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9206	dbpedia	3	30	https://ncanb.org/history-of-nigeria/	en	Canadian Association of New Brunswick	https://ncanb.org/wp-con…1/07/favicon.png	https://ncanb.org/wp-con…1/07/favicon.png	[ "https://ncanb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/WhatsApp-Image-2022-10-03-at-11.13.51-AM.jpeg", "http://localhost/ncanb/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/image3.jpg", "http://localhost/ncanb/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/image5-300x293.jpg", "https://ncanb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/iage-600x459-1.png", "https://nc...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://ncanb.org/wp-con…1/07/favicon.png		https://ncanb.org/history-of-nigeria/	Nigeria is located on the western coast of Africa. Before the colonial era, the peoples of Nigeria lived in hunting, fishing and farming societies. In the 15th century, the Portuguese were the first white people to arrive in Nigeria, before the arrival of the British. The people of Benin began to trade with the Portuguese, selling slaves, buying spices and firearms, and learning the art of writing and the Christian religion. By the 18th century, the British had taken over control of the slave trade from the Portuguese. However, in 1807, the British missionaries’ campaign against slavery led the British parliament to ban the slave trade. In 1884, Britain created the Oil Rivers Protectorate in the Niger Delta and claimed the region in 1885 after defeating King Jaja of Opobo. Did you know that the Niger Delta was called the Oil Rivers because it was a major producer of palm oil? In 1862, Lagos Island was declared a colony of Britain, and Mr. H.S Freeman became Governor of Lagos Colony. In 1893, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was renamed Niger Coast Protectorate with Calabar as capital. In 1890, the British reporter Flora Shaw suggested that the area be named “Nigeria” after the Niger River. [Flora Shaw later married Lord Frederick Lugard]. By 1900, Britain had control of Nigeria and had established the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate. In 1914, the Northern Nigeria Protectorate and Southern Nigeria Protectorate were amalgamated to form Nigeria, with Colonial Officer Frederick Lugard as Governor-General. In 1944 – NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) founded by Herbert Macauley. In 1949, the Northern People’s Congress was founded by Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello. In 1951, the Action Group Party was established by Chief Obafemi Awolowo. Also in 1951, an agitation of the NCNC under Dr. Namdi Azikiwe caused Britain to grant internal self-rule to Nigeria. In 1954, federalism was adopted in Nigeria and the position of Governor was created in the three regions (North, West and East. 1957-1958 Constitutional conferences in the UK The preparation of a new federal constitution for an independent Nigeria was carried out at conferences held at Lancaster House in London and presided over by The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd, M.P., the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Nigerian delegation to the Constitutional conferences was led by Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa of the NPC. It included Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Action Group, Dr. Azikiwe of the NCNC, and Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello of the NPC, also the premiers of the Western, Eastern, and Northern regions, respectively. In 1958, Nigerian Armed Forces were transferred to Federal control. In 1959, the Nigerian Navy was born. Also in 1959, a new Nigerian currency, the Pound, was Introduced. 1959 – First general elections in Nigeria. The NPC and the NCNC formed a coalition, and Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa was called on to lead the government, while Chief Obafemi Awolowo became official leader of the opposition. 1960 – Nigeria gained independence on 1st October. 1963 – Adoption of a new Nigerian constitution. Nigeria remained a Commonwealth Realm with Queen Elizabeth II as titular head of state until the Nigerian nation was declared a republic in 1963. Dr. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe – Nigeria’s First President. Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa.
9206	dbpedia	3	47	https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Currency_Revolution_in_Southern_Nige.html%3Fid%3D7N4aAAAAMAAJ	en	Google Books			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					https://books.google.com/	Search the world's most comprehensive index of full-text books. My library
9206	dbpedia	3	10	http://www.numismondo.net/pm/sng/	en	Southern Nigeria Protectorate Paper Money, 1909 Unissued Proof banknotes	http://www.numismondo.net/flags/sng/sng_favicon.ico	http://www.numismondo.net/flags/sng/sng_favicon.ico	[ "http://www.numismondo.net/flags/sng/sng_flag.png", "http://www.numismondo.net/leaders/GB/GB%20Queen%20Victoria.jpg", "http://www.numismondo.net/leaders/GB/Gbr%20Edward%20VII%2022.1.1901%20- 6.5.1910 .jpg", "http://www.numismondo.net/leaders/GB/gbr%20King%20George%20V%20med.jpg", "http://www.numismondo.net/...	[]	[]	[ "Southern Nigeria Protectorate Paper Money", "1909 Unissued Proof banknotes", "World paper money picture catalog", "money", "banknotes", "paper money", "IBNS", "International Bank Note Society", "collectible", "numismatics", "collecting", "syngraphics", "scripophily", "world numismatics", ...	null	[ "Garry Saint" ]	null	Southern Nigeria Protectorate Paper Money, 1909 Unissued Proof banknotes		http://www.numismondo.net/flags/sng/sng_favicon.ico		null	COLONY & PROTECTORATE OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA 1901 Proposed Banknote PROOFS Southern Nigeria is not a country listed in any coin or banknote numismatic catalogs. If you also collect postage stamps, you can find stamps for this colony issued from 1901-1913. Thanks to an avid banknote numismatic researcher, The Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria has now been listed in the Numismondo World Paper Money Picture Catalog. Our listing above includes 12 different Proof banknotes and the original correspondence between Mr. Thomas DeLaRue, Director of the printing company and Southern Nigeria High Commissioner, Sir Walter Egerton K.C.M.G. who was resident in Dorchester, England. Egerton never took office in Lagos as he had an acting High Commissioner, James Jamieson Thorburn, resident in Southern Nigeria. Southern Nigeria (1900 - 1914) was a British Protectorate formed by amalgamating the Niger Coast Protectorate with territories chartered by the Royal Niger Company below Lokoja on the Niger River. The Lagos colony was later added in 1906 and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. (1) The British pound sterling was the official currency of the new colony. It has been reported in several publications that the British West African pound was used in Southern Nigeria from 1913-14, however, the West Africa Currency Board did not begin issuing their banknotes until 1916, it is there for assumed that the British pound continued use until 1916. The Colony used the BWA Pound from 1916 - 58 with the exception of an emergency WWI issues by the Nigeria Government in 1918. The Nigeria Pound-Naira began in 1958 and continues today. In 1909, the researcher found a proposal to Introduce a new currency for the Southern Nigeria Colony & Protectorate. An order was given to British banknote printing company De La Rue. The result of the proposal for these new banknotes consists of a 2 page letter from the Director of De La Rue, addressed to Sir Walter Egerton K.C.M.G, Governor of Southern Nigeria (1904 - 1912), explaining the details of the proposed notes for Southern Nigeria. It contained the designs of front and back of all proposed denominations, with additional different back designs, example of underprint and watermark papers in different colors. In total there are 20 items contained in this lot and becomes a full set with letter and all the contents, as mentioned in the letter, without any missing items. From the correspondence it appears that the five denomination set of banknotes was in an advanced stage of development. It was awaiting approval of the reverse designs from several possible submitted designs which included a hippopotamus with its mouth wide open, a hippo side view and some various colour features. During this period of banknote history there was not much in terms of security features except for watermarks. TdlR proposed a new "protective overprint....guarding them against forgery by photography or direct transfer to stone." They also included 5 different coloured papers with watermark for consideration. Mr. DeLaRue requested a fee of ₤635 to perform the engraving of the plates - a paltry sum in today's terms! It was very interesting to read all of the original correspondence and to see the resulting designs, none of which would ever materialize into issued banknotes. This proposal never got beyond the proposal stage because of disputes between the Colonial government and the Treasury over the silver signorage privileges enjoyed by the British Bank of West Africa. In 1916 the British West Africa Currency Board issued its first banknotes obviating the need for Southern Nigeria banknotes, with these PROOFS languishing in the vaults of De La Rue for over 100 years before discovery. All the items are original and certified by PCGS with grades ranging from 58 AU to 64 UNC. These are 100+ years old, directly from the archives of the printer. There is no information found or recorded anywhere about this proposal and none of the paper money catalogs list a country called SOUTHERN NIGERIA. "This lot represents a missing numismatic history and is clearly a national Nigerian treasure" as stated by the researcher. We gratefully acknowledge Ramkumar for submitting these original images and the wonderful historic story surrounding their preparation. 6.8.2016 GSE
9206	dbpedia	0	53	https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/8-colonial-rule-in-west-africa/	en	8: Colonial Rule in West Africa – History Textbook			[ "https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/burning_of_coomassie.jpg", "https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/j-_e-_casely-hayford-the-archive-of-northwestern-university-2013.jpg", "https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/334/2020/08/Kwame_Nkrumah_JFKW...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/8-colonial-rule-in-west-africa/	Please click this link to download the chapter. The European scramble for Africa culminated in the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-85. The conference was called by German Chancellor Bismarck and would set up the parameters for the eventual partition of Africa. European nations were summoned to discuss issues of free navigation along the Niger and Congo rivers and to settle new claims to African coasts. In the end, the European powers signed The Berlin Act (Treaty). This treaty set up rules for European occupation of African territories. The treaty stated that any European claim to any part of Africa, would only be recognized if it was effectively occupied. The Berlin Conference therefore set the stage for the eventual European military invasion and conquest of African continent. With the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, the entire continent came under European colonial rule. The major colonial powers were Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal. The story of West Africa after the Berlin Conference revolves around 5 major themes: the establishment of European colonies, the consolidation of political authority, the development of the colonies through forced labor, the cultural and economic transformation of West Africa, and West African Resistance. European Penetration and West African Resistance to Penetration Effective Occupation was a clause in the Berlin Treaty which gave Europe a blank check to use military force to occupy West African territories. 1885-1914 were the years of European conquest and amalgamations of pre-colonial states and societies into new states. European imperialists continued to pursue their earlier treaty making processes whereby West African territories became European protectorates. Protectorates were a loaded pause before the eventual European military occupation of West Africa. Because protectorate treaties posed serious challenges to West African independence most West African rulers naturally rejected them. West African rulers adopted numerous strategies to forestall European occupation including: recourse to diplomacy, alliance, and when all else failed, military confrontation. Recourse to Diplomacy The British found few people as difficult to subdue as the Asante of Ghana in their quest to build their West African colonial empire. The Asante Wars against the British, which began in 1805, lasted a hundred years. Although outmatched by superior weaponry, the Asante kept the British army at bay for a short final period of independence. To understand the Asante wars, one has to look at role of King Prempeh I, who firmly resolved not to submit to British protection. When pressured in 1891 to sign a protection treaty which implied British control of Asante, Prempeh firmly and confidently rejected idea. Here are his words to the British envoy: The suggestion that Asante in its present state should come and enjoy the protection of Her Majesty the Queen and Empress of India, is a matter of very serious consideration and I am happy to say we have arrived at this conclusion, that my kingdom of Asante will never commit itself to any such policy. Asante must remain [independent] of old . . . In 1897, King Prempeh was exiled, and the Asante were told that he would never be returned. He was first taken to Elmina Castle. From there, he was taken to the Seychelles Islands. In 1899, in a further attempt to humiliate the Asante people, the British sent British governor Sir Frederick Hodgson to Kumasi to demand the Golden Stool. The Golden Stool was a symbol of Asante unity. In the face of this insult the chiefs held a secret meeting at Kumasi. Yaa Asantewa, the Queen Mother of Ejisu, was at the meeting. The chiefs were discussing how they could make war on the white men and force them to bring back the Asantehene. Yaa Asantewa saw that some of the bravest male members of nation were cowed. In her now famous challenge, Yaa Asantewa declared: How can a proud and brave people like the Asante sit back and look while white men took away their king and chiefs and humiliate them with a demand for the Golden Stool. The Golden Stool only means money to the white man; they searched and dug everywhere for it . . . If you, the chiefs of Asante, are going to behave like cowards and not fight, you should exchange your loincloths for my undergarments. That was the beginning of the Yaa Asantewa War. The final battle began on September 30, 1900, and ended in the bloody defeat of the Asante. Yaa Asantewa was the last to be captured, and subsequently exiled to the Seychelles, where she died around 1921. With the end of these wars, the British gained control of the hinterland of Ghana. Around the same time, Behanzin, the last king of Dahomey (1889-94), told the European envoy that came to see him: God has created Black and White, each to inherit its designated territory. The White man is concerned with commerce and the Black man must trade with the White. Let the Blacks do no harm to the Whites and in the same way the Whites must do not harm to the blacks. In 1895, Wobogo, the Moro Nabaor king of the Mossi told French Captain Restenave: I know the whites wish to kill me in order to take my country, and yet you claim that they will help me to organize my country. But I find my country good just as it is. I have no need of them. I know what is necessary for me and what I want: I have my own merchants: also, consider yourself fortunate that I do not order your head to be cut off. Go away now, and above all, never come back. Alliance When West African leaders struck alliances with the imperialists, they did so in an attempt to enhance their commercial and diplomatic advantages. King Jaja of Opobo, for instance, resorted to diplomacy as means of resistance to European intrusive imperialism. Mbanaso Ozurumba, a.k.a Jaja was a former slave of Igbo origin. He was elected as king of the Anna Pepple House in Bonny, Niger Delta, in 1863, following the death of his master. Soon a struggle between the Anna Pepple House and Manilla Pepple House led to the outbreak of civil war in Bonny in 1869. The war resulted in King Jaja’s migration and founding of the inland kingdom of Opobo which lay in the palm oil producing hinterland. Jaja was an avowed nationalist and determined to control the trade in his political domain. He was determined to prevent European incursions into the interior. He also wanted to ensure that Opobo oil markets remained outside the sphere of foreign traders. To this end, King Jaja signed a trade treaty with the British in 1873. Part of the treaty reads as follows: After April 2, 1873, the king of Opobo shall allow no trade established or hulk in or off Opobo Town, or any trading vessels to come higher up the river than the Whiteman’s beach opposite Hippopotamus Creek. If any trading ship or steamer proceeds further up the river than the creek above mentioned, after having been fully warned to the contrary, the said trading ship or steamer may be seized by King Jaja and detained until a fine of 100 puncheon [of palm oil] be paid by the owners to king Jaja . . . By signing the treaty, the British acknowledged Jaja as the king of Opobo and dominant middleman in the Niger Delta trade. However, the ensuing scramble for Africa of 1880s upset the understanding. The British merchants and officials were no longer in the mood to respect Jaja’s preeminence in the Niger Delta hinterland. They instead penetrated the hinterland to open up free trade and therefore a confrontation with Jaja became inevitable. In 1887, the British consul Harry Johnson enticed Jaja to the British gunboat for discussions; but then exiled him to West Indies where he died in 1891. Military Confrontation Some decentralized West African societies equally resisted European penetration. The Baule of Ivory Coast and Tiv of Nigeria stiffly resisted colonial occupation. The Baule fought the French from 1891-1911. The Tiv fought the British from 1900-30; and Igbo resistance was particularly widespread and prolonged. Because of the egalitarian nature of their society, the British found it extremely difficult to subjugate them. The British literally had to fight their way from Igbo village to village, from town to town, before they could finally declare their imperial authority over the Igbo people. Igbo elders challenged the British imperial penetration and invited the British to: “Come and fight: if you want warm, come, we are ready.” The British waged wars from about 1898-1910. While West Africans fought gallantly against their European intruders; everywhere but Ethiopia, the Europeans were triumphant. European Political Policies in their West African Dominions The British in West Africa The 19th century British colonial policy in West Africa was a policy of assimilation. Their grand plan was to have Africans assimilate into European civilization and culture. The policy created a western class of black Englishmen who were supposedly British partners in religion, trade and administration. These African “British men,” especially Creoles, rose in colonies of Freetown, Bathurst, southern Ghana and Lagos to important positions in the church, commercial firms and the colonial government. However, with the growth of European racism, western educated Africans (elites) found that they were increasingly discriminated against in administration. The British now imported European administrators to fill positions previously held by Africans. Western educated Africans like the Creoles were even forced out of the civil service. In 1910, the British colonial office expressed the opinion that Englishmen naturally expected to enjoy fruits of their conquests, therefore they should be preferred over Africans in senior positions. The problem however was that there were not enough Englishmen prepared to serve as colonial administrators in Africa. Therefore, the British soon adopted the policy of Indirect Rule. Indirect Rule was the brain child of Lord Lugard. He presented the principles of the system in his book The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. In it, he identified the two most important administrative principles to employ in ruling alien people. The first was the principle of decentralization, in which he stressed importance of recognizing and ruling people through their indigenous authorities. He argued that the role of the British officers, except in critical areas such as taxation, military forces and the alienation of land, was to advise, not demand. The second principle, was the principle of continuity. Lugard argued that the British should utilize indigenous institutions and authorities, thereby preserving “continuity” with the past, while laying foundations for what he saw as the progressive improvement of indigenous society. Indirect Rule which begun as administrative expedient in Northern Nigeria, would eventually be imposed throughout their territories of British Africa. Administrative Policies The British set up separate administrative machines for each of their colonies. At the head of each colony was the governor, who was responsible to the Secretary of State at the colonial office. He administered the colony with assistance of a partly nominated legislative council and executive council of officials. Most of the laws of the colony were drawn up by the government or his council. Each colony was divided into regions under a regional or chief administrator. The regions were divided into provinces which were controlled by the provincial commissioners. Each province was divided into districts under leadership of a district commissioner. Each district was divided into one or more traditional states which were ruled by traditional rulers. Features of Indirect Rule Indirect Rule saw to the mapping out of relatively large areas which were subject to single authority: Smaller ethnic groups were included in the jurisdiction of their larger, more highly organized neighbors. And district heads, especially in Igbo and Ibibiolands, Nigeria, were appointed to defined areas without much consideration to their relationship with the populations under their authority. Indirect Rule sustained tyrannical and corrupt governments and promoted divisions in populations: In Northern Nigeria, the system strengthened the emirates, therefore increasing the possibility of revolution by the oppressed peasantry. In Igboland and Ibibiolands, warrant chiefs were created to fill the leadership positions, because the Igbo and Ibibios had no chiefs, instead they had egalitarian systems of government which recognized authority as coming directly from the people. These warrant chiefs were corrupt and miniature tyrants. Therefore, in 1929 when the British tried to impose direct taxation on Igboland, Igbo women challenged government and the Women’s War or Ogu umunwanyi ensued. The warrant chiefs were the main targets of the women’s attack. Indirect Rule weakened traditional rule: The traditional paramount ruler in British West Africa was not really the head of social and political order. Rather, he was a subordinate of the British overlord who used him to implement unpopular measures such as compulsory labor, taxation, and military enlistment. Moreover, the British had the power to dispose of traditional rulers and replace them with their own nominees. And the British often interfered with existing paramountcies by breaking them up and raising subordinate chiefs to the status of paramount chiefs. The British District officers dictated to traditional rulers and treated them as employees of government rather than supervising and advising them. Members of ruling families were not encouraged to attend new schools that were introduced for fear they may become denationalized. In northern Nigeria and northern Ghana, the people as a result were not given the sort of education that would enable them cope with new problems of colonial society, thus making them even more dependent on District Commissioners and British Technical Officers. The greatest fault of the Indirect Rule system, however, was its complete exclusion of the West African educated elite from local government: the educated elite were excluded from both Native Administration and colonial government, and thus became transformed into an alienated class. In conclusion, Indirect Rule was implemented because it was cheap and practical. It preserved old conservative authorities who were ill equipped by education and temperament to cope with the changing environment. The French in West Africa Administrative Policies The French had a policy of assimilation which sought to “civilize” indigenes and gradually turn them into petits Français or junior Frenchmen. The highest-ranking of these juniors were the évolués, or evolved ones. They were colonial subjects trained to work in administrative positions. Évolués served two purposes. First, to cut down on costs by replacing French manpower. Second, to create an illusion that colonials were profiting from their becoming “civilized.” Both the junior Frenchmen or petits Français and the evolved ones or évolués were to serve the grandeur of France and in the far, far, future, they would become “civilized” enough to be considered fully French. This would never really happen however. When independence came, these well-positioned évolués often ended up running their countries. In French West Africa, the colonies were integral parts of the metropolitan country, and were also considered overseas provinces. West Africans were regarded as subjects of France, and like children were expected to have patriotic duties to their mother country. The French believed that the first duty of civilization to the savage was to give them “a taste for work” on the grounds that as beneficiaries of civilization, they should contribute to expenses of the country which brings them benefits. In keeping with this philosophy, the primary role of the “native” therefore was to fight and produce for mother country. The French believed that the “native” will inevitably be civilized by this process, so that in helping France, the “native,” in fact, helps him- or herself. West Africans that were deemed civilized were rewarded by conferring the privileged status of French citizen on them. To become a French citizen, the West African would have to have been born in one of the four communes or municipalities in Senegal: Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque, and Dakar. They must also have a merited a position in the French service for at least ten years; and have evidence of good character and possess a means of existence. They must also have been decorated with the Legion of Honor, a military award. The advantages of French citizenship were many. Once a West African became a Frenchman, they were subject to French law and access to French courts. The black Frenchman was exempted from indigénat, which is a legal system which enabled a French administrative officer to sentence any African for up to two years forced labour without a trial. A West African Frenchman could commute compulsory labor for a monetary payment. The person could be appointed to any post in France and in colony. For example, Blaise Diagne of Senegal was the first black African elected to French National Assembly and Mayor of Dakar, which was the capital of the Federation of French West Africa. He would however fall out of favor with West Africans because the French colonial government used him to forcibly conscript West Africans to fight for the French army during WWI. However, the assimilation policy was abandoned as impractical. By 1937, only eighty thousand of the fifteen million French West Africans had become French citizens. Seventy-eight thousand of those had because French citizens because they were born in one of the communes. Thus, in the 1920s, the policy was changed to the policy of association, which was advocated as the most appropriate for French Africa. On paper, association reorganized the society supposedly to achieve maximum benefit for both the French and the West African. In practice however, scholars have argued that this policy was like the association of a horse and its rider, since the French would at all times dictate the direction that the development should take and determine what would be of mutual benefit to themselves and West Africans. The colonial belief in the superiority of French civilization was reflected in the judicial system, their attitude toward indigenous law, indigenous authorities, indigenous rights to land, and the educational program. They condemned everything African as primitive and barbaric. Actual Administration The French employed a highly centralized and authoritarian system of administration. Between 1896 and 1904, they formed all of their eight West African colonies into the Federation of French West Africa (AVF), with its capital at Dakar. At the head of Federation was governor-general who answered to minister of colonies in Paris, took most of his orders from France, and governed according to French laws. At the head of each colony was the Lt.-governor who was assisted by a council of administration. The Lt.