered much of the goodwill and friendly acceptance from a population tired of war and the corruption of the old regime. At first, Laotian communist leaders were committed to fulfilling their revolutionary goals of fundamentally altering society through "socialist transformation and socialist construction." After 1979 the regime modified its earlier zealous pursuit of socialism and pursued more liberal economic and social policies, in much the same manner as Vietnam. For more than a decade after 1975, the Vietnamese continued to exercise significant influence upon the Laotian leadership through a variety of party, military, and economic channels. By the end of the 1980s, however--in particular following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in 1991 and diminishing assistance from the Soviet Union to Vietnam and Laos--Vietnam turned inward to concentrate on its own problems of development. This emboldened Laotians leaders to jettison even more of their socialist ideological baggage, abandon agricultural collectivization, and move toward a market economy. Laos was also free to pursue an independent foreign policy. The single most important vestige of the former communist system was the solitary ruling party, the LPRP. More about the Government of Laos.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	68	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sisavath_Keobounphanh	en	Sisavath Keobounphanh	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/6/67/Sisavath_Keobounphanh.jpg/220px-Sisavath_Keobounphanh.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Sisavath Keobounphanh was Vice President of Laos from 1996 to 1998 and third Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Laos from 1998 to 2000. He was succeeded by Bounnhang Vorachith. He was a member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and was President of the Lao Front for National Construction from 2001 to 2011, when he was succeeded by Phandoungchit Vongsa.	en	https://wikiwandv2-19431…icon-180x180.png	Wikiwand	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sisavath_Keobounphanh	Sisavath Keobounphanh (Lao: ສີສະຫວາດ ແກ້ວບຸນພັນ; 1 May 1928 – 12 May 2020)[2] was Vice President of Laos from 1996 to 1998 and third Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) of Laos from 1998 to 2000. He was succeeded by Bounnhang Vorachith. He was a member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and was President of the Lao Front for National Construction from 2001 to 2011, when he was succeeded by Phandoungchit Vongsa. Quick Facts 13th Prime Minister of Laos, President ... Close
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	24	https://dbpedia.org/page/Sonexay_Siphandone	en	About: Sonexay Siphandone	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	https://dbpedia.org/stat…dbpedia_logo.png	[ "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/dbpedia_logo_land_120.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/virt_power_no_border.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/LoDLogo.gif", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/sw-sparql-blue.png", "https://dbpedia.org/statics/images/od_80x15_red_green.png", "https://www.w3.org/Icons/valid-xhtml-rdfa" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Sonexay Siphandone (Lao: ສອນໄຊ ສີພັນດອນ; born 26 January 1966) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). He is the son of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and brother of Viengthong Siphandone. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. He was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 8th National Congress, and to the LPRP Politburo at the 10th National Congress.			DBpedia	http://dbpedia.org/resource/Sonexay_Siphandone	Sonexay Siphandone (Lao: ສອນໄຊ ສີພັນດອນ; born 26 January 1966) is a Laotian politician and member of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP). He is the son of former LPRP Chairman Khamtai Siphandon and brother of Viengthong Siphandone. He currently serves as Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. He was elected to the LPRP Central Committee at the 8th National Congress, and to the LPRP Politburo at the 10th National Congress.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	26	https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9075	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	73	https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/resources/reports/2010/asia/201405/t20140515_5762.html	en	International Department Central Committee of CPC			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	VIENTIANE, Oct. 22 -- Former General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) Central Committee and Laotian President Khamtai Siphandone met with senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Liu Yunshan in Champasak Province of Laos on Friday, according to a press release of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee issued here. Liu, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, is on a friendly visit to Laos. During the meeting, Liu said China and Laos have boasted political mutual trust and mutual-beneficial economic cooperation in the past nearly five decades. Liu said China treasures the traditional friendship with the Lao party, government and people, and would like to continue to deepen exchanges and cooperation with Laos in politics, economy, culture and other sectors. China is willing to join hands with Laos to advance bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, said Liu. Khamtai said the friendly cooperative relations between Laos and China, forged by generation of leaders of the two countries, have been deepened in the past years. Khamtai said Laos is ready to work together with China to develop multi-faceted cooperation and bring benefits for the two peoples. Enditem
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	85	https://www.scribd.com/document/191175670/Capitalism-Socialism-and-Communism	en	Capitalism, Socialism and Communism	https://imgv2-1-f.scribdassets.com/img/document/191175670/original/eebaf41e2d/1721948707?v=1	https://imgv2-1-f.scribdassets.com/img/document/191175670/original/eebaf41e2d/1721948707?v=1	[ "https://s-f.scribdassets.com/webpack/assets/images/shared/gr_table_reading.9f6101a1.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Dumindu Katuwala" ]	null	Capitalism, Socialism and Communism - Free download as Word Doc (.doc / .docx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or read online for free. The document discusses key aspects of capitalism including private ownership of capital goods and production for profit. It outlines factors of production, types of goods, and the role of money, capital accumulation, and financial markets. Wage labor and class structures are also examined. Different types of capitalism are defined such as mercantilism, free market capitalism, and social market economies.	en	https://s-f.scribdassets.com/scribd.ico?12a5fbf2b?v=5	Scribd	https://www.scribd.com/document/191175670/Capitalism-Socialism-and-Communism
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	2	https://www.idcpc.gov.cn/english/resources/reports/2010/asia/201405/t20140515_5762.html	en	International Department Central Committee of CPC			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	VIENTIANE, Oct. 22 -- Former General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) Central Committee and Laotian President Khamtai Siphandone met with senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Liu Yunshan in Champasak Province of Laos on Friday, according to a press release of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee issued here. Liu, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, is on a friendly visit to Laos. During the meeting, Liu said China and Laos have boasted political mutual trust and mutual-beneficial economic cooperation in the past nearly five decades. Liu said China treasures the traditional friendship with the Lao party, government and people, and would like to continue to deepen exchanges and cooperation with Laos in politics, economy, culture and other sectors. China is willing to join hands with Laos to advance bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, said Liu. Khamtai said the friendly cooperative relations between Laos and China, forged by generation of leaders of the two countries, have been deepened in the past years. Khamtai said Laos is ready to work together with China to develop multi-faceted cooperation and bring benefits for the two peoples. Enditem
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	32	https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/1332/	en	Elections: Laotian National Assembly 2002 General	https://eguide.s3.amazon…/img/favicon.png	https://eguide.s3.amazon…/img/favicon.png	[ "https://eguide.s3.amazonaws.com/eguide/img/IFES_Logo_R2_clear_crop.png", "https://eguide.s3.amazonaws.com/flags/laos.gif", "https://eguide.s3.amazonaws.com/eguide/img/IFES_Logo_R2_clear_crop.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://eguide.s3.amazon…/img/favicon.png		null	At stake in this election: 109 seats in the National Assembly (Sapha Heng Xat) Description of government structure: Chief of State: President Khamtai SIPHANDON Head of Government: Prime Minister Bounnhang VORACHITH Assembly: Laos has a unicameral National Assembly (Sapha Heng Xat) with 109 seats. The Prime Minister is nominated by the president and elected by the National Assembly. Description of electoral system: The President is elected by the National Assembly to serve a 5-year term. The Prime Minister is nominated by the president with the approval of the parliament. In the National Assembly (Sapha Heng Xat) 109 members are elected by plurality vote in multi-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms.* * The total number of seats increased from 99 to 109 for the 2006 election. Main parties in the electoral race: Party: Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) / Pug Pasason Patiwat Lao Leader: Khamtai SIPHANDON Seats won in this election: 109 Independent(s): Independents Leader: N/A Seats won in this election: 0 There was only one independent candidate in this years' election. Population and number of registered voters: Population: 5,502,340 (2002) Registered Voters: 2,545,838 (February 2002) Gender Data: · Female Population: 2,770,271 (2002) · Is Laos a signatory to CEDAW: Yes (17 July 1980) · Has Laos ratified CEDAW: Yes (14 August 1981) · Gender Quota: No · Female candidates in this election: Yes · Number of Female Parliamentarians: 25 (following the 2002 elections) · Human Development Index Position: 141 (2014) · Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) Categorization: Medium (2014) Disability Data: · Is Laos a signatory to CRPD: Yes (15 January 2008) · Has Laos ratified CRPD: Yes (25 September 2009) · Population with a disability: 825,351 (est.)
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	49	https://photius.com/countries/laos/government/laos_government_party_structure.html	en	Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System			[ "https://photius.com/countries/images/menu.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/close.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/search.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/close.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/share.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/close.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/email_150x65.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/facebook_150x65.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/twitter_150x65.png", "https://photius.com/countries/images/linkedin_150x65.png", "https://photius.com/thus/thus_images/pixel.gif", "https://photius.com/countries/countries_banner1.gif", "https://theodora.com/flags/new2/flag_logo.gif", "https://photius.com/wfb1999/images/map.gif", "https://photius.com/countries/geogrtab3.gif", "https://photius.com/countries/geogrtab4.gif", "https://photius.com/countries/countries_banner5.gif", "https://photius.com/countries/countries_banner6.gif", "https://theodora.com/itadesign.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "Party Structure History", "Maps", "World", "Fact", "Book", "", "Flags", "Economy", "Climate", "Natural; Resources", "Current Issues", "Agreements", "Population", "Ethnic", "Divisions", "Politics", "Constitution", "Legal", "Social", "Statistics", "Political", "System", "foreign", "affairs", "society" ]	null	[]	null		en			https://photius.com/countries/laos/government/laos_government_party_structure.html	<< Back to Laos Government The LPP steadily grew from its initial 300 to 400 members ("25 delegates representing 300 to 400 members" were said to have attended the founding congress of the party). By 1965 there were 11,000 members; by 1972, as it prepared to enter into the final coalition with the RLG, it had grown to some 21,000 members; by 1975, when the party seized full power, it claimed a membership of 25,000; and by 1991, at the convening of the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP claimed its membership had increased to 60,000. The LPRP has been organized in a manner common to other ruling communist parties, with greatest similarity to the Vietnamese Communist Party. As in other such parties, the highest authority is the party congress, a gathering of party cadres from throughout the country that meets on an intermittent schedule for several days to listen to speeches, learn the plans for future party strategy, and ratify decisions already taken by the party leadership. Next in the party hierarchy--since the elimination of the Secretariat in 1991--is the Central Committee, the party elite who fill key political positions throughout the country (see fig. 8). The Central Committee is charged with leading the party between congresses. In addition to members of the Politburo and former members of the Secretariat, the committee includes key government ministers, leading generals of the army, secretaries of provincial party committees, and chairpersons of mass organizations. When the LPRP first revealed itself to the public in 1975, the Central Committee comprised twenty-one members and six alternates. By the Fourth Party Congress, its size had expanded to fifty-one members and nine alternates. The average age of a Central Committee member in 1986 was fifty-two, with the oldest seventy-seven and the youngest thirty-three. The number of women on the Central Committee rose from three to five, including Thongvin Phomvihan, then Secretary General Kaysone's wife, who was chair of the LPRP's People's Revolutionary Youth Union and, in 1982, the first woman appointed to the Central Committee. At the Fifth Party Congress, the Central Committee stabilized in size at fifty-nine members and took on a few younger, more educated men to replace deceased or retired members. At the time, the oldest member was seventy-seven, the youngest thirty-five, with 22 percent over sixty, 30 percent between fifty and fifty-nine, and 40 percent under forty-nine. Only two women are full members of the Central Committee, and two continue as alternates. Thongvin Phomvihan--who had ranked thirty-fifth in 1986--was removed, accompanied by rumors of excessive political influence in her business activities. Notwithstanding this setback to Kaysone's family fortune, their son, Saisompheng Phomvihan, was appointed to the Central Committee, ranking forty-fifth, and was named governor of Savannakhét Province in 1993. This appointment inspired some private muttering about the emerging "princelings," referring as well to Souphanouvong's son, Khamsai Souphanouvong, number thirtyfour on the Central Committee, who became minister of finance. Despite the party's rhetoric asserting ethnic equality, the Central Committee has been dominated by lowland Lao. Upland minorities remain sparsely represented at the highest levels of party leadership. Only four members of ethnic minority groups were reported on the Central Committee elected at the Fifth Party Congress. The Central Committee is served by a number of subordinate committees. These committees include, most importantly, the Office of the Central Committee, and five other offices: Organization Committee; Propaganda and Training Committee; Party and State Control Committee; Administrative Committee of the Party and State School for Political Theory; and Committee for the Propagation of Party Policies. Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn from the Central Committee. A small group of men--seven in 1972 and eleven by 1993--have provided the critical leadership of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary veterans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secretary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of common experience, appears to have developed. In addition to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise additional political power--perhaps even more than in most other communist systems--through important posts within the governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo members also held seats on the Secretariat. At the Fifth Party Congress, the party abolished the nineperson Secretariat of the Central Committee and changed the designation of the head of the party (Kaysone) from secretary general to chairman. Until it was abolished, the Secretariat wielded influence second only to that of the Politburo. The Secretariat issued party directives and acted on behalf of the Central Committee when it was not in session, in effect managing the day-to-day business of the party. Khamtai Siphandon became party chairman in November 1992, but it is not certain whether he will accrue the same power and influence as his predecessor. Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng--see Glossary) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower level are 112 districts (muang--see Glossary), further divided into subdistricts (tasseng--see Glossary), each with their own party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrictlevel party committees have also been abolished. At the base of the country's administrative structure are more than 11,000 villages (ban--see Glossary), only some of which have party branches. Data as of July 1994
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	13	https://www.britannica.com/place/Laos/The-Lao-Peoples-Democratic-Republic	en	Laos - Landlocked, Mekong, Plateau	https://cdn.britannica.c…AA/Flag-Laos.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…AA/Flag-Laos.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-004-D7D8C514/Flag-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/42/4042-004-7619C005/Laos-map-boundaries-cities-locator.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/91/84891-004-EBCF18D7/Wat-Aham-Louangphrabang-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/85/183685-004-D3B20B54/World-Data-Locator-Map-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/01/145301-004-982A07FE/Bolovens-Plateau-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/05/14305-004-E2CA8BC2/Laos-map-features-locator.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/52/96052-004-18359A7C/monks-Buddhist-temple-Pha-That-Luang-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/25/184425-049-491EBF68/World-Data-pie-chart-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/60/128060-004-B53FD28F/Population-density-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel-resources/3-121/images/shared/default3.png?v=3.121.12", "https://cdn.britannica.com/40/129640-131-0EB20858/Flags-countries-world-flags-Country-blog-geography-2009.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/95/168695-131-11055CC5/Geography-Something-globe-Europe-Eurasia-Africa.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/91/142291-131-1FF39F2D/Flags-world-blue-sky-Countries-Globalization-relations-2010.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/64/244164-131-C5EE8DAB/nation-flags-world-map.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/38/247338-131-37776892/passport-visas-stamps-world-map.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/220368-131-C835E48E/United-States-electoral-college-votes-by-state.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/152568-131-E6B869A4/King-cobra-world-snake.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/57/203257-131-48B2BCA1/Martin-Luther-King-Jr-marchers-speech-I-August-28th-1963.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/28/60728-131-36BD65EF/infantrymen-German-Maxim-World-War-I-machine.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/93/173193-131-3EE3B458/Nelson-Mandela.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/31/142331-131-EE300AF6/basketball-Orange-background-lighting-Homepage-entertainment-history-2010.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/38/114738-131-1EC2D535/assassination-Pres-John-Wilkes-Booth-Abraham-Lincoln-April-14-1865.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-050-2707C4AA/Flag-Laos.jpg?w=220&h=150", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-050-2707C4AA/Flag-Laos.jpg?w=320&h=220" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Joseph J. Zasloff", "Pierre-Bernard Lafont" ]	1999-07-26T00:00:00+00:00	Laos - Landlocked, Mekong, Plateau: The politics of the newly established republic were guided by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP; called the Lao People’s Party until 1972), the communist party of Laos. Its Politburo was dominated by a small cohesive band of revolutionaries who had founded the party in 1955 and had engaged in persistent revolutionary activity until their takeover in 1975. These leaders had a long and intimate relationship with their Vietnamese communist allies. Prior to founding the party, they had been members of the Indochina Communist Party. Most spoke Vietnamese, and some had family ties with Vietnam. The party’s general secretary, Kaysone	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/place/Laos/The-Lao-Peoples-Democratic-Republic	The politics of the newly established republic were guided by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP; called the Lao People’s Party until 1972), the communist party of Laos. Its Politburo was dominated by a small cohesive band of revolutionaries who had founded the party in 1955 and had engaged in persistent revolutionary activity until their takeover in 1975. These leaders had a long and intimate relationship with their Vietnamese communist allies. Prior to founding the party, they had been members of the Indochina Communist Party. Most spoke Vietnamese, and some had family ties with Vietnam. The party’s general secretary, Kaysone Phomvihan, had a Vietnamese father; second-ranked Nouhak Phoumsavan and third-ranked Prince Souphanouvong had Vietnamese wives. Their worldview had been shaped by their shared revolutionary struggle with Vietnam. Moreover, the Vietnamese had numerous channels—party, military, and economic—through which they directly conveyed their influence. Thus, the new state was intimately linked to Vietnam and closely followed that country’s policy line until the late 1980s. In the early years of the LPDR, the leadership declared its twin economic goals to be “socialist transformation with socialist construction.” Following the Vietnamese communist model, the party leaders attempted to create agricultural collectives in the countryside and to nationalize the limited industry and commerce in the towns. Former members of the Royal Lao Army and of the deposed government—perhaps as many as 30,000—were incarcerated in “reeducation” camps. These and other repressive political measures and the grim economic conditions in Laos compelled some 10 percent of the country’s population to flee across the Mekong River to Thailand after 1975. As LPRP leaders consolidated their revolutionary victory by the end of the 1970s, they implemented limited policies of economic and social liberalization. In 1986 they inaugurated a major reform called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which followed the introduction of perestroika (“restructuring”), a similar economic reform program in the Soviet Union. The NEM introduced market incentives and began decentralizing government economic enterprise. With the collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself in the late 1980s and early ’90s and the implementation of economic reforms under the doi moi (“renovation”) initiative in Vietnam, Laos moved more rapidly to open its economy. Private investment and joint ventures were encouraged, and, to the relief of Lao peasants, attempts at collectivizing agriculture were abandoned in favour of family-operated farms. The ruling party retained unchallenged control, curbing any attempts at organized opposition. Nevertheless, there was some enlargement of political freedom and participation. A new constitution was promulgated in 1991. Citizens were permitted to move about their country more freely and even to cross the Mekong to Thailand with fewer impediments. Kaysone was elevated to heroic status following his death in 1992. Nouhak succeeded Kaysone as paramount leader, serving as president until forced by illness to resign in 1998; Gen. Khamtai Siphandon, a veteran revolutionary and (from 1991) prime minister, then moved from the premiership to the presidency. Although Khamtai oversaw further economic liberalization, he resisted political reforms. The LPRP continued to control the National Assembly, allowing few independents to contest elections. At the same time, the exiled Laotian royal family began to assume a higher profile, calling for a referendum to reestablish the monarchy; though the government generally stifled any dissent and threat to its rule, it took a measured response, particularly because of a growing reverence among ordinary Laotians for the Thai king. By the mid-1990s Laos was experiencing significant economic growth, with per capita GNP rising gradually—if from a very low base. The country had replaced aid from the Soviet Union with more substantial assistance from Japan, western Europe, Australia, and other bilateral donors, as well as from international organizations (including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In addition, neighbouring Thailand became by far the largest source of foreign investment. In 1994 a bridge opened between Thailand and Laos across the Mekong River at Vientiane, paving the way for greater trade between the two countries and symbolizing a political realignment for Laos away from its colonial and Cold War ally Vietnam; a second bridge across the Mekong between the two countries, farther downstream, officially opened in 2006. To diversify the economy, which depended heavily on the export of electricity (in addition to financial aid), the government began to open up Laos to visitors by developing tourism. Despite adopting such economic reforms, however, Laos continued to wrestle with underdeveloped fiscal and planning organizations, a weak central bank, and fragile financial institutions. In 1997 the country realized its longtime goal of becoming a full member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). However, its economy was subsequently damaged by the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. The kip (the Lao currency), closely linked to the Thai baht, plummeted in value by more than 75 percent, and inflation soared. Business investment, primarily from Thailand and Malaysia, declined, and Laos’s exports to its neighbours diminished. Although the Thai and Malaysian economies recovered in the early 21st century, Laos’s economic growth remained slow-paced. Joseph J. Zasloff As the new century advanced, however, the Laotian economy accelerated, benefitting from increased foreign direct investment from a long list of countries (Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, France, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, India, and Russia), especially in the natural resource and industry sectors. The largest boost to the economy came from construction of a number of large hydropower dams and expanding mining activities. The impact of these projects was enormous. Without these large hydropower and mining projects, Laos’s GDP growth rate would have averaged nearly two points lower between 2003 and 2006. By 2005 GDP growth in Laos had exceeded 7 percent, a level it would maintain or improve upon for the next decade. Since the beginning of the century, the Laotian government had pursued a modernization of the country’s rural economy through land concessions that brought about the lease of vast areas of cultivable land to foreign investors for the commercial production of crops (notably rubber, sugarcane, cassava, and eucalyptus). Though such concessions officially involved long-term leases of state land to investors, they often covered village lands, owing to poorly defined and enforced regulations governing land rights. Mounting incidents of land disputes between farmers and foreign investors, however, prompted the government to announce moratoriums on new land concessions on more than one occasion during the first two decades of the millennium. The LPRP continued in the early 21st century to rely on leaders who had participated in the revolution prior to 1975, even as the ranks of those senior officials were increasingly depleted by old age and illness. By 2000 most members of the Politburo, largely former military officers, were already over age 70, and, as of the 10th Congress of the LPRP, in January 2016, that largely septuagenarian revolutionary generation continued to hold power, as the ruling party chose Vice Pres. Bounnhang Vorachith, age 78, to replace Choummaly Sayasone, age 79, as general secretary. In April the National Assembly then elected Bounnhang to succeed Choummaly as president and Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith to take over as prime minister from Thongsing Thammavong. Choummaly had served as general secretary and president since 2006, and Thongsing had been prime minister since 2010. Laos’s foreign policy has undergone significant alteration since the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communist regimes in eastern Europe, but important continuities remained. The government retained its official commitment to Marxism and Leninism and expressed fraternity with its two communist neighbours, Vietnam and China, both of which continued to exert substantial political and economic influence on Laos. At the same time, Laos expanded its economic reliance on the industrialized West and on Japan and continued its formal association with the Francophone community of countries. However, the number of Laotians who speak French has been diminishing rapidly as the older generation—whose elite were educated in French—passes from the scene and English becomes the country’s second language. Many in the old guard of the LPRP and National Assembly continued to support closer relations with Vietnam while younger members steered more toward China, and proponents of greater economic and political reform looked toward Thailand and the West. Joseph J. Zasloff
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	0	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Khamtai Siphandone	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg/40px-Ambox_important.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/220px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/Flag_of_Laos.svg/23px-Flag_of_Laos.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/54/LAO_Gold_Medal_of_the_Nation_BAR.svg/60px-LAO_Gold_Medal_of_the_Nation_BAR.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ed/Order_of_Phoxay_Lane_Xang.png/60px-Order_of_Phoxay_Lane_Xang.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9c/Flag_of_Brunei.svg/23px-Flag_of_Brunei.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/63/BRU_Family_Order_of_Brunei_1st_Class.svg/60px-BRU_Family_Order_of_Brunei_1st_Class.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/21/Flag_of_Vietnam.svg/23px-Flag_of_Vietnam.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ed/Vietnam_Gold_Star_ribbon.png/60px-Vietnam_Gold_Star_ribbon.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg/23px-Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/55/SU_Order_of_the_Red_Banner_ribbon.svg/60px-SU_Order_of_the_Red_Banner_ribbon.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cd/LPRP_logo.svg/20px-LPRP_logo.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/9/96/Symbol_category_class.svg/16px-Symbol_category_class.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/06/Flag_of_Laos_%281952%E2%80%931975%29.svg/25px-Flag_of_Laos_%281952%E2%80%931975%29.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/Flag_of_Laos.svg/25px-Flag_of_Laos.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/06/Flag_of_Laos_%281952%E2%80%931975%29.svg/25px-Flag_of_Laos_%281952%E2%80%931975%29.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/56/Flag_of_Laos.svg/25px-Flag_of_Laos.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/thumb/8/8a/OOjs_UI_icon_edit-ltr-progressive.svg/10px-OOjs_UI_icon_edit-ltr-progressive.svg.png", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/poweredby_mediawiki.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2003-12-07T22:13:57+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	Laotian politician (born 1924) General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924) is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos[1] from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He was a member of the Communist Party of Indochina in 1954 and a member of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in 1956. Siphandone was born on 8 February 1924.[2] He comes from a peasant family from the far south of Laos. His first job was as a postman. He joined the national liberation movement Lao Issara after the end of the Second World War, which stood for the independence of Laos and against the return of the French protectorate administration. Before the French regained control of Savannakhet in March 1946, Siphandone seized the entire provincial fund (150,000 piastres). He became an officer of the armed wing of the movement and in 1948 their representative for southern Laos. After the split of Lao Issara in 1950 he joined the Viet Minh-backed Pathet Lao.[3] In 1954 he became a member of the Communist Party of Indochina, and in 1955 the Lao People's Party, whose central committee he was from 1957. He was considered a close confidant of the first Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane. In 1962 he became his successor as chief of staff of the armed units of the Pathet Lao. In 1966 he became commander-in-chief of the resulting "Lao People's Liberation Army", which fought with North Vietnamese support, in the Laotian Civil War against the royal troops. In 1972 he rose to the Politburo of the LPRP.[3] Siphandone was the military commander of the Pathet Lao rebellion.[4] After the successful Communist takeover in 1975, he became the Minister of Defense and a Deputy Prime Minister of Laos.[4] During the 5th Party Congress in 1991, Siphandone was the third highest-ranking member of the party leadership, after Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phoumsavanh.[5] On 15 August 1991, he succeeded Kaysone as Prime Minister of Laos, who had left office to become President. After the death of longtime party leader Kaysone in 1992, Siphandone became Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party.[4] Siphandone succeeded Nouhak Phoumsavanh as president in 1998.[6] At the 8th Party Congress in 2006, he became an advisor to the LPRP Central Committee. Siphandone remained as party leader until 21 March 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly.[7] He stepped down as president in June,[8] following the 2006 Laotian parliamentary election. Siphandone is married to Thongvanh Siphandone.[9] His son Sonexay joined the LPRP Politburo in 2016[10] and became Prime Minister of Laos in 2022.[11] His daughter Viengthong currently serves as President of the State Audit Organization.[12] On 8 February 2024, he turned 100, and was sent congratulatory messages by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng and President of Vietnam Võ Văn Thưởng. The Vietnamese ambassador to Laos Nguyen Ba Hung presented a birthday gift to Siphandone to his son Sonexay.[13][14] Laos: National Gold Medal Order of Phoxay Lane Xang Brunei: Family Order of Laila Utama (2004)[15] Vietnam: Gold Star Order Soviet Union: Order of the Red Banner (1984)[16]
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He was a deputy prime minister and minister of cooperatives and poverty alleviation (2015-16). Kchach, Almasbey (Ivanovich) (b. Sept. 19, 1958, Barmysh, Gudauta rayon, Abkhaz A.S.S.R., Georgian S.S.R. - d. April 17, 2012, Gagra, Abkhazia), interior minister of Abkhazia (1996-2001, 2001-03). He was also secretary of the Security Council (2003-05). He committed suicide when law enforcement officers came to arrest him on suspicion of involvement in an assassination attempt on President Aleksandr Ankvab. Ke Hua (b. December 1915 - d. Jan. 1, 2019, Beijing, China), Chinese diplomat. He was ambassador to Guinea (1960-64), Ghana (1972-75), the Philippines (1975-78), and the United Kingdom (1978-83). Ke Kim Yan (b. 1955, Bakan, Pursat province, Cambodia), a deputy prime minister of Cambodia (2009-23). He was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces (1999-2009). Ke Sovann (b. 1966), Cambodian diplomat. He has been permanent representative to the United Nations (2018-23) and ambassador to Canada (2018- ). Kean, Thomas H(oward) (b. April 21, 1935, New York City), governor of New Jersey (1982-90). Keane, Sir Michael (b. June 14, 1874 - d. Aug. 10, 1937), governor of Assam (1932-37); knighted 1932. Kearney, Frédéric Laure de (b. 1721? - buried Nov. 11, 1773, Fort-Royal [now Fort-de-France], Martinique), governor of Saint Lucia (1772-73). Kearny, Stephen Watts (b. Aug. 30, 1794, Newark, N.J. - d. Oct. 31, 1848, St. Louis, Mo.), governor of New Mexico (1846). Keat Chhon (b. Aug. 11, 1934, Chhlong, Kratie province, Cambodia), finance minister of Cambodia (1994-2013). He was also minister of industry and commerce (1967-69), chairman of the National Investment Committee (1993), a deputy prime minister (1993, 2008-13), minister of state for rehabilitation and development (1993-94), and permanent deputy prime minister (2013-16). Keating, Colin, New Zealand diplomat. He was permanent representative to the United Nations (1993-96). F. Keating Keating, Frank, byname of Francis Anthony Keating II (b. Feb. 10, 1944, St. Louis, Mo.), governor of Oklahoma (1995-2003). A Republican, he was elected to the Oklahoma House (1972) and to the Oklahoma Senate (1974), where he became minority leader. In 1981, he became U.S. attorney in Tulsa, in 1986, assistant treasury secretary, in 1988, associate attorney general - all posts overseeing law enforcement agencies. After that, he went on to be Jack Kemp's general counsel at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. After Senate Democrats refused to act on Pres. George Bush's nomination of him for a federal judgeship, he returned to Oklahoma in 1993 to enter the 1994 gubernatorial election, clearly the party leaders' choice; he was peppered in the primary by state senator Jerry Pierce's charges that he had been out of town too long, but won 57%-29%. The leading Democrat, Lt.Gov. Jack Mildren, failed to get an absolute majority in his primary and was forced into a September runoff, which he won with 59%. Mildren had an additional problem, the independent candidacy of Wes Watkins, former Democratic congressman from Little Dixie. Mildren led right after the primary, but by October, the polls showed something close to an even three-way race. In the final weeks, Keating zoomed ahead. He won 47% of the votes to 30% for Mildren and 23% for Watkins. He had wide margins in the metropolitan areas - 58%-27% over Mildren in Oklahoma City, 60%-27% in Tulsa. He performed with aplomb after the April 19, 1995, bomb leveled the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. He appeared on the news virtually round-the-clock, and coordinated efforts of federal, state, and local officials in the rescue, recovery, and investigative operations. P. (J.) Keating Keating, Paul (John) (b. Jan. 18, 1944, Sydney, N.S.W.), prime minister of Australia (1991-96). His background as an industrial advocate with the Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees Union led him into Labor politics. Elected to the House of Representatives for Blaxland in 1969, he was president (1979-83) of the New South Wales branch of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and was opposition spokesman on a number of different matters. Acquiring a reputation for sparkling political invective and party loyalty, he was chosen by Prime Minister Bob Hawke to be federal treasurer in 1983. He made his mark with a sometimes bizarre blend of earthy attacks on his opponents and high-level explanations and lectures on the more arcane aspects of economics. He appeared to have the capacity, single-handedly, to both damage and restore the economy. When he described Australia in 1986 as heading for "banana republic" status, support for the economy evaporated almost overnight. He recovered to be the architect of a shaky turnaround. As a reward for his loyalty and in recognition of his key role in the 1987 ALP election victory, Hawke unequivocally pronounced Keating as the man he would most like to have follow him as leader. Hawke decided to stay on beyond the 1990 election, but resigned in December 1991, following a party room decision which Keating largely engineered (before Hawke became, in Keating's words, as old as Methuselah). Keating at 47 became the youngest prime minister in Australia's history. He set forth a bold vision of Australia eventually becoming a republic, and he established links with Asia and the U.S. while largely ignoring European affairs. He led the ALP to another election victory in 1993 but was defeated in 1996. Keating, Paul (John Geoffrey) (b. Aug. 13, 1924 - d. March 13, 1980), Irish diplomat. He was ambassador to Nigeria (1968-70), West Germany (1970-72), and the United Kingdom (1977-78) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1978-80). Keatinge, Richard Harte (b. June 17, 1825 - d. May 26, 1904), chief commissioner of Ajmer-Merwara (1871-73) and Assam (1874-78). Kebich, Vyachaslau (Frantsavich), Russian Vyacheslav (Frantsevich) Kebich (b. June 10, 1936, Wiszniew, Poland [now Vishnevo, Valozhyn district, Minsk voblast, Belarus] - d. Dec. 9, 2020), chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian S.S.R./Belarus (1990-94). He was also chairman of the State Planning Committee and a deputy premier (1985-90). Kébreau, Antonio Thrasybule (b. Nov. 11, 1909, Port-au-Prince, Haiti - d. Jan. 13, 1963, Port-au-Prince), chairman of the Military Council of Haiti (1957). He was also army chief of staff (1957-58) and ambassador to the Vatican (1959-60) and Italy (1961-62). Kebzabo Kebzabo, Saleh (b. March 27, 1947, Léré, Chad), foreign minister (1996-97) and prime minister (2022-24) of Chad. He was also minister of commerce and industrial development (1993), public works, transportation, housing, and urban development (1997-98), mines, energy, and oil (1998), and agriculture (1999-2001) and a presidential candidate (1996, 2001, 2016, 2021). Kecmanovic, Vojislav, byname Djedo (b. 1881, Knespolje, Ottoman Empire [now in Bosnia and Herzegovina] - d. March 25, 1961, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina), chairman of the Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation (1943-45) and president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly (1945-46) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kedikilwe, Ponatshego (Honorius Kefhaeng) (b. Aug. 4, 1938, Sefhophe, Bechuanaland [now Botswana]), finance minister (1998-99) and vice president (2012-14) of Botswana. He was also minister of presidential affairs and public administration (1985-89, 1994-98), commerce and industry (1989-94), education (1999-2000), and minerals, energy, and water resources (2007-12). Keen, William John (b. 1873 - d. July 26, 1958), acting chief commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province (1925-26). Keenleyside, Hugh Llewellyn (b. July 7, 1898, Toronto, Ont. - d. Sept. 27, 1992, Victoria, B.C.), commissioner of the Northwest Territories (1947-50). A. Kefas Kefas, Agbu (b. Nov. 12, 1970, Wukari [now in Taraba state], Nigeria), governor of Taraba (2023- ). Kefas, Ibrahim (b. Jan. 27, 1948, Wukari [now in Taraba state], Nigeria - d. Oct. 1, 2021, Abuja, Nigeria), administrator of Cross River (1993-94) and Delta (1994-96). Kefauver, (Carey) Estes (b. July 26, 1903, near Madisonville, Tenn. - d. Aug. 10, 1963, Bethesda, Md.), U.S. politician. He was a representative (1939-49) and senator (1949-63) from Tennessee, a candidate for the 1952 and 1956 Democratic presidential nominations, and Democratic vice presidential candidate (1956). Kefi Kefi, (Mohamed) Mouldi (b. Feb. 10, 1946, Kef, Tunisia), foreign minister of Tunisia (2011). He was ambassador to Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in 1990-94, to Russia and the CIS countries in 1996-99, and to Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore in 2003-05. Keightley, Sir Charles (Frederic) (b. June 24, 1901, Anerley, Kent [now part of London], England - d. June 17, 1974, Salisbury, Wiltshire, England), governor of Gibraltar (1958-62); knighted 1945. Keijzer, Mona, byname of Maria Cornelia Gezina Keijzer (b. Oct. 9, 1968, Volendam, Noord-Holland, Netherlands), Dutch politician. She has been a deputy prime minister and minister of housing and regional planning (2024- ). Keiro, Thomas (b. May 12, 1933, Bassao, Chad), Chadian politician. He was minister of production and rural cooperation (1959-60), public works and communications (1960-62), and social affairs and labour (1962-64) and ambassador to the Central African Republic (1964-70) and Cameroon, Gabon, and Congo (Brazzaville) (1965-70). Keishing I.B. Keita Keishing, Rishang (b. Oct. 25, 1920, Bungpa Khunou, Ukhrul district, Manipur, India - d. Aug. 22, 2017, Imphal, Manipur), chief minister of Manipur (1980-81, 1981-88, 1994-97). Keita, Balla (b. July 26, 1938, Korhogo, Ivory Coast [now Côte d'Ivoire] - d. [assassinated] Aug. 1, 2002, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso), Ivorian politician. He was minister of scientific research (1980-86) and national education (1983-90). Keita, Ibrahim Boubacar (b. Jan. 29, 1945, Koutiala, French Sudan [now Mali] - d. Jan. 16, 2022, Bamako, Mali), foreign minister (1993-94), prime minister (1994-2000), and president (2013-20) of Mali. He was also ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Niger (1992-93) and president of the National Assembly (2002-07). He was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2002 and 2007. Keita, (Mamadou) Madeira (b. Jan. 11, 1917, Kourouninkoto, near Kita, French Sudan [now Mali] - d. Dec. 21, 1997, Bamako, Mali), interior minister of the Sudanese Republic (1959-60) and Mali (1960-62). He was also minister of national defense and security (1960-61), information (1961-62), justice (1962-68), and labour (1968). M. Keita Keita, Modibo (b. June 4, 1915, Bamako, French Sudan [now Mali] - d. May 16, 1977, Bamako), prime minister and head of state of Mali (1960-68). After World War II he was co-founder and secretary-general of the Sudanese Union, which in 1946 merged with the African Democratic Rally. The combined US-RDA became the leading party in French Sudan. Considered a dangerous anti-colonialist by the French, he was briefly imprisoned in 1946, but two years later he won a seat in the territorial assembly and in 1956-58 served as a deputy in the French National Assembly, becoming its first African vice president and holding a cabinet post in two French governments. Meanwhile, he had become president of the US-RDA and also mayor of the capital Bamako. In the crucial elections of 1957 his party won an overwhelming victory. In the 1958 referendum in which the West African territories had to choose between internal autonomy within the French Community and immediate isolated independence, he successfully campaigned for the community. Eager for a West African federation of former French territories, he could not combat the strong centrifugal forces at work among the soon-to-be-independent nations, especially in wealthy Ivory Coast. He finally settled for a Mali Federation made up only of Senegal and his own Sudan. He became prime minister of the short-lived federation, which could not even agree on a unitary or federal structure and which was also plagued with personality conflicts. When the two territories separated in 1960, he remained president of the government of the Sudan, which then took the name of Mali. He was also foreign minister in 1960-61. He was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by junior army officers on Nov. 19, 1968, and spent the remainder of his life in detention. M. Keita Keitel Keita, Modibo (b. July 31, 1942, Koulikoro, French Sudan [now Mali] - d. Jan. 2, 2021), foreign minister (1986-89) and prime minister (2002, 2015-17) of Mali. He was also minister of labour and public service (1982-86) and ambassador to Germany (1990-92). Keita, Moussa Léo (b. July 1, 1927, Madaoua, Niger), Malian diplomat. He was ambassador to the United States (1964-69) and Egypt (1969-72) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1966-67). Keitel, Klaus (b. Feb. 5, 1939, Naumburg, Prussia [now in Sachsen-Anhalt], Germany), Regierungsbevollmächtigter of Halle (1990). Keitel, Wilhelm (Bodewin Johann Gustav) (b. Sept. 22, 1882, Helmscherode, Brunswick [now part of Bad Gandersheim, Niedersachsen], Germany - d. [executed] Oct. 16, 1946, Nürnberg, Germany), chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of Germany (1938-45). He was made a field marshal in 1940. Kejriwal Kejriwal, Arvind (b. Aug. 16, 1968, Siwani, Haryana, India), chief minister of Delhi (2013-14, 2015- ). He was a backroom manager of India's most popular anti-corruption crusader Anna Hazare, who rallied Indians and rattled the government in nationwide protests and hunger strikes in 2011 to push for a powerful ombudsman who could fight corruption. When these protests did not have the desired effect, Kejriwal broke away from Hazare and prepared to launch a political party. The Aam Aadmi (Common Man) Party was accordingly launched in November 2012. In the 2013 elections in Delhi, the AAP won 28 of 70 seats and he formed a government with Congress support. He resigned within months, however, after Congress blocked a bill to establish an anti-corruption ombudsman. In 2014 he ran for a seat in the Lok Sabha (Indian lower house) for Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, but was defeated by Narendra Modi, the prime ministerial candidate of the Bharatiya Janata Party (who became prime minister). In the next elections in Delhi, in 2015, he won a landslide victory with 67 of 70 seats. But the party soon found itself in disarray, beset with personality clashes and competing ambitions. With the AAP's national ambitions having taken a big hit following a series of electoral reverses, he sought to mend fences with Congress in 2018 so as to play a role in an anti-BJP grouping. Keke, Joseph (Adjognon) (b. Dec. 5, 1927, Avrankou, near Porto-Novo, Dahomey [now Benin] - d. July 1, 2017), justice minister of Dahomey (1960-63). He was also minister of economy and planning (1970-72). K. Keke Keke, Kieren (Aedogan Ankwong Pierre Bernard) (b. June 27, 1971), foreign minister (2007-11, 2012-13) and finance minister (2008-11) of Nauru. He was also minister of health, sports, and transportation (2003), health, culture, tourism, shipping, and women's affairs (2004-07), telecommunications and transport (2007-08), trade and sustainable development (2008-11), and trade, health, and sports (2012-13) and minister assisting the president (2007-11). Kekeh, Biyemi (b. May 31, 1931, Lomé, Togo), Togolese politician. She was minister of social and women's affairs (1978-80) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1980-81). Kekeyev, Erdni-Ara, chairman of the Executive Committee of Kalmyk autonomous oblast (1926?-27?). He was also people's commissar of local industry of the Kalmyk A.S.S.R. (193...-37). Kekkonen Kekkonen, Urho (Kaleva) (b. Sept. 3, 1900, Pielavesi, Finland - d. Aug. 31, 1986, Helsinki, Finland), prime minister (1950-53, 1954-56) and president (1956-82) of Finland. At age 17 he fought against the Bolsheviks in Finland's war of independence. From the 1920s he became increasingly involved in the agrarian movement and he was a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1927-32. He was a member of parliament for the Agrarian Party (later renamed the Centre Party) in 1936-56 and served as speaker in 1948-50. He was minister of justice (1936-37, 1944-47) and interior (1937-39). A devout nationalist, he took responsibility for the resettlement in Finland of 300,000 Karelians ejected from the U.S.S.R. during the Winter War of 1939-40. In 1940 he was one of only two members of parliament to vote against ceding any Finnish territory to the U.S.S.R. By 1943, however, recognizing that Germany would lose the war, he concluded that a policy of friendly neutrality toward the Soviet Union was Finland's only hope for national salvation. In 1944 he joined the government of Prime Minister Juho Kusti Paasikivi and was a key negotiator in the controversial trials of war criminals. In 1950 he unsuccessfully ran for president, but became prime minister. He served in several coalitions, and was also interior minister (1950-51) and foreign minister (1952-53, 1954). In 1956 he was elected president. The friendly foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union came to be called the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. The word Finlandization was coined to depict the situation of a country that is overly compliant to the wishes of a powerful neighbour. Kekkonen continued to be reelected (1962, 1968, 1978); in 1973 parliament extended his third six-year term by an extra four years. An incapacitating illness forced his retirement in 1981. Kelani, Haissam (b. Aug. 6, 1926, Hama, Syria), Syrian diplomat. He was ambassador to Algeria (1962-63), Morocco (1965-66), East Germany (1969-72), and Canada and Mexico (1972-75) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1972-75). Kelapile, Collen Vixen (b. July 10, 1968, Maitengwe, Botswana), Botswanan diplomat. He was permanent representative to the United Nations (2018-23). Kelchtermans, Lambert (b. Sept. 10, 1929, Peer, Limburg, Belgium - d. May 26, 2021, Pelt, Limburg), Belgian politician. He was chairman of the Senate (1988). Kelepovsky, Arkady (Ippolitovich) (b. 1870, Kherson province, Russia - d. Nov. 29, 1925, Yugoslavia), governor of Lublin (1912-14), Livonia (1914-16), Pskov (1916), and Kharkov (1916-17). Keleti, György (b. May 18, 1946, Lucenec, Czechoslovakia [now in Slovakia] - d. Sept. 13?, 2020), defense minister of Hungary (1994-98). Kelimbetov, Kayrat (Nematovich) (b. Jan. 28, 1969, Alma-Ata, Kazakh S.S.R. [now Almaty, Kazakhstan]), a deputy prime minister of Kazakhstan (2012-13). He was also minister of economy and budget planning (2002-06) and economic development and trade (2011-12), head of the presidential administration (2008), and chairman of the National Bank (2013-15) and of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms (2020-22). Keller, Augustin (b. Nov. 10, 1805, Sarmenstorf, Aargau, Switzerland - d. Jan. 8, 1883, Lenzburg, Aargau), Landammann of Aargau (1857-58, 1861-62, 1865-66, 1868-69, 1874-75, 1880-81). He was also president of the National Council (1857) and the Council of States (1871-72) of Switzerland and president of the Synodal Council of the Christian Catholic (Old Catholic) Church of Switzerland (1875-79). Keller, Graf Eduard (Fyodorovich) (b. Jan. 23 [Jan. 11, O.S.], 1819 - d. Sept. 26, 1903, Wiesbaden, Germany), governor of Minsk (1858-61); great-grandson of Graf Yury Broun. Keller, Graf Fyodor (Eduardovich) (b. Aug. 15 [Aug. 3, O.S.], 1850, St. Petersburg, Russia - d. [in Russo-Japanese War] July 31 [July 18, O.S.], 1904, in present Liaoning province, China), governor of Yekaterinoslav (1900-04); son of Graf Eduard Keller. Keller, Hermann (b. 1945, Buchberg, Schaffhausen, Switzerland - d. Oct. 3, 2007, Buchberg), president of the government of Schaffhausen (1988, 1992, 1997, 2001). J. Keller Keller, Josef (b. Dec. 7, 1947), president of the government of Sankt Gallen (2004-05, 2009-10). Keller, Louis Joseph (b. April 12, 1899, Tours, Indre-et-Loire, France - d. April 22, 1968, Lugano, Switzerland), French official. He was prefect of Loir-et-Cher département (1944), chargé d'affaires in Czechoslovakia (1945-46), ambassador to the Dominican Republic (1951-56) and Cyprus (1961-63), and minister to Albania (1956-61). Keller-Sutter, Karin (Maria) (b. Dec. 22, 1963, Henau [now Uzwil], Sankt Gallen, Switzerland), president of the government of Sankt Gallen (2006-07, 2011-12) and justice and police minister (2019-22), finance minister (2023- ), and vice president (2024) of Switzerland. Kelley Kelley, Clarence M(arion) (b. Oct. 24, 1911, Kansas City, Mo. - d. Aug. 5, 1997, Kansas City, Mo.), director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1973-78). He joined the FBI fresh out of college in 1940, left to become chief of police in Kansas City in 1961, and was nominated to head the agency by Pres. Richard Nixon in 1973. He inherited an agency shaken by Watergate and in transition after the death of J. Edgar Hoover a year earlier. Kelley survived a minor scandal of his own in 1976, when Pres. Gerald R. Ford announced he would keep Kelley as FBI director despite disclosures that he had accepted window drapery valances and a small cabinet from senior FBI officials for his home. The gifts became an issue in Ford's failed reelection campaign. Kelley brought modern techniques for crime fighting to the bureau and changed its focus to white-collar and organized crime. He served until 1978, when he was succeeded by William H. Webster. Këllezi, Abdyl (b. Aug. 20, 1919, Tiranë, Albania - d. [executed] May 1977, Tiranë), finance minister of Albania (1948-53, 1954-56). He was also director of the State Bank (1946-48), a deputy premier (1958-66, 1974-75), chairman of the People's Assembly (1966-69), and chairman of the State Planning Commission (1968-75). Kellogg, Frank B(illings) (b. Dec. 22, 1856, Potsdam, N.Y. - d. Dec. 21, 1937, St. Paul, Minn.), U.S. secretary of state (1925-29). He was also a Republican U.S. senator from Minnesota (1917-23) and ambassador to the United Kingdom (1924-25). The 1928 international agreement renouncing war as an instrument of international policy became known as the "Kellogg Pact." In 1930 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1929. Kellogg, William P(itt) (b. Dec. 8, 1830, Orwell, Vt. - d. Aug. 10, 1918, Washington, D.C.), governor of Louisiana (1873-77). Kelly, Edward Joseph (b. May 1, 1876, Chicago, Ill. - d. Oct. 20, 1950, Chicago), U.S. politician. As chief engineer of the Chicago sanitary district during the 1920s Kelly became a friend of Patrick Nash, sewer contractor, who eventually became the other half of what was widely known as Chicago's Kelly-Nash machine - the Democratic political organization of Cook county. Kelly became mayor of Chicago in 1933 when the Chicago city council elected him to replace Mayor Anton Cermak, who had been assassinated by a bullet intended for President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was elected almost without opposition in 1935, 1939, and in 1943, refusing to run again in 1947. He played a leading role in the Democratic conventions that nominated Roosevelt for his second, third, and fourth terms. Kelly reduced Chicago's debt by $100,000,000 and left the city solvent. He was viewed by many as the prototype of the U.S. big-city political boss - and himself admitted that "to be a real mayor... you've got to be a boss." Kelly, Harry F(rancis) (b. April 19, 1895, Ottawa, Ill. - d. Feb. 8, 1971, West Palm Beach, Fla.), governor of Michigan (1943-47). Kelly, John (Philip) (b. June 25, 1941, Tuam, Ireland), governor of the Turks and Caicos Islands (1996-2000). Kelly, John F(rancis) (b. May 11, 1950, Boston, Mass.), U.S. secretary of homeland security (2017) and White House chief of staff (2017-19). He was also commander of U.S. Southern Command (2012-16). Kelly, José Eduardo do Prado (b. Sept. 10, 1904, Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil - d. Nov. 11, 1986, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), justice and interior minister of Brazil (1955). Kelly, Joseph Lawrence Andrew (b. March 10, 1907, Cowra, N.S.W. - d. Sept. 9, 1970, Sydney, N.S.W.), administrator of Nauru (1945). Kelly, Laura (Jeanne) (b. Jan. 24, 1950, New York City), governor of Kansas (2019- ). P. Kelly Kelly, Petra (Karin), née Lehmann (b. Nov. 29, 1947, Günzburg, Bayern, Germany - found dead Oct. 19, 1992, Bonn, Germany), German politician. She took the name of her mother's second husband, a colonel in the U.S. Army. When she was 13 she went with her parents to the U.S., where she became involved in the protest culture that swept the country during the 1960s, taking part in antiwar and civil rights demonstrations. She worked on the political staffs of both Hubert Humphrey and Robert Kennedy. After her return to Europe she became an official at the European Communities in Brussels and a member of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). But her political credo was far to the left of the SPD and made her instead a natural stalwart of the Greens. She was a tireless campaigner against nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the "destructive pursuit of economic growth." She described the Greens as the "anti-party party" and insisted that they would lose their real function and their appeal should they develop into a political party like any other. Her nightmare, as she once put it, was that the Greens would one day poll so many votes that they would have to play a role in government. The Greens wanted the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Western Europe and the withdrawal of the two German nations from their respective multinational pacts. The Greens adhered strictly to a system of rotating leadership, as a result of which she stepped down from the federal chairmanship of the party in 1982. Since the early 1980s, she had been involved with Gert Bastian, an army general who had resigned his commission and had become active in Green politics; their bodies were found about three weeks after Bastian, without explanation, apparently shot Kelly and then himself. Kelsen, Hans (b. Oct. 11, 1881, Prague, Austria [now in Czech Republic] - d. April 20, 1973, Berkeley, Calif.), Austrian jurist. He was instrumental in shaping the 1920 constitution and became a judge of the Supreme Constitutional Court (1920-30). Kelso, Frank B(enton), II (b. July 11, 1933, Fayetteville, Tenn.), U.S. chief of naval operations (1990-94) and acting Navy secretary (1993). Keltosová, Olga (b. Feb. 27, 1943, Pezinok, Slovakia), Slovak politician. She was minister of labour, social affairs, and family (1992-94, 1994-98) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1998). A. Kemakeza Kemakeza, Allan (b. Oct. 11, 1950, Panueli village, Savo island, Central province, Solomon Islands), prime minister of the Solomon Islands (2001-06). Elected to parliament in 1989, he was minister for police and justice (1989-90), housing and government services (1990-93), forests, environment, and conservation (1995-96), national unity, reconciliation, and peace (also deputy prime minister; 2000-01), and forestry (2007-08). He was knighted in June 2001. In August 2001 he was sacked as deputy prime minister over financial irregularities. Nevertheless his People's Alliance Party became the largest party in the December 2001 elections and he formed a government. His tenure as prime minister was a period of great turmoil when militant forces from Guadalcanal and Malaita caused disarray and stopped the already shaky government from functioning. He made the initial move for the intervention by the Pacific Forum-sponsored and Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in mid-2003. In 2007 he was found guilty of ordering a 2002 raid on a Honiara law firm to try to scare Australian lawyers out of the country. In 2008 he was sentenced to six months in jail; he was released Dec. 31, 2008. In 2010-14 he was speaker of parliament. In 2016 he was stripped of his knighthood. Kemakeza, Janice Mose, Solomon Islands diplomat. She was chargé d'affaires in the United States and at the United Nations (2019-22). Kemal Kemayah Kemal (Eddine), Said Ali (b. June 26, 1938, Moroni, Comoros - d. Sept. 13, 2020, Moroni), joint acting president (1995) and finance minister (1996) of the Comoros; son of Said Ibrahim Ben Ali. Kemayah, Dee-Maxwell Saah, Sr. (b. Dec. 20, 1965), foreign minister of Liberia (2020-24). He was also permanent representative to the United Nations (2018-20). Kemball, Arnold Burrowes (b. Nov. 18, 1820 - d. Sept. 21, 1908), political resident in the Persian Gulf (1852-55). Kemball, Charles Arnold (b. June 27, 1860 - d. Jan. 25, 1943, Harleston, Norfolk, England), political resident in the Persian Gulf (1900-04); nephew of Arnold Burrowes Kemball. Kember, James, high commissioner of the Cook Islands (1997-98). He was also New Zealand ambassador to Ethiopia (2011-14) and France (2015-17). Kemenade, Jos(ephus Antonius) van (b. March 6, 1937, Amsterdam, Netherlands - d. Feb. 19, 2020, Heiloo, Noord-Holland, Netherlands), queen's commissioner of Noord-Holland (1992-2002). He was also education minister of the Netherlands (1973-77, 1981-82) and mayor of Eindhoven (1988-92). Kemény, Gábor báró (b. Dec. 14, 1910, Budapest, Hungary - d. [executed] March 19, 1946, Budapest), foreign minister of Hungary (1944-45). Kemmerich Kemmerich, Thomas (Karl Leonhard) (b. Feb. 20, 1965, Aachen, West Germany), minister-president of Thüringen (2020). Kémoularia, Claude de (b. March 30, 1922, Paris, France - d. Nov. 4, 2016, Paris), French diplomat. He was ambassador to the Netherlands (1982-84) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1985-87). Kemov Kemov, Muradin (Raufovich) (b. Nov. 15, 1959, Adyge-Khabl, Karachay-Cherkess autonomous oblast, Stavropol kray, Russian S.F.S.R.), prime minister of Karachayevo-Cherkessia (2010-11). Kemp, Sir Albert Edward (b. Aug. 11, 1858, near Clarenceville, Canada East [now Quebec] - d. Aug. 12, 1929, near Bobcaygeon, Ont.), defence minister of Canada (1916-17); knighted 1917. He was also minister without portfolio (1911-16, 1920-21) and minister of overseas military forces (1917-20). Kemp, Brian (Porter) (b. Nov. 2, 1963, Athens, Ga.), governor of Georgia (2019- ). J. Kemp Kemp, Jack (French) (b. July 13, 1935, Los Angeles, Calif. - d. May 2, 2009, Bethesda, Md.), U.S. politician. He was a volunteer in Richard Nixon's presidential campaigns and a special assistant to Ronald Reagan when he was governor of California. In 1970 Kemp capitalized on his football fame to be elected to Congress as a conservative Republican representing suburban Buffalo. He became known for his defense of the Vietnam War and promotion of civil rights initiatives. While in Congress he was a member of the Budget Committee and served as chair of the Republican House Conference. Kemp was an early and forceful advocate of "supply side" economics - the theory that lower taxes will stimulate the economy and boost productivity, thereby creating jobs and increasing tax revenue by drawing from a broader base. The Kemp-Roth bill became a cornerstone of President Reagan's economic policy. But Kemp believed the president's advisers lacked the courage to stick with it through the recession. In 1982 he found himself bitterly at odds with the White House that had adopted his economic policy only a year earlier. He ran unsuccessfully for his party's presidential nomination in 1988. On Dec. 19, 1988, he was named by President-elect George Bush to the post of secretary of housing and urban development (HUD), and was unanimously approved by the Senate on Feb. 2, 1989, serving until 1993. He stepped into the limelight on Aug. 10, 1996, when Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole announced that Kemp would be his running mate. Kemp had squared off against Dole in the 1988 presidential primaries, and they were known to be adversaries on several issues. Nonetheless, the two set aside differences and focused on like goals under the motto "Unity does not require unanimity." Kempenaer, Jacobus Mattheüs de (b. July 6, 1793, Amsterdam, Netherlands - d. Feb. 12, 1870, Arnhem, Netherlands), interior minister of the Netherlands (1848-49). Kemper, James L(awson) (b. June 11, 1823, Madison county, Va. - d. April 7, 1895, Orange county, Va.), governor of Virginia (1874-78). Kempkers Kempný Kempkers, Joanna (Mary), high commissioner of the Cook Islands (2013-14). She was also New Zealand's high commissioner to India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh and ambassador to Nepal (2017-20). Kempný, Josef (b. July 19, 1920, Lazy-Orlová, Karviná district, Czechoslovakia [now in Czech Republic] - d. Nov. 25, 1996, Prague), prime minister of the Czech Socialist Republic (1969-70). He was also a deputy premier of Czechoslovakia (1969-70). Kempthorne Kempthorne, Dirk (Arthur) (b. Oct. 29, 1951, San Diego, Calif.), governor of Idaho (1999-2006) and U.S. interior secretary (2006-09). He spent seven years as mayor of Boise (1986-93). In 1992, he was selected to replace GOP Sen. Steve Symms, who chose not to run again. In the Senate, Kempthorne fought against unfunded federal mandates and was considered one of the most conservative of senators. He left the U.S. Senate to win Idaho's 1998 governor's race. A protégé of retiring Republican governor Phil Batt, he frustrated Democrat Robert Huntley and independent Peter Rickards by waging his seven-month campaign mostly from Washington. Kempthorne won 68% of the vote, drawing solid majorities from men and women, young and old, and the rich, middle-income, and poor. He not only claimed Idaho's traditional GOP majority but a quarter of voters identifying themselves as Democrats. Ken (Stephen), Don (b. June 6, 1960), justice minister of Vanuatu (2018-20). He has also been minister of youth development and training (2008), health (2010-11, 2012-13), cooperatives and ni-Vanuatu business development (2011, 2011-12), youth and sport (2014-15), infrastructure and public utilities (2015-16), and public utilities (2023- ). Kendall, Charles Brian (b. May 5, 1921), administrator of Ascension (1977). Kendall, Henry Ernest (b. April 29, 1864, Sydney, Nova Scotia - d. Sept. 2, 1949, Windsor, N.S.), lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia (1942-47). Kendall, Nathan E(dward) (b. March 17, 1868, Greenville, Iowa - d. Nov. 5, 1936, Des Moines, Iowa), governor of Iowa (1921-25). Kendall, Philip (Gary) (b. April 28, 1965), administrator of Tristan da Cunha (2023- ). Kendall, Wilfred I(ruwaki) (b. Jan. 27, 1943, Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands), Marshall Islands politician. He served as senator from Majuro and minister of internal affairs until 1986 when he became Marshall Islands ambassador to the United States until 1995. He was elected senator from Majuro again in 1995 and 1999, obtaining the most votes ever cast for a senatorial candidate in the country's history. In 1998-2000 he was justice minister and in 2000-08 minister of education. Kendrew, Sir Douglas (Anthony), early byname Joe Kendrew (b. July 22, 1910, Barnstaple, Devon, England - d. Feb. 28, 1989, Northamptonshire, England), governor of Western Australia (1963-73); knighted 1963. Kendrick, John B(enjamin) (b. Sept. 6, 1857, Cherokee county, Texas - d. Nov. 3, 1933, Sheridan, Wyo.), governor of Wyoming (1915-17). He was also a U.S. senator from Wyoming (1917-33). Keneally Keneally, Kristina (Kerscher), née Kerscher (b. Dec. 19, 1968, Las Vegas, Nev.), premier of New South Wales (2009-11). Kengo Kengo wa Dondo, (Joseph Léon), original name (until 1971) (Joseph) Léon Lubicz (b. May 22, 1935, Libenge, Équateur province, Belgian Congo [now in Sud-Ubangi province, Congo (Kinshasa)]), Zairian/Congo (Kinshasa) politician. The son of a Polish father and Tutsi mother, he served under Pres. Mobutu Sese Seko on numerous occasions. He was justice minister (1979-80), ambassador to Belgium (1980-82), prime minister (1982-86, 1988-90), and foreign minister (1986-87), before the transition from one-party rule. He came back as prime minister in 1994 when he was elected by a newly installed majority in the transitional parliament. He was said to have been a consensus candidate who, unlike Mobutu's radical opponent Étienne Tshisekedi, could work with Zaire's all-powerful ruler. His post remained bitterly contested by Tshisekedi, who since being shunted aside in favour of a Mobutu appointee in 1993 claimed to