-governor was directly under the governor-general and could make decisions on only a few specified subjects. The French policy of assimilation, was a policy of direct rule through appointed officials. Like British, they divided their colonies into regions and districts. The colonies were divided into cercles under the commandants du cercles. Cercles were divided into subdivisions under Chiefs du Subdivision. Subdivisions were divided into cantons under African chiefs. Distinguishing Features African Chiefs were not local government authorities. They could not exercise any judicial functions. They did not have a police force or maintain prisons. African chiefs were not leaders of their people. Rather, they were mere functionaries, supervised by French political officers. African chiefs were appointed, not by birth, but rather by education, and familiarity with the metropolitan administrative practice. African chiefs could be transferred from one province to another. The French policy actually went out of its way to deliberately destroy traditional paramountcies. The Portuguese in West Africa Administrative Policies Portugal, one of the poorest of the European colonist nations in Africa operated what amounted to a closed economic system in their African colonies. They created a system which welded their West African colonies to mother country, Portugal, both politically and economically. As such, their territories in West Africa were considered overseas provinces and integral part of Portugal. Actual Administration One underlying connection of all West African Portuguese colonies was the presence of relatively large numbers of Portuguese in the colonies, especially after 1945 when there was a full-scale emigration program from Portugal, especially to Angola. The Portuguese operated a very authoritarian and centralized system of government. At the top of government was the Prime Minister. Under him were the Council of Ministers and the Overseas Ministry, which was made up of the Overseas Advisory Council, and the General Overseas Agency. Then there was the Governor General, a Secretariat and Legislative Council. All of these offices were in Portugal. There were also Governors of Districts, Administrators of Circumscricoes, Chefes de posto and at the very bottom of the governmental hierarchy, the African Chiefs. As in the British case, the Portuguese corrupted the systems of chieftaincies. They sacked chiefs who resisted colonial rule in Guine, and replaced them with more pliant chiefs. Thus, the historical authority of chiefs and their relationships with subjects was corrupted to one of authoritarianism which reproduced the authoritarian system of government in the Estado Novo dictatorship (1926-74). Real authority was held by the Portuguese council of ministers, which was controlled by the prime minister. The direction of colonial policy was determined by the overseas ministry, aided by the advisory overseas council and two subsidiary agencies. The governor-general appointed the chief official resident for the colony. The chief official of the resident for the colony had far reaching executive and legislative power. He headed the colonial bureaucracy, directed the native authority system, and was responsible for the colonies’ finances. The Circumscricoes and Chefes de posto roughly corresponded to the British provincial and district officers. They collected taxes, were judges and finance officers. West African chiefs were subordinate to the European officers with little power to act on their own. Moreover, they could be replaced at any time by a higher Portuguese power. The political policy adopted in Guinea Bissau, São Tomé, Principe, and Cape Verdes, Portugal’s West African territories was a system of assimilado. The assimilado policy held that all persons, no matter their race, would be accorded this status if they met the specific qualifications. Similar to the French policy of assimilation, the Portuguese West African had to adopt a European mode of life; speak and read Portuguese fluently; be a Christian; compete military service; and have a trade or profession. However, only a small number Portuguese West Africans became assimilados because of the difficulty in achieving this station. Additionally, the Portuguese did not support education in their colonies. They built few secondary schools, and almost entirely neglected elementary education. Most of their emphasis was given to rudimentary levels of training where Portuguese West African students were taught moral principles and basic Portuguese; making it almost impossible for the Portuguese West African, even if she or he wanted to, to achieve the status of assimilado. The Germans in West Africa Administrative Policies The Germans had two territories in West Africa—Togo and Kameroon. German colonialism was too short-lived to establish a coherent administrative policy. German African colonial experience essentially amounted to thirty years (1884-1914) and was characterized by bloody African rebellions. However, their harsh treatment resulted in intervention and direct rule by German government. The German colonialists envisioned a “New Germany” in Africa in which colonialists would be projected as members of a superior and enlightened race; while Africans were projected as inferior, indolent, and destined to be permanent subjects of Germans. Actual Administration The Germans had a highly centralized administration. At the top of government was the Emperor. The Emperor was assisted by the Chancellor, who was assisted by Colonial Officers, who supervised the administration. At the bottom were the jumbes or subordinate African staff. These men had been placed in the stead of recognized leadership. European Economic and Social Policies in their West African Dominions The cardinal principles of the European colonial economic relationship in West Africa were to: (1) stimulate the production and export of West African cash crops including palm produce, groundnuts, cotton, rubber, cocoa, coffee and timber; (2) encourage the consumption and expand the importation of European manufactured goods; (3) ensure that the West African colony’s trade, both imports and exports, were conducted with the metropolitan European country concerned. The colonialists thus instituted the Colonial Pact which ensured that West African colonies must provide agricultural export products for their imperial country and buy its manufactured goods in return, even when they could get better deals elsewhere. To facilitate this process, the colonialists therefore forced West Africans to participate in a monetized market economy. They introduced new currencies, which were tied to currencies of the metropolitan countries to replace the local currencies and barter trade. Railroads were a central element in the imposition of the colonial economic and political structures. Colonial railways did not link West African economies and production together. They did not link West African communities together either, rather they served the purpose of linking West African producers to international trade and market place; and also connecting production areas to the West African coast. Moreover, railroads meant that larger amounts of West African produced crops could be sent to coast. All equipment used to build and operate the railroads were manufactured in Europe, and brought little to no economic growth to West Africa beyond reinforcing the production of West African cash crops for the external market. What was more, thousands of West African men were forced to construct these railroads; and many died doing so. The key to the development of colonial economies in West Africa, was the need to control labor. In the colonies, this labor was forced. There were basically two types of forced labor in Africa. The first, was peasant labor. This occurred in most parts of West Africa where agriculture was already mainstay. In East, Central, and South Africa, Africans performed migrant wage labor on European owned and managed mines and plantations. The colonial masters also imposed taxation in West Africa. By taxing rural produce, the colonial state could force West Africans to farm cash crops. West Africans had to sell sustenance crops on the market for cash. Then use cash to pay taxes. Taxes could be imposed on land, produce, and homes (hut tax). The requirement to pay tax forced West Africans into the colonial labour market. West African Response and Initiatives The imposition of foreign domination on West Africa did not go unchallenged. West Africans adopted different strategies to ensure survival. Some West African people living outside the cash crop areas found that they could get away with very little contact with the Europeans. Others exploited the system for their own gain by playing on the colonial government’s ignorance of specific regions’ histories. Still others pursued Western education and Christianity while holding strong to their identities. West African people struggled against the breaking up of their historical states as well as any threat to their land through petitions, litigations, uprisings Early Protest Movements West Africans organized protest against colonialism in form of the assertion of the right to self-rule. Some of the most notable movements included: (1) The Fante Confederacy (1868-72) of the Gold Coast, which recommended British withdrawal from all of her West African colonies; (2) The Egba United Board of Management (1865) of Nigeria, which aimed to introduce legal reforms and tolls on European lines, establish postal communications in Lagos; (3) The aborigines Rights Protection Society (1897) of the Gold Coast was formed to oppose government proposals to classify unoccupied land as crown land (meaning that the land belongs to government). In the 1920’s colonial administration succeeded in breaking alliance by supporting chiefs against the elite; (4) The National Congress of British West Africa (1920). The Congress was formed in Accra in 1920 under the leadership of J. E. Casely-Hayford, an early nationalist, and distinguished Gold Coast lawyer. Its aims were to press for constitution and other reforms, demand Legislative Council in each territory with half of members made up of elected Africa. They opposed discrimination against Africans in civil service, asked for a West African university, and asked for stricter immigration controls to exclude “undesirable” Syrians (business elite). The African Church Movement or Ethiopianism In the religious sphere, the Creoles played an important role in Christianizing many parts of West Africa including, Sierra Leone, Lagos, Abeokuta, and the Niger Delta. However, they soon met with the same kind of British racial arrogance encountered by West Africans in the colonial government. The British replaced Creole archbishops and superintendents with Europeans. A European succeeded Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther, and no African was consecrated to this high office again for next sixty years. The West African response to this was to break away from European churches and form new, independent West African churches. These churches included: the African Baptists, United Native African Church, African Church, United African Methodists—all in Nigeria, the United Native Church in Cameroon; and the William Harry Church in Ivory Coast. By 1920, there were no less than 14 churches under exclusive African control. In Fernando Po, Reverend James Johnson was leading figure of the African church movement until his death in 1917. The Independence movement among churches demanded that control be vested in West African lay or clerical leaders. Many churches incorporated aspects of West African ideas of worship into their liturgies, showing more tolerance for West African social institutions like polygamy. The Prophetic Church Movement also emerged during this time, propelling the establishment of at least three prominent churches in West Africa which related Christianity to current West African beliefs. These prophets offered prayers for the problems that plagued people in villages, problems which traditional diviners had previously offered assistance in form of sacrifices to various gods. The Prophet Garrick Braide movement Began in 1912, ending with imprisonment in 1916. The Prophet William Wade Harris movement began in 1912, reached its height in 1914-15, spreading his gospel in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Gold Coast. The Aladura (people of prayer) Movement in Western Nigeria, began during the influenza epidemic (1918-19), achieving its greatest impact during Great Revival of 1930. The African Church and prophetic movement was represented a nationalist reaction against white domination in religious sphere, whim encouraged Africans to adopt African names at baptism, adapt songs to traditional flavors, and translate the bible and prayer books into West African languages. Despite the rapid spread of Christianity in West Africa, Islam was spreading even more rapidly. West Africans embraced Islam as a form of protest against colonialism because it offered a wider world view devoid of the indignity of assimilation to the colonial master’s culture. The Role of West African Newspapers The emergence of African owned presses and newspapers played an important role in sowing the seeds of early nationalism. The West African elite, through their newspapers and associations, acted as watchdogs of the colonial government, protecting their citizens against its abuses. Isaac Wallace Johnson and Nnamdi Azikiwe, for instance, were active in the West African press; and the press served as an important element in keeping the elite united. The Sierra Leone Weekly News was founded in 1884, and the Gold Coast Independent first published in 1885. In Nigeria, the Lagos Weekly Record was established in 1890 by John Payne Jackson. He propagated racial and national consciousness in Nigeria during the period. All worked to spread nationalism among West Africans. The press was in fact the single most important element in the birth and development of nationalism in British West Africa. West Africans Abroad Many of West African’s future nationalist leaders, including, Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, and Nnamdi Azikiwe studied abroad. They obtained necessary education to fight white domination effectively. The fact that they often suffered from white racism while abroad made them far more militant. Azikiwe and Nkrumah studied at the Historically Black College, Lincoln University (United States of America). In London, the West African Student Union was founded in 1925 by Nigerian law student, Ladipo Solanke. Solanke, one of fathers of Nigerian nationalism, toured West Africa to raise funds for union which published its own journal. Members stressed cultural nationalism and emphasized the greatness of the African past. One of members, Ghanaian J. W. de Graft-Johnson, published book called The Vanished Glory. Members believed that West Africans should seeks their independence in near future. The Ethiopian Crisis, 1935 West Africans were jolted towards radicalism by Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Ethiopia held a special significance for colonized Africans. It was an ancient Christian kingdom, an island of freedom in a colonized continent. Ethiopia was taken as symbol for African and African Christians. Nkrumah who was in London at time later recalled, “at that time it was almost as if the whole of London had suddenly declared war on me personally.” Effects of WWI, 1914-1918 WW1 had far reaching political and economic impact on West Africa. French West Africans were more affected than those in the British colonies. It is estimated that 211,000 Africans were recruited from Francophone Africa. Of these 163,952 fought in Europe. Official figures say that 24,762 died, but this number is assumed to be low, and did not account for Africans missing in action. Compulsory military service was introduced in 1912. From 1915, French West Africans actively resisted, as wounded and mutilated Africans began to return home. It soon became obvious that no adequate provision made for families of absent soldiers. Few Africans fought in British Africa. They took part in the conquest of Togo and Kameron. 5000 carriers were sent from Sierra Leone, and over 1000 Nigerians and Ghanaian were killed or died of disease there. Effects of the War After war, following the decisions reached in the Treaty of Versailles, German colonies were taken away and handed over to Britain and France to be administered by them on behalf of League of Nations. Thus, the British and French occupied German Togo and Cameroon. Colonies consequently converted into mandated or trusteeship territories. WW1 influenced African Nationalism: African soldiers from both French and English territories fought Germans in Togo, Cameroons and Tanganyika. During those campaigns African soldiers gained some knowledge of outside world which widened outlook. They fought side by side with Europeans and discovered their strengths and weaknesses. They returned home with experience which deeply influenced desire for freedom and liberty WW1 led to the arbitrary division of Togo and Cameroon between France and Britain as result of Treaty of Versailles: The division was made without reference to peoples, and this offended the latter’s sense of justice and fair play. Thus, the people developed a strong hatred for colonialism. For instance, the Ewes of Togo were split by division, and thus, organized “Ewe Union Movement” to appeal for remerging of their ethnic group. WW1 allowed West Africans access to external wartime rhetoric, which had tremendous impact upon the thoughts and aspirations of literate West Africans. Woodrow Wilson (US) and Prime Minister Lloyd George of Britain made statements about principles of self-determination. West Africans believed that these principles were just as applicable to the colonies as to occupied territories of Europe. WW1 led to tremendous decrease in West African import trade and revenues from customs declined. Negro World Movements The 1st Pan African Congress was held in Trinidad in 1900 and attended mainly by West Indians. Like early nationalistic movements, this Pan African Congress was elitist and concerned with issues such as the disabilities of black civil servants. The 2nd Pan African Congress was held in Paris in 1919 under the initiative of W. E. B. Dubois, the founder of the National Association of the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who hoped that the problems of black people would be included in discussions of the Peace Conference at the end of WW1. Resolutions made at this congress were moderate. Few delegates from English West Africa attended. Later congresses in 1921, 1923, and 1927 were even weaker and less influential. Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) Marcus Garvey was the founder of Universal Negro Improvement Association. A Jamaican resident in New York, he influenced West Africans profoundly. He spoke of pride in black identity and said that to be an African was a matter of joy and pride, and that black men everywhere would gain their rights by militancy and not by supplication. Branches of the movement were established in Lagos and Gold Coast. Garvey urged black people in the New World to return to Africa and fight or what was their own. Liberia was going to be the launching point for this return. He founded a shipping company called the Black Star Line to strength links between Africa and Afro-Americans. Youth Movements of the 1930s In the 1930s, a series of new movements sprang up in Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and Sierra Leone. They called themselves Youth movements, not because their members were youth—they were often middle aged—but because the word, youth, was often used in West Africa to symbolize one’s rejection of the past. One such movement was the Gold Coast Youth Conference (1930), organized by J. B. Danquah. It was not a political party, but a discussion center which brought together larger numbers of debating clubs to discuss issues of national importance. In 1934, the Lagos Youth Movement was founded by a group of young men led by Ernest Ikoli, Samuel Akinsanya, Dr. J.C. Vaughan formed. In 1936, it changed its name to the Nigerian youth movement. The movement was restricted first to Lagos, then Nnamdi Azikiwe and H. O. Davies joined on their return to Nigeria in 1937 and 1938 respectively, and the movement became nationalistic in its outlook. The West African Youth League was formed in 1938. Organized by Sierra Leonean, Isaac Wallace-Johnson, it favored Marxism. Wallace-Johnson had international background. He had visited London and Moscow and had worked for communist newspaper in Hamburg. On his return to the Gold Coast, he was jailed for sedition. Effect of WWII WWII accelerated the growth of nationalism and shook the foundations of imperialism. The economic impact of the war on West Africa was tremendous and far reaching, resulting in (1) an increased economic importance of West Africa to the world market. Europe began to depend more on tropical Africa to supply rubber, cotton, cocoa, palm produce, and groundnuts. Thus, West African colonies increased the production of these cash crops. In Nigeria for instance, value of exports rose from 10,300,00 pounds in 1931 to 24,600,00 pounds in 1946. Imports rose from 6,800,00 pounds to 19,800,00 pounds during the same period. (2) West African workers developed grievances as a result of the colonial government introducing price control, controlling marketing of export crops, introducing wage ceilings, and pressuring for more production, Moreover, African businessmen were excluded from the import and export trade which was now reserved only for European firms. (3) The rise of trade unions emerged as a result of the rise of the cost of living without corresponding rise in wages. This provided stimulus for organizational activity among the labor class. In Nigeria the number of trade unions rose from 5 to 70, and the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (1943) became central coordinating body. Trade unions cooperated closely with nationalist leaders in pressing for the end of colonialism. (4) War resulted in speedy growth of cities as result of people flocking into cities to take up new jobs. Many West African cities more than doubled their population. Lagos rose from 100,000 in 1939 to 230,00 in 1950. Accra rose from 70,000 in 1941 to 166,00 in 1948. Towns became overcrowded with discontented job-seeker and workers who witnessed whites living in comfortable, spacious European reservations with paved streets and beautiful lawns and gardens, while they were living in slums. The people therefore became receptive to nationalist appeal and would become the first willing recruits into militant nationalist movement. (5) War gave impetus to education in West Africa. Because of increased prosperity resulting from war time economic boom, more parents could afford to send children to school, literacy spread, and newspaper readership increased. Newspapers became a powerful tool in hands of nationalists to push for political, economic and social development. (6) In spite of more job opportunities, thousands of school-leavers remained unemployed. For the first time, West African cities developed a new class of unemployed people especially in cities. They became disgruntled and blamed colonial government and European firms for their plight. They were easily won over by nationalist agitators. (7) The most decisive factor that accelerated the growth of nationalism was however the return of ex-servicemen. Over 176,000 men from British West Africa served in British colonial army during war. After war, large numbers of survivors returned. About 100,000 returned to Nigeria, and 65,000 retuned to Ghana from the Middle East, East Africa, Burma and India. Ex-service men had seen life in more developed countries and enjoyed high living standards in army. They had seen the strength of nationalist movements in Asia and fought side by side with Europeans and seen weaknesses which exposed the myth of European racial superiority. They came home with burning desire for better life for themselves and people and urgent demand for extension to Africa of freedom for which many of them had fought and died. Many joined ranks of militant nationalists. The Impact of European Colonialism on West Africa Belgium’s King Leopold, speaking at the 1884 Berlin West Africa conference, was attributed with saying, “I am determined to get my share of this magnificent African Cake.” Tragically, as history reveals, Leopold did get a considerable share of the “magnificent African cake,” which he exploited with unimaginable brutality. While European colonialism in West Africa lasted for a period of only about eighty years, the basic impetus for colonialism was to control existing West African markets, its mineral wealth, as well as to control its future economic discoveries. Portuguese dictator Marcelo Caetano put it this way, “[West African] Blacks are to be organized and enclosed in economies directed by whites.” Indeed, European colonial rule took much more from West Africa than it gave it. Colonialism was a double-edged-sword. While the European colonialists saw to the building of roads, railroads, ports, and new technology in West Africa, the infrastructure developed by them, and built with West African forced labor, was designed to exploit the natural resources of the colonies; and advance European colonial presence in West Africa. Effective colonial government control demanded a more efficient system of communications that previously existed in precolonial West Africa. Thus, in colonial northern Nigeria, for instance, railroads were specifically built for this purpose. With the discovery of mineral deposits in areas of colonial Sierra Leone, railways were either extended or spur lines were built to facilitate the exploitation of these minerals. In addition to railroads, the colonialists also improved and expanded the road networks in their various West African territories. This they did, much like the railways, to link production areas to the coasts. These roads however had the added effect of providing the impetus for increasing urbanization in West African cities and towns. As mentioned above, colonial investments in West Africa were concentrated, for the most part, on extractive industries and trade goods. In order to exploit these raw materials, the colonial governments had to control labor. They did this by encouraging large numbers of skilled and unskilled laborers to concentrate in given locales. This resulted in the tremendous growth of towns and cities in the vicinities of these industries. Another reason for the growth of new towns and cities, as well as urbanization, was the need to service the new agricultural sectors imposed by the colonial governments. Seaports, in cities like Dakar, Lagos, and Abidjan, thus, registered remarkable growth rates in the fifty years of the twentieth century. The same was true of towns selected by the colonial government as sites for the headquarters of the various colonial districts and provinces. The introduction of cash economies also had far reaching effects on urbanization in West African societies. By introducing taxation, Europeans could force Africans into the monetarized economy. Young men found it much easier to obtain European currency by working in government or civilian sector jobs in towns and cities, rather than working on the plantations, which many were forced to do. Thus, a greater mobility created by the roads and railroad networks, in addition to greater economic opportunities in certain colonial vicinities, combined to facilitate the rapid growth of West African cities. This growth in cities however had debilitating consequences on West African families. Migrant work encouraged the separation of families. In addition, the emphasis on cash crops grown for export made West African societies dependent on European economies. Little was done by the European colonialists to develop trade between West African colonies; and as a result, many West African nations still trade more with European countries than with neighboring West African states. Moreover, the land on which the European colonialists established these cash cropping plantations was seized forcibly from West Africans, leaving households landless, and dependent on the Europeans. While the various missionary societies proselytizing in West Africa, introduced schools of European learning in their West African dominions, as noted above, these for the most part, were far and few between. After the introduction of indirect rule, for instance, the British discouraged West Africans from acquiring higher education by denying them employment in the colonial administrations. They instead subsidized Christian missions to produce more clerks and interpreters. The French government on their part, limited the number of schools in their West African territories. Indeed, Senegal was the only colony that had secondary schools; and of these schools, the William Ponty school in Dakar was the oldest and most popular. Nwando Achebe
9206	dbpedia	1	48	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war-and-colonial-finance-africa/	en	War and Colonial Finance (Africa)	https://encyclopedia.191…a_thaler_IMG.png	https://encyclopedia.191…a_thaler_IMG.png	[ "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/1418-logo.png", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/eo/Maria_Theresa_thaler_IMG.png", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/worldc...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-07-02T21:38:04+00:00	This article provides a brief overview of the financial contribution of the African colonies to the First World War. It considers the problems faced by the colonial state in raising revenues during the war owing to a dramatic decrease in import and export trade. It shows how the war conditions led to increased impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Finally, it looks at the problems in currency supply and circulation caused by the war.	en	/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/favicon.ico	1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war-and-colonial-finance-africa/	By Karin Pallaver This article provides a brief overview of the financial contribution of the African colonies to the First World War. It considers the problems faced by the colonial state in raising revenues during the war owing to a dramatic decrease in import and export trade. It shows how the war conditions led to increased impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Finally, it looks at the problems in currency supply and circulation caused by the war. Introduction As Hew Strachan noted in his Financing the First World War, historians have generally neglected war finance, probably because its administration was not apparently decisive to the outcome of the war. However, the European powers’ capacity to obtain money to finance the war effort was one of the key elements of the war. Colonies in Africa and elsewhere were an important source of funding and were used by colonial powers to raise funds, both to contribute to the war in Europe and to finance the campaigns in Africa. There is no comprehensive analysis on the financial contribution of the African colonies to the war effort. The subject is treated only incidentally by the works that deal with specific African colonies during First World War. As in the case of the war economies, the lack of a thematic approach, in favor of a more country- or regional- based treatment of the First World War in Africa, has produced a patchy, even if in some cases very detailed, picture of the financial situation of the colonies. The war had important consequences on colonial balances. The limits put on commerce and shipping by the outbreak of hostilities reduced imports and exports and, as a consequence, colonial state revenues. This caused a significant decrease in development expenditure. All over Africa, direct taxation and trade tariffs were increased. Another direct consequence of the war was the reduced supply of money to the African colonies, owing to shipping problems and the lack of metals to produce the coins. This article is an attempt to connect the available evidence and to identify both some general trends in the ways in which the colonies contributed financially to the European war effort, and the consequences of the war on African colonial finances. In order to provide a general overview, this article will analyse the direct contribution of the colonies through an examination of their financial balances, the issues of taxation and revenues, and finally currency policies. African Colonies and the Cost of the War African colonies made an important financial contribution to the European war. To start with, the colonies bore a large part of the burden of the cost of the African campaigns. In West Africa, the costs for the Togoland and Cameroons campaigns were born by the local treasuries. The Gold Coast paid the total cost of the occupation of Togoland (60,000£), but also contributed to the increased costs of the forces in the Cameroons and East Africa. When the war ended in West Africa with the conquest of Cameroon in 1916, West African porters were moved to the campaign in East Africa. Although the imperial exchequer took over responsibility for the payment of the Nigerian carriers sent to East Africa, the Nigerian Carrier corps cost the territory over 46,000£ between December 1916 and December 1918. African colonies contributed to the war effort both directly from colonial budgets, and through individual subscriptions and private collections of funds. The Gold Coast contributed 500,000£ in gifts and loans from revenue. Private contributions and miscellaneous war funds amounted to 100,000£. Madagascar contributed 2,000,000 francs for the fabrication of large calibre artillery, and 100,000 francs were raised for the liberated regions of France. There were also individual contributions by French settlers and colonial officers, through which Madagascar collected 5,248,000 francs (i.e. 1.50 francs for every inhabitant of the colony). In French West Africa, debt subscriptions for a total of 31.2 million francs were obtained between 1914 and 1920. And the individual participation in the Ouvres et Journées (special events held to raise funds for specific war-related purposes) allowed the collection of 3.8 million francs. This was presented by the administration as a demonstration of the patriotism “from the far reaches of Chad to the ports of Senegal,” but, according to Marc Michel, this was really only a demonstration of the incapacity of colonized subjects to pay taxes. Stories about the patriotic spirit of Africans abound in the colonial literature. For instance Hubert Garbit (1869-1933), governor general of Madagascar, tells the story of a village on the island colony where the inhabitants had raised a standing stone in honor to the first Malagasy killed on the battlefield. On that occasion, 100,000 francs were collected for the colonial ambulances and a further 20,000 for the French Red Cross. The outbreak of hostilities disrupted pre-war shipping and trade patterns, dramatically reducing the most important source of revenues for the colonial states: import and export duties and custom tariffs. Many governments, therefore, decided to increase, wherever possible, shipping freights as well as import and export duties. In Nigeria, for example, custom duties were dramatically reduced when the ban on commerce with the enemy interrupted the trade in spirits that had dominated West African-German relations in the pre-war period. In order to increase revenues, Frederick Lugard (1858-1945), Governor of Nigeria, raised custom duties on tobacco and some foodstuffs, such as rice, with the aim of taxing people from the south who had benefited before the war from the rise in the price of palm kernels. Furthermore, the colonial state obtained revenues from a new export duty on three staples and from a 25 percent surtax on all imports. Since 1917, this produced an increase in the government revenues, also thanks to a surtax of 30 percent on railway freights. The war also meant a shortage of credit, because local banks refused to grant loans to companies that, owing to the shipping limits and war situation, were very likely going to be unable to repay them. In West Africa, the Bank of British West Africa, which enjoyed a monopoly in the banking business in all the West African British colonies, refused to make loans, leading to a shortage of silver coins, only obtainable from the bank. This disrupted the local economy since merchants were no longer able to buy local products. In Nigeria, the refusal of the Bank of British West Africa to grant loans to local companies led the colonial state to make loans to the mining companies in order to avoid production stoppages. Despite the general economic and financial crisis, there is also evidence of an increase in personal deposits in local banks. This was especially the case of the colonies where porters and soldiers could save and deposit their wages. In Malawi, for instance, deposits in the Post Office Savings Banks continued to increase during the war, probably owing to the savings of soldiers and carriers who were accumulating money to pay for bridewealth after the war. Another point that must be taken into consideration is the importance of South African gold for the war. Even if during hostilities the gold standard was abandoned, the war created more interest in the precious metal and European powers took special measures to protect their gold reserves. For Great Britain, in particular, South African gold was of great importance, since it represented two thirds of the entire Empire’s output. Before the war, the South African economy revolved around the gold mining industry: gold was sent to London weekly and from there it was sold on the open market. With the beginning of hostilities, this became impossible because of the fear that the enemy could capture the gold and also because of the dramatic increase in freight and insurance charges. It became essential, therefore, for Great Britain to prevent enemy access to South African gold. With the so-called August Agreement, signed on 14 August 1914 between the Bank of England and South African mining companies, the British government stated that it was ready to buy all South African gold at the official rate of £13 17s 9d per standard ounce. If South African mining companies agreed to sell gold only to the bank they obtained an advance of 97 percent of the value of gold when it arrived in London. In principle, the agreement was accepted voluntarily, but in practice, if South African companies tried to sell gold to other countries, the bank intervened to prevent it. The agreement was maintained until almost eight months after the armistice had been signed. No doubt, it was detrimental to South African gold producers, because despite the increase of the gold price during the war, the mining companies had to sell gold at the price fixed in the agreement. The agreement was an integral part of Great Britain’s war strategy and during the war the extent to which Great Britain had become dependent on South African gold to sustain both sterling and the London gold market was starkly revealed. One of the most important consequences of the war on Africans was a revision of the fiscal policy in the colonies. In order to face the reduction in revenues from trade, colonial governments introduced new taxes or increased those already at place. From Trade Tariffs to Direct Taxation: Africans Paying for the European War In many colonies, the war conditions led to an increased burden of impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Before the war, colonial balances were largely based on trade revenues and custom duties. The reduction of import and export trade, as well as of shipping space, caused a contraction in trade that dramatically curtailed the main source of revenue for the colonial state. As a consequence, and with the exception of those colonies where military exigencies necessitated them, public works came to a halt and development plans were shelved until after the war. In order to compensate for the reduction in trade revenues, colonial governments both increased import duties and shipping freights and raised or introduced direct taxation. The Kenya administration, for example, faced major deficits both in 1914-15 and in 1917-18, determined by a fiscal crisis during the war: as in other parts of the continent, revenues from custom duties dropped as shipping shortages severely curtailed non-essential imports as well as exports. And after 1916 the protectorate had to contribute to the cost of the East Africa campaign. As a result, the government turned to increased taxation of Africans. Taxes were increased from three to five rupees in 1915. In this way, revenues in some districts could be increased by up to 60 percent. The new tax only applied to some districts of the protectorate, and pastoralist groups, like the Maasai, were not involved. In Northern Nigeria, direct taxation was increased and in Yorubaland taxes were introduced for the first time in 1916, causing strong opposition from the local populations. In the southern part of the colony, additional revenues were obtained from court fees. In South Africa, the need to obtain funds for the war led to the introduction of a new income tax and to an increase in indirect taxation, causing strikes during the last two years of the war that continued into the post-war years. In the Gold Coast, the decrease of imports caused by the outbreak of hostilities led to a reduction of the income from custom duties that had been the main source of revenue for the colonial government. This affected, among other things, railway development, considered by the Governor Sir Hugh Clifford (1866-1941) as the key for the development of the colony. To continue railway construction, in May 1915 Clifford raised railway rates. In this way, work could be resumed on the northern line, also thanks to an increase in the duty on imports from 10 to 12 percent. In September 1916, further funds for public works were obtained from a new export tax on cocoa. In French West Africa, custom duties had provided at least two thirds of the total budget before the war. The money so obtained had been partly used to fund public works in the territories, but after the outbreak of the war these had to be dramatically reduced. In order to address the lack of revenues, the Governor General of French West Africa, Joost van Vollenhoven (1877-1918), reformed fiscal policy in 1917. This produced a general increase of fiscal revenues from 20 to 50 percent, mainly in Guinea and Dahomey and partly also in Senegal and Niger. In general terms, the increase in indirect and direct taxation during the war period led to a general increase of the control of the colonial state over its subjects, especially in some areas such as the Kenya reserves. The capacity of African subjects to pay taxes, and therefore the amount of revenues that the colonial state could collect, was also related to the availability of coins with which to pay taxes. However, the supply of currency was made problematic during the war by shipping problems and by the need for metals to produce munitions instead of coins. Currency Policies during the War With reference to the Gold Coast, Elizabeth Wrangham points out that nothing better illustrates the colonial relationship during the war than “the differing attitudes and responses to the currency problem.” The outbreak of hostilities caused shortages in the circulation of currency all over the continent. There were two main reasons. On one hand, the reduction in trade caused a general decrease in the circulation of money: imports were scarce and more expensive and African traders and peasants could not sell their produce. On the other hand, the war caused a dramatic reduction in the number of coins that could be produced by European mints. The British Royal Mint was employed in the production of munitions and nickel and bronze, generally employed to produce small-denomination coins, were now needed to produce arms. The reduced availability of money caused both problems in trade and in the payment of labor. Various problems arose, owing to the kind of production that each colony could bring to the market during the war years. The demand for currency was clearly connected to trade patterns and to the seasonality of the agricultural production; as a consequence, the disruption of commerce during the war also created dramatic fluctuations in the demand for coins. In the Gold Coast, for example, at the beginning of the war there was a slack in the cocoa trade that produced a surplus of coins. The West Africa Currency Board was required to send these back to London, where they were converted into English silver. A total of 530,000£ were repatriated between August and November 1914. But then cocoa prices quickly recovered and in December 1914 there was a new demand for coins that could not be easily satisfied because of the outbreak of hostilities. In 1915-16 all the colonies in West Africa faced a serious shortage of coins, made worse by the combination of a large crop of Nigerian groundnuts coming on the market at the same time as Gold Coast’s cocoa. In 1915 the serious lack of coins in the Gold Coast risked leaving half of the cocoa crop unsold on the market. Despite the well-known general distrust of people towards paper money, to solve the situation in 1915 paper notes were sent to West Africa. Currency notes were regarded with suspicion by laborers and many refused to work for them. Those workers and soldiers who were paid in notes, frequently exchanged them for coins with money dealers at a loss. They were accepted almost only in those areas involved in the export trade but generally refused elsewhere. Owing to the lack of metals, and since the Royal Mint was employed in producing munitions, beginning in 1917 no coins could be sent to West African colonies. In the German Cameroon, Governor Karl Ebermaier (1862-1943) paid the white staff in bank drafts, whereas askaris were paid in silver. Circulation was partially maintained by taxing the askaris in silver coins whose supply was however seriously limited. French West Africa had to face the same problems in the supply of money. Coins were moved from colony to colony to face temporary shortages and paper notes had to be introduced to replace small-denomination currencies. In Kenya, the government needed money to pay the porters and soldiers employed in the East African campaign. However, no coins could reach East Africa because of the war. To face the problem of the lack of currency circulation, one-rupee notes were issued to pay the military staff and were demonetized shortly after the war. To solve the monetary problems in the colonies, some colonial governments attempted the introduction of new currencies. This was the case, for instance, of the Italian government in Eritrea. Here, the Maria Theresa thaler had been used as the currency of commerce in the trade relationships along the East African coast and the Red Sea since at least the 1760s. The outbreak of the war interrupted the supply of thalers from Vienna. Therefore, the Italians coined a new thaler that replicated the Austrian one. To gain the confidence of the local traders, the new thalers had similar size, design, weight and finesse, as well as the Empress Maria Theresa effigy. In German East Africa, the supply of coins was completely stopped after the British blockade began in 1914. This reduced revenues as well as cash in circulation. As a way to call in cash, the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank increased its rate of interest from 4 to 5 percent. The outflow was sustained by the payment of salaries to government staff monthly rather than quarterly. Nonetheless, by mid-1915 there was no cash in circulation. This caused serious problems for the military campaign because porters and soldiers could not be paid and food for the army could not be bought. To compensate the lack of silver rupees, the government printed rupee notes but they could not be easily circulated because of the general distrust towards paper money. This was made more acute by the British intelligence which forged several million twenty-rupee notes, in this way contributing to the discrediting of German paper currency. To solve the problem of money scarcity, the government started a self-sufficient production of coins, as it had done with the production of other previously-imported items, such as quinine, candles, soap, etc.: brass coins were successfully minted from used Mauser cartridges. In Tabora, which replaced Dar es Salaam during the war as the capital city of the colony, the government struck 16,000 fifteen-rupees gold coins, known as Tabora sovereigns. In many parts of Africa, the process of colonial monetization was still largely incomplete and there were many areas in the continent not yet reached by colonial coins and notes. No doubt, the problems in currency circulation caused by the war contributed to an increase in the distrust towards colonial money, especially currency notes. At the same time, commodity currencies, still largely in circulation, could fill the void left by colonial money. According to Michel, in some areas of French West Africa there was a return to a “cowry economy.” This is confirmed also in some parts of British West Africa, such as in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, where cowries were used as currency during the war. Conclusion Africans paid a heavy price for maintaining the colonial governance of their countries in war-time. The war period showed that trade taxes were an unstable foundation on which to build colonial rule and led to the introduction of more widespread direct taxation. New export and import taxes, as well as trade restrictions such as the imposition of limited numbers of licences to ships, marked both a modification of the policy of laissez-faire that had dominated before the war and an increase in the control of the colonial state. The war also determined a revision of currency policies and a return, in some areas, to the use of commodity currencies. The war also meant an increase in the wealth of some sections of the population, such as carriers and soldiers, who could accumulate money from their wages that could be used to pay for bridewealth or livestock. Karin Pallaver, University of Bologna
9206	dbpedia	3	8	https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Nigeria-as-a-colony	en	Nigeria - Colonial History, Economy, People	https://cdn.britannica.c…Flag-Nigeria.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…Flag-Nigeria.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/5068-004-72A3F250/Flag-Nigeria.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/79/5079-004-8542C56D/Nigeria-map-boundaries-cities-locator.jpg", "https:...	[]	[]	[ "Nigeria", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Toyin O. Falola", "Reuben Kenrick Udo" ]	1999-07-26T00:00:00+00:00	Nigeria - Colonial History, Economy, People: After the British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company’s territories, the northern areas were renamed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the land in the Niger delta and along the lower reaches of the river was added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos remained the capital of the south, with Zungeru the new capital of the north. On January 1, 1914, following the recommendations of Sir Frederick Lugard, the two protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under a single governor-general resident in Lagos. Between	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Nigeria-as-a-colony	After the British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company’s territories, the northern areas were renamed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the land in the Niger delta and along the lower reaches of the river was added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos remained the capital of the south, with Zungeru the new capital of the north. On January 1, 1914, following the recommendations of Sir Frederick Lugard, the two protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under a single governor-general resident in Lagos. Between 1919 and 1954 the title reverted to governor. Following Lugard’s success in the north, he set out the principles of the administrative system subsequently institutionalized as “indirect rule.” Essentially, local government was to be left in the hands of the traditional chiefs, subject to the guidance of European officers. Native institutions were utilized and interference with local customs kept to a minimum, although the British did not always understand the local customs. While this system had built-in contradictions, over the years the Nigerian system developed into a sophisticated form of local government, especially in the emirates and under the banner of “native administration,” which became the hallmark of British colonial rule in Africa. Many changes accompanied British rule: Western education, the English language, and Christianity spread during the period; new forms of money, transportation, and communication were developed; and the Nigerian economy became based on the export of cash crops. Areas with lucrative crops such as cacao and peanuts (groundnuts) profited, while many people in different parts of the country had to migrate to work elsewhere as tenant farmers or use their newly acquired education and skills to work in cities as wage earners, traders, and artisans. Two tiers of government emerged, central and local. The central government, presided over by the governor-general and accountable to the secretary for the colonies in London, was more powerful but distant from the people. Local administration, where the colonial citizens typically experienced colonial authority, was based on the policy of indirect rule first developed in the north. To prevent any united opposition to its authority, the British adopted a divide-and-rule policy, keeping Nigerian groups separate from one another as much as possible. Traditional authorities were co-opted in the north, where the spread of Western education by Christian missionaries was strongly resisted by Muslim leaders. In the south the British occasionally created a political hierarchy where there had been none before; in most cases they ruled through those who were most malleable, whether these people had held traditional positions of authority or not. Because Western education and Christianity spread rapidly in the south and not in the north, development was much slower in the north, and the growing disparity between north and south later caused political tensions. Further dislocation accompanied the outbreak of World War I. Locally this involved the immediate invasion of the German-held Kamerun (Cameroon) by Nigerian forces, followed by a costly campaign that lasted until 1916. Later Nigerian troops were sent to East Africa. (During World War II they again served in East Africa, as well as in Burma [now Myanmar].) In 1922 Kamerun was divided under a League of Nations mandate between France and Britain, Britain administering its area within the government of Nigeria; after 1946 the mandated areas were redesignated as a United Nations (UN) trust territory. Although colonial rule appeared secure in the first two decades of the 20th century, the British struggled to keep control of their Nigerian colony and continued to do so until Nigeria became independent in 1960. The British, when faced with dissent, tended to grant political reforms in an effort to dispel the attractiveness of more-radical suggestions. Early on in colonial rule, for example, Nigerians protested the manner in which water rates and head taxes were collected. Nigerians also requested more political representation. The Nigerian Legislative Council was established in 1914 and was given limited jurisdiction; it was replaced in 1922 by a larger one that included elected members from Lagos and Calabar, although its powers also were limited and the northern provinces remained outside its control. A more representative system did not appear until 1946, when each geographic group of provinces had its own House of Assembly, with a majority of nonofficial (though not yet all elected) members; there were also a House of Chiefs and, in Lagos, a central Legislative Council. By 1919 the National Council of British West Africa, an organization consisting of elites across West Africa, was demanding that half the members of the Legislative Council be Africans; they also wanted a university in West Africa and more senior positions for Africans in the colonial civil service. Beginning in the 1920s, a number of Nigerians joined other Blacks in various parts of the world to embark on the wider project of Pan-Africanism, which sought to liberate Black people from racism and European domination. In 1923 Herbert Macaulay, the grandson of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, established the first Nigerian political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which successfully contested three Lagos seats in the Legislative Council. Macaulay was despised by the British, but he came to be regarded as the “father of modern Nigerian nationalism.” After the 1930s, political activities focused primarily on ways to end British rule. A national party, the Nigerian Youth Movement, emerged in 1934, and its members won elections to the Legislative Council. After 1940, political activities were broadened to include more people. In 1944 Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo who had been educated in the United States, united more than 40 different groups to establish the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The forces unleashed against the British were now diverse, including soldiers who had served in World War II, the media, restless youth, market women, educated people, and farmers, all of whom became committed to the anticolonial movement. Political leaders resorted to the use of political parties and the media to mobilize millions of Nigerians against the continuation of British rule. The British answered this activity by attempting to create a more representational colonial system. The Macpherson constitution, promulgated in 1951, provided for a central House of Representatives, but friction between the central and regional legislatures, related to the question of where supreme party authority lay, soon caused a breakdown. In response to Azikiwe and other nationalists, the Lyttelton constitution of 1954 created a fully federal system, comprising the three geographic regions of Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons, and the Federal Territory of Lagos. Each region had a governor, premier, cabinet, legislature, and civil service, with the significantly weaker federal government represented in Lagos by a governor-general, bureaucracy, House of Representatives, and Senate.
9206	dbpedia	2	26	https://academic.oup.com/book/32096/chapter/268018529	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
9206	dbpedia	3	9	https://aarcentre.com/ojs3/index.php/jaash/article/view/300/567	en	View of NIGERIAN CURRENCY SYSTEM, 1914			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			null
9206	dbpedia	0	2	https://globalfinancialdata.com/nigeria	en	Global Financial Data	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	[ "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/global/global-financial-data-logo-white.png 1x", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/currency/Nigeria.JPG", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/blog/GFD_Sector_and_Industry_Classification_System_Revised.jpg", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/address_icon....	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Odin Mayland" ]	0001-11-29T16:07:02-07:52	We are a Global Data provider: For over 25 years Global Financial Data has been providing alternative historical economic and financial data.	en	/templates/shaper_helixultimate/images/favicon.ico		https://globalfinancialdata.com/nigeria	Nigeria is a combination of four different colonies. Lagos was established as a colony by the British in 1861, subordinated to Sierra Leone from 1866 until 1874, and to the Gold Coast (Ghana) from 1874 until 1886. Lagos became part of Southern Nigeria in 1906. Southern Nigeria was established as the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1891, and went through several name changes before uniting with Northern Nigeria (which had belonged to the Royal Niger Company and had been established as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria on January 1, 1900) on January 1, 1914. Nigeria remained a British colony until it gained its independence on October 1, 1960 and it became a republic in 1963. British Cameroon was joined to Nigeria on October 1, 1961. Biafra was established as a separate state on May 30, 1967 out of three eastern provinces of Biafra, leading to civil war. Biafra surrendered on January 15, 1970, and Biafra was reincorporated into Nigeria. The British Pound Sterling (GBP) was used in Nigeria while it was a colony. Spanish Dollars were used in Nigeria with 4 Spanish Dollars equal to 1 British Pound Sterling to September 30, 1843 and 4.80 Spanish Dollars equal to 1 Pound Sterling until it was demonetized on May 11, 1880. MacGregor Laird issued token coins in Nigeria in 1858. These were denominated in British pence and in Dollars. French Francs also circulated. From May 11, 1880, gold nuggets and dust were demonetized and British coins, along with a few foreign gold and silver coins, were made legal tender. The first coins were struck for Nigeria in 1907. On July 1, 1913, the West African Currency Board was established originally to issue coins, but the Constitution was revised in November 1915 to allow for the issue of Pound (XWAP) banknotes at par with the British Pound Sterling. The West African Currency Board became a model for other currency boards in Africa and elsewhere. The Pound was divisible into 20 Shillings or 240 Pence. Manillas (metal pieces used as currency) continued in use in parts of Nigeria until autumn 1948, when they were withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for notes and coins. Nigeria issued the Nigerian Pound (NGP) at par with the British West African Pound after the Nigerian Central Bank was established on July 1, 1959. On January 1, 1973, Nigeria introduced the Naira (NGN) to replace the Pound with 1 Naira equal to 10 Shillings and divisible into 100 Kobo. Biafra issued its own Pound (BIAP) currency and coins at par with the Nigerian Pound, but it became worthless after Biafra was reincorporated into Nigeria. Banknotes were issued in Lagos prior to its incorporation into Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria was established on July 1, 1959 and became the sole issuing authority for Nigeria, succeeding the West African Currency Board. The Bank of Biafra issued banknotes for Biafra.
9206	dbpedia	1	49	https://althistory.fandom.com/wiki/British_Nigeria_(Twilight_of_a_New_Era)	en	British Nigeria (Twilight of a New Era)	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/4/42/Flag_of_British_Colonial_Nigeria.svg/revision/latest?cb=20111106201319	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/4/42/Flag_of_British_Colonial_Nigeria.svg/revision/latest?cb=20111106201319	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210916044045", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210916044045", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/4/42/Flag_of_British_Colonial_Nigeria.svg/r...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Alternative History" ]	null	The British Nigeria (Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria) was created as a merger of Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria on 1 January 1914, partly because of uneven economy in the two territories, and also due to growing tension with the German...	en	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/4/4a/Site-favicon.ico/revision/latest?cb=20210916203836	Alternative History	https://althistory.fandom.com/wiki/British_Nigeria_(Twilight_of_a_New_Era)	The British Nigeria (Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria) was created as a merger of Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria on 1 January 1914, partly because of uneven economy in the two territories, and also due to growing tension with the German colonies. Economy[] Colonies such as Nigeria became part of British imperial expansion that focused on exploiting raw materials, minerals, and foodstuffs important to Western industrial development. Britain tried to encourage tropical export crops in Nigeria and to stimulate demand there for British manufactured goods. The colonies built a railroad network between the 1890s and 1930s, and constructed roads at an accelerating rate after the 1930s. These developments, along with the introduction of the pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange, encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil. Local agricultural products include cassava (tapioca), corn, millet, peanuts, rice, rubber, sorghum, and yams. The West African Currency Board (WACB, headquartered in London) acts as the central bank and issues the British West African pound, also used in British West Africa. Armed forces[] The Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) is the army group, that has joint command in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia. is organized in 4 regiments and Volunteer Corps. British officers and noncommissioned officers organize, train, and equip regiments of the RWAFF.