be the only legitimate prime minister elected by a sovereign national conference. He also had many enemies in the president's entourage, especially among those who profited from the country's diamond trade. They were financially damaged in 1994 when Kengo expelled members of the Lebanese community who he accused of oiling the motor of the illicit trade. Mobutu in December 1996 named Kengo as the head of a new crisis cabinet to guide the war effort to retake land from ethnic Tutsi rebels in eastern Zaire. Kengo's enemies exploited his part-Tutsi origins to promote popular hatred of the premier. They argued he was not Zairian and so unqualified to lead the country in the war against ethnic Tutsi rebels said to be backed by Tutsi-led armies in neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi. He resigned on March 24, 1997, after Mobutu supported a parliamentary vote of no confidence against him. His downfall came because in political circles he was seen as responsible for the failure of the Zairian army to stop rebel advances. He went into exile in Brussels after Mobutu's fall in May 1997. Charged at the Congolese government's demand with money laundering in June 2003, he returned on Nov. 16, 2003. He was president of the Senate in 2007-19. Kenilorea Kenilorea, Sir Peter (Kauona Keninaraisoona) (b. May 23, 1943, Takataka village, Malaita island, Solomon Islands - d. Feb. 25, 2016, Honiara, Solomon Islands), prime minister of the Solomon Islands (1978-81, 1984-86). From 1968 to 1976 he worked in the civil service as a teacher at King George VI Secondary School, as a district officer and district commissioner in the eastern Solomons, and for a brief period in 1974-75 as secretary to the chief minister. He tried to enter politics as a candidate from Honiara in 1973 but had to wait until June 1976 when he was elected from East 'Are 'Are on Malaita. Soon afterward, after the resignation from politics of Solomon Mamaloni, the man who had seemed destined to be the Islands' first prime minister, Kenilorea, backed by other former public servants in parliament, was chosen as chief minister in his place. In that capacity he led the teams that negotiated both the independence constitution and a financial settlement of $43 million for the Solomons. On July 7, 1978, full independence was achieved, and Kenilorea became prime minister and responsible for foreign affairs. He faced various problems. The Solomons lacked cultural unity, and there was an active secessionist movement in the west; there was not a high level of political awareness among the populace, and there was little enthusiasm for independence in some quarters. There was also a bitter controversy over the granting of citizenship to migrant groups. He was knighted in 1982. In 1988-89 and 1990-92 he was foreign minister. From December 2001 to September 2010 he was speaker of parliament. Kenins, Atis (b. July 28, 1874, Grencu parish, Russia [now in Latvia] - d. March 9, 1961, Riga, Latvian S.S.R.), Latvian politician. He was minister of justice (1931-33) and education (1931-33). Kennan Kennan, George (Frost) (b. Feb. 16, 1904, Milwaukee, Wis. - d. March 17, 2005, Princeton, N.J.), U.S. diplomat. He entered the consular service in 1925, holding posts in Geneva, Hamburg, and Tallinn. In 1933 he accompanied Ambassador William Bullitt to Moscow when the U.S. embassy there reopened. Recalled to Washington in 1937, he spent a year in the State Department before being sent to Prague, where he arrived on Sept. 29, 1938, the day Britain and France signed Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland region over to Germany. After a year he was sent to Berlin, where he served as second, then as first secretary to the ambassador. After the U.S. entered World War II in December 1941, Kennan was interned for five months, being repatriated to the U.S. in May 1942. He was then assigned to Lisbon, and from 1944 to 1946 he served as minister-counselor for the U.S. embassy in Moscow. In 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall named Kennan director of the State Department's policy planning staff. In that position he oversaw a shift in policy toward the Soviet Union, advocating containment after the wartime years of appeasement (he laid out this policy in an article in Foreign Affairs in July 1947 under the name "Mr. X"). In 1949 he became one of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's principal advisers. Returning again to Moscow in 1952, he became U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, but remarks he made during a trip to Berlin that September (when he said that the isolation of a foreign diplomat in Moscow in 1952 was worse than he had experienced in 1941-42 as an interned diplomat in Germany) made him a persona non grata with the Soviets. He left the Foreign Service in 1953, except for a brief return in 1961-63 as ambassador to Yugoslavia. Kennedy, Sir Arthur Edward (b. April 9, 1810, Cultra, County Down, Ireland - d. June 3, 1883, at sea off the coast of Aden), governor of Gambia (1851-52), Sierra Leone (1852-54, 1868-72), Western Australia (1855-62), Vancouver Island (1864-66), Hong Kong (1872-77), and Queensland (1877-83); knighted 1868. Kennedy, Caroline (Bouvier) (b. Nov. 27, 1957, New York City), U.S. diplomat; daughter of John F. Kennedy. She was ambassador to Japan (2013-17). In 2021 she was nominated ambassador to Australia. C. Kennedy Kennedy, Charles (Peter) (b. Nov. 25, 1959, Inverness, Scotland - d. June 1, 2015, Fort William, Scotland), British politician. He stood in the 1983 general election as candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) for the "hopeless" constituency of Ross, Cromarty and Skye. To widespread astonishment, not least his own, the 23-year-old Kennedy captured the seat from the Conservatives, and entered Parliament as its youngest member. He soon became one of the SDP's most regular performers on radio and television. The majority of the SDP decided in 1988 to merge with the Liberal Party against the wishes of the party's leader, David Owen, but Kennedy stood aside as a potential interim leader of the SDP's pro-merger faction to back Robert Maclennan - ruling himself out as well as a possible leader of the newly merged party, the Liberal Democrats. He became its spokesperson on trade and industry (1988-89), health (1989-92), Europe and East-West relations (1992-97), and agriculture and rural affairs (1997-99). In 1990 he was elected to the titular post of party president, which he held for four years. In January 1999 Paddy Ashdown, who had led the party since 1988, announced that he would step down that summer. Although not as close personally to Prime Minister Tony Blair of the Labour Party as Ashdown had been, Kennedy was effectively the continuity candidate, promising to continue Ashdown's strategy of working closely with Labour on some issues, while opposing it on others. His main contender for the post, Simon Hughes, wanted the party to revert to the traditional Liberal posture of equal hostility to Labour and the Conservatives. In a closely fought contest, the result of which was announced on August 9, Kennedy defeated Hughes on the fourth count, after the other three candidates had been eliminated, by 57%-43%. In 2005 the Liberal Democrats under his leadership won 62 seats, their highest number since 1929. He resigned in 2006 after admitting to a drinking problem. He lost his seat when the Liberal Democrats collapsed in the 2015 election. D.M. Kennedy Kennedy, David M(atthew) (b. July 21, 1905, Randolph, Utah - d. May 1, 1996, Salt Lake City, Utah), U.S. secretary of the treasury (1969-71). After his two years as treasury secretary, he served two years as U.S. ambassador at large, with cabinet rank, and was U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1972 to 1973. Kennedy, Donald (b. Aug. 18, 1931, New York City - d. April 21, 2020, Redwood City, Calif.), commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (1977-79). He was also president of Stanford University (1980-92). Kennedy, Eamonn (Lucas) (b. Dec. 13, 1921, Dublin, Ireland - d. Dec. 12, 2000, New York City), Irish diplomat. He was ambassador to Nigeria (1961-64), West Germany (1964-70), France (1970-74), the United Kingdom (1978-83), and Italy, Turkey, and Libya (1983-86) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1974-78). E.M. Kennedy Kennedy, Edward M(oore), byname Ted Kennedy (b. Feb. 22, 1932, Boston, Mass. - d. Aug. 25, 2009, Hyannis Port, Mass.), U.S. politician; brother of John F. and Robert F. Kennedy; son of Joseph P. Kennedy; grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald. A Democrat, he was elected in 1962 to fill his brother John's former Senate seat representing Massachusetts; in 1964 he was first elected to a full six-year term, and he was reelected ever since. On July 18, 1969, he accidentally drove his car off a bridge on Chappaquiddick Island, Massachusetts, and his passenger, 28-year-old Mary Jo Kopechne, drowned. In December 1978 Kennedy's differences with the Jimmy Carter administration were dramatically emphasized at the Democratic Party's midterm conference in Memphis, Tenn., when he delivered an impassioned speech for his national health insurance plan, which differed sharply from Carter's attempts to hold down federal government spending. Kennedy appealed to the traditionally liberal soul of the party, and his enthusiastic reception by the Democrats was a sharp contrast to their lukewarm response to Carter's austere program. A "Draft Kennedy" movement began in some early primary states, but without overt encouragement from the senator. The change in Kennedy's posture came after the 1979 energy crisis, when adverse reaction to the mass cabinet resignations shocked Democratic politicians and sent Carter's standing in the polls plummeting. On Nov. 7, 1979, Kennedy officially became the third member of his family to run for president of the United States. But his declaration coincided with the start of the Iranian hostage crisis, which drastically raised Carter's approval rating and made criticizing the president a touchy matter. Renewed speculation about Kennedy's role in the Chappaquiddick accident kept him from getting off to a running start. He withdrew from the race during the 1980 convention. He remained an influential champion of liberal causes in the Senate until his death. Kennedy, Geoffrey (Alexander) (b. Sept. 6, 1931, Cottesloe, W.Aus. - d. July 16, 2012), acting governor of Western Australia (2000). J.F. Kennedy Kennedy, John F(itzgerald) ("JFK"), byname Jack Kennedy (b. May 29, 1917, Brookline, Mass. - d. Nov. 22, 1963, Dallas, Texas), president of the United States (1961-63); son of Joseph P. Kennedy; grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald. He served three terms in the House of Representatives (1947-53). In 1952 he successfully ran for the Senate against a popular incumbent, Henry Cabot Lodge. In 1958 his margin of victory was the largest ever in Massachusetts and the greatest of any senatorial candidate that year. In January 1960 he formally announced his presidential candidacy. Nominated on the first ballot, he declared in his acceptance speech, "We stand on the edge of a New Frontier." The phrase New Frontier was to become attached to his programs. In the general election, he narrowly defeated the Republican candidate, Vice Pres. Richard M. Nixon. Kennedy was the youngest man and the first Roman Catholic ever elected U.S. president. In October 1962 a buildup of Soviet nuclear missiles was discovered in Cuba. Kennedy demanded that the missiles be dismantled; he ordered a blockade that would stop Soviet ships from reaching that island. For 13 days nuclear war seemed near; then the Soviet Union announced that the missiles would be withdrawn. In 1963, while he and his wife Jacqueline were in a motorcade riding slowly through downtown Dallas, Texas, in an open limousine, a sniper opened fire. Two rifle bullets struck the president, at the base of his neck and in the head. He was dead upon arrival at Parkland Memorial Hospital. Lee Harvey Oswald, a 24-year-old Dallas citizen, was accused of the slaying. Two days later Oswald was shot to death by Jack Ruby, a local nightclub owner, in the basement of the Dallas police station. A presidential commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren later found that Oswald had acted alone. Kennedy, Sir John Noble (b. Aug. 31, 1893 - d. June 15, 1970), governor of Southern Rhodesia (1947-53); knighted 1945. Kennedy, Joseph P(atrick) (b. Sept. 6, 1888, Boston, Mass. - d. Nov. 18, 1969, Hyannis Port, Mass.), U.S. official. He was chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934-35) and the Maritime Commission (1937-38) and ambassador to the United Kingdom (1938-40). N. Kennedy Kennedy, Nick, byname of Nicholas Joseph Kennedy, administrator of Ascension (2017-18). R.F. Kennedy Kennedy, Robert F(rancis) ("RFK"), byname Bobby Kennedy (b. Nov. 20, 1925, Brookline, Mass. - d. June 6, 1968, Los Angeles, Calif.), U.S. attorney general (1961-64); brother of John F. Kennedy; son of Joseph P. Kennedy; grandson of John Francis Fitzgerald. He was an attorney at the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (1951-52), resigning to manage the successful campaign of his brother John F. Kennedy for election as U.S. senator from Massachusetts. He became chief counsel of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1955-57) and chief counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field (1957-60), in which role he prosecuted Dave Beck and Jimmy Hoffa of the Teamsters union, who were charged with corruption. He was an efficient manager of his brother John's successful presidential campaign in 1960, and as attorney general pursued a racket-busting policy and worked to enforce federal law in support of civil rights. When John's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, preferred Hubert H. Humphrey for the 1964 vice-presidential nomination, Kennedy resigned as attorney general and was elected senator for New York. On March 16, 1968, he announced his candidacy for the Democratic presidential nomination of that year. He advocated social justice at home and an end to the Vietnam War. During a campaign stop in California, he was shot on June 5 and died the following day. The assassin was Sirhan Sirhan (b. 1944), a Jordanian citizen who had lived in the U.S. since 1957. Kennedy, Robert F(rancis), Jr. (b. Jan. 17, 1954, Washington, D.C.), U.S. politician; son of Robert F. Kennedy; nephew of John F. Kennedy. In April 2023 he launched a bid for the 2024 Democratic presidential nomination. Mostly known for anti-vaccine quackery, he was more popular with Republicans than Democrats. In October he dropped the bid and announced an independent run. In March 2024 he named as his running mate Nicole Shanahan, wealthy ex-wife of Google co-founder Sergey Brin. Kennedy, William (b. Jan. 17, 1766, Bucks county, Pennsylvania - d. Jan. 29, 1851, Easton, Pa.), acting governor of New Jersey (1815). Kennedy-Cooke, Brian (b. Oct. 22, 1894 - d. June 13, 1963), deputy chief political officer of Eritrea (1941-42). Kennett Kenney Kennett, Jeff(rey Gibb) (b. March 2, 1948, Melbourne, Vic.), premier of Victoria (1992-99). Kenney, Jason (b. May 30, 1968, Oakville, Ont.), defence minister of Canada (2015) and premier of Alberta (2019-22). He was also minister of citizenship, immigration, and multiculturalism (2008-13), employment and social development (2013-15), and multiculturalism (2013-15). Kennon, Robert F(loyd) (b. Aug. 21, 1902, near Minden, La. - d. Jan. 11, 1988, Baton Rouge, La.), governor of Louisiana (1952-56). Kenny, Edward Courtenay (b. Nov. 20, 1885 - d. 1956), acting chief commissioner of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (1931). Enda Kenny Kenny, Enda, Irish Éanna Ó Coinnigh (b. April 24, 1951, Castlebar, County Mayo, Ireland), prime minister (2011-17) and defence minister (2014, 2016-17) of Ireland. He turned to politics in 1975 upon the death of his father, Henry Kenny, a long-serving Fine Gael member of the Dáil (lower house). Kenny won a comfortable victory in a special election to fill his father's seat in rural Mayo, and at just age 24 he was the youngest member of the Dáil. He was minister of tourism and trade in 1994-97 in the "rainbow coalition" government of Fine Gael prime minister John Bruton. After the collapse of Bruton's coalition, Kenny's stature rose as Fine Gael's declined. Weeks after the 2002 election, which saw the party win just 31 seats, Kenny was elected its leader. He immediately set to restoring the party's fortunes, and Fine Gael made an impressive showing in the 2007 election, capturing 51 seats. Fine Gael's momentum continued to build as Fianna Fáil prime minister Brian Cowen, beset with a banking crisis and a soaring national deficit, was obliged to accept a bailout package of more than $100 billion from the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. The Green Party withdrew from Cowen's coalition, and the government collapsed, forcing early elections in 2011. Capitalizing on widespread voter dissatisfaction, Fine Gael won 76 seats, ending 14 years of Fianna Fáil rule. Kenny formed a coalition with the Labour Party and was elected prime minister by an unprecedented 90 votes. His first term in office was dominated by Ireland's economic woes, but after years of gruelling austerity, Dublin took back control of its purse strings and unemployment fell sharply although the country did not return to its "Celtic Tiger" heyday. Although he was returned to power as leader of his centre-right party for an unprecedented second time in 2016, this time he had to rely on the goodwill of the opposition to remain there. He always insisted he would not lead his party into a third election but his departure in 2017 was propelled by widespread criticism of how he dealt with a scandal in the police force. He was succeeded as party leader and prime minister by Leo Varadkar. Kent, Edward (b. Jan. 8, 1802, Concord, N.H. - d. May 19, 1877, Bangor, Maine), governor of Maine (1838-39, 1841-42). Kent, John (b. 1805, Waterford, Ireland - d. Sept. 1, 1872, St. John's, Newfoundland), premier of Newfoundland (1858-61). Kent, Joseph (b. Jan. 14, 1779, Calvert county, Md. - d. Nov. 24, 1837, near Bladensburg, Md.), governor of Maryland (1826-29). Kent Hughes, Sir Wilfrid (Selwyn), byname Billy Kent Hughes (b. June 12, 1895, East Melbourne, Victoria - d. July 31, 1970, Kew, Melbourne, Vic.), interior (and works and housing) minister of Australia (1951-56); knighted 1957. J. Kenyatta Kenyatta, Jomo, original name Kamau Ngengi (b. Oct. 20, 1891, Ichaweri village, near Nairobi, British East Africa [now in Kenya] - d. Aug. 22, 1978, Mombasa, Kenya), president of Kenya (1964-78). In August 1914 he was baptized with the name Johnstone Kamau. Later he adopted the name Kenyatta, the Kikuyu term for a fancy belt that he wore. In 1922 he joined the first African political protest movement in Kenya, the East Africa Association. In 1925 it disbanded as a result of government pressures, and its members re-formed as the Kikuyu Central Association. Three years later he became its general secretary. In the 1930s he changed his name to Jomo (Burning Spear) Kenyatta. In September 1946 he took up leadership of the newly formed Kenya African Union, of which he was elected president in June 1947. In 1952 the Mau Mau rebellion erupted, directed against the presence of European settlers in Kenya and their ownership of land. On Oct. 21, 1952, Kenyatta was arrested on charges of having directed the Mau Mau movement. In April 1953 he was sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment. In 1960 Kenyan nationalist leaders organized the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and elected Kenyatta (still in detention despite having completed his sentence) president in absentia. He was released in August 1961, and negotiated the constitutional terms leading to independence. KANU won the preindependence election in May 1963, forming a provisional government, and Kenya celebrated its independence on Dec. 12, 1963, with Kenyatta as prime minister. A year later he became the first president of Kenya. His government was consistently friendly toward the West. He made Kenya the stablest black African country and one of the most economically dynamic as well. He died in office. U. Kenyatta Kenyatta, Uhuru (Muigai) (b. Oct. 28, 1961, Nairobi, Kenya), finance minister (2009-12) and president (2013-22) of Kenya; son of Jomo Kenyatta. He became politically active in the 1990s, being groomed by Pres. Daniel arap Moi. In October 2001 he was nominated by Moi to fill a parliament seat; a month later Moi elevated him to the cabinet as minister for local government. In 2002 he was elected as one of four vice-chairs of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). Also that year, he was named KANU's presidential candidate - a controversial move engineered by Moi, who was ineligible to stand for another term and wanted someone of his own choosing to succeed him. Moi's machinations backfired, however, as some KANU members left the party to support opposition leader Mwai Kibaki, who handily defeated Kenyatta in the December 2002 elections. Kenyatta then assumed the position of leader of the opposition in parliament. He was elected chairman of the party in 2005. In 2007 he withdrew his presidential candidacy a few months before the election and opted instead to back Kibaki, whose reelection was followed by widespread violence. Kibaki named Kenyatta as minister of local government in January 2008, but in a coalition government formed in April Kenyatta was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of trade. The next year, he moved from trade to finance. In late 2010 he was named by the International Criminal Court as being one of six suspects thought to be most responsible for instigating the post-election violence; he proclaimed his innocence. After the ICC announced charges against him in January 2012, he resigned as finance minister but remained in his post as deputy prime minister. In May 2012 he launched a new party, The National Alliance (TNA), which later that year became part of a multiparty alliance known as the Jubilee Coalition (becoming the Jubilee Alliance Party in 2015 and the Jubilee Party in 2016). He won the 2013 presidential election, defeating Prime Minister Raila Odinga. In 2014 he became the first sitting head of state to appear before the ICC; the charges were dropped later that year. In 2017 he again defeated Odinga; the election was annulled and repeated, Odinga then boycotting the vote. Keon, Michael (Edward Marcos) (b. Sept. 22, 1954, Rome, Italy), Philippine politician; son of Elizabeth Marcos-Keon. He has been president of the Philippine Olympic Committee (1981-84), governor of Ilocos Norte (2007-10), and mayor of Laoag (2019- ). Kepa, Józef (b. May 18, 1928, Rzeczycy, Poland - d. April 28, 1998, Warsaw, Poland), a deputy premier of Poland (1976-79). He was also first secretary of the party committee of Warszawskie województwo (1967-76) and minister of administration, local economy, and environmental protection (1979-81). Kepa, Sailosi (Wai) (b. Nov. 4, 1938 - d. March 1, 2004, Suva, Fiji), Fijian official. He was high commissioner to the United Kingdom (1985-88), ambassador to the Vatican (1986-88), justice minister and attorney-general (1988-92), ombudsman (1996-2003), and chairman of the Human Rights Commission (1999-2001). Kepa, Ro Teimumu (Vuikaba), née Tuisawau (b. Dec. 18, 1945, Suva, Fiji), Fijian politician; widow of Sailosi Kepa; sister-in-law of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. She was minister of women, culture, and social welfare (2000-01) and education (2001-06) and leader of the opposition (2014-18). (Ro is a chiefly title of Rewa.) Keppel, William (b. Nov. 5, 1727, Bedford, Bedfordshire, England - d. March 1, 1782), governor of Cuba (1763); son of William Anne Keppel, Earl of Albemarle; brother of George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle. Keppel, Sir William (d. Dec. 11, 1834, Paris, France), governor of Martinique (1796-1802) and Guernsey (1827-34); knighted 1813. Kerallah, (Ali) Djibrine (b. 1926, Ati, Chad - d. Oct. 21, 2001, Yaoundé, Cameroon), finance minister (1957-58, 1959-60, 1960-61, 1971), interior minister (1958-59, 1959), justice minister (1960), and foreign minister (1961-63) of Chad. He was also minister of state at the presidency (1971-73) and minister of state for civil service and labour (1973-75). Kératry, Émile (comte) de (b. March 20, 1832, Paris, France - d. April 6, 1904, Paris), prefect of police of Paris (1870). He was also prefect of the départements of Haute-Garonne (1871) and Bouches-du-Rhône (1871-72). Keravnos, Makis, byname of Iakovos (N.) Keravnos (b. Dec. 18, 1951, Larnaca, Cyprus), finance minister of Cyprus (2004-05, 2023- ). An economist who specialized in human resources training, his first public appointment was as labour minister in March 2003. Appointed finance minister in May 2004, he took on a budget deficit which then exceeded 5% of GDP and public debt exceeding 70%. His deficit-busting gameplan included an agreement by civil servants to increase retirement ages and cut down on pension bills, government outsourcing, and slashing overtime pay in the civil service. Based on the pledges to cut the deficit to 1.7% by the end of 2006 and show declining public debt - expected to fall to 66% of GDP in 2006 - Cyprus in April 2005 entered the European Exchange Rate (ERM 2) mechanism, a precursor to adopting the euro, which Cyprus did in January 2008. In August 2005 he resigned to take the helm of a major commercial bank. Kerber, Robert (b. May 21, 1884, Stettin, Germany [now Szczecin, Poland] - d. May 11, 1977, Vienna, Austria), interior minister of Austria (1933-34). He was also minister of social administration (1933). Kérékou Kérékou, Mathieu (b. Sept. 2, 1933, Kouarfa, northern Dahomey [now Benin] - d. Oct. 14, 2015), president of Benin (1972-91, 1996-2006). He served in the French army until Benin (then called Dahomey) became independent in 1960. He was involved in the military coup that overthrew Pres. Hubert Maga in 1967 and led to several years of political unrest; in 1972, Kérékou himself led another coup, after which he assumed the offices of president and minister of national defense. Under his leadership, Benin became a socialist state based on Marxist-Leninist principles. On Sept. 28, 1980, he reportedly was converted to Islam and changed his first name to Ahmed, but this was subsequently denied. Because of widespread protests, the Marxist ideology was abandoned late in 1989 and multiparty elections were scheduled. Kérékou remained president of a transition government established in 1990. Multiparty elections were held under a new constitution in March 1991, and Kérékou was defeated by Nicéphore Soglo. He was the first incumbent African president to be ousted in democratic elections. During five years in the political wilderness, he remained silent as Soglo, a former World Bank economist, helped put Benin's shattered economy back on its feet with a strong dose of free-market economics. But Soglo's personal popularity plummeted. In a 1996 rematch Kérékou defeated Soglo. He promised no major upheavals in economic policy although he attacked Soglo's brand of privatization as selling off the nation's assets at knock-down prices. He chose an ex-rival as his prime minister: Adrien Houngbédji, who was once sentenced to death for plotting against Kérékou's revolution. Houngbédji had finished third in the first round of the election and then rallied to Kérékou. Kérékou's reelection in 2001 was marred by accusations of fraud. He was barred from running again in 2006 by a constitutional limit on seeking a third term as well as by an age limit. Kerem, August (b. Oct. 11 [Sept. 29, O.S.], 1889, Karula parish, Valga county, Russia [now in Estonia] - d. May 28, 1942, Sosva camp, Sverdlovsk oblast, Russian S.F.S.R.), defense minister of Estonia (1931-32, 1933). He was also minister of agriculture (1920, 1923-25, 1929-31) and transport (1926-28). Kerèns, Pierre André Servais (b. July 22, 1780, Mechelen, Austrian Netherlands [now in Antwerp province, Belgium] - d. April 6, 1862, Maastricht), acting governor of Limburg (1831). Kerensky Kerensky, Aleksandr (Fyodorovich) (b. May 4 [April 22, O.S.], 1881, Simbirsk [now Ulyanovsk], Russia - d. June 11, 1970, New York City), head of the Russian provisional government (1917). He was attracted to the Narodniki revolutionary movement and later (c. 1905) joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He was elected to the fourth Duma in 1912 as a member of the small Trudoviki (Labour) group, and, unlike some of the more radical socialists, supported Russia's participation in World War I. But in the course of the war tsarist repression increased and Kerensky became increasingly disenchanted with the regime. When the February Revolution broke out (1917), he was offered, and promptly accepted, the posts of vice chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and of minister of justice in the provisional government formed by the Duma. He was the only person to hold positions in both bodies and acted as intermediary between them. In May, he was transferred to the posts of minister of war and of the navy. When the provisional government was again compelled to reorganize in July, Kerensky, whose dramatic oratorical style appeared to win him broad popular support, became prime minister. He initiated democratic reforms, but they did not go to the core of popular demands for peace and for breaking up the landed estates. Beset from the right and the left, his government was virtually paralyzed. Power gravitated to the Petrograd Soviet and the Bolsheviks finished off Kerensky's government in November (October, O.S.). He escaped to the front, sought vainly to rally armed support for his government, and remained in hiding until May 1918, when he emigrated to western Europe, living mostly in France before moving to the United States in 1940. Kerenxhi, Nesti (b. Sept. 5, 1920, Korçë, Albania - d. 2002, Tiranë, Albania), interior minister of Albania (1948). Keresztes-Fischer, Ferenc vitéz, until 1929 Ferenc Fischer (b. Feb. 18, 1881, Pécs, Hungary - d. March 3, 1948, Vöcklabruck, Austria), interior minister (1931-35, 1938-44), acting prime minister (1941, 1942), and acting foreign minister (1942) of Hungary. He was also governor of Baranya and Pécs (1921-31) and Somogy (1925-31). Kerim Kerim, Srgjan (b. Dec. 12, 1948, Skopje, Macedonia [now North Macedonia]), foreign minister of Macedonia (2000-01). He was also ambassador to Germany (1994-2000) and to Switzerland and Liechtenstein (1995-2000) and permanent representative to the United Nations (2001-03). In 2007-08 he was president of the UN General Assembly. Kerimbayev, Daniyal (Kerimbayevich) (b. March 29, 1909, Semipalatinsk oblast, Russia [now in Vostochno-Kazakhstan oblast, Kazakhstan] - d. Jan. 6, 1982, Alma-Ata, Kazakh S.S.R. [now Almaty, Kazakhstan]), chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh S.S.R. (1947-54). He was also chairman of the Executive Committee of Kustanay (1940-45), Pavlodar (1945-47), and Severo-Kazakhstan (1954-56) oblasti. Kerimkulov Kerimkulov, Medetbek (Temirbekovich) (b. Jan. 28, 1949), first deputy prime minister (2005-06) and acting prime minister (2005) of Kyrgyzstan. He was also mayor of Bishkek (1999-2005) and minister of industry, trade, and tourism (2006-07). Kerimov, Musa (Abdurakhmanovich) (b. 1938), chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. (1976-90). Kerin, John (Charles) (b. Nov. 21, 1937, Bowral, N.S.W. - d. March 28, 2023), Australian politician. He entered the federal parliament as member of the House of Representatives for Macarthur in 1972, lost his seat in 1975 when the reformist Labor government of Gough Whitlam fell, but regained another, Werriwa, N.S.W., in 1978. A supporter of Prime Minister Robert Hawke, he was rewarded with the portfolio for primary industry (from 1987, primary industries and energy). With his practical and theoretical economic background, he was a natural, although untimely, choice for the Treasury portfolio when Paul Keating resigned from the government in June 1991, following an unsuccessful challenge for the prime ministership. Kerin's sudden swings of policy direction - on interest rates, for example - often appeared to be the result of sail trimming to meet sectional demands within the Labor Party rather than a considered response to economic forces. Despite Hawke's assertion to the contrary, Kerin admitted that Australia was experiencing its most severe recession in 60 years. On December 6, with his approval rating at an all-time low, Hawke sacked Kerin, only to fall victim some two weeks later to a new leadership challenge from Keating. Kerin then became minister of trade and overseas development (until 1993). R. Kerin C. Kern Kernan Kerin, Rob(ert Gerard) (b. Jan. 4, 1954), premier of South Australia (2001-02). Kerkapoly, Károly (b. May 13, 1824, Szentgál, Hungary - d. Dec. 31, 1891, Budapest, Hungary), finance minister of Hungary (1870-73). Kerkavov, Rovshan (Bayramnazarovich), Turkmen Rowsen (Baýramnazarowiç) Kerkawow, a deputy prime minister of Turkmenistan (2001). He was also minister of communications (1997-2001). Kern, Christian (b. Jan. 4, 1966, Vienna, Austria), chancellor of Austria (2016-17). In 2010-16 he was CEO of the Austrian federal railways (ÖBB). He was chairman of the Social Democratic Party in 2016-18. Kern, Johann Konrad (b. June 11, 1808, Berlingen, Thurgau, Switzerland - d. April 14, 1888, Zürich, Switzerland), president of the government of Thurgau (1850, 1852). He was also Swiss president of the National Council (1850) and minister to France (1857-83). Kernan, Joe, byname of Joseph Eugene Kernan (b. April 8, 1946, Chicago, Ill. - d. July 29, 2020, South Bend, Ind.), governor of Indiana (2003-05). He was also mayor of South Bend (1988-97). Kerner, Otto, Jr. (b. Aug. 15, 1908, Chicago, Ill. - d. May 9, 1976, Chicago), governor of Illinois (1961-68). Kernot Kernot, Cheryl (b. Dec. 5, 1948, Maitland, N.S.W.), Australian politician. She joined the Australian Democrats (AD) in 1979 (two years after its founding), in part because she was attracted to an organization that right from the start had set up party administrative processes that were very appealing to women. In an early speech to the Australian Federation of University Women in Brisbane, Kernot recalled that because of the party's relative youth, the Democrats had not formed links with unions, business, or farmer organizations and had never had to battle with the sort of vested interests and entrenched male hierarchies that existed in other places. She was the party's representative in a Young Political Leaders' exchange tour of the U.S. in 1986, and in 1990 she was elected to the Senate on her fourth attempt. In late 1993 Kernot was heavily involved in the successful passage of the historic Native Title (Mabo) legislation, acting as a behind-the-scenes negotiator between the government, the Senate independents, and Aboriginal groups. She became leader of the AD after 81% of the full membership elected her in May 1993 and she became the most popular chief of any Australian political party. In 1994 she launched an "Inspiring Women" calendar for 1995, with herself as Miss April under the rubric "Strength and Courage." Kernot said that she hoped the calendar would send the message to women that success and inspiration were not necessarily synonymous with fame and wealth and that happiness was not just about being thin or fashionable. She ended by quoting Emmeline Pankhurst: "Women will only be truly successful when no one is surprised that they are successful." She defected to Labor in 1997. Kerr, Sir John Henry (b. 1871 - d. April 8, 1934), governor of Assam (1922-27); knighted 1922. J.R. Kerr Kerr, Sir John Robert (b. Sept. 24, 1914, Sydney, N.S.W. - d. March 24, 1991, Sydney), governor-general of Australia (1974-77). He served with the 2nd Australian Imperial Force in World War II. From 1966 to 1972 he was a judge on the Commonwealth Industrial Court and on the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory. Kerr was named chief justice of the New South Wales Supreme Court in 1972; two years later Prime Minister Gough Whitlam offered him the post of governor-general. In 1975 a series of government scandals and policy disputes led to a stalemate between Whitlam, whose Labor Party held a majority in the House of Representatives, and the opposition, which controlled the Senate and refused to release badly needed government funding. He broke with 200 years of tradition and precipitated a constitutional crisis on Nov. 11, 1975, when he used his power as governor-general to dismiss Whitlam's Labor government and compel a caretaker government led by the opposition leader, Malcolm Fraser, to call a general election. The controversy triggered by these actions continued to plague him. He stepped down as governor-general in 1977, and in 1978 he withdrew his name from consideration for the post of ambassador to UNESCO. He was knighted in 1974. R.J. Kerr C. Kerruish Kerr, Richard J(ames) (b. Oct. 4, 1935, Fort Smith, Ark.), acting CIA director (1991). He was appointed as deputy CIA director by Pres. George Bush on Feb. 15, 1989, confirmed by the Senate on March 16, and sworn in March 20. He served in this position until March 2, 1992. He served as acting CIA director from William Webster's departure on Sept. 1, 1991, until Robert Gates was sworn in on Nov. 6, 1991. Kerr, Robert S(amuel) (b. Sept. 11, 1896, near Ada, Indian Territory [now in Okla.] - d. Jan. 1, 1963, Washington, D.C.), governor of Oklahoma (1943-47). He was also a U.S. senator from Oklahoma (1949-63). Kerr, Thomas (b. 1818 - d. August 1907), governor of the Falkland Islands (1880-91). Kerrey, Bob, byname of Joseph Robert Kerrey (b. Aug. 27, 1943, Lincoln, Neb.), governor of Nebraska (1983-87). He was also a U.S. senator from Nebraska (1989-2001) and a candidate for the 1992 Democratic presidential nomination. Kerruish, Sir (Henry) Charles (b. July 23, 1917, Ballafayle, Maughold parish, Isle of Man - d. July 23, 2003, Strang, Braddan parish, Isle of Man), chairman of the Executive Council of the Isle of Man (1961-67); knighted 1979. He was speaker of the House of Keys (1962-90) and president of the Legislative Council and of Tynwald (1990-2000). Kerruish, (John) Michael (b. Nov. 2, 1948 - d. July 14, 2010, Isle of Man), acting lieutenant governor of the Isle of Man (2005). He was attorney general (1993-98), second deemster (1998-2003), and first deemster (2003-10). Kerry, Cameron (Forbes) (b. Sept. 6, 1950), U.S. acting commerce secretary (2013); brother of John Kerry. J. Kerry Kerry, John (Forbes) (b. Dec. 11, 1943, Denver, Colo.), U.S. secretary of state (2013-17). He served in the Vietnam War in 1966-69 and after his return became a prominent spokesman for the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. In 1972 he ran unsuccessfully for the House of Representatives, but in 1982 he was elected lieutenant governor of Massachusetts, and in 1984 he was elected to the U.S. Senate (reelected in 1990, 1996, 2002, and 2008). He was the Democratic candidate in the 2004 presidential election but lost to incumbent George W. Bush. As secretary of state during Pres. Barack Obama's second term, he notably helped draft the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement (from which Pres. Donald Trump withdrew in 2018). In 2020 president-elect Joe Biden named Kerry special presidential envoy for climate. He left the post in early 2024 to work on Biden's reelection campaign. Kersaint, Armand Guy Simon de Coëtnempren, comte de (b. July 29, 1742, Paris, France - d. [executed] Dec. 4, 1793, Paris), governor of Berbice and Demerara-Essequibo (1782). Keruak, Tun (Datuk Seri Panglima Haji) Mohamad Said (b. Nov. 15, 1926 - d. Nov. 17, 1995), chief minister (1975-76) and head of state (1987-94) of Sabah. S.S. Keruak Keruak, Datuk Seri (Haji Mohamad) Salleh (bin Tun Mohamad) Said (b. July 10, 1957, Kota Belud, British North Borneo [now Sabah, Malaysia]), chief minister of Sabah (1994-96); son of Tun Mohamad Said Keruak. He received the titles Datuk (September 1990) and Datuk Seri (March 21, 1996). In 2015-18 he was Malaysian minister of communications and multimedia. Kervyn de Lettenhove, Joseph (Marie Bruno Constantin), baron (b. Aug. 17, 1817, Saint-Michel, near Bruges, Netherlands [now in Belgium] - d. April 2, 1891, Saint-Michel), interior minister of Belgium (1870-71). Also known as a historian, he was created baron in 1861. Kery, Theodor (b. July 24, 1918, Mannersdorf an der Rabnitz, Burgenland, Austria - d. May 9, 2010, Kobersdorf, Burgenland), Landeshauptmann of Burgenland (1966-87). Keshtmand Keshtmand, Sultan Ali (b. 1935, near Kabul, Afghanistan), prime minister of Afghanistan (1981-88, 1989-90). He was a member of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party. After the Communist coup of April 1978, he was appointed minister of planning. In August of the same year, he was arrested for plotting against Nur Mohammad Taraki's regime. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. After the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in 1979, he became a member of the Politburo and a deputy prime minister and (until September 1980) again minister of planning, and later was appointed as prime minister. In 1990, he was appointed first vice president, but in 1991 he was dismissed from this position. After his dismissal, he moved to Moscow and subsequently to England. While abroad, Keshtmand, who belongs to the Hazara ethnic group, charged that Afghanistan had been ruled by the Pashtuns and that the minorities had been underrepresented in past Afghan governments. Kesmir, Cemal, until Jan. 1, 1935, Artin Cemal Bey (b. 1862, Ibradi, Ottoman Empire [now in Antalya province, Turkey] - d. Sept. 29, 1949, Istanbul, Turkey), interior minister of the Ottoman Empire (1919). He was also governor of Konya (1918-19, 1919) and minister of commerce (1920). Kesmir, Halit Nazmi (b. 1897, Ibradi, Ottoman Empire [now in Antalya province, Turkey] - d. March 23, 1948, Ankara, Turkey), finance minister of Turkey (1946-48); son of Cemal Kesmir. Kesper, Lodewijk Albert (b. May 18, 1892, Gouda, Zuid-Holland, Netherlands - d. March 26, 1963, The Hague, Netherlands), queen's commissioner of Zuid-Holland (1945-55). Kessler, Harry W. (b. Aug. 15, 1927, Toledo, Ohio - d. Jan. 2, 2007, Perrysburg Township, Ohio), mayor of Toledo (1971-77). He entered the political arena in 1961 when he unsuccessfully sought a City Council seat. He was beaten again the next year when he ran for state representative, and lost a third time in 1963 in his second bid for council. He finally was elected in 1965, the first in a long string of victories. After four years on council and two as vice mayor, he moved into the mayor's office Jan. 27, 1971, under tough circumstances. Mayor William Ensign and City Manager William Gross had resigned, the economy was faltering, and city finances were shaky. Kessler became mayor through a 13-11 vote in the Democratic Party executive committee to beat Carol Pietrykowski as the party's choice to be appointed to succeed Ensign. A heavy underdog in the 1971 mayoral primary, Kessler lost to Howard Cook by 7,000 votes. But in the general election two months later, Kessler defeated Cook for a two-year term. He was reelected in 1973 and 1975. He helped spearhead the development that remade the downtown riverfront and changed the city's skyline. On the political scene, he was credited for standing up to Bill Boyle, then chairman of the Lucas County Democratic Party, when patronage issues arose. Kessler did not seek reelection in 1977, citing burnout from the 1975 race (when he took a lot of heat because of the relationship he built with the publisher of the Toledo Blade, Paul Block, Jr.), yet ran successfully that November to be clerk of municipal court, holding that post until 1992 and then serving as a member of the Toledo Board of Education in 1992-95. Kessler, Heinz (b. Jan. 26, 1920, Lauban, Germany [now Luban, Poland] - d. May 2, 2017, Berlin, Germany), defense minister of East Germany (1985-89). Herbert Kessler Kessler, Herbert (b. Feb. 2, 1925, Bludesch, Vorarlberg, Austria - d. July 27, 2018, Rankweil, Vorarlberg), Austrian politician. He was mayor of Rankweil (1957-64), member of the Vorarlberg legislature (1954-64), and Landeshauptmann of Vorarlberg (1964-87). Kessler, Philippe (Jacques Nicolas) (b. Oct. 3, 1927, Navenne, Haute-Saône, France - d. Aug. 31, 2013, Besançon, Doubs, France), prefect of Mayotte (1980-81). He was also prefect of Gers département (1981). Kessler, Zdenek (b. Dec. 29, 1926, Brno, Czechoslovakia [now in Czech Republic] - d. Aug. 25, 2003), chief justice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic (1993-2003). Kestens, Prosper (b. Dec. 27, 1867, Ghent, Belgium - d. Sept. 14, 1945, Brussels, Belgium), defense minister of Belgium (1925-26). Kestler (Farnés), Maximiliano (b. June 6, 1919, San Felipe, Guatemala - d. May 30, 2010, Guatemala), Guatemalan diplomat. He was permanent representative to the United Nations (1969-70). Ketema Ketema Yifru (b. Dec. 12, 1929, Gara Muleta, Ethiopia - d. Jan. 14, 1994, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), foreign minister of Ethiopia (1961-71). He was also minister of commerce, industry, and tourism (1971-74). Kéthly, Anna (b. Nov. 16, 1889, Budapest, Hungary - d. Sept. 7, 1976, Blankenberge, Belgium), Hungarian politician. A union leader and Social Democrat closely watched by the police of the Austro-Hungarian empire, she was elected to the Hungarian parliament in 1922 and represented the city of Szeged until 1948, when she resigned on the forced union of her party with the Communists. Imprisoned from 1950 to 1954, she in 1956 became briefly minister of state in Imre Nagy's revolutionary government. On November 4 the government was deposed by Soviet forces that installed János Kádár as premier. The following day she arrived at the UN in New York to plead for help but the Security Council would not hear her. She went into exile in Brussels. Ketola, Heljä(-Marja), previously Heljä Tammisola (b. May 18, 1946, Pori, Finland), Finnish politician. She was the last chairman of the Finnish Communist Party before its merger (together with its umbrella organization, the Finnish People's Democratic League) into the Left Alliance. Formerly the party's secretary-general (1988-90), Tammisola was elected chairman at the February 1990 party congress which decided to transfer all political activities to the new alliance which would be founded in April; the party technically continued to exist, with Ketola as chairman, until it declared bankruptcy in November 1992. Ketskhoveli, Zakhary (Nikolayevich) (b. 1902 - d. 1970), chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Georgian S.S.R. (1952-53). He was also a deputy premier (1942-47), first deputy premier (1947-52), people's commissar of food industry (1944-46), and minister of beverages industry (1946-47) and light and food industry (1953). Kettlewell, Andrew (Michael) (b. March 5, 1958, Harrogate, Yorkshire [now in North Yorkshire], England), administrator of Ascension (2002-05). Keudell, Walter von (b. July 17, 1884, Castellammare di Stabia, Italy - d. May 7, 1973, Bonn, West Germany), interior minister of Germany (1927-28). Keuky Lim (b. March 7, 1937, Kompong Khleang, Siem Reap province, Cambodia), foreign minister of Cambodia (1973-75). He was also information minister (1970-71). He went into exile in Thailand and then in France. Keuneman, Pieter (Gerald Bartholomeus) (b. Oct. 3, 1917, Colombo, Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] - d. Jan. 23, 1997), Sri Lankan politician. He was general secretary (1943-73) and chairman (1973-80) of the Communist Party and minister of housing and construction (1970-77). Keutcha J. Key Keutcha, Jean (b. June 1923, Bazou, near Bangangté, Cameroon - d. April 1, 2012, Yaoundé, Cameroon), foreign minister of Cameroon (1971-72, 1975-80). He was also minister of agriculture (1972-75) and ambassador to the Benelux countries (1983-85) and China (1985-89). Kevorkov, Boris (Sarkisovich) (b. 1932 - d. 1998), first secretary of the Communist Party committee of Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast (1973-88). Key, Sir John (Phillip) (b. Aug. 9, 1961, Auckland, N.Z.), prime minister (and tourism minister) of New Zealand (2008-16); knighted 2017. He was leader of the National Party in 2006-16. Key, William S(haffer) (b. Oct. 6, 1889, Dudleyville, Ala. - d. Jan. 5, 1959, Oklahoma City, Okla.), commander of the Allied occupation forces in Iceland (1943-44). Keyes, Alan (Lee) (b. Aug. 7, 1950, New York City), U.S. politician. He was assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (1985-87) and a candidate for the Republican presidential nominations of 1996, 2000, and 2008. Keyes, Henry W(ilder) (b. May 23, 1863, Newbury, Vt. - d. June 19, 1938, North Haverhill, N.H.), governor of New Hampshire (1917-19). Keyes, Sir Terence Humphrey (b. May 28, 1877 - d. Feb. 26, 1939), British political agent in Bahrain (1914-16); knighted 1933. Keys, Derek (Lyle) (b. Aug. 30, 1931, Johannesburg, South Africa - d. April 29, 2018), finance minister of South Africa (1992-94). He was also minister of trade, industry, and economic coordination (1991-94). Keyser, F(rank) Ray, Jr. (b. Aug. 17, 1927, Chelsea, Vt. - d. March 7, 2015, Brandon, Vt.), governor of Vermont (1961-63). Kezrak Kezrak, Salih Hulusi, before 1935 Salih Pasha (b. 1864, Constantinople, Ottoman Empire [now Istanbul, Turkey] - d. Oct. 25, 1939, Istanbul), grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire (1920). He was also minister of war (1909-10), navy (1910, 1919-20, 1920-21, 1921-22), and interior (1922). Kezza, Antoine (b. 1933), Central African Republic politician. He was minister of civil service and labour (1966-69), veterans (1969), industry, mines, and geology (1969-70), and economic planning and cooperation (1970) and ambassador to Ethiopia (1970-72), West Germany (1972-75?), Chad (1975?-76), Romania (1976-80s), and Côte d'Ivoire (1980s). Kgabo, Englishman (Moranche Kagiso) (b. 1925, Kweneng, Bechuanaland [now Botswana] - d. 1992), home affairs minister of Botswana (1984-89). He was also minister of local government and lands (1966-73, 1983-84) and information and broadcasting (1973-74). Kgama III Boikanyo a Sekgoma, also spelled Khama, byname the Good (b. 1837 - d. Feb. 21, 1923, Serowe, Bechuanaland [now Botswana]), chief of baNgwato (1872-73, 1875-1923); son of Sekgoma I a Kgari. Kgari, Bakwana Kgosidintsi (b. Oct. 29, 1921, Serowe, Bechuanaland [now Botswana] - d. May 16, 1977), foreign minister (1971-74) and home affairs minister (1974-77) of Botswana. Kgathi, Shaw, defense, justice, and security minister of Botswana (2014-19). He was also minister of youth, sports, and culture (2009-14). Khabadze Khabadze, Archil (b. March 11, 1981, Batumi, Adzhar A.S.S.R., Georgian S.S.R.), prime minister of Ajaria (2012-16). Khabarov, Vladimir (Viktorovich) (b. Feb. 11, 1951 - d. July 2010), head of the administration of Nenets autonomous okrug (1996). Khabibullayev, Pulat (Kirgizbayevich) (b. Oct. 14, 1936, Andizhan, Uzbek S.S.R. - d. Feb. 7, 2010), chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek S.S.R. (1988-89). He was also president of the Academy of Sciences (1984-88) and chairman of the Supreme Soviet (1985-88) of the Uzbek S.S.R. and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology of Uzbekistan (1994-2002). Khabibullin, Ravmer (Khasanovich) (b. July 10, 1933, Chekmagush, Bashkir A.S.S.R., Russian S.F.S.R. - d. Aug. 31, 2011), first secretary of the Communist Party committee of the Bashkir A.S.S.R. (1987-90). Khabirov Khachaturyan Khabirov, Rady (Faritovich) (b. March 20, 1964, Sayranovo, Bashkir A.S.S.R., Russian S.F.S.R.), head of the republic of Bashkortostan (2018- ). Khachatryan, Gagik (Gurgeni) (b. Nov. 26, 1955, Amasia village, Shirak region, Armenian S.S.R.), finance minister of Armenia (2014-16). Khachaturyan, Vahagn (Garniki) (b. April 22, 1959, Sisian, Armenian S.S.R.), president of Armenia (2022- ). He was also mayor of Yerevan (1992-96) and minister of high-tech industry (2021-22). Khaddam Khaddam, Abdul-Halim (Said), Arabic `Abd al-Halim (Sa`id) Khaddam (b. June 21, 1932, Banias, northern Syria - d. March 31, 2020, Paris, France), foreign minister (1970-84), a vice president (1984-2005), and acting president (2000) of Syria. He entered politics after the Ba`th Party took power in 1963. He held a series of governor positions in Hama (1963-64), Quneitra (1964-67), and Damascus (1968) and served as minister of the economy and foreign trade (1969-70). When Hafez al-Assad seized power in 1970, he gave his old friend Khaddam the foreign ministry. In 1984 he was appointed one of three vice presidents, exclusively responsible for Lebanon. He played a key role in mapping out the Taif accord in 1989 between Lebanon's warring factions that put an end to the civil war there. But his influence started to wane in 1998 when the Lebanon job was given to Bashar al-Assad. When Hafez al-Assad died he became caretaker president until Bashar took over. He resigned as vice president in June 2005 and moved to Paris in September. In December he openly distanced himself from Pres. Bashar al-Assad's regime, accusing Assad of involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Though he was previously seen as a hardliner, he now explained that he had resigned because reforms were not progressing. Khadikov, Azamat (Taimurazovich) (b. June 17, 1955, Beslan, North Ossetian A.S.S.R., Russian S.F.S.R.), acting prime minister of North Ossetia-Alania (2015). Khadjimba Khadjimba, Raul (Djumkovich), also spelled Khadzhimba or Khajimba (b. March 21, 1958, Tkuarchal [Tkvarcheli], Abkhaz A.S.S.R., Georgian S.S.R.), prime minister (2003-04), vice president (2005-09), and president (2014-20) of Abkhazia. He was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2004 and 2009. K.B. Khadka N. Khadka Khadka, Khum Bahadur (b. May 1951, Satabariya, Nepal), home minister of Nepal (1995-97, 1997-98, 2001-02). He was also minister of supply (1998), housing, physical planning, and local development (1999), works and transport (1999-2000), water resources (2000), and physical planning and works (2000-01). Khadka, Narayan (b. March 20, 1949, Bhojpur, Nepal), foreign minister of Nepal (2021-22). He was also minister of urban development (2014-15). Khadka, Purna Bahadur (b. Feb. 29, 1956), defense minister and a deputy prime minister of Nepal (2023-24). Khadzhiyev, Salambek (Naibovich) (b. Jan. 7, 1941, Shali, Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., Russian S.F.S.R. - d. March 2, 2018), chairman of the Government of National Revival of Chechnya (1995). He was also Soviet minister of chemical and oil refining industry (1991) and chairman of Russia's State Committee for Industrial Policy (1995-96). Khagba, Beslan (Badrovich) (b. May 23, 1956, Gudauta, Abkhaz A.S.S.R., Georgian S.S.R.), interior minister of Abkhazia (2015). Khagur, Asfar (Pshikanovich) (b. Oct. 4, 1960, Panakhes, Teuchezhsky rayon, Adygey autonomous oblast, Russian S.F.S.R. - d. August 2013), prime minister of Adygeya (2004-06). Khai Dinh Khai Dinh (era name), personal name Nguyen Phuoc Tuan, temple name Hoang Tong, posthumous style Tuyen Hoang De (b. Oct. 8, 1885, Hue, Annam [now in Vietnam] - d. Nov. 6, 1925, Hue), emperor of Vietnam (1916-25). Khairallah, Adnan (b. 1940, Tikrit, Iraq - d. [helicopter crash] May 5, 1989, near Mosul, Iraq), defense minister of Iraq (1977-89); cousin of Saddam Hussein. He was also a deputy prime minister (1979-89). Khakamada, Irina (Mutsuovna) (b. April 13, 1955, Moscow, Russian S.F.S.R.), Russian politician. She was chairwoman of the State Committee for Support and Development of Small Business (1997-98), co-chair of the Union of Rightist Forces (2000-04), and a minor presidential candidate (2004). Khaketla Khaketla, 'Mamphono (b. March 5, 1960), finance minister (2015-16) and foreign minister (2016-17) of Lesotho. She was also minister of communications, science, and technology (2002-04), natural resources (2004-07), and education and training (2007-12). Khakhalov, Aleksandr (Uladayevich) (b. May 27 [May 14, O.S.], 1909, Khandala ulus, Zabaikalsky oblast [now in Buryatia republic], Russia - d. May 2, 1970, Moscow, Russian S.F.S.R.), first secretary of the Communist Party committee (1951-60) and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1960-70) of the Buryat-Mongol (from 1958 Buryat) A.S.S.R. Khakhva, Tengiz (Suleymanovich) (b. Feb. 3, 1952, Batumi, Adzhar A.S.S.R., Georgian S.S.R.), first secretary of the Communist Party committee (1990-91) and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1990-91) of the Adzhar A.S.S.R. Khakimov, Dilyor (Zafarovich) (b. Nov. 1, 1969, Tashkent, Uzbek S.S.R.), Uzbek diplomat. He was permanent representative to the United Nations (2013) and ambassador to the Benelux countries (2017-23). Khalaf, Kadhim M. (b. April 20, 1922), Iraqi diplomat. He was chargé d'affaires at the United Nations (1955-56, 1957-58) and in West Germany (1959-60), permanent representative to the United Nations (1966-67), and ambassador to the United Kingdom (1968-71). Khalap, Ramakant (b. Aug. 5, 1946, Mandre, Goa, Portuguese India [now in North Goa district, Goa, India]), Indian minister of state for law and justice (1996-98). Khalatbari, Abbas Ali (b. 1912 - d. [executed] April 11, 1979), secretary-general of CENTO (1962-67) and foreign minister of Iran (1971-78). He was also ambassador to Poland (1960-62). Khaleel, Ahmed (b. March 17, 1962), Maldivian diplomat. He was chargé d'affaires (2006-08) and ambassador (2009-16) to Japan and permanent representative to the United Nations (2008). Khalid Khalid (ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud), Arabic Khalid (ibn `Abd al-`Aziz Al Faysal Al Sa`ud) (b. 1913, Riyadh, Arabia [now in Saudi Arabia] - d. June 13, 1982, al-Ta´if, Saudi Arabia), king of Saudi Arabia (1975-82). The fourth son of Abdul Aziz, founder of the Saudi kingdom, he became the closest supporter of his brothers Saud and Faysal. At age 14, he was sent as his father's representative to the desert tribes to hear their grievances. In 1932 he was appointed viceroy of the Hejaz, and in 1934 he took part in a war against Yemen led by Faysal, and afterward was made interior minister and Saudi representative at the peace negotiations. In 1939 he left Arabia for the first time to take part in the abortive London conference on Palestine. Regarded as a "man of the desert," he concerned himself with the problems of the Bedouin and took a special interest in desert-reclamation projects through the use of groundwater. His modest personality and reputation for calm reason made him the chief conciliator in the disputes that arose among the large family of royal princes. He is said to have been influential in 1964, when elders of the royal family met at his palace and decided to remove his brother Saud as king to be replaced by Faysal, who then appointed Khalid as crown prince. From 1970, illness cast doubt on his eventual succession to the throne, but he did take over on Faysal's assassination in 1975 and was welcomed as a figure who enjoyed much popularity, especially with the Bedouin. He reacted moderately to Egyptian president Anwar as-Sadat's Israeli peace initiative and benefited from the success of the 1979 visit to his country of Queen Elizabeth II and his return visit to the U.K. in 1981. He left much of the administration of the country to his half-brother Prince Fahd, who became his successor. Khalid, Asadullah (b. 1969, Nawa district, Ghazni province, Afghanistan), defense minister of Afghanistan (2018-21). He was also governor of Ghazni (2002-05) and Kandahar (2005-08), minister of border and tribal affairs (2010-12), and head of the National Directorate of Security (2012-13). He was wounded in an assassination attempt in December 2012. Khalid, Mansour, Arabic al-Mansur Khalid (b. Dec. 13, 1931, Omdurman, Sudan - d. April 22, 2020, Khartoum, Sudan), foreign minister of The Sudan (1971-75, 1977). He was also minister of youth and social affairs (1969-71) and education (1975-77) and permanent representative to the United Nations (1971). Miraj Khalid Khalid, (Malik) Miraj, Miraj also spelled Meraj (b. 1916, Dera Chahal village, Lahore district, Punjab, India [now in Pakistan] - d. June 13, 2003, Lahore), interim prime minister of Pakistan (1996-97). He pioneered the left-wing Movement of Afro-Asian Solidarity in Pakistan and attended a tri-continental solidarity conference in Havana in 1966 as secretary of the Pakistani delegation. He joined the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in 1968 a year after the party was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, under whom he served as minister of food, agriculture, and underdeveloped regions (1971-72), law and parliamentary affairs (1974-76), and social welfare, health, and rural development (1976-77) and as chief minister of Punjab (1972-73). He was National Assembly speaker when Pres. Ghulam Ishaq Khan sacked the first government of Benazir Bhutto, Zulfikar's daughter, in 1990. Khalid was not given a PPP ticket to contest the October 1993 elections that brought Bhutto to power for the second time, but was afterwards named as rector of Islamabad's International Islamic University. He dissociated himself from active politics and became critical of Bhutto's government in 1996. In November 1996 Pres. Farooq Leghari named the soft-spoken 80-year-old as caretaker prime minister to replace Bhutto, whom he sacked overnight on charges of corruption and misrule. Leghari also dissolved parliament. Khalid pledged to ensure that free and fair elections would be held in February 1997. Khalid Al Faysal (ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud) (b. Feb. 24, 1940, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), Saudi prince; son of Faysal; grandson of Abdul Aziz. He has been governor of Asir (1971-2007) and Makkah (2007-13, 2015- ) and education minister (2013-15). Khalid ibn A. Khalid ibn K. Khalid ibn Ahmad (ibn Muhammad) Al Khalifa, Sheikh (b. April 4, 1960, Bahrain), foreign minister of Bahrain (2005-20); great-great-grandson of Sheikh Ali ibn Khalifa Al Khalifa. He was previously ambassador to the United Kingdom (2001-05), the Netherlands (2002-05), Ireland (2002-05), Norway (2002-05), and Sweden (2003-05). Khalid ibn Bandar (ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud), Saudi prince; grandson of Abdul Aziz. He was governor of Riyadh (2013-14) and head of the General Intelligence Directorate (2014-15). Khalid ibn Bandar (ibn Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud) (b. Aug. 14, 1977), Saudi diplomat; son of Bandar ibn Sultan. He has been ambassador to Germany (2017-19) and the United Kingdom (2019- ). Khalid ibn Khalifa ibn Abdul Aziz Al Thani, Sheikh (b. 1968, Doha, Qatar), prime minister and interior minister of Qatar (2020-23). Khalid ibn Salman (b. 1988, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), Saudi prince; son of Salman. He has been ambassador to the United States (2017-19) and defense minister (2022- ). Khalid (bin) Ibrahim, Tan Sri (Abdul) (b. Dec