9206	dbpedia	3	50	https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nigerian-state-implications-development-ndudi-nwabueze-fe83f	en	The Nigerian State: Implications for Development	https://static.licdn.com/aero-v1/sc/h/en3f1pk3qk4cxtj2j4fff0gtr	https://static.licdn.com/aero-v1/sc/h/en3f1pk3qk4cxtj2j4fff0gtr	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Ndudi nwabueze" ]	2023-12-28T10:24:02+00:00	Abstract The Nigerian state otherwise called the Federal Republic of Nigeria, was before colonial administration, made up of autonomous, independent nations that include Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Ijaw, Kanuri, Tiv, Effik, Edo, Nupe, amongst others. There are over two hundred and fifty ethnic and	en	https://static.licdn.com/aero-v1/sc/h/al2o9zrvru7aqj8e1x2rzsrca		https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/nigerian-state-implications-development-ndudi-nwabueze-fe83f	Abstract The Nigerian state otherwise called the Federal Republic of Nigeria, was before colonial administration, made up of autonomous, independent nations that include Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Ijaw, Kanuri, Tiv, Effik, Edo, Nupe, amongst others. There are over two hundred and fifty ethnic and indigenous languages in Nigeria. The Colonial administrator, following the Berlin Conference of 1884/5, first supervised the configuration of these nations into the Colony of Lagos, Southern, and Northern Protectorates, and in 1906, joined the Colony of Lagos and Southern Protectorate to become Southern Protectorate. Then, in 1914, the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Protectorates became the Nigerian State. Ever since, the Nigerian State had been balkanized into Southern, Western, and Northern Regions in the 1950s; after independence in 1960, Southern, Western, Northern, and Midwestern Regions in 1963; 12 States structured by Gowon in 1967; 19 States in 1976 by Murtala Mohammed; 21 States in 1987 by Babaginda; 30 States in 1991 by Babaginda; and 36 in 1996 by Sani Abacha. Despite the reasons adduced for the creation of states, development has eluded Nigerian states because of the overriding personal interests of the leading (political, military, and economic) elites, religion, ethnicity, military incursion into politics, and other factors, contributed to the developmental illusion. Consequently, the nation-state called Nigeria continued to fail, due to the political ineptitude of the leaders and the lack of political capacity to harness the natural, human, and other resource endowments to develop the country, Nigeria. In this paper, we shall be exploring how the Nigerian State has impacted development. Before that, let’s quickly have a brief introduction. Introduction Before 1914, no country existed as Nigeria, but a geographical expression of multiethnic nations with distinct languages, religions, cultures, economic modes, and political organizations, amongst others, inhabited the land mass now called Nigeria. In the history of West Africa, the country enjoyed the luxury of being home to empires like the Kanem-Bornu Empire, Benin Empire, Oyo Empire, Sokoto Caliphate, and other kingdoms like the Hausa kingdoms, and the Nri Kingdom, etc. The Nigeria State, better known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, came to be in 1914, with the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Protectorate by Lord Frederick Lugard. The country is situated in West Africa between the Sahel region to the north of the Sahara Desert and the Gulf of Guinea to the south of the Atlantic Ocean. She shares borders with Niger Republic in the North, Chad in the Northeast, Cameroon in the East, Benin Republic in the West, and the South, bounded by the Atlantic Ocean. After decades of colonial administration through indirect rule, Nigeria became independent on 1st October 1960, and a Republic in 1963. However, it must be noted that colonial rule led to the spread of Christianity and the establishment of Western education in Nigeria. Between the 1950s and before the first military coup in 1966, she was governed by central and regional governments. The regional governments were Eastern, Midwestern, Western, and Northern, headed by a Premier, and economically, the regional governments, strived to develop their region. Unfortunately, in 1967, Nigeria drifted into civil war due to the failures of the leaders to prioritize Nigeria’s interest above regional and ethnic protectionism; by 1970 when the war ended, deep distrust, injustice, and suspicion became the order of the day. Igbos, for instance, were said to be the victims of the war as they lost their properties scattered across Nigeria. Holding on to power by the military at the end of the war, failure to sincerely implement the 3Rs of reconciliation, rebuilding, and reconstruction, as well as the subsequent overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1981, robbed the Nigerian state of the chance to build a new united Nigeria, where equity, fairness, justice, and rule of law prevails. Though, a civil rule through elections has been established in Nigeria since May 29th, 1999, the Nigerian state has wobbled politically, and fallen into serious economic, social, and political crisis that makes development illusory. Before we delve into Nigeria’s developmental crisis, let’s take a brief journey into Nigeria’s political history. Nigeria’s Political History The Nigeria state came to be in 1914 and it became the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 1963. The history of her political nationhood developed in phases. But for this discussion, we are going to prism the development of Nigeria’s nationhood from the perspectives of (1) Pre-colonial Nigeria, (2) Colonial Nigeria, and (3) Post-colonial Nigeria. Pre-colonial Nigeria: During this period, there was no Nigerian state, instead, what existed were independent multiethnic nations with distinct languages, cultures, religions, judicial systems, political organizations, economic systems, and inter-relations in the areas of trade and commerce. Some of the ethnic nations grew to become empires with very organized political structures, trade, socio-economic systems, justice administration, and military systems. Notable empires and kingdoms in pre-colonial Nigeria were Kanem-Bornu, Oyo, and Benin, Hausa kingdom in the north, and Nri kingdom of Igbo land in the east, etc. According to the historical records of medieval Arab and Muslim historians and geographers, the Kanem-Bornu empire was referred, to as the country’s major center for Islamic civilization. Furthermore, the Kanem-Bornu empire was said to oversee the Eastern Trade route of the Trans Sahara Trade route running from Bornu to Tripoli (Bornu - Fezzan - Ghadames – Ghat - Air-Fez - Tripoli). In southern Nigeria, coastal trade with Europeans flourished before the introduction of the slave trade. For instance, in the 16th century, Portuguese explorers were the first to begin direct trade with the people of southern Nigeria, in port cities like Calabar, Lagos, Badagry, Bonny Island, Brass Island, and Akassa. Benin and Oyo empires were also recorded as major slave trading empires. In the north, the continuous internal wars amongst the Hausa city-states and the fall of the Kanem-Bornu empire opened the gateway to the rise of the Fulani kingdom led by Usman Dan Fodio and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. Before the Caliphate was conquered in 1903 by the British colonial administration, its territory expanded to modern-day northern and some parts of central Nigeria and had the largest concentration of slaves (2 million), who were used for agriculture. Following the outcome of the Berlin Conference of 1884/1885 the thriving Nigerian kingdoms and empires were overthrown by the British colonial administration which established its spheres of influence over the territories. For instance, in1851, Lagos was bombarded, and by 1861 it became a colony of Britain. Then, the Benin Empire followed in 1897. In 1900, with the establishment of the Southern Protectorate, western Nigeria came under British rule. In 1903, the Sokoto Caliphate was conquered, and in the east, the Nri kingdom was conquered in 1911. Thus, leading us to the era of colonial Nigeria. (2) Colonial Nigeria: Though the Nigerian State was born on 1st January 1914, following the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Protectorates, the British colonial rule divided and administered Nigeria in the order of Northern and Southern Protectorates, and Lagos Colony, introducing indirect rule policy without due considerations of the different historical, socio-economic and political background of the ethnic nations. Thus, creating the ember of disunity, which to date has remained a major problem plaguing the Nigerian state. For example, it was on record that the indirect rule policy of the British colonial administration, validated and legitimized Islamic tradition and culture in the north, forbade the operations of Christian missions in the north, encouraged the spread of Christianity, and established educational institutions by Christian missionaries, and built coastal economy of the south. The colonial rule midwifed a series of constitutional reforms, starting with the Clifford Constitution of 1922 to the 1960 Independent Constitution of Nigeria. Likewise, the administration was challenged with waves of political agitations by Nigerian nationalists, demanding deepened political reforms and self-rule. The agitations for self-rule got to its climax in 1953, when Chief Anthony Enahoro moved the motion for Nigeria’s Independence in the Parliament. Though the motion was defeated, once more, it exposed the divide-and-rule policy of the British colonial administration and the divide between the northern and southern Nigeria, as the northern members of the parliament, staged a walkout. Though the motion was reintroduced and passed in 1957 and 1958, by S. L Akintola and Remi Fani Kayode respectively, the British colonial authorities refused to ratify the passed bills. Until, eventually, in 1959, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa re-proposed the bill for Nigeria’s independence, and it was passed because of the sustained pressure on the colonial administration. Reacting to the pressure, the colonial governor announced the decision of the British government to grant independence to Nigeria on 1st October 1960. Unfortunately, at independence, and thereafter, Nigerians see themselves more as Northerners, Westerners, Easterners, Midwesterners, and Middlebeltans, than they see themselves as Nigerians. They were regionally inclined, recognized, and owned their allegiance to their regions of origin, thereby widening the gap of disunity. Today, not much difference in terms of allegiance has changed. No wonder political contest for elective positions like the ‘president’ of the country is heavily tilted or divided along ethnic lines or regions. This evil has spread to the state and local government elections. Very worrisome is that ‘National Interest’ has become an adjunct of regionalism and ethnicity, a vehicle for propagating primordial ethnic interests, exploitation, and sharing of political offices in Nigeria. This, explains why political appointments are heavily skewed in favour of the president’s ethnicity and region. Secondly, the imbalances between the north and south were expressed in Nigeria's political, social, and economic lives despite the fact the richest Nigerian is from the north. Particularly of note during the colonial administration was the growth and rise of nationalism and Nationalist movements in the agitations for political reforms and increasing constitutional government in Nigeria, and Nigeria’s independence. Nigerian nationalism was pioneered by Herbert Macaulay in the 1920s, with the sole purpose of uniting Nigerians of multiethnic backgrounds to resist colonialism. This is the root of structural imbalances within the nation due to the socio-economic projects, and establishment of administrative centers by colonial administration without regard to the wish of the people of Nigeria. The first of the nationalist movements was the Nigerian Youth Movement, founded in 1933 by Professor Eyo Ita, to champion the agitations against colonial rule. Its membership cuts across Nigeria’s multi-ethnic groups and had Nationalists like Stanley Orogun, Eyo Ita, Samuel Akisanya, Elnest Ikoli, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, H. O. Davis, Dr Kofo Abayomi, Adeyemo Alakija, amongst others. The Nigerian Youth Movement was equivocal in its opposition to the indirect rule policy of the colonial British Administration and advocated for complete autonomy within the British Empire based on equal partnership with the other member states. Though there were efforts by the colonial administration to repress Nigerian nationalism, it resulted in radical agitations and multiple secessionist movements demanding independence for Nigeria from colonial rule. The colonial administrators in 1960, had no choice but to grant Nigeria’s independence, in the wake of growing and increasing demand for self-rule. Besides political activities, economically the colonial administration developed an exploitative economic policy with the sole purpose of exploring and exploiting local Nigerian resources for the development of Britain. For instance, it is on record that the British government chartered the Royal Niger Company under George Taubman Goldie to gain control of trade and influence along the coastal states of Nigeria and the bank of the river Niger in her favour. Nigeria’s natural resources and agricultural produce were exploited and shipped to England. Such natural resources include coal mined in Enugu, Tin mined in Jos, and Crude oil, mined from Niger Delta regions. Agricultural produce shipped to Britain included palm oil for powering machines of industrial England, timber and plywood, cocoa, groundnuts, etc., as raw materials for British growing industries. Ironical, infrastructural developments like roads and bridges, railway lines, and seaports by the colonial administration were built to facilitate and promote British interest. For instance, Jos-Enugu-Port Harcourt railway lines were constructed to aid the transportation of Tin from Jos and coal from Enugu to Port Harcourt seaport, from where the products were shipped to Britain. Secondly, the internal roads and bridges were constructed to link the hinterlands to the coastal cities like Calabar, Lagos, Badagry, Bonny Island, and railway stations in cities like Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Ibadan, Abeokuta, etc., to facilitate the movement of goods for easy shipment to Britain. Further, it was argued that colonialism was created to find markets for industrial British companies, to obtain raw materials for their industries, and markets to sell their finished products, thereby enhancing the growth of British companies. Affirming the exploitation of Nigeria by the British colonial administration, Patrick Oluwole Ojo el ta opined that, radical scholars blame the persistent socio-economic challenges in Nigeria on the structural deficiencies created by the country’s colonial experiences, and that colonialism was a system designed not only to exploit, but also meant to keep Nigeria in permanent vulnerable position of underdevelopment. Despite the exploitation of Nigerian resources and destruction of our indigenous socio-economic and political structures by the British colonial administration, we must recognize the introduction of education by European missionaries, which helped in developing Nigerian nationalism and nationalists, sharpened nationalists’ voices, shaped agitations for Nigeria’s independence, and nurture Nigerians to become the managers of their affairs. Though, Nigeria is yet deeply yoked in neo-colonialism. 3 Post-colonial Nigeria: In 1954, the road to self-rule was mapped, when Nigeria gained partial self-rule. This was followed with complete independence (self-rule) on 1st October 1960, when power transited to Nigeria’s government with Prime Minister (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) driving and Governor-General (Nnamdi Azikiwe) on the passenger’s seat, thereby laying the foundation for Parliamentary system of government. Suffices, a national government was formed at the center by the coalition of Northern People’s Congress, headed by Sir Ahmadu Bellow, and National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons headed by Nnamdi Azikiwe, while the Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo, functioned as the opposition party. The parties exhibited regional and ethnic characteristics in terms of membership spread and influence, which was a manifest expression of ethnic politics that laid the foundation for the corruption of the electoral and political process. It was the corruption of the political processes by the politicians that paved the way for the January 1966 military coup in Nigeria. The following counter-coup in May 1966 though, ushered in Gen. Yakubu Gowon’s administration, was also a manifestation of ethnic protectionism, and interpreted as a revenge coup against the Igbos who led the January 1966 coup, where leading politicians from the north were mostly victims. The aftermath of the coup and counter-coup was the ensuing unfortunate civil war, due to the failure and inability of the leaders to resolve the differences owing to distrust, politics of deception, ethnicity, and regional interest over Nigeria’s interest. While the war raged, Nigeria enjoyed an oil boom from crude oil exploration, and the huge revenues received from its exportation were wantonly miss-managed by the military administrations, its impact is still felt by Nigerians to date as small and medium businesses were not supported, and there was no reasonable investment in infrastructures. According to Wikipedia, in the article, ’Nigeria’, ‘’the oil revenues fueled the rise of federal subsidies to states, and the federal government became the center of political struggle and the threshold of power in the country. As oil production and revenue rose, the Nigerian government became increasingly dependent on oil revenues … for budgetary and economic concerns’’. Gowon’s administration was ousted by a 1975 coup of the triumvirate of three brigadier generals, who accused Gowon of being autocratic. General Murtala Muhammed became the head of State, while Olusegun Obasanjo was next in command, followed by Theophilus Danjuma. The government introduced political, economic, and social reforms. For instance, a timetable to return the country to civil rule was drawn, the civil service was purged of corrupt personnel, and austerity measures to control inflation. Unfortunately, Murtala was killed in a failed coup led by Colonel Buka Suka Dimka in 1976. Consequently, General Olusegun Obasanjo became the military head of state, supported by General Shehu Yar'Adua, and General Theophilus Danjuma. The government amongst its reform programmes were local government reform, and the setting up of a constitution drafting committee to return the country to civilian rule. Resulting of the reform, a civilian rule headed by Shehu Shagari was on 1 October 1979, sworn in as the first President and Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thereby ushering Nigeria’s second republic. Shagari’s government was accused of total corruption in all sectors. Following the widespread vote-rigging and violence that characterized the 1983 election, Shagari’s government was overthrown in December 1983. Major General Muhammadu Buhari was installed as military head of state. In 1985, Gen. Ibrahim Babaginda overthrew Buhari in a palace coup d'état, accusing him of high-handedness. Babangida established the Nigerian Political Bureau to recommend how to transition Nigeria to the Third Republic. In 1989, Babangida started making plans for a transition into the Third Nigerian Republic. Notable amongst his political reforms were the formation of two political parties (SDP & NRC), and the OptionA4 voting procedure. Unfortunately, Babaginda annulled the June 12 election that was largely acclaimed to be won by Moshood Abiola and created the crisis of the Third Republic, which manifested into various resistance movements, the fall of his government in1993, and the ushering of Interim National Government, headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan in 1993. Shonekan’s Government was short-lived as he was overthrown by Gen. Sani Abacha in a commando style and installed himself as the Military Head of state. Abacha’s regime was regarded as the most punitive government in the history of Nigeria. For instance, he used wide-scale military force to suppress civilian agitation for the restoration of the 1983 June 12 election, and arrested and imprisoned Moshood Abiola, and a host of NADECO members. The height of his maximum rule was the hanging of environmental campaigner, Ken Saro-Wiwa and four Ogoni elders on trumped-up charges. In addition to being a maximum ruler, Abacha was not just corrupt but stole hundreds of millions of dollars from the government treasury. His regime came to a sudden end via sudden death. He was succeeded by, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who initiated and adopted a new constitution on 5 May 1999, that laid the foundation for a return to civilian rule and provided for multiparty elections, thus leading us to the present democratic dispensation of twenty-four years of uninterrupted civilian rule in Nigeria. At this juncture, let’s pursue to briefly consider the concept of development. The Concept of Development According to IGI Global.com, and Topper.com, ‘development is ‘the process that results in growth, progress, positive change, or the addition of physical, economic, environmental, social, and demographic components to an existing system or environment’’. According to Wikipedia, ‘Development is the result of society's capacity to organize resources to meet challenges and opportunities’’. Given the definitions above, development is a process that results in advancement through the capacity to harness the resources of the nation for political, economic, social, justice, security, and technological development. However, in the words of topper.com economic development refers to an improvement in the quality of life and well-being of the people of the economy. Adebayo (2013: 353) defines development, ‘’as an important mode of production in modern society and the key in classifying countries as developed, underdeveloped, developing or emerging economies based on their level of industrialization’’. This definition sees development from the perspective of production, and as an instrument of measuring development, in developing, and underdeveloped nations. Nonetheless, we can describe development as a growth process that promotes social, cultural, economic, security, technological, and political advancement of people from a state of weakness to strength, and it encompasses all aspects of human endeavour. As a growth process, it commands the capacity to respond and overcome social, cultural, economic, security, technological, and political crises legitimately. Culturally, it involves the use of various sequences of our cultural heritage and other variables to achieve national development. Development may result in the specialization which is because of new subsystems, new structures, and new roles created to meet the challenges ahead. Political development, for example, may result in equality, capacity, and differentiation while economic development could lead to a reduction in inflation, unemployment rate, and improved standard of living. On the other hand, security development entails total guarantying of peace, and protection of lives and property without fear or threat. Security development requires commitment, dedication, sacrifice, and focus from the drivers to enable it to realize its goal. Meaning, that quality leadership is a necessity if the development of a nation like Nigeria is to be realized. This is because the leader should be able to generate quality ideas and steer the ship of the nation’s development to a growth path; in addition to, having the emotional and mental attitude to harness the resources of the nation for political, economic, social, justice, technological, and cultural growth, and development of the nation. However, Nigeria has not been favoured or fortunate with leaders that have the political capacity and unquestionable integrity citizens can entrust with their sovereign power and can guarantee the security of their lives and property. Impacts of Nigerian State on Development. The journey of the development of the Nigerian statehood has been an unstable one. While several governments have had developmental plans to drive economic, social, and political growth, little has been achieved with the plans as government officials pay lip services to the plans and use the plans as conduit pipes for defrauding the nation. While this paper is not focusing on the developmental plans, we shall center our efforts on such elements as politics, security, ethnicity, leadership, religion, the justice system, and economic development in this phase of the discussion to underscore factors hindering Nigeria’s developmental efforts. Post-colonial Nigerian politics can best be described as a regressive error because, at independence, Africans and the world community had expected Nigeria to lead and champion the course of the black world and be a home for the black race. Unfortunately, the steam quickly faded away no sooner after her independence. Examining Nigeria’s political development to find the answer to why the steam faded quickly, one would say that colonial Nigeria was more politically active, with purposeful politicians who worked for the growth and development of the nation than the era of post-colonial Nigeria, particularly, after the fall of First Republic. For instance, history will not forget nationalists like Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, Tafawa Balewa, Anthony Enahoro, Stanley Orogun, Eyo Ita, Samuel Akisanya, Elnest Ikoli, H. O. Davis, Dr Kofo Abayomi, Adeyemo Alakija, K. O. Mbadiwe, Denis Osadebe, etc., who worked assiduously to wrestle Nigeria’s independence from Britain and gave the sound bite that Nigeria is the hope of the black race. Their politicking was pure, selfless, sacrificial, inclusive, and borderless of ethnicity, as they projected the Nigerian dream before the world. Unfortunately, the political gains of the nationalists were eroded by the military, who invaded the political space, ceased political power, derailed Nigeria’s progress, and dashed the hope of Nigeria leading the black race in the community of world affairs. However, the present politics of Nigeria christened the Fourth Republic, is nothing, but a piece of soured, rotten, and decayed apple. The present politicians, benefiting from the sacrifices of Nigeria's founding fathers, are only motivated to public office for personal interest and gains rather than the interest of the Nigerian state. They deceitfully used the instruments and resources of the Nigerian state to climb to socio-economic and political positions of influence and turn around to defraud the state and subject Nigerian citizens to untold suffering. They manipulate ethnicity, regionalism, and religion to escalate and widen the gap of political divide between the once peaceful, loving ethnic groups in Nigeria for their selfish gain. To further entrench their political evil, they institutionalized political patronage, entitlement, and godfatherism to perpetuate their continuous stay in government and stealing of public funds. They turned polling booths into national robbery booths, where electorates are robbed of their voting rights and the political will to decide who governs them. Hence the current crops of political office occupiers in Nigeria are nothing but civilian coup plotters and vote robbers with the INEC chairman as the coup brigade commandant. Because of the false processes of producing political office holders, Nigeria carries a red flag of integrity question mark before the international community. In addition, politicians manipulate the justice system and appoint counterpart corrupt judicial officials to head litigations involving them, to obtain favourable judgments and earn false integrity in a broad day rape of justice, where only three or five or seven-man judge, void votes of thousands/millions of Nigerians. Fresh in our minds are the certificate saga of the previous and present administrations involving ex-president Buhari and current president Tinubu, which publicly embarrassed the Nigerian nation and her citizens. The display of political selfishness also came into play in Wike’s political base song in the unsuccessful impeachment attempt on Similaye Fubara, the governor of Rivers State. The display of political rascality and selfishness notwithstanding, twenty-four years of uninterrupted civilian rule is something to cherish in high hopes that one day, Nigerians will smile. In the sphere of security, the country cannot be said to have developed the capabilities to deal with security challenges like cybercrime, terrorism, and electronic warfare. Though Nigeria may have active and functional security organizations and succeed in fighting against session and reuniting the east with other parts of the country, the current challenges of Cybercriminals, terrorist groups, and the growing trend of Electronic Warfare, called for a new national defence and security strategy to curb the activities of criminal groups. This is becoming more worrisome given that terrorists, cybercriminals, and other criminal groups are exploiting and leveraging the advantage of technology (using social media) to perpetrate crimes. Terrorist organizations, for example, use social media to recruit, indoctrinate, and assign terrorist attacks to new members. While cybercriminals are hacking into governments, organizations, individual assets, and information to defraud the victims of Billions of Dollars. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect, ISWA, and Bandits have continued to cause havoc on Nigerian nationhood, ceasing part of the country, forcing the people to pay taxes of various natures, kidnapping for ransom, killing people, and destroying valuable property. For instance, it was estimated that over 3,500 people were internally displaced, 264 children orphaned, 392 women widowed, several police and military personnel killed, several police stations razed, and over 700 inmates were forcefully released, to mention just a few of the havoc caused the nation by terrorist groups. Illuminating further, Aderonke (2015) observed that, ‘in Nigeria, the upsurge of terrorism engineered by Boko Haram poses grave security challenges to the nation’. Akpomera, & Omoyibo, (2013), said. ‘Nigeria currently faces security and developmental dilemma with the crucible of terrorism largely enveloped in the foreign policy perspective with neighbours’’. Prof.I.C. Achumba El ta (2013), quoting Kufour (2012), noted that the cause of insecurity in Nigeria are, political conflicts; unbalanced development that involves horizontal inequalities; religious/ethnic distrust; and leadership failure. While Eunice Reddick according to Prof.I.C. Achumba El ta (2013), associated insecurity with the low level of economic development because of poor governance and high-level of corruption, and said corruption is “the walls that stand in the way of progress, the red tape that stops an idea from becoming a business, the patronage that distributes wealth based on tribe and sect”. Impliedly, poor governance as a manifestation of weak leadership, political entitlement, corruption, ethno-religious distrust, and failure of the electioneering process to produce capable leaders, are accountable for Nigeria’s inability to develop her security capability and capacity to guarantee absolute security to her citizenry. Nigeria security elites are wickedly corrupt and like their political allies, mismanaged the trust bequitted upon them, and turned themselves into instruments of oppression and suppression against the ordinary Nigerian. In some cases, they have become the antithesis of the constitution they swore to uphold. However, responding to the security threat, the Nigerian government developed a new National Security Strategy to fight the growing security threat arising from threatening security challenges. Economically, several elements have crippled the development of the Nigerian state. Leading the pack is, the Nigerian state lacked political leaders without blemish to catapult her to the paths of economic development and growth despite operating a democratic system of government. Though it’s argued that development and democracy complement each other, working side by side, successive governments (democratic and non-democratic) in Nigeria, have demonstrated a lack of political will to initiate or sustain economic policies or structural transformation, or to embark on sound economic reform to reposition the country for greatness in all ramifications. According to Akinola (2008), Nigeria’s ‘poor macroeconomic management, continues to display the attributes of a state in crisis. In the words of Dhikru and Adeoye (2016), ‘With the weakness of the Nigerian state and its ineffectiveness, it has become challenging to eradicate impoverishment, engage in infrastructural development, and stem the tides of insurgency and terrorism, which have the potency to derail the country’s moderate political development’. No doubt, the issue of failure of political leadership with the willpower (capacity) to direct economic development and growth remains topmost. Mimiko (2010) opined that ‘the Nigerian state has degenerated to the point where it is unable to provide minimal social security for its vulnerable population’. Impliedly, the government of Nigeria failed to uphold the principle of accountability to the people as democracy demands. Consequently, corruption or corrupt practices by the political elites become a reoccurring decimal in the economic development woes of the Nigerian state. According to Patrick Oluwole Ojo el ta, ‘corruption constitutes the key factor underlying the continuing underdevelopment debacle and the seemingly intractable socio-economic development in Nigeria’. Ilufoye Ogundiya el ta (2008), noted that ‘governance surely hinders development where it manifests in corrupt practices; greed and insatiable appetite for resource accumulation’. Aliyu and Elijah (2009), said, ‘Corruption carts resources away from government capital expenditure and human capital development and ends up in private pockets. However, Teresa Nogueira (2023), questioned Nigeria’s breed of federalism and said, ‘’Nigeria’s “hybrid” federal system and overall poor leadership are impediments to development as the country continues to experience rapid demographic growth combined with economic stagnation’’. Finally, the practice of feeding bottle federalism will continue to hinder real economic development and growth in Nigeria, as the philosophy of fiscal federalism has been jettisoned, and centralized federal government control of the country’s revenue is imposed on the federating states. Describing what economic action Nigeria should take, the World Bank (1997), said, ‘’No matter the upsurge of globalization and the prospects of the borderless state, the expectation is for states to take a decisive role in economic transformation, growth, and development and jettison every act that is inimical to improved livelihood as well as socioeconomic and political development of the country’’. Ethnicity and regionalism, in the scheme of the development of the Nigerian state, have their fair share in underdeveloping Nigeria. Before l go into the discussion, let me acknowledge that the various ethnic groups had existed harmoniously before colonialism with distinct cultural and linguistic differences as autonomous societies. Nonetheless, the foundation for communal sentiments among the various ethnic groups was laid by colonialism. Attesting to this notation, J. S. Coleman (1958), wrote, ‘’In 1920, Sir Hugh Clifford, the colonial Governor of the country at the time, made it abundantly clear that his administration would seek to secure, ‘’to each separate people the right to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its chosen form of government; and the peculiar political and social institutions which have been evolved for it by the wisdom and the accumulated experiences of generations of its forebears’’. However, ethnicity and regionalism in contemporary Nigeria were products of socioeconomic competition between the hosts and migrant communities due to colonialism. Thus, leading to the formation of ethnic groups to protect their interests and guarantee socioeconomic security. Confirming this