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	28	https://vovworld.vn/en-US/news/party-state-leaders-congratulate-former-lao-leader-on-100th-birthday-1269851.vov	en	Party, State leaders congratulate former Lao leader on 100th birthday	https://photo-cms-vovwor…ienmung_CNKP.jpg	https://photo-cms-vovwor…ienmung_CNKP.jpg	[ "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/w730/uploaded/vovworld/qosino/2024_02_07/14-dienmung_cnkp.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/c200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/vjryqdxwp/2024_07_25/vov5_25-ctntolamtieptbtctnlao_RWUA.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/c200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/vjryqdxwp/2024_07_25/vov5_24-ctntolamtiepdoantrungquoc_ASST.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/vjryqdxwp/2024_07_25/23-ttphamminhchinhtiepdacphaivien_EFCP.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/ihvayht/2024_07_25/20-ctntolam-thucday_YAGS.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/400x240/Uploaded/vovworld/igszno/2024_07_12/dautam_MEIC.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/igszno/2024_07_09/20chiemnguongvedepvietnamduongsat_CBEF.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/200x120/Uploaded/vovworld/fcivpcvo/2024_04_16/gaunieu_KMZX.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/wqjczdhwq/2024_07_19/22-tbtnguyenphutrongtutran_AZVE.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/pwvopivp/2024_07_25/img_1703_wojl_VORH.jpeg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/wqjczdhwq/2024_07_25/img_1703_WOJL.jpeg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/pwvopivp/2024_07_18/01lexuatquanthethao_FLHU.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/igszno/2024_07_20/24-ttklhq-lanhdaocacnuoc_SSVB.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/vjryqdxwp/2024_07_18/spokespersonphamthuhang_JQVM.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/qosino/2024_07_13/3-anh1-tuantuanduyen_FXAK.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/c120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/qosino/2024_07_13/vov5_2-quangbinhsietchat_NEAC.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/c120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/qosino/2024_07_13/vov5_1-kiengiangdautu_HQUH.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/wqjczdhwq/2024_07_06/4-tuhao_ZYNE.jpg", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/ecfzyrrtlyr/2024_03_03/mld_NQMD.png", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/ecfzyrrtlyr/2024_03_03/musicon_GLDU.png", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/ecfzyrrtlyr/2024_03_03/musicnews_HAFY.png", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/ecfzyrrtlyr/2024_02_22/mld_GUYE.png", "https://photo-cms-vovworld.zadn.vn/120x90/Uploaded/vovworld/ecfzyrrtlyr/2024_02_17/musicon_IOBW.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "VOV", "VOVworld", "Party", "State", "leaders", "congratulate", "former", "Lao", "leader", "100th birthday", "Khamtai Siphandone" ]	null	[]	2024-02-07T17:36:43-07:00	(VOVWORLD) - Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and President Vo Van Thuong have cabled a message of congratulations to former Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and former President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone on the occasion of his 100th birthday on Thursday.	en	//static.vovworld.vn/favicon.ico	THE VOICE OF VIETNAM	https://vovworld.vn/en-US/news/party-state-leaders-congratulate-former-lao-leader-on-100th-birthday-1269851.vov	Former Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and former President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone. (Photo: kpl.gov.la) In the message, they said the Vietnamese Party, State and people highly value Mr. Siphandone’s dedication and brainpower, highlighted his role in the Lao revolutionary cause and in consolidating the great friendship, special solidarity, and comprehensive cooperation between the Parties, States and people of Vietnam and Laos. They wished Mr. Siphadone and his spouse good health, happiness and longevity.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	64	https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/2003282794	en	Laos salutes 30 years of communism	https://www.taipeitimes.…51202172304.jpeg	https://www.taipeitimes.…51202172304.jpeg	[ "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/logo1_forfooter.gif", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/logo.gif", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/home.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/search2.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/times.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/twitter.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/facebook.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/line.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/images/2005/12/03/20051202172304.jpeg", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/right.png", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/images/2024/07/21/thumbs/p05-240721-306.jpg", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/images/2024/07/20/thumbs/P05-240720-301.jpg", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/images/2024/07/17/thumbs/P05-240717-309.jpg", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/images/2024/07/21/thumbs/p05-240721-308.jpg", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/logo1_forfooter.gif", "https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/assets/images/rss.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "台北時報", "The Taipei Times" ]	null	[ "台北時報" ]	2005-12-03T00:00:00	Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan		https://www.taipeitimes.…_icon-mobile.jpg		https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2005/12/03/2003282794	RED-LETTER DAY The secretive Asian state held a huge Soviet-style National Day parade to celebrate the 30-year anniversary of the People's Revolutionary Party's triumph AP One of the world's last communist nations yesterday celebrated its triumph over a US-backed government 30 years ago with a mass Soviet-style rally almost extinct in the post-Cold War world. More than 25,000 soldiers, government officials and members of state youth organizations were marshaled at dawn on a vast square to hear 81-year-old president and communist party chief Khamtay Siphandone read a 12-page speech. Flanked on a high reviewing stand by the eight other members of the all-powerful Politburo, Khamtay recalled the revolutionary struggle against the US but focused largely on the Laos' liberalized economic policy. "The economy is improving throughout the country. People are experiencing a better standard of living," he said, citing progress in agriculture, mining, tourism and hydropower. Although still among the world's poorest nations, Laos has registered impressive growth rates over the past decade and the World Bank estimates the economy, fueled by foreign investment and a boost in exports, will grow by 7 percent next year. Khamtay said the Lao People's Revolutionary Party would continue to set the course for the country as it has since a 600-year-old monarchy was abolished and the victorious Pathet Lao guerrillas proclaimed Laos a communist state on Dec. 2, 1975. Backed by the Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao fought a Vientiane government held up by US aid and overcame intense aerial bombardment and a secret, CIA-trained army of ethnic Hmong guerrillas. The government collapsed in mid-1975 following the defeats of similar US-supported governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Aging veterans of the war, many proudly wearing chestfulls of medals, took part in Friday's one-and-a-half-hour ceremony at That Luang square, bordered by a huge socialist-style National Assembly building as well as the country's most sacred Buddhist monastery, the golden-spired Pha That Luang. Red and gold banners were strung around the square, reading "Long live the Lao People's Democratic Republic" and "Peace, Independence, Democracy, Prosperity." The more than 1km-long formation included 900 cheerleaders with pink and white pompoms and little girls with pigtails and bouquets of plastic flowers performing dances before the leaders. But unlike Soviet and other communist celebrations of the bygone era, there was no display of military might and the only weapons visible were those carried by the honor guard. A lone helicopter flew over at the end of the ceremony. Entry was by invitation only with Vientiane's ordinary people and a sprinkling of foreign tourists viewing the proceedings from outside the cordoned off area. "The change of regime in 1975 was a radical one in our history. It was not just a change of rulers but a deep change in the direction of the country. The monarchy was abolished and people seized power," Foreign Ministry spokesman Yong Chanthalansy said on the eve of the event. "Sometimes the changes were painful, but 30 years later the people have come to realize that they were all worth it." Although the government has liberalized the economy and slightly loosened its grip on the media, the 100,000-strong party brooks no opposition. Observers say that reforms have been faster in Laos' communist neighbors, Vietnam and China. "People are much more confident than before. They see that the government as being serious about reform," Yong said.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	90	http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7861.html	en	THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY			[ "https://a.advameg.com/matomo.php?idsite=22&rec=1", "http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/pdf.gif", "http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/jpeg.gif", "http://www.country-data.com/frd/cs/jpeg.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Country Listing Laos Table of Contents Laos THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY Figure 8. Organization of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), 1993 Source: Based on information from Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society, London, 1986, 61. Khamtai Siphandon, Prime Minister, Lao People's Democratic Republic Courtesy Embassy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Washington Nouhak Phoumsavan, President, Lao People's Democratic Republic Courtesy Embassy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Washington Whereas communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have crumbled, in Laos, the ruling communist party, the Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party-- LPRP; see Glossary) has retained undiluted political control. The constitution, adopted in August 1991, notes simply in Article 3 that the LPRP is the "leading nucleus" of the political system. LPRP statutes, revised following the Fifth Party Congress held in 1991, leave no doubt regarding the dominant role of the party: The party is...the leading core of the entire political system, hub of intelligence, and representative of the interest of the people of all strata. The party formulates and revises the major lines and policies on national development in all spheres; finds solutions to major problems; determines the policies regarding personnel management, training of cadres, and supplying key cadres for different levels; controls and supervises activities of party cadres and members, state agencies and mass organizations.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	33	https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9075	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	70	https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo/army-headquarters-views.html	en	res stock photography and images	https://s.alamy.com/logo…avicon-16x16.png	https://s.alamy.com/logo…avicon-16x16.png	[ "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy-black.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy-black.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/mastercard.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/visa.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/amex.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/paypal.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/apple-pay.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/google-pay.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Alamy Limited" ]	null	Find the perfect army headquarters views stock photo, image, vector, illustration or 360 image. Available for both RF and RM licensing.	en	https://s.alamy.com/logo…avicon-16x16.png	Alamy	https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo/army-headquarters-views.html	Alamy and its logo are trademarks of Alamy Ltd. and are registered in certain countries. Copyright © 22/07/2024 Alamy Ltd. All rights reserved.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	69	http://wearelao.com/prominent-families-of-lao-pdr/	en	Prominent Families of Lao PDR – Wearelao.com			[ "http://wearelao.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/wal-site-log.png", "http://wearelao.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/WAL-QRcode-300-300-Osource-150x150.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Bruno Vincent" ]	2023-07-08T03:15:51+00:00		en			http://wearelao.com/prominent-families-of-lao-pdr/	Lao PDR, or Laos, is a country in Southeast Asia with a rich history and culture. There are several prominent families in Laos who have played important roles in the country’s political, social, and economic development over the years. Here are a few examples: 1. Souphanouvong family – This family is one of the most prominent in Laos and is closely associated with the country’s communist movement. Souphanouvong was the first president of Laos after the communist takeover in 1975, and his brothers, Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phoumsavanh, also held high-ranking positions in the government. 2. Bounnhang Vorachith family – Bounnhang Vorachith is the current president of Laos and comes from a prominent family that has been involved in politics for several generations. His father, Kham Vorachith, was a senior official in the communist government, and his brother, Soubanh Srithirath, has also held high-ranking positions in the government. 3. Phoumi Vongvichit family – Phoumi Vongvichit was a key figure in the communist movement in Laos and served as the country’s foreign minister for many years. His family has remained influential in Laos, with several members holding positions in the government and military. 4. Sisavangvong family – This family has been associated with the Lao monarchy for several generations. Sisavangvong was the last king of Laos before the communist takeover in 1975, and his descendants continue to be involved in politics and society in Laos. 5. Khamtai Siphandone family – Khamtai Siphandone served as the president of Laos from 1998 to 2006 and was a key figure in the country’s communist government. His family has remained influential in Laos, with several members holding positions in the government and military. It’s worth noting that Laos is a socialist country, and political power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of leaders. As a result, the families listed above have had a disproportionate influence on the country’s political and social landscape.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	25	https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/geos/la.html	en	The World Factbook			[ "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/ciaseal.gif", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/fblogo.gif", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/flags/la-flag.jpg", "https://user.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/fbook/01/maps/la-map.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Executive branch: chief of state: President Gen. KHAMTAI Siphandon (since 26 February 1998) and Vice President Lt. Gen. CHOUMMALI Saignason (since NA March 2001) head of government: Prime Minister BOUNGNANG Volachit (since NA March 2001); Deputy Prime Ministers THONGLOUN Sisolit (since NA March 2001), SOMSAVAT Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998) cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president, approved by the National Assembly elections: president elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term; election last held 21 December 1997 (next to be held NA 2002); prime minister appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly for a five-year term election results: KHAMTAI Siphandon elected president; percent of National Assembly vote - NA% Economy - overview: The government of Laos - one of the few remaining official communist states - began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. The results, starting from an extremely low base, were striking - growth averaged 7% during 1988-97. Reform efforts subsequently slowed, and GDP growth dropped an average of 3 percentage points. Because Laos depends heavily on its trade with Thailand, it was damaged by the regional financial crisis beginning in 1997. Government mismanagement deepened the crisis, and from June 1997 to June 1999 the Lao kip lost 87% of its value. Laos' foreign exchange problems peaked in September 1999 when the kip fell from 3,500 kip to the dollar to 9,000 kip to the dollar in a matter of weeks. Now that the currency has stabilized, however, the government seems content to let the current situation persist, despite limited government revenue and foreign exchange reserves. A landlocked country with a primitive infrastructure, Laos has no railroads, a rudimentary road system, and limited external and internal telecommunications. Electricity is available in only a few urban areas. Subsistence agriculture accounts for half of GDP and provides 80% of total employment. For the foreseeable future the economy will continue to depend on aid from the IMF and other international sources; Japan is currently the largest bilateral aid donor; aid from the former USSR/Eastern Europe has been cut sharply.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	84	http://www.worldlanguage.com/Countries/Laos.htm	en	Laos Products and Chinese, French, Lao, Miao, Vietnamese, Yao (Asian) Languages			[ "http://www.worldlanguage.com/Images/blank.gif", "http://www.worldlanguage.com/Images/cart.gif", "http://www.worldlanguage.com/CountryFlags/109.gif", "http://www.worldlanguage.com/Images/Audio.gif", "http://www.worldlanguage.com/CountryMaps/109.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Laos				null	Geography Location: Southeastern Asia, northeast of Thailand Geographic coordinates: 18 00 N, 105 00 E Map references: Southeast Asia Area: total: 236,800 sq km land : 230,800 sq km water: 6,000 sq km Area - comparative: slightly larger than Utah Land boundaries: total: 5,083 km border countries : Burma 235 km, Cambodia 541 km, China 423 km, Thailand 1,754 km, Vietnam 2,130 km Coastline: 0 km (landlocked) Maritime claims: none (landlocked) Climate: tropical monsoon; rainy season (May to November); dry season (December to April) Terrain: mostly rugged mountains; some plains and plateaus Elevation extremes: lowest point: Mekong River 70 m highest point: Phou Bia 2,817 m Natural resources: timber, hydropower, gypsum, tin, gold, gemstones Land use: arable land : 4% permanent crops: 0% permanent pastures: 3% forests and woodland: 54% other : 40% (1998 est.) Irrigated land: 1,640 sq km note: rainy season irrigation - 2,169 sq km; dry season irrigation - 750 sq km (1998 est.) Natural hazards: floods, droughts, and blight Environment - current issues: deforestation; soil erosion; a majority of the population does not have access to potable water Environment - international agreements: party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Nuclear Test Ban signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea Geography - note: landlocked People Population: 5,777,180 (July 2002 est.) Age structure: 0-14 years: 42.5% (male 1,233,659; female 1,219,872) 15-64 years: 54.2% (male 1,543,246; female 1,591,419) 65 years and over:3.3% (male 86,375; female 102,609) (2002 est.) Population growth rate: 2.47% (2002 est.) Birth rate: 37.39 births/1,000 population (2002 est.) Death rate: 12.71 deaths/1,000 population (2002 est.) Net migration rate:0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2002 est.) Sex ratio: at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.01 male(s)/female 15-64 years:0.97 male(s)/female 65 years and over : 0.84 male(s)/female total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2002 est.) Infant mortality rate: 90.98 deaths/1,000 live births (2002 est.) Life expectancy at birth: total population : 53.88 years male: 51.95 years female: 55.87 years (2002 est.) Total fertility rate: 5.03 children born/woman (2002 est.) Nationality: noun: Lao(s) or Laotian(s) adjective: Lao or Laotian Ethnic groups: Lao Loum (lowland) 68%, Lao Theung (upland) 22%, Lao Soung (highland) including the Hmong ("Meo") and the Yao (Mien) 9%, ethnic Vietnamese/Chinese 1% Religions: Buddhist 60%, animist and other 40% Languages: Lao (official), French, English, and various ethnic languages Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 57% male: 70% female : 44% (1999 est.) Government Country name: conventional long form: Lao People's Democratic Republic conventional short form: Laos local long form : Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxaxon Lao local short form: none Data code: LA Government type: Communist state National capital: Vientiane Administrative divisions: 16 provinces (khoueng, singular and plural), 1 municipality* (kampheng nakhon, singular and plural), and 1 special zone** (khetphiset, singular and plural); Attapu, Bokeo, Bolikhamxai, Champasak, Houaphan, Khammouan, Louangnamtha, Louangphabang, Oudomxai, Phongsali, Salavan, Savannakhet, Viangchan, Viangchan, Xaignabouli, Xaisomboun*, Xekong, Xiangkhoang Independence: 19 July 1949 (from France) National holiday: National Day, 2 December (1975) (proclamation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic) Constitution: promulgated 14 August 1991 Legal system: based on traditional customs, French legal norms and procedures, and Socialist practice Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal Executive branch: chief of state : President Gen. KHAMTAI Siphandon (since 26 February 1998) and Vice President Lt. Gen. CHOUMMALI Saignason (since 27 March 2001) head of government :Prime Minister BOUNGNANG Volachit (since 27 March 2001); First Deputy Prime Minister Maj. Gen. ASANG Laoli (since NA May 2002), Deputy Prime Minister THONGLOUN Sisolit (since 27 March 2001), and Deputy Prime Minister SOMSAVAT Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998) cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president, approved by the National Assembly elections : ppresident elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term; election last held 24 February 2002 (next to be held NA 2007); prime minister appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly for a five-year term election results: KHAMTAI Siphandon elected president; percent of National Assembly vote - NA% Legislative branch: unicameral National Assembly (85 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms) elections:last held 24 February 2002 (next to be held NA 2007) election results: percent of vote by party - NA%; seats by party - LPRP or LPRP-approved (independent, non-party members) 109 Judicial branch: People's Supreme Court (the president of the People's Supreme Court is elected by the National Assembly on the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing Committee; the vice president of the People's Supreme Court and the judges are appointed by the National Assembly Standing Committee) Political parties and leaders: Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), KHAMTAI Siphandon, party president; other parties proscribed Political pressure groups and leaders: noncommunist political groups proscribed; most opposition leaders fled the country in 1975 International organization participation: ACCT, AsDB, ASEAN (observer), CP, ESCAP, FAO, G-77, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, Intelsat (nonsignatory user), Interpol, IOC, ITU, Mekong Group, NAM, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UPU, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO (observer) Diplomatic representation in the US: chief of mission: Ambassador VANG Rattanavong chancery: 2222 S Street NW, Washington, DC 20008 telephone: [1] (202) 332-6416 FAX : [1] (202) 332-4923 Diplomatic representation from the US: chief of mission: Ambassador Douglas A. HARTWICK embassy: Rue Bartholonie, B.P. 114, Vientiane mailing address: American Embassy, Box V, APO AP 96546 telephone: [856] (21) 212581, 212582, 212585 FAX: [856] (21) 212584 Flag description: three horizontal bands of red (top), blue (double width), and red with a large white disk centered in the blue band Economy Economy - overview:The government of Laos - one of the few remaining official Communist states - began decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise in 1986. The results, starting from an extremely low base, were striking - growth averaged 7% in 1988-2001 except during the short-lived drop caused by the Asian financial crisis beginning in 1997. Despite this high growth rate, Laos remains a country with a primitive infrastructure; it has no railroads, a rudimentary road system, and limited external and internal telecommunications. Electricity is available in only a few urban areas. Subsistence agriculture accounts for half of GDP and provides 80% of total employment. The economy will continue to benefit from aid from the IMF and other international sources and from new foreign investment in food-processing and mining. GDP: purchasing power parity -$9.2 billion (2001 est.) GDP - real growth rate: 5% (2001 est.) GDP - per capita: purchasing power parity - $1,630 (2001 est.) GDP - composition by sector: agriculture:53% industry: 22% services:25% (2000 est.) Inflation rate - consumer price index: 10% (2001 est.) Labor force: 2.4 million (1999) by occupation: agriculture 80% (1997 est.) Unemployment rate: 5.7% (1997 est.) Budget: revenues : $211 million expenditures: $462 million, including capital expenditures of $NA (FY98/99 est.) Industries: tin and gypsum mining, timber, electric power, agricultural processing, construction Industrial production growth rate: 7.5% (1999 est.) Electricity - capacity: 261,000 kW (1995) Electricity - production: 1.02 billion kWh (2000) Electricity - consumption per capita: 690.6 million kWh (2000) Agriculture - products: sweet potatoes, vegetables, corn, coffee, sugarcane, cotton; water buffalo, pigs, cattle, poultry Exports: total value: $325 million (2001 est.) commodities: electricity, wood products, coffee, tin, garments partners :Thailand 20%, France 7.5%, Germany 5.9%, UK 4.1%, Belgium 4% (2000) Imports: total value: $540 million (f.o.b., 2000 est.) commodities: food, fuel oil, consumer goods, manufactures partners: Thailand 52%, Singapore 3.9%, Japan 1.6%, Hong Kong 1.5%, China 0.8% (2000) Debt - external: $2.53 billion (1999) Economic aid: recipient: $345 million (1999 est.) Currency: 1 new kip (LAK) = 100 at Exchange rates: kips per US dollar - 9,467.00 (December 2001), 8,954.58 (2001), 7,887.64 (2000), 7,102.03 (1999), 3,298.33 (1998), 1,259.98 (1997) Fiscal year: 1 October - 30 September Communications Telephones: 25,000 (1997) Telephone system: service to general public is poor but improving, with over 20,000 telephones currently in service and an additional 48,000 expected by 2001; the government relies on a radiotelephone network to communicate with remote areas domestic: radiotelephone communications international: satellite earth station - 1 Intersputnik (Indian Ocean Region) Radio broadcast stations: AM 10, FM 0, shortwave 0 Radios: 730,000 (1997) Television broadcast stations:4 (1999) Televisions: 52,000 (1997) Transportation Railways: 0 km (2001) Highways: total: 14,000 km paved:3,360 km unpaved: 10,640 km (1991) Waterways: about 4,587 km, primarily Mekong and tributaries; 2,897 additional kilometers are sectionally navigable by craft drawing less than 0.5 m Pipelines: petroleum products 136 km Ports and harbors: none Merchant marine: total: 1 cargo ship (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 2,370 GRT/3,000 DWT (2002 est.) Airports: 51 (2001) Airports - with paved runways: total: 9 2,438 to 3,047 m: 1 1,524 to 2,437 m: 5 914 to 1,523 m : 3 (2001) Airports - with unpaved runways: total : 42 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 914 to 1,523 m: 15 under 914 m:26 (2001) Military Military branches: Lao People's Army (LPA; includes riverine naval and militia elements), Air Force, National Police Department Military manpower - military age: 18 years of age Military manpower - availability: males age 15-49: 1,365,027 (2002 est.) Military manpower - fit for military service: males: 734,945 (2002 est.) Military manpower - reaching military age annually: males : 64,437 (2002 est.) Military expenditures - dollar figure: $55 million (FY98) Military expenditures - percent of GDP: 4.2% (FY96/97) Transnational Issues Disputes - international: demarcation of boundaries with Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam is nearing completion, but with Thailand, several areas including Mekong River islets, remain in dispute; ongoing disputes with Thailand and Vietnam over squatters
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	45	https://www.alamy.com/cave-of-the-communist-resistance-fighters-pathet-lao-tham-than-khamtai-image62029664.html	en	Cave of the Communist resistance fighters Pathet Lao, Tham Than Khamtai Siphandon, former headquarters of the Laotian People's Stock Photo	https://c7.alamy.com/com…amtai-DGWKD4.jpg	https://c7.alamy.com/com…amtai-DGWKD4.jpg	[ "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/logos/1.68.0/alamy.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/mastercard.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/visa.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/amex.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/paypal.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/apple-pay.svg", "https://s.alamy.com/assets/latest/footer/google-pay.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "army", "asia", "asian", "cave", "caves", "communist", "east", "fighters", "headquarters", "houaphan" ]	null	[ "Alamy Limited" ]	null	Download this stock image: Cave of the Communist resistance fighters Pathet Lao, Tham Than Khamtai Siphandon, former headquarters of the Laotian People's - DGWKD4 from Alamy's library of millions of high resolution stock photos, illustrations and vectors.	en	https://s.alamy.com/logo…avicon-16x16.png		https://www.alamy.com/cave-of-the-communist-resistance-fighters-pathet-lao-tham-than-khamtai-image62029664.html	Cave of the Communist resistance fighters Pathet Lao, Tham Than Khamtai Siphandon, former headquarters of the Laotian People's Captions are provided by our contributors. RMID:Image ID :DGWKD4 Image details Contributor : imageBROKER.com GmbH & Co. KG / Alamy Stock Photo Image ID : DGWKD4 File size : 50 MB (1.3 MB Compressed download) Open your image file to the full size using image processing software. Releases : Model - no \| Property - noDo I need a release? Dimensions : 5110 x 3421 px \| 43.3 x 29 cm \| 17 x 11.4 inches \| 300dpi Date taken : 14 June 2009 Photographer : Stefan Auth More information : Cave of the Communist resistance fighters Pathet Lao, Tham Than Khamtai Siphandon, former headquarters of the Laotian People's Army, Vieng Xai, Houaphan province, Laos, Indochina, Southeast Asia, Asia Taxes may apply to prices shown.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	10	https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/la/la021en.html	en	LAW ON ENTERPRISES			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC PEACE INDEPENDENCE DEMOCRACY UNITY PROSPERITY ________________ Presidentâs Office No. 29/PO DECREE of the PRESIDENT of the LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC On the Promulgation of the Law on the Amendment of the Enterprise Law Pursuant to Chapter 6, Article 67, point 1 of the Constitution of the Lao People's Democratic Republic which provides for the promulgation of the Constitution and of laws which are adopted by the National Assembly; and Pursuant to Resolution No. 55/NA, dated 9 November 2005, on the adoption of the Law on the Amendment of the Enterprise Law; and Pursuant to Proposal No. 18/NASC, dated 18 November 2005, of the National Assembly Standing Committee. The President of the Lao People's Democratic Republic Decrees That: Article 1. The Law on the Amendment of the Enterprise Law is hereby promulgated. Article 2. This decree shall enter into force on the date it is signed. Vientiane, 9 December 2005 The President of the Lao Peopleâs Democratic Republic [Seal and Signature] Khamtai SIPHANDON Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR LAO PEOPLEâS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC PEACE INDEPENDENCE DEMOCRACY UNITY PROSPERITY ______________________ National Assembly No. 11/NA 9 November 2005 LAW ON ENTERPRISES Part I General Provisions Article 1. Purposes The Law on Enterprises determines the principles, procedures and measures for the incorporation, operation and management of enterprises in the Lao People's Democratic Republic with the aims of promoting production, business and services in all economic sectors to develop the workforce [engaged in] production and production relationships1, and [or promoting] national socio- economic growth to contribute to national development and improvement of the livelihood of the multi-ethnic people. Article 2. Definitions Terms used in this Law on Enterprises shall have the meanings ascribed below: â¢ An enterprise [refers to] a business organisation of individuals or legal entities which shall have a name, capital, an administration and management, and an office, and which is registered as an enterprise under this law. An enterprise is also referred to as a âbusiness unitâ; â¢ A business [refers to] a business activity in any specific undertaking, either as part of or as the whole of the process from production to services, for the purpose of seeking profit and serving the societyâs common interests; 1 This is a literal translation of the Lao term, which has the connotation of opening up the possibilities for different relationships in the ownership of means of production. 1 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR â¢ The list of controlled businesses2 [refers to] the list of business types that are highly sensitive to national stability, social order, and fine national traditions and to the environment, which require the permission of, and inspection3 by, the relevant authorities prior to the registration of the enterprise; â¢ A sole-trader enterprise4 [refers to] a form of enterprise owned by an individual. A sole-trader enterprise operates under the name of its owner who holds unlimited liability for the debts of the enterprise; â¢ A partnership enterprise [refers to] a form of enterprise5 established on the basis of a contract between at least two investors who contribute capital to joint business operations for the purpose of sharing profits; â¢ A general partnership enterprise [refers to] a form of partnership enterprise which is jointly operated by the partners primarily based on mutual trust and where all partners have joint and unlimited liability for the debts of the enterprise; â¢ A limited partnership enterprise [refers to] a form of partnership enterprise in which some6 of the partners have unlimited liability for the debts of the enterprise and are referred to as âgeneral partnersâ, and the other partners have limited liability and are referred to as âlimited partnersâ; â¢ A company [refers to] a form of enterprise established through the division of its capital into shares, each share having equal value. A shareholder is only liable for the companyâs debts up to an amount not exceeding the unpaid portion of [such shareholderâs] shares; â¢ A limited company [refers to] a form of company with at least two and no more than thirty shareholders, except in the cases described in paragraph one, Article 85 of this law, and a limited company with a single shareholder is called a âone-person limited companyâ7; â¢ A public company [refers to] a form of company with at least nine shareholders who are the promoters, and the companyâs shares can be freely transferred and openly offered to the public; 2 This term is sometimes also referred to as the ânegative listâ. 3 In the Lao language, the same word is used to represent all of the following related (but slightly different) concepts: âcontrolâ, âinspectionâ, âsupervisionâ, âauditâ and âmonitoringâ. The translators have chosen âinspectionâ (and its variants) as the most appropriate English equivalent but readers should note and bear in mind the other meanings that might have been intended. 4 This term is sometimes also translated as âsole-proprietorship enterpriseâ. 5 In the old Business Law, this form of enterprise was called a partnership company. In this law, the term has been changed to âpartnership enterpriseâ. 6 There must be more than one general partner in this type of enterprise. 7 This term is sometimes also translated as âsole limited companyâ. 2 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR â¢ A public offering of shares [refers to] an offering of shares to the public in the stock exchange market or outside the stock exchange as described in laws and regulations; â¢ A State company8 [refers to a company] established by the State and managed under rules applicable to companies and it shall not sell more than forty-nine percent of its shares9; â¢ A joint company [refers to] a company jointly established between the State and another sector10[,] whether domestic or foreign[,] in which each party holds fifty percent of the shares; â¢ Shares represent the capital of a partnership enterprise or company and may be divided into unequal or equal value depending on the form of partnership or company as stipulated in this law; â¢ An ordinary share [refers to] a type of share which the owner cannot redeem; â¢ A preferred share [refers to] a type of share which the owner may redeem, and which has specific rights and obligations that are different from ordinary shares; â¢ A share certificate [refers to] an important legal document of title representing the rights and the proportion of ownership of a partner in a partnership enterprise or a shareholder in a company; â¢ A debenture [refers to] a loan certificate issued by a company without collateral which gives the debenture holder legitimate rights that guarantee the repayment of principal and interest as agreed; â¢ A dividend [refers to] the money distributed to partners or shareholders from the net profit generated by a partnership enterprise or a company after deduction of the cost of capital, expenses and debts; â¢ A quorum [refers to] the minimum number of participants in a meeting required to convene a meeting; â¢ Commercial confidentiality [refers to] important information about the production process, business or services of an enterprise that may result in loss to the stability and financial status of that enterprise if they are disclosed; â¢ A liquidator [refers to] a person appointed by the court or an enterprise to perform rights and duties in the attachment of the assets of a dissolved or bankrupt enterprise in order to pay the creditors and distribute the remaining amount to the owners11, partners or shareholders of the concerned enterprise. 8 This entity is different from a State-owned enterprise in the old Business Law. 9 The literal translation of this phrase is âmay sell shares up to less than 50%â. 10 The literal translation on this phrase is âwith a party from the non-governmental sectorâ. 11 This term is not limited to investors but rather could include, e.g., the owner of a sole-trader enterprise. 3 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 3. Right to Establish Enterprise Lao citizens, foreign residents, apatrids12 residing in the Lao PDR and foreigners, including their organisations, are entitled to establish enterprises or participate in business transactions in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Lao PDR. Article 4. Equality in Business Transactions All economic sectors, domestic and foreign, are equal before the law in business activities, and may compete and cooperate in expanding production forces, [and in] extending their production, business and services. Article 5. Obligations of Enterprises Enterprises have the obligation to conduct their business operations in accordance with their business purposes, to keep accounting books, to perform fiscal obligations towards the government, to protect the workersâ legitimate rights and interests, to preserve the environment, and to uphold other relevant laws and regulations of the Lao PDR. Article 6. State Policy and Protection of Rights and Interests of Enterprises The State encourages and promotes domestic and foreign persons and organisations to establish enterprises or to participate in business activities in all non-restricted sectors by issuing customs and tax policies, regulations, [and] measures, [and by] providing information, services and other facilities to enterprises to contribute to socio-economic development. The legitimate rights and interests of enterprises, namely their capital and property, are protected by laws. Article 7. International Cooperation The State promotes international relations and cooperation in business activities by exchanging lessons and information, by mobilizing capital, sciences, technologies and experience in business management that is advanced13, [and also promotes] the opening up of the market, [and] regional and global integration. 12 Readers may wish to refer to the Law on Lao Nationality for the distinction between aliens, apatrids (i.e. persons unable to certify their nationality) and foreign individuals. 13 In the original Lao text, it is unclear whether this adjective qualifies business management or all other nouns preceding it. 4 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 8. Scope of Application This law applies to private enterprises, both domestic and foreign, State enterprises14 and joint enterprises established and operating in the Lao PDR. Cooperative enterprises and small retail traders do not fall under the scope of application of this law and will be dealt with in detail separately. Part II Enterprises Chapter 1 Types, Forms and Categories of Enterprises Article 9. Types of Enterprises There are four types of enterprises in the Lao PDR: private enterprises, State enterprises,15 joint enterprises and collective enterprises. A private enterprise may elect to use any form or category of enterprise stipulated in Article 10 and Article 11 of this law for the establishment and operation of its enterprise. A State enterprise and a joint enterprise may be established and operated in the form of a company only. A State enterprise is referred to as a âState companyâ and a joint enterprise as a âjoint companyâ. Article 10. Forms of Enterprises The form of an enterprise [refers to] the business organisation that is the basis for the establishment and business operations of all types of enterprises. Enterprises are classified in three forms: 1. Sole-trader entreprise; 2. Partnership enterprise; 3. Company. 14 The Lao term here is a different word from âState companyâ. 15 In the original Lao text, the same words are used here for State-owned enterprises and mixed enterprises as were used in the Business Law. However, the translators have used different English words for these enterprises in this law because the nature of these entities is different. 5 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 11. Categories of Partnership Enterprises and Companies Partnership enterprises and companies are classified in the following four categories: 1. Partnership enterprises are classified in two categories: â¢ General partnership enterprise; â¢ Limited partnership enterprise. 2. Companies are classified in two categories: â¢ Limited company, including one-person limited company; â¢ Public company. Chapter 2 Registration of Enterprises Article 12. Registration of Enterprises Enterprise registration [refers to] the acceptance of a notification for enterprise registration16 as lawful recognition by the State of an individual or legal entity, either domestic or foreign, that is established and is operating a business in the Lao PDR. The procedure for enterprise registration is separately regulated. An enterprise is registered once throughout the period of operation of such enterprise. Article 13. Filing of Notification for Enterprise Registration Any person intending to conduct business in the Lao PDR shall file a notification for enterprise registration with the concerned State agencies as specified under this law. 16 The term ânotification for enterprise registrationâ (rather than âapplication for enterprise registrationâ) is used in the Lao text and has the connotation that enterprise registration should generally be a matter of notifying the relevant authorities of, rather than seeking permission for, the establishment of a business unit. 6 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 14. Procedures and Timeframe for Consideration of Enterprise Registration Upon receipt of a notification for enterprise registration, the commercial sector17 shall examine whether the type of business to be registered falls in the list of controlled or non-controlled businesses. If the proposed business is not in the controlled list, the enterprise registration authority of the commercial sector shall consider18 issuing a certificate of enterprise registration no later than ten official working days from the date of receipt of the notice. In the event that the type of business submitted for registration falls within the list of controlled businesses, the commercial sector shall immediately forward the application to the concerned authority19. Such authority shall consider and respond no later than ten working days, except in the case of certain businesses that require a longer technical review process. Thereafter, the commercial authority shall consider issuing an enterprise registration certificate no later than three working days. In the event that the enterprise registration certificate is not issued, a written response with reasons shall be given to the applicant for enterprise registration. The list of controlled businesses and the timeframe for the technical review process as stipulated in paragraph two of this article shall be approved by the government only. Article 15. Invalid Registration of Enterprises An invalid registration of an enterprise [refers to] the registration of an enterprise where part or the whole content of [such] registration does not conform to the form, category [or]20 reality, and that needs to be corrected. Such correction may be made by amendment. In the event that the correction cannot be made, the enterprise shall be dissolved in accordance with the procedures set forth in this law. 17 The term âsectorâ is used in many Lao laws to refer to the cluster of government ministries or agencies engaged in a particular activity. 18 This term has the connotation of having the power to approve. 19 This is a reference to the authority regulating the controlled industry. 20 The Lao word âandâ is sometimes used in a disjunctive sense, often when the authors wish to emphasize the importance f all items in the disjunctive list. Here the literal translation is âandâ, but it is clear that the disjunctive âorâ meaning is intended. 7 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The registration of an enterprise [granted] to a person restricted by law or the registration of an enterprise in contravention of any law or regulation shall be invalid. The invalidity of any enterprise registration or the dissolution of the enterprise shall not terminate the liabilities of the enterprise. Article 16. Effects of Enterprise Registration The registration of an enterprise has the following effects: 1. Creates a legal entity of a partnership enterprise or a company that is separate from its shareholders, having rights, duties and responsibilities within the scope of its purposes and bylaws21; 2. Enables the enterprise to carry out business activities within the business sectors indicated in its enterprise license without requiring further approval or review from the relevant authorities, except for certain types of businesses specified in the list of controlled businesses, as provided in Article 14 of this law; 3. The contents22 that were filed with the notification for enterprise registration shall be disclosed, and any interested person may see such application as described in paragraph one, Article 19 of this law; 4. The enterpriseâs name and tax registration are registered. Article 17. Effects of Failure to Conduct Business Operations An enterprise shall commence its business operations within ninety days from the date of the enterprise registration. In the event that an enterprise fails to operate within that period or suspends its operation and fails to perform its fiscal obligations over twelve months continuously without reasons, the relevant enterprise registration officers shall notify such enterprise to clarify the reasons[.]23 If such enterprise fails to meet the registration officers within ten working days from the date the notice is received or at the meeting no sufficient reason is given, such enterprise shall be considered suspended and [shall be] dissolved in accordance with the procedures set forth in this law. 21 This is a reference to the internal regulations of the company. 22 This is a literal translation. The intention is to refer to âthose matters that must be includedâ. See Article 11 of the Contract Law for a similar use of âcontentsâ. 23 For readability, the punctuation of this sentence has been modified. 8 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 18. Modification of Contents in Enterprise Registration Any modification of the contents in the enterprise registration after registration, such as the purpose or the registered capital, shall be notified to the relevant enterprise registration officers within one month after the decision on such modifications has been made, except for the modification of contents in the enterprise registration relating to the types of business falling within the list of controlled businesses, which shall comply with paragraph two of Article 14 of this law. Any enterprise that provides invalid contents in its enterprise registration or gives notice of a modification later than the period specified in paragraph one of this article, whether intentionally or not, shall not be entitled to assert [such deficiencies] as an argument for the release from liability for its acts against third parties acting in good faith. Article 19. Public Disclosure of Contents of Enterprise Registration Individuals and legal entities may access or request a copy of filed registration documents from the enterprise registration officers. Such registration documents refer to documents filed by the enterprise for enterprise registration as required under this law. A person requesting a copy of such documents shall pay fees as stipulated. Other than the documents described in paragraph one of this article, disclosure shall be permitted only with the prior consent of the concerned enterprise, unless otherwise provided by the laws. Article 20. Registered Capital of Enterprises The registered capital of a sole-trader enterprise is the capital declared by the owner to the enterprise registration officer in its enterprise registration. The registered capital of a partnership or company is the value of all shares as defined in item 4 of Article 33 and item 4 of Article 81 of this law. Such registered capital is also referred to as the âstated capitalâ of the partnership or the company. For certain types of businesses, as necessary, the relevant sector has the authority to set the minimum required registered capital for enterprise registration, provided that approval from the government has been obtained. The declared registered capital must truly exist in the Lao PDR, as prescribed by the laws. In the event of a breach, the breaching party shall be responsible under the laws for the offence of making false statements to a government authority. 9 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Chapter 3 Name of Enterprise Article 21. Selection of Name of Enterprise An enterprise may select the name or surname of one or several persons or may use other names as agreed. Any enterprise first subscribing for a name shall have priority over other enterprises. The name of an enterprise shall at all times indicate the form or category of such enterprise. A subscribed name shall terminate if the subscribing enterprise is not accepted for enterprise registration. Upon the registration of an enterprise, the business operator shall display a sign with its name. Article 22. Forbidden Names Forbidden names are: 1. Names causing confusion, [names that are] similar or identical to the names of other enterprises within the same province, [or] city[,] or names of other enterprises that are widely known; 2. Names that conflict with the fine national culture and traditions or with social order; 3. Names that contain the name of any country, [or] international organisation, or the name of any symbol of cultural identity or national sacred site; 4. Names that are identical or similar to a form or category of enterprise. Article 23. Allowing other Persons to Use Name or License of Enterprise Any authorisation to another person to use the name or enterprise license for business activities shall be made in writing and in accordance with the Contract Law of the Lao PDR. In the event that there is no written authorisation for the use of a name or enterprise license but there is sufficient evidence indicating that the owner of the name or enterprise license knew but did not complain or object or supported such use, it shall be deemed as due authorisation. 10 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 24. Liability for Allowing other Persons to use Name or License of Enterprise Any person who authorises others to use its name or enterprise license shall be responsible to third parties in accordance with the agreed contract24 or as provided by the laws. Any person who authorises a person having no capacity25 to use its name or enterprise license shall be liable for the act of such persons. Any person who authorises an individual or legal entity that is subject to legal restrictions to use its name or enterprise license shall be jointly liable for the acts of that individual or legal entity. Any business operations carried out by the authorised persons shall be deemed to be business operations [conducted] without an enterprise registration. A State company may not authorise any individual or legal entity to use its name or enterprise license. In the event of any violation, it shall be personally liable to the third party. Article 25. Transfer and Restrictions on Transfer of Name A name may be transferred only when: 1. It is transferred together with the transfer of the whole enterprise, including its rights and obligations; 2. It is the name of an enterprise that has been entirely and lawfully dissolved. Upon the proper transfer of a name in accordance with item 1 above, the transferee shall notify the debtors and creditors of the enterprise within sixty days and notify the relevant enterprise registration officers within five working days from the date of the transfer. Any improper transfer of a name in any form, including monopolizing the market through the transfer of any name, is forbidden. In the event of any violation, the transferor and transferee shall be liable for their acts in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of the Lao PDR. A State company is not permitted to transfer its name to any other type of enterprise. 24 This appears to be a reference to the contract between the owner of the name or license and the permitted user of the name or license, as referred to in Article 23. 25 This term refers to legal capacity and mental capacity. 11 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 26. Cancellation of Name A name shall be cancelled together with the dissolution of the enterprise. Upon termination of a name, the owner of the name shall remove the sign of its name within seven days from the date of the notice of termination. Any individual or legal entity still using a cancelled name or enterprise license shall be deemed to be conducting business without a proper enterprise registration. Part III Sole-Trader Enterprises Article 27. Filing of Notification for Enterprise Registration Any person intending to register a sole-trader enterprise shall submit an application with the following details: 1. The name and kind of business; 2. The name, address and nationality of the enterprise owner and manager; 3. The location of the enterprise; 4. The registered capital. Article 28. Rights and Duties of Owner The owner of a sole-trader enterprise has the following rights and duties: 1. To administer and manage the enterprise himself26 or to employ other persons to administer and manage the enterprise; 2. To decide by himself the use of profits or other matters relating to the enterprise; 3. To keep accounts as provided by the Law on Enterprise Accounting; 4. To perform obligations towards the State; 5. To perform other rights and duties as provided by the laws. 26 Readers should note that the Lao language does not distinguish between genders in pronouns. In this translation, a reference to a gender is a reference to all genders, unless the context requires otherwise (as is the case in some Articles). The translatorsâ decision to use the male gender pronoun as the default translation was made in the interests of simplicity and consistency. 12 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 29. Manager The manager of a sole-trader enterprise may be the owner himself or one or several third parties27 employed as managers. An external employed manager is remunerated as agreed with the owner of the sole-trader enterprise. A sole-trader enterprise with several managers may appoint one manager as the overall supervisor who shall solely have authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the sole-trader enterprise with third parties. Such manager is called the âgeneral managerâ. This provision is also applicable to managers of partnership enterprises and one-person limited companies. A manager performs all his tasks on the basis of the rights and duties described in the contract and under the supervision of the enterprise owner. A manager may assign certain of his tasks to other assistants. Article 30. Managerâs Employment Contract A managerâs employment contract shall be made in writing as provided by the Contract Law. The contents of the employment contract shall describe the rights, duties, remuneration and responsibilities of the contracting parties and how the contract may be terminated. Relations between the enterprise owner, manager(s), and third parties are governed by the relevant laws. Article 31. Dissolution and Liquidation A sole-trader enterprise is dissolved in the following cases: 1. The sole-trader enterprise owner decides to dissolve the enterprise; 2. Dissolution by court order; 3. Bankruptcy28; 4. Death or lack of capacity29 of an enterprise owner who has no heir. In the event that the sole-trader enterprise is dissolved, its owner shall have the obligation to liquidate the enterprise by himself or to appoint third parties as liquidators, except when the dissolution is ordered by the court or the sole-trader enterprise is in bankruptcy, in which case only the court shall appoint the liquidator. 27 The literal translation of this term is âpersons outside of the companyâ. 28 This is a reference to final declaration of bankruptcy by the court. 29 This term has the connotation of mental capacity. 13 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Part IV Partnership Enterprises Chapter 1 General Principles Relating to Partnership Enterprises Article 32. Partners of Partnership Enterprise Investors in a partnership enterprise are called âpartnersâ. Partners in a partnership enterprise may be individuals or legal entities. Article 33. Partnership Contract A partnership contract shall be made in writing and shall be consistent with the Contract Law of the Lao PDR. A partnership contract shall describe the following primary contents: 1. The name of the enterprise; 2. The business purpose; 3. The names [and] locations of the headquarters and all branches, if any; 4. The stated capital or value of shares of the partnership enterprise divided into cash, kind or labour; 5. The names, addresses and nationalities of the partners of the partnership; 6. The names and signatures of all partners of the partnership. The stated capital described in item 4 of this article is the registered capital of the partnership enterprise. Article 34. The Status of Partnership Enterprise as Legal Entity The indices of the status of a partnership enterprise as a legal entity comprise: 1. The name of the partnership; 2. The names [and] locations of its headquarters and all branches, if any; 3. The assets and capital; 4. The bylaws of the partnership enterprise; 5. Liability for debts according to the form of partnership enterprise; 6. The legal capacity to exercise rights and obligations, and to be a plaintiff or defendant [in legal proceedings] in the same manner as natural persons. 14 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 35. Branches of Partnership Enterprises A partnership enterprise registered in the Lao PDR is not required to further register its branches and such branches shall not have the status of a separate legal entity from the partnership enterprise. Each branch office shall notify the enterprise registration officers at that location. A branch of a foreign partnership enterprise operating in the Lao PDR is required to register the enterprise in accordance with this law. The establishment of a branch of a Lao partnership enterprise in a foreign country shall be governed by the laws of that country. In the event that the branch of a domestic or foreign legal entity is sued in the Lao PDR, such suit shall be deemed to be against that legal entity. This provision covers foreign legal entities that have branches in the Lao PDR. Article 36. Bylaws of Partnership Enterprises The bylaws of a partnership enterprise shall contain the following main items: 1. The matters specified in item 1 to item 5 of Article 33 of this law; 2. The names, addresses and nationalities of the managers of the partnership enterprise. In the event that other partners are not co- managers, restrictions on the use of power of the managers may be defined; 3. The method for the distribution of profits and responsibility for the partnershipâs losses; 4. The method and schedule of payment for shares; 5. Administration and management; 6. Meetings and rules for the adoption of resolutions; 7. Resolution of disputes; 8. Dissolution and liquidation. The contents of item 1 of this article must be included in the notification of enterprise registration, but30 the partnership enterprise may [decide to] include additional contents. The bylaws of a partnership enterprise must be signed by its manager. 30 The literal translation of this phrase is âexcept that the partnership enterprise shall decide to include additional contentsâ. The idea here is that only item 1 is mandatory and must be included in the application; items 2 to 8 are optional. 15 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 37. Modification of Establishment Contract31 or Bylaws Any modification to the contents of the establishment contract or bylaws of a partnership enterprise shall be made by unanimous consent of all partners, except as otherwise agreed. Resolutions on the amendment or modification of such establishment contract or bylaws shall be notified to the relevant enterprise registration officers within ten working days from the date of the partnersâ meeting adopting such resolution on modification. Chapter 2 General Partnership Enterprises A. Enterprise Registration and Internal Relations of General Partnership Enterprises Article 38. Filing of Notification for Registration of General Partnership Enterprises The following documents are required for the filing of a notification for the registration of a general partnership enterprise: 1. The application form for notification of enterprise registration; 2. The general partnership contract containing the names and signatures of all partners; 3. The name, address and nationality of the manager when the partners decide not to act as co-managers; 4. The bylaws of the general partnership enterprise. The application32 for notification of enterprise registration shall be signed by the manager. Article 39. Capital Contributions The capital of a general partnership enterprise is contributed by the partners. Such capital contribution may be provided in cash, in kind or in labour. 31 This contract appears to be the same as a partnership contract. 32 The translators are aware that there are slightly different references in this Article, namely, to the previously mentioned process of ânotification for registrationâ (see also footnote 16), to an application form, and to an application for giving notification of registration. It would appear that this article aims to spell out in greater detail the process commonly referred to generally as ânotification for registrationâ. 16 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Capital contributed in kind or in labour shall be appraised in monetary terms. Capital provided in labour shall not be recorded in the balance sheet of the general partnership enterprise. The methods and schedule of payment for shares specified in paragraph one of this article shall be agreed among the partners. Prior to the registration of the enterprise, the partners shall contribute their shares in full as agreed. In addition to the capital described in paragraph one of this article, partners in a general partnership enterprise may finance any transaction carried out by the general partnership enterprise with their own funds. The use of funds described in paragraph four of this article, including liabilities and the distribution of dividends, shall be agreed among the partners. Article 40. Shares Each share in a general partnership enterprise need not be of equal value. Upon payment for their shares by partners as provided in paragraph three of Article 39 of this law, the general partnership enterprise shall issue share certificates to the partners based on the paid proportion of shares. Share certificates of a general partnership enterprise are not negotiable. Article 41. Manager All partners in a general partnership enterprise may act as co-managers or appoint one or more partners to be managers. The manager is the representative of the general partnership and of the other partners. The manager shall not receive a salary or bonuses for the performance of his duties, unless otherwise agreed. The manager of a general partnership enterprise may be a third party. A third party appointed as manager shall be remunerated with a salary or bonuses as agreed by the partners. Article 42. Appointment or Removal of Manager The appointment or removal of the manager requires the unanimous vote of all partners, unless otherwise agreed. Each partner has one vote. The partner to be appointed or removed as manager is not entitled to cast a vote. 17 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 43. Rights and Duties of Manager The manager has the following rights and duties: 1. To fully and faithfully perform his duties33 for the best interests of the general partnership enterprise; 2. To exercise the rights and perform the duties described in the bylaws of the general partnership enterprise; 3. To recruit third parties to assist in any transaction of the general partnership enterprise for which he has responsibility. In the event that several partners are joint co-managers, the administration and management of the general partnership enterprise shall be based on a majority vote or as it may otherwise be agreed as described in the bylaws. Each person shall have one vote. In the event that there is a single manager, such manager shall have the sole authority to administer and manage the general partnership enterprise, unless restrictions are otherwise provided. The restrictions referred to in paragraph three of this article shall have no effect upon third parties if such restrictions are not stipulated in the enterprise registration filing. Article 44. Rights and Duties of Partners Partners have the following rights and duties: 1. To inquire on the overall status of the general partnership enterprise at all times; 2. To examine or make copies of accounting records and other documents of the general partnership enterprise; 3. To receive dividends and be liable for losses as agreed; 4. To have unlimited liability for the general partnershipâs total debts; 5. To have the right to veto, oppose or complain if these [rights] have been agreed upon, but there shall be detailed provisions in the bylaws on the subject matter and applicable procedures for the use of such rights; 6. To receive a portion of contributed capital and profits as agreed when the general partnership enterprise is dissolved. Article 45. Acceptance of New Partners and Transfer of Shares A general partnership enterprise may not accept new partners and each partner may not transfer shares among themselves, unless otherwise agreed. 33 The literal translation of this term is âto fully perform his duties and with loyaltyâ. 18 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR In the event that the partners agree to accept a new partner or to allow the transfer of shares, unanimous consent is required from all partners. The acceptance of new partners may be carried out by transferring shares to third parties or by allowing a third party to acquire a portion of newly issued shares. Upon a decision to accept a new partner or to transfer shares to another [partner], [the partnership enterprise] shall notify the relevant enterprise registration officers within five working days from the date of the decision on such acceptance or transfer. In the event that only one partner remains in the general partnership enterprise as a result of the transfer of shares or for any other reason, the general partnership enterprise shall be dissolved. In the event that the name of the general partnership enterprise includes the names of partners, when one partner withdraws, the general partnership enterprise is entitled to delete such partnerâs name from its name. Article 46. Prohibited Acts and Business Transactions of Partners Partners are prohibited from carrying out any acts or business transactions that compete with their own general partnership enterprise. An act or transaction which is considered as competing with the general partnership enterprise is: 1. [When a partner engages] on his own behalf in a business transaction that is similar to the purpose of the general partnership enterprise; 2. [When a partner engages] on behalf of another person, such as being a manager or director of another enterprise, in a business transaction that is similar to the purpose of the general partnership enterprise; 3. Being a partner in another general partnership enterprise or being a general partner34 in a limited partnership enterprise. [In the event of] any breach of the restrictions in this article, the general partnership enterprise has the right to claim the entire profits obtained from such acts or business transactions or to file a petition for dissolution of the general partnership enterprise. Article 47. Exemptions from Restrictions [A partner] may be exempted from the restrictions described in Article 46 of this law when: 34 The literal translation of this term is âhaving unlimited liabilityâ. 19 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 1. [He has] obtained the unanimous consent of all other partners; 2. Such act or business transaction by the partner was carried out prior to [his] joining the partnership and the other partners did not object. B. Relationship between General Partnership Enterprises and Third Parties Article 48. Liability for Debts Each partner shall have unlimited liability for the debts of the general partnership enterprise. A creditor may claim for payment of debt from each partner but only after it has made a claim against the general partnership enterprise which remains unsettled. All partners may agree on the proportion of each partnerâs liability for the debts or losses of the general partnership enterprise, but such agreement shall have no effect on third parties. Partners are liable for the debts of the partnership only when: 1. Such debts arise from the performance of duties of the manager or other partners in accordance with bylaws of the general partnership enterprise; 2. Such debts arise from the performance of any duty to achieve the purpose of the general partnership enterprise and such acts were approved by all partners. Article 49. Rights to Benefits All partners are entitled to receive the benefits obtained by the general partnership enterprise from transactions with third parties on behalf of the enterprise, whether or not such benefits are obtained in the name of the general partnership enterprise. Article 50. Liability of Withdrawing Partners and New Partners A partner withdrawing from a general partnership enterprise shall be liable for the debts of the general partnership arising prior to his withdrawal from the general partnership enterprise. Such liability shall terminate within one year from the date of approval of such withdrawal, except when a longer period of liability has been agreed. A new partner is liable for the entire debt of a general partnership enterprise, unless otherwise agreed, but such agreement shall have no effect on third parties. 20 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR C. Merger of General Partnership Enterprises Article 51. Merger of General Partnership Enterprises A general partnership enterprise may merge with one or several other general partnership enterprises into either the original partnership enterprise or into a new general partnership enterprise. General partnership enterprises may merge only when the following conditions are met: 1. Unanimous consent was obtained in a meeting of all partners of the general partnership enterprises to be merged, unless otherwise agreed. The resolutions adopted by such meeting shall be registered with the enterprise registration officers within ten working days from the date of the resolution to merge; 2. The merger has been published through appropriate mass media at least once within ten working days from the date the resolution to merge is adopted to inform and allow creditors to oppose the merger within sixty days from the date the creditors receive the notification, and creditors fail to oppose or respond within the stipulated period of time; 3. The enterprise has been registered again. Article 52. Objection to Merger and Effects of Merger In the event that a creditor objects to the merger of a general partnership enterprise, [the general partnership enterprise] cannot merge, unless all debts have been paid to that creditor only. A merger of general partnership enterprises does not result in the dissolution of the enterprises [or]35 the lapse of previous rights or responsibilities. D. Dissolution of General Partnership Enterprises Article 53. Grounds for Dissolution A general partnership enterprise may be dissolved on three grounds: dissolution by agreement between the partners, dissolution by court order and dissolution by operation of law36. 35 See footnote 20. 36 The literal translation of this term is âdissolution by legal effectâ. 21 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The enterprise registration officers shall be temporarily notified37 of the dissolution of a general partnership enterprise on any grounds within ten working days from the date the grounds for dissolution occurred. Article 54. Dissolution by Agreement between Partners A general partnership enterprise may be dissolved by unanimous agreement of the partners. Article 55. Dissolution by Court Order Any partner of a general partnership enterprise may request the court to consider the dissolution of the general partnership enterprise when he finds that: 1. The general partnership enterprise has suffered losses and cannot solve [the problem]; 2. An event of force majeure occurs making it impossible to continue the business of the general partnership enterprise; 3. Such partner has been misled or forced to become a partner; 4. A partner has committed an act or is acting with the intention to breach the partnership contract or the bylaws or is acting in gross negligence and causing severe damage to the general partnership enterprise. The partner requesting the court to consider the dissolution shall not be the partner causing the aforementioned events. Other partners may request the court to order the partner at fault to pay compensation or to withdraw from the partnership enterprise instead of ordering dissolution. In such event, the general partnership enterprise shall distribute the assets of the enterprise to such partner at the current value of such assets after deducting the damage caused by such partner, unless otherwise agreed by the partners. Article 56. Dissolution by Operation of Law A general partnership enterprise may be dissolved on any of the following legal grounds: 1. Dissolution in accordance with the contract or bylaws of the general partnership enterprise; 2. Only one partner remains in the general partnership enterprise; 3. A partner dies, becomes bankrupt or has no legal capacity, except as otherwise agreed; 37 This is a literal translation. It appears to be a reference to temporary dissolution upon the occurrence of the events set out in Article 53 as opposed to permanent dissolution under Article 67. 22 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 4. Dissolution stipulated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of Part II of this law. In the event that a partner dies but the general partnership enterprise is not dissolved, the heir of the deceased partner is entitled to receive the full distribution of dividends or assets of the deceased partner. Article 57. Effects of Temporary Dissolution The temporary dissolution of a general partnership enterprise has the following effects: 1. The temporary suspension of a partnerâs right to claim benefits from the general partnership enterprise; 2. The liability of partners for payment of unpaid shares is not terminated; 3. The temporary suspension of payments, [but] receivables owed to the enterprise shall be paid; 4. The general partnership enterprise shall have no right to engage in business activities, but shall continue to exist as a legal entity for a period of time until its dissolution is registered and the enterprise registration license is permanently cancelled in order to complete pending matters and proceed with liquidation. E. Liquidation of General Partnership Enterprises Article 58. Methods for Liquidation Partners may agree on the method for distribution of assets or liquidation as provided in the bylaws of the general partnership enterprise or as agreed between partners, except for a dissolution caused by bankruptcy, by court order, or when only one partner remains in the partnership. Article 59. Appointment or Removal of Liquidator Liquidation of a general partnership enterprise may be carried out by the manager or all partners as joint liquidators or by appointing a partner or a third party to act as the liquidator. Such appointment shall require unanimous approval from all partners. In the event that the votes cast by partners for the selection of the liquidator are not sufficient as required in paragraph one of this article, the partners of the general partnership enterprise may request the court to appoint the liquidator. 23 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The liquidator specified under this article and Article 60 of this law shall be removed in the same way he38 was appointed. Article 60. Appointment of Liquidator by Court In the case of the dissolution of a general partnership enterprise caused by bankruptcy or by court order or when only a single partner remains in the partnership, only the court shall appoint the liquidator. In the event that a general partnership enterprise is dissolved because of the death of a partner, the deceased partnerâs heir is entitled to act or participate as liquidator. Where there are several heirs, one person shall be appointed as their representative. Article 61. Appointment of Replacement for Liquidator who is Unable to Perform In the event that, for any reason, a liquidator is unable to perform his duties following his appointment, such as death or lack of capacity, all partners shall act as joint liquidators until a new liquidator is appointed as a replacement. The general partnership enterprise shall give public notice of the appointment, removal or termination of the liquidatorâs duties within ten working days from such appointment, removal or termination as provided in this article, Article 59 and Article 60 of this law. Article 62. Rights and Duties of Liquidators In the case of the liquidation of a general partnership enterprise, the liquidator has the following rights and duties: 1. To give written notice of the dissolution to creditors of the general partnership enterprise and announce through suitable mass media within ten working days from the date of the occurrence causing the dissolution39 in order to inform the public and allow creditors to present documents relating to the debts of the general partnership enterprise; 2. To collect all assets, and to create a balance sheet; 38 For readability, these provisions have been translated as if the liquidator is a natural person; however, in practice, liquidators can be legal entities or natural persons. 39 The time limit qualifies both the written notice and the announcement. 24 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 3. To continue to complete pending business of the general partnership enterprise; 4. To receive remuneration for the performance of his duties from the general partnership enterprise as agreed; 5. To apply necessary measures to preserve assets, to claim for full repayment of debts, [and] to sell or transfer the assets of the general partnership enterprise; 6. To submit a report on the balance sheet to auditors to certify its accuracy; 7. To report on the collection of assets and various activities to the relevant creditors, partners or to the court if the liquidator is appointed by the court; 8. To call the meeting of creditors and partners to adopt or decide on such issues as necessary and to call a meeting at least once every six months; 9. To perform the tasks assigned by the meeting of the partners and creditors; 10. To present quarterly reports on the balance sheet to the enterprise registration officers; 11. To repay debts to creditors and distribute remaining assets to the partners; 12. To mediate issues or file claims in court in legal proceedings in the name of the general partnership enterprise; 13. To report to the partners or to the court, if the court has appointed the liquidator, if he finds that the assets of the general partnership enterprise, including those of its partners, are insufficient to pay the debts. In the event that the general partnership enterprise is unable to pay its excessive debts, the liquidator may file with the court for bankruptcy. Upon the declaration of bankruptcy by the court following the process defined in the Law on the Bankruptcy of Enterprises, the rights and duties of the liquidator shall be terminated and his tasks shall be transferred to the asset supervision committee40. Article 63. Performance of Duties by Several Liquidators The joint performance of duties by several liquidators shall be based on a majority vote where each person has one vote, except if a specific task is assigned to a different person, but such assignment shall be notified to the enterprise registration officers within ten working days from the date of appointment. Restrictions on the use of power by the liquidators have no effect on third parties. 40 Readers may wish to refer to Article 15 of the Law on Bankruptcy of Enterprises for more information on this committee. 25 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 64. Priority in Payment of Debts and Distribution of Assets The payment of debts and the distribution of assets shall be made in the following [order of] priority: 1. Salaries of the employees; 2. Debts owed to the State that do not arise from contracts between [the enterprise and] the State or persons described in Article 4 of the Law on Secured Transactions; 3. Secured debts; 4. Unsecured debts; 5. Debts of the general partnership enterprise owed to the partners as described in paragraphs four and five of Article 39 of this law; 6. Distribution of profits or losses among the partners; 7. Return of capital contributed by the partners. In this case, capital contributed in labour may not be reimbursed, unless the partners have agreed on the reimbursement at the time of capital contribution. Article 65. Duties of Liquidators after Liquidation Upon the completion of liquidation, the liquidator shall: 1. Immediately prepare a statement and report on the distribution of assets and repayment of debts for adoption by the meeting of creditors and partners; 2. Inform the public of the report on the distribution of assets and repayment of debts within ten working days from the date of completion of the distribution of assets and repayment of debts; 3. Hand over all documents relating to the liquidation of the concerned general partnership enterprise and register the completion of liquidation with the enterprise registration officer. Article 66. Liability of Liquidators Liquidators are liable for their following acts: 1. Intentional acts that cause damage to the general partnership enterprise or [damage caused] by severe gross negligence in the performance of their duties. Severe gross negligence [refers to] the failure to perform their tasks or performing [their tasks] in a wrongful manner which they know or ought to know would cause damage; 2. Acts against the assignors41 and third parties as stipulated in relevant laws. 41 This is a reference to persons appointing the liquidator. 26 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 67. Notification of Dissolution and Cancellation of Enterprise License Upon public notice of the distribution of assets and repayment of debts as described in item 2, Article 65 of this law, the liquidator shall register the permanent dissolution of the general partnership enterprise within ten working days with the relevant enterprise registration officer. The relevant enterprise registration officer shall cancel the enterpriseâs name from the enterprise registry in accordance with paragraph one above and issue a public notice on such cancellation within ten working days from the date the name is cancelled. A general partnership enterprise shall have no status as a legal entity from the date the court orders the permanent dissolution of the partnership enterprise. The dissolution of a general partnership enterprise due to bankruptcy or merger of the partnership does not require notice of dissolution. Article 68. Liability of Partners of General Partnership Enterprises All partners shall be jointly liable for the debts of the general partnership enterprise remaining unpaid for a period of three years from the date the court ordered permanent dissolution. In the case described in paragraph one above, the court shall appoint a liquidator to carry out liquidation procedures until the debts have been repaid in full. Chapter 3 Limited Partnership Enterprises A. General Principles and Enterprise Registration Article 69. Liability of Partners General partners in a limited partnership enterprise shall have unlimited liability for the debts of the limited partnership enterprise. Partners with limited liability in a limited partnership enterprise shall be liable for the debts of the limited partnership enterprise up to an amount not exceeding the unpaid portion of their subscribed shares. All partners of a limited partnership enterprise that has not completed registration shall have unlimited liability for the debts of the partnership occurring during the period of establishment. 27 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 70. Filing of Notification for Enterprise Registration The filing of a notification for the registration of a limited partnership enterprise shall be subject to Article 38 of this law. B. Relationship between Limited Partners and Limited Partnership and [with] Third Parties Article 71. Capital Contribution Limited partners may contribute capital in cash or in kind, but shall not contribute in labour. Each share of a limited partnership enterprise not need be of equal value. The methods and schedule for capital contributions shall be agreed among all partners in the limited partnership enterprise. Article 72. Transfer of Shares Limited partners may transfer their shares without requiring approval from the other partners. Such transfer of shares is effective against third parties only after prior notice [has been given] and an amendment to the enterprise registration has been made. In the event that a limited partner faces any issue, the following solutions shall apply: 1. If a partner dies, his heirs may replace him as partner, unless otherwise agreed; 2. If a partner becomes bankrupt, only the share of the bankrupt partner shall be sold and given to the asset supervision committee for further proceedings in accordance with the Law on the Bankruptcy of Enterprises. The disposal of the share of the bankrupt partner terminates his status as a partner in the limited partnership enterprise, but the limited partnership enterprise may continue business activities; 3. If a partner lacks legal capacity, the guardian of that partner shall be assigned to oversee and administer his interests, except when the partner has otherwise agreed in advance. Article 73. Liability of Limited Partners in Management of Limited Partnership Enterprises Limited partners are not entitled to act as managers like the general partners, except if they are appointed by all the general partners. 28 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR In the event that a limited partner acts as manager without a proper appointment, it shall have the following effects: 1. [Such limited partner] shall have unlimited liability for the damage caused to the enterprise and to third parties; 2. In the event that the partners of the limited partnership enterprise supported, endorsed, assigned or knew of such acts but did not object, the limited partnership enterprise shall be jointly liable for any damage to third parties. In the event that a limited partner is involved in a limited partnership enterprise in any way mentioned in the paragraph above, that partner shall have unlimited liability for debts to third parties only, but his limited liability towards the limited partnership enterprise remains unchanged. Article 74. Effects of Authorising Others to Use Enterprise Name The name of a limited partnership enterprise is obtained from the names or surnames of the general partners. Any limited partner who authorises the limited partnership enterprise to use his name, whether directly or indirectly, shall be liable for the debts of the limited partnership enterprise to third parties in a manner similar to the general partners, but his limited liability towards the limited partnership enterprise remains unchanged. Article 75. Distribution of Dividends or Interest Limited partners are entitled to receive dividends or interest from the limited partnershipâs business activities that generate profit in the agreed proportion or amount, except when the limited partnership enterprise sustains losses or its capital is diminished because of the prior accumulation of losses. The payment of dividends or interest shall take place at the end of each fiscal year in accordance with the Law on Enterprise Accounting of the Lao PDR. Dividends or interest legitimately distributed by the limited partnership enterprise may not be reclaimed. 29 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 76. Rights and Duties of Limited Partners Limited partners have the following rights and duties: 1. To give opinions [and] recommendations to[,] and to make inquiries regarding the business operations of the limited partnership enterprise of[,] the manager; 2. To be liquidators of the limited partnership enterprise, if they are appointed; 3. To elect or remove the manager, unless otherwise agreed; 4. To vote on amendments to the bylaws and on the dissolution of the limited partnership enterprise. The methods of voting shall be described in detail in the bylaws of the limited partnership enterprise; 5. To conduct other lawful business activities, regardless of whether such business activities are similar or identical to the activities of the limited partnership enterprise in which they are partners. The exercise of the rights and the performance of the duties of limited partners described in items 1 to 5 of this article shall not be deemed to be involvement in the management of limited partnership enterprise as mentioned in Article 73 of this law. Article 77. Application of Provisions relating to General Partnership Enterprises In addition to the provisions contained in Chapter 3, Part IV, the provisions of Chapter 2, Part IV of this law shall apply with respect to enterprise registration, the internal and external relationships of the enterprise, mergers, dissolution and the liquidation of the enterprise. Part V Companies Chapter 1 General Principles Relating to Companies Article 78. Shareholders of Companies Persons who contribute capital to a company are called âshareholdersâ. Shareholders are only liable for the companyâs debts up to an amount not exceeding the unpaid portion of [their] shares. A company may have one or more shareholders. 30 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Shareholders or promoters of a company may be natural persons or legal entities. Article 79. Status [of a Company] as Legal Entity and [Status of] Branches of Company A company is a legal entity and its branches have the identical legal status as branches of partnership enterprises as stipulated in Article 34 and Article 35 of this law. Article 80. Group Company Any company acquiring a sufficient number of shares in another company in order to gain control over such companyâs administration is called a âgroup companyâ. A company controlled by another company as described in paragraph one above is referred to as a âsubsidiaryâ. Restrictions on the scope of management control shall be in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. Article 81. Contract of Incorporation A contract of incorporation shall be made in writing in accordance with the Contract Law of the Lao PDR. A contract of incorporation shall contain the following items: 1. The name of the enterprise; 2. The business purpose; 3. The name [and] location of the headquarters and all branches, if any; 4. The stated capital broken down into the value and number of shares, the proportion contributed in kind, the proportion contributed in cash, and [the number of] common shares and preferred shares; 5. The names, addresses and nationalities of the promoters of the company, and the number of shares subscribed by each promoter; 6. Provisions referring to the directorsâ unlimited liability for the debts of the company.42 The provisions on unlimited liability of the director in this paragraph shall terminate one year after the date [such] director is removed from the company; 7. The names and signatures of the promoters of the company. 42 This has the connotation that the extent of the directorâs liability, if any, must be stipulated in the contract of incorporation. 31 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The stated capital mentioned in item 4 of this article is the registered capital of the company. A company with a single shareholder is not required to have a contract of incorporation. Article 82. Bylaws of Companies The bylaws of a company shall contain the following items: 1. The matters described in item 1 to item 6 of Article 81 of this law; 2. The method for the distribution of the companyâs profits or dividends; 3. The method and schedule of payment for shares; 4. Administration and management; 5. Meetings and methods for voting; 6. Methods for dispute resolution; 7. Dissolution and liquidation. The contents of item 1 of this article must be included in the notification for enterprise registration, but the company may include additional information. The bylaws of a company must be signed by the director43. Article 83. Modifications of Contract of Incorporation or Bylaws Any amendment or modification to the contents of the contract of incorporation or the bylaws of a company shall be made by special resolution of the shareholdersâ meeting as described in Article 144 of this law. Any resolution of the shareholdersâ meeting on the amendment or modification of the contract of incorporation or the bylaws of a company shall be notified to the relevant enterprise registration officers within ten working days from the date the shareholdersâ meeting adopts the resolution on modification. Chapter 2 Limited Companies A. General Principles and Incorporation Article 84. Shareholding of Limited Companies A limited company may hold shares of other companies or may be a partner in other partnership enterprises but shall not be a shareholder in its own limited company. 43 In the original Lao text, it is unclear whether this term should be singular or plural. The translators have therefore simply used the singular form here. 32 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 85. More or Fewer Shareholders than Number Stipulated A limited company with more than thirty shareholders may continue to maintain its status as a limited company provided that a special resolution is required as specified in Article 144 of this law. In the event that the limited company does not wish to maintain its status as a limited company or does not receive sufficient votes as specified in paragraph one of this article, the company shall amend the enterprise registration license in accordance with the procedures and principles governing the establishment of public companies or dissolve the company. In the event that only a single shareholder remains in the limited company, the limited company shall change its name to âone-person limited companyâ and shall comply with the provisions under sub-section J, Chapter 2, Part V of this law, or dissolve the limited company. Article 86. Incorporation of Limited Companies A limited company shall be incorporated in accordance with following procedures and conditions: 1. At least two promoters submit the contract of incorporation as a notification to the enterprise registration officers where the companyâs headquarters are located; 2. Upon notification of the contract of incorporation of a limited company required under item 1 of this article, the company must find persons to subscribe for all the shares of the company. The share subscription shall not be carried out through a public offering. Persons subscribing for shares are referred to âshare subscribersâ; 3. The meeting of incorporation is convened; 4. The promoters of the limited company assign all tasks to the director elected by the incorporation meeting; 5. The director calls for payment in full of shares from the promoters and subscribers of the limited company as defined in paragraph one of Article 96 of this law; 6. Upon full payment of shares as provided in item 5 of this article, the director shall register the enterprise within thirty days from the date of full payment of shares. Article 87. Promoters of Limited Companies The promoters of a limited company are persons who initiate the establishment of the limited company, but are not representatives of the limited company and are required to hold at least one share. 33 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The main duties of the promoters of a limited company are to undertake all activities relating to the establishment of the limited company until the meeting of incorporation is convened. Article 88. Liability of Promoters towards Share Subscribers The promoters of a limited company shall be liable to share subscribers for the following acts: 1. Acting in [their own] personal interests; 2. Concealing revenues or expenses incurred in association with the establishment of the limited company; 3. Incurring expenses or making contracts outside the objective of establishing the limited company; 4. Evaluating their assets in excess of [their] actual value; 5. Other liabilities as provided in this law. The promoters shall resolve [such acts] and compensate for any damages arising from such acts in accordance with the laws and regulations. Article 89. Liability of Promoters towards Third Parties The promoters of a limited company shall have joint unlimited liability for contracts signed with third parties relating to the establishment of a limited company or44 for unapproved expenses for the establishment of a limited company or for expenses that have been approved but where the company does not get registered. Article 90. Rights and Duties of Incorporation Meeting of Limited Companies The incorporation meeting of a limited company has the following rights and duties: 1. To adopt the bylaws of the limited company; 2. To approve the contract of incorporation and other contracts relating to the establishment of the limited company entered into by promoters with third parties, including the expenses incurred by the promoters relating to the establishment of the limited company; 3. To decide on the common and preferred shares, if any; 4. To elect the initial board of the limited company. 44 See footnote 20. 34 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR At least ten working days before the date the incorporation meeting is convened, the promoters shall send a report on the incorporation to the share subscribers together with the list of share subscribers, their addresses and the number of shares subscribed by each person. Article 91. Resolutions of Incorporation Meeting of Limited Companies Resolutions of the incorporation meeting shall be effective only when adopted by more than half of the promoters and share subscribers attending the meeting and by share subscribers representing more than half of the total shares subscribed. One share shall be equal to one vote. The promoters or share subscribers shall not have the right to vote on matters in which they have any involvement that could benefit them45, except for votes to elect the directors of the limited company. The incorporation meeting of a limited company shall determine whether a promoter or share subscriber has an involvement that could benefit him or a direct benefit. Article 92. Filing of Notification for Enterprise Registration The following documents are required for the filing of a notification for enterprise registration of a limited company: 1. The application form for the notification of enterprise registration and the contract of incorporation of the limited company; 2. The minutes of the incorporation meeting of the limited company; 3. The bylaws of the limited company. The notification for enterprise registration shall be signed by the director. Article 93. Liability of Directors for Default in Enterprise Registration The registration officers shall reject the registration of a limited enterprise if the time set forth in item 6 of Article 86 of this law has expired, except [when] the delay in registration arises by reason of necessity that is not the fault of the directors or the shareholders adopt a resolution to continue the enterprise registration by a vote of more than four-fifths of the fully paid shares. In the event that the limited company is not registered, the directors shall return the total value of shares in full to the shareholders within three months from the date the enterprise registration officers reject the registration of the enterprise. 45 In the original Lao text, there is one word for the whole idea of âinvolvement that could benefit themâ. 35 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR In the event that the three months is exceeded and the directors involved do not return the total value of the shares in full to the subscribers, such directors shall be liable for the remaining amount together with interest at the bank rate for loans, except that a director may prove that he was not at fault in delaying the enterprise registration and is unable to return such shares in full. B. Shares and Share Certificates of Limited Companies Article 94. Shares Each share of a limited company shall not be issued [with a face value of] less than two thousand Kip. A share of a limited company may be held by one or several shareholders, and one person shall be assigned to have rights as a shareholder in the limited company, provided that these shareholders shall be jointly responsible for payment of unpaid shares to the limited company. Shares of a limited company may be contributed in cash or in kind. The contribution in kind shall be appraised in monetary terms [which appraisal shall be] approved by at least two-thirds of the promoters and share subscribers attending the incorporation meeting, except as otherwise agreed. Shares contributed in other forms than in kind and in cash shall be determined in detail at the incorporation meeting. There are two types of shares of a limited company: common shares and preferred shares. Article 95. Value of Shares and Issuance of Shares below Par Value The value of a share of a limited company shall be determined in the contract of incorporation. Such value of a share is referred as its âpar valueâ. A limited company shall not issue shares below par value as described in paragraph one above, except when the limited company reduces its capital as stipulated in Article 112 of this law. The restrictions under this paragraph shall not apply to price setting by the shareholders for the sale or purchase of shares. A limited company may only increase the value of its shares by complying with Article 110 of this law. Article 96. Payment of Shares before Enterprise Registration Payment of shares before enterprise registration is the payment of shares following the incorporation meeting stipulated in item 5 of Article 86 of this law. 36 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR In such case of payment of shares, the subscribers shall pay in full if it is in kind and at least seventy percent of the value of subscribed shares if it is in cash. The directors of the limited company may call for payment of the remaining amount at any time after registration of the enterprise, unless the companyâs bylaws stipulate otherwise. Article 97. Payment of Shares after Enterprise Registration In calling for the payment of shares as described in paragraph two, Article 96 of this law, the directors of a limited company shall call upon each shareholder to pay for shares in proportion to his shareholding by giving thirty days prior written notice to each shareholder indicating the date and amount of payment. Payment of shares as mentioned above or payment of shares in other cases, such as an increase of capital under Article 110 of this law, shall be made in cash and it is prohibited to set off debts with the limited company, unless a special resolution of the shareholdersâ meeting is passed. Article 98. Effects of Failure to Pay for Shares Shareholders who fail to pay for shares at the first call by the directors of a limited company shall pay interest at the bank rate for loans on the portion remaining unpaid commencing from the date they receive notice, and are entitled to vote in the shareholdersâ meeting with only their fully paid shares. In the event that a shareholder fails to pay both shares and interest at the second call, the directors are entitled to sell these shares by giving priority as specified in items 1 to 4 of Article 111 of this law to recover payment for the shares and interest for the limited company. Any remaining amount shall be returned to the concerned shareholder. In the event that the amount from the sale of shares under paragraph two of this article is not sufficient, the directors have the right to claim for full payment; otherwise, the directors may refuse to register the transfer of shares or suspend the right to vote of the concerned shareholder at the shareholdersâ meeting. Article 99. Rights and Duties of Common Shareholders Owners of common shares are referred to as âcommon shareholdersâ. Common shareholders have the following rights and duties: 1. To present opinions on the limited companyâs activities; 2. To participate in the limited companyâs activities; 3. To pay for shares on the due date; 37 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 4. To fully protect their interests; 5. To receive information and examine the records of the limited company as provided in the limited companyâs bylaws; 6. To file complaints against directors, officers or employees of the limited company causing prejudice to their interests; 7. To be liable for the unpaid portion of their shares; 8. To have pre-emptive rights with respect to the transfer or sale of shares by shareholders of the limited company to third parties; 9. To elect or remove directors of the limited company; 10. To receive part of the assets remaining from liquidation in event of dissolution; 11. To receive dividends in proportion to their shareholdings; 12. To exercise such other rights and perform such other duties as specified under laws and regulations. The distribution of dividends and assets described in items 10 and 11 of this article may be carried out only after the distribution to the limited companyâs preferred shareholders and creditors. Article 100. Rights and Duties of Preferred Shareholders Owners of preferred shares are referred to as âpreferred shareholdersâ. Preferred shareholders have the following rights and duties: 1. The rights and duties as described in items one to six of Article 99 of this law; 2. To be entitled to the distribution of assets and dividends before the common shareholders. Dividends may be received at a fixed amount or as a percentage of shares as agreed by the shareholders; 3. To receive other special rights. Any modification or revision of these special rights shall be determined in the limited companyâs bylaws; 4. To redeem their shares when the limited company is profitable or to seek to sell their shares to new shareholders after the limited company has refused to buy such shares, except as otherwise agreed. In the event that the limited company agrees to purchase the shares mentioned in item 146 of this article, the purchase price shall be at the set price or agreed price. Preferred shareholders are not entitled to elect the directors of the limited company. 46 In the original Lao text, the reference to ââitem 1â may be an erroneous reference which should have been made to item 4. 38 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 101. Issuance of Share Certificates of Limited Companies Within thirty days from the date of registration of a limited company, the directors shall issue share certificates to the shareholders. Each share certificate shall bear the signature of the director with the stamp of the limited company. Each share certificate shall have a value of at least one share or more. There are two types of share certificates of limited companies: registered share certificates and bearer share certificates.47 Article 102 Registered Share Certificates Registered share certificates shall contain the following main items: 1. The serial number of the share certificate; 2. The name of the limited company; 3. The name of the shareholder; 4. The number of shares held by the shareholder; 5. The value of each share; 6. The value of the unpaid portion and schedule of payment, if specified; 7. The signature of the director and stamp [of the limited company]. A registered share certificate may be for shares that have not been paid. Such registered share certificate may be converted into a bearer share certificate when the shareholder has paid for the shares in full and registered to cancel the previous [certificate]. In the event that the bylaws of the limited company require that the directors hold shares of the limited company, the directors shall only hold registered share certificates. Article 103. Bearer Share Certificates A bearer share certificate is a negotiable instrument and may only be issued if the following conditions are met: 1. The shares have been fully paid; 2. The right of the company to issue bearer share certificates shall be specified in the bylaws of the company. A bearer share certificate has similar contents to a registered share certificate, except for the contents relating to the name of shareholders and the value of the unpaid shares. 47 The literal translations of these terms are âname certificatesâ and âno-name certificatesâ, respectively. 39 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR A bearer share certificate may be converted into a registered share certificate by cancelling such share certificate and issuing a registered share certificate in its place. Article 104. Transfer of Shares A bearer share certificate of a limited company may be transferred by handing over the share certificate to another. Bearer shares may only be transferred when: 1. [The transfer] is consistent with the restrictions on share transfer provided in the bylaws of the limited company; 2. [The transfer] does not contravene any legal restrictions on share transfers; 3. They are acquired [pursuant to] a transfer of shares by operation of law; 4. [The transfer] is made in writing by indicating the names and signatures of the transferor and transferee, as well as the names and signatures of at least one witness for the transferor and one for the transferee, and the serial number of the transferred share certificate; 5. The transfer is registered. In the event of a transfer to a third party, a prior offering shall be made to the other shareholders of the company, and the transfer shall be registered with the name and address of the transferee in the share register. The directors of a limited company may refuse to register a transfer of registered share certificates if the shares have not been fully paid. In the event that a limited company has registered the transfer of shares as mentioned in paragraph three above, the transferor shall remain liable to creditors for his unpaid portion of the transferred shares. Article 105 Share Transfer by Operation of Law A share transfer by operation of law [refers to] the transfer of shares pursuant to the grounds set out in paragraph two of Article 98 and paragraph three of Article 108 of this law, or by the death, bankruptcy or other circumstances of the shareholder. A person who receives shares transferred by operation of law shall present full and proper evidence on the acquisition of such transferred shares, including share certificates, to the relevant limited company in order to be issued a share certificate and to be registered as a new shareholder of the limited company. 40 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 106. Restrictions on Share Transfers by Operation of Law Restrictions on share transfers by operation of law include: 1. The restrictions described in paragraph three, Article 98 of this law; 2. Restrictions on share transfers under other laws, such as restrictions, if any, against shareholding by foreign persons, foreign residents or apatrids in any type of business; 3. The transfer of shares during the supervision of assets48; 4. The transfer of shares when the shareholder register book is closed, if agreed or specified in the bylaws of the limited company. Article 107. Shareholder Register Book The shareholder register book shall contain the following main items: 1. The names, addresses and nationalities of the shareholders; 2. The number of shares, value of shares, and serial numbers of share certificates divided according to their types as registered share certificates and bearer share certificates; 3. The unpaid portion of shares in the case of registered share certificates; 4. The date of registration as shareholder of the limited company; 5. The date of deletion from the shareholder list of the limited company. The shareholder register book shall be kept at the office of the limited company and made available for inspection by shareholders at agreed times. The directors of the limited company shall send copies of the shareholder register book each time any changes are made or at least once a year if there is no change[,] to the relevant enterprise registration officers not later than 25 December of each year. Article 108. Invalid Transfer of Registered Share Certificates A transfer of registered share certificates shall be invalid if there is any breach of the requirements set forth in paragraph two, Article 104 of this law. An invalid transfer of such shares results in the transferee not becoming a shareholder of the limited company until a proper solution is found. In such case, the transferor shall remain the owner of the transferred shares. 48 This is a reference to supervision under Article 16 of the Law on the Bankruptcy of Enterprises. 41 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR A transferee who has possessed shares in good faith for more than two years, without any claim or protest, is entitled to be the lawful owner of such shares. Article 109. Liability of Share Transferor and Transferee The transferor is liable to creditors for the unpaid portion of the shares transferred, in the case:49 1. As provided in paragraph four, Article 104 of this law; 2. Payment is called on transferred shares; 3. The transferee is unable to pay the outstanding portion of the unpaid shares. The transferorâs liabilities are liabilities towards creditors[,] and they shall be terminated within one year from the date of registration of the share transfer. The limited company may not file a claim50 against the transferor. The transferee acquires all rights, duties and obligations attaching to the transferred shares. C. Increase or Reduction of Capital of Limited Companies Article 110. Increase of Capital A limited company may increase its registered capital by increasing the number of shares or increasing the value of each share. Increasing the registered capital shall be approved by [the adoption of] a special resolution of the shareholdersâ meeting as stipulated in Article 144 of this law. 49 The translators left this term as is because it is unclear whether the term refers to cumulative events or a single triggering event. 50 In Laos, there are several means by which citizens with grievances are able to seek redress either administratively or through the legal process. The reader may wish to refer to Article 2 of the Law on Handling Petitions for more information on these means. The word translated as a "claim" in this Enterprise Law corresponds to the second category of petitions referred to in Article 2 of the Law on Handling Petitions. 42 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 111. Offering of Additional Shares Additional shares shall be offered in the following order of priority: 1. [Shares are] offered to the limited companyâs shareholders in proportion to their shareholding by sending a written notice to each shareholder indicating the timeframe for response. Any failure to respond or delay in responding shall be considered as a forfeiture of [that shareholderâs] rights; 2. The shares which were not acquired after the specified timeframe had expired or in respect of which the shareholders refused to acquire these shares in proportion to their shareholding are then offered to the other shareholders of the limited company who have an interest in acquiring them; 3. The directors have the right to purchase shares remaining after the offering under item 2 of this article; 4. [Any remaining shares] shall be offered to third parties. The methods and procedures for the transfer of shares shall comply with the bylaws of the limited company. The measures defined in Article 98 of this law shall apply to subscribers who fail to pay for the additional shares when [payment is] due. Article 112. Reduction of Capital A limited company may reduce its registered capital by reducing the value of each share or reducing the number of the companyâs shares. The reduction of registered capital shall comply with the following requirements: 1. The value of shares remaining after the reduction shall not be less than two thousand Kip; 2. The capital remaining after the reduction shall not be less than one half of the registered capital and shall not be less than the capital set by the relevant authorities as described in paragraph three, Article 20 of this law; 3. The reduction of registered capital may be executed only when a special resolution is passed as provided in Article 144 of this law; 4. The creditors of the limited company have not opposed the reduction of such capital. 43 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Article 113. Notice to Creditors Notice shall be given to creditors of the limited company to allow them to oppose the reduction, as follows: 1. Written notice shall be sent to all the creditors of the limited company indicating the reasons for the capital reduction, [and] the value or number of shares to be reduced. The time period for objecting shall not be less than two months from the date such notice is received. Creditors who fail to respond within such timeframe shall be deemed not to object; 2. Public notice shall be given at least ten times by indicating the timeframe for response and other details as described in item 1 of this article. Article 114. Objections and Responsibility51 for Notice An objection by a creditor prevents the limited company from reducing its capital, unless the debt due to that creditor has been fully repaid. In the event that any creditor has not received such notice on the reduction of capital due to the fault of the limited company, the limited company shall pay the debt owed to such creditor not later than one year from the date of the shareholdersâ meeting adopting the resolution for the reduction of the capital of the limited company. In the event that the creditor is at fault, such creditor shall be considered as having not objected. Article 115 Registration of Capital Increase or Reduction A limited company that has increased or reduced its capital, as provided in this sub-section C, shall register that change in capital with the relevant enterprise registration officers as follows: 1. The registration of a capital increase shall be made within ten working days from the date specified for the payment of subscribed shares; 2. The registration of a capital reduction shall be made within ten working days from the date of no objection or from the date debts are paid to the opposing creditors. 51 This articles does not appear to address responsibilities or liabilities; however, the word ââresponsibilityâ is used in the original Lao text. 44 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR Upon registering the capital increase or reduction, the limited company shall give public notice at least once within ten working days from the date the change in capital is registered. The documents submitted [to register] the changed new [amount of registered] capital shall include the list of shareholders whose shares in the limited company have been increased or reduced, their nationalities and addresses, the serial number of share certificates and the number of shares held. D. Directors and Board of Directors of Limited Companies Article 116. Directors A director is the representative of a limited company. The relationships among directors, the limited company and third parties shall be based on the relevant laws and regulations. A director of a limited company receives no salary but receives an annual honorarium and remuneration for each meeting at the rate or in the amount determined by the shareholdersâ meeting, except for third party directors or as otherwise agreed. Directors may or may not be shareholders, except as otherwise agreed. All acts of directors must be within the scope of power and duties determined in the bylaws of the company and shall be under the supervision of the shareholdersâ meeting. A limited company may have several directors depending on the needs of the limited company. In the event that a limited company has several directors, one of whom is authorised to enter into contracts with third parties on behalf of the limited company, such director shall be called the âgeneral directorâ. In the event that the chairman of the board of directors is elected as the general director, he shall be referred to as the âpresident of the boardâ. Article 117. Qualifications of Directors A director of a limited company shall have the following qualifications: 1. Shall not be a legal entity; 2. Shall have legal capacity; 3. Shall not be a bankrupt person, who is still under the restricted period for conducting business; 45 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR 4. Shall never have been convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation of assets. Article 118. Appointment or Removal of Directors Directors are appointed in the following manner: 1. The initial board of directors is appointed by the incorporation meeting of the limited company; 2. Subsequent boards of directors are appointed by the shareholdersâ meeting; 3. Any vacancy in between two ordinary shareholdersâ meetings shall be filled by an appointment made by a meeting of the board of directors.52 In the event that the limited company does not have a board of directors, the bylaws shall provide for the appointment of such director. A director of a limited company is removed by the shareholdersâ meeting, notwithstanding the manner in which such director was appointed. The removal of a director may take place at any time when there are sufficient reasons to justify [such removal] or there is no confidence in such director. The shareholders or the board of directors of a limited company shall not be entitled to request the court to appoint or remove directors, except when the appointment procedures stipulated in this law or in the bylaws of the limited company have been violated. Article 119. Voting Procedures for Appointment or Removal of Directors Voting for the appointment or removal of directors shall be carried out in two ways: by cumulative voting and by ordinary voting. Cumulative voting is when each shareholder multiples his shares by the number of directors to be elected and votes for one or several candidates he chooses. In counting the votes, one share shall be equal to one vote. The candidate receiving the most votes is elected as a director. 52 The term âmeeting of the board of directorsâ is used interchangeably in two senses. First, to refer to the meetings held by the directors. Second, to refer the âbody of directorsâ attending such meetings. The second meaning is intended here and in similar provisions dealing with shareholdersâ meetings. 46 Translation Endorsed by the Law Committee of the National Assembly of the Lao PDR The removal of directors elected by cumulative voting may only take place if the votes for his removal53 are at least equal to the number of votes that elected that director. Ordinary voting is the vote to elect one director where one share is equal to one vote. The elected candidate under paragraph four of this article is the person who receives over half
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	47	https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Laos.htm	en	Laos			[ "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/laofran.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_1952.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/luangpr.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_vientianekingdom.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/lao_cham.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "ben cahoon" ]	null					null	Luang Phra Bang (Lan Xang) c.1707 - 1893 Map of Luang Phra Bang Capital: Luang Phra Bang (Luang-Prabang 1893-1945) (Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to 1561; Vientiane 1561-1695) Population: N/A .... Müang Xiang Dong Xiang Tong ... - ... Thai occupation. 889 - .... Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1185 - 1191 Under Khmer suzerainty. 1353 Kingdom of Lan Xang Hom Khao 1478 - 1479 Occupied by Vietnam. 1574 - 1603 Burmese vassal. 1575 - 1591 Occupied by Burma. 1707 Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang (officially Lan Xang Hom Khao). Mar 1765 - 1772 Under Burmese suzerainty. 1772 - 1795 Under Thai suzerainty. 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation. 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation. 1795 - 1828 Vassal of Vietnam. 3 Oct 1893 French protectorate; part of French Indochina (see Vietnam). 21 Aug 1941 Wiang Chhan and Xiang Khuang incorporated into Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 25 Aug 1945 Japanese occupation. 8 Apr 1945 Royal proclamation declares end of French protectorate. 25 Aug 1945 French troops liberate Luang Phra Bang. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings 1575 - 1575 Nokeo-Koumane (1st time) (d. 1596) 1575 - 1591 Burmese occupation 1591 - 1596 Nokeo-Koumane (2nd time) (s.a.) 1596 - 1621 Vorouvong Sa II (b. 1585 - d. 1622) 1621 - 1622 Ouphagnauvarath I (b. 1597 - d. 1622) 1623 - 1627 Phothisarath II (b. 1552 - d. 1627) 1627 - 1633 Mom Keo (d. 1633) 1633 - 1637 Ton Khan (Ouphagnauvarath II) (d. 1637) 1637 - 1638 Vickhsai (d. 1638) 1638 - 1690 Sulingvongsa (b. 1618 - d. 1690) 1690 - 1695 Tian Thala (d. 1696) 1695 - 1698 Nan Tharat (d. 1698) 1698 - 1706 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1735) (to 1735 in Wiang Chhan) 1707 - 1713 Kingkitsarath (d. 1713) 1713 - 1723 Ong Kham (d. 1759) (in Chiang Mai 1727-1759) 1723 - 1749 Thao Ang (= Inthason) (d. 1749) 1749 (8 months) Inthaphom (= Intharavongsa) (d. 1776) 1749 - 1768 Sotika-Koumane (b. bf.1734 - d. 1771) 1768 - 1788 Suryavong II (b. 1751? - d. 1791) 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation 3 Feb 1792 - 179. Anurutha (1st time) (b. 1735 - d. 1819) 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation 2 Jun 1794 - 31 Dec 1819 Anurutha (2nd time) (s.a.) 31 Dec 1819 - 7 Mar 1837 Manthaturath (b. 1772 - d. 1837) (regent for Anurutha 1817 - 31 Dec 1819; lives as a monk in Bangkok 1825-26, leaving Luang Phra Bang to be administered by Thai officials) 1825 - 1826 .... -Thai official 1837 - 1838 Unkeo -Regent (d. 1850) 1838 - 23 Sep 1850 Sukha-Söm (b. 1797 - d. 1850) 23 Sep 1850 - 1 Oct 1868 Chantha-Kuman (b. 1799 - d. 1868) 1 Oct 1868 - 15 Dec 1895 Unkham (b. 1811 - d. 1895) 15 Dec 1895 - 25 Mar 1904 Sakkarin (b. 1840 - d. 1904) (regent for Unkham Apr 1888 - 15 Dec 1895) 26 Mar 1904 - 15 Sep 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) (also king of Laos from 12 Oct 1945) 15 May 1946 - 27 Aug 1946 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) Prime minister 21 Aug 1941 - 10 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) Non-party French Vice-consul 1887 - 5 Jun 1894 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (b. 1847 - d. 1925) Commissioner-general (subordinated to the Governor-general of French Indochina) 5 Jun 1894 - Apr 1895 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (s.a.) Commandant-supérieur of Bas-Laos (in Khong, Champasak) 1 Jun 1895 - 30 Apr 1899 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (b. 1852 - d. 1930) Commandant-supérieurs of Haut-Laos (in Luang Prabang) 1 Jun 1895 - 10 Mar 1897 Joseph Vacle (1st time) (interim) (b. 1857 - d. 1907) 10 Mar 1897 - 11 Oct 1898 Louis Paul Luce (interim) (b. 1856 - d. 1931) 11 Oct 1898 - Apr 1899 Joseph Vacle (2nd time) (interim) (s.a.) Resident-supérieurs (subordinated to the Governors-general of French Indochina) Sep 1895 - Mar 1896 Léon Jules Pol Boulloche (b. 1859 - d. 1922) 11 Feb 1899 - 12 Feb 1903 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (s.a.) (acting to 30 Apr 1899) 12 Feb 1903 - 11 May 1906 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (b. 1860 - d. 1926) (1st time) (interim) 11 May 1906 - 1 Apr 1907 Louis Saturnin Édouard Laffont (b. 1853 - d. 1930) (interim) 1 Apr 1907 - 9 Jan 1912 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (s.a.) (2nd time) 24 Aug 1910 - 27 Jul 1911 Antoine Georges Amédeé Ernest (b. 1863 - d. 1941) Outrey (acting for Mahé) 9 Jan 1912 - 4 Jul 1913 Louis Antoine Aubry de la Noë (b. 1862 - d. 1942) (interim) 4 Jul 1913 - 9 Oct 1913 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (b. 1863 - d. 19..) (1st time) (acting) 9 Oct 1913 - Feb 1914 Jean Édouard Bourcier (b. 1870 - d. 1941) Saint-Chaffray (interim) 31 May 1914 - 3 May 1918 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 3 May 1918 - 21 Mar 1931 Jules Georges Théodore Bosc (b. 1871 - d. 1959) 26 Apr 1921 - Jan 1923 Joël Daroussin (interim) (b. 1870 - d. 1951) (acting for Bosc) 7 May 1925 - Jan 1926 Jean-Jacques Dauplay (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 1943) (acting for Bosc) 21 May 1928 - 12 Dec 1928 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (b. 1884 - d. 1931) (interim) (acting for Bosc) 21 Mar 1931 - 12 May 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (1st time) (interim) 25 Mar 1931 Pierre André Michel Pagès (b. 1893 - d. 1980) (did not take office) 12 May 1931 - 4 Jun 1931 Yves Charles Châtel (b. 1865 - d. 1944) 11 Jun 1931 - 21 Nov 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (2nd time) (interim) 21 Nov 1931 - 11 Feb 1932 Jules Nicolas Thiebaut (interim) (b. 1884 - d. 1935) 11 Feb 1932 - 16 Dec 1933 Aristide Eugène Le Fol (b. 1878 - d. 1967) 16 Dec 1933 - 1 Jan 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (b. 1891 - d. 1977) (1st time) (acting) 1 Jan 1934 - 10 Jul 1934 Louis Frédéric Eckert (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 19..) 10 Jul 1934 - 4 Aug 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 4 Aug 1934 - 5 Apr 1938 Eugène Henri Roger Eutrope (b. 1881 - d. 1953) 25 Nov 1934 - 13 Oct 1935 Frédéric Claire Guillaume Louis (b. 1883 - d. 1959) Marty (interim) 5 Apr 1938 - 16 Nov 1940 André Touzet (b. 1883 - d. 1956) 16 Nov 1940 - 29 Dec 1941 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (3rd time) (interim) 29 Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1945 Louis Antoine Marie Brasey (b. 1891 - d. 1957) (Japanese prisoner 10 Mar - 9 Jun 1945)Japanese Commander 38th Division, in Vientiane 10 Mar 1945 - Aug 1945 Masanori Sako Japanese Supreme Counsellor (in Luang Prabang) 5 Apr 1945 - 22 Aug 1945 Kazuo Ishibashi Mil (Japanese 21st Army, 2nd Div. Correspondence Corps) Wiang Chhan (Viang Chan) to 1828 Map of Wiang Chhan Capital: Wiang Chhan (Vientiane 1887-1945) 1707 Kingdom of Wiang Chhan resulting from the split of the Kingdom of Lan Xang. 1778 - 1781 Occupied by Thailand. 1781 - 12 Nov 1828 Vassal of Thailand. 12 Nov 1828 Annexation by Siam (see Thailand). 17 Oct 1887 French colony (Vientiane - French deformation of Wiang Chhan). 1941 Incorporation into Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 27 Aug 1945 Occupied by Japan. Kings 1707 - 1730 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1730) 1730 - 1767 Ong Long (d. 1767) 1767 - 1778 Ong Bun (1st time) (b. 1730 - d. 1781) 1778 - 1780 Phraya Supho -Thai governor (d. 1780) 1780 - Nov 1781 Ong Bun (2nd time) (s.a.) 21 Nov 1781 - Jan 1795 Nanthasen (d. 1795) 2 Feb 1795 - 7 Feb 1805 Intharavong Setthathirath III (b. 17.. - d. 1805) (crowned on 23 Jul 1795) 7 Feb 1805 - 12 Nov 1828 Anuvong (b. 1767 - d. 1829) Champasak (Nakhon Champasak) c.1713 - 27 Aug 1946 Map of Champasak Capital: Pakse [Pakxe] (Champassak [Bassac] 1863-1908; Nakhon Champasak 1791-1863; Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi 1713-1791) 161. Kingdom of Nakhon Kala Champaknaburisi founded. 1713 Name changed to Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi. 1791 Name changed to Nakhon Champasak. 1778 - 19 Sep 1904 Vassal state of Thailand. 1811 - 1813 Thai occupation. 1819 - 1821 Thai occupation. 1851 - 1856 Thai occupation. 1860 - 1863 Thai occupation. 19 Sep 1904 French protectorate. 22 Nov 1904 Principality under French protectorate (Champassak). 9 May 1941 - 17 Nov 1946 Right-bank of Champasak annexed by Thailand. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. 27 Aug 1946 Principality extinguished. Kings 1700 - 1713? Nan Rath 1713 - 1738 Nokasat (b. c.1693 - d. 1738) 1738 - 1791 Saya Kuman (b. 1710 - d. 1791) (regent for Nokasat 1725-38) 1791 Xiang Keo 1791 - 1811 Fai Na (d. 1811) 1811 (3 days) No Muong (d. 1811) 1811 - 1813 Cha Nou (d. 1813) 1813 - 1821 Ma Noi (d. 1821) (fled to Thailand in 1820) 1821 - 1827 Rajabud Yo -Thai governor (d. 1827) 1827 - 1840 Hui (Huy) (b. 1780 - d. 1840) 1840 - 1850 Nak (regent for Hui to 1840) (b. 1774 - d. 1850) 1851 - 1852 Süa -Regent (d. 1852) 1850 - 1853 Buwana -Thai governor (d. 1853) 1853 - 1855 Suriya -Regent (d. 1855) 1856 - 1858 Kham Nhai (b. 1830 - d. 1858) 1858 - 1860 Chu -Regent 1862 - 28 Jul 1900 Kham Suk (b. 1838 - d. 1900) (governor to 1863) 28 Jul 1900 - 22 Nov 1904 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (b. 1874 - d. 1945) Princes 22 Nov 1904 - Nov 1945 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (s.a.) Nov 1945 - 26 Aug 1946 Boun Oum (b. 1912 - d. 1980) Xiang Khuang Map of Xiang Khuang Capital: Xiang Khuang (Xieng Khouang 1893-1946) 698 Müang Maharatanaburirom Phommachakkhati Simahanakkharatakkasela Nakhon Xiang Khuang Rajathani state founded in the Plain of Jars. 889 - 1368 Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1478 - .... Vassal of Vietnam. 1568 - 1598 Vassal of Pegu (Burma). 1772 - 1835 Under Thai suzerainty. 1835 Annexed by Thailand. 18.. Annexed by Vietnam. 1848 Restored as a vassal state of Vietnam. 1851 Sovereignty restored. 1875 Annexed by Thailand. 1876 Sovereignty restored. 1887 Made a vassal state of Thailand. 1888 - 3 Oct 1893 Annexed by Thailand. 3 Oct 1893 Made a French colonial (Muang Phuan) possession as part of Laos. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings (rath, chao xiwit) 1687 - 1688 Chao Kham Lan (d. 1688) 1688 - 1690 Chao Kham Phuttha (d. 1690) 1690 - 1694 Chao Kham Sattha (d. 1694) 1694 Chao Bun Lang Thai (d. 1694) 1694 - 1698 Chao Bun Lot (d. 1698) 1698 - 1712 Chao Kham Bun Khong 1712 - 1714 Phraña Kham Thewo -Regent (d. 1714) (= Phraña Thammatewo) 1714 - 1740 Chao Bun Chan 1740 - 1751 Chao Kham Un Müang 1751 - 1753 Chao Ong Lo (1st time) 1753 (3 months) Chao Ong Bun 1753 - 1779 Chao Ong Lo (2nd time) 1779 - 1781 Chao Ong Si Phom 1781 - 1782 Chao No Müang 1782 - 1802 Chao Som Phu 1802 - 1803 Chao Xiang 1803 - 1831 Chao Suthakasuvannakuman (= Chao Noi) 1831 - 1835 Chao San -Regent 1835 - 1848 Annexed to Thailand, then Vietnam 1848 - 1865 Phra Chao Issarasettha (= Chao Po) 1865 - 1874 Chao Üng 1875 - 1876 Annexed to Thailand 1876 - 1887 Chao Khanti 1887 - 1888 Thao Xiang Phet -Regent 1888 - 1899 Kham Ngon Laos 15 Sep 1945 Unification of Kingdom of Laos proclaimed.22 Oct 1953 Independence. 2 Dec 1975 Lao People's Democratic Republic General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Party (from Feb 1972, Lao People's Revolutionary Party) 22 Mar 1955 - 29 Mar 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (b. 1920 - d. 1992) Presidents of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 29 Mar 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) 25 Nov 1992 - 21 Mar 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (b. 1924) General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 21 Mar 2006 - 22 Jan 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (b. 1936) 22 Jan 2016 - 15 Jan 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (b. 1937) 15 Jan 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (b. 1945) King (Rath)¹ 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) Head of State 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) LI Kings (Rath)¹ 23 Apr 1946 - 29 Oct 1959 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) (king of Luang Phra Bang 15 May - 27 Aug 1946) 28 Nov 1946 - 25 Oct 1949 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) LI (Head of State,in Bangkok exile) 21 Aug 1959 - 2 Dec 1975 Savang Vatthana (b. 1907 - d. 1978?) (regent to 4 Nov 1959) Presidents 3 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Prince Souphanouvong (b. 1912 - d. 1995) PPPL 31 Oct 1986 - 15 Aug 1991 Phoumi Vongvichit (b. 1909 - d. 1994) PPPL (acting for Souphanouvong) 15 Aug 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 25 Nov 1992 - 24 Feb 1998 Nouhak Phoumsavan (b. 1914 - d. 2008) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 8 Jun 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 19 Apr 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (s.a.) PPPL19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL Prime ministers (Sep 1982-14 Aug 1991, Chairmen of the Council of Ministers) 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) Non-party 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phaya Khammao (b. 1911 - d. 1984) LI (chairman of Provisional Government; continues in Bangkok, Thailand exile to 25 Oct 1949) 23 Apr 1946 - 15 Mar 1947 Prince Kindavong (b. 1900 - d. 1951) Non-party 15 Mar 1947 - 25 Mar 1948 Prince Souvannarath (b. 1893 - d. 1960) Non-party 25 Mar 1948 - 24 Feb 1950 Prince Boun Oum (1st time) (b. 1912 - d. 1962) Non-party 24 Feb 1950 - 15 Oct 1951 Phoui Sananikone (1st time) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) PS 21 Nov 1951 - 20 Oct 1954 Prince Souvanna Phouma (1st time) (b. 1901 - d. 1984) NPP 25 Nov 1954 - 21 Mar 1956 Katay Don Sasorith (b. 1904 - d. 1959) NPP 21 Mar 1956 - 17 Aug 1958 Prince Souvanna Phouma (2nd time) (s.a.) NPP 17 Aug 1958 - 31 Dec 1959 Phoui Sananikone (2nd time) (s.a.) RPL 31 Dec 1959 - 7 Jan 1960 Sounthone Pathammavong (b. 1911 - d. 1985) Mil/CDIN (Army Chief of Staff) 7 Jan 1960 - 3 Jun 1960 Kou Abhay (b. 1892 - d. 1964) Non-party 3 Jun 1960 - 15 Aug 1960 Prince Somsanith (b. 1913 - d. 1975) CDIN 30 Aug 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Prince Souvanna Phouma (3rd time) (s.a.) RLP (from 10 Dec 1960, in Cambodia exile and at Ban Khangkhai, recognized by the Communist states to 31 Dec 1961) 11 Dec 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Quinim Pholsena (not recognized) (b. 1915 - d. 1963) SPK 13 Dec 1960 - 23 Jun 1962 Prince Boun Oum (2nd time) (s.a.) Non-party 23 Jun 1962 - 2 Dec 1975 Prince Souvanna Phouma (4th time) (s.a.) NLPK 8 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 15 Aug 1991 - 24 Feb 1998 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 27 Mar 2001 Sisavath Keobounphanh (b. 1928 - d. 2020) PPPL 27 Mar 2001 - 8 Jun 2006 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 23 Dec 2010 Bouasone Bouphavanh (b. 1954) PPPL 23 Dec 2010 - 19 Apr 2016 Thongsing Thammavong (b. 1944) PPPL 19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - 30 Dec 2022 Phankham Viphavanh (b. 1951) PPPL 30 Dec 2022 - Sonexay Siphandone (b. 1966) PPPL Commander of the Chinese (Nationalist) 93rd Division 23 Sep 1945 - Mar 1946 Lu Guoquan (Lu Kuo-ch'üan) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) (= Zheng Chong) French Commissioners of the French Republic in Laos (subordinated to the High Commissioners of France in Indochina) 29 Aug 1945 - 6 Apr 1946 Hans Imfeld (acting to 23 Sep 1945)(b. 1902 - d. 1947) 6 Apr 1946 - 29 Jul 1947 Jean Léon François Marie de (b. 1907 - d. 1951) Raymond 29 Jul 1947 - 20 Mar 1948 Maurice Marie Auguste Michaudel (b. 1901 - d. 1975) (interim)20 Mar 1948 - 8 Aug 1949 Alfred Gabriel Joseph Valmary (b. 1901 - d. 1970) (interim) 8 Aug 1949 - 27 Apr 1953 Robert Louis Aimable Régnier (b. 1897 - d. 1962)High Commissioner of the French Republic in Laos 27 Apr 1953 - 22 Oct 1953 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (b. 1903 - d. 1979)High Representatives of the French Republic in Laos 22 Oct 1953 - 6 Jan 1954 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (s.a.) 6 Jan 1954 - 4 Mar 1955 Michel Georges Eugène Bréal (b. 1896 - d. 1973) ¹The full style of the ruler was: Samdach Brhat Chao Maha Sri Vitha Lan Xang Hom Khao Luang Prabang Parama Sidha Khattiya Suriya Varman Brhat Maha Sri. Territorial Disputes: Southeast Asian states have enhanced border surveillance to check the spread of avian flu; talks continue on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River; Cambodia and Laos have a longstanding border demarcation dispute; concern among Mekong River Commission members that China's construction of eight dams on the Upper Mekong River and construction of more dams on its tributaries will affect water levels, sediment flows, and fisheries; Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned about Laos' extensive plans for upstream dam construction for the same reasons. Party abbreviations: PPPL = Phak Paxaxôn Pativat Lao (Revolutionary People's Party of Laos, part of mainly Vietnamese Indochinese Communist Party [DCSD] founded 1930 by Ho Chi Minh, a Committee for Laos, known 1950-1955 as Neo Lao Issara [Free Lao Front] which on 22 Mar 1955 became Phak Passason Lao [Lao People's Party] [PPL]; renamed PPPL Feb 1972, dictatorial, communist, only Legal Party since 1975, est.1936); Mil = Military; - Former parties: CDIN = Comité pour la Défense des Interêts Nationaux/Khana Kammakan Pongkan Phongphanyot Haeng Xat (Committee for Defense of National Interests, rightist, anti-communist, military backed, 1958-1965);LI = Lao Issara (Free Lao, nationalist, anti-communist, 1945-1949); NLPK = Lao Pen Kang (Lao Neutralist Front, neutralist, 1961-1975); NPP = Parti National Progressif/Phak Xat Kaona (National Progressive Party, 1950-1958, merged into RLP); PS = Phak Seri (Independent Party, NPP opposition, 1950-1958, merged into RLP);RLP = Rassemblement du Peuple Laotien/Lao Laum Lao (Rally of the Lao People, formed by NPP and IP, 1958-1975); SPK = Santhiphap Pen Kang (Peace Through Neutrality, leftist, 1955-1963) © Ben Cahoon
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	7	https://en.nhandan.vn/party-state-leaders-congratulate-former-lao-leader-on-100th-birthday-post133191.html	en	Party, State leaders congratulate former Lao leader on 100th birthday	https://image-en.nhandan…07/laos-2558.jpg	https://image-en.nhandan…07/laos-2558.jpg	[ "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/w800/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_02_07/laos-2558.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/kdrejwqxj/2024_07_22/1-6542-2222.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/kdrejwqxj/2024_07_22/nguyen-phu-trong-1755-1790.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/kdrejwqxj/2024_07_22/qh-3622-6872.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/kdrejwqxj/2024_07_22/party-general-secretary-nguyen-phu-trong-2-3673-6015.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/tong-bi-thu-nguyen-phu-trong-2172024a1-3496-3026.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/prof-xu-liping-6608-447.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/mexico-2440-4757.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/img-6834-3619-5583.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/chienthang-7048.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/eclyestesfj/2024_07_21/screenshot-2024-07-21-085502-8495-6156.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/xi-jinping-6707-8928.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/pcf-1037-986.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/nguyen-phu-trong-7-9047-6292.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/vna-potal-viet-nam-va-argentina-tang-cuong-quan-he-hop-tac-7491852-2297-4858.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/vna-potal-hiep-dinh-geneva-1954-moc-son-lich-su-mang-y-nghia-thoi-dai-7474180-8102-8569.jpg", "https://image-en.nhandan.vn/350x200/Uploaded/2024/aslxvtxwtys/2024_07_20/russiapartyleader-5157.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-02-07T15:32:09+07:00	Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and President Vo Van Thuong have cabled a message of congratulations to former Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and former President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone on the occasion of his 100th birthday, which falls on February 8.	en	https://static-cms-nhandan.epicdn.me/web-multi/styles/img/favicon.ico	Nhan Dan Online	https://en.nhandan.vn/party-state-leaders-congratulate-former-lao-leader-on-100th-birthday-post133191.html	In the message, they said the Vietnamese Party, State and people highly value Siphandone’s dedication and brainpower, highlighting his important role in the Lao revolutionary cause and in consolidating the great friendship, special solidarity and comprehensive cooperation between the Parties, States and people of Vietnam and Laos. They wished Siphadone and his spouse good health, happiness and longevity to stay alongside the Lao Party and State leaders in steering the nation toward even greater achievements in renovation, national construction and defence; successfully implementing the Resolution of the LPRP’s 11th National Congress, and building a country that is peaceful, independent, democratic, united, and prosperous towards the goal of socialism. "The Vietnamese Party, State and people will work together with the Lao Party, State and people to protect, preserve, and foster the bilateral special solidarity in a practical and effective manner across all fields, bringing benefits to the people of both countries and contributing to maintaining peace in the region and the world," the message read.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	51	https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/resources/reports/2010/asia/201405/t20140515_5762.html	en	International Department Central Committee of CPC			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	VIENTIANE, Oct. 22 -- Former General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) Central Committee and Laotian President Khamtai Siphandone met with senior Communist Party of China (CPC) official Liu Yunshan in Champasak Province of Laos on Friday, according to a press release of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee issued here. Liu, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, is on a friendly visit to Laos. During the meeting, Liu said China and Laos have boasted political mutual trust and mutual-beneficial economic cooperation in the past nearly five decades. Liu said China treasures the traditional friendship with the Lao party, government and people, and would like to continue to deepen exchanges and cooperation with Laos in politics, economy, culture and other sectors. China is willing to join hands with Laos to advance bilateral comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership, said Liu. Khamtai said the friendly cooperative relations between Laos and China, forged by generation of leaders of the two countries, have been deepened in the past years. Khamtai said Laos is ready to work together with China to develop multi-faceted cooperation and bring benefits for the two peoples. Enditem
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	53	https://www.economist.com/asia/1999/03/11/gone-for-a-kip	en	Gone for a kip	https://www.economist.co…llback-image.png	https://www.economist.co…llback-image.png	[ "https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=16,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 16w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=32,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 32w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=48,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 48w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=64,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 64w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=96,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 96w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=128,quality=80,format=auto/sites/default/files/19990313issuecov.jpg 128w, 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https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=600,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 600w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=834,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 834w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=960,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 960w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1096,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 1096w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1280,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 1280w, https://www.economist.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1424,quality=80,format=auto/media-assets/image/20240720_ASP501.jpg 1424w" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "The Economist" ]	1999-03-11T00:00:00	Asia	en	/favicon.ico	The Economist	https://www.economist.com/asia/1999/03/11/gone-for-a-kip	INFLATION is running at about 100% a year. The currency has fallen by over 80% against the dollar since June 1997, tumbling even more than the Indonesian rupiah. The banks are broke and the government appears to have no policy. But no one is rioting in the streets. Perhaps it could only happen in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. But the reputation of the 4.5m Laotians for imperturbable serenity is being sorely put to the test. In January, the currency, which is not freely convertible, began its latest collapse. The black market was offering about 4,500 kip to the dollar two months ago; today the rate is about 6,300. Van Athith, an official newspaper, has reported “uncontrolled inflation” in Vientiane's produce markets. Why? The balance-of-payments deficit is growing, exports are falling and foreign investment is drying up. Government revenues have also been hit by a poorly handled tax reform. The central bank and the government seem at a loss to know what to do. The official exchange rate, which had previously followed the black market rate down, is now stuck at about 4,200.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	32	https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/search/site/1977%3Fpage%3D1435	en	CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)			[ "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Glyph-FOIA.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Menu-Close-NoBorder.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/IG.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fb.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Tw.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Li.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/YT.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fl.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/favicon.ico		null	Did you mean 1967?page=1430 Check if your spelling is correct, or try removing filters. Remove quotes around phrases to match each word individually: "blue drop" will match less than blue drop. You can require or exclude terms using + and -: big +blue drop will require a match on blue while big blue -drop will exclude results that contain drop.