assertion, Nnoli (1978), wrote, ‘Both migrants and hosts organized themselves along communal lines to safeguard their interests in the struggle for the scarce and un- equally distributed resources’’. Examples of such ethnic groups include the Yoruba Union, Ibo Union, Calabar Improvement League, Owerri Divisional Union, Urhobo Renascent Convention, Igbirra Progressive Union, etc. Arising from the socioeconomic struggles were unequal income, unequal employment, and social status differentiation among the ethnic groups, which formed the ember of blame, frustration, and strengthening of communal groups (protectionism) to better their lots, thereby giving birth to ethnicity. According to Nnoli (1978), in 1945, Eyo Ita, sensing the negative trend that was emerging because of the growing power of these parochial associations, warned that ‘’the greatest need of Nigerians today is to become a community…to evolve a national selfhood’’. Akinsanya-Ikoli succession conflict in the Nigeria Youth Movement was a classical manifestation and demonstration of ethnic prejudice and the underlining political struggle and danger associated with ethnicity, which to date has engulfed Nigerian politics. During the colonial administration, ethnicity complicated national politics as it determined the formation of political parties and regional governments and laid the foundation for minority agitation out of fear of being dominated by a majority ethnic group. Consequently, at independence, the three major political parties (Northern People's Congress, National Council of Nigeria Citizens, and Action Group) had ethnic and regional colorations. The military coups of 1966 and the consequential civil war in 1967, were all influenced and determined by ethnicity and regional bias, consideration, or protectionism. In post-independent Nigeria, both political and nonpolitical elites have continued to plunder the wealth of Nigeria hiding under the cover of ethnic and regional protection. They destroy national structures like the Federal Character principle for socioeconomic and political development while promoting nepotism, ethnic favouritism, political patronage, and settlement while sacrificing merit on the altar of ethnicity and regional cleavages. Presently, this evil is inflicted on the Nigerian state through the collaboration of politicians, bureaucrats, military elites, economic class, and royal monarchs, who are the projectors and defenders of ethnicity and regionalism. In the elections of 2015, 2019, and 2023, regionalism and ethnicity reached prominence as a major determining equation in electing Nigeria’s president. Illuminating how the ruling elites manipulated ethnicity to better their lot over the seasons, Prof. Richard Sklar (1967), said, ‘’ethnic movements may be created and instigated to action by the new men of power in furtherance of their special interests which are time and again constitutive interests of emerging social class’’. Further, he described ethnicity as a mask for class privileges. The greatest danger of ethnicity to the Nigerian state is that political leaders own their allegiance to their ethnic regions thereby subverting the Nigerian constitution they swore to protect. Secondly, political appointments into government offices, are heavily skewed in favour of ethnicity and regionalism. Finally, there is the danger of consciously weeping up ethnic sentiments and the use of ethnic symbols by politicians in mobilizing for political support and promotion of selfish interests. Leadership is adjudged the greatest challenge of the Nigerian State. That is the inability of Nigeria inspite of her being blessed with intelligent and hard-working men and women, to produce a leader who is resourceful, fearless, capable, and has the capacity to drive the wheel of progress of the nation from a state of weakness to greatness by harnessing her endowed human, natural, material, and technological resources. That is a leader who has a clear vision and mission of leading the country by placing national interest above personal, ethnic, religious, and regional interests; a leader that guides, directs, listens, empathizes, and influences, as well as serves the people with a sense of purpose, selflessly, and communicates with the people respectfully. Finally, a leader with undoubted integrity, accountable, and the citizenry can believe and trust every word he/she communicates. Unfortunately, Nigeria has had a series of political and nonpolitical leaders with unlimited greed and has institutionalized the culture of greed in every fabric of Nigerian society, thus, resulting in failed leadership and Nigeria state, as a true reflection of her leadership problem. Emphasizing Nigeria’s failed leadership, Oboma Daniel Ebun (2016), opined, ‘’Nigeria…is greatly endowed with natural resources but bankrupt of visionary and selfless leadership’’. Exploring Nigeria’s leadership, one will argue that the leadership represents a leader in that society Julius Nyerere (1969), described as ‘one man, …can acquire as a great ‘reward’ as a thousand of his fellows can acquire between them”. In the words of Nnamdi Azikiwe (1980), ‘Nigeria is an affluent society where there are few very rich and very many very poor’. These statements affirm that Nigerian leaders are not only greedy and corrupt but politicize the welfare of the citizens by tormenting them with the basic necessities of life like food and shelter security. No wonder a Nigerian politician spent twice the cost of the project to commission the project. Hence, the citizens are the helpless victims of the social contract between them and the leaders. Another characteristic of Nigerian leaders is that of playing gods. They speak as if they are not mortals, and life and death are in their hands. Have you listened to these formal governors: Nyesom Wike, El Rufai, and Adams Oshomole, for example? Describing them as emperors is underestimating the powers they arrogated themselves. Instead, they backstaged every quality of leadership in the words of Jacob & Jacques (1990), that, “leadership is a process of giving purpose to collective effort and causing willing effort to be expended to achieve collective purpose.”; Jeb Blount (2012), that ‘leadership is about hard work, self-discipline, and sacrifices. It is the notion of sacrifices that concerns us here. Nigerian leaders never sacrifice for the development of the nation; rather, they keep asking the people to continue to sacrifice for their fatherland, while they plunder the commonwealth. They are disconnected from the people and are clouded by selfish gains instead of selfless service to the people. They lack principles, values, and ethical standards, which are the hallmarks of leadership. Hence, when they say they are ‘servant leaders’, they mean that they are the masters while the people are the slaves. Leaders in Nigeria are not leaders but dictators with overbearing oppressive tendencies, dictating to the people what they feel is right or wrong, forgetting the meaning of achieving collective purpose through the collective efforts of all. Their policy initiatives are hurting instead of succoring to the people. Because of their primitive accumulation of public wealth and wasteful expending of the treasury, they lived in fear, in over-walled mansions, surrounded by security operatives who were enough to form a battalion. I will summarize this half by agreeing with Oboma Daniel Ebun (2016), who said, ‘’The history of the leadership of Nigeria is filled with leaders who are corrupt, incompetent, rigid, intolerant, insensitive, callous, egoist, visionless and tribalistic. It is little wonder then that these leaders have not been able to harness the human and economic resources of the country to bring about an enviable development’’. Religion, though, has been argued is complimentary to development; like ethnicity or regionalism, is one of the elements that has impacted the development of the Nigerian state. Nigeria is a free religious country where her citizens freely worship and express their religious beliefs unmolested. In pre-colonial Nigeria, the ethnic groups practiced different religious beliefs, commonly called ‘Traditional Religion’. The political, socio-economic, and justice systems of the people were closely intertwined with religion in their rituals, and they acted as a moral gauge of the standard behaviour of the people. It was a mirror of self-conscience in propagating the moral ethics of the societies. For instance, religion preaches love, fairness, and equity, as it emphasizes, ‘do unto others what you want them to do unto you’. Going further, it is not an overstatement to say that trade, commerce, and religion grew side by side as Traditional priests, Christian, and Islamic preachers played the dual role of promoting religion and acting as trade and commercial representatives of individuals and the major trading companies like Royal Niger Company. A deep overview of the relationship between religion and socioeconomic and justice systems, makes one argue that religion was the foundation upon which the justice and socio-economic systems thrived. For instance, instances abound when traditional religious priests had to preside over social trade or land disputes. During colonial rule, the role of religion was not diminished, instead, it gained prominence as the country was divided along religious lines - Southern Christians and Northern Moslems, and traditional religion became stigmatized, and less prominent, as practitioners, were perceived as ‘evil men’. However, explaining the role of religion on national development, Okechukwu Odinaka Ajegbu (2012), opined that ‘religion has positively affected the Nigerian economy through its teachings. People are thought to believe in their capability to create wealth, jobs are created both directly and indirectly by religious institutions, taxes from their investments are paid to the government, etc., and all these help to boost the economy of the country and improve the living standard of the people. Nonetheless, the political elites have manipulated the religious divide for their selfish gain and have successfully used religious cover or conflict to deceive the citizenry, further divide the country, and threaten her corporate existence. Another dangerous use of religion by politicians in Nigeria is ‘religious identity’ in the sharing of political offices along religious divides amidst strong criticisms of unbalanced representation by Christians and Muslims alike. According to Okechukwu Odinaka Ajegbu (2012), ‘Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of religious differentiation and conflict, with Nigerian Muslims much more likely to evince or articulate a religious identity than Christians’. Unfortunately, this threatening danger is a time bomb waiting to explode and engulf the country. It is very painful that the political elites careless about it because they interplay religion and politics to gain acceptance of the electorates by visiting religious houses during campaigns to secure the endorsement of prominent religious leaders and the sympathy of the religious group. Further, the insecurity bedeviling the nation, particularly, terrorism, has been linked to religion. According to Hoffman (1993), ‘It is also a fact that about a quarter of all terrorist groups and …half of most the dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concern’. This is true of the Boko Haram sect, ISWA, and Bandits terrorist groups in northern Nigeria, who are mainly Muslim youths, used and dumped political thugs, that metamorphosed into terrorist groups. No wonder one of the key objectives of Boko Haram is overthrowing ‘injustice’. That is overthrowing the injustice of age-long deprivation, denial, oppression, suppression, and 'use and dump', perpetuated by the political elites. Hence, one will argue that religious terrorism in Nigeria is self-inflicted. Okechukwu Odinaka Ajegbu (2012), said, ‘religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics…it strives to avenge a long history of persecution and injustice’. The question that needs to be answered here is, is religious terrorism inimical to Nigeria’s development? Again, Okechukwu Odinaka Ajegbu (2012), provides an answer when he states that ‘religious terrorism in Nigeria possess a significant threat to national development as it is evident in Northern Nigeria where economic and social activities in some of the highly volatile States (Yobe and Borno) have almost been grounded by the stream of killings, destruction of basic means of livelihood of the people and truncating of foreign and local investments; thereby becoming a cock on the wheel of development of the States and Nigeria at large’. Consequently, religion has thus, become an instrument of self-destruction as religious groups engaged themselves in unhealthy competitions with animosity and suspicion of each other in a tense atmosphere, ready to explode. Secondly, the use of force, intimidation, arson, kidnapping, and killing of worshipers in cold blood by some fanatical religious groups, breeds hatred and further makes religion clogs in the wheel of the progress of the Nigerian state. I will conclude this section on religion by quoting Ogenyi and Ukpe (2013), who quoted Ogbeide (2012), ‘…religion is a double-edged sword and can create social order, harmony, cohesion, and stability while it can be used by wealthy and powerful people to exploit and oppress the people therefore, becoming a veritable source of violent conflicts and social dislocation’. The justice system is next in the series of our discussion. The judiciary by definition of democracy is the balancer on the principles of ‘Rule of Law’. It adjudicates and interprets the law according to the Constitution. Because of its fairness in executing its functions, it is regarded as the ‘hope of the common man’, a guarantor, and a protector of the rights of the people. Essentially, the primary duty of the judicial system is, the settlement of conflicts between the national and subnational governments, subnational governments, governments, and individuals/groups on the one hand, and among individuals or groups on the other, based on the existence of a constitutional legal framework. But in Nigeria, whether in a democratic or undemocratic government, the judiciary is under siege and has become an instrument of oppression in the hands of the elites. Consequentially, the justice system is an evil hill on the path of the development of the Nigerian state. It truly represents Karl Marx’s view of justice in a social system, where the elites (judges, lawyers, politicians, academians, businessmen, Kings, etc.) deliberately manipulate the law to protect their unlawful actions, legitimize criminality, protect criminal agents, accept abnormal behaviour, and makes rules to protect their interests. In the same vain, judicial workers organized and aligned themselves as willing tools, in cult-like manners for the sake of perverting justice with their cohorts. The court system, for example, allots judgments and decides who wins a case based on class or group distinction. Secondly, they unlawfully institutionalized selective justice and enforcement of the law. For instance, highly placed elites hardly serve their prison terms in the prisons, and neither do law enforcement agents arrest them for crimes against the state. For example, it is only in Nigeria that convicts win elections from inside the prisons. The criminal justice system in addition to being selective, mainly concerns itself with policing and punishing the marginalized, not the wealthy, and those that perform clandestine functions for the elite. In the words of David Gordon, ‘The justice system mainly focuses on prosecuting the underclass criminals while ignoring the crimes of the elite and the middle classes. Hence, the justice system does not pretend about its continuous maintenance and protection of the ruling class by making rules to reinforce ruling class ideology, punish or intimidate perceived opponents, and unfaithful followers, and those tagged as ‘social failures’ to wade off oppositions, shift attention from, and hide the evils of their actions through the use of state instruments like the court, police and media. According to Chambliss (1978), ‘the ruling class (politicians and business owners) were part of a crime syndicate who used their wealth and influence to bribe officials and avoid punishment. Snider (1993), said that laws protecting the ruling class were rigorously enforced while those that protected ordinary people were more "for show". Hence, the country is entangled in the social conflict of judicial betrayal because the judges, lawyers, politicians, academicians, business class, top-place traditional rulers, social bourgeoisie, and owners of productive forces keep corrupting, manipulating, and influencing the justice system to perpetuate the elites in power, and their evil acts. The constitution which ought to be the foundation of the law of governance, is set aside, while executive lawlessness in the name of ‘Presidential or Executive Order’ usurps the constitution. Illuminating further, Dhikru and Adeoye (2016), quoting Akinseye George (2000), opined, ’lack of judicial independence and its associated ills, a recipe for misgovernance and maladministration, particularly by the executive arm of government, which manifested in many folds during military rule and did not significantly improve even in the country’s several attempts to democratize in the Second, Third, and Fourth Republics. Volumes of instances of abuse of the judiciary, misapplication of the rule of law, controversial judgments, and threats of judicial officials exist. Notable examples are the invasion of judges' homes by DSS officers in 2016, and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Code of Conduct Tribunal trial of former Chief Justice Onoghen. Since the judicial arm of government is now an appendage of the president or governor, judges like the biblical or proverbial salt, lost their taste or integrity because they lack the courage to say 'no' or have the dignity to resign from office when the executive order is against their ethical and constitutional vows. Secondly, lawyers like Nicodemus jostle between the judge’s chambers bidding and delivering the ‘Ghana-must-go Sacks’ stalked with evil money to pervert justice. Describing the contribution of the justice system to Nigeria’s development, Simbine &Oladeji (2010), accused the justice system of partisanship when they wrote, ‘It should be noted that, rather than check the excesses of the then government, the judiciary, in several instances, appeared partisan’. Rather, in my view, are 'partisan' as the minister of justice and the attorney general is a political appointee of the president. No wonder judges with vested interests are appointed to judge on cases concerning the elites. To conclude this discussion, l will quote Adamolekun (2016), who said that, 'a review of the activities of this arm, since 1960, reveals that it suffered “critical oscillations and dwindling fortunes in development and performance’. Therefore, to have a performing justice system with rising fortunes requires a sincere and honest leader in dear need of a free and independent judiciary, devoid of all forms of judicial bias, and judicial officers with unquestionable integrity. Conclusion The issues we discussed and those not mentioned, do not mean that the Nigerian state is bad, rather, they have hindered her development and growth and denied her her status in the Committee of Nations. While we agree that the development of the Nigerian state is bedeviled with many problems, some not discussed in this presentation, some of the issues were pre-colonial, others colonial, and the most threatening ones were post-colonial. These are the self-inflicted problems like insecurity (militancy, Islamization, banditry, kidnapping for ransom, cybercrime, etc.), economic crimes (like stealing and flighting of public funds, over-invoicing, and inflation of government contracts), social infrastructural crime (deliberate arson, conversion, and destruction of public infrastructures), Politics of bitterness (politics of disunity and distrust, abuse of executive, legislative and judicial powers, anti-people policies), etc. I called them most threatening because these problems are avoidable with the rightful leader, who can harness, nurture, and utilize the resources of the nation for her development and growth. Unfortunately, Nigeria and Nigerians have not been fortunate with the right leader like Moses to lead them to the promised statehood. References 1. Billy Dudley (1982) An Introduction to Nigerian Government amp; Politics, London, Macmillan Press Ltd. 2. E O Abiola (1972), West African History: A.D. 1000 TO The Present Day, Ado Ekiti, Omolayo Standard Press amp; Bookshops Co. Ltd. nbsp; 3. Adu Boahen (1965) Topics in West African History, Lagos, Longman Publishers. 4. Wikipedia Nigeriannbsp; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerianbsp;nbsp 5. Wikipedia Nigerian Youth Movement https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Youth_Movement 6. Wikipedia Nigerian Nationalism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_nationalism 7. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2019) ‘National Security Strategy’ 8. Aderonke, Majekodunmi (2015) ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Contemporary Nigeria: Understanding the Emerging Trends in Journal of Policy and Development Studies Vol. 9 No. 4, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science University of Lagos, Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria www.arabianjbmr.com/JPDS_index.php 9.Dictionary.com (https://www.dictionary.com/browse/threat 10. Collins English Dictionary (https://www.collinsdictionary.com › dictionary › 11. Debricked (https://debricked.com › Home › The Debricked Blog 12. Dhikru and Adeoye (2016), ‘Nigerian State and the Crisis of Governance: A Critical Exposition’ https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019865810 13. Teresa Nogueira (2023), ‘Why Nigeria’s Development Remains Stunted’ https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/nigeria-development/ 14 Aliyu Shehu Usman Rano and Elijah Akanni Oludele (2008) Corruption and Economic Growth in Nigeria: 1986-2007. Available online at http://www.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12504/ 15. Ogundiya, Ilufoye Sarafa, “Political Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations” (2009) 11 (4) Anthropologist 281-292 16. Patrick Oluwole Ojo el ta (2014) ‘’Governance And The Challenge Of Socio-Economic Development’’ in Journal Of Sustainable Development Law And Policy Nigeria’’) 3:1, Afe Babalola University. 17. Okwudiba Nnoli (1978) Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd. 18. Richard Sklar (1967), ‘Political Science and Political Integration’ in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.V. No 1. 19. J. S. Coleman (1958), Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, California, University of California Press. 20. Oboma Daniel Ebun (2016), ‘Leadership and Development in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis’ in International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, Volume VII, No. 7.1 Quarter I 21. Azikiwe, Nnamdi (1980), Ideology for Nigeria: Capitalism, Socialism or Welfarism? Lagos, MacMillan Publishers. 22. Prof. Dr. Christian Wickert (2022) Marxist theory of crime 23. Jacob, R. & Jacques, E. (1990), “Military Executive Leadership” in Clark, K. E. & Clark, M.B.(eds) Measures of Leadership: Orange; Leadership Library of America. 24. Jeb, Blount (2012), People Follow You: The Real Secret to What Matters Most in Leadership. New Jersey; John Wiley &Sons Incor. 25. Okechukwu Odinaka Ajaegbu (2012) ‘’Religion and National Development In Nigeria’’ in American Academic & Scholarly Research Journal Vol. 4, No. 4, July 2012 26. Patricia N, UKPE & Elvis O, Ogenyi (2013), ‘’Religious Conflicts and Economic Development In Nigeria’’ in Noun International Journal Of Peace Studies And Conflict Resolution Vol. 2, No. 1, March, 2022.
9206	dbpedia	0	44	http://kspjournals.org/index.php/JSAS/article/view/1801	en	Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences	http://kspjournals.org/public/journals/3/journalFavicon_en_US.png	http://kspjournals.org/public/journals/3/journalFavicon_en_US.png	[ "http://kspjournals.org/public/site/images/kspjournals/jsas2.png", "http://kspjournals.org/plugins/blocks/readingTools/icons/printArticle.png", "http://kspjournals.org/plugins/blocks/readingTools/icons/metadata.png", "http://kspjournals.org/plugins/blocks/readingTools/icons/citeArticle.png", "http://kspjour...	[]	[]	[ "British colonialism; British imperialism; Palestine Currency Board; East African Currency Board; West African Currency Board." ]	null	[ "Tal BOGER" ]	null	British imperialism and portfolio choice in the currency boards of Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa	en	http://kspjournals.org/public/journals/3/journalFavicon_en_US.png		null	Bank of England. (2017). A millennium of macroeconomic data for the UK. Version 3,30 April. [Retrieved from]. Berlin, H.M. (2001). The Coins and Banknotes of Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1929-1947. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company. Butlin, M., Dixon, R., & Lloyd, P. (2014). Statistical Appendix: Selected data series, 1800–2010. In S. Ville & G. Withers (Eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi. 10.1017/CHO9781107445222.033 Cain, P.J. (1996). Gentlemanly imperialism at work: The Bank of England, Canada, and the Sterling Area, 1932-1936. Economic History Review, 49(2), 336-357. doi. 10.2307/2597919 Clauson, G.L.M. (1944). The British Colonial Currency System. The Economic Journal, 54(213), 1-25. doi. 10.2307/2959827 Digital Archive on Currency Boards. Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise. [Retrieved from]. Drummond, I.M. (1974). Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. East African Currency Board. (1920/1921-1971/1972). Report of the East African Currency Board for the Period Ending the 30th June, 1921 (1920/1921); Report of the East African Currency Board for the Year Ending [the] 30th June, … (1921/1922-1960/1961); Report for the Year Ended 30th June... (1961/1962-1970/1971); The Final Report of the East African Currency Board (1971/1972). London: Waterlow and Sons (1920/1921-1958/1959; from appearances also 1959/1960-1960/1961, although no place or publisher is listed); Nairobi: Government Printer, Kenya(1959/1960-1964/1965); Printing and Packaging Corporation (1965/1966-1970/1971); East AfricanCurrency Board (1971/1972). The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Hopkins, A.G. (1973). An Economic History of West Africa. New York: Columbia University Press. Hopkins, A.G. (1970). The creation of a colonial monetary system: The origins of the West African currency board. African Historical Studies, 3(1), 101-132. doi. 10.2307/216483 Katz, S.I. (1956). Development and stability in Central and West Africa: A study in colonial monetary institutions. Social and Economic Studies, 5(3), 281-294. Kratz, J.W. (1966). The East African currency board. Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 13(2), 229-255. doi. 10.2307/3866425 Krozewski, G. (1993). Sterling, the 'Minor' territories, and the end of formal empire, 1939-1958. Economic History Review, 46(2), 239-265. doi. 10.2307/2598016 Krus, N., & Kurt S. (2014). Currency board financial statements. Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, Studies in Applied Economics No.22. [Retrieved from]. McPhee, A. (1970). The Economic Revolution in British West Africa. New York: Negro Universities Press. Mwangi, W. (2001). Of coins and conquest: The East African currency board, the rupee crisis, and the problem of colonialism in the East African protectorate. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), 763-787. Narsey, W. (2016). British Imperialism and the Making of Colonial Currency Systems. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Nathan, R.R., (1946). Palestine: Problem & Promise. New York: PublicAffairs Press. Newlyn, W.T. (1966). Separate currencies in East Africa. Transition, 24, 23-25. doi. 10.2307/2934506 Ofonagoro, W.I. (1979). From traditional to British currency in Southern Nigeria: Analysis of a currency revolution, 1880-1948. Journal of Economic History, 39(3), 623-654. doi. 10.1017/S0022050700092949 Ottensooser, R.D. (1955). The Palestine Pound and the Israeli Pound. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz. Palestine Currency Board. (1928-1952). Report of the PalestineCurrency Board for the Period Ended 31st March, London: Waterlow and Sons. The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Reuveny, J. (1991). The financial liquidation of the Palestine mandate. Middle Eastern Studies, 27(1), 112-130. Rowan, D.C. (1954). The origins of the West African currency board. South African Journal of Economics, 22(4), 421-438. doi. 10.1111/j.1813-6982.1954.tb01661.x Schuler, K. (1996). Should Developing Countries Have Central Banks? London: Institute of Economic Affairs. West African Currency Board. (1913/1914-1972/1973). Report of the West African Currency Board for the Period Ended 30th June 1914(1913/1914); Report of the West African Currency Board for the Year Ended 30th June ... (1914/1915-1971/1972); Final Report of the West African Currency Board for the Period 1st July, 1972 to 31stOctober, 1973 (1972/1973). London: Darling and Sons for His Majesty’s Stationery Office (1913/1914-1917/1918); His Majesty’s Stationery Office (1918/1919-1919/1920); Waterlow andSons (1920/1921-1972/1973); from 1965 onward, no publisher is listed, but the typography remainsthe same until 1970, suggesting that the publisher was also the same at least until then). The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Wolf, H.C., Atish R., Helge, B., & Gulde, A.M. (2008). Currency Boards in Retrospect and Prospect. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
9206	dbpedia	0	13	https://aeh.uwpress.org/content/51/1/24	en	Rethinking West African Monetary History	https://aeh.uwpress.org/…cover-source.jpg	https://aeh.uwpress.org/…cover-source.jpg	[ "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/wpaeh_mobile_b.png", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/wpaeh_logo_final.png", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/all/modules/contrib/panels_ajax_tab/images/loading.gif", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/public/highwire/wpaeh/51/1.co...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Marisa Candotti" ]	2023-05-01T00:00:00	This article provides a new answer to one of the central questions in precolonial West African histories: the interaction of credit with the expansion of production for the market. According to Hopkins, during the nineteenth century long-distance commercial capital had a limited effect on West African local production. In contrast, this article argues that surplus trading profits played a crucial role in the growth of manufacturing. However, to fully appreciate the interaction of trading profits and local manufacturing, it is necessary to reconsider the approach to West African monetary history. Recently, world economic historians have devoted renewed attention to African monetary history, suggesting a new theoretical approach that enables a reconsideration of how multiple monetary transactions worked in practice. This approach is based on the “complementary” relationship among monies circulating side by side. This article argues that a complementary relationship between multiple markets and monies makes possible the articulation of a different perspective on the place of money within the process of economic growth in precolonial savanna economies.	en	https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/images/favicon.ico	African Economic History	https://aeh.uwpress.org/content/51/1/24	Abstract This article provides a new answer to one of the central questions in precolonial West African histories: the interaction of credit with the expansion of production for the market. According to Hopkins, during the nineteenth century long-distance commercial capital had a limited effect on West African local production. In contrast, this article argues that surplus trading profits played a crucial role in the growth of manufacturing. However, to fully appreciate the interaction of trading profits and local manufacturing, it is necessary to reconsider the approach to West African monetary history. Recently, world economic historians have devoted renewed attention to African monetary history, suggesting a new theoretical approach that enables a reconsideration of how multiple monetary transactions worked in practice. This approach is based on the “complementary” relationship among monies circulating side by side. This article argues that a complementary relationship between multiple markets and monies makes possible the articulation of a different perspective on the place of money within the process of economic growth in precolonial savanna economies.