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"https://bloximages.chicago2.vip.townnews.com/thestar.com/content/tncms/live/libraries/flex/components/torstar_core/resources/images/icons/google-play.svg?_dc=1720706592" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Oakland Ross", "Oakland Ross Feature" ]	2011-09-16T17:02:00-04:00	For an ousted tyrant, life can be grim. But execution is usually not in the cards. In fact, some former despots have done pretty darned well.	en	https://www.thestar.com/content/tncms/site/icon.ico	Toronto Star	https://www.thestar.com/news/insight/the-dictator-dilemma-what-happens-to-deposed-despots/article_39d26fba-67ec-5efd-b5ed-bc3f2cc0c09a.html
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	93	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCuEs4hab34t9HDpU6lvaRCw	en	Khamtai Siphandon	https://yt3.googleusercontent.com/pxccqGQRdfKcVw_CRES5NUrk9YGvB7612c6r84xDd3_sY8aQNIUd00PSWzxanB4La4FWu-Svpw=s900-c-k-c0x00ffffff-no-rj	https://yt3.googleusercontent.com/pxccqGQRdfKcVw_CRES5NUrk9YGvB7612c6r84xDd3_sY8aQNIUd00PSWzxanB4La4FWu-Svpw=s900-c-k-c0x00ffffff-no-rj	[]	[]	[]	[ "Video", "teilen", "Kamerahandy", "Videohandy", "kostenlos", "hochladen" ]	null	[]	null	My birthday - 8 February 1924My age - 98Subscribe i reach100:200:300:400:500:600:700:800:900:1000:My date i will became on august 2022:Khamtai Siphadon (18 A...	de	https://www.youtube.com/s/desktop/060ac52e/img/favicon.ico	YouTube	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCuEs4hab34t9HDpU6lvaRCw
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	85	https://twitter.com/NotMountainChen/status/1755596442268569798	en	x.com			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			https://abs.twimg.com/re…ios.77d25eba.png	X (formerly Twitter)	null
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	73	https://dokumen.pub/aseans-half-century-a-political-history-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-9781442272538-9781442272514.html	en	ASEAN's half century: a political history of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations / 9781442272538, 9781442272514	https://dokumen.pub/img/…781442272514.jpg	https://dokumen.pub/img/…781442272514.jpg	[ "https://dokumen.pub/dokumenpub/assets/img/dokumenpub_logo.png", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/explorations-in-early-southeast-asian-history-the-origins-of-southeast-asian-statecraft-9780472901951-9780891480112-9780472127993.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/flying-the-line-the-first-half-century-of-the-air-line-pilots-association-0960970800-9780960970803-l-8192070.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/flying-the-line-the-first-half-century-of-the-air-line-pilots-association-0960970800-9780960970803.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/southeast-asian-history-a-captivating-guide-to-the-history-of-southeast-asia-thailand-vietnam-bali-and-the-philippines.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/a-half-century-of-conflict-2.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/southeast-asian-tribes-minorities-and-nations-volume-2-9781400887637.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/my-memoirs-half-a-century-of-the-history-of-iraq-and-the-arab-cause-9781626373969.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/the-indian-association-of-alberta-a-history-of-political-action-1nbsped-9780774850216-9780774808767.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/a-brief-history-of-singapore-and-malaysia-multiculturalism-and-prosperity-the-shared-history-of-two-southeast-asian-tigers-0804854203-9780804854207.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/policing-canadas-century-a-history-of-canadian-association-of-chiefs-of-police-9781487578480.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/img/200x200/aseans-half-century-a-political-history-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-9781442272538-9781442272514.jpg", "https://dokumen.pub/dokumenpub/assets/img/dokumenpub_logo.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	This authoritative book provides a comprehensive political history of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)...	en	https://dokumen.pub/doku…e-icon-57x57.png	dokumen.pub	https://dokumen.pub/aseans-half-century-a-political-history-of-the-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-9781442272538-9781442272514.html	Table of contents : Acknowledgments ASEAN Community Basic Structure Note on ASEAN Documentation List of Abbreviations Map 1 Introduction to ASEAN: ASEAN’s Fiftieth Birthday 2 The Founding of ASEAN: The Bangkok Declaration 3 ASEAN’s First Reinvention: The 1976 First ASEAN Summit 4 The Third Indochina War: The Situation in Kampuchea 5 The Expansion of ASEAN: From Five to Ten 6 Adapting to Peace: The 1988 Third ASEAN Summit 7 ASEAN’s Second Reinvention: The 1992 Fourth ASEAN Summit 8 ASEAN’s Third Reinvention: The Building Blocks of the ASEAN Community 9 Intra-ASEAN Conflict: Norms versus Behavior 10 ASEAN’s Existential Crisis: The South China Sea Conflict 11 ASEAN’s Vision 2025: A Fourth Reinvention? About the Author Citation preview
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	26	https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Laos.htm	en	Laos			[ "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/laofran.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_1952.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/luangpr.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_vientianekingdom.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/lao_cham.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "ben cahoon" ]	null					null	Luang Phra Bang (Lan Xang) c.1707 - 1893 Map of Luang Phra Bang Capital: Luang Phra Bang (Luang-Prabang 1893-1945) (Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to 1561; Vientiane 1561-1695) Population: N/A .... Müang Xiang Dong Xiang Tong ... - ... Thai occupation. 889 - .... Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1185 - 1191 Under Khmer suzerainty. 1353 Kingdom of Lan Xang Hom Khao 1478 - 1479 Occupied by Vietnam. 1574 - 1603 Burmese vassal. 1575 - 1591 Occupied by Burma. 1707 Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang (officially Lan Xang Hom Khao). Mar 1765 - 1772 Under Burmese suzerainty. 1772 - 1795 Under Thai suzerainty. 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation. 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation. 1795 - 1828 Vassal of Vietnam. 3 Oct 1893 French protectorate; part of French Indochina (see Vietnam). 21 Aug 1941 Wiang Chhan and Xiang Khuang incorporated into Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 25 Aug 1945 Japanese occupation. 8 Apr 1945 Royal proclamation declares end of French protectorate. 25 Aug 1945 French troops liberate Luang Phra Bang. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings 1575 - 1575 Nokeo-Koumane (1st time) (d. 1596) 1575 - 1591 Burmese occupation 1591 - 1596 Nokeo-Koumane (2nd time) (s.a.) 1596 - 1621 Vorouvong Sa II (b. 1585 - d. 1622) 1621 - 1622 Ouphagnauvarath I (b. 1597 - d. 1622) 1623 - 1627 Phothisarath II (b. 1552 - d. 1627) 1627 - 1633 Mom Keo (d. 1633) 1633 - 1637 Ton Khan (Ouphagnauvarath II) (d. 1637) 1637 - 1638 Vickhsai (d. 1638) 1638 - 1690 Sulingvongsa (b. 1618 - d. 1690) 1690 - 1695 Tian Thala (d. 1696) 1695 - 1698 Nan Tharat (d. 1698) 1698 - 1706 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1735) (to 1735 in Wiang Chhan) 1707 - 1713 Kingkitsarath (d. 1713) 1713 - 1723 Ong Kham (d. 1759) (in Chiang Mai 1727-1759) 1723 - 1749 Thao Ang (= Inthason) (d. 1749) 1749 (8 months) Inthaphom (= Intharavongsa) (d. 1776) 1749 - 1768 Sotika-Koumane (b. bf.1734 - d. 1771) 1768 - 1788 Suryavong II (b. 1751? - d. 1791) 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation 3 Feb 1792 - 179. Anurutha (1st time) (b. 1735 - d. 1819) 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation 2 Jun 1794 - 31 Dec 1819 Anurutha (2nd time) (s.a.) 31 Dec 1819 - 7 Mar 1837 Manthaturath (b. 1772 - d. 1837) (regent for Anurutha 1817 - 31 Dec 1819; lives as a monk in Bangkok 1825-26, leaving Luang Phra Bang to be administered by Thai officials) 1825 - 1826 .... -Thai official 1837 - 1838 Unkeo -Regent (d. 1850) 1838 - 23 Sep 1850 Sukha-Söm (b. 1797 - d. 1850) 23 Sep 1850 - 1 Oct 1868 Chantha-Kuman (b. 1799 - d. 1868) 1 Oct 1868 - 15 Dec 1895 Unkham (b. 1811 - d. 1895) 15 Dec 1895 - 25 Mar 1904 Sakkarin (b. 1840 - d. 1904) (regent for Unkham Apr 1888 - 15 Dec 1895) 26 Mar 1904 - 15 Sep 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) (also king of Laos from 12 Oct 1945) 15 May 1946 - 27 Aug 1946 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) Prime minister 21 Aug 1941 - 10 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) Non-party French Vice-consul 1887 - 5 Jun 1894 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (b. 1847 - d. 1925) Commissioner-general (subordinated to the Governor-general of French Indochina) 5 Jun 1894 - Apr 1895 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (s.a.) Commandant-supérieur of Bas-Laos (in Khong, Champasak) 1 Jun 1895 - 30 Apr 1899 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (b. 1852 - d. 1930) Commandant-supérieurs of Haut-Laos (in Luang Prabang) 1 Jun 1895 - 10 Mar 1897 Joseph Vacle (1st time) (interim) (b. 1857 - d. 1907) 10 Mar 1897 - 11 Oct 1898 Louis Paul Luce (interim) (b. 1856 - d. 1931) 11 Oct 1898 - Apr 1899 Joseph Vacle (2nd time) (interim) (s.a.) Resident-supérieurs (subordinated to the Governors-general of French Indochina) Sep 1895 - Mar 1896 Léon Jules Pol Boulloche (b. 1859 - d. 1922) 11 Feb 1899 - 12 Feb 1903 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (s.a.) (acting to 30 Apr 1899) 12 Feb 1903 - 11 May 1906 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (b. 1860 - d. 1926) (1st time) (interim) 11 May 1906 - 1 Apr 1907 Louis Saturnin Édouard Laffont (b. 1853 - d. 1930) (interim) 1 Apr 1907 - 9 Jan 1912 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (s.a.) (2nd time) 24 Aug 1910 - 27 Jul 1911 Antoine Georges Amédeé Ernest (b. 1863 - d. 1941) Outrey (acting for Mahé) 9 Jan 1912 - 4 Jul 1913 Louis Antoine Aubry de la Noë (b. 1862 - d. 1942) (interim) 4 Jul 1913 - 9 Oct 1913 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (b. 1863 - d. 19..) (1st time) (acting) 9 Oct 1913 - Feb 1914 Jean Édouard Bourcier (b. 1870 - d. 1941) Saint-Chaffray (interim) 31 May 1914 - 3 May 1918 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 3 May 1918 - 21 Mar 1931 Jules Georges Théodore Bosc (b. 1871 - d. 1959) 26 Apr 1921 - Jan 1923 Joël Daroussin (interim) (b. 1870 - d. 1951) (acting for Bosc) 7 May 1925 - Jan 1926 Jean-Jacques Dauplay (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 1943) (acting for Bosc) 21 May 1928 - 12 Dec 1928 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (b. 1884 - d. 1931) (interim) (acting for Bosc) 21 Mar 1931 - 12 May 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (1st time) (interim) 25 Mar 1931 Pierre André Michel Pagès (b. 1893 - d. 1980) (did not take office) 12 May 1931 - 4 Jun 1931 Yves Charles Châtel (b. 1865 - d. 1944) 11 Jun 1931 - 21 Nov 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (2nd time) (interim) 21 Nov 1931 - 11 Feb 1932 Jules Nicolas Thiebaut (interim) (b. 1884 - d. 1935) 11 Feb 1932 - 16 Dec 1933 Aristide Eugène Le Fol (b. 1878 - d. 1967) 16 Dec 1933 - 1 Jan 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (b. 1891 - d. 1977) (1st time) (acting) 1 Jan 1934 - 10 Jul 1934 Louis Frédéric Eckert (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 19..) 10 Jul 1934 - 4 Aug 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 4 Aug 1934 - 5 Apr 1938 Eugène Henri Roger Eutrope (b. 1881 - d. 1953) 25 Nov 1934 - 13 Oct 1935 Frédéric Claire Guillaume Louis (b. 1883 - d. 1959) Marty (interim) 5 Apr 1938 - 16 Nov 1940 André Touzet (b. 1883 - d. 1956) 16 Nov 1940 - 29 Dec 1941 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (3rd time) (interim) 29 Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1945 Louis Antoine Marie Brasey (b. 1891 - d. 1957) (Japanese prisoner 10 Mar - 9 Jun 1945)Japanese Commander 38th Division, in Vientiane 10 Mar 1945 - Aug 1945 Masanori Sako Japanese Supreme Counsellor (in Luang Prabang) 5 Apr 1945 - 22 Aug 1945 Kazuo Ishibashi Mil (Japanese 21st Army, 2nd Div. Correspondence Corps) Wiang Chhan (Viang Chan) to 1828 Map of Wiang Chhan Capital: Wiang Chhan (Vientiane 1887-1945) 1707 Kingdom of Wiang Chhan resulting from the split of the Kingdom of Lan Xang. 1778 - 1781 Occupied by Thailand. 1781 - 12 Nov 1828 Vassal of Thailand. 12 Nov 1828 Annexation by Siam (see Thailand). 17 Oct 1887 French colony (Vientiane - French deformation of Wiang Chhan). 1941 Incorporation into Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 27 Aug 1945 Occupied by Japan. Kings 1707 - 1730 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1730) 1730 - 1767 Ong Long (d. 1767) 1767 - 1778 Ong Bun (1st time) (b. 1730 - d. 1781) 1778 - 1780 Phraya Supho -Thai governor (d. 1780) 1780 - Nov 1781 Ong Bun (2nd time) (s.a.) 21 Nov 1781 - Jan 1795 Nanthasen (d. 1795) 2 Feb 1795 - 7 Feb 1805 Intharavong Setthathirath III (b. 17.. - d. 1805) (crowned on 23 Jul 1795) 7 Feb 1805 - 12 Nov 1828 Anuvong (b. 1767 - d. 1829) Champasak (Nakhon Champasak) c.1713 - 27 Aug 1946 Map of Champasak Capital: Pakse [Pakxe] (Champassak [Bassac] 1863-1908; Nakhon Champasak 1791-1863; Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi 1713-1791) 161. Kingdom of Nakhon Kala Champaknaburisi founded. 1713 Name changed to Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi. 1791 Name changed to Nakhon Champasak. 1778 - 19 Sep 1904 Vassal state of Thailand. 1811 - 1813 Thai occupation. 1819 - 1821 Thai occupation. 1851 - 1856 Thai occupation. 1860 - 1863 Thai occupation. 19 Sep 1904 French protectorate. 22 Nov 1904 Principality under French protectorate (Champassak). 9 May 1941 - 17 Nov 1946 Right-bank of Champasak annexed by Thailand. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. 27 Aug 1946 Principality extinguished. Kings 1700 - 1713? Nan Rath 1713 - 1738 Nokasat (b. c.1693 - d. 1738) 1738 - 1791 Saya Kuman (b. 1710 - d. 1791) (regent for Nokasat 1725-38) 1791 Xiang Keo 1791 - 1811 Fai Na (d. 1811) 1811 (3 days) No Muong (d. 1811) 1811 - 1813 Cha Nou (d. 1813) 1813 - 1821 Ma Noi (d. 1821) (fled to Thailand in 1820) 1821 - 1827 Rajabud Yo -Thai governor (d. 1827) 1827 - 1840 Hui (Huy) (b. 1780 - d. 1840) 1840 - 1850 Nak (regent for Hui to 1840) (b. 1774 - d. 1850) 1851 - 1852 Süa -Regent (d. 1852) 1850 - 1853 Buwana -Thai governor (d. 1853) 1853 - 1855 Suriya -Regent (d. 1855) 1856 - 1858 Kham Nhai (b. 1830 - d. 1858) 1858 - 1860 Chu -Regent 1862 - 28 Jul 1900 Kham Suk (b. 1838 - d. 1900) (governor to 1863) 28 Jul 1900 - 22 Nov 1904 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (b. 1874 - d. 1945) Princes 22 Nov 1904 - Nov 1945 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (s.a.) Nov 1945 - 26 Aug 1946 Boun Oum (b. 1912 - d. 1980) Xiang Khuang Map of Xiang Khuang Capital: Xiang Khuang (Xieng Khouang 1893-1946) 698 Müang Maharatanaburirom Phommachakkhati Simahanakkharatakkasela Nakhon Xiang Khuang Rajathani state founded in the Plain of Jars. 889 - 1368 Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1478 - .... Vassal of Vietnam. 1568 - 1598 Vassal of Pegu (Burma). 1772 - 1835 Under Thai suzerainty. 1835 Annexed by Thailand. 18.. Annexed by Vietnam. 1848 Restored as a vassal state of Vietnam. 1851 Sovereignty restored. 1875 Annexed by Thailand. 1876 Sovereignty restored. 1887 Made a vassal state of Thailand. 1888 - 3 Oct 1893 Annexed by Thailand. 3 Oct 1893 Made a French colonial (Muang Phuan) possession as part of Laos. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings (rath, chao xiwit) 1687 - 1688 Chao Kham Lan (d. 1688) 1688 - 1690 Chao Kham Phuttha (d. 1690) 1690 - 1694 Chao Kham Sattha (d. 1694) 1694 Chao Bun Lang Thai (d. 1694) 1694 - 1698 Chao Bun Lot (d. 1698) 1698 - 1712 Chao Kham Bun Khong 1712 - 1714 Phraña Kham Thewo -Regent (d. 1714) (= Phraña Thammatewo) 1714 - 1740 Chao Bun Chan 1740 - 1751 Chao Kham Un Müang 1751 - 1753 Chao Ong Lo (1st time) 1753 (3 months) Chao Ong Bun 1753 - 1779 Chao Ong Lo (2nd time) 1779 - 1781 Chao Ong Si Phom 1781 - 1782 Chao No Müang 1782 - 1802 Chao Som Phu 1802 - 1803 Chao Xiang 1803 - 1831 Chao Suthakasuvannakuman (= Chao Noi) 1831 - 1835 Chao San -Regent 1835 - 1848 Annexed to Thailand, then Vietnam 1848 - 1865 Phra Chao Issarasettha (= Chao Po) 1865 - 1874 Chao Üng 1875 - 1876 Annexed to Thailand 1876 - 1887 Chao Khanti 1887 - 1888 Thao Xiang Phet -Regent 1888 - 1899 Kham Ngon Laos 15 Sep 1945 Unification of Kingdom of Laos proclaimed.22 Oct 1953 Independence. 2 Dec 1975 Lao People's Democratic Republic General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Party (from Feb 1972, Lao People's Revolutionary Party) 22 Mar 1955 - 29 Mar 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (b. 1920 - d. 1992) Presidents of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 29 Mar 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) 25 Nov 1992 - 21 Mar 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (b. 1924) General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 21 Mar 2006 - 22 Jan 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (b. 1936) 22 Jan 2016 - 15 Jan 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (b. 1937) 15 Jan 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (b. 1945) King (Rath)¹ 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) Head of State 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) LI Kings (Rath)¹ 23 Apr 1946 - 29 Oct 1959 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) (king of Luang Phra Bang 15 May - 27 Aug 1946) 28 Nov 1946 - 25 Oct 1949 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) LI (Head of State,in Bangkok exile) 21 Aug 1959 - 2 Dec 1975 Savang Vatthana (b. 1907 - d. 1978?) (regent to 4 Nov 1959) Presidents 3 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Prince Souphanouvong (b. 1912 - d. 1995) PPPL 31 Oct 1986 - 15 Aug 1991 Phoumi Vongvichit (b. 1909 - d. 1994) PPPL (acting for Souphanouvong) 15 Aug 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 25 Nov 1992 - 24 Feb 1998 Nouhak Phoumsavan (b. 1914 - d. 2008) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 8 Jun 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 19 Apr 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (s.a.) PPPL19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL Prime ministers (Sep 1982-14 Aug 1991, Chairmen of the Council of Ministers) 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) Non-party 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phaya Khammao (b. 1911 - d. 1984) LI (chairman of Provisional Government; continues in Bangkok, Thailand exile to 25 Oct 1949) 23 Apr 1946 - 15 Mar 1947 Prince Kindavong (b. 1900 - d. 1951) Non-party 15 Mar 1947 - 25 Mar 1948 Prince Souvannarath (b. 1893 - d. 1960) Non-party 25 Mar 1948 - 24 Feb 1950 Prince Boun Oum (1st time) (b. 1912 - d. 1962) Non-party 24 Feb 1950 - 15 Oct 1951 Phoui Sananikone (1st time) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) PS 21 Nov 1951 - 20 Oct 1954 Prince Souvanna Phouma (1st time) (b. 1901 - d. 1984) NPP 25 Nov 1954 - 21 Mar 1956 Katay Don Sasorith (b. 1904 - d. 1959) NPP 21 Mar 1956 - 17 Aug 1958 Prince Souvanna Phouma (2nd time) (s.a.) NPP 17 Aug 1958 - 31 Dec 1959 Phoui Sananikone (2nd time) (s.a.) RPL 31 Dec 1959 - 7 Jan 1960 Sounthone Pathammavong (b. 1911 - d. 1985) Mil/CDIN (Army Chief of Staff) 7 Jan 1960 - 3 Jun 1960 Kou Abhay (b. 1892 - d. 1964) Non-party 3 Jun 1960 - 15 Aug 1960 Prince Somsanith (b. 1913 - d. 1975) CDIN 30 Aug 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Prince Souvanna Phouma (3rd time) (s.a.) RLP (from 10 Dec 1960, in Cambodia exile and at Ban Khangkhai, recognized by the Communist states to 31 Dec 1961) 11 Dec 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Quinim Pholsena (not recognized) (b. 1915 - d. 1963) SPK 13 Dec 1960 - 23 Jun 1962 Prince Boun Oum (2nd time) (s.a.) Non-party 23 Jun 1962 - 2 Dec 1975 Prince Souvanna Phouma (4th time) (s.a.) NLPK 8 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 15 Aug 1991 - 24 Feb 1998 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 27 Mar 2001 Sisavath Keobounphanh (b. 1928 - d. 2020) PPPL 27 Mar 2001 - 8 Jun 2006 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 23 Dec 2010 Bouasone Bouphavanh (b. 1954) PPPL 23 Dec 2010 - 19 Apr 2016 Thongsing Thammavong (b. 1944) PPPL 19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - 30 Dec 2022 Phankham Viphavanh (b. 1951) PPPL 30 Dec 2022 - Sonexay Siphandone (b. 1966) PPPL Commander of the Chinese (Nationalist) 93rd Division 23 Sep 1945 - Mar 1946 Lu Guoquan (Lu Kuo-ch'üan) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) (= Zheng Chong) French Commissioners of the French Republic in Laos (subordinated to the High Commissioners of France in Indochina) 29 Aug 1945 - 6 Apr 1946 Hans Imfeld (acting to 23 Sep 1945)(b. 1902 - d. 1947) 6 Apr 1946 - 29 Jul 1947 Jean Léon François Marie de (b. 1907 - d. 1951) Raymond 29 Jul 1947 - 20 Mar 1948 Maurice Marie Auguste Michaudel (b. 1901 - d. 1975) (interim)20 Mar 1948 - 8 Aug 1949 Alfred Gabriel Joseph Valmary (b. 1901 - d. 1970) (interim) 8 Aug 1949 - 27 Apr 1953 Robert Louis Aimable Régnier (b. 1897 - d. 1962)High Commissioner of the French Republic in Laos 27 Apr 1953 - 22 Oct 1953 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (b. 1903 - d. 1979)High Representatives of the French Republic in Laos 22 Oct 1953 - 6 Jan 1954 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (s.a.) 6 Jan 1954 - 4 Mar 1955 Michel Georges Eugène Bréal (b. 1896 - d. 1973) ¹The full style of the ruler was: Samdach Brhat Chao Maha Sri Vitha Lan Xang Hom Khao Luang Prabang Parama Sidha Khattiya Suriya Varman Brhat Maha Sri. Territorial Disputes: Southeast Asian states have enhanced border surveillance to check the spread of avian flu; talks continue on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River; Cambodia and Laos have a longstanding border demarcation dispute; concern among Mekong River Commission members that China's construction of eight dams on the Upper Mekong River and construction of more dams on its tributaries will affect water levels, sediment flows, and fisheries; Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned about Laos' extensive plans for upstream dam construction for the same reasons. Party abbreviations: PPPL = Phak Paxaxôn Pativat Lao (Revolutionary People's Party of Laos, part of mainly Vietnamese Indochinese Communist Party [DCSD] founded 1930 by Ho Chi Minh, a Committee for Laos, known 1950-1955 as Neo Lao Issara [Free Lao Front] which on 22 Mar 1955 became Phak Passason Lao [Lao People's Party] [PPL]; renamed PPPL Feb 1972, dictatorial, communist, only Legal Party since 1975, est.1936); Mil = Military; - Former parties: CDIN = Comité pour la Défense des Interêts Nationaux/Khana Kammakan Pongkan Phongphanyot Haeng Xat (Committee for Defense of National Interests, rightist, anti-communist, military backed, 1958-1965);LI = Lao Issara (Free Lao, nationalist, anti-communist, 1945-1949); NLPK = Lao Pen Kang (Lao Neutralist Front, neutralist, 1961-1975); NPP = Parti National Progressif/Phak Xat Kaona (National Progressive Party, 1950-1958, merged into RLP); PS = Phak Seri (Independent Party, NPP opposition, 1950-1958, merged into RLP);RLP = Rassemblement du Peuple Laotien/Lao Laum Lao (Rally of the Lao People, formed by NPP and IP, 1958-1975); SPK = Santhiphap Pen Kang (Peace Through Neutrality, leftist, 1955-1963) © Ben Cahoon
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	13	https://www.britannica.com/place/Laos/The-Lao-Peoples-Democratic-Republic	en	Laos - Landlocked, Mekong, Plateau	https://cdn.britannica.c…AA/Flag-Laos.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…AA/Flag-Laos.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-004-D7D8C514/Flag-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/42/4042-004-7619C005/Laos-map-boundaries-cities-locator.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/91/84891-004-EBCF18D7/Wat-Aham-Louangphrabang-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/85/183685-004-D3B20B54/World-Data-Locator-Map-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/01/145301-004-982A07FE/Bolovens-Plateau-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/05/14305-004-E2CA8BC2/Laos-map-features-locator.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/52/96052-004-18359A7C/monks-Buddhist-temple-Pha-That-Luang-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/25/184425-049-491EBF68/World-Data-pie-chart-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/60/128060-004-B53FD28F/Population-density-Laos.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel-resources/3-121/images/shared/default3.png?v=3.121.12", "https://cdn.britannica.com/40/129640-131-0EB20858/Flags-countries-world-flags-Country-blog-geography-2009.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/95/168695-131-11055CC5/Geography-Something-globe-Europe-Eurasia-Africa.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/91/142291-131-1FF39F2D/Flags-world-blue-sky-Countries-Globalization-relations-2010.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/64/244164-131-C5EE8DAB/nation-flags-world-map.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/38/247338-131-37776892/passport-visas-stamps-world-map.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/45/189145-131-45FF672E/Secret-Service-Agent-Earpiece.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/152568-131-E6B869A4/King-cobra-world-snake.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/85/203585-131-D4FEE60A/Solar-Eclipse-Flare-Astronomy-Outer-Space.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/43/148643-131-2B2237A6/example-landscape-Irish-Ireland-Sligo.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/92/125692-131-43C78F64/Charles-Pete-Conrad-Apollo-12-surface-flag-Nov-19-1969.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/220368-131-C835E48E/United-States-electoral-college-votes-by-state.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/38/114738-131-1EC2D535/assassination-Pres-John-Wilkes-Booth-Abraham-Lincoln-April-14-1865.jpg?w=200&h=200&c=crop", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-050-2707C4AA/Flag-Laos.jpg?w=220&h=150", "https://cdn.britannica.com/29/4029-050-2707C4AA/Flag-Laos.jpg?w=320&h=220" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Joseph J. Zasloff", "Arthur J. Dommen" ]	1999-07-26T00:00:00+00:00	Laos - Landlocked, Mekong, Plateau: The politics of the newly established republic were guided by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP; called the Lao People’s Party until 1972), the communist party of Laos. Its Politburo was dominated by a small cohesive band of revolutionaries who had founded the party in 1955 and had engaged in persistent revolutionary activity until their takeover in 1975. These leaders had a long and intimate relationship with their Vietnamese communist allies. Prior to founding the party, they had been members of the Indochina Communist Party. Most spoke Vietnamese, and some had family ties with Vietnam. The party’s general secretary, Kaysone	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/place/Laos/The-Lao-Peoples-Democratic-Republic	The politics of the newly established republic were guided by the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP; called the Lao People’s Party until 1972), the communist party of Laos. Its Politburo was dominated by a small cohesive band of revolutionaries who had founded the party in 1955 and had engaged in persistent revolutionary activity until their takeover in 1975. These leaders had a long and intimate relationship with their Vietnamese communist allies. Prior to founding the party, they had been members of the Indochina Communist Party. Most spoke Vietnamese, and some had family ties with Vietnam. The party’s general secretary, Kaysone Phomvihan, had a Vietnamese father; second-ranked Nouhak Phoumsavan and third-ranked Prince Souphanouvong had Vietnamese wives. Their worldview had been shaped by their shared revolutionary struggle with Vietnam. Moreover, the Vietnamese had numerous channels—party, military, and economic—through which they directly conveyed their influence. Thus, the new state was intimately linked to Vietnam and closely followed that country’s policy line until the late 1980s. In the early years of the LPDR, the leadership declared its twin economic goals to be “socialist transformation with socialist construction.” Following the Vietnamese communist model, the party leaders attempted to create agricultural collectives in the countryside and to nationalize the limited industry and commerce in the towns. Former members of the Royal Lao Army and of the deposed government—perhaps as many as 30,000—were incarcerated in “reeducation” camps. These and other repressive political measures and the grim economic conditions in Laos compelled some 10 percent of the country’s population to flee across the Mekong River to Thailand after 1975. As LPRP leaders consolidated their revolutionary victory by the end of the 1970s, they implemented limited policies of economic and social liberalization. In 1986 they inaugurated a major reform called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which followed the introduction of perestroika (“restructuring”), a similar economic reform program in the Soviet Union. The NEM introduced market incentives and began decentralizing government economic enterprise. With the collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union itself in the late 1980s and early ’90s and the implementation of economic reforms under the doi moi (“renovation”) initiative in Vietnam, Laos moved more rapidly to open its economy. Private investment and joint ventures were encouraged, and, to the relief of Lao peasants, attempts at collectivizing agriculture were abandoned in favour of family-operated farms. The ruling party retained unchallenged control, curbing any attempts at organized opposition. Nevertheless, there was some enlargement of political freedom and participation. A new constitution was promulgated in 1991. Citizens were permitted to move about their country more freely and even to cross the Mekong to Thailand with fewer impediments. Kaysone was elevated to heroic status following his death in 1992. Nouhak succeeded Kaysone as paramount leader, serving as president until forced by illness to resign in 1998; Gen. Khamtai Siphandon, a veteran revolutionary and (from 1991) prime minister, then moved from the premiership to the presidency. Although Khamtai oversaw further economic liberalization, he resisted political reforms. The LPRP continued to control the National Assembly, allowing few independents to contest elections. At the same time, the exiled Laotian royal family began to assume a higher profile, calling for a referendum to reestablish the monarchy; though the government generally stifled any dissent and threat to its rule, it took a measured response, particularly because of a growing reverence among ordinary Laotians for the Thai king. By the mid-1990s Laos was experiencing significant economic growth, with per capita GNP rising gradually—if from a very low base. The country had replaced aid from the Soviet Union with more substantial assistance from Japan, western Europe, Australia, and other bilateral donors, as well as from international organizations (including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). In addition, neighbouring Thailand became by far the largest source of foreign investment. In 1994 a bridge opened between Thailand and Laos across the Mekong River at Vientiane, paving the way for greater trade between the two countries and symbolizing a political realignment for Laos away from its colonial and Cold War ally Vietnam; a second bridge across the Mekong between the two countries, farther downstream, officially opened in 2006. To diversify the economy, which depended heavily on the export of electricity (in addition to financial aid), the government began to open up Laos to visitors by developing tourism. Despite adopting such economic reforms, however, Laos continued to wrestle with underdeveloped fiscal and planning organizations, a weak central bank, and fragile financial institutions. In 1997 the country realized its longtime goal of becoming a full member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). However, its economy was subsequently damaged by the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. The kip (the Lao currency), closely linked to the Thai baht, plummeted in value by more than 75 percent, and inflation soared. Business investment, primarily from Thailand and Malaysia, declined, and Laos’s exports to its neighbours diminished. Although the Thai and Malaysian economies recovered in the early 21st century, Laos’s economic growth remained slow-paced. Joseph J. Zasloff As the new century advanced, however, the Laotian economy accelerated, benefitting from increased foreign direct investment from a long list of countries (Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, France, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, India, and Russia), especially in the natural resource and industry sectors. The largest boost to the economy came from construction of a number of large hydropower dams and expanding mining activities. The impact of these projects was enormous. Without these large hydropower and mining projects, Laos’s GDP growth rate would have averaged nearly two points lower between 2003 and 2006. By 2005 GDP growth in Laos had exceeded 7 percent, a level it would maintain or improve upon for the next decade. Since the beginning of the century, the Laotian government had pursued a modernization of the country’s rural economy through land concessions that brought about the lease of vast areas of cultivable land to foreign investors for the commercial production of crops (notably rubber, sugarcane, cassava, and eucalyptus). Though such concessions officially involved long-term leases of state land to investors, they often covered village lands, owing to poorly defined and enforced regulations governing land rights. Mounting incidents of land disputes between farmers and foreign investors, however, prompted the government to announce moratoriums on new land concessions on more than one occasion during the first two decades of the millennium. The LPRP continued in the early 21st century to rely on leaders who had participated in the revolution prior to 1975, even as the ranks of those senior officials were increasingly depleted by old age and illness. By 2000 most members of the Politburo, largely former military officers, were already over age 70, and, as of the 10th Congress of the LPRP, in January 2016, that largely septuagenarian revolutionary generation continued to hold power, as the ruling party chose Vice Pres. Bounnhang Vorachith, age 78, to replace Choummaly Sayasone, age 79, as general secretary. In April the National Assembly then elected Bounnhang to succeed Choummaly as president and Foreign Minister Thongloun Sisoulith to take over as prime minister from Thongsing Thammavong. Choummaly had served as general secretary and president since 2006, and Thongsing had been prime minister since 2010. Laos’s foreign policy has undergone significant alteration since the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communist regimes in eastern Europe, but important continuities remained. The government retained its official commitment to Marxism and Leninism and expressed fraternity with its two communist neighbours, Vietnam and China, both of which continued to exert substantial political and economic influence on Laos. At the same time, Laos expanded its economic reliance on the industrialized West and on Japan and continued its formal association with the Francophone community of countries. However, the number of Laotians who speak French has been diminishing rapidly as the older generation—whose elite were educated in French—passes from the scene and English becomes the country’s second language. Many in the old guard of the LPRP and National Assembly continued to support closer relations with Vietnam while younger members steered more toward China, and proponents of greater economic and political reform looked toward Thailand and the West. Joseph J. Zasloff
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correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	4	https://pantheon.world/profile/person/Khamtai_Siphandon	en	Khamtai Siphandon Biography	https://pantheon.world/api/screenshot/person?id=392446	https://pantheon.world/api/screenshot/person?id=392446	[ "https://pantheon.world/images/icons/icon-nav.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/logos/logo_pantheon.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/icons/icon-search.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/392446.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/profile-w.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-left-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/221594.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/5875489.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/30863161.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/838215.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/2311415.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/1230413.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/392446.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/1194302.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/2569372.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/746776.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/1243159.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/15127815.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/607367.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-right-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-left-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/73695.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/605843.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/5043162.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/1658891.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/166278.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/475055.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/392446.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/1195679.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/80140.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/155964.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/585148.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/206714.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/25563189.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-right-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-left-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/394983.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/4469239.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203890.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203729.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203675.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203724.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/392446.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/20646086.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203693.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203702.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/16305897.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203717.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203695.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-right-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-left-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/394983.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/4469239.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203890.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203729.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203675.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203724.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/392446.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/20646086.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203693.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203702.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203717.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/203695.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/profile/people/10264680.jpg", "https://pantheon.world/images/ui/tri-right-b.svg", "https://pantheon.world/_next/image?url=%2Fimages%2Flogos%2Flogo_datawheel.png&w=256&q=75 1x, /_next/image?url=%2Fimages%2Flogos%2Flogo_datawheel.png&w=640&q=75 2x", "https://pantheon.world/images/logos/logo_CL.svg", "https://pantheon.world/_next/image?url=%2Fimages%2Flogos%2Flogo_creative_commons.png&w=96&q=75 1x, /_next/image?url=%2Fimages%2Flogos%2Flogo_creative_commons.png&w=256&q=75 2x", "https://pantheon.world/images/logos/logo_facebook.svg", "https://pantheon.world/images/logos/logo_twitter.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	/images/favicon.ico		null	Khamtai Siphandon General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924) is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone . Read more on Wikipedia
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	84	https://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Laos/sub5_3d/entry-2973.html	en	LEADERS, LEGISLATURE, ELECTIONS, BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION IN LAOS	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	https://factsanddetails.…ouch-icon/fb.png	[ "https://factsanddetails.com/themes/fad@site2020/images/logo.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Jeffrey Hays" ]	null		en	https://factsanddetails.…uch-icon_114.png		null	HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT IN LAOS The most powerful position is the head of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Power is concentrated in the party. In most cases the leader of the party is the President. The President is the leader of the country and also head of the armed forced. He is technically chosen by the National Assembly but in truth is the most powerful member of the Politburo, which is selected through a mysterious process by Laos’s communist party . He has the power to rule by decree. Laos also has a Prime Minister. He is appointed by the President and is in charge of the running the government administration along with the Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Chairman of Committees (the equivalent of Ministries). Cabinet ministers are appointed by president and approved by National Assembly. Executive branch: chief of state: President Lt. Gen. Choummali Saignason (since 8 June 2006); Vice President Bounn-Gnang Volachit (since 8 June 2006). Head of government: Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong (since 24 December 2010); First Deputy Prime Minister Maj. Gen. Asang Laoli (since May 2002), Deputy Prime Ministers Maj. Gen. Douangchai Phichit (since 8 June 2006), Somsavat Lengsavat (since 26 February 1998), and Thongloun Sisoulit (since 27 March 2001). [Source: CIA World Factbook] The president of the country is elected by a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly for a term of five years. One surprising constitutional provision transforms the presidency from a ceremonial position into an important political power. The president appoints and can dismiss the prime minister and members of the government, with the approval of the National Assembly — parliamentary responsibility that has not yet occurred in the short life of the current constitutional regime. He also presides over meetings of the government, "when necessary," and appoints and dismisses provincial governors and mayors of municipalities as well as generals of the armed forces, upon the recommendation of the prime minister. In addition, the president receives and appoints ambassadors and declares states of emergency or war. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] The powers accorded to the president grew perceptively during the drafting process of the constitution, but the sudden death of Kaysone, who had moved from prime minister to state president after the promulgation of the constitution, temporarily introduced doubts regarding the relative power potential of the two offices. Nonetheless, the president of state heads the armed forces and has the right and duty to promulgate laws and issue decrees and state acts. The primary organization for administration is the government, which consists of the prime minister — its head — and deputy prime ministers, ministers, and chairs of ministry-equivalent state committees. The prime minister, appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly, serves a five-year term. Duties of this office include the guidance and supervision of the work of government ministries and committees, as well as of the governors of provinces and mayors of municipalities. The prime minister appoints all the deputies at these levels of government, as well as the local district chiefs. * Politburo and Central Committee Laos is ruled by 11-member Politburo (Political Bureau), which operates in secret and is accountable to no one and does not make public any of its policy decisions. The members of the Laos Politburo are widely regarded as corrupt, inept and unable to make decisions. They are technically supposed to be chosen by the Central Committee but in reality are selected through a process known only to them directed primarily from the top. Other important bodies include the 61-member Central Executive Committee (or Central Committee) and the Council of Ministers (comprised of more than a dozen ministry heads) of the Laotian People’s Revolutionary Party. Since the elimination of the Secretariat in 1991, the Central Committee is the second highest body in the party hierarchy after the Politburo and made up of party elite who fill key political positions throughout the country. The Central Committee is charged with leading the party between congresses. In addition to members of the Politburo and former members of the Secretariat, the committee includes key government ministers, leading generals of the army, secretaries of provincial party committees, and chairpersons of mass organizations. * Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn from the Central Committee. A small group of men — seven in 1972 and eleven by 1993 — have provided the critical leadership of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary veterans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secretary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of common experience, appears to have developed. In addition to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise additional political power — perhaps even more than in most other communist systems — through important posts within the governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo members also held seats on the Secretariat. Many top members and leaders in the Laotian People’s Revolutionary Party are in their 70s and 80s. As of 2000, the youngest member of the eight-member Politburo was 69. Vietnam’s influence in Laos remains strong primary based on the ties of these old timers and their mentors in Vietnam. National Assembly: the Legislature of Laos Legislative branch: unicameral National Assembly (132 seats; members elected by popular vote from a list of candidates selected by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party to serve five-year terms). elections: last held on 30 April 2011 (next to be held in 2016)election results: percent of vote by party - NA; seats by party - LPRP 128, independents 4. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The National Assembly was formerly named the Supreme People’s Assembly. It had 107 members in the mid 2000s. Before 2002 it had 99 members. All but maybe one or two deputies are members of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. The Lao assembly debates very little and serves more as a rubber stamp for decisions made by the powerful 11-member politburo, propped up by a highly cohesive 61-member central committee, modelled largely on neighbouring Vietnam, its biggest political ally, which in turn is modeled on the assembly in the former Soviet Union. Laos’s National Assembly has its own Standing Committee, which is lead by a Chairman and Vice-Chairman. It convenes in ordinary sessions twice a year. Its main purpose is to rubber stamp policy made by the politburo. According to Martin Stuart Fox, a professor of history at the University of Queensland: “The National Assembly is just a rubber stamp and will continue to be one as long as Laos is a single-party authoritarian state", "Everything it decides on has already been determined by the party hierarchy ... What is debated is again determined by the party.’’ Although basically a rubber-stamp institution, the National Assembly representatives have become more critical on social and economic issues.” Although basically a rubber-stamp institution, the National Assembly representatives have become more critical on social and economic issues. According to the Voice of America: “On paper it is a body of lawmakers chosen by and for the people. But analysts say in reality, the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, a communist party, selects the candidates, who serve at its convenience. Stuart-Fox says the role of the National Assembly is to lend the party a pretense of democratic legitimacy. He says its duties are supposed to include passing laws and choosing government leaders. [Source: Voice of America, April 28, 2011] Official Duties of the National Assembly of Laos The national assembly passes votes on most laws and is be tasked with choosing a president and approving his choice of prime minister. The National Assembly, the country's supreme legislative body, is to be elected every five years. Significantly, this designation was used in RLG and French colonial times, before the introduction of the title "Supreme People's Assembly" in late 1975. It is located in a new building, far larger than the previous structure built in colonial times, and contains an auditorium seating 800 persons. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] The National Assembly makes decisions on fundamental issues and oversees administrative and judicial organs. Its most significant powers include electing and removing the president of state, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and the prosecutor general, "on the recommendation of the National Assembly Standing Committee." Its prestige has been further enhanced by the constitutional mandate to "make decisions on the fundamental issues of the country" and to "elect or remove the President of state and the Vice President of state", by a two-thirds vote, and to approve the removal of members of the government on the recommendation of the president of state. Its powers encompass amending the constitution, determining taxes, approving the state budget, endorsing or abrogating laws, and electing or removing the two top judicial figures in the system. Members of the National Assembly have the "right to interpellate the members of the government." The National Assembly also ratifies treaties and decides questions of war and peace. These powers may prove to be limited, however, by a provision in the constitution that the National Assembly will generally meet in ordinary session only twice a year. The Standing Committee meeting in the interim may convene an extraordinary session if it deems necessary. The constitution does not specify the number of members in the National Assembly, whose candidates are screened by the LPRP. The 1989 election placed seventy-nine members in this body, representing districts of between 40,000 and 50,000 persons each. The election campaign lasted two months, and candidates appeared before voters at night in local schools or pagodas. Voting consisted of crossing out unfavored candidates, and every ballot contained at least two candidates. The number of party members elected by this process was officially placed at sixty-five. * Between sessions, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, consisting of the president and the vice president elected by the National Assembly and an unspecified number of other members, prepares for future sessions and "supervise[s] and oversee[s] the activities of the administrative and judicial organizations." It is empowered to appoint or remove the vice president of the Supreme People's Court and judges at all levels of the lower courts. Its supervisory role can be reinforced by National Assembly committees established to consider draft laws and decrees and to help in the supervision and administration of the courts. The special National Assembly Law passed March 25, 1993, specifies five substantive areas for National Assembly committees: secretarial; law; economic planning and finances; cultural, social, and nationalities; and foreign affairs. The membership of the committees includes not only National Assembly members but also chiefs and deputy chiefs, who "guide the work," and technical cadres. * Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party In March 2011, Amelie Bottolier-Depois of AFP wrote: “The ruling communist party of Laos opened its five-yearly congress, an event analysts say will see a power struggle between rival pro-Vietnam and China camps. Red banners are on display throughout the capital Vientiane, where 576 delegates of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) are gathered until March 21 to choose members of the ruling Politburo, according to state media. Representing more than 191,700 party members, delegates are to decide who will take the key post of general secretary, currently occupied by 75-year-old Choummaly Sayasone, who is expected to stay in the job. [Source: Amelie Bottolier-Depois, AFP, March 17, 2011] The congress — described by the Vientiane Times as "the most significant event in the country's political life" — is the traditional venue for the redistribution of powers. But in a surprise move in December, Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh quit to be replaced by National Assembly president Thongsing Thammavon. Analysts say his appointment points to a realignment of power in favour of the party's pro-Vietnamese factions and those wary of major Chinese investments pouring into the country. "Some people saw in this a victory for the pro-Vietnamese over pro-Chinese members," said one foreign observer, who declined to be named. The reshuffle allowed the party — which has ruled since 1975 — to maintain strong ties with Vietnam's communists, according to Martin Stuart-Fox, a Laos expert at Australia's University of Queensland. "Political ties between Laos and Vietnam have always been strong, and Thongsing as a good Party man has been closer to Vietnam than Bouasone was," he said. According to Laos government: On March 17, 2011, the 9th National Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) convened at the Meeting room of the Party Central Committee Office, kilometer 6 in Vientiane with the participation of 576 delegates representing more than 191,700 party members nationwide. The congress took place under the theme:"Enhancing cohesive solidarity of the Lao nation and unity within the Party, upholding the leadership role and capacity of the Party, Devising breakthrough approach for the implementation of the renovation policy, Creating solid basis for lifting our nation from underdevelopment by 2020, and Advancing further towards Socialism destination". [Source: The National Assembly of the Lao PDR, 2011] Former Party General Secretary Khamtay Siphandone and the state and government leaders as well as members of the diplomatic corps and some international organizations also attended the opening session of the congress. In his opening speech, Politburo member and Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong expressed limitless gratitude and respectful commemoration to late beloved President Kaysone Phomvihane who found the Lao People's Army, Lao People's Revolutionary Party, a new regime and starting the principle based renovation policy in the Lao PDR. Comrade Thongsing Thammavong noted that the Congress took place at an important time, when the country received a great number of achievements in the cause of national defence and construction made in the past 35 years. Party General Secretary Choummaly Sayasone presented the VIII Party Central Committee's report at the opening session, while Mr. Somsavat Lengsavad, Politburo member and head of the Secretariat for the IX Party Congress presented the Seventh five year socio-economic development plan ( 2011-2015). The five day congress will consider and approve the political report of the VIII Party Central Committee to the IX Party Congress, the Seventh five year socio-economic development plan ( 2011-2015), and the amended rule of the Party. The Party Congress will make comments to the leadership review report of the VIII Party Central Committee and then there will be the election of the IX Party Central Committee. The representatives from line central and local Party Committees as well as role -model sectors will present their report, make inputs to different documents of the Party Congress. AFP reported: “The gathering choose members of the ruling Politburo as well as decided who will lead the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in the post of general secretary, Khenthong Nuanthasing told AFP. Choummaly Sayasone currently holds the joint position of party chief and president, making him the most powerful figure in the one-party state. He is eligible for another term. The Congress follows the surprise resignation in December of Prime Minister Bouasone Bouphavanh, who was replaced by Thongsing Thammavong, 66-year-old president of the communist-dominated National Assembly. [Source: AFP, February 21, 2011 -] “At the party's last meeting in 2006, almost 500 delegates gathered to represent about 150,000 party members. They selected an 11-member Politburo and 55 members of the Central Committee, another key leadership body. Legislators for the communist-dominated National Assembly are to be elected by the public on April 30, after which a new government will be formed.” -\ Elections in Laos Elections in Laos for the National Assembly (NA) are held every five years. The last one was held on April 30, 2011. Seats by party : Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP): 128, independents 4. The next is to be held in 2016. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The election in 2002, was one year earlier than had originally been planned. In the election in February 2002, there were some new better-educated faces, including more women, few significant resulted from the election. Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal. According to the constitution those over 18 can vote and those over 21 can run for office. The president and vice president are elected by National Assembly for five-year terms. The prime minister nominated by the president and elected by the National Assembly for five-year term. Recent National Assembly election results: Choummali Saignason elected president; Boun -Gnang Volachit elected vice president. The percent of National Assembly vote for these elections is not available. [Source: CIA World Factbook] The law provides for a representative national assembly, elected every five years in open, multiple-candidate, fairly tabulated elections, with voting by secret ballot and universal adult suffrage. However, the constitution legitimizes only the LPRP; all other political parties are outlawed. Election committees, appointed by the NA, must approve all candidates for local and national elections. Candidates do not need to be LPRP members, but in practice almost all were. The most recent NA election, held in 2006, was conducted under this system. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] The NA chooses members of the Standing Committee, generally based on the previous Standing Committee's recommendations. Upon such recommendations, the NA elects or removes the president and vice president. The Standing Committee has the mandate to supervise all administrative and judicial organizations and the sole power to recommend presidential decrees. It also appoints the National Election Committee, which has powers over elections, including approval of candidates. Activities of the Standing Committee were not fully transparent. The NA, upon the president's recommendation, formally elects the prime minister and other government ministers.^^ Laotian Parliamentary Election in 2011 In late April 2011, Laos held elections for its national assembly today. Reuters reported: The five-yearly poll offered citizens a rare say in the running of one of Asia’s most secretive and tightly controlled countries but struggled to generate much excitement among Laos’s people, most of whom see the election as a formality, with candidates hand-picked and vetted by the only legal political party in what is one of the world’s last remaining socialist states. But there are some subtle changes this time that the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) says reflects the country’s diversity and offers greater representation to ethnic groups, women and rural communities, which constitute 70 per cent of the population. [Source: Reuters, April 30, 2011] “Because of its poor infrastructure, Laos will transport ballot boxes by air from five far-flung provinces inaccessible by road to speed up the vote count. An estimated 2.5 million eligible voters have a chance to elect 132 representatives from among the 190 candidates vying to become assembly members and “approve the fundamental issues of the nation”, according to state media. “ Lao Movement for Human Rights reported: “The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) announced the results of the legislative elections of April 30, 2011, by underlining the success and “the joyful atmosphere’’ of these elections, proclaiming ’the democratic rights of the Lao multi-ethnic people’’, ’’ in exercising their political rights’’, , while the international press qualified these elections as "pure rubber stamp’’ ’, ’’a recording room ’’ in a country where the opposition is not tolerated and peaceful demonstrations in favour of human rights each time severely repressed. The official press stated that 99.6 percent of the population participated at these mandatory votes (3.23 million out of 3.24 million registered voters). [Source: Mouvement Lao pour les Droits de l’Homme (MLDH),Lao Movement for Human Rights, May 13, 2011 ~~] As for the seats distribution, 4 out of 132 are not representatives of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). Women have not increased in number (25 percent). Among 38.6 percent issued from the ethnic minorities (51), 9 percent are Khmu (12) and only 5.3 are Hmong (7). Faced with this pretence of an election, the only goal of which was to enable the totalitarian regime to boast about its legitimacy to the donors and the international community, the Lao Movement for Human Rights solemnly demands that the Lao authorities give the power back to the people, so that it can choose its leaders freely, in accordance with a multiparty system. ~~ Professor Martin Stuart-Fox, a specialist on Laos at the University of Queensland in Australia, told the Voice of American the communist party controls all elections in Laos. "Overwhelmingly, the people who stand for the National Assembly elections are members of the party," he says. "A few independents are allowed to stand, but they have been checked out by the party." [Source: Voice of America, April 28, 2011 \|=\|] "But the names and who will serve have already been determined by the party. So, all the assembly does is simply to rubber stamp the decisions that the party has already made." Nonetheless, Stuart-Fox says the party has allowed a slight improvement in the body’s internal discussions. He says while in the past there was no real debate on issues, the National Assembly now, on occasion, addresses problems such as corruption, a growing concern. "And, this has been debated within the assembly without naming names, and, of course, nothing comes out of it in terms of prosecutions," he says. "But, it does signal the government's disquiet over the level of corruption." \|=\| Women and Minorities in the Laos Government There were 29 women in the 115-seat NA, including two on the nine-member Standing Committee, and three women were members of the 13-member Supreme Court. The 55-seat LPRP Central Committee included four women, one of whom was also a member of the 11-member Politburo and president of the National Assembly. Of 12 ministers in the Prime Minister's Office, two were women. The minister of labor and social welfare also was a woman. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] While 80 percent of the population lived in rural areas and the village chief and village council handled most everyday matters, fewer than 1 percent of the village chiefs were women. The LWU — the LPRP mass organization focused on women's issues with a presence in every village and at every government level — is the only organization that has representation in every village; however, only one member of the LWU represented women in each village council.^^ There were seven members of ethnic minorities in the LPRP Central Committee, including two in the Politburo. The NA included 23 members of ethnic minorities, while three of the 28 cabinet ministers were members of ethnic minority groups. The new president of the National Assembly was also a member of an ethnic minority. One SPC justice was a member of an ethnic minority.^^ Welfare, Taxes and Local Government in Laos Laos is made up of provinces, municipalities, districts, and villages. Local government is set up on the district and village level. Provincial governors and mayors of municipalities are appointed by the President. Deputy provincial governors, deputy mayors and district chiefs are appointed by the Prime Minister. Lack of funds severely limits government services Local divisions: 16 provinces and one municipality (Vientiane). Capital: Vientiane (Viangchan). Administrative divisions: 16 provinces (khoueng, singular and plural) and 1 capital city* (nakhon luang, singular and plural); Attapu, Bokeo, Bolikhamxai, Champasak, Houaphan, Khammouan, Louangnamtha, Louangphabang, Oudomxai, Phongsali, Salavan, Savannakhet, Viangchan (Vientiane), Viangchan, Xaignabouli, Xekong, Xiangkhouang. Independence: 19 July 1949 (from France). [Source: CIA World Factbook ++] Provinces are subdivied into districts (“muang” ), subdistricts (“taseng” ) and villages (“baan” ). Administration at the village level is conducted by local elected village chiefs and village councils. Munag officials appointed by the national or provincial government are responsible for important administrative duties such as tax collection, school supervision and agriculture projects. The constitution gives no clear guidance on provincial and district responsibilities except to specify that the leaders at each echelon must ensure the implementation of the constitution and the law and must carry out decisions taken by a higher level. In spite of the party's inclination to centralize decision making, provinces and localities have enjoyed a surprising degree of autonomy in shaping social policy. This independence is partly due to limited resources and poor communications with Vientiane. But the central government has also encouraged direct contacts along the borders with China, Thailand, and Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring jurisdictions. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng) is directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower level are 112 districts (muang), further divided into subdistricts (tasseng), each with their own party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abolished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdistrictlevel party committees have also been abolished. At the base of the country's administrative structure are more than 11,000 villages (ban), only some of which have party branches. * A) Taxes and other revenues: 22.3 percent of GDP (2012 est.); country comparison to the world: 138. B) Budget: revenues: $2.066 billion; expenditures: $2.258 billion (2012 est.). Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-): -2.1 percent of GDP (2012 est.), country comparison to the world: 83. Laos initiated a VAT tax system in 2010. ++ The government does not maintain a social welfare system, but the National Committee for Social Welfare and War Veterans operates a number of "orphan's schools" in some province centers and administers retirement pay to government officials. This retirement pay, however, is as insignificant as their salaries were before retirement. Orphans, handicapped persons, and elderly persons living in rural villages are usually supported and cared for by their relatives, although the level of support depends on the economic resources of the caretakers. Lowland Lao are traditionally tolerant of mentally handicapped members of their community, and these persons, although not economically productive, are allowed to live with their families and move around the village at will. This family approach to social welfare operates in the towns as well, often on a neighborhood basis but particularly relying on extended kinship networks. As a consequence, urban beggars were unknown between 1975 and about 1987, although a small number appeared in Vientiane after that date, perhaps reflecting the increase in urban economic differentiation as much as any increase in acute poverty. [Source: Library of Congress] Corporate tax rate: 22 percent, compared to 17 percent in Singapore and 35.6 percent in Japan. [Source: Yomiuri Shimbun] Bureaucracy in Laos The bureaucracy is under the control of the Council of Ministers (comprised of more than a dozen ministries). Technically it implements the Constitution, laws and resolutions adopted by the National Assembly and decrees and acts of the President. Committees are the equivalent of Ministries. In 1990s, bureaucrats earned $20 to $30 a month. Many grew their own rice and vegetables. The historical evolution of Laos created identifiable layers of bureaucratic behavior. Traditional royal customs and Buddhist practices set the foundation. Next, there was an overlay of French influence, the product of colonial rule from 1890 to 1954. During this period, several generations of Laotian bureaucrats were trained and often placed in subordinate rank to French-imported Vietnamese civil servants. The administration used French as the official language and followed French colonial administrative practices. From 1954 to 1975, there was an increase in United States influence, and the United States provided training and educational opportunities for future bureaucrats as well as employment in United States agencies. Because of its brevity, however, the United States impact was far less pervasive than the French. [Source: Library of Congress, 1994 ] When the communists seized power in 1975, a new layer of bureaucrats — strongly influenced by North Vietnam and the Soviet Union and its allies — was added. Many of the French-trained and United States-influenced bureaucrats fled across the Mekong River. Of those who stayed, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 were sent to seminar camps or reeducation centers. The few Westerntrained bureaucrats who remained possessed French- or Englishlanguage skills and the technical competence needed to deal effectively with the Western foreign aid donors so critical to the economy. The Western-trained bureaucrats were essential because not many of the new revolutionary cadres who moved into key positions of bureaucratic authority had much formal education, knowledge of a foreign language, or competence in the technical and managerial skills necessary to run a national economy. The few cadres in each ministry who were capable of managing the economy were often unavailable because there were so many demands for their services: for example, meeting with visiting foreign delegations, traveling to international meetings, and attending political training sessions. Since its inception, the LPDR bureaucracy has been lethargic and discouraged individual initiative. It has been dangerous to take unorthodox positions. Some officials have been arrested on suspicion of corruption or ideological deviation: for example, "pro-Chinese" sentiment. Initiative has been further constrained by the lack of legal safeguards, formal trial procedures, and an organized system of appeal. The beginnings of a penal code, which the SPA endorsed in 1989, and the promulgation of a constitution in 1991, however, may solidify the system of justice and provide a clear definition as to what constitutes a crime against socialist morality, the party, or the state. * The lethargy of the bureaucracy is understandable within the cultural context of Laos. As a peasant society at the lower end of the modernization scale, the LPDR has adopted few of the work routines associated with modern administration. Foreign aid administrators frequently point out that Laotian administrators have difficulty creating patterns or precedents, or learning from experience. Laotians are known for their light-hearted, easy-going manner. This bo pinh nyang (never mind — don't worry about it) attitude is reflected in the languid pace of administration. Official corruption has also been acknowledged as problematic. * Kaysone acknowledged the bureaucracy's low level of competence. In his report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986, he chided those in authority who gave "preference only to (their friends) or those from the same locality or race; paying attention to only their birth origin, habits and one particular sphere of education." Patronage is but one area that has come under scrutiny and resulted in admonishments to strengthen inspection and control. Kaysone further railed against "dogmatism, privatism, racial narrowmindedness , regionalism and localism." Corruption in Laos The government of Laos is widely regarded as very corrupt but determining how corrupt is difficult because it is so secretive. There is probably less corruption than their could be based on the fact that few people is Laos are rich and there are not many foreign companies operating there. But on the other hand, the government brings in little money from income taxes or other revenues and bureaucrats and officials get paid so little they all must rely to some degree on corruption to bring in money. Many high level leaders and officials are said to be more interested in enriching themselves than in helping their poverty stricken country. Ordinary Laotians generally believe that people who have money are somehow connected with the government and those who don’t have money as having no connections with the government. Wages of all government officials were extremely low; and many officials, such as police, had broad powers that they could easily abuse. Many police officers used their authority to extract bribes from citizens. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] Some civil servants and high level government officials live in surprisingly nice villas despite $20 to $30 a week salaries. It can be argued that the low salaries are what drives them to become corrupt in the first place. But corruption seems to have gotten a bit out of control with as much as 40 percent of foreign aid going directly to the government while only 20 percent of the government budget goes education and health and other social welfare programs.. This particularly hypocritical as the Communists came to power with the promise of stamping out corruption from the previous regime. Low level corruption includes bureaucrats accepting “tips” to give a license, speed up paperwork and turning their back on smuggling. Many foreign operations in Laos employ a “fixer” that helps them navigate through the bureaucracy and pay bribes where they are expected. High-level corruption may include things like taking kick backs from logging companies and contractors involved in road and the dam projects. According to Lonely Planet: “Corruption remains a major problem. Far too much of the country’s limited resources finds its way into the pockets of a small political-economic elite, who pay little or no taxes. Smuggling of timber and wildlife threatens declared ‘bio-diversity areas’ (national parks where some people still live). Laws are flouted because the legal system is not independent, but under the control of the Party. [Source: Lonely Planet] Combating Corruption in Laos The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Corrupt officials reportedly were seldom punished. Police were trained at the National Police Academy, but the extent to which the academy's curriculum covered corruption was unknown. [Source: 2010 Human Rights Report: Laos, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department, April 8, 2011 ^^] In theory the government's National Audit Committee has responsibility for uncovering corruption in all government ministries, including the MoPS, but in practice its investigative activities were minimal. Authorities arrested and administratively punished lower-level officials on occasion for corruption. There were no reports of criminal cases being brought to trial. The government-controlled press rarely reported cases of official corruption.^^ Central and provincial inspection organizations responsible for enforcing laws against corruption lacked defined roles and sufficient powers as well as adequate funding, equipment, and legal support from the government.^^ Prior to taking their designated positions, senior officials were required by party policy to disclose their personal assets to the LPRP's Party Inspection Committee. The committee inspects the officials' assets before and after the officials have been in their positions. However, the LPRP used its control of government authorities and media to block public censure of corrupt officials who were party members.^^ There are no laws providing for public access to government information, and in general the government closely guarded the release of any information pertaining to its internal activities, deeming such secrecy necessary for "national security."^^ Former Laotian prime minister Bouasone Bouphavanh vowed to tackle graft but resigned, analysts said, because he had failed to build a large enough powerbase in his communist party. Image Sources: Text Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Times of London, Lonely Planet Guides, Library of Congress, Laos-Guide-999.com, Compton’s Encyclopedia, The Guardian, National Geographic, Smithsonian magazine, The New Yorker, Time, Newsweek, Reuters, AP, AFP, Wall Street Journal, The Atlantic Monthly, The Economist, Global Viewpoint (Christian Science Monitor), Foreign Policy, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, NBC News, Fox News and various books and other publications. Last updated May 2014
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correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	86	https://gidemy.com/Downloads/Books/Business/Investment/28.%2520Law%2520on%2520the%2520Promotion%2520of%2520Domestic%2520Investment%2520(2004)%2520Eng.pdf	en	Free Educational Resource Downloads	https://i0.wp.com/downlo…=880%2C440&ssl=1	https://i0.wp.com/downlo…=880%2C440&ssl=1	[ "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2020/06/ecz-2016-pastpapers.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/04/sa_1618765428_the Sequential Model of Professional Selling.JPG", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2022/01/Accounting-and-Finance.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2020/01/JAVA-programming.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2020/12/Sewing.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/01/Numeracy-Books-for-Nursery-School.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/03/Grade-11-Chemistry-Lesson-Plans.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2022/01/Differential-Geometry.png", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/03/Grade-8-Integrated-Science-Lesson-Plans.jpg?fit=464%2C508&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/01/children-worksheets.jpeg?fit=650%2C433&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2019/11/Form.png?fit=650%2C343&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2019/11/scheme.png?fit=400%2C216&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2019/11/GI-Online-Academy-Syllabi.jpg?fit=650%2C279&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2019/12/Open-book.jpg?fit=650%2C433&ssl=1", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2021/03/Chemistry-Grade-10-Lesson-Plan.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2020/12/Sewing.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2022/01/Carpentry.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2019/11/Zambi-Grade-8.png", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2022/01/Complex-Analysis.png", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/09/High-School-Philippines.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/sites/3/2022/01/Electronics-Repair.jpg", "https://downloads.gidemy.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/09/Phillipines-Basic-Education-2.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2020-06-21T16:57:21+02:00	Spread the love	en	https://i0.wp.com/downlo…it=32%2C32&ssl=1	Gidemy Resource Downloads	https://downloads.gidemy.com/	Editable Lesson Plans Every teacher needs a carefully drawn lesson plan, irrespective of the training, experience or competency. A lesson plan is required to assist the students in achieving the learning objectives, on the short term and long term as well. Having a lesson is exactly like having a complete and clear picture of how a learning process is going to take place and how students are able to grasp and retain what is being taught to them ... Work Sheets Worksheets offer a unique learning avenue to kids. They are not only fun to do but even facilitate ease of learning and knowledge retention in young minds. As an assessment tool, worksheets can be used by teachers to understand students' previous knowledge, the outcome of learning, and the process of learning; at the same time, they can be used to enable students to monitor the progress of their own learning ... Exam Past Papers Studying past papers are a valuable part of exam preparation and help keep revision focused on important themes whilst practicing exam style questions. Past exam papers are one of the most helpful tools available to prepare for both internal and external examinations as they provide students with practical insight into how the forthcoming exam paper is likely to look and the key themes or subject areas most likely to be covered. Before starting revision for a subject it is always worth taking time to seek out past papers ... Educational Public Service Documents Public service is a service intended to serve all members of a community. It is usually provided by the government to people living within its jurisdiction, either directly or by financing provision of services. The following are Forms that are used for data records for public service staff in the ministry of education. Public Service is noble! ... Lesson Schemes A syllabus is derived from the curriculum. It is about that list of topics to be taught and learned for a specific period, or programme, while the scheme of work is drawn from the syllabus and broken into pieces to be taken on a termly basis. The lesson plan is a further breaking down of work to be done. The scheme of work also guides supervisors of schools in determining the efforts of the schools and teachers towards meeting the societal demands on them. The scheme of work is aimed at serving the following purposes: A Guide to the teacherFor organisational conveniencekeeping records of what is taught and what ought to be taught (Okai, 2010). The scheme of work is broken into unit plans per month or per week. A unit plan breaks down further the scheme of work into smaller portions that can be treated within a period of a week. The unit plan can, therefore, be described as the organised sequence of content and learning experience derived for an analysis of the scheme of work designed to be covered by the class within a period of week (Okai, 2010) ... Syllabi /Curriculum A Syllabi is a document that communicates information about a specific course or subject and defines expectations and responsibilities for the leaner and a teacher. A curriculum is broadly defined as the totality of student experiences that occur in the educational process. The term often refers specifically to a planned sequence of instruction, or to a view of the student’s experiences in terms of the educator’s or school’s instructional goals ... Educational Books For students, it is worth saying that: “A room without books is like a body without a soul.” A good book is like a good friend; the more you read it, the more interesting it will be. They have always benefit to the reader. The benefits of reading books range from improving mental health to improving physical health, to creating healthy habits, and it’s no wonder that books and reading are so high up on the list of personal entertainment. Though books have been around for an incredibly long time, they have not lost their importance throughout the years ...
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correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	66	http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-7867.html	en	Key Leaders			[ "https://a.advameg.com/matomo.php?idsite=22&rec=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Country Listing Laos Table of Contents Laos Key Leaders Kaysone Phomvihan was preeminent leader of both the party and the state until his death in November 1992. Kaysone's unusual career of leadership had taken him through two decades of revolution and almost another two decades of independence. Born in 1920, Kaysone studied at the Faculty of Law at the University of Hanoi where, in 1942, he joined the struggle against the French colonialists, according to his official biography. Kaysone was known in Hanoi by his Vietnamese name Quoc. For at least a decade after independence, Kaysone avoided contact with the masses, Western diplomats, and journalists, remaining heavily guarded and secretive, in some ways continuing an earlier shadowy revolutionary style. Kaysone's caution may have been influenced by concern for his safety because several attempts had been made on his life during the first few years of his rule. However, during 1989 and 1990, Kaysone moved about more freely in Laos and showed himself more openly to the outside world. For the first time, he made state visits to Japan, China, and Sweden. He gave interviews to Western journalists and was more available to meet with Western officials. His public statements suggested that he was impressed by the level of development he had seen in affluent nations and that he was open to new techniques to bring economic progress to Laos under the leadership of the LPRP. Although the political careers of most communist leaders in Europe and Asia had been terminated when fundamental new policies were introduced to their regimes, Kaysone continued his leadership without challenge, showing unusual political agility and ideological flexibility. Kaysone had long embraced Marxism- Leninism, following the pattern of his Vietnamese and Soviet mentors. When evidence of change in the communist world began to appear, Kaysone propounded the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, invoking Lenin, but soon moved control of state enterprises to autonomous firms, and by 1989 edged more deliberately toward a market economy (see Industrial Policy , ch. 3). Kaysone appeared to be a pragmatic communist leader, open to the ideas of outsiders and zealous for--although unsuccessful at producing--economic growth. Upon Kaysone's death, the person who had been second in party Politburo rank as long as Kaysone had been first, Nouhak Phoumsavan, born in 1914, was passed over as party chairman-- presumably for reasons of age and ill health--in favor of the third-ranking member, General Khamtai Siphandon. However, in keeping with the Laotian communist practice of maintaining continuity and honoring seniority, Nouhak was promoted from deputy prime minister to president of state. The new LPRP chairman, Khamtai, also retains his government post as prime minister, suggesting that he has consolidated his role as the preeminent political leader. Born in 1924 in Champasak Province, Khamtai is the youngest surviving member of the group that founded the Free Laos Front (Neo Lao Issara--see Glossary) in 1950 and the LPP in 1955. He is thought to have spent part of World War II (1939-45) in India and was employed as a postal worker in southern Laos after the war. He joined the Lao Issara (Free Laos-- see Glossary) in 1946 and remained with the Pathet Lao group that split with the Lao Issara in 1949 (see The Coming of Independence , ch. 1). Assigned to military and political functions in the southern Laos sector, Khamtai was elected to the Central Committee of the Free Laos Front in 1950. According to a biography published in the Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan (People) [Hanoi], Khamtai was appointed chief of staff of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA--see Glossary) in 1954, and in 1957 he was elected to membership in the Central Committee of the LPP. He directed the party's propaganda and training functions during 1959 and 1960 and in 1961 was named supreme commander of the LPLA. In 1962 he was appointed to the Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee and named deputy secretary of the General Military Committee. Khamtai moved steadily forward in the LPRP Politburo to the third ranking position, serving as minister of national defense from 1975 to 1991 and as deputy prime minister before his elevation to the post of prime minister in 1991. Khamtai's background in the military establishment, which has been a conservative force in Laotian politics, is thought to make him particularly sensitive to security concerns. He has a reputation as a hardliner and appears to be more inclined toward secrecy than Kaysone. Before assuming the post of prime minister, he had little exposure to Westerners, although his contacts increased when he took on his new task. The deputy prime minister for foreign affairs in 1993 was Phoun Sipaseut, a veteran Politburo member who headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for seventeen years. Below him, in the rank of minister of foreign affairs, is Somsavat Lengsavat, who ranked fifty-first in the LPRP Central Committee. In Kaysone's time, an "inner cabinet" of six party leaders carried the major decisionmaking responsibility for the government. Of this group, only three members were living as of mid-1994--Nouhak, Khamtai, and Phoun. It is uncertain whether Kaysone's successors will continue the inner cabinet, but there appears to be some generational conflict. A transition will be required from leaders who were educated by service in the secret revolutionary party to those who may have studied abroad--very likely in France--before 1975 and whose membership in the party came during a more open era. One of the vice ministers of foreign affairs in 1992, for example, studied in the French military academy, Saint Cyr, as did a former minister of external economic relations. The latter was dealing very adroitly in 1991 with foreign donors, and at the Fifth Party Congress, his rank on the Central Committee rose from twenty-sixth to sixteenth. His counterpart in the Ministry of Finance, however, a former provincial governor with more than three decades of service in the revolutionary movement, was propelled from forty-third to tenth in the Central Committee and gained membership in the Politburo. Data as of July 1994 Country Listing
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	89	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/12/2/laos-fetes-30-years-of-communism	en	Laos fetes 30 years of communism	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	https://www.aljazeera.co…esize=1200%2C675	[ "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/b620f733-31c8-4a15-be81-9cc069da939ccb53dc97ad7c4979aff670b252003c55.jpeg?resize=250%2C180&quality=80", "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/8306187482861bfe142748de6a78ec4c292e0.jpeg", "https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/830623150acec1b814edb956b029201cb7b8f.jpeg", "https://www.aljazeera.com/static/media/aj-footer-logo.bac952ad.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "News" ]	null	[ "Al Jazeera" ]	2005-12-02T00:00:00	Laos has marked 30 years of communism with a mass rally of 25,000 people and exhortations to modernise the economy of one of Asia’s poorest and least developed nations.	en	/favicon_aje.ico	Al Jazeera	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/12/2/laos-fetes-30-years-of-communism	Banners, as well as national and communist party flags, adorned many buildings on Friday but there were few other signs of festivities in Vientiane, with officials discussing the challenges ahead as well as the achievements of the regime. “We have ensured the country’s political stability and maintained public order,” President Khamtay Siphandone said in his speech. The communists took Vientiane in August 1975 less than four months after the fall of the US-backed South Vietnamese regime in Saigon, now Ho Chi Minh City, and founded the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on 2 December. People linked to the former US-backed government were sent to re-education camps, the economy was collectivised, and the country closed its doors on the West. Only in the early 1990s did Laos begin to slowly open up. Now a country of 5.6 million people, Laos joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997, introduced economic reforms and accepted foreign aid, still a mainstay of its economy. Pledges “Over the past 30 years, we were able to develop the economy and maintain a consistent pace of growth,” said Khamtay, whose speech greeted with scant applause from the crowd. In a voice that sounded faint at times even through the loudspeakers, he said Laos would emerge out of the list of least developed countries by 2020. He said the regime planned to lift the country out of least-developed status “by enhancing the strength of all economic sectors based on the market-oriented mechanism, together with seizing external cooperation and assistance.” Women in traditional dress attended the celebrations He also acknowledged the “support from the international community, including friendly countries, the United Nations system, financial organisations and non-government organisations.” As soon as Khamtay’s speech ended, the crowds, including around 3000 men and women from the armed forces, marched away hurriedly. Donors say Laos had some achievements to show already.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	1	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Khamtai Siphandone	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/military/images/f/f4/Ambox_content.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/20?cb=20131224231759", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/180px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6a181c72-e8bf-419b-b4db-18fd56a0eb60", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6c42ce6a-b205-41f5-82c6-5011721932e7", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/464fc70a-5090-490b-b47e-0759e89c263f", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/f7bb9d33-4f9a-4faa-88fe-2a0bd8138668" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Military Wiki" ]	2024-07-03T16:38:30+00:00	General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao language: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924)[1] is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos[2] from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	Military Wiki	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao language: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924)[1] is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos[2] from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He was a member of the Communist Party of Indochina in 1954 and a member of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in 1956. As of 2022, he is the oldest living state leader. Early life[] Siphandone comes from a peasant family from the far south of Laos. His first job was as a postman. He joined the national liberation movement Lao Issara after the end of the Second World War, which stood for the independence of Laos and against the return of the French protectorate administration. Before the French regained control of Savannakhet in March 1946, Siphandone seized the entire provincial fund (150,000 piastres). He became an officer of the armed wing of the movement and in 1948 their representative for southern Laos. After the split of Lao Issara in 1950 he joined the Pro-Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao.[3] In 1954 he became a member of the Communist Party of Indochina, 1955 Lao People's Party, whose central committee he was from 1957. He was considered a close confidant of the first Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane. In 1962 he became his successor as chief of staff of the armed units of the Pathet Lao. In 1966 he became commander-in-chief of the resulting "Lao People's Liberation Army", which fought with North Vietnamese support in the Laotian civil war against the royal troops. In 1972 he rose to the Politburo of the LPRP.[3] Political career[] After the Communist takeover in 1975, he became Minister of Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He held this office for 16 years. After Kaysone and Nouhak Phoumsavanh he was from the 5th party congress in 1991 number three in the party leadership. On 15 August 1991, he became Kaysone's successor as successor. After the death of longtime party leader Kaysone 1992 Siphandone rose to the top of the state party LPRP. He was the military commander of the Pathet Lao rebellion. On its takeover of the Laotian government in 1975 he became minister of defence, commander of the army, and a deputy prime minister. On the creation of chairmanship of LPRP q the in 1991, he became prime minister, succeeding party leader Kaysone Phomvihane, who became president. Siphandone became party leader on Kaysone's death, and succeeded Nouhak Phoumsavanh as president in 1998. At the 8th Party Congress in 2006, he became an Advisor to the LPRP Central Committee. Siphandone remained as party leader until 21 March 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly. As expected, he stepped down as President soon after the 30 April 2006, National Assembly elections. References[] Party political offices Preceded by Phoumi Vongvichit President of the Lao Front for National Construction 1991 – 2001 Succeeded by Sisavath Keobounphanh Preceded by Kaysone Phomvihane Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 1992 – 2006 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone (General Secretary) Political offices Preceded by None Minister for Defence of Laos 1975 – 1991 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone Preceded by Kaysone Phomvihane Prime Minister of Laos 1991 – 1998 Succeeded by Sisavath Keobounphanh Preceded by Nouhak Phoumsavanh President of Laos 1998 – 2006 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone Diplomatic posts Preceded by Megawati Sukarnoputri Chairperson of ASEAN 2004 Succeeded by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Template:LPPRGenSecs
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	53	https://github.com/GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE/blob/master/src/test/resources/jape/InputTexts/AveLong	en	gateplugin-ANNIE/src/test/resources/jape/InputTexts/AveLong at master · GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE	https://opengraph.githubassets.com/c68ab8993f7442f00bc272c97e4f1d9f16ec8a5b1d29ca4a76acd681058f8afe/GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE	https://opengraph.githubassets.com/c68ab8993f7442f00bc272c97e4f1d9f16ec8a5b1d29ca4a76acd681058f8afe/GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Contribute to GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE development by creating an account on GitHub.	en	https://github.com/fluidicon.png	GitHub	https://github.com/GateNLP/gateplugin-ANNIE/blob/master/src/test/resources/jape/InputTexts/AveLong	Skip to content Navigation Menu
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	48	https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Laos-prepares-for-a-changing-of-the-guard	en	Laos prepares for a changing of the guard	https://www.ft.com/__ori…s&source=nar-cms	https://www.ft.com/__ori…s&source=nar-cms	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=1076130949081971&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F4%2F8%2F5%2F1%2F3711584-1-eng-GB%2F0122N-Laos-Bounnyang.jpg?width=693&height=390&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://asia.nikkei.com/bundles/app/images/placeholder.jpg?ez", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F2%2F2%2F7%2F4%2F5964722-1-eng-GB%2F0306N08-Laos.jpg?width=240&height=137&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F9%2F8%2F4%2F6%2F7796489-1-eng-GB%2F1202N-Laos-rail.jpg?width=240&height=137&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F3%2F4%2F1%2F0%2F48000143-12-eng-GB%2FCropped-1721644447GettyImages-2162989387.jpg?width=240&height=137&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F7%2F0%2F6%2F3%2F48003607-3-eng-GB%2FCropped-17216292812024-07-21T115731Z_776982270_RC2KZ8ABDWT1_RTRMADP_3_BANGLADESH-PROTESTS.JPG?width=240&height=137&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://www.ft.com/__origami/service/image/v2/images/raw/https%3A%2F%2Fcms-image-bucket-production-ap-northeast-1-a7d2.s3.ap-northeast-1.amazonaws.com%2Fimages%2F8%2F8%2F6%2F9%2F47999688-4-eng-GB%2FCropped-17214636982024-07-19T135736Z_1858667889_RC26Y8AOEQ1G_RTRMADP_3_BANGLADESH-PROTESTS.JPG?width=240&height=137&fit=cover&gravity=faces&dpr=2&quality=medium&source=nar-cms", "https://asia.nikkei.com/bundles/app/images/app-modal.png?ez" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "prepares", "changing", "guard", "" ]	null	[ "TAMAKI KYOZUKA, Nikkei staff" ]	2016-01-28T03:00:00+00:00	VIENTIANE   It was business as usual at the latest leadership shuffle in Laos -- at least for the most part. While the Lao People's Revolutionary	en	/apple-touch-icon-144x144.png?ez	Nikkei Asia	https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Laos-prepares-for-a-changing-of-the-guard	VIENTIANE It was business as usual at the latest leadership shuffle in Laos -- at least for the most part. While the Lao People's Revolutionary Party sought to maintain the status quo in its policies, it also laid the groundwork for a transfer of power from first-generation revolutionaries to their "princeling" offspring. STRIKING A BALANCE The LPRP has ruled Laos as a one-party state for 40 years. On Jan. 22, it elected Vice President Bounnhang Vorachith as its new secretary-general, one of several major leadership changes announced during the twice-a-decade party congress.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	51	https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp11s00229r000201930001-4	en	THE EXPANDING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDOCHINA			[ "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Glyph-FOIA.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Menu-Close-NoBorder.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/ic_search.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/modules/file/icons/application-pdf.png", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/modules/contrib/print/icons/print_icon.png", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/IG.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fb.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Tw.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Li.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/YT.svg", "https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/images/bt/Fl.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/sites/all/themes/foia_theme/favicon.ico		https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp11s00229r000201930001-4	? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 25X1 The Expanding Soviet Militar Presence in Indochina An Intelligence Assessment Secret SOV 86-10004CX January 1986 Copy 444 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 The Expanding Soviet Militar Presence in Indochina An Intelligence Assessment This paper was prepared by Office of Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third World Activities Division, SOYA, Secret SOV 86-10004CX January 1986 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Key Judgments Information available as of] November 1985 was used in this report. Secret The Expanding Sovierilitarvl Presence in Indochina Sino-Vietnamese hostilities have enabled Moscow to expand its military cooperation with Vietnam and improve its overall position in Indochina. Since China's 1979 attack on Vietnam, the Soviets' most tangible gain has been their access to Cam Ranh Bay, their only operational naval base outside the USSR. The Soviets' steady military buildup there has: ? Substantially increased their capabilities to monitor US and allied naval and air activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and to threaten regional sea lines of communications, especially maritime traffic ? passing through the Strait of Malacca. ? Improved their capabilities to augment their naval strength in the Indian Ocean quickly in crises. ? Demonstrated support for Hanoi against China and established the USSR as a key player in regional security affairs. One of Moscow's main objectives is to increase its security in the Far East by developing a reliable regional partner to help it carry out its strategic encirclement of the Chinese. To this end, the Soviets are organizing, training, and equipping the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Soviet advisers, who now number about 2,500, and a massive infusion of Soviet weapons have helped Vietnam to modernize and expand its forces, especially those opposite China. Both Moscow and Hanoi have sent aid to Laos and Cambodia. The Vietnamese have sent troops, while the Soviets have provided the weapons and expertise necessary to upgrade the Lao and Cambodian armed forces. Hanoi wants to build up the fledgling Cambodian forces so that it can re- duce its own military presence, thus removing an obstacle to improved relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Soviets, who also want im roved relations with the non-Communist states, share this objective. By supporting Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and domination of Laos, the Soviets have also been able to establish a military presence in the two countries. The estimated 500 Soviet advisers in Laos are esneciallv active 25X1 25X1 111 Secret soV 86-10004CX January 1986 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Some 200 Soviets are also providing weapons and military training to the Cambodian ground, air, and naval forces. Soviet military ties to Cambodia and Laos, however, have led to problems with Hanoi, which is determined to remain the dominating influence in Vientiane and especially in Phnom Penh. Moscow, for its part, is aware of the distrust and animosity the Lao and Khmer have for the Vietnamese and sees bilateral security relations with the two countries as a means of exerting leverage on the Vietnamese. We judge it unlikely, however, that the Soviets would jeopardize their gains in Vietnam, especially their base at Cam Ranh, by pushing too hard and fast to build influence in Hanoi's client states. The Soviets probably calculate that their increased military involvement in Vietnam, especially along the Sino-Vietnamese border, their expanded naval presence in the South China Sea, and their diplomatic support for the Vietnamese serve as deterrents to large-scale Chinese military action against the Vietnamese. We cannot confidently predict whether the Soviets would intervene militarily in the event of a major Chinese attack on Vietnam. At a minimum, however, we believe that the Soviets would support their ally by stepping up military resupply efforts, providing additional intelligence assistance and more direct advisory support, diplo- matic demarches, and possibly threatening military manuevers on China's northern border Through the 1980s, we expect that the Soviets probably will: ? Maintain a relatively stable number of military advisers in Vietnam, as they concentrate on modernizing PAVN forces along the Sino- Vietnamese border. ? Increase the number of advisers in Laos and Cambodia, as they expand their role in upgrading the Lao and Khmer armed forces. Secret iv 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 C Secret ? Continue to increase their use of Cam Ranh Bay. We predict that the most advanced ships and aircraft sent to the Soviet Far East will be assigned to the bases in the Far Eastern USSR, but that some of the ships and aircraft made surplus by the Pacific Fleet's ongoing moderniza- tion will be based at Cam Ranh. ? Count on their growing military capabilities at Cam Ranh?as contrast- ed with the uncertain future of US military bases in the Philippines?to strengthen the position of those groups in non-Communist Southeast Asia that are willing to distance their countries from the West, especially those that fear the United States might turn to them for bases. 25X1 V Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Contents 1 25X1 Page Key Judgments iii Scope Note ix The Evolving Relationship 1 Cam Ranh Bay 1 Advantages of the Soviet Presence at Cam Ranh for the Vietnamese 1 The Sovereignty Issue 6 Soviet Activities at Other Vietnamese Bases 7 The Soviet Military Advisory Role in Vietnam 7 Arms Deliveries 8 Ground Forces 8 Air and Air Defense Forces 8 Naval Forces 8 Advisers 10 Military Exercises 11 25X1 Impact on Training 11 Influence on Military Doctrine 13 The One-Commander System 14 Clashes at the Working Level 14 The Soviet Advisory Role in Laos and Cambodia 15 Moscow's and Hanoi's Shared Objectives. . . 15 . . . And Frictions 15 The Soviet Military Presence in Cambodia 16 Ground Forces and Logistics 16 Naval Forces 17 Air Force 17 The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Laos 19 Outlook 20 Possible Soviet Responses to Another Chinese Attack 20 Projected Advisory Role 20 The Soviets' Future Use of Cam Ranh 20 vii Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 r`, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 C Scope Note Secret This paper traces the Soviet military presence in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos since the late 1970s. It describes the level and activities of Soviet mili- tary forces and advisers in these countries, and it addresses the strains in the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship stemming from the growing Soviet military presence in Indochina. In-depth analysis of larger issues, such as the influence of the Soviet presence on regional security problems or political and economic costs for the Soviets, is beyond its scope. ix Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret Major Events in Soviet Expansion in Indochina 25X1 1975 April North Vietnam's victory over the South. 1977 May Lao Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon visits Moscow. 1978 January-February Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovskiy visits Laos. July Vietnam joins Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). August Soviets establish Military Advisory Group in Hanoi. November Moscow and Hanoi sign treaty of friendship and cooperation. December Vietnam invades Cambodia. 1979 February China invades Vietnam. First Soviet combat ship calls in Da Nang, Vietnam. March First Soviet ship visits Cam Ranh. April Soviet TU-95 (Bear D naval reconnaissance) makes first deploy- ment to Da Nang. 1980 Soviets deploy the first TU-142 (Bear F antisubmarine warfare) to Da Nang. Soviet naval and air operations shift from Da Nang to Cam Ranh. First Soviet ships call at Cambodian port. 25X1 1981 Soviets conduct first naval exercise (ASW) with the Vietnamese. Soviet-Vietnamese joint venture established to conduct offshore oil exploration. 1982 January-February Soviet Chief of General Staff Ogarkov visits Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 1983 May Cambodian Defense Minister Bou Thang visits the USSR. November-December Soviets deploy first Badger (TU-16) aircraft to Cam Ranh. 1984 April First Soviet-Vietnamese naval amphibious exercise conducted. May, June Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen. Van Tien Dung makes two visits to Moscow. December Soviet Ground Forces Chief, Marshal Petrov, visits Vietnam. Soviets deploy MIG-23s to Cam Ranh. 1985 September Vietnamese Defense Minister Van Tien Dung visits Moscow. October Lao Defense Minister Khamtai Siphandon visits Moscow. 25X1 Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret The Expanding Soviet Military Presence in Indochina The Evolving Relationship Soviet military advisers have been in North Vietnam since the late 1950s. Influence over the Vietnamese military, however, was limited, and Soviet military advisers and aid were competing with China for influence in Hanoi, especially during the Vietnam war. Although Soviet military assistance was impor- tant in North Vietnam's victory over the South in 1975, the Soviets were not able to expand their military presence in Vietnam as a consequence of providing the aid. The situation changed dramatically for the Soviets as Hanoi's relations with China and Cambodia deterio- rated (see inset and foldout map, p.23). The Soviets, at Vietnam's request, signed a bilateral friendship treaty in early November 1978 and subsequently increased their military assistance to Vietnam. The Vietnamese, who undoubtedly hoped the treaty would deter a Chinese response to their invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, were rudely awakened by China's February 1979 incursion. Vietnam's subsequent deci- sion to request substantial Soviet military advisory assistance and financial support for the invasion of Cambodia and domination of Laos allowed Moscow to establish an important military foothold in South- east Asia. Cam Ranh Bay By far the most tangible benefit for the Soviets in Vietnam is the use of the naval, air, and SIGINT facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet naval forces stationed at Cam Ranh are the largest single group outside the USSR's home waters and the Mediterra- nean. In addition to projecting Soviet military power in the South China Sea, where American power was once undisputed, Soviet access to Cam Ranh puts pressure on China. The base has also enabled the Soviets to: ? Substantially increase their capability to monitor US and allied naval and air activity in Southeast 1 and Southwest Asian waters and to threaten region- al sea lines of communication, especially maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca 25X1 25X1 25X1 ? Augment their naval presence in the Indian Ocean 25X1 more quickly in response to crises. ? Provide a visible demonstration of support for Hanoi against China and establish themselves as key play- ers in regional security issues. Cam Ranh's features undoubtedly influenced the Soviets' decision to select it as their base in Vietnam. These include: ? One of the best deepwater harbors in the world and natural protection from surrounding peninsulas and islands. ? Isolation from any large town or commercial activi- ty, which makes it easily secured. ? Facilities and buildings, remaining from its former use as an American military base, that the Soviets could build on and expand. 25X1 25X1 ? Location along the transit lanes of the South China 25X1 Sea. ? Location out of range of most of the Chinese Air Force. Advantages of the Soviet Presence at Cam Ranh for the Vietnamese The growing Soviet presence at the base provides a visible sign of Moscow's support for its Vietnamese ally. It also serves as a deterrent against attacks from the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and especially the Chinese. China, Vietnam's predominant rival and the only Asian Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 country with a navy powerful enough to challenge the Vietnamese, must now contend not only with a mod- ernizing Vietnamese Navy, but also with a growing Soviet naval and air threat along its southern flank. Moreover, Vietnam may calculate that Moscow's concern for its base at Cam Ranh will constrain Soviet leaders from dramatically improving relations 3 with Beijing. The Vietnamese?who have been ner- vous about Soviet intentions since Moscow and Beij- ing began their ministerial talks in October 1982? probably see the base as insurance that the Soviets will not abandon Vietnam in the event of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 R Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Hanoi is still extremely sensitive about its sovereignty and has not permitted the Soviets exclusive use of Cam Ranh. the Viet- namese continue to maintain a small contingent of naval forces there, including a helicopter school and some small surface ships. In addition they use one of the six piers at the base. Vietnamese access to Soviet-controlled areas of the bases however, is limited. Secret Soviet Activities at Other Vietnamese Bases Although there are rumors and occasional references to other Soviet bases in Vietnam, Cam Ranh is the Soviets' only operational military base. Soviets are present at Vietnamese naval and air facilities other than Cam Ranh, however. Soviet ships, for example, deliver to Haiphong ground force equipment used by PAVN (the People's Army of Vietnam) to defend the northern border. Most aircraft deliveries, including the MIG-21s destined for Laos and Cambodia, are made at Da Nang. In addition, the Vietnamese repair ana overhaul soviet naval auxiliaries and hydrograph- ic research ships at Ho Chi Minh City. Soviet planes operating out of Cam Ranh occasionally also use other airfields The Vietnamese also have emphasized publicly that the Soviets are only allowed to "use" the naval and air facilities, describing the Soviet presence as a neces- sary deterrent to Chinese aggression and as a counter- weight to American military bases in the Philippines. Soviet concern about Vietnamese nationalist senti- ment could be a brake on further expansion of permanent naval facilities. Despite the large number of vessels deployed to Cam Ranh, the Soviets have not built extensive support facilities on shore. They have preferred to provide most logistics and housing from facilities afloat. This reluctance may stem from their concern that permanent facilities would be lost if Soviet-Vietnamese relations soured and Soviet access to Cam Ranh were denied, as well as from their experiences in Egypt and Somalia. Moreover, Viet- namese authorities may have restricted the number of permanent installations the Soviets are allowed. 7 The Soviet Military Advisory Role in Vietnam The estimated 2,500 advisers, specialists, and support per- sonnel constitute the Soviets' third-largest MAG in the Third World.2 The number and role of Soviet military advisers began to increase about 1977 and rose notably after the 1979 Chinese invasion (see figure 5). The Chinese invasion convinced the Viet- namese that China was a long-term threat. As a result, they made the major political decision to accept increased external involvement in their mili- tary affairs in exchange for the rapid buildup of more 25X1 25X1 25X1 9)(1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X11 zoA1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret Figure 5 Soviet Military Advisers in Indochina, 1975-85 Number 3,000 500 0 1975 ? Vietnam ? Laos ? Cambodia 3078041-86 80 85 1 modern, conventional armed forces. Moreover, the Chinese Army's familiar- ity with PAVN tactics made the PAVN more vulner- able. This vulnerability and the need to adapt combat tactics to accommodate the new Soviet weaponry were factors contributing to the Vietnamese decision to allow greater Soviet influence. Arms Deliveries In the wake of the Chinese incursion, the Soviets and Vietnamese reportedly concluded an agreement to expedite the flow of arms, military equipment, and technical assistance, as well as to increase the size of the Soviet advisory mission (see figure 6). The highest level of military aid was sent immediately after the invasion when the USSR provided approximately $1.8 billion worth of material. Since then, Soviet military aid has averaged $800 million annually. The massive infusion of Soviet military assistance since 1979 has allowed the Vietnamese to modernize and expand Secret their forces, especially those opposite the Chinese border in northern Vietnam. Ground Forces. The focus of the modernization effort has been on the ground forces, the dominant service in terms of size and political influence.' Soviet deliveries of ground force equipment have included T-54/55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, 122-mm D-30 howitzers, 122-mm D-74 field artillery, as well as engineering and river-crossing vehicles extensive Soviet influence on the development of selected combat units. The overall result of Soviet help has been a significant upgrade in the capabilities of the PAVN ground forces since 1979. Air and Air Defense Forces. Soviet aid has enabled the Vietnamese Air Force to develop an effective, integrated air defense system and improved ground support capabilities. The Soviets have sent substantial numbers of MIG-21/Fishbeds, which can match any fighter now flown by the Chinese. In addition, the Vietnamese air defense system incorporates two types of surface-to-air missiles?SA-2s and SA-3s. Naval Forces. The Soviets are also helping the Viet- namese to improve their naval forces. The recent deliveries of Soviet ships increase Vietnam's abili- ty to defend its territorial waters and the Spratly Islands. The modernization program began in the early-to-mid-1970s. The Soviets provided impetus through equipment deliveries and advisory assistance. 8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 20A1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 (25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Figure 6 Major Soviet Weapons Sent to Vietnam Since 1979 Description Year Operational Air Defense MIG-21 Fishbed J/N Low-level tactical air defense fighter. Matches any fighter currently flown by the Chinese. Range of 400 kilometers. 1968-73 Ground Forces T-54 T-55 Primary tank used by PAVN. Its main 1949-58 armament is a 100-mm gun. SS-1 Scud B A single-stage, surface-to-surface missile system having a 300-km range. 1961 Navy Petya I/II A shallow-sea antisubmarine (ASW) light frigate equipped with torpedos and depth charges. 1960-67 Weapons Likely To Be Delivered to Vietnam 307805 1-86 MIG-23 Flogger BIG Principal Soviet tactical aircraft. Intended primarily for the air-intercept role but can have a secondary mission of ground attack. 1972-78 T-62 Improved tank that has replaced T-54/55 in 1961 Warsaw Pact forces. Significant numbers have been exported to other Third World countries. 9 Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 2v1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret A fly; care The Soviets seized the chance to expand their military role in Vietnam, a country whose war-fighting capa- bilities have been demonstrated. Building up the Vietnamese forces provided an excellent opportunity to tie down many Chinese units. Hanoi's interest in fostering closer military ties must have seemed espe- cially attractive after years of Sino-Soviet competition for influence in Vietnam. In addition, having their advisers work closely with PAVN enabled the Soviets to acquire valuable information on Chinese military capabilities and tactics. The changes in Soviet military advisory practices following the Sino-Vietnamese border war are illus- trated by the expansion of the advisory mission to the Vietnamese Air Force (VAF). Soviet military advisers are involved in almost every aspect of the operations of the military unit or agency to which they are assigned?a practice followed in other large Soviet MAGs such as those in Cuba and Ethiopia. Their objective is to help turn PAVN into a modern, regular army by helping the Vietnamese reorganize and train in the Soviet manner, as well as integrate Soviet- provided equipment. Soviet advisers probably also try to prevent the Viet- namese from squandering the military aid the way they have often done with Soviet economic aid. The Soviets' influence within PAVN has grown sub- stantially as a result of the extensive military aid and technical expertise they have provided. The Vietnam- ese are now much more militarily dependent upon the Soviets; their military capabilities would be hurt considerably if the Soviets discontinued their aid. Secret At the same time, the Soviets have not found it necessary to provide the PAVN with their most sophisticated weaponry to sustain this leverage. We believe Moscow will eventually provide MIG-23s to Vietnam. The Soviets have already given them to other socialist allies?including Cuba, North Korea, and Angola?and Hanoi probably is sensitive that Vietnam is the only important ally that has not received an aircraft that has become something of a status symbol in the Third World. 10 25X1 25X1 I LOA 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 (25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X11 25X1 25X1 LSJZ I 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 _ r-` 25X1 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Military Exercises Secret 25X1 and the Philippines have made conflicting claims. This region is considered potentially rich in natural 25X1 resources, especially oil. If the Soviets and the Viet- namese choose to drill for oil there, they will want to be in a position to defend themselves from a possible Chinese attack and to deter the ASEAN countries from seriously challenging the claim. 25X1 Impact on Training Soviet advisers, The modernization of the Vietnamese Navy will enhance Hanoi's ability to defend the contested Sprat- ly Islands where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, 11 have helped to convert most PAVN officer training programs to Soviet curriculums. Their overall objective probably is to mold a new generation of PAVN military leaders who are amenable to Soviet tactics and training. Secret 5X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 I7V 25X1 25X1 25X1 225X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 There is, however, at least some resentment in Viet- nam about Soviet influence on PAVN training. The quality of training in the USSR has been questioned. Vietnamese students have com- plained that instructors place greater importance on a "pro-Soviet outlook" than on military competence. The Vietnamese have accepted the Soviet military advisers at the armed forces academies, 13 Secret 25X1 Hanoi's insistence25X1K1 upon defining the political or "military art" dimen- sion of PAVN's training not only distinguishes it from Soviet Warsaw Pact allies and other key Soviet military clients such as Ethiopia?where Soviet influ- ence extends over party matters as well?but also reflects the importance the Vietnamese attach to their 25X1 own military history and experience. ,25X1 ZOA I Influence on Military Doctrine Having defeated the French and Americans in two important Indochinese wars and having successfully withstood the 1979 Chinese incursion, the Vietnamese are proud of their military history. Vietnamese lead- ers believe the PAVN officers, who have extensive combat experience, are highly competent but ac- knowledge that their technical skills and knowledge of sophisticated weaponry are limited. The Vietnamese have always borrowed selectively from foreign mili- tary doctrines, including, in recent years, Soviet doc- trine. The Vietnamese are tailoring Soviet military practices to fit PAVN's specific needs. They recognize that PAVN has gained from Soviet military expertise, but they believe they cannot adopt foreign ideas without analyzing them first. Defense Minister Van Tien Dung, in December 1984, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary celebration of the founding of PAVN, stated that PAVN "has benefited greatly from the experience and advanced knowledge of the Soviets." General Dung emphasized, though, that Vietnamese military science, "due to the specific conditions and situation of the revolution ... must successfully re- solve by itself [italics added] all problems arising in the people's lives from their hard struggle." 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X11 In an article in the December 1984 Tap Chi Cong San, the Vietnamese Communist Party theoretical 25X1 journal, Lt. Gen. Bui Phung discussed the importance of integrating Soviet aid into PAVN's rear services. Although acknowledging the significance of aid, he did not suggest the restructuring of Vietnamese forces Secret 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret along Soviet lines. Instead, he stressed that PAVN must decide how best to use Soviet aid to suit its specific needs: The aid from the Soviet Union and the socialist countries has been very effective. It has made us better able to supply advanced technical equip- ment and materials to troops in our rear ser- vices. However, this aid demands that we in- crease our research, that we study and learn the properties and uses of this equipment in order to maintain and utilize it in a manner consistent with climatic and geographical conditions on the battlefield in our country and the circum- stances under which our troops live and fight. The One-Commander System Soviet advisers assigned to PAVN, nonetheless, have apparently been successful in persuading the Viet- namese leadership to adopt certain far-reaching changes in their command structure. The most impor tant example is the Vietnamese decision to adopt the one-commander model practiced by the Soviets. In this system, the senior military commander takes responsibility for both command and political deci- sions in his unit. Previously, the Vietnamese had adopted the Chinese dual-command system where military and political officers of equivalent ranks thrashed out command decisions.' In the past, the Soviets themselves have had problems sorting out the relationship between military and political officers. Tensions were greatest from the 1920s until the middle of World War II when the zampolit (political officers) were subordinated to the military commander on several occasions, only to be reinstated again on equal footing. This even included the authority to cosign operational orders. Since 1942, however, the one-commander prin- ciple has prevailed in the Soviet military. Secret Clashes at the Working Level Despite the close Soviet-Vietnamese military relation- ship, differences in outlook sometimes lead to prob- lems. many PAVN officials respect Soviet military exper- tise but believe the Soviets do not sufficiently under- stand the special circumstances facing Vietnam. For example, younger PAVN officers?the generation the Soviets are trying to influence?have expressed doubts about the suitabil- ity of Soviet-type motorized divisions in the Vietnam- ese environment. Their concerns include an inade- quate road network, impassable jungle and mountain areas, and the PAVN soldiers' lack of technical sophistication. Although PAVN forces are being mod- ernized the process is probably hindered by skepticism among the PAVN rank and file. Apparently, the Vietnamese often passively resist Soviet advice, by voicing agree- ment but taking no action to implement it. 14 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25)(1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 The Soviet Advisory Role in Laos and Cambodia Moscow's and Hanoi's Shared Objectives... The Soviets have provided the military, economic, and advisory aid necessary for Vietnam's continued domi- nation of Laos and occupation of Cambodia. The Soviet military advisory presence followed in the wake of PAVN troops-40,000 to 50,000 in control of Laos since 1975 and 140,000 occupying Cambodia since late 1978. By supporting Vietnam's longstanding ob- jectives in Indochina, Moscow gains favor in Hanoi and forestalls Beijing's influence. The security relationship that Moscow and Hanoi have worked out is complementary. The Vietnamese furnish the manpower necessary to stabilize the situa- tion in its client states (that is, keeping out the Chinese), and the Soviets provide the financial re- sources and military and technical expertise for up- grading the armed forces of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Moreover, both Hanoi and Moscow appar- ently agree that there should be three separate states in Indochina, and the Vietnamese probably welcome Moscow's long-term economic and military commit- ments to Vientiane and Phnom Penh, which support the Lao Communist government and buttress the besieged Heng Samrin regime.' ' The Chinese have long held that the Vietnamese would like to subsume both Laos and Cambodia into one entity, an Indochina Federation, assuming the role the French had in the 19th century as colonizers. It appears Hanoi prefers to exert suzerainty over Laos and Cambodia by establishing puppet governments in the respective capitals, thus maintainin the facade of an independent Laos and Cambodia. 15 Secret ... And Frictions although will- ing to support Vietnam's dominant role in Laos and Cambodia, the Soviets are nevertheless resolved to maintain their own independent presence in both countries. They have committed substantial resources to establishing their foothold in Indochina and want to be in a position to discourage or prevent Hanoi from evicting them. They are reportedly aware of the distrust and animosity the Lao and Cambodians have for the Vietnamese and are trying to develop separate links with each country as a means of exerting some leverage on the Vietnamese. Moscow's apparent objective in Laos and Cambodia is to have as high a profile as possible without offending the Vietnamese. The Soviets are unlikely to jeopar- dize their strategic gains in Vietnam, especially their base at Cam Ranh, by pushing too hard and fast to build up their influence in Vietnam's client states, particularly at Hanoi's expense. They probably learned a lesson in 1981 when the Vietnamese ousted Pen Sovan?the first Khmer leader installed by Ha- noi?after the invasion of Cambodia. While the pre- cise reasons for Pen Sovan's removal are unclear, one factor was Hanoi's suspicion of Pen Sovan's close- ness to the Soviets. the Vietnamese are not totally happy with the expanding Soviet security role in the other two states. The Vietnamese, whose political advisers dominate the decisionmaking pro- cess in Laos and Cambodia, are in a position to restrict the contact the Lao and Khmer have with the Soviets. Secret 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret The Soviet Military Presence in Cambodia The Soviets have played a key role in supporting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia for the past seven years. They have given diplomatic and media support to their ally, and, without Moscow's extensive economic aid of an estimated $1 billion annually, it is unlikely that Hanoi, given the dismal state of the economy, would be in a position to sustain the costly occupation of Cambodia. Soviet military materiel and advisory assistance to Vietnam have enhanced Han- oi's position in Cambodia as well. Moscow, knowing that Vietnamese actions against the Cambodian resistance in the early spring of 1984 triggered a strong military response from China in April and May, nevertheless provided considerable military and political backing to Vietnam before and during Hanoi's 1984-85 dry-season offensive. Soviet Ground Forces Chief, Marshal Petrov, who arrived in Vietnam on 20 December 1984 to attend the Viet- namese 40th armed forces anniversary, was the high- est ranking Soviet military visitor to Indochina since Chief of Staff Ogarkov visited Hanoi in 1982. Viet- nam's planned attacks on the resistance forces were Secret probably discussed during this visit. Ground Forces and Logistics. Soviet efforts to up- grade the Cambodian ground, naval, and air forces dovetail with Hanoi's objective of improving Phnom Penh's armed forces so that it can gradually reduce its own military presence in Cambodia. Because the Vietnamese need Soviet military advisers to maintain the weaponry the USSR has sent, the Soviets have continuing opportunities to exert influence in Cambo- dian military affairs. Military training in the USSR gives the Soviets another opportunity to cultivate Cambodian military personnel. 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret 25X1 we do not expect that the Soviets will soon establish a 25X1 major support facility in Cambodia for their own use. At the same time 25X1 since the beginning of 1985, the Soviets have deliv- ered several small naval craft to the Cambodians. The Soviets might, therefore, help the Cambodians to upgrade at least one of the naval facilities to accom- modate their fledgling navy. Phsar Ream is probably the better candidate for upgrading. Kampong Saom is the only deepwater port in Cambodia, but it is also more congested with merchant shipping. Phsar Ream is more isolated, and its facilities are adequate for the small craft the Soviets are providing. Soviet ships occasionally call at the facility to show the flag in the Gulf of Thailand, and Soviet vessels could also dock at Phsar Ream for replenishing food and water. Air Force. Soviet efforts to establish a Cambodian air force reportedly have been under way since at least 1981, 17 The deployment of MIG-21s to Cambodia, would introduce a new tactical air capability that could be used against Khmer guerrilla forces in Cambodia. Thailand would also face a potential threat along the Cambodian border. While we believe a fledgling Cambodian air force would present only a modest military threat to Thailand, the psychological impact might be greater. Deployments of MIG-21s to Cam- bodia would intensify Thai security concerns, already high following Vietnam's aggressive dry-season cam- paign against Cambodian resistance groups and nu- merous incursions into Thailand. Secret 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1(1 25X1 225X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 Secret Soviet Aid to Laos Soviet deliveries to Laos since 1979 include small arms, artillery pieces, armored vehicles, patrol boats, communications equipment, radar, and SA-3 mis- siles. Soviet civilian specialists have also worked on proj- ects that build up the country's infrastructure and have security implications. These projects include the construction of roads, fuel pipelines, hospitals and schools, and mining, and mapmaking. The Soviet Military Advisory Group in Laos The Soviets have had an advisory presence in Laos since the Communist takeover in 1975. the Soviets made even more significant inroads in Laos after 1978, following the deterioration of Lao-Chinese relations, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, and the withdrawal of Chi- nese roadbuilding units from Laos in early 1979. Since signing a defense agreement with Laos in 1978, the Soviets have taken the lead in modernizing the Lao People's Army (LPA) by turning a largely guer- rilla army into a fledgling conventional military force, We believe the Soviets' major goal is to upgrade the fighting capability of the LPA through arms deliver- ies, advisory assistance, training, and reorganization 19 The Soviets also have been instrumental in developing the small but growing Lao Air Force. The Soviets supply the aircraft, help train the pilots, and work with Lao technicians to maintain the planes. Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11S00229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ZOA I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Outlook Possible Soviet Responses to Another Chinese Attack The extensive aid the Soviets have given their Indo- chinese allies since 1979, as well as the Soviet base at Cam Ranh, raises the question of how the Soviets would respond to another large-scale Chinese attack on Vietnam. Soviet leaders probably believe that improvements in Vietnamese military capabilities since 1979 will deter the Chinese from military activities more serious than artillery exchanges along the Sino-Vietnamese border or a naval show of force in the South China Sea. The 1979 Chinese incursion into Vietnam was costly enough; a second "lesson" almost certainly would be even more damaging, given the Vietnamese buildup. Chinese decisionmakers would also have to consider both the Soviet-assisted buildup of the Vietnamese Navy and the Soviet naval and air forces at Cam Ranh. At the same time, the Soviets no doubt realize that their expanded military presence in Vietnam raises the chances of their direct involvement should such a conflict occur. The Soviets would undoubtedly try to stay out of the conflict as long as they believed the Vietnamese could handle it. Indeed, Moscow probably has not given direct guarantees to come to Hanoi's assistance in the event of a Chinese attack. Both parties probably find it beneficial to leave the nature of any Soviet response vague; Hanoi for fear the Soviets would say no, Moscow for fear of having to refuse a commitment. Moreover, both Hanoi and Moscow probably see advantages to Chinese uncer- tainty over the likelihood and nature of Soviet mili- tary responses. A Chinese attack that seriously threatened Vietnam would confront the Soviets with a dilemma. It would put at risk the USSR's recently won strategic position in Southest Asia. At the same time, a decisive Soviet military intervention in a land war in Southeast Asia would not only be logistically difficult to support, but also could develop into a major Sino-Soviet conflict on several fronts. We cannot confidently predict how either the Soviets or the Chinese would behave in a regional crisis, but we judge that both would want to avoid a major escalation. Secret There are, of course, a number of actions, short of direct intervention, by which the Soviets could weigh in on Vietnam's side. These include stepped-up mili- tary resupply, provision of intelligence support and more direct advisory assistance, diplomatic de- marches, and, perhaps, the threat of military ma- neuvers on China's northern borders. Almost certain- ly, a regional crisis would halt present efforts to improve Sino-Soviet relations. Projected Advisory Role We believe the Soviet military advisory presence in Vietnam has stabilized. The Soviets will continue to work closely with PAVN along the Sino-Vietnamese border, helping the Vietnamese to improve their tac- tics, absorb modern equipment, and upgrade commu- nications capabilities. The slow pace of PAVN mod- ernization and reorganization along Soviet lines- -indicates the Soviet advisory presence will be required for some time. The Soviets also have a vested interest in remaining in Vietnam to ensure that their influence in the country remains intact. The Soviets' presence in Laos and Cambodia is likely to increase as their military advisory skills and weap- ons are needed to build up the Lao and Cambodian armed forces. The military advisory presence could double within the next five years, The Soviets' Future Use of Cam Ranh We believe the Soviet buildup at Cam Ranh will continue at a measured pace through the 1980s. We do not expect a change in Moscow's priority of assigning its most advanced ships and aircraft to the defense of the Soviet Far East. At the same time, as the Pacific Fleet grows, the Soviets will have addition- al combatants and aircraft available for out-of-area operations, such as those at Cam Ranh. The gradual growth at the base is thus in part a result of the ongoing expansion and modernization of the Soviet 20 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 fl 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Pacific Fleet. In addition, the Soviets probably are constrained by political factors such as Vietnamese sensitivities over sovereignty. The ships the Soviets are most likely to deploy through the 1980s include additional diesel and nuclear-powered attack submarines?possibly equipped with new long-range cruise missiles?and small missile-armed combatants. The deployment of mobile surface-to-surface coastal defense missiles would be a logical next step. In recent years, however, the Soviets have been improving existing support facilities, building new ones, and increasing the amount of ground support equipment at Cam Ranh Airfield. This activity sug- gests the Soviets eventually will deploy additional aircraft?probably more Badgers?to Cam Ranh. The construction at the airfield also raises the possi- bility that the USSR may send Backfire bombers? the aircraft that will replace the Badger in Soviet Naval Aviation?to Vietnam. This deployment would signify an important departure from the gradual Soviet buildup at Cam Ranh. The Backfire is faster than the Badger, carries better antiship missiles, and has more complete and sophisticated jamming capa- bilities. Its deployment to Vietnam would also widen the Soviet military threat to the region because its greater combat radius would enable it to strike targets as far away as Australia and well into the Pacific Basin. We believe, however, that requirements to perform higher priority missions from Soviet territory and the relatively slow pace at which Backfires are being introduced into Soviet Naval Aviation make their permanent basing in Cam Ranh unlikely over the next few years. The Soviets, nonetheless, could at any time make temporary deployments 21 The Soviets may eventually add more air defense equipment such as surface-to-air missiles to strengthen the overall air defense capabilities at Cam Ranh. The stronger naval force backed up by the air regi- ment would improve the USSR's ability to conduct distant area missions and interdict unescorted mer- chant shipping and lightly defended convoys in the 25X1 South China Sea. It would also increase the potential threat to Western naval ships in the area, but proba- bly would not have sufficient stren th to defeat US carrier battle groups. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 225X1 25X1 25X1 Over the longer term, the Soviets probably calculate that their growing military capabilities at Cam Ranh?as contrasted with the uncertain future of US 25X1 military bases in the Philippines?will strengthen the position of those groups within non-Communist Southeast Asia that are willing to distance their countries from the West, especially those countries that fear the United States might turn to them for bases. 25X1 Secret 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 _ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/24: CIA-RDP11500229R000201930001-4
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	2	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Khamtai Siphandone	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/military/images/f/f4/Ambox_content.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/20?cb=20131224231759", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/180px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6a181c72-e8bf-419b-b4db-18fd56a0eb60", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/6c42ce6a-b205-41f5-82c6-5011721932e7", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/464fc70a-5090-490b-b47e-0759e89c263f", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/f7bb9d33-4f9a-4faa-88fe-2a0bd8138668" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Military Wiki" ]	2024-07-03T16:38:30+00:00	General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao language: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924)[1] is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos[2] from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	Military Wiki	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao language: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924)[1] is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos[2] from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He was a member of the Communist Party of Indochina in 1954 and a member of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in 1956. As of 2022, he is the oldest living state leader. Early life[] Siphandone comes from a peasant family from the far south of Laos. His first job was as a postman. He joined the national liberation movement Lao Issara after the end of the Second World War, which stood for the independence of Laos and against the return of the French protectorate administration. Before the French regained control of Savannakhet in March 1946, Siphandone seized the entire provincial fund (150,000 piastres). He became an officer of the armed wing of the movement and in 1948 their representative for southern Laos. After the split of Lao Issara in 1950 he joined the Pro-Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao.[3] In 1954 he became a member of the Communist Party of Indochina, 1955 Lao People's Party, whose central committee he was from 1957. He was considered a close confidant of the first Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane. In 1962 he became his successor as chief of staff of the armed units of the Pathet Lao. In 1966 he became commander-in-chief of the resulting "Lao People's Liberation Army", which fought with North Vietnamese support in the Laotian civil war against the royal troops. In 1972 he rose to the Politburo of the LPRP.[3] Political career[] After the Communist takeover in 1975, he became Minister of Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He held this office for 16 years. After Kaysone and Nouhak Phoumsavanh he was from the 5th party congress in 1991 number three in the party leadership. On 15 August 1991, he became Kaysone's successor as successor. After the death of longtime party leader Kaysone 1992 Siphandone rose to the top of the state party LPRP. He was the military commander of the Pathet Lao rebellion. On its takeover of the Laotian government in 1975 he became minister of defence, commander of the army, and a deputy prime minister. On the creation of chairmanship of LPRP q the in 1991, he became prime minister, succeeding party leader Kaysone Phomvihane, who became president. Siphandone became party leader on Kaysone's death, and succeeded Nouhak Phoumsavanh as president in 1998. At the 8th Party Congress in 2006, he became an Advisor to the LPRP Central Committee. Siphandone remained as party leader until 21 March 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly. As expected, he stepped down as President soon after the 30 April 2006, National Assembly elections. References[] Party political offices Preceded by Phoumi Vongvichit President of the Lao Front for National Construction 1991 – 2001 Succeeded by Sisavath Keobounphanh Preceded by Kaysone Phomvihane Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 1992 – 2006 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone (General Secretary) Political offices Preceded by None Minister for Defence of Laos 1975 – 1991 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone Preceded by Kaysone Phomvihane Prime Minister of Laos 1991 – 1998 Succeeded by Sisavath Keobounphanh Preceded by Nouhak Phoumsavanh President of Laos 1998 – 2006 Succeeded by Choummaly Sayasone Diplomatic posts Preceded by Megawati Sukarnoputri Chairperson of ASEAN 2004 Succeeded by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Template:LPPRGenSecs
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	11	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	en	New Lao PM inherits multiple poison chalices	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	https://i0.wp.com/asiati…600%2C1068&ssl=1	[ "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AT-logo-wide-banner-1.png?fit=706%2C104&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1", "https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/?s=80&d=mm&r=pg", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Sonexay-Siphandone-Laos-2022.jpg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Laos-Laos-China-Railway-Poster-Facebook-e1556077338457.jpg?resize=780%2C401&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Trump-American-Flag-US.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Tempest-BAE-Systems-UK.jpg?resize=800%2C600&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Israel-Protest-2024.jpg?resize=1200%2C900&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Phankham-Viphavanh.jpg?resize=780%2C468&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-28T104904Z_2030712917_RC138B6E0030_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-UN.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Laos-Fuel-Line-Inflation-May-2022.jpg?resize=780%2C486&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Hong-Kong-skyline-e1571882091566.jpg?resize=780%2C472&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Laos-Khamtay-Siphandone.jpg?resize=780%2C520&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Blinken_Wang-Yi.jpg?fit=1200%2C675&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/US-Factory-Industrial-Policy.jpg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/China-EW.jpg?fit=1200%2C799&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/B-21-Raider-US-Air-Force.jpg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Tempest-BAE-Systems-UK.jpg?fit=1200%2C801&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/maxresdefault-e1721871787674.jpeg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Trump-American-Flag-US.jpg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/asa_2022-11-25_22-10-56.jpeg?fit=1200%2C800&ssl=1&resize=240%2C240", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Nvidia-B200.png?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Kim-Jong-Un-North-Korea-Cigarette.jpeg?resize=240%2C240&ssl=1", "https://asiatimes.com/wp-includes/images/rss.png", "https://i0.wp.com/asiatimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/asia-times-logo-2.png?fit=738%2C125&ssl=1" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "David Hutt" ]	2023-01-02T13:49:16+00:00	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the	en	https://asiatimes.com/wp…ATLogo-192px.png	Asia Times	https://asiatimes.com/2023/01/new-lao-pm-inherits-multiple-poison-chalices/	The scion of a major political dynasty and a key conduit for Chinese investment, Sonexay Siphandone took over as Laos’ prime minister last week after the unexpected early resignation of his predecessor. After weeks of rumors about whether he would go, Phankham Viphavanh offered his resignation as on December 30, the last day of a National Assembly sitting. He goes down as the shortest-serving prime minister in the communist era, in the job just shy of 24 months. Under his tenure, Laos had a particularly poor Covid-19 response in 2021 and then was hit by economic crises on multiple fronts last year. He’s also at the center of several scandals that have tainted the image of a formerly straight-cut apparatchik. “I am 72 years old, and am no longer in good health,” Phankham said before the assembly. “Because of this, I feel that I can no longer carry the heavy burdens our country is facing.” Sonexay, a former deputy prime minister and investment minister, received a near-unanimous vote from the National Assembly to become the next prime minister. Aged 56, he is one of the youngest premiers in recent history. “I understand deeply that this will be a difficult and challenging role,” he told the National Assembly. Indeed, Laos has one of Asia’s highest rates of inflation, a fast depreciating currency, and there’s no certainty it won’t default on its external debts, much of which is owed to key partner China, not least for a high-speed railway project connecting the two countries. Sonexay’s most important and immediate task will be to convince Beijing to give debt deferrals on loans owed at a time it can barely afford interest repayments. Beijing, for its part, won’t want another key Belt and Road Initiative partner to default. Sonexay hails from one of Laos’ two most important political dynasties. His father Khamtay Siphandone was a former prime minister and state president in the 1990s, and aged 98 still exerts big influence over the party. “Sonexay, as a next-generation leader entrusted by the senior party leaders, is expected to lead those technocrats in crucial cabinet positions who are also from mainstream clans and close to dynasties,” says Toshiro Nishizawa, a University of Tokyo professor and a former adviser to the Lao government. “Sonexay’s ascension might reflect accelerated leadership rejuvenation attempts with the party’s inner circle consensus led by Thongloun Sisoulith,” the state president and communist party chief, Nishizawa added. Given the dynastic source of power, some analysts doubt whether Sonexay is much of a “technocrat”, although he has occupied key government posts and was made chair of a special economic task force set up in mid-2022. It “may represent a step backwards for any ‘good governance’ initiatives in Laos, such as they are,” says an analyst who requested anonymity. Indeed, the Siphandone family is known for being close to corrupt officials and involvement in the shady world of Laos’ extractive resources. An analyst noted that Khamtay “oversaw the peak of the logging boom in Laos in the 1990s.” The mood in Laos is mixed, even though rumors had been circulating for weeks that Phankham would retire. One Lao resident told Asia Times that they’re hopeful Sonexay can shake up the government and was pleasantly surprised that the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), which would have directly managed the power transfer, had even accepted it. Some analysts had doubted rumors in recent weeks that Phankham would resign because they believed it would be an explicit admission of personnel and policy failure by the party. Even though Phankham used the excuse of poor health, which may or may not be true, many Laos reckon he was forced out. But another resident of Vientiane says that “most people are just resigned to how things are now. Most of the rural youth have already left for work in Thailand, the educated try for scholarships.” Sonexay’s assumption of the premiership is a major victory for the Siphandone clan, whose power base lies in the south of the country. His sister, Viengthong Siphandone, rose quickly through the ranks at the party’s last National Congress in early 2021 to become the new chair of the Supreme Court. She was formerly head of the State Audit Organization. Viengthong is married to Khampheng Saysompheng, a former minister of Labor and Social Welfare, and then minister of Industry and Commerce (he was replaced in June). He is “widely seen as one of many corrupt high-level government officials,” stated an analyst writing in 2015. As well as Viengthong, ranked 18th in the Central Committee, two other members of the Siphandone clan sit on the party’s decision-making body: Viengsavath (ranked 52nd) and Athsaphangthong (64th). Sonexay first made it into the Central Committee in 2006 after serving as governor of Champasak province, in southwestern Laos. A decade later he was elected onto the Politburo for the first time and made a deputy prime minister and head of the prime minister’s office, a position that put him in close contact with Thongloun Sisoulith, the prime minister at the time. Thongloun is now state president and general secretary of the communist party. As well as a deputy prime minister, Sonexay also in 2019 became Minister of Planning and Investment, one of the most powerful positions in the cabinet as it confers close cooperation with influential investors from China and Vietnam, as well as direct access to the governments in Beijing and Hanoi. Because of his family pedigree and fast rise through the party ranks, some analysts suspected that Sonexay might have been named prime minister at the last quinquennial power reshuffle in early 2021. But months before the National Assembly made its announcement, he only received the ninth rank in the Politburo during the party’s National Congress, a sign he wasn’t about to land the premiership. Instead, that post went to Phankham, who arguably took over at the wrong possible moment. After experiencing hardly any cases of Covid-19 in 2020, infection and death rates spiked in the months after Phankham became prime minister in March 2021. At one point last year, Laos sat at the bottom of the Nikkei Asia Covid-19 Recovery Index. Then came the economic crisis of 2022. Inflation has topped nearly 40%. The local currency, the kip, crashed in value by as much as 68% against the US dollar, as of October. About a fifth of the workforce is unemployed, reckons the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. Worse, Laos’ debt-service obligations will average US$1.3 billion per year from next year until 2026, roughly the same amount the state had in official foreign reserves in June. It isn’t clear if Laos can continue making these payments or if it will receive further debt deferrals from China, its main external creditor. A default could be on the cards, many analysts reckon. Phankham may have been the public face of these crises, but Sonexay played an active role after being appointed head of the government’s special economic task force in June. He delivered the economic report at the latest sitting of the National Assembly in December. Phankham was also dogged by scandals. He has come under criticism for allegedly granting too many concessions for mining exploitation in the north of the country and over his government’s failure to adequately tackle corruption, Radio Free Asia reports. During his resignation speech, Phankham claimed that he was stepping down because of reaching the retirement age and “health problems”, although there is much skepticism about the claim. In addition, there are rumors that the Siphandone family advanced their power move because Khamtay, the 98-year-old patriarch, is currently in poor health. But a Lao source told Asia Times that Sonexay’s promotion may have come earlier than desired since Lao prime ministers are rarely re-elected. Sonexay is a “compromise figure” within the ruling communist party, the source added. It isn’t clear that Sonexay will entirely benefit from this early reshuffle, and that it might have been politically wiser for him if Phankham had continued for another 12 months or so in the job and then staged a reshuffle when the worst of the economic crisis is expected to be over. Most analysts expect a slightly better economic situation next year although the major problems will persist, as Asia Times reported last week the World Bank expects gross domestic product (GDP) growth of around 3.8%, compared to just 2.5% in 2022. Sonexay’s premiership could be helped in that his promotion comes as China races down the path of reopening from “zero-Covid.” Greater numbers of Chinese tourists are expected to visit Laos this year, boosting the important but depleted sector and delivering more foreign currency reserves to the state coffers. More Chinese investment and trade with Laos is also expected in 2023. Sonexay’s father, Khamtay, was the leader of the party’s military wing in the 1970s and 1980s, and is suspected of having opposed many of the pro-market reform ideas being led by party founding secretary-general Kaysone Phomvihane. However, Khamtay oversaw many economic reforms during his premiership in the early 1990s, although he strongly opposed political reform. Laos remains one of the most repressive states in Asia, with no free press or allowances for dissent. Sonexay isn’t expected to lead any major shift in foreign policy for Laos, which tries to balance between China and Vietnam, its main trade and political partners. Phankham was seen by some as being closer to the Vietnamese side, as he was the former president of the Laos-Vietnam Friendship Association. In November 2000, President Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese head of state to visit Laos, following an invitation by then-Lao president Khamtay Siphandone. As investment minister, Sonexay was deeply involved in several Chinese-led projects, including the $6 billion China-Lao railway. He also has ties with Vietnam and Thailand. In October 2017, he led a delegation to Hanoi to meet Nguyen Phu Trong, general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Vietnamese prime minister Pham Minh Chinh was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Sonexay on his ascension to the premiership. US Ambassador to Vientiane Peter Haymond also offered his congratulations. “The United States is committed to our Comprehensive Partnership with the Lao PDR, and we look forward to working with the Prime Minister and his government to support Laos’ continued economic recovery,” he said in a statement.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	9	https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2024/02/09/laos-celebrates-100th-anniversary-of-president-khamtay-siphandone039s-birth	en	Laos celebrates 100th anniversary of President Khamtay Siphandone's birth	https://apicms.thestar.c…2/09/2536730.jpg	https://apicms.thestar.c…2/09/2536730.jpg	[ "https://www.thestar.com.my/theme_metro/images/TSOL640x100.png", "https://cdn.thestar.com.my/Themes/img/close.png", "https://apicms.thestar.com.my/uploads/images/2024/07/23/thumbs/200/2817461.webp", "https://apicms.thestar.com.my/uploads/images/2024/07/23/thumbs/200/2817461.webp", "https://apicms.thestar.com.my/uploads/images/2024/07/22/thumbs/200/2816128.webp", "https://apicms.thestar.com.my/uploads/images/2024/07/23/thumbs/200/2817418.webp", "http://b.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=6035691&cv=2.0&cj=1", "https://cdn.thestar.com.my/Themes/img/times-solid.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "Laos", "Khamtay Siphandone", "birth", "anniversary" ]	null	[ "The Star Online" ]	2024-02-09T00:00:00	VIENTIANE: President Thongloun Sisoulith, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone and other government leaders on Wednesday (Feb 7) attended an event to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Khamtay Siphandone and reflect on his virtues and his outstanding achievements for the nation and all Lao people.	en	https://cdn.thestar.com.my/Themes/img/favicon.ico	The Star	https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2024/02/09/laos-celebrates-100th-anniversary-of-president-khamtay-siphandone039s-birth	VIENTIANE: President Thongloun Sisoulith, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone and other government leaders on Wednesday (Feb 7) attended an event to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Khamtay Siphandone and reflect on his virtues and his outstanding achievements for the nation and all Lao people. Speaking at the event, Vice President Bounthong Chitmany said that on this momentous occasion the Party and state and Lao citizens recalled and praised the great virtues of the president and his untiring dedication to the liberation and self-determination of his country. President Khamtay Siphandone was a great patriot, an outstanding revolutionary, and capable and firm in all situations, Dr Bounthong said. President Khamtay Siphandone was one of the first generation of leaders who stood side by side with President Kaysone Phomvihane and other leaders in establishing the revolutionary party and army in Laos. As part of the celebrations, an exhibition of photos, documents and books titled “The Life and Revolutionary Activities of President Khamtay Siphandone” opened on Wednesday at the Kaysone Phomvihane Museum in Vientiane. This exhibition aims to publicise the life and revolutionary activities of President Khamtay Siphandone, who made such an important contribution to the revolutionary mission of the Party and the people, to the extent that everyone in Laos and many other countries knew of his determination to achieve victory and free Laos from foreign domination. At the same time, the exhibition is an educational opportunity for all employees, Party members, soldiers, police, students, and Lao and foreign visitors, teaching them about the valiant efforts of the former President and other Party and state leaders. The exhibition is open to the public for three months. - Vientiane Times/ANN
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	46	https://laos.embassy.gov.au/vtan/Celebrating-65-years-of-Laos-Australia-relations.html	en	Celebrating 65 years of Laos-Australia relations			[ "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/app/images/coat-of-arms-black-80.png", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/Cheering.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/65th-awardees.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/PhotosExhibition.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/all/X-Twitter-Icon.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/app/css/favicon.ico?v=-1122234577		null	The Australian Embassy last night conferred five ‘65th anniversary awards’ to recognise outstanding contributions to Laos-Australia relations at its National Day reception in Vientiane. The reception, which this year also marked the 65th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Australia and the Lao PDR, was attended by around 400 guests from the Lao Government, business community, civil society, academia, media and representatives of the diplomatic corps. Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith, who completed a Masters Degree at Monash University under an Australia Awards scholarship, attended as the Guest of Honour, and presented the 65th anniversary awards. The reception also featured an exhibition of historical photographs to capture important moments in Laos-Australia relations over the past six decades – including the memorable 1993 visit to Australia by then Prime Minister Khamtay Siphandone, and the opening of the first Australian-built Friendship Bridge across the Mekong in 1994. Australian Ambassador to the Lao PDR, John Williams, said the 65th anniversary awards were intended to personalise Australia-Laos relations, as well as to recognise outstanding achievement. “The real strength of Laos-Australia relations over the past 65 years is not the architecture put in place by our two governments, but the myriad of positive networks of collaboration between the people of both countries across so many areas of work and life,” Williams said. The recipients of the 65th anniversary awards included Phu Bia Mining General Manager, and AustCham Lao founder Richard Taylor, for his contribution to bilateral ties and two-way business connections; Thasano Centre Director Dr Phoudalay Lathvilavong, for her long collaboration with Australian agricultural experts to support small holder farming families in southern Laos; and LNCCI Vice President and leading Lao geologist Saman Aneka, for his contribution to two-way trade and investment. Mahosot Hospital Director, Prof Bounthapany Bounxoie, received an award on behalf of the entire Interplast Lao program team. Surgical teams from Australian NGO Interplast have, for over two decades, trained local counterparts and helped deliver reconstructive and plastic surgery for burns and other accident victims. One award was conferred posthumously on the late Dr Grant Evans, a founding father in the field of Lao studies and one of Australia’s leading academics on contemporary South-East Asia. Dr Evans passed away in September 2014 after a short battle with cancer. His wife, Keomany, received the award from Minister Saleumxay. Two senior Lao Government recipients were unable to attend the Australia Day reception, but will receive their awards at separate 65th anniversary events later in the year. Two of Australia’s better known Lao alumni, Volachit Intharaphithak (Sam) and Aluna Thavonesouk, joined Australian band the Sally Marett Trio to entertain guests. This included a duet by Sam and Aluna of the song, ‘Australia and Laos, friends forever’ which Sam wrote to celebrate the friendship between both countries. Guests were also treated to Luang Prabang-style kangaroo sausages, as well as Australian beef and lamb, wine, cheese and beer, and famous Australian deserts, including pavlova and lamingtons. Laos’ relationship with Australia is the country’s longest unbroken diplomatic relationship at Ambassador level. Australia remains one of the Lao PDR’s main development partners, with Australia’s programs focusing on education and human resource development, trade and business reform, rural development and agriculture, and natural resource management. For further information, or queries please contact: Khounkham Douangphachone, Media and Communications Officer
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	30	https://laotiantimes.com/2023/11/20/former-presidents-centenary-spurs-transformation-of-historic-residence/	en	Former President's Centenary Spurs Transformation of Historic Residence	https://laotiantimes.com…2023/11/00-1.jpg	https://laotiantimes.com…2023/11/00-1.jpg	[ "https://sp-ao.shortpixel.ai/client/to_webp,q_lossless,ret_img,w_395,h_60/https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Asset-2@2x-8.png", "https://sp-ao.shortpixel.ai/client/to_webp,q_lossless,ret_img,w_395,h_60/https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Asset-2@2x-8.png", "https://sp-ao.shortpixel.ai/client/to_webp,q_lossless,ret_img/https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/WhatsApp-Image-2024-07-15-at-14.22.18_77289d7a.jpg", "https://sp-ao.shortpixel.ai/client/to_webp,q_lossless,ret_img,w_1068,h_558/https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/00-1-1068x558.jpg", "https://sp-ao.shortpixel.ai/client/to_webp,q_lossless,ret_img,w_395,h_60/https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/New-logo.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Chono Lapuekou" ]	2023-11-20T00:00:00	Champasack Provincial authorities are gearing up to transform the old residence of former President Khamtai Siphandone into a multifaceted tourist destination and educational hub.	en	https://laotiantimes.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/new-favicon-300x300.jpg><meta name=description content=Champasack Provincial authorities are gearing up to transform the old residence of former President Khamtai Siphandone into a multifaceted tourist destination and educational hub.	Laotian Times	https://laotiantimes.com/2023/11/20/former-presidents-centenary-spurs-transformation-of-historic-residence/	Champasack Provincial authorities are gearing up to transform the old residence of former President Khamtai Siphandone into a multifaceted tourist destination and educational hub. Located in Hua Khong Pha Nyai village, within the Hua Khong district of Champasack Province, this historic house is set to undergo a significant metamorphosis. The impetus for this transformation is the upcoming 100th birthday of former President Khamtai. A milestone that will be commemorated in the coming year, as reported by the state media outlet Pathed Lao. Born on 8 February 1924, Khamtai served as President of Laos from 1998 to 2006 and Chairman of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party from 1992 to 2006. In an effort to pay homage to the remarkable life and contributions of President Khamtai Siphandone, Champasack Provincial authorities are crafting a comprehensive plan. The initiative encompasses a diverse array of activities, ranging from commemorating his achievements and publishing biographical materials to conducting interviews with party members and community stakeholders. The planned activities include seminar sessions, documentary production, and engaging question-answer competitions delving into the nuances of President Khamtai’s leadership. A visual feast awaits visitors, with exhibitions featuring photographs depicting the various facets of the president’s life and daily activities. Additionally, gatherings and flea markets showcasing local Lao products from Champasak Province will add a vibrant touch to the celebrations. The authorities are gathering details about the president’s residence, his birthplace, and other relevant aspects. The overarching objective is to preserve these historical landmarks as not only tourist attractions but also as learning centers, fostering a deeper understanding of the nation’s history.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	0	0	https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-simple.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg/220px-The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Crystal_Clear_app_Login_Manager.png/20px-Crystal_Clear_app_Login_Manager.png", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://simple.wikipedia.org/static/images/footer/poweredby_mediawiki.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2014-02-26T23:49:45+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khamtai_Siphandone	General Khamtai Siphandon (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924) is a Laotian politician. He was President of Laos[1] from 24 February 1998, until 8 June 2006, when he was officially replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He also served as Prime Minister of Laos from 15 August 1991 to 24 February 1998.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	65	http://www.mofa.gov.la/index.php/activities/state-leaders/5610-70th-anniversary-of-the-establishment-of-diplomatic-relations-between-the-lao-pdr-and-the-france-republic	en	70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Lao PDR and the France Republic			[ "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/logo3.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/e-magazine_EN.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/evisa.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/pic02.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/laoGovern.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/law project.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/united nations.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/ltp.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/banners/asean.png", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/70LaoFrance-remark.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/70LaoFrance-4.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/2021Leaders/Leaders2024/70LaoFrance-5.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/ASEAN2024/2024_ASEAN_Logo.jpg", "http://www.mofa.gov.la/images/party%20X.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	/templates/test15eng/favicon.ico		null	Remarks by H.E. Saleumxay KOMMASITH, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao PDR at the reception on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Lao PDR and the France Republic, Vientiane, 17th November 2023 Son Excellence Mme Siv-Leng CHHUOR, Ambassadrice de la République Française auprès de le République Démocratique Populaire Lao, Mesdames et Messieurs les Ministres, Vice-Ministres, les Ambassadeurs et les membres du corps diplomatique, Mesdames et Messieurs, J’ai un grand honneur et plaisir de représenter le gouvernement lao d’assister et de commémorer avec madame l’ambassadrice le 70ème anniversaire de l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre Le Laos et La France, qui marque une autre étape importante dans les relations amicales de longue date et bonne coopération entre nos deux pays. Her Excellency Mrs. Siv-Leng CHHUOR, Ambassador of the France Republic to the Lao PDR, Excellencies Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Ambassadors and members of the Diplomatic Corps, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It is my great honour and pleasure to represent the Lao Government at this reception to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Laos and France, which marks another important milestone in longstanding friendly ties and good cooperation between our two countries. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Laos and France share long-standing legacy and on 22nd October 1953 we signed a friendship treaty which was considered as a turning point of relations between Laos and France. Since then, the bilateral and friendly relation has entered a new era based on mutual respect, sovereignty and independence. In 1989, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement in the fields of science, technology and culture, which has extensively brought a lot of benefits to the Lao PDR. In the political and diplomatic area, the two countries have enhanced at the high level. The high-ranking officials between the two countries have the regular exchange of visits, such as: In 1991, H.E. Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane, former Prime Minister of the Lao PDR, visited the France Republic; and H.E. Mr. Jacques Chirac, governor of Paris, visited the Lao PDR in 1992; In 1997, H.E. Mr. Khamtai Siphandone, Prime Minister of the Lao PDR, also visited the French Republic; In 2012, H. E. Mr. François Hollande, former President of the French Republic visited the Lao PDR; And in 2013, His Excellency Choummaly Xayasone, former President of the Lao PDR, visited the French Republic. I myself when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs also visited the French Republic in 2019. At the same time, the two countries have also coordinated, collaborated and supported one another in both regional and international arenas, particularly in the framework of La Francophonie, UN, ASEM, ASEAN and other international organizations. Two countries Laos-France have increased socio-economic cooperation mainly in the areas: Trade-investment, Education, Heath, Energy, Agro-ecology, Sustainable tourism, culture and etc. The most welcome and please is the two countries have tried to promote trade and investment cooperation, in which the value of bilateral trade reached $38 million in 2022. French investments in Laos have 227 projects with a total value of 558 million dollars and France is ranked No. 8 of the foreign investments in Laos. These are qualified investment projects. Moreover, there is the relationship between people and people which can be seen that every year numerous peoples of two countries have travelled in each country, especially during the 9 months of 2023, according to tourism statistics, 26,794 French tourists visited Laos. All of these reflect our strong commitment to continuously strengthening the cooperation and relationship between the two countries. Ladies and Gentlemen, France is one of the important development partners of Laos. The assistance and support of France have significantly contributed to the socio-economic development of Lao PDR, poverty reduction and the improvement of the livelihood of Lao people. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Government of the Lao PDR, to express my sincere thanks and gratitude to the French Government for the support and valuable assistance provided to the Lao PDR in the past as well as the commitments to continue cooperation for the development of the Lao PDR in the future, in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks. I highly appreciate the development of Lao-French relations and stand ready to work closely with the French government to further enhance and bring our friendly relations and tangible cooperation into a new height for common benefits of our two peoples. Ladies and Gentlemen, To mark the historical 70th anniversary of Laos and France, the two countries organized many activities such as: the Lao Embassy in Paris organized the lecture on the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Laos and France at Sorbonne University; a meeting to promote and advertise Lao tourism, and also a Lao-France economic Forum. At the same time, the French Embassy in Vientiane also organized many crucial events such as the Laos and France Fashion Week, the festival France-Laos and a joint Laos-France friendship Tree planting at Chao Anouvong Park. Specifically, both countries launched the France-Laos Economic Forum which is the first meeting ever to gather the Lao companies and foreign investors to exchange their opinions on promoting the investment and trade cooperation in Laos. Thus, I would like to express my special congratulations to Ambassador, all staffs of the French Embassy as well as the parties concerned for the excellent arrangement of this meaningful event. Lastly, I wish Ambassador Siv-Leng CHHUOR, all colleagues from the French Embassy as well as all distinguished guests present here this evening good health, happiness and every success in your noble tasks. Thank you!