9206	dbpedia	3	46	https://m.facebook.com/Wisdomblogg/videos/video-history-who-are-the-biafra-and-how-britain-change-niger-company-interest-i/912180833171747/	en	VIDEO: HISTORY: Who are the Biafra? And how Britain change Niger company interest in west Africa to Nigeria? Do Biafra people have legit reason to...	https://scontent.xx.fbcd…500g&oe=66C9C830	https://scontent.xx.fbcd…500g&oe=66C9C830	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	VIDEO: HISTORY: Who are the Biafra? And how Britain change Niger company interest in west Africa to Nigeria? Do Biafra people have legit reason to...	de	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yT/r/aGT3gskzWBf.ico		https://www.facebook.com/Wisdomblogg/videos/video-history-who-are-the-biafra-and-how-britain-change-niger-company-interest-i/912180833171747/
9206	dbpedia	3	31	https://journals.flvc.org/ysr/article/view/132808/136744	en	View of Sole Native Authority (SNA) and the People at War: A Historical Review of the 1948 Erunkoja tax Riot in Ile-Ife	https://journals.flvc.or…avicon_en_US.png	https://journals.flvc.or…avicon_en_US.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://journals.flvc.or…avicon_en_US.png		null
9206	dbpedia	1	69	https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78	en	African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies	https://www.openedition.…poldev160x75.png	https://www.openedition.…poldev160x75.png	[ "https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/custom/sitename.png", "https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/docannexe/image/2435/logo_simple_GenevaGraduateInstitute_2022_RGB-small120.png", "https://static.openedition.org/images/cc/cc-by-nc.png", "https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/images/social-icons/twitter...	[]	[]	[ "democracy", "political economy", "history", "independence", "colonial \| colonisation", "economic \| development history", "Africa Sub-Saharan" ]	null	[]	2010-03-01T00:00:00+01:00	This article reviews how colonial rule and African actions during the colonial period affected the resources and institutional settings for subsequent economic development south of the Sahara. The issue is seen from the perspective of the dynamics of development in what was in 1900 an overwhelmingly land-abundant region characterised by shortages of labour and capital, by perhaps surprisingly extensive indigenous market activities and by varying but often low levels of political centralisation. The differential impact of French and British rule is explored, but it is argued that a bigger determinant of the differential evolution of poverty, welfare and structural change was the contrast between “settler” and “peasant” economies.	en	https://static.openediti…ages/favicon.png		http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/78	1. Introduction 2The causal significance of legacies varies, in that they affect subsequent freedom of manoeuvre to different extents and in different directions. At its strongest, legacy takes the form of “path determination”, implying that colonial choices determined post-colonial ones, or at least conditioned them, such that departure from the colonial pattern was, and perhaps remains, difficult and costly. Besides asking about the strength of the influence of the past on the future, we need to consider the nature of that influence. Did colonial rule put African countries on a higher or lower path of economic change? It will be argued here that the “path(s)” on which African economies were (to a greater or lesser extent) set by the time of independence are most usefully seen not as necessarily initiated in the colonial period, but often rather as continuations and adjustments from paths of change established before the European partition of the continent. 3The following discussion has three preliminary sections. Thus, chapter 2 first attempts a summary of the economic record since independence in order to define the pattern for which colonial legacies may have been partly responsible. Chapter 3 outlines contending views of those legacies. Chapter 4 tries to define the economic and political structures and trends within Africa on the eve of the European partition of the continent. It identifies an emerging African comparative advantage in land-extensive forms of production, which West Africans in particular were already exploiting and, by their investments and initiatives, deepening. 4In this framework, chapter 5 then introduces the colonial regimes, highlighting their fiscal constraints and comparing different national styles of colonial rule, focusing on the largest empires, those of Britain and France. It is a theme of this essay, however, that another kind of variation between colonies was more important, i.e. that defined by the extent and form of European appropriation and use of land: “settler”, “plantation” and “peasant” colonies. Chapter 6 considers how far colonial rule (and the actions of European companies that it facilitated) reinforced the emergence of a comparative advantage in land-extensive primary exports and looks at the consequences of this for the welfare of the population. Chapter 7 explores colonial contributions, and their limits, for the very long-term shift of African factor endowments from labour scarcity towards labour abundance and a relatively high level of human capital formation, such as helped Tokugawa Japan, and more recently other parts of Asia, to achieve “labour-intensive industrialisation” (Sugihara 2007). Chapter 8 assesses the impact of different kinds of European regime on African entrepreneurship and on institutions facilitating, hindering or channelling African participation in markets. Chapter 9 completes the substantive discussion by commenting on the long-term effects of the colonial intrusion on the capacity of the State in Africa for facilitating and promoting economic development. 2. Post-colonial change and variation 5Notoriously, output per head in Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest of any major world region and has, on average, expanded slowly and haltingly since 1960. But there have been important changes, and variations over space, in policy and performance. In policy, structural adjustment in the 1980s marked a watershed: a fundamental shift from administrative to market means of resource allocation. The change, however, was less dramatic in most of the former French colonies, where (except in Guinea) the maintenance of a convertible currency had enabled governments to avoid some of the supplementary price and quantity controls which had increasingly been imposed in the mostly former British colonies outside the franc zone. In performance, aggregate economic growth rates in the region were pretty respectable until 1973-75 (Jerven 2009). Ironically, in the decade or so following the adoption of structural adjustment they were stagnant or negative, before the Chinese-led boom in world commodity prices eased the region into 12 years of gross domestic product (GDP) growth at an average of 5% a year before the crises of 2007 (rising fuel and food prices, then the beginning of the international financial crisis) and 2008 brought about a “great recession” in 2009 (IMF 2009). 3. Contrasting perspectives on the colonial legacy 8Colonial extraction in Africa could be seen most decisively in the appropriation of land for European settlers or plantations, a strategy used not only to provide European investors and settlers with cheap and secure control of land, but also to oblige Africans to sell their labour to European farmers, planters or mine-owners (Palmer and Parsons 1977). Even in the “peasant” colonies, i.e. where the land remained overwhelmingly in African ownership, we will see that major parts of the services sector were effectively monopolised by Europeans. Then there was coercive recruitment of labour by colonial administrations, whether to work for the State or for European private enterprise (Fall 1993; Northrup 1988). Of potentially great long-term importance was the unwillingness of colonial governments to accept, still less promote, the emergence of markets in land rights on land occupied by Africans, whether in “settler” or “peasant” colonies (Phillips 1989). From the perspectives of both dependency theory and “rational choice” institutionalism, the original sin of colonialism in Africa was that it did not introduce a full-blooded capitalist system, based upon private property and thereby generating the pressures towards competition and accumulation necessary to drive self-sustained economic growth. 9A narrower but important argument was made by the then small group of liberal development economists between the 1950s and 1970s. At a time when development economists (especially but not exclusively those writing in French) tended to favour a leading role for the State in the search for development in mixed economies (Hugon 1993; Killick 1978) P. T. Bauer (1953; 1972) attacked the late colonial State for introducing statutory marketing boards and thereby laying the foundation of what he considered to be deadening State interventionism. 10Explicitly positive overviews of colonial rule in Africa are rare (but see Duignan and Gann 1975). Many studies, though, mention the suppression of intra-African warfare, the abolition of internal slave trading and slavery, the introduction of mechanised transport and investment in infrastructure, and the development of modern manufacturing in the “settler” economies and in the Belgian Congo. Excited by the late 20th century wave of economic “globalisation”, some economic liberals have argued that the British empire pioneered the process through its general opposition to tariff protection (1846-1931) and by other pro-market measures (Ferguson 2003; Lal 2004). With respect to tariffs, this case would apply less strongly to French colonies because of the protectionism of the French empire. It is also much less true of the final 30 years of British rule in Africa, which saw not only tariffs but also the creation of marketing boards. From the perspective of institutional change, a fundamental observation applicable to the region generally was highlighted by John Sender and Sheila Smith (1986). Writing in the “tragic optimist” tradition of Marx’s writings on British rule in India, they emphasised that wage labour was rare at the beginning of colonial rule and increasingly common by the end of it. For them, as for Bill Warren (1980), imperialism was the “pioneer of capitalism”. 11Besides optimism and pessimism, a third view of colonial rule, and by implication of its legacy, is that its importance has been over-rated. There are different routes to this conclusion. Many historians are struck by the brevity of colonial rule south of the Sahara, i.e. about 60 years in most of tropical Africa (Ajayi 1969), and by the weakness of the colonial State (Herbst 2000). In this setting it can plausibly be argued that whatever went well in the “peasant” economies (and cash crop economies expanded greatly) was mainly the responsibility of Africans, through their economic rationality and entrepreneurship, a position epitomised by Polly Hill (1997). More ambivalent are the arguments of Jean-François Bayart (1989; 2000). Building on the familiar observation that rulers in Africa have usually found it hard to raise large revenues from domestic sources, Bayart argues that, during colonial rule and since, African elites became clients of colonial or overseas States. Thereby they forged relations which, though unequal, benefited themselves as well as the foreigners. Whereas dependency theory emphasised the primacy of foreign agency in determining historical outcomes, Bayart insists that African elites played a calculating and key role in establishing the “extraverted” pattern of African political economy. 4. A pre-colonial perspective on colonial legacies 12To evaluate the colonial legacy, we need to distinguish it from the situation and trends at the beginning of colonial rule, which in most of Sub-Saharan Africa occurred during the European “Scramble”, from 1879 to circa 1905. At that time the region was, as before, characterised generally (not everywhere all the time) by an abundance of cultivable land in relation to the labour available to till it (Hopkins 1973; Austin 2008a). This did not mean “resource abundance” as much of Africa’s mineral endowment was either unknown or inaccessible with pre-industrial technology or was not yet valuable even overseas. For example, many of the major discoveries (notably of oil in Nigeria and diamonds in Botswana) were to occur only during the period of decolonisation. Moreover, the fertility of much of the land was relatively low or at least fragile, making it costly or difficult to pursue intensive cultivation, especially in the absence of animal manure. Sleeping sickness prevented the use of large animals, whether for ploughing or transport, in the forest zones and much of the savannas. The extreme seasonality of the annual distribution of rainfall rendered much of the dry season effectively unavailable for farm work. The consequent low opportunity cost of dry-season labour reduced the incentive to raise labour productivity in craft production. Conversely, the characteristic choices of farming techniques were land-extensive and labour-saving; but the thinness of the soils constrained the returns on labour (Austin 2008a). All this helps to explain why the productivity of African labour was apparently higher outside Africa over several centuries, cf. the underlying economic logic of the external slave trades which in turn, ironically, aggravated the scarcity of labour within Africa itself (Austin 2008b; Manning 1990). 13Within Africa, the structure of incentives encouraged a high degree of self-sufficiency, and by the middle of the 20th century it was widely assumed that pre-colonial economies had necessarily been overwhelmingly subsistence-oriented. The last half-century of research has progressively changed this assessment, especially for West Africa where a strong tendency towards extra-subsistence production was evident in the 16th and 17th centuries. While damaged by the aggravated “Dutch disease” effects of the Atlantic slave trade (Inikori 2007; Austin, forthcoming), this tendency was strongly resumed from the first decade of the 19th century when that trade began to be abolished, with West Africans producing on a wider and larger scale for internal as well as overseas markets. Given the relative scarcity of labour, and in the absence (generally) of significant economies of scale in production, it was rare for the reservation wage (the minimum wage rate sufficient to persuade people to sell their labour rather than work for themselves) to be low enough for a would-be employer to afford to pay it. Hence the labour markets of pre-colonial Africa mainly took the form of slave trading (Austin 2005, chapters 6, 8; Austin 2008a). 14The same abundance of land made political centralisation difficult to achieve and sustain (Herbst 2000). Political fragmentation had facilitated the Atlantic slave trade, in that larger States would have had stronger incentives and capacities for rejecting participation in it (Inikori 2003). This fragmentation later facilitated the European conquest. Ethiopia was the exception that proved the rule, with its fertile central provinces and large agricultural surplus supporting a long-established and modernising State that, alone in Africa, had the economic base to resist the “Scramble” successfully. 5. Colonial regimes: similarities and variations 16Colonial rule in Africa was intended to be cheap, viz. for taxpayers in Europe. The British doctrine was that each colony should be fiscally self-supporting. Thus, any growth in government expenditure was supposed to be financed from higher revenues, as it was in Ghana in the 1920s when Governor Guggisberg was able to fund the creation of what became the country’s best-known hospital and school, as well as a new harbour and more railways and roads, from customs proceeds that had been fuelled by the colony’s increasing exports of cocoa beans. In practice the French were equally committed to covering costs. In French West Africa too there was a major programme of public works in the 1920s, although, as also in Ghana, within a few years expenditure had to be curtailed when export prices fell and the growth of revenue ended (Hopkins 1973, 190). 17After retrenchment during the 1930s Depression, and especially during the Second World War, colonial administrations found themselves (for a variety of reasons) entering the post-war era with a new public commitment to be seen to promote actively the development of the economies over which they presided. “Developmental” language was partly redeemed by greater spending. In principle this came partly from the metropolitan taxpayer. However, in the French case Patrick Manning (1998, 123-5) has calculated that the government continued to receive more in tax from Africa than it spent in Africa. In British West Africa the new statutory export marketing boards accrued substantial surpluses by keeping a large margin between the price paid to producers and the price that the boards received for the crop on the world market. The surpluses were kept in London, in British government bonds, as forced savings from African farmers (Rimmer 1992, 41-2), which assisted the British metropolitan economy to recover from the post-war dollar shortage. 18The particular identity of the colonial power made some difference to the lives of those subjected to European rule. Contrasts between the two largest empires in Africa are traditionally made with reference to greater British reliance on African chiefs as intermediaries (“indirect rule”) and the French doctrine of assimilating a small minority of Africans into French culture and citizenship. On the whole it is arguable that, in economic terms, the similarities were much greater than the differences, except when the latter arose from the composition of their respective African empires. French rule, like British, relied on African intermediaries, including chiefs, even though France was much more insistent on abolishing African monarchies (as in Dahomey, in contrast to the British treatment of the structures and dynasties of the States of Buganda, Botswana, Lesotho and, after an abortive attempt at abolition, Ashanti). In West Africa the French made much greater use of forced labour, but that was primarily because the French territories were, from the start, relatively lacking in cash-earning and therefore wage-paying potential. That specific policy, Corvée and its use to benefit white planters rather than African farmers, made a difference to the colonial legacy in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. It meant that African cocoa farming took off much more quickly and dramatically in the former, so that Ghana was much wealthier at independence, when Côte d’Ivoire was in the process of catching up (and overtaking) after a late start (Hopkins 1973, 218-9), which it proceeded to do by the 1980s. 6. Colonial rule and Africa’s specialisation in primary product exports 20The “extraversion” and “monoculture” of African economies is widely lamented and condemned as a victory of colonial interests over African interests. The risks entailed in extreme specialisation, however, need to be set against the long-run income gain to be expected from the exploitation of comparative advantage. But again, although the location of a colonial economy’s comparative advantage could be identified, sooner or later the task of capitalising on it raised the question of what investments might profitably deepen that advantage and, above all, of how the costs and benefits would be distributed. Conflicts of ideology, and especially the balance of power between different interest groups, worked out variously across the range of African colonies. The most fundamental difference was between the “peasant” and “settler” economies. Let us consider the contrasting cases of export agriculture in the former, notably in West Africa, and mining in the latter, most obviously in South Africa. 21We have noted that, by the eve of the European partition of the continent, Africa had already revealed an emerging comparative advantage in export agriculture. In West Africa in particular it was in the joint interests of the population, European merchants and the colonial administrations to further this. In Ghana British planters were initially allowed to enter to grow cocoa beans. But lacking the discriminatory support from the government that their counterparts enjoyed in Kenya and southern Africa, they failed in commercial competition with African producers (Austin 1996a), just as French planters were later to be eclipsed by African ones in Côte d’Ivoire following the abolition of Corvée. Colonial reliance on the efforts of African small capitalists and peasants in the growing and local marketing of export crops paid off in what became Ghana and Nigeria, with more than 20-fold increases in the real value of foreign trade between 1897 and 1960 (Austin 2008a, 612), benefiting British commercial interests as well as (via customs duties) the colonial treasury. The efforts of W. H. Lever, the soap manufacturer, to win government permission, along with the necessary coercive support, to establish huge oil palm plantations in Nigeria continued from 1906 to 1925, but they were always rebuffed in favour of continued African occupation of virtually all agricultural land. Ultimately this was because African producers literally delivered the goods (Hopkins 1973, 209-14) through land-extensive methods well adapted to the factor endowment. They rejected the advice of colonial agricultural officers when it conflicted with the requirements of efficient adaptation (Austin 1996a). The positive contribution of the administrations was to reinforce and permit the exploitation of these economies’ comparative advantage in export agriculture. They did this partly by investment in transport infrastructure, investment to which African entrepreneurs also contributed (Austin 2007). Equally important, although the colonial administration never really established a system of land titling, in Ghana (for example) it upheld the indigenous customary right of farmers to ownership of trees they had planted, irrespective of the outcome of any later litigation about the ownership of the land the trees stood upon. Thus, African producers enjoyed sufficient security of tenure to feel safe in investing in tree crops on a scale sufficient to create, in the case of Ghana, what became for nearly 70 years the world’s largest cocoa economy (Austin 2005, chapters 14, 17). 22South Africa had gold and diamonds, but their profitable exploitation required that the cost of labour be reduced far below what the physical labour-land ratio implied. C. H. Feinstein’s quantitative exercise indicates that without such coercive intervention in the labour market, most of South Africa’s mines would have been unprofitable until the end of the gold standard era in 1932 (Feinstein 2005, 109-12). If South Africa eventually obtained a “free market” comparative advantage in mining, it was only after several decades of using extra-market means to repress black wages, notably through land appropriation and measures to stop Africans from working on European-owned land except as labourers rather than tenants. 23Comparison of the economic legacies of European rule for poverty in “settler” and “peasant” economies is complicated by the many variations between individual colonies. However, some generalisations are possible. It is clear that the distribution of wealth and income was, and has remained, much more unequal in the “settler” economies than in the “peasant” ones. Preliminary findings by Sue Bowden, Blessing Chiripanhura and Paul Mosley (2008) support the proposition that possession of land put a floor under real wages in the “peasant” colonies, enabling labourers migrating into export-crop growing areas to share in the gains from exports that were otherwise divided between European firms, African and Asian middlemen and African farm-owners (see also Austin 2005). Bowden, Chiripanhura and Mosley find real wages beginning to rise from the 1920s and 1930s in the “peasant” colonies of Ghana and Uganda respectively and not falling back afterwards to the 1914 floor. In contrast, it was only in the 1970s that the real wages of black gold-miners in South Africa began a sustained rise above their early 20th century level (Lipton 1986, 410). In the sample taken by Bowden, Chiripanhura and Mosley it was only in the “pure settler” economies, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), not in the “peasant” colonies of Ghana or Uganda nor even in the intermediate case of Kenya, that there were declines in rural African living standards over periods of longer than 15 years within the 20th century. This pattern in real wages, together with the long-term expansion of African export agriculture which underpinned the growth of real wages in the “peasant” colonies, was reflected in the earlier onset of falling infant mortality in Ghana and Uganda compared to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. 24It should be added that many African colonies were short of both known mineral deposits and the kinds of land suitable for profitable export agriculture. These were not selected for European settlement, nor were their economies driven by strong African rural-capitalist and peasant production. They had to rely on seasonal exports of male wage labourers, and on growing the less lucrative cash crops such as cotton, the timing of whose labour requirements conflicted with those of food crops, thereby creating risks to food security (Tosh 1980). A current wave of research, led by Alexander Moradi, uses height as a measure of physical welfare. The average height of African populations rose during the colonial period in Ghana and even in the “semi-settler” economy of Kenya (Moradi 2008; 2009). When this research is extended to poorer colonies such as southern Sudan, Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) or those in the West African Sahel, it would be no surprise if welfare improvements there are found to have been smaller than in the better-endowed economies studied so far. It was particularly in (selected areas of) the less favourably-endowed economies that colonial governments sought to raise productivity through very large-scale, capital-intensive and authoritarian projects, notably the massive irrigation scheme of the Office du Niger in Mali and the mechanisation campaign of the East African Groundnut Project in Tanganyika. Both were spectacular failures in their own output and productivity terms, not least because they were inefficient in relation to the prevailing factor ratios and physical environments (Hogendorn and Scott 1981; Roberts 1996, 223-48; Van Beusekom 2002). 25Poor as was the record of “settler” colonialism for the living standards of the indigenous population, it was in colonies where Europeans appropriated land on a large scale, for settlers or for companies, that the earlier and larger beginnings were made in modern manufacturing. 7. Towards manufacturing? 26Where industrialisation has occurred in Asia, it has tended to follow a more labour-intensive route than in Europe and North America, substituting longer working hours for additional machinery where possible (Sugihara 2007) and generally having a higher proportion of labour to capital at any given level of output. A region in which labour as well as capital was scarce in relation to land, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, was not well suited to follow either route in the early 20th century. 29Given the relative scarcity of labour and the small markets, together with the comparative advantage in land-extensive primary production, it is not surprising that there was not much more manufacturing by the end of the colonial period. Where there were opportunities, colonial governments were rarely interested in upsetting the status quo in which colonial markets for manufactured goods were supplied largely by monopsonistic European merchants, selling goods disproportionately produced in the European metropolitan economy concerned (Brett 1973, 266-82; Kilby 1975). But given that, despite rising population, the factor endowments of even the larger African economies were not suited to industrialisation in 1960, the more important question is perhaps whether colonial rule, directly or indirectly, laid foundations on which Africa might later develop the conditions for a much larger growth of manufacturing. 8. Markets and African entrepreneurship 32This familiar division between “settler” and “plantation” colonies, on one hand, and “peasant” (and rural capitalist) colonies, on the other, was far from purely exogenous to African economic history. Where African producers were able to enter export markets early and on a wide scale, before European exporters really got going, their success was sufficient to tip the balance of the argument among colonial policy-makers in favour of those who thought it economically as well as politically wisest to leave agricultural production in African hands. As we saw in chapter 6, British West Africa was the major example of this. In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya African farmers responded quickly to opportunities to grow additional grain to supply internal markets. But the governments reacted by trying to drive Africans out of the produce market and into the labour market by reserving land for Europeans, while either prohibiting Africans from leasing it back or (as in inter-war Kenya) limiting the time that African “squatters” could work for themselves rather than for their European landlords (Palmer and Parsons 1977; Kanogo 1987). African production for the market proved resilient, however, and the governments eventually accepted this and shifted to imposing controls on agricultural marketing that favoured European producers rather than trying to displace African ones. In Kenya it was only in the mid-1950s, during the Mau Mau revolt, that the government lifted restrictions on African production of high-value cash crops (Mosley 1983). Thus, to the extent that African production for the market in the late 19th century was greater in what became the “peasant” agricultural-export economies than in what became the “settler” economies, that contrast was reinforced by government actions in the latter over the following decades. 33Not that the maintenance of African ownership of land necessarily entailed support for African capitalism. Admittedly, we have seen that the colonial State in Ghana protected the property of agricultural investors, in the sense of preserving the ownership of a farmer over trees or crops that he or she had planted, irrespective of the outcome of legal disputes about the ownership of the land on which they stood. But in “settler” and “peasant” colonies alike colonial governments were hesitant and usually hostile to the emergence of land markets in areas controlled by Africans. This policy eventually changed in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, with selective promotion of land registration, in response to the de facto emergence of land sales and individual proprietorship (cultivable land having become increasingly scarce in the areas left to Africans) and with African land-owners being seen as a politically conservative force in the context of Mau Mau (Mosley 1983, 27-8; Kanogo 1987). In West Africa, without the settler pressure on African access to land, and given the expansion of cash crops that occurred early in the colonial period and again in the 1950s, neither the political case nor the economic case for compulsory land titling was as yet compelling (Austin 2005). 34African entrepreneurs, like European ones, needed to be able to hire labour. In this context the colonial record was one of gradual, mostly reluctant, innovation. Sooner or (often) later, they legislated against slavery. But in West Africa, the region with evidently the largest slave population at the start of the 20th century, the replacement of the slave market by a wage labour market depended very much on the progress of African cash crop agriculture (Austin 2009). During the inter-war decades the continued use of forced labour by colonial administrations came under sustained pressure from the International Labour Office in Geneva. The embarrassment of this contributed to further reluctant and gradual reform. By the end of the Second World War, as Frederick Cooper (1996) has shown, British and French authorities had accepted that wage labour had become a regular occupation for Africans, rather than a seasonal sideline from farming. Indeed, Cooper went on to show that in London and Paris the long-run fiscal implications of having to give workers in Africa the same rights as workers in Europe contributed to the decisions to withdraw from tropical Africa. For African societies the end of slavery and the rise of wage labour was arguably a condition of continued large-scale participation in international trade. As early as 1907 the chocolate manufacturer Cadbury had moved its cocoa-buying to Ghana following bad publicity about “slave-grown” cocoa in the Portuguese colony of Sao Tome, where it had been buying before (Southall 1975, 39-49). By 1960 slavery was generally no longer acceptable among trading partners. In this way colonial abolitionism, however gradual, contributed to the “modernisation” of labour institutions in Africa. 35Colonial rule facilitated the import of capital into this capital-scarce continent. But only in mining, and to some extent in “settler” and “plantation” agriculture, did this happen on a large scale. The survey by Herbert S. Frankel (1938) of external capital investment in white-ruled Africa remains the only comprehensive study for the colonial period. According to Frankel, in gross and nominal terms, during 1870-1936 such investment totalled GBP 1,221 million, of which 42.8% was in South Africa. This meant GBP 55.8 per head in South Africa, but only GBP 3.3 in the French colonies and GBP 4.8 in British West Africa. Public investment constituted 44.7% of the grand total and almost 46% of the non-South Africa total (Frankel 1938, 158-60, 169-70). Governments, and to some extent mining and plantation companies, invested in the transport infrastructure required for the development of, mainly, the export-import trade. In Nigeria and Ghana Africans also took a leading role in building motor roads and pioneering lorry services (Heap 1990). In institutional terms the colonial period saw the eventual abolition of human pawning, with its replacement by promissory notes and, in those areas of West Africa where it was possible, by loans on the security of cocoa farms. It also saw the introduction of modern banking, but the banks were much more willing to accept Africans’ savings than to offer them loans, partly because of the colonial governments’ non-introduction of compulsory land titling (Cowen and Shenton 1991). 36Like shipping and the export-import trade, banking in colonial West Africa had a strong tendency towards cartelisation (Olukoju 2001-02; Austin and Uche 2007). The initial imposition of colonial rule and boundaries itself disrupted intra-African networks of exchange, and the increasing presence of European merchants in the interior relegated many African traders further down the chain of intermediation between shippers and farmers (Goerg 1980; Nwabughuogu 1982). Organised resistance to European cartels mostly emerged later and was largely confined to particular colonies, given the tradition of cocoa “hold-ups” with which African farmers and brokers confronted successive European merchant cartels in Ghana and the indigenous banking movement in Nigeria (Miles 1978; Hopkins 1966). Until the advent of independence it remained the case in the “peasant” colonies that the markets dominated by Europeans were cartelistic, whereas the markets populated by Africans were characterised by extreme competition (Hopkins 1978, 95). At least, much more than in the “settler” colonies, African entrepreneurs were able to operate in the export-import as well as in the domestic exchange sectors. Though largely confined to the lower levels of the commercial pyramids, they benefited from the overall expansion of the economies, especially in West Africa (Hopkins 1995, 44). The monopolistic arrangements were shaken a bit by decolonisation (Austin and Uche 2007), but the old African sector became the “informal” sector, the old European sector the “formal” one (Austin 1993). At independence, new governments were faced with the familiar problems of this financial dualism, notably lack of cheap credit from the formal sector for informal enterprises. 37Despite asymmetric competition, the more economically successful “peasant” colonies saw the continuation of a tradition of entrepreneurship and mostly (but not always) small-scale accumulation in agriculture, crafts and trade. The result, as John Iliffe (1983, 67) noted, was “a strong contrast between West Africa, with its long-established capitalistic sector and its entrepreneurs from artisanship and trade, and eastern and southern Africa, where entrepreneurs had emerged chiefly through (…) Western education and modern sector employment”. Early post-colonial policy did not always build on this, for example in the case of Ghana, with high taxation of export agriculture and the creation of State monopolies in certain sectors (Austin 1996b). 9. State capacity 38It is widely accepted that States have a critical role in economic development, at least in enforcing the rules of economic activity and providing physical public goods. Therefore, we should ask how colonial rule affected the historic constraint on political centralisation in Africa, namely the difficulty of raising revenue. Beyond this we need to consider the size of the State and the nature of authority and legitimacy, i.e. whether colonisation was responsible for fragmenting Africa, as is often said, or whether, as the colonial rulers themselves claimed, they were a modernising force, bringing the State to the “Stateless” and replacing patrimonial authority by bureaucratic authority. 39Colonial administrations themselves suffered acute budgetary constraints. Although European empires introduced to Africa the possibility of raising loan finance (at least in an impersonal, law-governed though undemocratic way), the colonial administrations were restricted in their resort to money markets by the metropolitan insistence that each colony be fiscally self-sufficient and balance its budget. The introduction in each colony of a single currency as legal tender probably reduced net transaction costs (although in some cases the demonetisation of existing currencies hurt Africans holding them). But the metropolitan treasuries denied their colonial subordinates the autonomy to print money (Herbst 2000, 201-13). The French colonies used the French franc. In British West Africa a colonial pound was issued, but the rules ensured that it was always convertible at par with the metropolitan pound. It was only at independence that the new African governments had the option of creating national currencies, an option the former French colonies mostly declined while the former British colonies soon accepted. 40Given that they faced much the same practical constraints as the African States that had preceded them, colonial governments generally continued the reliance of pre-colonial kingdoms upon taxes on trade and people, rather than on land or agriculture. It was the above-mentioned discovery, during the Second World War, that the export marketing board could be a major revenue-raiser, which was the major fiscal innovation of colonial rule. As independence approached, this unintended consequence of a wartime expedient offered African politicians unprecedented opportunities to, for example, transform educational opportunities for their populations. The marketing board as a fiscal instrument was an important colonial legacy, and its possibilities and implications were only beginning to be understood. By the 1980s the limits of the device had become clear, as ordinary traders and producers could evade it by trading on parallel markets (Azarya and Chazan 1987). 41Smuggling brings us to one of the more notorious legacies of the colonial partition of Africa: the imposition of boundaries dividing people of shared culture, the delineation of some States so small as to be of questionable economic viability and the creation of some States so large as to be potentially ungovernable. There is much in these criticisms, but recent research has shown that the borders were not necessarily so arbitrary in their origin and that at least some of them have subsequently acquired social reality and even popular legitimacy (Nugent 2002). Again, while the colonial legacy includes several very small States, most colonies (even the small ones) were larger than the pre-colonial polities on which or in place of which they were imposed; and some of them formed parts of larger regional units (notably French West Africa). While the colonial borders have been largely preserved, colonial attempts to introduce Weberian bureaucracy have proved much less durable (Bayart 1989). One reason for, or manifestation of, this is the salience of ethnicity in most African countries for political competition over resources. 42From the late 1970s onwards a generation of historians and anthropologists tended to argue that ethnicity in Africa, far from being “primordial”, was created, or at least greatly entrenched, by colonial strategies of “divide and rule” (seminal contributions included Iliffe 1979, 318-41, and Ranger 1983, although the thesis was pursued beyond those cautious initial statements). Recent historiography has shown that the emphasis on the capacity of colonial States to invent and manipulate traditions, including those relating to ethnicity and chieftaincy, was partly justified, but it underestimated the capacity of African elites and peoples to influence the outcomes themselves (Spear 2003). By no means all ethnic divisions originated in the colonial period (Vansina 2001), although they were usually deepened and reified by the interaction of colonial and African elites (Prunier 1995). Whatever the precise division of responsibility in this interaction, there is general agreement among scholars that ethnicity has been a more important organising principle of political association and conflict since colonial rule than before it. This matters for economic development because ethnic divisions are often seen, by public opinion and by some economists (notably Easterly and Levine 1997), as primarily responsible for rent-seeking rather than growth-promoting policies in post-colonial Africa. However, that approach has been criticised on various grounds (notably by Arcand, Guillaumont and Jeanneney 2000), and it is arguable that the salience of ethnicity in African political and economic life is as much a response to as a cause of the difficulties of enlarging the economic cake in African conditions and of the continued weakness of State capacity. 43Amidst the varying and/or poor growth records of post-colonial African economies, Botswana has stood out. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2002a) argue that it is an exception that proves the rule, i.e. that while Botswana did not have the beneficial institutional legacy characteristic of the “full settler” colonies like Australia, it was exceptionally lightly ruled by Britain and as a result escaped the worst of the extractive propensities that they see as generally characteristic of non-“settler” colonialism. In my view two considerations point to a different conclusion. First, without the discovery of diamonds, it is hard to see how post-colonial Botswana could have grown dramatically faster than colonial Bechuanaland. Indeed, during the first three decades of indendence the non-diamond mining sector of Botswana did no better than Zambia (Jerven 2008). Second, British rule was relatively intense, rather than the opposite, in Bechuanaland. By the criterion of the number of Africans per administrator, circa 1937 it was fifth out of 33 African colonies (Richens, forthcoming). 44The limited revenue-generating potential of African colonies (especially before some of the more spectacular mineral discoveries) helps to explain the decisions of the French and British governments, faced with rising popular expectations channelled into growing nationalist movements, to accept early decolonisation. Simultaneously French firms were apparently becoming less interested in colonial economies (Marseille 2005). If so, it is ironic that the French government remained closely involved with its former colonies after their independence, not least through the franc zone. Again, in the 1950s British firms on the spot expressed concern about their future under independent African governments, but they failed to attract much notice from the decolonising authorities (Tignor 1998; Stockwell 2000). The irony of the latter case is that a few years later the British government’s attitude to the Biafran secession was influenced by the interests of British oil companies (Uche 2008). 10. Conclusion 45This article has considered the issue of colonial legacies in relation to the longer-term dynamics of economic development in what was in 1900 an overwhelmingly land-abundant region, characterised by simultaneous shortages of labour and capital, by perhaps surprisingly extensive indigenous market exchanges, especially in West Africa, and by varying but often low levels of political centralisation. Colonial governments and European firms invested in both infrastructure and (especially in southern Africa) in institutions designed to develop African economies as primary-product exporters. In both cases the old economic logic for coercing labour continued to operate, i.e. the continued existence of slavery in early colonial tropical Africa and the use of large-scale land grabs to promote migrant labour flows in “settler” economies. But there were changes and variations. While we have noted differences between French and British policy, for example in West Africa, the bigger contrasts were between “peasant” and “settler” colonies. 46In British West Africa in particular there was a genuine coincidence of interest between African farmers, European merchants and colonial governments in enlarging and exploiting West Africa’s comparative advantage in land-extensive agriculture. The resultant income at least enabled many of the slave-owners to become employers instead. In these cases the British government (and the French in Côte d’Ivoire after 1945) correctly recognised where their own self-interest lay when they supported African investment in export agriculture. It was in those “peasant” colonies that were best endowed with lands suitable for producing the more lucrative crops that African populations experienced significant improvements in purchasing power and had the most improvement in physical welfare. In the same countries, however, colonial rulers, partly because of fiscal constraints as well as a probably realistic assessment of the short-term economic prospects, did little directly to prepare the economies to move “up the value chain”. Thus, the first generation of post-colonial rulers presided over economies which were as yet too short of educated (and cheap) labour and sufficient (and sufficiently cheap) electricity to embark successfully on industrialisation. It has taken post-colonial investment in education and other public goods to move West African economies, and tropical Africa generally, closer to the prospect of a substantial growth of labour-intensive manufacturing, if international competition permits it. 47 “Settler” colonies had a worse record for poverty reduction, especially considering the mineral resources of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, but they had a better one for structural change. The large-scale use of coercion was the basis for the construction of white-ruled economies that, especially in South Africa, eventually became profitable enough for a partly politically-impelled policy of import-substituting industrialisation to achieve some success. Thus, the rents extracted from African labourers were channelled into structural change, although the process became self-defeating as it progressed, contributing to the fall of apartheid. 48As promoters of market institutions, the colonial regimes had a very mixed record; but probably in all Sub-Saharan countries there was far more wage labour, and a lot more land sales, and a lot more people more deeply dependent on markets, by 1960 than there had been in 1890 or 1900. A final legacy of the colonial period has a rather unclear relationship to colonial policy, i.e. the sustained growth of (total) population since 1918 has progressively transformed the factor ratios and, on the whole, increased the long-term economic potential of the continent.
9206	dbpedia	0	25	https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria.htm	en	Nigeria			[ "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-col.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-col2.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng_rnc.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nig_cia1.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng_rnc.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Ben Cahoon" ]	null					null	Niger Territories 2 Jun 1887 - 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Co. Flag 1 Feb 1888 - 31 Dec 1899 R.N.C. Ensign Map of Niger Territories Headquarters: Asaba Population: N/A Jul 1879 United African Company Limited (U.A.C.), formed by the merger of four trading firms in Niger River Delta area - Alexander Miller Brother & Co., the Central African Trading Co. Ltd., the West African Co. Ltd., and James Pinnock, to exploit resources in the Niger River basin.6 Jun 1882 Renamed The National African Company Limited (N.A.C.) formed to take over the assets of the U.A.C.5 Jun 1885 British protectorate over Niger Districts. 10 Jul 1886 Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited (R.N.C.), granted a royal charter to replace the N.A.C. 10 Jul 1887 British protectorate, R.N.C. formally given right to administer the region by the U.K. (Niger Territories). 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Company surrenders its charter to U.K. government (effective 1 Jan 1900); R.N.C. is renamed The Niger Company Ltd. and in 1929 it is merged into a new United Africa Company.1 Jan 1900 Company transfers its territories to U.K., which are divided between NorthernNigeria Protectorate and Southern Nigeria Protectorate. President of the United African Company 1879 - 1882 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (b. 1815 - d. 1895) Chairman of The National African Company Limited 1882 - 10 Jul 1886 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (s.a.) Presidents of the Royal Niger Company 10 Jul 1886 - 25 Feb 1895 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (s.a.) Mar 1895 - 1 Jan 1900 Sir George Taubman Goldie (b. 1846 - d. 1925) Agent Generals of United African Company; 1882-1886 National African Company; from 10 Jul 1886, Royal Niger Company Jul 1879 - 1888 David MacIntosh (McIntosh) (b. 1844 - d. 1888) (and from Jul 1884, British vice-consul on the Niger) 15 Nov 1888 - 1 Jan 1900 Joseph Flint (b. 1851 - d. 1925) Northern Nigeria 2 Jun 1887 - 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Company 1 Jan 1900 - 1 Jan 1914 Map of Northern Nigeria Capital: Lokoja Population: 9,269,000 (1911) 5 Jun 1885 Niger Districts Protectorate (under United African Company). 10 Jul 1886 Niger River Delta Protectorate (under Royal Niger Company). 1 Jan 1900 Protectorate of Northern Nigeria formed from part of Niger Territories. 1 Jan 1914 Part of British Nigeria Colony and Protectorate as northern province. Director 5 Jun 1885 - 10 Jul 1886 Sir George Taubman Goldie (b. 1846 - d. 1925) Governors10 Jul 1886 - 1 Jan 1900 thePresidents of Royal Niger CompanyHigh Commissionersof the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 1 Jan 1900 - Jun 1906 Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (b. 1858 - d. 1945) (from 1 Jan 1901, Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard) 1901 William Wallace (acting for Lugard)(b. 1856 - d. 1916) 1902 Thomas Lethbridge Napier Morland (b. 1856 - d. 1925) (acting for Lugard) 1903 William Wallace (acting for Lugard)(s.a.) 1906 Arthur Willoughby George Lowry Cole(b. 1860 - d. 1915) (acting for Lugard) Jul 1906 - Apr 1907 Sir William Wallace (acting) (s.a.) Apr 1907 - 7 May 1908 Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard (b. 1867 - d. 1932) Governorsof the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 7 May 1908 - 28 Sep 1909 Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard (s.a.) 1908 Sir William Wallace (s.a.) (acting for Girouard) 28 Sep 1909 - 1912 Sir Henry Hesketh Bell (b. 1864 - d. 1952) 1911 Charles Lindsay Temple (b. 1871 - d. 1929) (acting for Bell) 1912 Herbert Symonds Goldsmith (b. 1873 - d. 1945) (acting for Bell) 1912 Charles Lindsay Temple (s.a.) (acting for Bell) Oct 1912 - 31 Dec 1913 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Southern Nigeria 1885 - 1893 1893 - 1 Jan 1900 1 Jan 1900 - 16 Feb 1906 16 Feb 1906 - 1 Jan 1914 Map of Southern Nigeria Capital: Lagos (Calabar 1904-1914; Old Calabar 1885-1904; [Bight of Biafra- Bonny 1849-1885; Bight of Benin- Lagos 1852-1867]) Population: 7,855,749 (1911) 30 Jun 1849 Bight of Biafra (also called Bight of Bonny)(south-eastern Nigeria) declared a British protectorate. 1 Feb 1852 Bight of Benin (south-western Nigeria) declared a British protectorate. 16 Jul 1884 British protectorate over Brass, Bonny, Opobo, Aobh, and Old Calabar (excluding Lagos). 29 Jan 1885 - 24 Oct 1885 German protectorate declared over over fifty miles of coastal land to the east of Lagos, called Mahinland (Mahin-Gebiet), by Heinrich Bey agent of G.L. Gaiser. 5 Jul 1885 Bights of Biafra and Benin united as Oil Rivers Protectorate. 1 Aug 1891 Effective British consular administration established. 13 May 1893 Protectorate extended and renamed Niger Coast Protectorate. 1 Jan 1900 United with parts of the Niger Territories to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.1 May 1906 Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (incorporating Lagos) (by Order in council of 16 Feb 1906). 1 Jan 1914 Part of British Nigeria Colony and Protectorate as Southern provinces. British Consuls of the Bight of Benin(at Lagos) May 1852 - 21 Jul 1853 Louis Frazer (vice consul) (b. 1819 - d. 1883) 21 Jul 1853 - 17 Apr 1859 Benjamin Campbell (b. 1802? - d. 1859) 18 Apr 1859 - 25 Nov 1859 Edward Francis Lodder (acting) (b. 1836 - d. 1894) 25 Nov 1859 - 16 Jun 1860 George Brand (b. 1816 - d. 1860)16 Jun 1860 - 13 Dec 1860 Henry Hand (acting) (d. 1861?) 21 Dec 1860 - 17 May 1861 Henry Grant Foote (b. 1821? - d. 1861) 17 May 1861 - 29 Jan 1862 William McCoskry (acting) 29 Jan 1862 - 1867 the administrators of Lagos 1867 - 5 Jul 1885 the consuls for the Bight of Biafra British Consuls of the Bight of Biafra (Bonny)(from 1867, and Bight of Benin)(at Fernando Poo) (also British Superintendents of Port Clarence [Fernando Póo] to 1855) 30 Jun 1849 - 10 Jun 1854 John Beecroft (b. 1790 - d. 1854) 10 Jun 1854 - 22 Sep 1855 James William Bishop Lynslager (acting)(b. 1810 - d. 1864) 22 Nov 1855 - 6 Jun 1861 Thomas Joseph Hutchinson (b. 1820 - d. 1885) Sep 1861 - Sep 1864 Sir Richard Francis Burton (b. 1821 - d. 1890) 17 Oct 1864 - 1873 Charles Livingstone (b. 1821 - d. 1873) (acting to 3 Dec 1864) 3 Dec 1870 - 31 Mar 1872 David Hopkins (acting for Livingstone) (b. 1838 - d. 1879) 18 Aug 1873 - 1877 George Hartley 11 Jul 1877 - 1878 Henry Chaster Tait (acting) (b. 1844 - d. 1928) Jan 1878 - 13 Sep 1879 David Hopkins (s.a.) 13 Sep 1879 - 5 Jun 1885 Edward Hyde Hewett (b. 1830 - d. 1891) Consuls-general of the Oil Rivers Protectorate 5 Jun 1885 - 1 Jan 1891 Edward Hyde Hewett (s.a.) 1887 - 1888 Henry "Harry" Hamilton Johnston (b. 1858 - d. 1927) (acting for Hewett) 1 Jan 1891 - 28 Jul 1891 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting) (b. 1859 - d. 1949) (from 9 Nov 1911, Henry Lionel Galway) Commissionersand Consuls-general of the Oil Rivers Protectorate 28 Jul 1891 - 1 Jan 1896 Claude Maxwell MacDonald (b. 1852 - d. 1915) (from 4 Aug 1892, Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald) 6 Sep 1892 - 15 Feb 1893 Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (b. 1860 - d. 1909) (acting for MacDonald) 1 Jan 1896 - 31 Dec 1899 Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (s.a.) (from 22 Jun 1897, Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moore) Aug 1896 - Oct 1896 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.)Oct 1896 - 4 Jan 1897 James Robert Phillips (acting for Moor)(b. c.1864 - d. 1897) Feb 1898 - Dec 1898 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.) High Commissioners of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1 Jan 1900 - Jul 1903 Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (s.a.) Mar 1900 - Nov 1900 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.) Jul 1903 - 1903 Leslie Probyn (acting) (b. 1862 - d. 1938) 1903 - 6 Apr 1904 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (b. 1869 - d. 1935) (acting) 2 Apr 1904 - 30 Apr 1906 Walter Egerton (b. 1858 - d. 1947) (from 9 Nov 1905, Sir Walter Egerton) 13 Jan 1905 - 23 Feb 1905 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 24 Feb 1905 - 3 Apr 1905 Algernon John Bernard Harcourt (b. 1863 - d. 1940) (acting for Egerton) 9 May 1905 - 30 Jul 1905 James Jamieson Thorburn (b. 1864 - d. 1929) (acting for Egerton) 3 Aug 1905 - 27 Sep 1905 Frederick Seton James (b. 1870 - d. 1934) (acting for Egerton) 28 Sep 1905 - 22 Dec 1905Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 1 Jan 1906 - 11 Feb 1906 James Jamieson Thorburn (b. 1864 - d. 1929) (acting for Egerton) Governorsand Administrators of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1 May 1906 - 27 Feb 1912 Sir Walter Egerton (s.a.) 10 Jun 1906 - 5 Aug 1906 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 3 Oct 1912 - 31 Dec 1913 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Lagos 1870 - 1886 1886 - 30 Apr 1906 Map of Lagos Colony Capital: Lagos Population: 72,703 (1911) 6 Aug 1861 Lagos and adjacent area ceded to the U.K. 5 Mar 1862 British colony as Lagos; local dynasty continues (see under Nigerian traditional states) (subordinated to Sierra Leone 1866-1874, and then to the Gold Coast 1874-1886). 22 Aug 1862 Lagos Settlement 19 Feb 1866 - 24 Jul 1874 Lagos a territory of British West Africa. 24 Jul 1874 - 13 Jan 1886 Part of Gold Coast Lagos colony. 13 Jan 1886 Lagos a separate colony. 18 Oct 1887 Lagos protectorate in hinterland (Colony and Protectorate of Lagos). 1 May 1906 Incorporated into Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (by Order in council of 16 Feb 1906). Governorsof the Settlement of Lagos 6 Aug 1861 - 22 Jan 1862 William McCoskry (acting) (= Ajele Apongbon) 22 Jan 1862 - Apr 1865 Henry Stanhope Freeman (b. 1836 - d. 1865)1863 25 Jul 1863 William Rice Mulliner (acting) (b. 1834 - d. 1863)Aug 1863 - 24 Mar 1866 John Hawley Glover (b. 1829 - d. 1885) (acting to 21 Apr 1865) Administratorsof the Settlement of Lagos Mar 1866 - Apr 1866 John Hawley Glover (s.a.) Apr 1866 - Nov 1866 Charles George Edward Patey (b. 1813 - d. 1881) (acting) Nov 1866 - Aug 1870 John Hawley Glover (1st time) (s.a.) Aug 1870 - 1870 Henry Towry Miles Cooper (b. 1838 - d. 1877) (acting for Glover) 1870 William Henry Simpson (b. 1830 - d. 1872) (acting for Glover) 1870 - 1871 John Hawley Glover (2nd time) (s.a.) 1871 Josiah Gerard (d. 1872) (acting for Glover) 1871 - Jun 1872 John Hawley Glover (3rd time) (s.a.) Mar 1872 - Jun 1872 John Pope Hennessy (b. 1834 - d. 1891) (acting for Glover) Jun 1872 - Dec 1872 Henry William John Fowler (interim) (b. 1842 - d. 1893)Dec 1872 - Aug 1873 George Berkeley (b. 1819 - d. 1905) Aug 1873 - Oct 1873 Charles Cameron Lees (1st time) (b. 1831 - d. 1898) (acting) Oct 1873 - Jun 1874 George Cumine Strahan (b. 1838 - d. 1889) Jun 1874 - Sep 1874 John Shaw (acting) (b. 1838 - d. 1899) Lieutenant GovernorsAdministering the Government of Lagos Sep 1874 - Jun 1875 Charles Cameron Lees (2nd time) (s.a.) Jun 1875 - Feb 1876 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (1st time) (b. 1830 - d. 1878) (acting) Feb 1876 - Mar 1876 Charles Cameron Lees (3rd time) (s.a.) Mar 1876 - Dec 1876 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (2nd time) (s.a.) Jan 1877 - Nov 1877 Charles Cameron Lees (4th time) (s.a.) Nov 1877 - 9 Apr 1878 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (3rd time) (s.a.) (acting)6 Apr 1878 - 29 Apr 1878 Frank Simpson (acting) (b. 1836 - d. 1912) 30 Apr 1878 - 16 Aug 1878 Malcolm Janson Brown (acting) 17 Aug 1878 - Sep 1879 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (1st time) (b. 1848 - d. 1913) (acting) Sep 1879 - Oct 1879 Herbert Taylor John Ussher (b. 1836 - d. 1880) Oct 1879 - Dec 1880 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (2nd time) (s.a.) (acting) Dec 1880 - Dec 1880 William Brandford Griffith (b. 1824 - d. 1897)1880 Charles Dennett Turton (acting) (b. c.1840 - d. 1913) Dec 1880 - May 1881 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (3rd time) (s.a.) (acting) May 1881 - Oct 1882 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (1st time) Oct 1882 - Apr 1883 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (acting) (s.a.) Apr 1883 - Aug 1883 Sir Samuel Rowe (acting) (b. 1835 - d. 1888) Aug 1883 - Mar 1884 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (2nd time)Mar 1884 - Aug 1884 Robert Murray Rumsey (acting) (b. 1849 - d. 1922) Aug 1884 - Feb 1885 Robert Knapp Barrow (acting) (b. 1838 - d. 1888) Feb 1885 - May 1885 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (3rd time) May 1885 - May 1885 Charles Pike (acting) (b. 1840? - d. 1891) May 1885 - Jan 1886 Frederick Evans (acting) (b. 1849 - d. 1939)Governors and Commanders-in-chief of the Colony of Lagos 13 Jan 1886 - 1889 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (1st time) (s.a.) (from 1 Jan 1890, Sir Cornelius Alfred Moloney) 1889 - 1890 George Chardin Denton (acting) (b. 1851 - d. 1928)1890 - 1891 Sir Cornelius Alfred Moloney (s.a.) (2nd time) Sep 1891 - Oct 1896 Gilbert Thomas Carter (b. 1848 - d. 1927) (from 3 Jun 1893, Sir Gilbert Thomas Carter) Oct 1896 - 1896 Frank Rohrweger (acting) (b. 1859 - d. ....) 1896 - Apr 1897 William Brandford Griffith (acting) (b. 1858 - d. 1939) 23 Apr 1897 - May 1899 Henry Edward McCallum (b. 1852 - d. 1919) (from 4 Jul 1898, Sir Henry Edward McCallum) 1898 - 1899 George Chardin Denton (s.a.) (acting for McCallum) May 1899 - 1902 Sir William MacGregor (1st time) (b. 1847 - d. 1919) 1900 - 1901 George Chardin Denton (s.a.) (acting for MacGregor) 1902 Henry Fenwick Reeve (acting) (b. 1857 - d. 1946) 1902 - 1903 Charles Herbert Harley Moseley (b. 1857 - d. 1933) (1st time)(acting) 1903 - Jan 1904 Sir William MacGregor (2nd time) (s.a.)Jan 1904 - Sep 1904 Charles Herbert Harley Moseley (s.a.) (2nd time)(acting) 16 Sep 1904 - 30 Apr 1906 Walter Egerton (b. 1858 - d. 1947) (from 9 Nov 1905, Sir Walter Egerton) Nigeria 1 Jan 1914 Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria 1 Oct 1954 Federation of Nigeria 1 Oct 1960 Independence 1 Oct 1963 Federal Republic of Nigeria 24 May 1966 Republic of Nigeria 1 Sep 1966 Federal Republic of Nigeria Governor-generaland Commander-in-chief 1 Jan 1914 - 8 Aug 1919 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Governors and Commanders-in-chief 8 Aug 1919 - 13 Nov 1925 Sir Hugh Charles Clifford (b. 1866 - d. 1941) 13 Nov 1925 - 17 Jun 1931 Sir Graeme Thomson (b. 1875 - d. 1933) 17 Jun 1931 - 1 Nov 1935 Sir Donald Charles Cameron (b. 1872 - d. 1948) 1 Nov 1935 - May 1943 Sir Bernard Henry Bourdillon (b. 1883 - d. 1948) 1 Jul 1940 - 1942 Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh (b. 1877 - d. 1953) (did not take office) 19 May 1942 - 13 Jul 1942 Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell Burns (b. 1887 - d. 1980) (acting for Bourdillon) May 1943 - 18 Dec 1943 Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell Burns (s.a.) (acting) 18 Dec 1943 - 14 Oct 1947 Sir Arthur Frederick Richards (b. 1885 - d. 1978) 14 Oct 1947 - 15 Apr 1948 George Beresford-Stooke (acting) (b. 1897 - d. 1983) 15 Apr 1948 - 1 Oct 1954 Sir John Stuart Macpherson (b. 1898 - d. 1971) Queen¹ 1 Oct 1960 - 1 Oct 1963 the Queen of the United KingdomGovernors-general and Commanders-in-chief (representing the British monarch as head of state from 1 Oct 1960) 1 Oct 1954 - 15 Jun 1955 Sir John Stuart Macpherson (s.a.) Non-party 15 Jun 1955 - 15 Nov 1960 Sir James Wilson Robertson (b. 1899 - d. 1983) Non-party 15 Nov 1960 - 1 Oct 1963 Nnamdi Chukwuemeka Azikiwe (b. 1904 - d. 1996) NCNC Presidentand Commander-in-chief 1 Oct 1963 - 16 Jan 1966 Nnamdi Chukwuemeka Azikiwe (s.a.) NCNC Head of the Federal Military Government, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces15 Jan 1966 - 17 Jan 1966 Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (b. 1937 d. 1967) Mil (head of Supreme Council of Revolution of Nigerian Armed Forces, in rebellion) 16 Jan 1966 - 24 May 1966 Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi- (b. 1924 - d. 1966) Mil Ironsi Heads of the National Military Government, Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces 24 May 1966 - 29 Jul 1966 Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi- (s.a.) Mil Ironsi 29 Jul 1966 - 1 Aug 1966 Vacant 1 Aug 1966 - 1 Sep 1966 Yakubu Cinwa Dan-Yumma Gowon (b. 1934) Mil Heads of the Federal Military Government, Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces (from 17 Mar 1967, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) 1 Sep 1966 - 29 Jul 1975 Yakubu Cinwa Dan-Yumma Gowon (s.a.) Mil 29 Jul 1975 - 13 Feb 1976 Murtala Ramat Mohammed (b. 1938 - d. 1976) Mil 14 Feb 1976 - 1 Oct 1979 Olusegun Fajinmi Okikiolakan Aremu (b. 1937) Mil Obasanjo Presidentand Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 1 Oct 1979 - 31 Dec 1983 Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (b. 1925 - d. 2018) NPN Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces31 Dec 1983 - 27 Aug 1985 Muhammadu Buhari (b. 1942) Mil President, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces27 Aug 1985 - 26 Aug 1993 Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (b. 1941) Mil Head of the Interim National Government26 Aug 1993 - 17 Nov 1993 Ernest Adegunle Oladeinde Shonekan (b. 1936 - d. 2022) Non-party Heads of State and Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 17 Nov 1993 - 8 Jun 1998 Sani Abacha (b. 1943 - d. 1998) Mil 9 Jun 1998 - 29 May 1999 Abdulsalam Abubakar (b. 1942) Mil Presidents, Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 29 May 1999 - 29 May 2007 Olusegun Fajinmi Okikiolakan Aremu (s.a.) PDP Obasanjo 29 May 2007 - 5 May 2010 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (b. 1951 - d. 2010) PDP (incapacitated by illness from 9 Feb 2010) 9 Feb 2010 - 29 May 2015 Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan (b. 1957) PDP (acting for Yar'Adua to 5 May 2010) 29 May 2015 - 29 May 2023 Muhammadu Buhari (s.a.) APC 6 Jun 2016 - 20 Jun 2016 Yemi Osinbajo (1st time) (b. 1957) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 19 Jan 2017 - 13 Mar 2017 Yemi Osinbajo (2nd time) (s.a.) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 7 May 2017 - 19 Aug 2017 Yemi Osinbajo (3rd time) (s.a.) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 29 May 2023 - Bola Ahmed Adekunle Tinubu (b. 1952) APC Prime ministers30 Aug 1957 - 15 Jan 1966 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (b. 1912 - d. 1966) NPC;1964 (from 1 Jan 1960, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) + NNA15 Jan 1966 - 17 Jan 1966 Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (acting) (b. 1917 - d. 1969) NPC Chairman of the Transitional Council 4 Jan 1993 - 26 Aug 1993 Ernest Adegunle Oladeinde Shonekan (s.a.) Non-party ¹Full style: (a) 1 Oct 1960 - 31 Aug 1961: "By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith"; (b) 31 Aug 1961 - 1 Oct 1963: "By the Grace of God Queen of Nigeria and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth." Territorial Disputes: Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including Jun 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phase-out of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved. Party abbreviations (political parties banned 1966-1979, 1983-1989): APC = All Progressives Congress (progressive, merger of ACN, ANPP, CPC, and APGA dissidents, est.6 Feb 2013); APP = All People's Party (coalition of associations, 1998-2003, then ANPP); PDP = People's Democratic Party (social conservative, est.1998);Mil = Military; - Former parties:NNA = Nigerian National Alliance (northern based electoral coalition, incl. NPC and Nigerian National Democratic Party and others, 1964-1966); NPN = National Party of Nigeria (coalition, 1978-1983); NPC Northern People's Congress (northern autonomist, Hausa/Fulani dominated, 1951-1966); NCNC = National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Igbo dominated, until 1959 named National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1944-1966); UPN = Unity Party of Nigeria (social democratic, seen pro-Yoruba, 1978-1983) Biafra 30 May 1967 - 12 Jan 1970 Map of Biafra Hear National Anthem "Land of the Rising Sun" Text of National Anthem (1967-1970) Constitution (30 May 1967) Capital: Enugu (Umuahia 1967-69, Owerri 1969-70) Currency: 1968-1970 Biafran Pound (BIAP) National Holiday: 30 May (1967) Independence Day Population: 13,500,000 (1967) GDP: $N/A Exports: $N/A Imports: $N/A Ethnic groups: Igbo (Ibo) 70%, Ibibio, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ekoi, Efik, and others Total Armed Forces: 100,000 (1968) Merchant marine: N/A Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional beliefs International Organizations/Treaties: None 30 May 1967 Secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria as Republic of Biafra (not widely recognized internationally¹). 10-26 Jul 1967 Nigerian federal troops take Ogoja, Nsukka and Bonny Island. 9 Aug 1967 - 20 Sep 1967 Midwest Region occupied by Biafra, and Republic of Benin declared on 19 Sep 1967 (see Edo under federal states). 28 Sep 1967 Enugu captured, new capital Unuahia. 24 May 1968 Port Harcourt captured. 22 Apr 1969 Unuahia captured, last capital Owerri. 9 Jan 1970 Owerri captured. 12 Jan 1970 Re-integration into Nigeria. 15 Jan 1970 Biafran forces formally surrender. Head of State and Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra 30 May 1967 - 15 Jan 1970 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (b. 1933 - d. 2011) Mil 8 Jan 1970 - 15 Jan 1970 Philip Efiong (b. 1924 - d. 2003) Mil (acting for Odumegwu-Ojukwu) ¹recognized only by: Tanzania (13 Apr 1968), Gabon (8 May 1968), Ivory Coast (9 May 1968), Zambia (20 May 1968), and Haiti (22 Mar 1969). Republic of Benin: see Edo under Federal states © Ben Cahoon
9206	dbpedia	3	32	https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/about-nigeria.htm	en	About Nigeria	https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/favicon.ico	https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/favicon.ico	[ "https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/mosaic/_M_userfiles/Nigeria_political_map.jpg", "https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/mosaic/_M_userfiles/nigeria_wappen_200px.png", "https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/mosaic/_M_userfiles/Flag_of_Nigeria.jpg", "https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/mosaic/_M_userfiles/Muhammadu-Buh...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	favicon.ico		null	The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria wishes to inform all Nigerians that the Nigeria Immigration Service has launced the Enhanced E-Passport in all Nigerian Diplomatic Missions. This new form of passport enrollment will ensure enhanced reliability, durability and increase national security integrity of Nigerian passports. To this effect, applicants are advised to take note of the following regulations guiding the application process for the enhanced e-passport: National Identity Number (NIN) is a mandatory information to obtain the enhanced passport; Information on the NIN must tally with the information on the passport for the purpose of renewal; The information on the passport payment receipt must tally with the NIN information and the passport for renewal itself; Applicants shall book their appointment directly at the immigration official website before coming to the Mission;
9206	dbpedia	0	30	https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/africa-1946.aspx	en	African Coins			[ "https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/images/dd_arrow.jpg", "https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/images/blank.gif", "https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/images/blank.gif", "https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/images/blank.gif", "https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/images/blank.gif", "https://www....	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "the online coin shop" ]	null	F_META_DESCRIPTION_AFRICAN	en	/faviconNew.ico		https://www.vcoins.com/en/coins/world/africa-1946.aspx