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	67	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kaysone_Phomvihane	en	Kaysone Phomvihane	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	https://wikiwandv2-19431…s/icon-32x32.png	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/d5/Kaysone_Phomvihane_1978.jpg/220px-Kaysone_Phomvihane_1978.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Kaysone Phomvihane was the first leader of the Communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 1955 until his death in 1992. After the Communists seized power in the wake of the Laotian Civil War, he was the de facto leader of Laos from 1975 until his death. He served as the first Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic from 1975 to 1991 and then as the second President from 1991 to 1992.	en	https://wikiwandv2-19431…icon-180x180.png	Wikiwand	https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Kaysone_Phomvihane	Lao politician, communist leader (1920–1992) / From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Dear Wikiwand AI, let's keep it short by simply answering these key questions: Can you list the top facts and stats about Kaysone Phomvihane? Summarize this article for a 10 year old SHOW ALL QUESTIONS Kaysone Phomvihane (Lao: ໄກສອນ ພົມວິຫານ, pronounced [ˈ kɑɪsɒn ˈˈpɒmvɪhɑːn];[1] 13 December 1920 – 21 November 1992) was the first leader of the Communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 1955 until his death in 1992. After the Communists seized power in the wake of the Laotian Civil War, he was the de facto leader of Laos from 1975 until his death. He served as the first Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic from 1975 to 1991 and then as the second President from 1991 to 1992. Quick Facts General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party[a], Succeeded by ... Close
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	88	https://en.qdnd.vn/asean-community/vietnam-and-asean/state-president-pays-visit-to-former-lao-leader-470778	en	State President pays visit to former Lao leader	https://file3.qdnd.vn/da…5/4192538458.jpg	https://file3.qdnd.vn/da…5/4192538458.jpg	[ "https://file3.qdnd.vn/data/images/3/2018/12/28/dohung/image1.png?dpi=150&quality=100&w=auto", "https://en.qdnd.vn/image/images/br_next.png", "https://en.qdnd.vn/image/images/print.png?w", "https://file.qdnd.vn/data/old_img/hongthanh/2016/6/15/4192538458.jpg", "https://en.qdnd.vn/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rca&isc=true&guid=1f495b1b-d6f7-40c0-b426-7a054867f5e6", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://file3.qdnd.vn/data/images/0/2022/10/19/dohung/mau%202.jpg?dpi=150&quality=100&w=auto", "https://en.qdnd.vn/image/hoangsa.jpg", "https://en.qdnd.vn/image/thoitiet/nhnn.jpg", "https://file3.qdnd.vn/data/images/3/2024/07/18/upload_2112/lien hoan ntqc-cover.jpg?dpi=150&quality=100&w=250", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/", "https://en.qdnd.vn/image/images/button_gototop.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	PANO – During the visit to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, on June 14th, President Tran Dai Quang and his delegation members visited former Party Chairman and State President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone in Champasak province...	vi		en.qdnd.vn	https://en.qdnd.vn/asean-community/vietnam-and-asean/state-president-pays-visit-to-former-lao-leader-470778	PANO – During the visit to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, on June 14th, President Tran Dai Quang and his delegation members visited former Party Chairman and State President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone in Champasak province. The delegation then laid flowery wreaths at the Monument of Vietnam-Laos Alliance in Combat, visited Laos-Vietnam Rubber Latex Factory 27-2, met with the staff of the Vietnamese Consulate General in Pakse (capital of Champasak) and the Vietnamese community in the locality. President Tran Dai Quang spoke highly of Mr. Khamtai Siphandon’s tremendous contributions to the revolutionary cause of Laos and the special Vietnam-Laos relationship. The Vietnamese top official sent regards of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and other Vietnamese high-ranking leaders of Vietnam to the Lao former leader. President Quang also informed the Lao former leader of the outstanding socio-economic achievements of Vietnam over the past time and the fine results of the talks and meetings with Lao leaders within the visit. He affirmed that his state-level visit to Laos this time and the Vietnam visits by high-ranking Lao leaders over the past time showed the strong determination of the two Parties, States and Governments in preserving, strengthening and fostering the Vietnam-Laos special relationship. During this visit, the two sides worked out appropriate measures to boost the bilateral comprehensive cooperation, contributing to protecting the revolutionary achievements of each country. President Tran Dai Quang visiting former Party Chairman and State President of Laos Khamtai Siphandone Comrade Khamtai Siphandone expressed joy and said he felt touched by the regards and sentiment of the Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and high-ranking leaders and former leaders of Vietnam. He highly appreciated the significance of the state-level visit to Laos of President Tran Dai Quang and the delegation. The Lao former leader congratulated Vietnam upon the success of the 12th National Party Congress, saying that along with the success of the 10th National Party Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the two parties would devise sound development guidelines and foreign policies in the new periodto affirm the deep respect towards the special Vietnam-Laos solidarity and comprehensive cooperation. He believed that leaders of both countries would try their best to foster the relations between the two Parties, States and peoples. President Quang wished comrade Khamtai Siphandone good health and hoped the former Lao leader would continue contributing his valuable experience to boosting the Vietnam-Laos special relationship and the education of the Vietnam-Laos special traditional friendship to younger generations of the two countries. Talking to the staff of the Vietnam Consulate General in Pakse and overseas Vietnamese in Champasak province, President Tran Dai Quang laid stress on highlights of the domestic situation and results reached with leaders of Laos during his state-level visit. Understanding the thoughts, aspirations and sentiments towards the homeland of the participants, President Tran Dai Quang appreciated the efforts of the overseas Vietnamese community in the province of Champasak in recent years and urged them to continue promoting the spirit of unity to build a strong overseas Vietnamese community and make more contributions to the socio-economic development of the locality and the homeland. By so doing, they would contribute to fostering the special solidarity and friendship between Vietnam and Laos. Emphasizing the fact that Vietnam is a leading investor in the province, the President called on the Consulate General of Vietnam in Pakse to pay more attention to the legitimate needs of the Vietnamese people working or living in the province and Southern Laos and provide timely support for Vietnamese businesses. President Tran Dai Quang also visited overseas Vietnamese businesses in the province of Champasak who are victims in the fire at Dao Huong market on May 17th and encouraged them to overcome the difficulties and stabilize their lives . On behalf of the Party and State, President Quang presented USD 10,000 to the victims to help them partially fix the damage in the fire. He also donated USD 10,000 to overseas Vietnamese Association in Champasak province for organizing community activities. Translated by Huu Duong Related stories: >> President concludes Lao visits, heads to Cambodia
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	32	https://laos.embassy.gov.au/vtan/Celebrating-65-years-of-Laos-Australia-relations.html	en	Celebrating 65 years of Laos-Australia relations			[ "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/app/images/coat-of-arms-black-80.png", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/Cheering.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/65th-awardees.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/vtan/PhotosExhibition.jpg", "https://laos.embassy.gov.au/files/all/X-Twitter-Icon.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/app/css/favicon.ico?v=-1767466242		null	The Australian Embassy last night conferred five ‘65th anniversary awards’ to recognise outstanding contributions to Laos-Australia relations at its National Day reception in Vientiane. The reception, which this year also marked the 65th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Australia and the Lao PDR, was attended by around 400 guests from the Lao Government, business community, civil society, academia, media and representatives of the diplomatic corps. Foreign Minister Saleumxay Kommasith, who completed a Masters Degree at Monash University under an Australia Awards scholarship, attended as the Guest of Honour, and presented the 65th anniversary awards. The reception also featured an exhibition of historical photographs to capture important moments in Laos-Australia relations over the past six decades – including the memorable 1993 visit to Australia by then Prime Minister Khamtay Siphandone, and the opening of the first Australian-built Friendship Bridge across the Mekong in 1994. Australian Ambassador to the Lao PDR, John Williams, said the 65th anniversary awards were intended to personalise Australia-Laos relations, as well as to recognise outstanding achievement. “The real strength of Laos-Australia relations over the past 65 years is not the architecture put in place by our two governments, but the myriad of positive networks of collaboration between the people of both countries across so many areas of work and life,” Williams said. The recipients of the 65th anniversary awards included Phu Bia Mining General Manager, and AustCham Lao founder Richard Taylor, for his contribution to bilateral ties and two-way business connections; Thasano Centre Director Dr Phoudalay Lathvilavong, for her long collaboration with Australian agricultural experts to support small holder farming families in southern Laos; and LNCCI Vice President and leading Lao geologist Saman Aneka, for his contribution to two-way trade and investment. Mahosot Hospital Director, Prof Bounthapany Bounxoie, received an award on behalf of the entire Interplast Lao program team. Surgical teams from Australian NGO Interplast have, for over two decades, trained local counterparts and helped deliver reconstructive and plastic surgery for burns and other accident victims. One award was conferred posthumously on the late Dr Grant Evans, a founding father in the field of Lao studies and one of Australia’s leading academics on contemporary South-East Asia. Dr Evans passed away in September 2014 after a short battle with cancer. His wife, Keomany, received the award from Minister Saleumxay. Two senior Lao Government recipients were unable to attend the Australia Day reception, but will receive their awards at separate 65th anniversary events later in the year. Two of Australia’s better known Lao alumni, Volachit Intharaphithak (Sam) and Aluna Thavonesouk, joined Australian band the Sally Marett Trio to entertain guests. This included a duet by Sam and Aluna of the song, ‘Australia and Laos, friends forever’ which Sam wrote to celebrate the friendship between both countries. Guests were also treated to Luang Prabang-style kangaroo sausages, as well as Australian beef and lamb, wine, cheese and beer, and famous Australian deserts, including pavlova and lamingtons. Laos’ relationship with Australia is the country’s longest unbroken diplomatic relationship at Ambassador level. Australia remains one of the Lao PDR’s main development partners, with Australia’s programs focusing on education and human resource development, trade and business reform, rural development and agriculture, and natural resource management. For further information, or queries please contact: Khounkham Douangphachone, Media and Communications Officer
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	71	https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Laos.htm	en	Laos			[ "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/laofran.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_1952.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/luangpr.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/la_vientianekingdom.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/lao_cham.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "ben cahoon" ]	null					null	Luang Phra Bang (Lan Xang) c.1707 - 1893 Map of Luang Phra Bang Capital: Luang Phra Bang (Luang-Prabang 1893-1945) (Xiang Dong Xiang Thong to 1561; Vientiane 1561-1695) Population: N/A .... Müang Xiang Dong Xiang Tong ... - ... Thai occupation. 889 - .... Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1185 - 1191 Under Khmer suzerainty. 1353 Kingdom of Lan Xang Hom Khao 1478 - 1479 Occupied by Vietnam. 1574 - 1603 Burmese vassal. 1575 - 1591 Occupied by Burma. 1707 Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang (officially Lan Xang Hom Khao). Mar 1765 - 1772 Under Burmese suzerainty. 1772 - 1795 Under Thai suzerainty. 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation. 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation. 1795 - 1828 Vassal of Vietnam. 3 Oct 1893 French protectorate; part of French Indochina (see Vietnam). 21 Aug 1941 Wiang Chhan and Xiang Khuang incorporated into Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 25 Aug 1945 Japanese occupation. 8 Apr 1945 Royal proclamation declares end of French protectorate. 25 Aug 1945 French troops liberate Luang Phra Bang. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings 1575 - 1575 Nokeo-Koumane (1st time) (d. 1596) 1575 - 1591 Burmese occupation 1591 - 1596 Nokeo-Koumane (2nd time) (s.a.) 1596 - 1621 Vorouvong Sa II (b. 1585 - d. 1622) 1621 - 1622 Ouphagnauvarath I (b. 1597 - d. 1622) 1623 - 1627 Phothisarath II (b. 1552 - d. 1627) 1627 - 1633 Mom Keo (d. 1633) 1633 - 1637 Ton Khan (Ouphagnauvarath II) (d. 1637) 1637 - 1638 Vickhsai (d. 1638) 1638 - 1690 Sulingvongsa (b. 1618 - d. 1690) 1690 - 1695 Tian Thala (d. 1696) 1695 - 1698 Nan Tharat (d. 1698) 1698 - 1706 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1735) (to 1735 in Wiang Chhan) 1707 - 1713 Kingkitsarath (d. 1713) 1713 - 1723 Ong Kham (d. 1759) (in Chiang Mai 1727-1759) 1723 - 1749 Thao Ang (= Inthason) (d. 1749) 1749 (8 months) Inthaphom (= Intharavongsa) (d. 1776) 1749 - 1768 Sotika-Koumane (b. bf.1734 - d. 1771) 1768 - 1788 Suryavong II (b. 1751? - d. 1791) 1788 - 1792 Thai occupation 3 Feb 1792 - 179. Anurutha (1st time) (b. 1735 - d. 1819) 179. - 2 Jun 1794 Thai occupation 2 Jun 1794 - 31 Dec 1819 Anurutha (2nd time) (s.a.) 31 Dec 1819 - 7 Mar 1837 Manthaturath (b. 1772 - d. 1837) (regent for Anurutha 1817 - 31 Dec 1819; lives as a monk in Bangkok 1825-26, leaving Luang Phra Bang to be administered by Thai officials) 1825 - 1826 .... -Thai official 1837 - 1838 Unkeo -Regent (d. 1850) 1838 - 23 Sep 1850 Sukha-Söm (b. 1797 - d. 1850) 23 Sep 1850 - 1 Oct 1868 Chantha-Kuman (b. 1799 - d. 1868) 1 Oct 1868 - 15 Dec 1895 Unkham (b. 1811 - d. 1895) 15 Dec 1895 - 25 Mar 1904 Sakkarin (b. 1840 - d. 1904) (regent for Unkham Apr 1888 - 15 Dec 1895) 26 Mar 1904 - 15 Sep 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) (also king of Laos from 12 Oct 1945) 15 May 1946 - 27 Aug 1946 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) Prime minister 21 Aug 1941 - 10 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) Non-party French Vice-consul 1887 - 5 Jun 1894 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (b. 1847 - d. 1925) Commissioner-general (subordinated to the Governor-general of French Indochina) 5 Jun 1894 - Apr 1895 Auguste Jean-Marie Pavie (s.a.) Commandant-supérieur of Bas-Laos (in Khong, Champasak) 1 Jun 1895 - 30 Apr 1899 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (b. 1852 - d. 1930) Commandant-supérieurs of Haut-Laos (in Luang Prabang) 1 Jun 1895 - 10 Mar 1897 Joseph Vacle (1st time) (interim) (b. 1857 - d. 1907) 10 Mar 1897 - 11 Oct 1898 Louis Paul Luce (interim) (b. 1856 - d. 1931) 11 Oct 1898 - Apr 1899 Joseph Vacle (2nd time) (interim) (s.a.) Resident-supérieurs (subordinated to the Governors-general of French Indochina) Sep 1895 - Mar 1896 Léon Jules Pol Boulloche (b. 1859 - d. 1922) 11 Feb 1899 - 12 Feb 1903 Marie Auguste Armand Tournier (s.a.) (acting to 30 Apr 1899) 12 Feb 1903 - 11 May 1906 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (b. 1860 - d. 1926) (1st time) (interim) 11 May 1906 - 1 Apr 1907 Louis Saturnin Édouard Laffont (b. 1853 - d. 1930) (interim) 1 Apr 1907 - 9 Jan 1912 Georges Marie Joseph Mahé (s.a.) (2nd time) 24 Aug 1910 - 27 Jul 1911 Antoine Georges Amédeé Ernest (b. 1863 - d. 1941) Outrey (acting for Mahé) 9 Jan 1912 - 4 Jul 1913 Louis Antoine Aubry de la Noë (b. 1862 - d. 1942) (interim) 4 Jul 1913 - 9 Oct 1913 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (b. 1863 - d. 19..) (1st time) (acting) 9 Oct 1913 - Feb 1914 Jean Édouard Bourcier (b. 1870 - d. 1941) Saint-Chaffray (interim) 31 May 1914 - 3 May 1918 Claude Léon Lucien Garnier (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 3 May 1918 - 21 Mar 1931 Jules Georges Théodore Bosc (b. 1871 - d. 1959) 26 Apr 1921 - Jan 1923 Joël Daroussin (interim) (b. 1870 - d. 1951) (acting for Bosc) 7 May 1925 - Jan 1926 Jean-Jacques Dauplay (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 1943) (acting for Bosc) 21 May 1928 - 12 Dec 1928 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (b. 1884 - d. 1931) (interim) (acting for Bosc) 21 Mar 1931 - 12 May 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (1st time) (interim) 25 Mar 1931 Pierre André Michel Pagès (b. 1893 - d. 1980) (did not take office) 12 May 1931 - 4 Jun 1931 Yves Charles Châtel (b. 1865 - d. 1944) 11 Jun 1931 - 21 Nov 1931 Paul Raimond Octane Le Boulanger (s.a.) (2nd time) (interim) 21 Nov 1931 - 11 Feb 1932 Jules Nicolas Thiebaut (interim) (b. 1884 - d. 1935) 11 Feb 1932 - 16 Dec 1933 Aristide Eugène Le Fol (b. 1878 - d. 1967) 16 Dec 1933 - 1 Jan 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (b. 1891 - d. 1977) (1st time) (acting) 1 Jan 1934 - 10 Jul 1934 Louis Frédéric Eckert (interim) (b. 1878 - d. 19..) 10 Jul 1934 - 4 Aug 1934 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (2nd time) (acting) 4 Aug 1934 - 5 Apr 1938 Eugène Henri Roger Eutrope (b. 1881 - d. 1953) 25 Nov 1934 - 13 Oct 1935 Frédéric Claire Guillaume Louis (b. 1883 - d. 1959) Marty (interim) 5 Apr 1938 - 16 Nov 1940 André Touzet (b. 1883 - d. 1956) 16 Nov 1940 - 29 Dec 1941 Adrien Anthony Maurice Roques (s.a.) (3rd time) (interim) 29 Dec 1941 - 10 Mar 1945 Louis Antoine Marie Brasey (b. 1891 - d. 1957) (Japanese prisoner 10 Mar - 9 Jun 1945)Japanese Commander 38th Division, in Vientiane 10 Mar 1945 - Aug 1945 Masanori Sako Japanese Supreme Counsellor (in Luang Prabang) 5 Apr 1945 - 22 Aug 1945 Kazuo Ishibashi Mil (Japanese 21st Army, 2nd Div. Correspondence Corps) Wiang Chhan (Viang Chan) to 1828 Map of Wiang Chhan Capital: Wiang Chhan (Vientiane 1887-1945) 1707 Kingdom of Wiang Chhan resulting from the split of the Kingdom of Lan Xang. 1778 - 1781 Occupied by Thailand. 1781 - 12 Nov 1828 Vassal of Thailand. 12 Nov 1828 Annexation by Siam (see Thailand). 17 Oct 1887 French colony (Vientiane - French deformation of Wiang Chhan). 1941 Incorporation into Kingdom of Luang Phra Bang. 10 Mar 1945 - 27 Aug 1945 Occupied by Japan. Kings 1707 - 1730 Setthathirath II (b. 1685 - d. 1730) 1730 - 1767 Ong Long (d. 1767) 1767 - 1778 Ong Bun (1st time) (b. 1730 - d. 1781) 1778 - 1780 Phraya Supho -Thai governor (d. 1780) 1780 - Nov 1781 Ong Bun (2nd time) (s.a.) 21 Nov 1781 - Jan 1795 Nanthasen (d. 1795) 2 Feb 1795 - 7 Feb 1805 Intharavong Setthathirath III (b. 17.. - d. 1805) (crowned on 23 Jul 1795) 7 Feb 1805 - 12 Nov 1828 Anuvong (b. 1767 - d. 1829) Champasak (Nakhon Champasak) c.1713 - 27 Aug 1946 Map of Champasak Capital: Pakse [Pakxe] (Champassak [Bassac] 1863-1908; Nakhon Champasak 1791-1863; Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi 1713-1791) 161. Kingdom of Nakhon Kala Champaknaburisi founded. 1713 Name changed to Nakhon Champa Nakhaburisi. 1791 Name changed to Nakhon Champasak. 1778 - 19 Sep 1904 Vassal state of Thailand. 1811 - 1813 Thai occupation. 1819 - 1821 Thai occupation. 1851 - 1856 Thai occupation. 1860 - 1863 Thai occupation. 19 Sep 1904 French protectorate. 22 Nov 1904 Principality under French protectorate (Champassak). 9 May 1941 - 17 Nov 1946 Right-bank of Champasak annexed by Thailand. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. 27 Aug 1946 Principality extinguished. Kings 1700 - 1713? Nan Rath 1713 - 1738 Nokasat (b. c.1693 - d. 1738) 1738 - 1791 Saya Kuman (b. 1710 - d. 1791) (regent for Nokasat 1725-38) 1791 Xiang Keo 1791 - 1811 Fai Na (d. 1811) 1811 (3 days) No Muong (d. 1811) 1811 - 1813 Cha Nou (d. 1813) 1813 - 1821 Ma Noi (d. 1821) (fled to Thailand in 1820) 1821 - 1827 Rajabud Yo -Thai governor (d. 1827) 1827 - 1840 Hui (Huy) (b. 1780 - d. 1840) 1840 - 1850 Nak (regent for Hui to 1840) (b. 1774 - d. 1850) 1851 - 1852 Süa -Regent (d. 1852) 1850 - 1853 Buwana -Thai governor (d. 1853) 1853 - 1855 Suriya -Regent (d. 1855) 1856 - 1858 Kham Nhai (b. 1830 - d. 1858) 1858 - 1860 Chu -Regent 1862 - 28 Jul 1900 Kham Suk (b. 1838 - d. 1900) (governor to 1863) 28 Jul 1900 - 22 Nov 1904 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (b. 1874 - d. 1945) Princes 22 Nov 1904 - Nov 1945 Bua Laphan Ratsadany (s.a.) Nov 1945 - 26 Aug 1946 Boun Oum (b. 1912 - d. 1980) Xiang Khuang Map of Xiang Khuang Capital: Xiang Khuang (Xieng Khouang 1893-1946) 698 Müang Maharatanaburirom Phommachakkhati Simahanakkharatakkasela Nakhon Xiang Khuang Rajathani state founded in the Plain of Jars. 889 - 1368 Part of Khmer (Cambodian) empire. 1478 - .... Vassal of Vietnam. 1568 - 1598 Vassal of Pegu (Burma). 1772 - 1835 Under Thai suzerainty. 1835 Annexed by Thailand. 18.. Annexed by Vietnam. 1848 Restored as a vassal state of Vietnam. 1851 Sovereignty restored. 1875 Annexed by Thailand. 1876 Sovereignty restored. 1887 Made a vassal state of Thailand. 1888 - 3 Oct 1893 Annexed by Thailand. 3 Oct 1893 Made a French colonial (Muang Phuan) possession as part of Laos. 15 Sep 1945 Part of Kingdom of Laos. Kings (rath, chao xiwit) 1687 - 1688 Chao Kham Lan (d. 1688) 1688 - 1690 Chao Kham Phuttha (d. 1690) 1690 - 1694 Chao Kham Sattha (d. 1694) 1694 Chao Bun Lang Thai (d. 1694) 1694 - 1698 Chao Bun Lot (d. 1698) 1698 - 1712 Chao Kham Bun Khong 1712 - 1714 Phraña Kham Thewo -Regent (d. 1714) (= Phraña Thammatewo) 1714 - 1740 Chao Bun Chan 1740 - 1751 Chao Kham Un Müang 1751 - 1753 Chao Ong Lo (1st time) 1753 (3 months) Chao Ong Bun 1753 - 1779 Chao Ong Lo (2nd time) 1779 - 1781 Chao Ong Si Phom 1781 - 1782 Chao No Müang 1782 - 1802 Chao Som Phu 1802 - 1803 Chao Xiang 1803 - 1831 Chao Suthakasuvannakuman (= Chao Noi) 1831 - 1835 Chao San -Regent 1835 - 1848 Annexed to Thailand, then Vietnam 1848 - 1865 Phra Chao Issarasettha (= Chao Po) 1865 - 1874 Chao Üng 1875 - 1876 Annexed to Thailand 1876 - 1887 Chao Khanti 1887 - 1888 Thao Xiang Phet -Regent 1888 - 1899 Kham Ngon Laos 15 Sep 1945 Unification of Kingdom of Laos proclaimed.22 Oct 1953 Independence. 2 Dec 1975 Lao People's Democratic Republic General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Party (from Feb 1972, Lao People's Revolutionary Party) 22 Mar 1955 - 29 Mar 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (b. 1920 - d. 1992) Presidents of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 29 Mar 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) 25 Nov 1992 - 21 Mar 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (b. 1924) General Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 21 Mar 2006 - 22 Jan 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (b. 1936) 22 Jan 2016 - 15 Jan 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (b. 1937) 15 Jan 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (b. 1945) King (Rath)¹ 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Sisavang Vong (1st time) (b. 1885 - d. 1959) Head of State 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (b. 1890 - d. 1959) LI Kings (Rath)¹ 23 Apr 1946 - 29 Oct 1959 Sisavang Vong (2nd time) (s.a.) (king of Luang Phra Bang 15 May - 27 Aug 1946) 28 Nov 1946 - 25 Oct 1949 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) LI (Head of State,in Bangkok exile) 21 Aug 1959 - 2 Dec 1975 Savang Vatthana (b. 1907 - d. 1978?) (regent to 4 Nov 1959) Presidents 3 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Prince Souphanouvong (b. 1912 - d. 1995) PPPL 31 Oct 1986 - 15 Aug 1991 Phoumi Vongvichit (b. 1909 - d. 1994) PPPL (acting for Souphanouvong) 15 Aug 1991 - 21 Nov 1992 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 25 Nov 1992 - 24 Feb 1998 Nouhak Phoumsavan (b. 1914 - d. 2008) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 8 Jun 2006 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 19 Apr 2016 Choummaly Sayasone (s.a.) PPPL19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL Prime ministers (Sep 1982-14 Aug 1991, Chairmen of the Council of Ministers) 15 Sep 1945 - 20 Oct 1945 Prince Phetsarath Rattanavongga (s.a.) Non-party 20 Oct 1945 - 23 Apr 1946 Prince Phaya Khammao (b. 1911 - d. 1984) LI (chairman of Provisional Government; continues in Bangkok, Thailand exile to 25 Oct 1949) 23 Apr 1946 - 15 Mar 1947 Prince Kindavong (b. 1900 - d. 1951) Non-party 15 Mar 1947 - 25 Mar 1948 Prince Souvannarath (b. 1893 - d. 1960) Non-party 25 Mar 1948 - 24 Feb 1950 Prince Boun Oum (1st time) (b. 1912 - d. 1962) Non-party 24 Feb 1950 - 15 Oct 1951 Phoui Sananikone (1st time) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) PS 21 Nov 1951 - 20 Oct 1954 Prince Souvanna Phouma (1st time) (b. 1901 - d. 1984) NPP 25 Nov 1954 - 21 Mar 1956 Katay Don Sasorith (b. 1904 - d. 1959) NPP 21 Mar 1956 - 17 Aug 1958 Prince Souvanna Phouma (2nd time) (s.a.) NPP 17 Aug 1958 - 31 Dec 1959 Phoui Sananikone (2nd time) (s.a.) RPL 31 Dec 1959 - 7 Jan 1960 Sounthone Pathammavong (b. 1911 - d. 1985) Mil/CDIN (Army Chief of Staff) 7 Jan 1960 - 3 Jun 1960 Kou Abhay (b. 1892 - d. 1964) Non-party 3 Jun 1960 - 15 Aug 1960 Prince Somsanith (b. 1913 - d. 1975) CDIN 30 Aug 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Prince Souvanna Phouma (3rd time) (s.a.) RLP (from 10 Dec 1960, in Cambodia exile and at Ban Khangkhai, recognized by the Communist states to 31 Dec 1961) 11 Dec 1960 - 13 Dec 1960 Quinim Pholsena (not recognized) (b. 1915 - d. 1963) SPK 13 Dec 1960 - 23 Jun 1962 Prince Boun Oum (2nd time) (s.a.) Non-party 23 Jun 1962 - 2 Dec 1975 Prince Souvanna Phouma (4th time) (s.a.) NLPK 8 Dec 1975 - 15 Aug 1991 Kaysone Phomvihane (s.a.) PPPL 15 Aug 1991 - 24 Feb 1998 Khamtai Siphandon (s.a.) PPPL 24 Feb 1998 - 27 Mar 2001 Sisavath Keobounphanh (b. 1928 - d. 2020) PPPL 27 Mar 2001 - 8 Jun 2006 Boungnang Vorachith (s.a.) PPPL 8 Jun 2006 - 23 Dec 2010 Bouasone Bouphavanh (b. 1954) PPPL 23 Dec 2010 - 19 Apr 2016 Thongsing Thammavong (b. 1944) PPPL 19 Apr 2016 - 22 Mar 2021 Thongloun Sisoulith (s.a.) PPPL 22 Mar 2021 - 30 Dec 2022 Phankham Viphavanh (b. 1951) PPPL 30 Dec 2022 - Sonexay Siphandone (b. 1966) PPPL Commander of the Chinese (Nationalist) 93rd Division 23 Sep 1945 - Mar 1946 Lu Guoquan (Lu Kuo-ch'üan) (b. 1903 - d. 1983) (= Zheng Chong) French Commissioners of the French Republic in Laos (subordinated to the High Commissioners of France in Indochina) 29 Aug 1945 - 6 Apr 1946 Hans Imfeld (acting to 23 Sep 1945)(b. 1902 - d. 1947) 6 Apr 1946 - 29 Jul 1947 Jean Léon François Marie de (b. 1907 - d. 1951) Raymond 29 Jul 1947 - 20 Mar 1948 Maurice Marie Auguste Michaudel (b. 1901 - d. 1975) (interim)20 Mar 1948 - 8 Aug 1949 Alfred Gabriel Joseph Valmary (b. 1901 - d. 1970) (interim) 8 Aug 1949 - 27 Apr 1953 Robert Louis Aimable Régnier (b. 1897 - d. 1962)High Commissioner of the French Republic in Laos 27 Apr 1953 - 22 Oct 1953 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (b. 1903 - d. 1979)High Representatives of the French Republic in Laos 22 Oct 1953 - 6 Jan 1954 Miguel Joaquim de Pereyra (s.a.) 6 Jan 1954 - 4 Mar 1955 Michel Georges Eugène Bréal (b. 1896 - d. 1973) ¹The full style of the ruler was: Samdach Brhat Chao Maha Sri Vitha Lan Xang Hom Khao Luang Prabang Parama Sidha Khattiya Suriya Varman Brhat Maha Sri. Territorial Disputes: Southeast Asian states have enhanced border surveillance to check the spread of avian flu; talks continue on completion of demarcation with Thailand but disputes remain over islands in the Mekong River; Cambodia and Laos have a longstanding border demarcation dispute; concern among Mekong River Commission members that China's construction of eight dams on the Upper Mekong River and construction of more dams on its tributaries will affect water levels, sediment flows, and fisheries; Cambodia and Vietnam are concerned about Laos' extensive plans for upstream dam construction for the same reasons. Party abbreviations: PPPL = Phak Paxaxôn Pativat Lao (Revolutionary People's Party of Laos, part of mainly Vietnamese Indochinese Communist Party [DCSD] founded 1930 by Ho Chi Minh, a Committee for Laos, known 1950-1955 as Neo Lao Issara [Free Lao Front] which on 22 Mar 1955 became Phak Passason Lao [Lao People's Party] [PPL]; renamed PPPL Feb 1972, dictatorial, communist, only Legal Party since 1975, est.1936); Mil = Military; - Former parties: CDIN = Comité pour la Défense des Interêts Nationaux/Khana Kammakan Pongkan Phongphanyot Haeng Xat (Committee for Defense of National Interests, rightist, anti-communist, military backed, 1958-1965);LI = Lao Issara (Free Lao, nationalist, anti-communist, 1945-1949); NLPK = Lao Pen Kang (Lao Neutralist Front, neutralist, 1961-1975); NPP = Parti National Progressif/Phak Xat Kaona (National Progressive Party, 1950-1958, merged into RLP); PS = Phak Seri (Independent Party, NPP opposition, 1950-1958, merged into RLP);RLP = Rassemblement du Peuple Laotien/Lao Laum Lao (Rally of the Lao People, formed by NPP and IP, 1958-1975); SPK = Santhiphap Pen Kang (Peace Through Neutrality, leftist, 1955-1963) © Ben Cahoon
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	3	68	https://www.academia.edu/44604588/KHAKI_CAPITAL_The_Political_Economy_of_the_Military_in_Southeast_Asia	en	KHAKI CAPITAL The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia	http://a.academia-assets.com/images/open-graph-icons/fb-book.gif	http://a.academia-assets.com/images/open-graph-icons/fb-book.gif	[ "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/academia-logo-redesign-2015-A.svg", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/academia-logo-redesign-2015.svg", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/single_work_splash/adobe.icon.svg", "https://0.academia-photos.com/attachment_thumbnails/65067623/mini_magick20201130-19844-1sy8it9.png?1606736343", "https://0.academia-photos.com/1471081/525306/37895778/s65_paul.chambers.jpeg", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loaders/paper-load.gif", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png", "https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loswp/related-pdf-icon.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Paul Chambers", "naresuan.academia.edu" ]	2020-11-30T00:00:00	KHAKI CAPITAL The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia				https://www.academia.edu/44604588/KHAKI_CAPITAL_The_Political_Economy_of_the_Military_in_Southeast_Asia	Zakharov, Anton O. Review of: Paul Chambers & Napisa Waitoolkiat (eds.) Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia, Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2017, 351 pp., ISBN 978-87-7694-225 (pbk) (Studies in Asian Topics, no. 61), in: Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 91, pt 2, No 315, pp. 159–164 (December 2018). The military has always been a crucial trait of modern states. Its leading or at least highly influential role in many Asian states is well-known due to multiple coups d’état and armed conflicts throughout the twentieth century. Southeast Asian states, with the sole exception of Thailand (Siam), did emerge as anti-colonial projects in the middle twentieth century and as results of the Second World War. Their births coincide with the Cold War and its clashes between the Capitalist World led by the USA and the Communist World led by the USSR and/or China. Struggles of new Southeast Asian states for independence and against various ideological rivals did make the military a key factor in their formation. Paul Chambers’ and Napisa Waitoolkiat’s volume offers a comprehensive study of the military in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The editors focus on the connection between the military and economy. How the military in these countries obtains its funding, how the military influences politics and civilian officials, how the civilian can or do control the military, how an active role of the military in national economies of Southeast Asian states helps or endangers the democratic building, — are the main questions of the volume under review. As the theme of the conference suggests, the ongoing crisis and power shift in the Asia-Pacific could have repercussion for Europe and Germany. In the case of Southeast Asia relevant issues include: the rise of China’s political and economic influence that goes along with a more assertive foreign policy (for example, The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the South China Sea conflict), growing defense spending and arms purchases and more and more spillover effects from crises originating in neighboring areas (an escalation on the Korean Peninsula or a Taiwan Straits crisis, for example). I will discuss this from a Southeast Asian standpoint. ► Borchers, H. (2014). ASEAN's environmental challenges and non-traditional security cooperation: Towards a regional peacekeeping force? ASEAS – Austrian Journal of SouthEast Asian Studies, 7(1), 5-20. This article reflects on the prospect for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and regional security cooperation. I argue that progress on 'soft' security issues stands to facilitate a slow deepening of 'hard' security cooperation at the ASEAN level. Governments of ASEAN member states are still reluctant to develop a regional mechanism for conflict resolution , which they perceive to be a challenge to the norms of non-interference and state sovereignty. Yet, these norms are subject to dynamic shifts in the security environment that regional governments now have to manage. The establishment of mechanisms to address politically less controversial non-traditional security issues such as environmental challenges stands to further develop and consolidate military-to-military ties and deepen political trust among member states. An ASEAN standby force for emergency response and disaster relief has become a politically acceptable initiative and could set the stage for the development of an ASEAN peacekeeping force.  In diesem Beitrag wird die Möglichkeit einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe und einer region-alen Sicherheitskooperation betrachtet. Ich argumentiere, dass Fortschritte bei " weichen " Sicherheitsfragen eine stetige Vertiefung der " harten " Sicherheitszusammenarbeit auf ASEAN-Ebene ermöglichen. Noch zögern die Regierungen der ASEAN-Staaten, einen re-gionalen Konfliktlösungsmechanismus zu entwickeln, da sie diesen als Infragestellung der Normen der Nichteinmischung und der staatlichen Souveränität sehen. Diese Nor-men hängen jedoch von dynamischen Veränderungen in der Sicherheitsumgebung ab, mit welchen die Regierungen konfrontiert sind. Die Einrichtung von Mechanismen um politisch weniger umstrittene, nicht-traditionelle Sicherheitsthemen anzugehen, wie z.B. Umweltherausforderungen, ist ein erster Schritt dahin, militärische Kooperationen weit-er zu entwickeln, zu festigen sowie das politische Vertrauen zwischen den Mitgliedsta-aten zu vertiefen. Eine ASEAN-Abruftruppe für Notfall-und Katastrophenhilfe ist bereits eine politisch akzeptable Initiative geworden. Dies könnte den Weg für die Entwicklung einer ASEAN-Friedenstruppe festlegen.
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	26	https://www.bookrags.com/Khamtai_Siphandon/	en	Khamtai Siphandon Summary	https://dolmv3q9e9skh.cloudfront.net/productImage/?sku=lens-khamtai_siphandon&w=200	https://dolmv3q9e9skh.cloudfront.net/productImage/?sku=lens-khamtai_siphandon&w=200	[ "https://d22o6al7s0pvzr.cloudfront.net/images/bookrags/bookrags_logo.png?1706062909", "https://dolmv3q9e9skh.cloudfront.net/productImage/?sku=lens-khamtai_siphandon&w=150", "https://d22o6al7s0pvzr.cloudfront.net/images/bookrags/gb/gb_wen.gif", "https://d22o6al7s0pvzr.cloudfront.net/images/bookrags/socialicons/facebook-socialicon.png?1457284146", "https://d22o6al7s0pvzr.cloudfront.net/images/bookrags/socialicons/twitter-socialicon.png?1457284146", "https://d22o6al7s0pvzr.cloudfront.net/images/bookrags/socialicons/pinterest-socialicon.png?1457284146" ]	[]	[]	[ "Khamtai Siphandon Summary", "notes", "summaries", "chapter summaries", "analysis", "outline", "synopsis", "Khamtai Siphandon plot summary", "overview", "book", "literature", "reviews", "reports", "essays", "practice", "study", "teach", "homework", "questions", "answers" ]	null	[]	null	Immediately download the Khamtai Siphandon summary, chapter-by-chapter analysis, book notes, essays, quotes, character descriptions, lesson plans, and more - everything you need for studying or teaching Khamtai Siphandon.	en	/favicon.ico	www.BookRags.com	https://www.bookrags.com/Khamtai_Siphandon/	2,633 words, approx. 9 pages Laos - Khamtay Siphandone Khamtay SiphandonePresident (pronounced "KAM-tie SEE-pan-don") "We must put a stop to exploitive business practices, such as indiscriminate logging ... Read more
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	51	https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q104914585	en	Sonexay Siphandone	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/13/PM_Kishida_meeting_PM_Siphandone_of_Laos_%28cropped%29.jpg/220px-PM_Kishida_meeting_PM_Siphandone_of_Laos_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://login.wikimedia.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/footer/wikimedia-button.svg", "https://www.wikidata.org/static/images/footer/poweredby_mediawiki.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Laotian politician, current PM	en	/static/apple-touch/wikidata.png		https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q104914585
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	53	https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106WPRT60250/html/CPRT-106WPRT60250.htm	en	EXTENSION OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	[WPRT 106-6] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] 106th Congress WMCP: 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 106-6 _______________________________________________________________________ SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES __________ WRITTEN COMMENTS ON THE EXTENSION OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS TO THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13 NOVEMBER 4, 1999 Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means by its staff ------------ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 60-250 CC WASHINGTON : 1999 COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York BILL THOMAS, California FORTNEY PETE STARK, California E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida ROBERT T. MATSUI, California NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania AMO HOUGHTON, New York SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan WALLY HERGER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM McCRERY, Louisiana JIM McDERMOTT, Washington DAVE CAMP, Michigan GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana MAC COLLINS, Georgia JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee ROB PORTMAN, Ohio XAVIER BECERRA, California PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida WES WATKINS, Oklahoma LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona JERRY WELLER, Illinois KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado RON LEWIS, Kentucky MARK FOLEY, Florida A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel ______ Subcommittee on Trade PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois, Chairman BILL THOMAS, California SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York AMO HOUGHTON, New York RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts DAVE CAMP, Michigan MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana JENNIFER DUNN, Washington XAVIER BECERRA, California WALLY HERGER, California JIM NUSSLE, Iowa Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published in electronic form. The printed record of written comments remains the official version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare both printed and electronic versions of the hearing/written comments record, the process of converting between various electronic formats may introduce unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the current publication process and should diminish as the process is further refined. C O N T E N T S __________ Page Advisory of July 29, 1999, announcing request for written comments on the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic................................... 1 ______ American Legion, John F. Sommer, Jr., letter..................... 3 Andreae, Charles, III, Andreae, Vick & Associates LLC, statement. 4 Green, Hon. Mark, a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, statement........................................... 5 Hmong International Human Rights Watch, Chicago, IL, Xiong Chuhu, statement and attachments...................................... 6 Illumination Technologies, Inc., East Syracuse, NY, Teng Lee, letter......................................................... 8 JBC International, James B. Clawson, letter...................... 11 Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., Eau Claire, WI, Vang Pobzeb, letter and attachments......................................... 12 Lao Veterans of America, Inc.: Philip Smith, statement...................................... 22 Wangyee Vang, Fresno, CA, letter and attachments............. 29 National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, Ann Mills Griffiths, statement................. 30 Spyder Active Sports, Inc., Boulder, CO, statement............... 42 US-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., statement....................... 43 ADVISORY FROM THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: (202) 225-6649 July 29, 1999 No. TR-14 Crane Announces Request for Written Comments on the Extension of Normal Trade Relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic Congressman Philip M. Crane (R-IL), Chairman, Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced that the Subcommittee is requesting written public comments for the record from all parties interested in the extension of permanent normal trade relations (NTR) to the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos). BACKGROUND: At present, Laos is listed in general note 3(b) of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) among those countries that are denied normal tariff treatment. As a result, Lao products are subject to the higher tariff rates in column 2 of the HTS, which has the practical effect of excluding Lao products from the U.S. market. Legislation is required to amend the HTS in order for NTR to be extended to the products of Laos. Laos is not subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 (the ``Jackson-Vanik amendment'') because it did not become a Communist country until after the effective date of that law. In 1997, the United States concluded a bilateral trade agreement providing market access for U.S. goods and services in the Lao market and protection of intellectual property rights. In addition, the United States reached agreement with Laos in 1997 on a bilateral investment treaty, the first to be negotiated with a Southeast Asian country, to provide U.S. investors with the right of national treatment. In 1998, U.S. imports from Laos were valued at $21 million, while U.S. exports totaled $3.7 million. Top imports from Laos in 1998 were miscellaneous manufactured articles, while leading U.S. exports included chemicals, and machinery and transportation equipment. DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS: Any person or organization wishing to submit a written statement for the printed record should submit six (6) single-spaced copies of their statement, along with an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in WordPerfect 5.1 format, with their name, address, and comments date noted on label, by the close of business, Friday, September 10, 1999, to A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1102 Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS: Each statement presented for printing to the Committee by a witness, any written statement or exhibit submitted for the printed record or any written comments in response to a request for written comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any statement or exhibit not in compliance with these guidelines will not be printed, but will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 1. All statements and any accompanying exhibits for printing must be submitted on an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in WordPerfect 5.1 format, typed in single space and may not exceed a total of 10 pages including attachments. Witnesses are advised that the Committee will rely on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing record. 2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the Committee. 3. A witness appearing at a public hearing, or submitting a statement for the record of a public hearing, or submitting written comments in response to a published request for comments by the Committee, must include on his statement or submission a list of all clients, persons, or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears. 4. A supplemental sheet must accompany each statement listing the name, company, address, telephone and fax numbers where the witness or the designated representative may be reached. This supplemental sheet will not be included in the printed record. The above restrictions and limitations apply only to material being submitted for printing. Statements and exhibits or supplementary material submitted solely for distribution to the Members, the press, and the public during the course of a public hearing may be submitted in other forms. Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on the World Wide Web at `HTTP://WWW.HOUSE.GOV/WAYS__MEANS/'. American Legion Washington, DC 20006 September 8, 1999 Honorable Philip M. Crane, Chairman Subcommittee on Trade House Committee on Ways and Means 1102 Longworth House Office Bldg. Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Crane: The American Legion opposes the granting of the Jackson-Vanik waiver to Laos. We believe that the Lao government is not doing as much as it could to seek the resolution of the POW/MIA issue. The opportunities offered from Jackson-Vanik to U.S. business should not be granted until the Lao government shows notable improvement in their assistance with U.S. accounting efforts. As with Vietnam, we believe that the United States should not let commercial interests take priority over the accounting of our missing servicemembers. The Lao will lose the incentive to increase cooperation with accounting efforts if they see that the current U.S. Administration is dedicated only in words and not in deeds. The Pathet Lao have yet to unilaterally provide credible information on American POWs last known alive in their control. Although U.S. officials, veterans and family organizations have for several years urged the Lao government to commence an oral history program in order to elicit information that would be helpful in resolving cases, questionnaires have just recently been developed and distributed. As of now there is no guarantee that any significant information will be forthcoming. Joint Task Force--Full Accounting is carrying out joint field activities in Laos in cooperation with the Lao government, although it is being done on a restricted--North to South--basis. The Lao have permitted a few exceptions to this, but for the most part hold to the restricted pattern of operation. Aside from the joint field activities, there is a paucity of unilateral cooperation on the part of the Lao government to provide information to resolve cases and repatriate remains of missing Americans. Unless and until the Lao government is held accountable by the Clinton Administration, there is no reason for Vientiane to exert any meaningful unilateral cooperation. Until this happens, we cannot support the Jackson-Vanik waiver. Sincerely, JOHN F. SOMMER, JR. Executive Director Statement of Charles Andreae III Having represented clients internationally for 10 years, I can appreciate the value of extending Normal Trade Relations in an effort to promote free trade. I have seen firsthand the positive aspects of granting Normal Trade Relations which help to achieve American interests overseas. Laos presents new opportunities for many American businesses seeking to expand their foothold in Asia. These opportunities in the Laotian market will create new jobs in the United States, foster closer diplomatic relations, and enable Laos to continue down the path of further economic liberalization. To protect its interests in peace and stability and access to markets in Asia, the U.S. must create an environment that encourages Laos to integrate into the international system as a responsible member. Given population trends in Asia, Laos is certain to have an impact on the international system and American interests in Asia. For Laos to become a full participant in the international system and uphold international rules and norms, Laotian leaders must see that doing so will best serve Laos' interests. This can be accomplished only if Americans interact with, rather than isolate, Laos. Establishing Normal Trade Relations provides the interaction necessary to bring Laos into greater conformity with international rules and norms especially now when the Laotian government continues its New Economic Mechanism. Furthermore, by granting Normal Trade Relations to Laos, the United States is showing a continued commitment to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a group which encompasses 500 million people with a combined $1 trillion dollar gross domestic product and a two way trade with the U.S. of over $250 billion. Normal Trade Relations with Laos would provide a firm foundation for a healthy and growing American economy. NTR would also help promote a stable and secure world in which political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions can flourish. These interests allow the U.S. to maintain a system of healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations and Laos is no exception to this rule. NTR for Laos will play a fundamental role in advancing these enduring American interests in Asia. Most-favored-nation treatment is the normal tariff treatment that the United States provides to all but a handful of its trading partners. It is a principle which undergirds the open international trading system that the U.S. has labored for decades to expand. NTR has been, in fact, a key ingredient of America's global strategy since World War II and the purpose of this strategy has been to build a cooperative free-trade environment within which America's businesses and economy can prosper. Statement of Hon. Mark Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin As the Subcommittee on Trade considers this controversial issue, I believe it is essential that the committee members be aware of a serious situation involving a constituent of mine-- Mr. Houa Ly of Appleton, Wisconsin. Nearly five months ago, Mr. Ly disappeared near the Thai- Lao border. According to eyewitnesses who were traveling with Mr. Ly, Lao government authorities are responsible for this disappearance. These eyewitnesses have shared with me the following account of Mr. Ly's disappearance: On April 19 of this year, a party of four Hmong-American men--Mr. Houa Ly, Mr. Michael Vang, Mr. Neng Lee and Mr. Hue Vang--were traveling in Thailand near the city of Chiang Khong. The group, having been advised that the nearby Thai-Lao border was open to tourists and the public, crossed the Mekong River into Laos. Once across the border, the party split into two groups. Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang began speaking to several men, some of whom identified themselves as authorities in the Lao government. Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang briefly left the area. When they returned, Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang were missing. After a brief search, Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang witnessed Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang being forced onto a boat by Lao men. The boat, with Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang aboard, sped away on the Mekong River. Mr. Ly and Mr. M. Vang have not been heard from since. On May 4, upon their return to Chiang Mai, Thailand, Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang reported this incident to the American Consulate. Two days later, according to Mr. Lee and Mr. H. Vang, an American official from the consulate informed them he had received reports that both men had been imprisoned and that Mr. Ly may have been killed. Subsequent independent reports have indicated that the two men are currently imprisoned by Lao government authorities. Although the Lao government continues to deny any knowledge of Mr. Ly's entry into Laos or his current whereabouts, I believe they have not been completely forthcoming with U.S. authorities charged with investigating this case. At best, the communist Lao government has been less than fully cooperative in this situation. At worst, individuals who are authorities of the Lao government are responsible for the seizure--and possibly the execution--of U.S. citizens traveling abroad. The latter would represent a grave and reprehensible act against citizens of the United States. The Lao government's actions surrounding this case must be taken into account when reviewing possible Normal Trade Relations status for the Lao People's Democratic Republic. It is my belief that this case is yet another piece of a larger body of strong evidence demonstrating that Laos is not yet ready to join the family of nations enjoying NTR status with the United States. Statement of Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director, Hmong International Human Rights Watch, Chicago, Illinois Chairman Crane and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director of Hmong International Human Rights Watch. Our organization represents Hmong victims of human rights abuse, so everything I have to say is on their behalf. To understand the Hmong people's problems in Laos today it is important to point out their role during the Vietnam War. Since the Hmong population was located in a very strategic place along the mountainous Laos/Vietnam border, many thousands of Hmong were recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency to fight against the invading North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The Hmong became known as the C.I.A.'s ``secret army'' and were formed into Special Guerilla Units, which were used to sabotage enemy supply lines along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, call in bombing strikes, and help rescue downed American pilots. This was all done at great risk to the Hmong. Towards the end of the war, the Hmong had suffered so greatly that they had to sacrifice children as young as 10 years old to become soldiers, since many of the older recruits had either been killed or wounded. The Hmong have been credited with tying up 2-3 of the NVA's best fighting divisions, which would otherwise have been used to fight against American soldiers in South Vietnam. Though the Vietnam War ended nearly 25 years ago, the genocide of the Hmong continues to this very day throughout the jungles of Phou Bia mountain and the surrounding countryside. In 1975, the newly formed Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) renamed the Hmong homeland region of Phou Bia, Muang Cha, Muang Om, and the Hmong capitol of Long Cheng (all formerly located in Xieng Khouang province), and designated this area Saysomboun Special Zone (See map--Attachment A). No foreigners or international monitors have been allowed access to this region for the past 25 years. The LPDR has used this secluded area to launch repeated military assaults against these displaced Hmong. Since 1975, over 40,000 Hmong have been killed here and another 60,000 have been displaced into the jungles of Phou Bia. The former Hmong capitol of Long Cheng has been completely wiped out and is now overgrown with dense forest. At present, there are still more than 10,000 Hmong hiding out in the Phou Bia area waiting for the Hmong Killing Fields to end (See video tape--Attachment B). In 1979, the LPDR launched heavy military attacks and used chemical weapons against the Hmong living in this area. Again, in June 1990, the LPDR launched more air attacks inside Saysomboun Special Zone. In February 1998, the LPDR began another series of artillery attacks. The war has ended but the Killing Fields of the Hmong continues to this very day. Recently, the LPDR has installed 3 new military camps at Phou Bia mountain, so the killing of the Hmong people continues on and on. The Lao military has moved in and destroyed all the Hmong rice fields and has turned them into mine fields. On May 25, 1998, an aircraft carrying 26 high ranking Vietnamese and Lao military leaders crashed in Saysomboun Special Zone. They were in the process of planning genocidal attacks against the Hmong population taking refuge in this area. Again, in July 1999, the LPDR began launching heavy military attacks to wipe out the total Hmong population taking refuge in the Phou Bia jungles of Saysomboun Special Zone by the year 2000. This ongoing genocide of the Hmong people must stop! The international community must immediately intervene to save the Hmong civilian population. Although the lowland Lao have freedom of movement within the country, this is not so for the ethnic Hmong. For example, the Hmong at La Khai camp, Xieng Khouang province, and those in Muang Cha, Muong Ong, and Muong Ao, Saysomboun Special Zone are not allowed to move outside of these areas. Whoever is caught will either be tortured, imprisoned, or killed. An example of this is Boua Vang Lee who was killed by LPDR police officers Thao Khaman and Thao Khamkeuth on October 20, 1996. After he was killed, his father, his wife, his younger brother, two of his sons, and six Hmong village chiefs sued the LPDR government asking for 9,379,600 kip (equivalent to $13,400 U.S. dollars) in compensation for funeral costs and the loss of his life. The LPDR later retaliated against his family killing his wife and crippling his little 2 year old son in January 1998, just because of the lawsuit that was filed. Because of the continuing intimidation by the LPDR government they can no longer safely follow through on the case, so have asked our organization to bring their it to the attention of the international community. We are requesting that the LPDR should pay $1 million in damages to cover the expenses of the funerals and the loss of life of Boua Van Lee and See Xiong, along with the permanent crippling of his young son and the psychological trauma that the family has been put through and continues to face to this very day. (See photos of Boua Van Lee and his wife & son--Attachment C) We are requesting that international monitors, along with Hmong International Human Rights Watch, be granted official unrestricted access to Saysomboun Special Zone so that the Hmong Killing Fields may be put to an end. There has been no durable solution to this problem for almost 25 years. Why? It is because this issue has never been properly addressed. The United States must play a critical role in pressuring the Lao government to withdraw its troops from Saysomboun Special Zone before any consideration of granting Normalized Trading status to Laos. The LPDR has gone all out to promote this year and next year as ``Visit Laos Year'' to attract many foreign tourists from different countries. It is ironic, for the past 25 years thousands of it's own Hmong citizens are still blacklisted and not allowed visas to enter the country. It is still impossible for Hmong Americans to do business in Laos because of the continuing discrimination by the Lao government. We request that this blacklist of Hmong, who have resettled in a second or third country, be made available to the U.S. Department of State and Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with the reason why these Hmong are not allowed visas to enter the LPDR. Those who attempt to operate a business are later bamboozled out of their investments and kicked out of the country. Some good examples of this are the cases of James Xiong (Classic Travel), Lilly Thao and Dr. Sam Thao (brick factory), Doua Yang (foundry factory), Mr. Seng Moua and Mr. Doua Yang (Ban Phak Seng Souk hotel), Bee Xiong (car imports to Laos), etc. We request that these businessmen/women be brought to testify in front of the Subcommittee on Trade so that you can hear from their real life experiences. Our organization would be more than glad to contact these people to testify. The LPDR laws change from day to day on the whims of officials. Tactics such as bribery and intimidation are a very common practice. At the moment there are no such laws in the LPDR which protect foreign investments. An Arbitration Committee should be formed consisting of the U.S. and LPDR governments, Hmong International Human Rights Watch, along with foreign investors before any kind of Normalized Trading Relations are established. Any type of dispute between foreign investors and their Lao counterparts must be arbitrated under this committee. This is the only way the investment capitol of foreigners can truly be protected. In the past, the LPDR government and Lao business counterparts always used various tactics to frame foreign investors, kicking them out of the country and taking over their business assets. The Hmong are still being denied equal access to education. Hmong students do not have the opportunity to travel abroad for higher education even though many lowland Lao are allowed this luxury. Comparing the Hmong population in the U.S. to the lowland Lao population in the U.S. there is a noted higher percentage of Hmong possessing high level degrees. This achievement shows what great value the Hmong place on education and should be reflected in the number of Hmong candidates in Laos allowed to study abroad. At the present time, Hmong written language is not allowed to be taught in public schools. This should be changed so that the Hmong language can be taught at any public school. Discrimination against the Hmong goes beyond just party politics. We have documented many cases of high ranking Hmong LPDR officials who have either been imprisoned, tortured, killed, or forced to step down from their positions for no other reason than being ethnic Hmong. Boua Chong Lee, who is currently being held in a Lao prison, is a good example of this. He was the former LPDR military leader of Luang Prabang province until being forced into retirement. He stated that ``now the situation for the Hmong in Laos is much worse than it was for the Hmong during French colonial times'' [quoted just before his arrest July 1995--videotape in the possession of H.I.H.R.W.]. Boua Chong Lee was severely beaten then arrested just because he voiced his opinion about how the LPDR treats the Hmong minority. Other Hmong who are currently in jail without a trial are: Vue Mai, Yang Va, Boua Yeng Vang, Wa Kou Vang, Houa Lee, and Michael Vang. These prisoners should be immediately released before Normal Trade Relations are granted to Laos. (See photos of high level prisoners who need to be immediately released--Attachment D) The lingering problem of the remaining 30,000 Hmong refugees living in Thailand has not been effectively addressed. This is because their situation is directly related to the current political climate in Laos. The reason these 30,000 Hmong are now living at Wat Thamkrabok (15,000), Khet Noy village, Phetchaboun (6000), Tak, Chieng Rai, and other provinces in northern Thailand is because they left the UNHCR sponsored refugee camps. Why did they leave the safety of the refugee camps? They left the camps because of a legitimate fear of forced/coerced repatriation. There are also over 1100 Hmong refugees still living in Napho refugee camp. They too fear repatriation. Part of this is due to the ongoing problems Hmong are having with their land allocations at Ban Pha Thao. The UNHCR and the LPDR have also not fulfilled their promise to the Hmong returnees at Ban Na Saat repatriation site. In 1994, these refugees returned from Napho refugee camp because an irrigation project and electricity were promised to them by the UNHCR and the LPDR. They must fulfill these promises. These Hmong returnees are also discriminated against by special marks on their LPDR citizen I.D. cards, which disables them from fully integrating into Lao society. They cannot obtain government employment, nor engage in business ventures, nor continue higher education, plus they also have travel limitations. (See Hmong returnee I.D. card--Attachment E). We request that this discriminatory I.D. card be immediately abolished for the more than 27,000 repatriates before Normal Trading Relations with the LPDR is established. A new and non- discriminatory I.D. card should be issued to all Laotian citizens. Before Normal Trade Relations are granted to Laos the LPDR must withdraw all of their troops from Saysomboun Special Zone. The above refugees should be escorted and protected by the UN Army so that they can return to their homeland at Saysomboun Special Zone. They should also be helped out financially with their resettlement. The major problem, and again I have to really stress this important point, is the unresolved issue of Vue Mai's disappearance in Laos. Vue Mai was the former leader of Ban Vinai refugee camp. He agreed to support the repatriation program and return to Laos only after the UNHCR had guaranteed his and the other returnees safety. By doing this he took an immense and unselfish risk so that the UNHCR's Hmong repatriation program would run smoothly. Therefore, it is essential that the United Nations seriously follow up on the investigation of Vue Mai's case. This can be done by first making use of the confidential report Hmong International Human Rights Watch has sent to the U.N. in Geneva (received by UNHCR Oct 22, 1998), which details events leading up to the time of Vue Mai's arrest by the LPDR's secret police. We are also requesting a list from the UNHCR of all the Hmong refugees who have repatriated to Laos, so that we can check to see how they are doing. Vue Mai must be released from prison before any attempts to Normalize Trading Relations with the LPDR. The Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugee problems have been solved, but the issue of the Hmong refugees is still not solved and never will be until Vue Mai is released from prison. Hmong International Human Rights Watch is strongly opposed to Normalized Trading Relations or Most Favored Nation trading status with the Lao People's Democratic Republic unless all of the above conditions are met with first. Sincerely, Xiong Chuhu, Executive Director [Attachments are being retained in the Committee files.] Illumination Technologies, Inc. East Syracuse, NY 13057 September 8, 1999 Chairman Philip M. Crane Subcommittee on Trade U.S. House of Representatives 1102 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Subject: Extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos Dear Chairman Crane: I am writing you to ask for your help in seeking the extension of normal trade relations (NTR) for Laos. I am a chemist and an entrepreneur. Asia is our largest foreign market accounting for a third of the company's revenues. I am also a partner in another company, in Syracuse, specializing in developing advanced illumination instrumentation for use in machine vision applications--namely, automated manufacturing processes. I also have interests in other businesses. Southeast Asia is a significant market for the products of these enterprises that employ Americans and bring wealth to the US. Laos is a part of the Southeast Asian market. I plan to invest in Laos. I strongly urge you and the members of the Subcommittee on Trade to grant Laos normal trade relations (NTR) for the following reasons: The United States and Laos have maintained uninterrupted diplomatic relations in the last four decades. Despite severe destruction to Laos resulting from heavy bombardment by the US during the war, Laos has cooperated fully with the US in finding its MIA's and a plethora of other issues. NTR will foster a closer tie between the two countries. The US has signed a favorable trade agreement with Laos that the US has been unable to obtain from any other country in Southeast Asia. Without NTR, this trade agreement has remained ineffective. Without legal protection or the protection of the US, small US investors such as myself have been unable to invest in Laos. Yet, without acceptance from Congress, Laos has extended to US companies large economic concessions--especially in natural resources exploration and development--making the US the second largest investor. NTR will open Laos for further concessions and maintain the US as both a major benefactor and beneficiary of a developed Lao economy. Though, presently undeveloped, Laos is the crossroads of a huge market: China to the North, Vietnam to the East, Cambodia to the South, and Thailand and Burma to the West. Laos is developing a free-market economy. Its border is now fully open. With half a million expatriates of Laos as US citizens, the US is presented with a unique advantage to compete by utilizing her enormous economic and political assets and the direct link of its citizens with the citizens of Laos. I have seen products in the US market that were produced in Laos, but packaged in Thailand. As such, these products have benefited Thailand, but not the people of Laos and the American consumers because the producers in Laos were paid very little and the American consumers had to pay much higher prices. With NTR, these and other products can be made in Laos and shipped directly to the US at a better price for both the people of Laos and the American consumers. Laos' strategic location as a buffer state between China and Southeast Asia dictates a geopolitical consideration. Laos presents no threat to the US. Laos is simply an unexplored asset with a substantial reserve of natural resources, but sandwiched between powerful rivaled neighbors. A well-to-do, stable and secure Laos will create and preserve stability in Indochina and the region. An economically disadvantaged Laos will be conducive to political instability and vulnerable to outside destabilizing influences--specifically from regional contending powers. NTR will extend to Laos, in the eyes of other nations, the full recognition and partnership of the Superpower (the US). Furthermore, it will provide Laos with the necessary resources to solidify her economy and strengthen her territorial integrity and sovereignty. Despite the lasting effects of war, in the last 25 years, Laos has taken steps to improve itself: Adopting a constitution written by an American law expert. Introducing democratic reforms with a parliament and universal suffrage at its core. The people of Laos now choose their representatives. Further reforms are on the way. Introducing law and order as its basic operating system. Bringing its minorities to share power in the government. Joining the international community through various organizations, including ASEAN, thus accepting the international standards and codes of conduct. Introducing a free-market economy and establishing trade links with countries around the world. Laos is integrating itself into the global economy. It has to be clear that, after 1975, as the result of the flight of its citizens to other countries, Laos was left with an enormous brain drain. Its intellectual, technical and entrepreneurial capacity was devastated. Laos lost almost its entire educated population. The leadership of Laos came out of the jungles after two decades of war with guns and bullets, but had no experience managing a modern nation or economy. Laos had to start from scratch. Despite continuing security problems, Laos has opened up its border and striven to join the rest of the world. Undeniably, Laos still has much to improve. Equally undeniable, Laos has made substantial progress in the last 25 years despite enormous hardship. As a Hmong-American having countless number of relatives in Laos, only a prosperous Laos can improve the quality of their lives. Only a peaceful Laos can prevent human rights violations. An internationally involved and open Laos will be subject to international standards and scrutiny, thus ensuring greater freedom and better treatment to its citizens. NTR for Laos will clearly and unequivocally demonstrate not only a good will and a moral imperative, but moreover, an unmistakable signal of US's willingness to assist Laos in its painful attempt to raise the living standard of the people, to participate fully in the family of nations, and to advance democracy and stability in Laos and the entire region. I have learned that Congress failed to approve NTR for Laos the last time due to questions regarding human rights violations. Certainly, there are bound to have human rights violations in any country at the level of development of Laos. These issues must be addressed by the government of Laos. The international community must hold the leaders of Laos responsible. However, the larger questions still beg for answers: How can any society at subsistence level (where self- preservation is the order of the day) avoid violence? It cannot. Violence breeds abuses and impedes democracy. How can a country confronting with the remnants of internal strife and external hostilities avoid the use of force and therefore the abuses of human rights? It cannot. Peace and security are the basis to uphold human rights. Next, how can the denial of NTR to Laos stop human rights violations? It cannot and in fact it promotes the abuses by depriving the people of Laos the means to develop and to empower themselves. By denying NTR to Laos, who are being penalized? Definitely, not the few old leaders of Laos, but the people of Laos. By keeping the people poor, uneducated and weak, the power of the few leaders is reinforced. The people of Laos ought not be held hostage because of the leaders of Laos. These leaders will soon be gone. The people of Laos will forever remain. What can NTR do for Laos? Laos has a very small economy and is considered one of the poorest countries in the world. NTR will foster substantial trade and investment by Hmong/Lao-Americans and others in Laos. By also increasing trade with the US, the people of Laos will earn the resources and capacity to develop Laos. Development is the key to the preservation of human rights and the upholding of democratic values. I was a Hmong refugee from Laos who had lost many loved ones while trying to escape to Thailand, I am therefore well qualified to speak against Laos. Yet, I believe that the people of Laos and the American people are best served by improving relations, but not the continuation of a policy of alienation and estrangement. Economic reliance on trade with the US will empower the US to deal more effectively with the government of Laos. By contributing to the development of Laos through strong trade relations and political engagement, the US and the Hmong/ Lao-Americans will be in a much stronger position to influence and shape the future of Laos. The large majority of the half million Hmong/Lao-Americans, like all Americans through history, now wish to see a better life and future for their fellow brothers and sisters in the old country. They also wish closer relations between their country, the US, and their motherland, Laos. NTR is a step in the right direction. The rate of democratic reforms in Laos rests upon the rate of its human resources and economic developments. NTR is essential in accelerating the process. I am now asking for your support and the use of the power of your office as Chairman to impress upon your fellow committee members and the members Congress to approve the extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to Laos. My profound thanks for your help. Respectfully, Teng Lee Chairman, Illumination Technologies, Inc. JBC International August 2, 1999 A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 1102 Longworth House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Dear Mr. Singleton, Pursuant to the request of the Honorable Phillip M. Crane, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, JBC International submits comments in support of the extension of unconditional normal trade relations (NTR) to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. JBC International is a trade-consulting and lobbying firm that provides government relations services to businesses worldwide. We extend representation and advocacy services to businesses and governments throughout the world. JBC International builds industry and government coalitions to leverage trade negotiations. Most importantly, we promote the removal of trade barriers and the opening of foreign markets. Extending normal trade relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic could only benefit the US. Laos imports approximately $3.7 million annually in chemicals, machinery and transportation equipment from the United States. The Lao PDR also has several investment opportunities in transportation, energy, contracts, private property, inheritance, state banking, accounting insurance, and labor relationships. In addition to current import and investment opportunities, the government has allowed the privatization of state owned enterprises, which may be acquired by foreign and domestic organizations. The country also holds significant deposits of natural resources. Approximately 47% of the country is forested with a variety of commercial species which may be used easily for commercial production. Gem deposits include sapphire, zircon, and amethyst. Valuable mineral deposits include gold, iron ore, tin, potash, limestone, silver, lead, zinc, copper, bauxite, coal and lignite. The Lao PDR shares boarders with Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. Extending normal trade relations to Laos would increase US trade stability and indirectly improve opportunities for trade to neighboring countries and improving diplomatic relations in the region. Therefore, US business relations are not the only benefit of extending normal trade relations with the Lao People's Democratic Republic. We thank you for the opportunity to express our comments in support of the extension of normal trade relations to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Extending NTR is one more important step to becoming a global free market economy. Yours Truly, James B. Clawson Chairman and CEO Lao Human Rights Council, Inc. Eau Claire, WI 54702 September 2, 1999 The Honorable Bill Archer, Chairman House Ways and Means Committee The Honorable Philip Crane, Chairman Subcommittee on Trade U.S. Senators, U.S. Senate and, Other Members of the U.S. Congress U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairmen Archer and Crane, U.S. Senators, and all Members of the U.S. Congress: On behalf of the Hmong and Lao American people and communities whom we represent in the United States, we are hereby inform, request and appeal to the U.S. Congress to reject and denounce the granting of ``Permanent Normal Trade Relations'' (NTR) and economic and foreign assistance to the Communist Lao government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) because of the following reasons: Witnesses and other people in Laos have reported that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government killed more than 300,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. Those witnesses and other people in Laos have continued to report that the war, killing fields, genocide, human rights violations and oppression against Hmong and Lao people are still going on in the countryside in Laos today. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese government and the Communist Lao government are conducting ``biological and chemical weapons warfare'' and an ethnic cleansing war against Hmong and Lao people in Laos today. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Vietnamese government, the Russian government, and other governments have been providing and supplying biological and chemical weapons, military materials, weapons, guns and equipment to the Communist Lao government to conduct war and genocide against Hmong and Lao people in Laos. Witnesses in Laos reported that Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Mr. Feng Sakchittaphong, Mr. Pang Thong Chokbeengboun, Mr. Wang Kou Vang, Mr. Boua Yeng Vang, Mr. Nhia Yee Yang, Mr. Youa Pao Herr, Mr. Youa Her Vue, and Mr. Xia Dang Thao are nine (9) of the 25,000 Hmong and Lao political prisoners in Laos today. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao government is seeking foreign aid and assistance in order to finance the Communist armed forces to conduct an ethnic cleansing war against people in Laos, especially the Hmong ethnic group. Therefore, the U.S. Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations and economic and foreign assistance to the Communist Lao government. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao government committed ``international terrorism'' against Mr. Houa Ly and Mr. Michael Vang in April 1999. These two gentlemen are Hmong American citizens. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao government has committed ``crimes against peace and crimes against humanity and war crimes'' in Laos. The Communist Lao government has violated the Vientiane Agreement on Laos of 1973 and international human rights law. Witnesses in Laos reported that there are about 30,000 to 70,000 Vietnamese soldiers and advisers who assist, support, and direct the Communist Lao government to conduct war against Hmong and Lao people in Laos. Nine-Point Proposal for Peace and Human Rights The U.S. Congress should consider the following nine (9)- point proposal for peace and human rights for people in Laos: 1. The U.S. Congress must not grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations nor economic and foreign assistance to the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government because these two governments have committed ``war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity'' in Laos. 2. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to demand that the Communist Lao government, Communist Vietnamese government, Russian government and other governments must immediately and unconditionally stop the use of biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 3. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to investigate and stop the ethnic cleansing war, genocide, oppression and human rights violations against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 4. We appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to bring the Communist Lao government and its Communist leaders, officials, agents, supporters and conspirators and the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Vietnamese leaders and officials to the International Military Tribunal Court (World Court) to trial for ``war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity'' against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 5. We appeal to the U.S. government, International Red Cross and international relief agencies and human rights organizations and international communities, and to the United Nations to send food and medical supplies, and to provide other basic human needs to those Hmong and Laotian people who escaped and have been living in the countryside because of Communist oppression, terrorism, genocide, the killing fields, ethnic cleansing war, human rights violations and biological and chemical weapons warfare committed by the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government. 6. We appeal to the U.S. government, United Nations, and international human rights organizations to demand the Communist Lao government to release Mr. Latsami Khamphoui, Feng Sakchittaphong, Wang Kou Vang, Nhia Yee Yang, Boua Yeng Vang, Youa Pao Herr, Youa Her Vue, Xia Dang Thao, Pang Thong Chokbengboun, and many other thousands of Hmong and Laotian political prisoners in Laos. 7. We appeal to the U.S. government to bring true peace, democracy, freedom, human rights and national reconciliation to people in Laos. 8. We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to stop the repatriation of Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand, and other displaced locations inside Thailand to return to Communist Laos because the Communist Lao government has committed genocide, oppression and human rights violations against Mr. Vue Mai, Chong Moua Thao, Yong Vang Lor, Nhia Yee Yang, and many hundreds of other returnees in Laos. We appeal to the U.S. government, Royal Thai government, and the UNHCR to provide more food, medical supplies, and other basic human needs to Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand. We appeal to the U.S. government, UNHCR, international organizations, and the Communist Lao government to provide more food, medical supplies and other basic human needs and land for returnees in Laos. 9. We appeal to the U.S. government to continue opening the door of opportunity for Hmong and Laotian refugees in the Napho Refugee Camp, Thailand, to resettle in the United States because of political reasons, family reunification, and genocide in Laos. Between June and July 1999, the delegation of the Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., in the United States went to the border between Thailand and Laos. People, witnesses and returnees from Laos met with us. They reported and certified that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government have conducted war and genocide against Hmong and Lao people because of the legacy of Hmong-American relations, cooperation, and connection during the Cold War. Witnesses in Laos reported that the Communist Lao government has imprisoned Mr. Xia Dang Thao, Nhia Yee Yang and more than 300 Hmong returnees in Laos. Witnesses said the Communist Lao authorities arrested and tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong returnees in Laos. Those witnesses reported that officials of the Communist Lao government, U.S. Embassy, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Laos did not report the true situation in Laos to the U.S. Congress and the rest of the world. People in Laos appealed to the Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., to report to the U.S. Congress and the rest of the world that the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government cooperate together to exterminate and kill Hmong people. They said the war, genocide, killing fields, and human rights violations against people in Laos, especially the Hmong people, are going on in the countryside. This is the true situation in Laos. Thank you so much for your consideration of the above proposals for true peace, human rights, justice and liberty and democracy. Respectfully, Dr. Vang Pobzeb Executive Director Enclosure Appendix I Reasons and Request for Justice and to Stop Genocide, Human Rights Violations and War in Laos Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos March 1, 1999 The U.S. Government The United Nations Dear U.S. Government and the United Nations: I am former Captain Nhia Herr Vang. I am 62 years old. From 1961 to 1975, I served in the Special Forces (SGU), under Regiment 25, Battalion 225, Company 2252, Second Military Region, under General Vang Pao and the American CIA in Laos during the Vietnam War. As I am aware, between 1958 and 1960, American CIA advisors and officials contacted and requested General Vang Pao to recruit and lead Hmong and Lao people to cooperate with the U.S. government to stop the aggression and expansion of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Therefore, we cooperated with the U.S. government. In 1973, the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the Vientiane Peace Agreement on Laos required that all foreign soldiers and advisors withdraw completely from Laos. These agreements state that the political and military problems in Laos have to be solved by Lao people. The U.S. government complied with these agreements. The U.S. government completely withdrew all its advisors and soldiers from Laos. However, to the contrary, the Communist Vietnamese government did not comply with these two agreements. In May 1975, the Communist Vietnamese soldiers and the Communist Pathet Lao soldiers cooperatively took over the Kingdom of Laos with armed forces and aggression. After the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao Movement took over Laos, they exterminated, oppressed, suppressed, killed and imprisoned many thousands of SGU soldiers and officials of the American CIA and Royal Lao government and other people in Laos. The Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government arrested, rounded up and sent many thousands of soldiers, officials and other people to death in many reeducation camps and concentration camps in Laos. In the area I occupied, in June 1975, I was arrested and forced to be reeducated in Seminar Camp where I stayed for four days. Fortunately, I escaped from the reeducation camp. Genocide, human rights violations, war and extermination by the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government against CIA soldiers, officials and other people in Laos were causal factors and reasons for people in Laos to form the Democratic Movement to fight against Communist aggression and oppression in Laos. Our struggles are self-defense for survival, freedom, democracy and human rights. In my village, the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers tortured and killed two Hmong families composed of ten people. The heads of these two families and victims were CIA and SGU soldiers. Therefore, people in my village and many other locations in Laos formed the Democratic Movement to defend ourselves for survival. Between 1975 and 1976, the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers used biological and chemical weapons to kill many CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and other people in Laos. Many more people suffered. Many people died. Therefore, about 1,000 Hmong people surrendered to the Communist Lao government. The Communist Lao government arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed those people. About 500 Hmong people fled Laos to Thailand and they sought resettlement in the United States. According to our statistical figure, there were 8,000 Hmong people in the village of Phou Ma Thao, Muang Mouk, Xieng Khouang Province, in 1975. In 1999, there are 1,500 people who survived and live in this village because the Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers killed more than 6,000 people in this one village. According to many reliable reports of many witnesses in Laos, the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government have killed about 300,000 people in Laos between 1975 and 1999. Of these victims, more than 40,000 were former CIA and SGU soldiers and officials of the CIA and Royal Lao government. The Communist Lao and Vietnamese soldiers burned and destroyed villages, houses, forests, farms and animals. They killed Hmong and Lao people and animals using biological and chemical weapons. In 1998 and 1999, there are more than five (5) Vietnamese military divisions stationed inside Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers are direct, support and assist the Communist Lao government to conduct the war, genocide and biological and chemical warfare against people in Laos. There has been neither peace nor stability inside Laos for the past 24 years, because the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao government is violating the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina and the Vientiane Peace Agreement on Laos of 1973. Because of the inhuman atrocities against our people by the Communist Lao government, I am calling upon the U.S. government and the United Nations to recognize that the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government have violated the Charter of the United Nations and the international human rights laws and principles. Nine-Point Proposal for Peace in Laos In order to bring a true peace, justice, human rights and stability to Laos, we people in Laos propose the following nine-point proposal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to consider: 1. To request the twelve (12) signatories (nations) and the United Nations who signed and witnessed the Paris Peace Agreements on Indochina on March 2, 1973, to guarantee and bring a true peace to Laos. 2. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to demand that the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government must immediately stop the war, genocide and human rights violations against people in Laos. 3. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to demand that all the Vietnamese soldiers and advisors must withdraw from Laos immediately and unconditionally. 4. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to send international peacekeeping forces to stop the war and keep the peace and to supervise free elections in Laos. 5. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to bring a true peace, justice and human rights to Laos. 6. To request the Royal Lao family, Dr. Khamphai Abhay, General Vang Pao, General Thonglith Chokbengboun and many other Laotian leaders to return to Laos in order to guarantee and maintain peace and stability for people in Laos. 7. To request the U.S. government and the United Nations to establish a ``safe haven zone'' and ``liberation zone'' for people, including the freedom fighters in Laos. The international communities should provide medicine, food and other basic human needs to people in these zones. 8. To request the U.S. government, the United Nations, and international human rights organizations to send investigators to investigate, monitor and stop genocide and human rights violations in Laos. 9. If all steps above fail to bring peace to Laos, the U.S. government and the United Nations must give an opportunity for CIA and SGU soldiers, officials and their family members and associates in Laos to seek political asylum and resettlement in the United States because of political reasons, genocide, human rights violations and war by the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government in Laos. On behalf of the Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos, I appeal to and request the U.S. government and the United Nations to consider the above proposals to save the lives of people in Laos. We need the U.S. government and the United Nations to bring a true peace, justice, human rights, and stability to Laos. We hope to receive assistance and support from the U.S. government and the United Nations in the near future. Respectfully requested and submitted: Signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang, Leader of the Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos. cc: (1) U.S. government. (2) United Nations (3) Royal Lao Family (4) Dr. Khamphai Abhay (5) General Vang Pao (6) General Thonglith Chokbengboun (7) Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA (8) United Lao Movement for Democracy, USA (9) United Lao Movement for Human Rights and Democracy in France (10) International human rights organizations Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao language which was signed by Mr. Nhia Herr Vang, a leader of the Lao Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Laos. Appendix II Affidavit and Statement of Mr. Blia Yang Chang to the U.S. Government and the United Nations on the True Situation in Laos March 9, 1999 Dear Ladies and Gentlemen: I am Mr. Blia Yang Chang. I am a former political prisoner in the Sam Khe political prison in Vientiane area, Laos, from September 10, 1997 to October 1, 1998. I was a captain and soldier under the American CIA and General Vang Pao in Laos from 1961 to 1975. Many thousands of people in Laos and I were happy to serve the U.S. government during the Vietnam War. I would like to report the following on the true situation in Laos to the government of the United States; government of France, government of the United Kingdom; the United Nations and international community; and international human rights organizations as follows: War and Genocide in Laos 1. In May 1975, the U.S. government withdrew from Laos completely. The U.S. government did not inform our Hmong and Laotian soldiers about the change of its foreign policy in Laos and Southeast Asia. Many thousands of Hmong and Laotian soldiers and civilians were arrested, imprisoned, and murdered or executed by the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers. The Communist government sent the King, Queen and many thousands of people to death in many concentration camps in Laos in the past two decades. In 1975, many thousands of people, including myself, could not escape to Thailand. We were subject to arrest, imprisonment and death by the Communist Lao soldiers and North Vietnamese soldiers. We saw the Communist soldiers kill many people in Muang Cha and many of the villages in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos. 2. As a result, I and many thousands of other people escaped to Mount Bia (Phoum Bia) in Xieng Khouang Province. I stayed in Mount Bia from 1975 to 1996. I saw the communist Lao and Communist Vietnamese soldiers massacre and kill more than 500 Hmong people in Mount Bia. The Communist soldiers used heavy guns and other weapons, and warplanes, to kill many thousands of people in many other locations. The Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao government used Soviet warplanes to drop many chemical weapons and bombs to kill many thousands of Hmong people in Mount Bia and many other locations in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in Laos. I saw the Soviet warplanes drop many chemical weapons and bombs to kill Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 3. The Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers launched and have been conducting war, genocide, human rights violations, oppression, and ethnic cleansing warfare against our Hmong and Laotian people in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in Laos from 1975 to the present time in 1999. In 1975, the Vietnam War was over for the U.S. government and American people, but the war is not yet over for Hmong and Laotian people. 4. The Communist Vietnamese government did not withdraw its Communist troops and soldiers from Laos. In 1999, there are still many thousands of Vietnamese soldiers, advisors and other Vietnamese people in Laos. The Vietnamese soldiers changed from military uniforms to civilian clothes and uniforms. Therefore, foreigners in Laos do not understand who are Laotians and who are Vietnamese people. The Communist Vietnamese government and Russian government have continuously supplied military materials, equipment, guns and weapons to the Communist Lao government to conduct war against people in Laos from 1975 until today. 5. Today, there is a war going ion in Mount Bia and other locations in Xieng Khouang Province and many other provinces in Laos. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers continue to carry on war against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 6. Many thousands of former CIA soldiers and their family members and other people have continued to escape to the countryside in order to avoid the genocide, persecution and imprisonment which are being committed by the Communist Lao government. Many people have died in the countryside from hunger, disease and war. 7. The Communist Lao government has continued to issue announcements and propaganda throughout Laos that those Hmong and Laotian people who escaped to the countryside can and should come back to live peacefully with the Communist Lao government without punishment and without revenge. Therefore, in 1996, I brought a document of amnesty which the Communist Lao government issued to me and to other people. We surrendered to the Communist authorities. I came to live in peace with my family members of the village of Phoum Ghan II, Vientiane area. However, on September 10, 1997, the Communist Lao authorities arrested and imprisoned me. Mr. Ya Xiong Chang and Nhia Lue Chang were also arrested and imprisoned by the Communist Lao government. The Communist Lao government imprisoned us at the Sam Khe concentration camp, Vientiane area, Laos. I witnessed that there were more than 250 Hmong and Laotian political prisoners in the Sam Khe concentration camp and in other political prisons in the Vientiane area. There are many thousands of Hmong and Laotian political prisoners in Laos. Conditions and food in the prison are the worst. Prisoners do not get enough food to eat and do not get clean water to drink. 8. Many other people in Laos and myself estimate that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers have killed more than 300,000 people in Laos in the past 23 years. The war and killing fields in Laos are still going on in the countryside in Laos. 9. The true situation in Laos is that the Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers have been cooperating together to carry on war, genocide, human rights violations, oppression and killing fields against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. The people in Laos need peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, food, basic human needs, medicine, and economic development. The people in Laos do not need war, genocide, oppression and human rights violations. Five-Point Peace Proposal for Laos Therefore, as I am a former Hmong political prisoner in Laos and a friend of the U.S. government, I would like to propose the following five points to the U.S. government and the United Nations and international rights organizations to consider for peace for the people in Laos: 1. The people in Laos and I appeal that the U.S. government and the United Nations must demand that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government and soldiers stop the war, genocide, human rights violations and biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Laotian people in Laos. 2. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to bring a true peace, democracy, freedom and human rights to the people in Laos. 3. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations to pressure the Communist Vietnamese government to withdraw all its soldiers and advisors from Laos completely and unconditionally. 4. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government, the United Nations and international humanitarian agencies to bring food, basic human needs, clothes, and medicine to Hmong and Laotian people in the countryside who escaped to there in order to avoid genocide and punishment. 5. The people in Laos and I appeal to the U.S. government and the United Nations and international human rights organizations to send delegates and representatives to Laos on fact-finding missions on the problems of genocide, human rights violations, war and peace in Laos. I swear and certify that the above statements and reports are true and correct. I tell and report the true situation in Laos to the U.S. Congress, U.S. government, American people and the United Nations. Respectfully, Name: Mr. Blia Yang Chang Signature: Notice: This English version is a translation from the verbal Hmong language of Mr. Blia Yang Chang. Appendix III Hmong Refugees Request Human Rights from U.S. Government Napho Forced Repatriation Camp Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, No. 014 June 2, 1999 Dear President Bill Clinton, President of the United States: Dear Members of the U.S. Congress and Senators, Washington, D.C.: Dear General Vang Pao, Hmong Leader: Dear Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc. in the United States: We, the Hmong refugees in the Napho Forced Repatriation Camp, Nakhon Phanom Province, Thailand, are writing this letter and petition to you regarding the problems of Hmong refugees in this camp. The purpose of this letter is to request true human rights and freedom. We request resettlement in the United States. Our requests, purposes and reasons are as follows: 1. On April 19-20, 1999, officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from Laos and Thailand and the Thai government have announced in the Napho refugee camp in Thailand that there is peace in Laos and are pressuring Hmong refugees in this camp to register to return to Laos. These officials have announced that each refugee who voluntarily registers to return to Laos will receive at least $100 from the U.S. government and 2,000 baht (Thai currency) as well as other assistance and support, in order to pressure refugees to return to Laos. However, they also announced that those refugees who refuse to register for voluntary repatriation from the Napho Camp, Thailand to Laos will not receive any assistance and help from the UNHCR and other parties involved in the repatriation to Laos. The officials stated that the Napho refugee camp will be closed down in 1999 and that they will force refugees from Thailand to Laos in 1999. 2. We Hmong refugees respectfully ask the Royal Thai government and you to recognize that between May and June 1987, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Thai Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, contracted and used Hmong refugees in Thailand to cooperate in helping the Royal Thai government fight against the Communist Lao government during the Thai-Lao border war in the three villages and Luong Kao, border between Laos and Thailand. Major Chong Her Xiong was our military commander (company 201) who led more than 250 Hmong soldiers in cooperation with the Thai armed forces (company 6). We cooperated with the Thai government to help to defend its national security and sovereignty. The Thai government won the war because of our support and cooperation. Therefore, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh gave videotape equipment, 30,000 baht in Thai currency, and many other awards to our Hmong soldiers. Therefore, we Hmong refugees are not willing to return to Laos, because we fear that the Communist Lao government shall imprison and kill us because of the above reasons. 3. The Communist Vietnamese government sent about 70,000 Vietnamese soldiers to cooperate with the Communist Lao government to wage war, genocide, ethnic cleansing warfare, and human rights violations against people in Laos. Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, and continuing in 1999, the Communist Vietnamese government and Communist Lao government has killed more than 300,000 people in Laos. The ``killing fields'' in Laos are still going on in 1999. The Communist Lao government has imprisoned 25,000 to 30,000 people in Laos, and continues to arrest, imprison and kill more Hmong and Lao people in 1999 without fair trials or reasons. These arrests, imprisonments and deaths are evidence that the Communist Lao government has been exterminating ethnic groups, especially Hmong people. 4. In 1993, the Communist Lao government arrested, imprisoned, tortured and killed Mr. Vue Mai, a leader of Hmong returnees in Laos. On April 6, 1999, the Communist Lao government arrested and imprisoned Mr. Vang Thai Xiong, another group leader of Hmong returnees in Laos. There are many other cases which are similar to the cases of Vue Mai and Vang Thai Xiong in Laos. We Hmong refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand, are political refugees. We are former soldiers and family members of former soldiers and associates of the U.S. government and CIA during the Vietnam War. Therefore, we declare that we shall not return to death in Communist Laos. 5. We Hmong refugees appeal to the UNHCR, Thai government and the U.S. government to solve our problems in Thailand in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the United Nations. Chapter 1 and Article 1 of the Convention defines who are ``refugees'' (please see the Convention of 1951). We are legal refugees and political refugees under the definition of the 1951 Convention. 6. There are 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand, who endorsed and agreed with this petition and letter. We appeal to Dr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., to bring our requests to the U.S. government, the UNHCR, and the Thai government for consideration of our requests for human rights. Thank you for your help and assistance. Respectfully submitted and requested, Written and signed by representatives of refugees on behalf of 1,286 Hmong and Lao refugees in the Napho Camp, Thailand Signed by: 1. Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp, Thailand (BV04019). 2. Mr. Vang Fai Dang, Leader of Hmong refugees, Napho Camp, Thailand (Refugee Status, ID, ST 197) and Mr. Thak Keo Vimxay. Heads of Families of Refugees who Endorsed and Supported this Petition and Letter include: Name Refugee Status 3. Mr. Nou Ly Vang................. (CA 03324) 4. Mrs. Chang Kia.................. (CB 200368) 5. Mr. Chong Shoua Vang............ (ST 198) 6. Mr. Vang Koua................... (BV 07742) 7. Mr. Lo Pao Lor.................. (NP 16616) 8. Mr. Xay Yee Chang............... (CA 4005) 9. Mr. Tong Yang................... (BSC 0172) 10. Mr. Xay Shoua Xiong............. (BV 03085) 11. Mr. Shoua Lo Xiong.............. (BN 1710) 12. Mr. Xay Seng Xiong.............. (BV 07577) 13. Mr. Ly Fong Xiong............... (CA 04706) 14. Mr. Youa Teng Thao.............. (BV 02521) 15. Mr. Yang Tou.................... (BV 0330) 16. Mr. Shoua Thao.................. (NN 16628) 17. Mr. Xai Thao.................... (NP 016627) 18. Mr. Oua Thai.................... (NP 16716) 19. Mr. Xai Thao Xiong.............. (BN 09036) 20. Mr. Mai Lor..................... (ST 01949) 21. Mrs. Youa Her................... (BV 08530) 22. Mr. Chao Thao................... (CA 05594) 23. Mr. Ka Xiong.................... (CA 05600) 24. Mr. Seng Shoua Xiong............ (BV 4078) 25. Mr. Yee Her..................... (BN 09179) 26. Mr. Wang Neng Thao.............. (CA 3217) 27. Mr. Chong Xiong Chang........... (CA 4003) 28. Mr. Vang Thao................... (BV 10325) 29. Mr. Xai Toua Chang.............. (BV 1914) 30. Mrs. Yia Ly..................... (CB 200669) 31. Mr. Cha Ly...................... (BV 8941) Notice: The above English version is a translation from the original Lao language which was written and signed by the above witnesses. Mr. Xiong Nhia Koua and Vang Fai Dang and the other 29 heads of families of refugees above requested resettlement in the United States. They declared that they shall not return to Laos because of political reasons. Appendix IV Request for Human Rights and Democracy July 4, 1999 Dear President of the United States, U.S. Congress General Vang Pao Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, USA I am Mr. Moua Yia. I am 42 years old. I am a leader of the Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters in Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Laos. I am hereby reporting on the true situations in Laos from 1975 to 1999 to you. The true situations in Laos for the past 24 years and also in 1999 are that the Communist Lao government and the Communist Vietnamese government have continued to commit war, genocide, human rights violations, oppression, extermination, ethnic cleansing war and biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong and Lao people in Laos. On October 12, 1975, the Communist Lao government arrested, tortured and killed my father, Mr. Nhia Toua Moua, a 45-year-old leader of the village. The Communist Lao government also tortured and killed four CIA soldiers, including Mr. Moua Bee, 35 years old; Mr. Boua Fue Moua, 38 years old; Mr. Moua Xiong, 33 years old; and Mr. Youa Lue Lor, 37 years old. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government have cooperated to kill many thousands of Lao and Hmong people in Laos because of the legacy of the Hmong-American relations during the Vietnam war. The Communist Lao government and Communist Vietnamese government killed about 350,000 people in Laos in the past 24 years. The war, genocide, human rights violations and biological and chemical weapons warfare against Hmong people are still going on in Laos in 1999. Therefore, I respectfully request the U.S. government to stop the war in Laos and to save the lives of our people, because we do not want to die by war anymore. We are former soldiers under the American CIA and General Vang Pao. Therefore, we request that the U.S. government must save our lives. We do not want to die by the Communist war. We need peace, democracy and human rights like the American people and other people in the world have. We appeal to and request the U.S. government and international human rights organizations to stop the war, genocide and human rights violations against people in Laos. Thank you so much. Respectfully requested, Signed by Mr. Moua Yia Leader of the Democratic Movement and Freedom Fighters Phou Bia (Mount Bia), Xieng Khouang Province, Laos cc: (1) The U.S. government (2) U.S. Congress (3) General Vang Pao (4) Mr. Vang Pobzeb, Lao Human Rights Council, Inc., USA Notice: The above English version is a translation from the Lao language, which was written and signed by Mr. Moua Yia on July 4, 1999. Note: This document is translated ``The Laotian Paper'' from a Lao version to English version by a Christian Missionary at Louang Prabang, Laos. Appendix V THE LAOTIAN PAPER February 10, 1998 Mr. Khamtai Siphandon Prime Minister Office of the Chairman Council of Ministers Vientiane, Laos To Prime Minister Siphandon From: The Laotian People This letter is sent to you to demand that you immediately order your troops to cease fire against the Lao people in the Northern, Central and Southern provinces of Laos. You cannot hide the fact that from December 1, 1997 to the present time, countless of innocent Laotian men, women, and children in those provinces have been killed by your government's 105 mm guns, chemicals, air raids, and by other military attacks. We have witnesses that on January 28-29, 1998 you ordered Russian-made B8 helicopters to drop lethal chemicals on the Lao-Hmong at Phoubia, Phaphai, Phoula, Phou La Phao, Mouang Cha, Mouang Mok, and other areas in Xiengkhouang province. These drops of red and yellow chemicals and the poisoning of specific water sources have immediately killed thousands of Lao civilians, including men, women and children. Furthermore, your troops captured large groups of women and children. All the children were killed immediately. The women were raped and killed by your soldiers who left them dead and naked. Mr. Prime Minister, you and your colleagues cannot afford to pay the price for this genocide. We were born in Laos and are Lao citizens. We claim the rights for life and to live freely in our own country. For twenty-two years, the Pathet Lao regime has conducted genocide against the Laotian people. We demand that you and your fellow leaders immediately withdraw your troops which were deployed to murder Lao civilians in the regions mentioned above. These killings must be immediately stopped. Otherwise, you and your colleagues must bear responsibility and all the consequences. Be aware, that once the truth is brought to the attention of the international community, you and your cohorts will be held responsible for this genocide by millions of Lao citizens as well as the international community. We, the survivors of your genocide have concrete evidence, and we are willing to testify before our fellow Lao citizens and the world, that you and your cohorts are conducting the most bloodthirsty murder campaign against your own citizens and the greatest violation of human rights in our history. Mr. Prime Minister, the Laotian people have suffered enough from decades of war. We want a government that respects peace, human rights and which is able to stimulate economic development for the benefit of the people. We do not deserve any more of the crazy and bloody war that you and your cohorts created. The Laotian people deserve to live in peace. You will not win and will not be able to totally wipe out the civilians whom you consider your opposition. We, the Lao citizens, give you and your colleagues our last warning to either cease fire immediately or we will have no choice but to assert our rights as citizens to condemn your administration and bring you before an international court of law. When this happens, you and your fellow leaders cannot deny responsible for what you have done to the Laotian people. This letter is executed in Laos this 10th day of February 1998 by the Laotian people, your fellow countrymen. Representative of the Lao People Bounchan Sodabanh cc: Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos US Department of State US Committee on Foreign Affairs Relation US Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs US Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam Foreign Minister of the People's Democratic Republic of China United Nations Headquarters of ASEAN World Bank Asian Development Bank Amnesty International International Human Rights Organizations Lao Human Rights Council in America National and International Media Organizations All Whom It May Concern Statement of Philip Smith, Washington, D.C., Director, Lao Veterans of America, Inc. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you, as well as the honorable Members of the Trade Subcommittee, for the special invitation extended to the Lao Veterans of America to submit comments today in the U.S. House of Representatives regarding Laos. We appreciate your role in the debate over whether or not to extend Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to the regime currently ruling Laos, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). We believe that the freedom-loving people of Laos will benefit, one bright day in the future, from your devotion to the democratic institutions and deliberative processes that have made America a great nation and a leader in the international community. Indeed, our deepest prayers and aspirations are to help to give voice in this testimony to the vast silent majority of the population in Laos--the countless individuals living in despair, poverty, discrimination and oppression in the LPDR because of decades of misguided policies forced upon them by a militaristic regime that has bankrupt the people, like the peoples of Eastern Europe under Communism, both economically and spiritually. I. About the Lao Veterans of America The Lao Veterans of America (LVA) is a non-profit veterans organization created to educate the general public and U.S. policymakers about the historic contributions made by the Lao and Hmong veterans of the U.S. Secret Army in Laos who served with U.S. clandestine and military forces during the Vietnam War. The LVA was founded and established with visionary leadership from Colonel Wangyee Vang and a very dedicated group of individuals. It enjoys an active advisory board and the participation of many distinguished American leaders, including many Members of Congress as well as those who served in senior policymaking positions during the Vietnam War. Major General Vang Pao and General Thonglit Chokbenboun are Honorary Co- Chairmen of the LVA. The Lao Veterans of America has chapters throughout the United States and represents over 60, 000 Laotian-Americans and their families. It has been recognized repeatedly by the U.S. Congress, Administration officials and the news media for its outstanding contributions to U.S. national security interests during the Vietnam War as well as its ongoing positive work in Washington, D.C., Southeast Asia and communities throughout the United States. For nearly a decade, the Lao Veterans of America, working in cooperation with other like-minded organizations that share similar goals, has played a significant role in helping to shape U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia as well as domestic policy toward the Lao-America and Hmong-American community. The LVA has had a major impact in the public arena and participated in the national dialogue regarding vital issues, including, but not limited to: 1.) organizing numerous research and U.S. Congressional fact-finding missions to Southeast Asia; 2.) hosting the first national recognition ceremonies for the Hmong veterans and their families, including the awarding of Congressional citations and the establishment of a memorial in Arlington National Ceremony; 3.) opposing the forced repatriation of Laotian refugees in Southeast Asia and bringing thousands of additional veterans and their families to the United States; 4.) encouraging Congress to successfully introduce and develop support for legislation granting citizenship to Hmong and Lao veterans of the U.S. Secret Army; 5.) urging Congress to introduce legislation that helped to successfully restore SSI to the Hmong and Lao veterans and their communities; and, 6.) playing a leadership role in the effort to urge Congress to reject the granting of MFN and NTR trade status to the LPDR regime by working to educate Members of Congress about the current situation in Laos and requesting that they continue to reject the granting of normal trade status to the regime in Laos until it undertakes basic economic and political reforms. In July and August of this year, the Lao Veterans of America conducted two major research missions to Southeast Asia in cooperation with Members of Congress, Southeast Asian government officials as well as various non-governmental organizations. Some of the research mission findings are contained in this testimony. II. The LPDR's Failed Efforts To Gain Special Trading Status in Recent Years Mr. Chairman, in 1997, the LPDR aggressively sought for the first time--in a bold step, unprecedented since the collapse of Laos to the communists in 1975--what was then called Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status from the U.S. Congress. Hitherto, granting MFN or NTR trade status to the LPDR regime had not been considered by Congress given the regime's horrific record on numerous issues. It is important to note that by 1997, the Lao communists were in a desperate situation and fearful that--like their former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe--events would spin out of control and they would lose their domestic grip on power to the forces of freedom, reform and market economics. In the face of deplorable, and steadily worsening economic conditions in the LPDR, the regime went abroad begging for financial aid, first from its former Cold War allies, including remarkably Cuba (whom, astonishingly, the LPDR actually asked for economic assistance from its nearly bankrupt ally--predictably, without result), and then, in desperation, from the United States. Sadly, Laos under the communists had become an economic basket case broken from decades of corruption and mismanagement in a Soviet-style command economy as well as the political and economic collapse of it largest foreign aid patron, the former Soviet Union. The U.S. Department of State, instead of pressing for systemic political and economic reform in Laos when significant potential leverage existed at the end of the Cold War and the difficult years for the regime that followed, apparently simply urged the LPDR to increase its efforts, in cooperation with the State Department, to obtain MFN trade status from the U.S. Congress. Moreover, the State Department worked to provide other forms of U.S. assistance to the Lao communists. Astonishingly, no significant conditions to encourage political and economic reform were placed on the LPDR regime by the U.S. Department of State in return for these generous concessions and Administration efforts to help obtain MFN trade status from Congress. Instead the State Department seemed to turn a blind eye to the regime's excesses and aggressively defended the LPDR and its policies from its critics in the United States and abroad. Hiring for the first time an American lobbyist, the LPDR vigorously pursued its effort to obtain MFN trade status on Capitol Hill with a number of its allies in the business as well as the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) community in Washington, D.C. White-washing the horrific ongoing nature of the LPDR and its behavior, they seemed overly eager to curry favor, with elements of the ruling elite in the Lao regime. The LPDR regime and its allies in Washington, D.C., as well as some elements within the State Department, also vigorously worked to attempt to discredit and smear the work of organizations, activists, journalists and ordinary public- spirited individuals in America and abroad concerned about the plight and ongoing suffering of the Lao people; some of those targeted included people who had lost family or loved ones in Laos because of the regime's brutality. These efforts on the part of the LPDR failed miserably and, in fact, backfired on the regime's plans to obtain MFN trade status. The apparent worst enemy of the Lao government, in terms of its efforts to obtain MFN trade status for the first time seemed to be the Lao government itself. It continued to engage in reckless and unbridled behavior with regard to international norms and the mistreatment of its own people. For example, it was even so imprudent at the time as to crackdown publicly on religious practice, arresting and imprisoning dozens of Christians in Laos, including American missionaries. Moreover, the LPDR regime strangely sought to justify its inexcusable actions with a bizarrely worded press release posted on its Embassy's internet site in Washington, D.C.; this after over fifty Members of Congress signed a letter in protest to the religious crackdown against the Christians in Laos. Mr. Chairman, tens of thousands of Lao and Hmong-Americans across the United States and internationally rallied against the LPDR regime and its efforts to obtain MFN trade status in the 105th Congress. News reports filled the American press as well as the international media about opposition to the LPDR's trade efforts by the Hmong and Lao people. The Lao Veterans of America was pleased to help in this regard as well as to urge Members of Congress to review the situation more closely and to organize, for the first time, an actual hearing exclusively on the situation in Laos from the perspective of the victims. It is to the credit of many in the U.S. Congress that sound reason, the light of factual information, and the enduring values that have made America the great nation that it is, were finally able to prevail and pierce the dark deception of the LPDR's propaganda and disinformation effort in Washington, D.C. In July 1997, on the same day that the MFN legislation for Laos was voted on by the Trade Subcommittee, the first hearing since the Vietnam War was held in Congress regarding the situation in Laos. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus in cooperation with the House International Relations Committee, under the combined leadership of Chairman Ben Gilman, Congressman Tom Lantos, Congressman John Porter, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, Subcommittee Chairman Chris Smith, Congressman Bruce Vento and Congressman George Radanovich organized and hosted this important hearing. Lao and Hmong victims and survivors of the LPDR's brutality and atrocities testified about their experiences before the Congress. Also providing testimony were noted experts on the current situation in Laos such as T. Kumar from Amnesty International and Colonel Wangyee Vang, National President of the Lao Veterans of America. III. Opposition by the Lao Veterans of America and the Vast Majority of Lao and Hmong-Americans to the Granting of NTR Trade Status to the Lao Regime Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly in our view, and in the sentiments firmly held by the vast majority of Lao and Hmong- Americans, it would be premature and unconscionable for the U.S. Congress to provide the LPDR regime in Laos with Normal Trade Relations (NTR) at this time. Although highly coveted by the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP)--particularly its coercive state organs of control, including its military and security forces, whose morbid Stalinist institutions would be transfused with fresh supplies of foreign investment capital-- such a move by Congress to grant NTR status to Laos would clearly not be in the interest of either the people of Laos or the United States in the current dispensation. We base our staunch opposition to granting NTR to the Lao government on the significant body of information regarding the ongoing rogue conduct of the LPDR regime, which includes, but is not limited to, the following points listed below. IV. Overview of the Regime in Laos--The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR)--A Threat to Civil Society in Communities in South East Asia, the United States and the Internationally. The Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (LPDR) is a one-party communist state ruled by the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party (LPRP). The LPRP exercises absolute control over the State and its institutions. It is intolerant of political diversity and the existence of political and religious groups or organizations with differing viewpoints. The communist party enjoys a monopoly on power at all levels of society in Laos. All other political parties outlawed. Military and security forces consume a disproportionately large amount of the State's annual budget and are tasked with crushing all forms of free thought that might emerge to challenge the policies or power of the State or its leadership--including political, religious, social and economic thought. The LPDR retains close working relationships on security and other maters with rogue, or Stalinist regimes in North Korea and Cuba. For example, in 1995, the government of Laos took a delivery of 20 busts of its communist Party founder, Kaysone Phomvihane from North Korea-- whose sculptors produced similar busts of the former Korean Dictator Kim IL-Sung. Currently, these busts are being placed in newly constructed memorial squares in all of the provincial capitals of Laos as well as other LPDR designated locations throughout the country. It is, therefore, no surprise that the LPDR remains one of the most corrupt, repressive and backward nations in Southeast Asia and, indeed, the world. In the last decade, the LPDR and its leadership have become more obsessed with absolute control of the State, and have heighten coercive efforts against political, ethnic and religious dissidents and opposition groups in Laos, especially after the Berlin Wall was brought down and the economic and political collapse of its chief patron--the former Soviet Union. LPDR military and security forces engage in ethnic and political cleansing of dissident and minority elements who challenge the LPRP's policies or leadership. Dissidents or members of suspect ethnic minorities are often jailed or executed extrajudicially--many simply disappear. Independent human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Asia Watch are barred from Laos by the government. Foreign journalists are assigned ``minders'' by the LPDR security services to monitor their movements and activities. Frequent reports by Lao and Hmong families living in the United States or abroad regarding allegations of the persecution or killings of their relatives still residing in Laos by the regime are sometimes difficult to confirm independently because of these restrictions and the often secretive nature of the LPDR regime. V. Ongoing Ethnic Cleansing Operations by the LPDR Regime Against the Hmong and Other Minority Groups in Laos. There are numerous and ongoing large-scale and small-unit ethnic cleansing operations being conducted by the LPDR military and security forces against Hmong, Khmu, Mien and other minority enclaves in Laos. Accurate numbers as to the casualties killed and wounded in Laos by the government remain elusive due to the closed nature of the LPDR regime as well as the remoteness of the regions and the primitive conditions that exist in many parts of Laos. In the 1990s, however, conservative estimates place the number of minority people killed annually in Laos by the government in these operations at several thousand. Numbers were far higher on an annual basis in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s following the collapse of the Royal Lao government and the takeover by the communists in 1975. In the 1980s, large-scale operations by Vietnamese military forces in Laos, in coordination with LPDR security forces, probably accounted for the deaths of tens of thousands of Hmong and other minority peoples on an annual basis. Moreover, tens of thousands of Hmong and Lao people also fled the country as refugees across the Mekong River to Thailand during these years. Mr. Chairman, currently military operations are being conducted by the LPDR in northern Xieng Khouang Province, Laos, against some 8,000 Hmong people that are largely surrounded in two major defensive pockets. International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman raised serious concerns about this issue with Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand in August of this year after his staff conducted research interviews with Hmong leaders and representatives from this area. Thai officials and key leaders in the United States Congress remain concerned about the possible need to provide humanitarian assistance for a potential refugee influx that the ongoing LPDR ethnic cleansing operations might generate. In Southern Xieng Khouang Province (including what the LPDR established as the ``Xiasomboun Special Zone''), Bolikhamsai Province and Khammuan Province, Laos, some 1500 Hmong are being hunted by special LPDR ethnic cleansing units tasked with exterminating them. In the Southern panhandle of Laos, hundreds of Khmu people who oppose the LPDR's policies are subjected to military attacks by the regime that have claimed the lives of hundreds of people over the last several years. Many have begun to take up arms against the government or flee to the jungle in self- defense. Mr. Chairman, currently, in 1999, it is estimated that at least 12,000 minority people are currently in imminent danger of extermination in Laos by LPDR ethnic cleansing units. The Hmong people continue to be singled out for attack by the LPDR which still often mistrusts them, given their role in support of anti-communist efforts with U.S. clandestine and military forces during the Vietnam War. The main targets of ethnic cleansing by the LPDR regime are almost exclusively civilians living in villages in various remote areas of Laos--where people wish to live in freedom, and resistance and opposition forces continue to seek safe-haven from the regime. Current, LPDR tactics do not seek to discriminate between civilian and resistance targets. Suspect or unspecified ethnic minority groups in their traditional rural or mountain homelands are attacked by military and security forces with the apparent intent to kill all of the inhabitants. Entire villages are attacked indiscriminately with seemingly no regard for civilian lives--especially those of women and children who, if they survive the initial attack, are often raped, mutilated or summarily executed. For such operations, the LPDR routinely deploys for airborne support its older, but still quite lethal, Soviet-built MI-6 and MI-8 ``HIP-E'' attack helicopters--in tactical combat formations of four to six helicopters-- sometimes equipped with 57 mm rocket pods, machine guns and cluster munitions. It is also worthy to note that the LPDR is deploying, in larger numbers, ethnic battalions of communist or conscripted Hmong and other minorities against people of their own ethnicity in an effort to obtain better intelligence as well as divide and conquer these groups. Currently, one battalion each of communist or conscripted Hmong are reportedly deployed in Xieng Khouang and Khammuan provinces respectively to assist LPDR ethnic cleansing units with their operations. LPDR troops often suffer from severe discipline problems and low morale due to conscription and lack of pay for months on end. These problems have been exacerbated in recent years with the economic crisis in Laos. Consequently, LPDR troops are frequently known to loot, plunder and rape in many of the areas where they operate. The military and security forces are thus viewed with ever increasing suspicion, contempt and hostility by many Lao people. Underground political and armed opposition groups continue to develop and grow in such an environment. Astonishingly, the LPDR regime apparently continues to aggressively desire military support and senior-level advice from Vietnam for its military operations against the Hmong people in Xieng Khouang Province. On May 31, 1998, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the Voice of Vietnam in Hanoi had announced the crash in Xieng Khouang Province, Laos, of a very senior delegation of Vietnamese military officials, on
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	5	https://kids.kiddle.co/Khamtai_Siphandone	en	Khamtai Siphandone facts for kids	https://kids.kiddle.co/i…28cropped%29.jpg	https://kids.kiddle.co/i…28cropped%29.jpg	[ "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/wk/kids-robot.svg", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/wk/kids-search-engine.svg", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/3/37/The_Prime_Minister%2C_Dr._Manmohan_Singh_meeting_with_the_President_of_Laos%2C_Mr._Khamtay_Siphandone_at_Vientiane_in_Laos_on_November_29%2C_2004_%28cropped%29.jpg", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/5/56/Flag_of_Laos.svg/22px-Flag_of_Laos.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/5/54/LAO_Gold_Medal_of_the_Nation_BAR.svg/60px-LAO_Gold_Medal_of_the_Nation_BAR.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/e/ed/Order_of_Phoxay_Lane_Xang.png/60px-Order_of_Phoxay_Lane_Xang.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/9/9c/Flag_of_Brunei.svg/22px-Flag_of_Brunei.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/6/63/BRU_Family_Order_of_Brunei_1st_Class.svg/60px-BRU_Family_Order_of_Brunei_1st_Class.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/2/21/Flag_of_Vietnam.svg/22px-Flag_of_Vietnam.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/e/ed/Vietnam_Gold_Star_ribbon.png/60px-Vietnam_Gold_Star_ribbon.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/a/a9/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg/22px-Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/5/55/SU_Order_of_the_Red_Banner_ribbon.svg/60px-SU_Order_of_the_Red_Banner_ribbon.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/5/5f/Kids_robot.svg/60px-Kids_robot.svg.png", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/wk/kids-search-engine.svg" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Learn Khamtai Siphandone facts for kids	en	/images/wk/favicon-16x16.png		https://kids.kiddle.co/Khamtai_Siphandone	General Khamtai Siphandone (Lao: ຄຳໄຕ ສີພັນດອນ; born 8 February 1924) is a Laotian politician who was Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from 24 November 1992 to 21 March 2006 and President of Laos from 24 February 1998 to 8 June 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly Sayasone. He was a member of the Communist Party of Indochina in 1954 and a member of the Central Committee of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in 1956. Early life Siphandone was born on 8 February 1924. He comes from a peasant family from the far south of Laos. His first job was as a postman. He joined the national liberation movement Lao Issara after the end of the Second World War, which stood for the independence of Laos and against the return of the French protectorate administration. Before the French regained control of Savannakhet in March 1946, Siphandone seized the entire provincial fund (150,000 piastres). He became an officer of the armed wing of the movement and in 1948 their representative for southern Laos. After the split of Lao Issara in 1950 he joined the Viet Minh-backed Pathet Lao. In 1954 he became a member of the Communist Party of Indochina, and in 1955 the Lao People's Party, whose central committee he was from 1957. He was considered a close confidant of the first Secretary-General Kaysone Phomvihane. In 1962 he became his successor as chief of staff of the armed units of the Pathet Lao. In 1966 he became commander-in-chief of the resulting "Lao People's Liberation Army", which fought with North Vietnamese support, in the Laotian Civil War against the royal troops. In 1972 he rose to the Politburo of the LPRP. Political career Siphandone was the military commander of the Pathet Lao rebellion. After the successful Communist takeover in 1975, he became the Minister of Defense and a Deputy Prime Minister of Laos. During the 5th Party Congress in 1991, Siphandone was the third highest-ranking member of the party leadership, after Kaysone Phomvihane and Nouhak Phoumsavanh. On 15 August 1991, he succeeded Kaysone as Prime Minister of Laos, who had left office to become President. After the death of longtime party leader Kaysone in 1992, Siphandone became Chairman of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Siphandone succeeded Nouhak Phoumsavanh as president in 1998. At the 8th Party Congress in 2006, he became an advisor to the LPRP Central Committee. Siphandone remained as party leader until 21 March 2006, when he was replaced by Choummaly. He stepped down as president in June, following the 2006 Laotian parliamentary election. Family and personal life Siphandone is married to Thongvanh Siphandone. His son Sonexay joined the LPRP Politburo in 2016 and became Prime Minister of Laos in 2022. His daughter Viengthong currently serves as President of the State Audit Organization. On 8 February 2024, he turned 100, and was sent congratulatory messages by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng and President of Vietnam Võ Văn Thưởng. The Vietnamese ambassador to Laos Nguyen Ba Hung presented a birthday gift to Siphandone to his son Sonexay. Awards and honors Laos: National Gold Medal Order of Phoxay Lane Xang Brunei: Family Order of Laila Utama (2004) Vietnam: Gold Star Order Soviet Union: Order of the Red Banner (1984) See also
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	1	10	https://www.manushyafoundation.org/post/lao-govt-s-decision-to-use-state-fund-for-khamtai-siphandone-s-birthday-sparks-public-backlash	en	🇱🇦Lao Govt's decision to use State Fund for Khamtai Siphandone's Birthday sparks public backlash!	https://static.wixstatic…97442377~mv2.png	https://static.wixstatic…97442377~mv2.png	[ "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/a0db76_24048dd59ba64054a47ec490b38a838d~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_523,h_75,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_auto/Logo%20with%20tagline%20(Horizontal).png", "https://static.wixstatic.com/media/a0db76_a56077e1284f449fa1860a9397442377~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_49,h_49,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,blur_2,enc_auto/a0db76_a56077e1284f449fa1860a9397442377~mv2.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "Foundation", "Manushya" ]	null	[ "Manushya Foundation" ]	2023-08-07T09:33:30.957000+00:00	🇱🇦#WhatsHappeningInLaos Laos is gearing up to celebrate Former President Khamthai Siphandon's 100th birthday, with the government's budget earmarked for the occasion!Lao authorities have disclosed that the budgets of relevant ministry agencies will be utilized to cover the upcoming birthday celebration's expenses. Consequently, the public has been left wondering which actual ministerial agencies will be responsible for the allocation of the resources. In addition, Lao citizens are questioning	en	https://static.wixstatic…bf857b%7Emv2.png	Manushya Foundation	https://www.manushyafoundation.org/post/lao-govt-s-decision-to-use-state-fund-for-khamtai-siphandone-s-birthday-sparks-public-backlash	🇱🇦#WhatsHappeningInLaos Laos is gearing up to celebrate Former President Khamthai Siphandon's 100th birthday, with the government's budget earmarked for the occasion! Lao authorities have disclosed that the budgets of relevant ministry agencies will be utilized to cover the upcoming birthday celebration's expenses. Consequently, the public has been left wondering which actual ministerial agencies will be responsible for the allocation of the resources. In addition, Lao citizens are questioning whether these funds could not be allocated for better use, such as tackling the ongoing economic crisis, the high unemployment rate, debt issues, the depreciating kip, or addressing the urgent needs of flood-stricken local communities. While the Lao government is busy planning the birthday party, several provinces in Laos, including Savannakhet, are grappling with relentless torrential rains that have resulted in catastrophic flooding. Images circulating on social media platforms depict drowned cattle, submerged homes, and local communities still stranded atop their roofs, wondering whether help will ever come their way. In 2018, heavy rains coupled with substandard construction techniques resulted in the tragic collapse of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy dam in Attapeu province, claiming at least 71 lives and displacing over 7000 people. Half a decade later, survivors of the dam collapse are still waiting to receive fair and adequate compensation from the Lao government. Sadly, despite climate change-induced disasters becoming increasingly common, Laos doesn’t seem in a hurry to transition away from development projects that are harmful to the environment or to implement measures to prevent and mitigate the impact of natural disasters. ✊🏼Manushya Foundation calls on the Lao government to truly check its priorities! Instead of spending scarce public funds on extravagant birthday celebrations, Laos should take concrete measures to address the ongoing hardship of the Lao people and provide immediate support to disaster-struck communities! Read the official announcement letter at Grandeur Law House - The People's Legal Team. #WeAreManushyan ♾️ Equal Human Beings
correct_leader_00141	FactBench	2	12	https://m.facebook.com/vientianetimesonline/posts/former-president-khamtay-siphandone-wants-authorities-in-three-southern-province/1352742994793150/	en	Bei Facebook anmelden	https://www.facebook.com…icon_325x325.png	https://www.facebook.com…icon_325x325.png	[ "https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/v3/y8/r/k97pj8-or6s.png", "https://facebook.com/security/hsts-pixel.gif?c=3.2" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Melde dich bei Facebook an, um dich mit deinen Freunden, deiner Familie und Personen, die du kennst, zu verbinden und Inhalte zu teilen.	de		Facebook	https://www.facebook.com/login/