9206	dbpedia	1	85	https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Lugard	en	Frederick Lugard \| British Colonial Administrator & Imperialist	https://cdn.britannica.c…ortrait-1936.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…ortrait-1936.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/77/10177-004-106FADD2/detail-Lugard-painting-WJ-Carrow-National-Portrait-1936.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel-resources/3-124/images/...	[]	[]	[ "Frederick Lugard", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Margery Perham" ]	1998-07-20T00:00:00+00:00	Frederick Lugard was an administrator who played a major part in Britain’s colonial history between 1888 and 1945, serving in East Africa, West Africa, and Hong Kong. His name is especially associated with Nigeria, where he served as high commissioner (1900–06) and governor and governor-general	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/biography/Frederick-Lugard	Frederick Lugard (born January 22, 1858, Fort St. George, Madras, India—died April 11, 1945, Abinger, Surrey, England) was an administrator who played a major part in Britain’s colonial history between 1888 and 1945, serving in East Africa, West Africa, and Hong Kong. His name is especially associated with Nigeria, where he served as high commissioner (1900–06) and governor and governor-general (1912–19). He was knighted in 1901 and raised to the peerage in 1928. Born in India of missionary parents, Lugard was educated in England and, after briefly attending the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, joined the Norfolk Regiment. Posted to India and swept into the British imperial advance of the 1880s, he served in the Afghan, Suakin (Sudan), and Burma (Myanmar) campaigns. An officer with a promising career ahead of him in British India, he experienced a catastrophic love affair with a married woman. Highly strung and undermined by Burma fever, he sought oblivion by following the explorer David Livingstone’s lead in fighting Arab slave raiders in eastern Africa. In 1888 he was severely wounded while leading an attack upon a slaver’s stockade near Lake Nyasa. But he had found his life’s work in service for Africa and for Britain—work that he saw as having a mutually beneficial purpose. His next enterprise was under the imperial British East Africa Company, one of the chartered companies that preceded imperial annexation in Africa. Leaving Mombasa in August 1890, he led a caravan for five months along an almost untrodden route of 800 miles (1,300 km) to the advanced kingdom of Buganda. Here he found a complex struggle going on among animists, Muslims, Protestants, and Roman Catholics—the latter two groups converted by British and French missionaries who had reached Buganda earlier by a southern route—and the nominal king, or kabaka. Within 18 months—not without a brief use of his one operative Maxim gun—Lugard imposed peace, carried out an immense march to the west, and won a treaty of allegiance from the kabaka. Hearing that his company meant to abandon Uganda because of mounting expenses, he hurriedly returned to England to fight a successful two-pronged campaign to defend, first, the retention of Uganda in addition to imperial annexation and, second, his own reputation against accusations of harshness and injustice. In 1894–95 Lugard accepted another dangerous mission, this time for the Royal Niger Company, to race the French in a treaty-making exploration on the Middle Niger. He succeeded in that enterprise in spite of great hardships—including a poisoned arrow in his head. From the Niger he went, again at some risk to his life, to the semidesert of the Bechuanaland Protectorate for the private British West Charterland Company, which was prospecting for diamonds. There he was tracked down by a runner sent by the colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, to offer him his first official government appointment. He was to create a British-officered African regiment that he was to employ in a second attempt to fend off the French, who then were competing with the British right across Africa from the Niger to the Nile. This was to become the famous West African Frontier Force. Lugard’s success in this difficult undertaking led to his appointment as high commissioner for Northern Nigeria. Most of this vast region of 300,000 square miles (800,000 square km) was still unoccupied and even unexplored by Europeans. In the south were pagan tribes and in the north, historic Muslim city-states with large walled cities whose emirs raided the tribal territories to the south for slaves. In three years, by diplomacy or the swift use of his small force, Lugard established British control, though in hastening to take the major states of Kano and Sokoto he forced the hands of his more cautious home government. Only two serious local revolts marred the widespread acceptance and cooperation that Lugard obtained. His policy was to support the native states and chieftainships, their laws and their courts, forbidding slave raiding and cruel punishments and exercising control centrally through the native rulers. This system, cooperative in spirit and economical in staff and expense, he elaborated on in his detailed political memorandums. It greatly influenced British administration in Africa and beyond. Though sometimes misapplied or overprolonged, it helped bridge the gap between tribal systems and the new movements toward democracy and unity. Lugard’s main fault as an administrator was an unwillingness to delegate responsibility, but the variety of the conditions and the vast distances acted as a check on this fault. If some of his officers were critical, the majority greatly respected their chief, and a number of “Lugard’s men” went on to govern other territories in Africa. In 1902 Lugard married Flora Shaw, a beautiful and famous woman, herself a great traveler, an authority upon colonial policy, and a member of the staff of The Times of London. A very deep devotion and partnership grew up between them. Because she could not stand the Nigerian climate, Lugard felt obliged to leave Africa and to accept the governorship of Hong Kong, which he held from 1907 to 1912. No greater contrast could be imagined than that between the vast untamed expanse of Northern Nigeria and the small island of Hong Kong with its highly civilized Chinese and sophisticated commercial British community. But the bushwhacker from Africa achieved a surprising degree of success and, on his own initiative, founded the University of Hong Kong. He could not, however, resist the great opportunity offered to him in 1912 to unite the two parts of Nigeria into one vast state. The south and north showed wide contrasts in their original character and in their traditions of British rule. It was an immense task to unify their administration. Lugard did not attempt a complete fusion of their systems and retained a degree of dualism between south and north. He found the south, especially the sophisticated Africans of Lagos and the southeast, less easy to understand than the northerners, and in 1918 he had to deal with a serious outbreak in the important city-state of Abeokuta. Nor did he find it easy to extend the principles of indirect rule to the loosely organized societies of the Igbo (Ibo) and other southeastern tribes. His tenure of office also was made more difficult by World War I, with its interruption of communications, its resultant shortages of staff, and the war with the Germans in the Cameroons along his eastern frontier. Yet, in the main, Lugard carried through an immense task of unification, which was officially declared on January 1, 1914. Historians must judge the event by the decision of the Nigerians to obtain their independence in 1960 as a united state and to defend it against the attempted Igbo secession to set up an independent state, Biafra, in the late 1960s. In 1919 he retired, but only to a life of unceasing activity in his role as the leading authority on colonial government. He wrote his classic Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, published in 1922. In 1928 he became Baron Lugard of Abinger and spoke with authority in the House of Lords on colonial subjects. He became British member of the Permanent Mandates Commission and of the International Committees on Slavery and Forced Labour and chairman of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures. To the end of his life, deeply saddened by the death of his wife in 1929, he worked almost incessantly in his secluded house on a survey of matters affecting the interests of native races both inside and outside the British Empire. Though to modern critics of colonialism there may seem much to criticize in his ideas and actions, there can be no questioning the great range and effectiveness of the three periods of his work: in the opening up of Africa; in its government at a most formative stage in its history; and as elder statesman working during his so-called retirement almost up to his death.
9206	dbpedia	3	6	https://globalfinancialdata.com/nigeria	en	Global Financial Data	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	[ "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/global/global-financial-data-logo-white.png 1x", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/currency/Nigeria.JPG", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/blog/GFD_Sector_and_Industry_Classification_System_Revised.jpg", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/address_icon....	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Odin Mayland" ]	0001-11-29T16:07:02-07:52	We are a Global Data provider: For over 25 years Global Financial Data has been providing alternative historical economic and financial data.	en	/templates/shaper_helixultimate/images/favicon.ico		https://globalfinancialdata.com/nigeria	Nigeria is a combination of four different colonies. Lagos was established as a colony by the British in 1861, subordinated to Sierra Leone from 1866 until 1874, and to the Gold Coast (Ghana) from 1874 until 1886. Lagos became part of Southern Nigeria in 1906. Southern Nigeria was established as the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1891, and went through several name changes before uniting with Northern Nigeria (which had belonged to the Royal Niger Company and had been established as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria on January 1, 1900) on January 1, 1914. Nigeria remained a British colony until it gained its independence on October 1, 1960 and it became a republic in 1963. British Cameroon was joined to Nigeria on October 1, 1961. Biafra was established as a separate state on May 30, 1967 out of three eastern provinces of Biafra, leading to civil war. Biafra surrendered on January 15, 1970, and Biafra was reincorporated into Nigeria. The British Pound Sterling (GBP) was used in Nigeria while it was a colony. Spanish Dollars were used in Nigeria with 4 Spanish Dollars equal to 1 British Pound Sterling to September 30, 1843 and 4.80 Spanish Dollars equal to 1 Pound Sterling until it was demonetized on May 11, 1880. MacGregor Laird issued token coins in Nigeria in 1858. These were denominated in British pence and in Dollars. French Francs also circulated. From May 11, 1880, gold nuggets and dust were demonetized and British coins, along with a few foreign gold and silver coins, were made legal tender. The first coins were struck for Nigeria in 1907. On July 1, 1913, the West African Currency Board was established originally to issue coins, but the Constitution was revised in November 1915 to allow for the issue of Pound (XWAP) banknotes at par with the British Pound Sterling. The West African Currency Board became a model for other currency boards in Africa and elsewhere. The Pound was divisible into 20 Shillings or 240 Pence. Manillas (metal pieces used as currency) continued in use in parts of Nigeria until autumn 1948, when they were withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for notes and coins. Nigeria issued the Nigerian Pound (NGP) at par with the British West African Pound after the Nigerian Central Bank was established on July 1, 1959. On January 1, 1973, Nigeria introduced the Naira (NGN) to replace the Pound with 1 Naira equal to 10 Shillings and divisible into 100 Kobo. Biafra issued its own Pound (BIAP) currency and coins at par with the Nigerian Pound, but it became worthless after Biafra was reincorporated into Nigeria. Banknotes were issued in Lagos prior to its incorporation into Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria was established on July 1, 1959 and became the sole issuing authority for Nigeria, succeeding the West African Currency Board. The Bank of Biafra issued banknotes for Biafra.
9206	dbpedia	1	46	https://academic.oup.com/book/32096/chapter/268018529	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
9206	dbpedia	2	13	https://aeh.uwpress.org/content/51/1/24	en	Rethinking West African Monetary History	https://aeh.uwpress.org/…cover-source.jpg	https://aeh.uwpress.org/…cover-source.jpg	[ "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/wpaeh_mobile_b.png", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/wpaeh_logo_final.png", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/all/modules/contrib/panels_ajax_tab/images/loading.gif", "https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/public/highwire/wpaeh/51/1.co...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Marisa Candotti" ]	2023-05-01T00:00:00	This article provides a new answer to one of the central questions in precolonial West African histories: the interaction of credit with the expansion of production for the market. According to Hopkins, during the nineteenth century long-distance commercial capital had a limited effect on West African local production. In contrast, this article argues that surplus trading profits played a crucial role in the growth of manufacturing. However, to fully appreciate the interaction of trading profits and local manufacturing, it is necessary to reconsider the approach to West African monetary history. Recently, world economic historians have devoted renewed attention to African monetary history, suggesting a new theoretical approach that enables a reconsideration of how multiple monetary transactions worked in practice. This approach is based on the “complementary” relationship among monies circulating side by side. This article argues that a complementary relationship between multiple markets and monies makes possible the articulation of a different perspective on the place of money within the process of economic growth in precolonial savanna economies.	en	https://aeh.uwpress.org/sites/default/files/images/favicon.ico	African Economic History	https://aeh.uwpress.org/content/51/1/24	Abstract This article provides a new answer to one of the central questions in precolonial West African histories: the interaction of credit with the expansion of production for the market. According to Hopkins, during the nineteenth century long-distance commercial capital had a limited effect on West African local production. In contrast, this article argues that surplus trading profits played a crucial role in the growth of manufacturing. However, to fully appreciate the interaction of trading profits and local manufacturing, it is necessary to reconsider the approach to West African monetary history. Recently, world economic historians have devoted renewed attention to African monetary history, suggesting a new theoretical approach that enables a reconsideration of how multiple monetary transactions worked in practice. This approach is based on the “complementary” relationship among monies circulating side by side. This article argues that a complementary relationship between multiple markets and monies makes possible the articulation of a different perspective on the place of money within the process of economic growth in precolonial savanna economies.
9206	dbpedia	1	11	https://archive.conscientiabeam.com/index.php/26/article/view/2060/5146	en	View of The Colonialists & Indigenous Exchange Currency: Tracing the Genesis of Socioeconomic Woes in Postcolonial Nigeria	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png		null
9206	dbpedia	1	4	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Nigeria_Protectorate	en	Southern Nigeria Protectorate	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/46/Flag_of_the_Southern...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2004-11-18T07:05:35+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Nigeria_Protectorate	British protectorate from 1900 to 1914 Southern Nigeria was a British protectorate in the coastal areas of modern-day Nigeria formed in 1900 from the union of the Niger Coast Protectorate with territories chartered by the Royal Niger Company below Lokoja on the Niger River.[1] The Lagos colony was later added in 1906, and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1914, Southern Nigeria was joined with Northern Nigeria Protectorate to form the single colony of Nigeria.[2] The unification was done for economic reasons and the colonial administration sought to use the budget surpluses in Southern Nigeria to offset this deficit.[3] Sir Frederick Lugard, who took office as governor of both protectorates in 1912, was responsible for overseeing the unification, and he became the first governor of the newly united territory. Lugard established several central institutions to anchor the evolving unified structure.[4] A Central Secretariat was instituted at Lagos, which was the seat of government, and the Nigerian Council (later the Legislative Council), was founded to provide a forum for representatives drawn from the provinces. Certain services were integrated across the Northern and Southern Provinces because of their national significance—military, treasury, audit, posts and telegraphs, railways, survey, medical services, judicial and legal departments—and brought under the control of the Central Secretariat in Lagos.[3] The process of unification was undermined by the persistence of different regional perspectives on governance between the Northern and Southern Provinces, and by Nigerian nationalists in Lagos.[5] While southern colonial administrators welcomed amalgamation as an opportunity for imperial expansion, their counterparts in the Northern Province believed that it was injurious to the interests of the areas they administered because of their relative backwardness and that it was their duty to resist the advance of southern influences and culture into the north. Southerners, on their part, were not eager to embrace the extension of legislation originally meant for the north to the south.[3] From its foundation, southern Nigeria was administered by a high commissioner. The first high commissioner was Ralph Moor. When Lagos was amalgamated with the rest of southern Nigeria in 1906, the then high commissioner Walter Egerton was made into Governor of the territory.[6] When in 1900 the protectorate passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, Ralph Moor became High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria and laid the foundations of the new administration, his health failing, he retired on pension on 1 October 1903. Egerton became Governor of Lagos Colony, covering most of the Yoruba lands in the southwest of what is now Nigeria, in 1903. The colonial office wanted to amalgamate the Lagos Colony with the protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and in August 1904 also appointed Egerton as High Commissioner for the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. He held both offices until 28 February 1906. On that date, the two territories were formally united and Egerton was appointed Governor of the new Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, holding office until 1912. In the new Southern Nigeria, the old Lagos Colony became the Western Province, and the former Southern Nigerian Protectorate was split into a Central Province with capital at Warri and an Eastern Province with capital at Calabar. When his predecessor in Southern Nigeria, Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor, resigned, a large part of the southeast of Nigeria was still outside British control. On taking office, Egerton began a policy of sending out annual pacification patrols, which generally obtained submission through the threat of force without being required to actually use force. When Egerton became Governor of Lagos he enthusiastically endorsed the extension of the Lagos – Ibadan railway onward to Oshogbo, and the project was approved in November 1904. Construction began in January 1905 and the line reached Oshogbo in April 1907. He favoured rail over river transport, and pushed to have the railway further extended to Kano by way of Zaria. He also sponsored extensive road construction, building on the legislative foundation laid by his predecessor Moor which enabled use of unpaid local labour. Egerton shared Moor's views on the damage that was being done to the Cross River trade by the combination of indigenous middlemen and traders based in Calabar. The established traders at first got the Colonial Office to pass rules inhibiting competition from traders willing to set up bases further inland, but with some difficulty, Egerton persuaded the officials to reverse their ruling. Egerton was a strong advocate of colonial development. He believed in deficit financing at certain periods of a colony's growth, which was reflected in his budgets from 1906 to 1912. He had a constant struggle to obtain approval for these budgets from the colonial office. As early as 1908, Egerton supported the idea of "a properly organized Agricultural Department with an energetic and experienced head", and the Department of Agriculture came into being in 1910. Egerton endorsed the development of rubber plantations, a concept familiar to him from his time in Malaya, and arranged for land to be leased for this purpose. This was the foundation of a highly successful industry. He also thought there could be great potential in the tin fields near Bauchi, and thought that if proven a branch line to the tin fields would be justified. Egerton came into conflict with the administration of Northern Nigeria on a number of issues. There was debate over whether Ilorin should be incorporated into Southern Nigeria since the people were Yoruba, or remain in Northern Nigeria since the ruler was Muslim and for some time Ilorin had been subject to the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. There was argument about the administration of duties on goods landed on the coast and carried into Northern Nigeria. And there was dispute over whether railway lines from the north should terminate at Lagos or should take alternative routes to the Niger River and the coast. Egerton had reason on his side in objecting to the proposed line terminating at Baro on the Niger, since navigation southward to the coast was restricted to the high-water season, and even then was uncertain. Egerton's administration imposed policies that tended towards segregation of Europeans and Africans. These included excluding Africans from the West African Medical Service and saying that no European should take orders from an African, which had the effect of ruling out African doctors from serving with the army. Egerton himself did not always approve of these policies, and they were not strictly upheld. The legal relationship between the Lagos government and the Yoruba states of the Lagos Colony was not clear, and it was not until 1908 that Egerton persuaded the Obas to accept the establishment of the Supreme Court in the main towns. In 1912, Egerton was replaced by Frederick Lugard, who was appointed Governor-General of both Southern and Northern Nigeria with the mandate to unite the two. Egerton was appointed Governor of British Guiana as his next posting, clearly a demotion, which may have been connected to his fights with the Colonial Office officials. Lugard returned to Nigeria as Governor of the two protectorates. His main mission was to complete the amalgamation into one colony. Although controversial in Lagos, where it was opposed by a large section of the political class and the media, the amalgamation did not arouse passion in the rest of the country. From 1914 to 1919, Lugard was made Governor General of the now combined Colony of Nigeria. Throughout his tenure, Lugard sought strenuously to secure the amelioration of the condition of the native people, among other means by the exclusion, wherever possible, of alcoholic liquors, and by the suppression of slave raiding and slavery. Lugard ran the country with half of each year spent in England, distant from realities in Africa where subordinates had to delay decisions on many matters until he returned, and based his rule on a military system.[25] High-Commissioners and Governors[26] Name Tenure Office Portrait Sir Ralph Moor 1900–1903 High Commissioner of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Sir Walter Egerton 1903–1912 High Commissioner of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate 1903–1906 Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1906–1912 Sir Frederick Lugard 1912–1914 Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria The British economic policy for Africa at the time was founded on the belief that if African peoples were brought to embrace European civilisation with its emphasis on law and order their economic resources would be more effectively and thoroughly exploited to the benefit of all. It was optimistically and simplistically believed that the problem of African economic development was largely the problem of law and order; that once the slave trade was suppressed the chaos and anarchy believed to be the bane of life in Africa would disappear and African endeavour would be channelled to the collection of the national produce of the tropical forest for the satisfaction of European needs. The view came to be held that Africans by themselves were incapable of maintaining law and order to the level needed to bring about the much-desired economic revolution and that only European rule could do it. It was not enough for the colonial power to impose and maintain law and order though. It was also necessary to promote and develop free movement and natural growth and trade. Also it was the generally accepted assumption that the economic efforts and products of a colony should supplement, rather than compete with or undermine, the economic efforts and products of the metropolitan country. This was a survival of the mercantilist system which had come to grief in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Revenue and expenditure in £s[26] Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus/Deficit 1900 535,902 424,257 +111,645 1901 606,431 564,818 +41,613 1902 801,737 619,687 +182,050 1903 760,230 757,953 +2,277 1904 888,136 863,917 +24,219 1905 951,748 998,564 -46,816 1906 1,088,717 1,056,290 +32,427 1907 1,459,554 1,217,336 +242,218 1908 1,387,975 1,357,763 +30,212 1909 1,361,891 1,648,648 -286,793 1910 1,933,235 1,592,282 +340,953 1911 1,956,176 1,717,259 +238,917 1912 2,235,412 2,110,498 +124,914 1913 2,668,198 2,096,311 +571,887 Postage stamps and postal history of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Southern Nigeria Government Gazette
9206	dbpedia	3	49	https://www.apfelbauminc.com/nigeria-collectors-stamps/	en	Collectors’ Stamps from Nigeria	https://www.apfelbauminc…-453028901-2.jpg	https://www.apfelbauminc…-453028901-2.jpg	[ "https://apfelbaum-media.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/17005700/logo.png", "https://apfelbaum-media.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/17005700/logo.png", "https://apfelbaum-media.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/17005700/logo.png", "https://apfelbaum-media.s3.amazonaws.com/w...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2022-07-21T19:00:13+00:00	The most populous country in the continent and a rising economic power, Nigeria is at the forefront of the rising interest in African philately. Collectors looking into the rare stamps of Nigeria are instantly rewarded with a number of attractive issues, as well as a fascinating look at the legacy of colonialism and the internal […]	en	https://apfelbaum-media.…APfav3-32x32.jpg	Apfelbaum, Inc.	https://www.apfelbauminc.com/nigeria-collectors-stamps/	The most populous country in the continent and a rising economic power, Nigeria is at the forefront of the rising interest in African philately. Collectors looking into the rare stamps of Nigeria are instantly rewarded with a number of attractive issues, as well as a fascinating look at the legacy of colonialism and the internal struggles many newly independent countries faced in the latter half of the 20th century. History in Context: Nigeria’s Early Stamps Modern-day Nigeria was ruled under a series of British protectorates from 1800 until finally gaining independence in 1960. Stamps were in circulation as early as 1874, when a half-penny issue bearing the image of Queen Victoria in profile was printed for use in Lagos. Other regions to issue their own stamps during this time period included: The Oil River Protectorate, which opened a post office in 1891 and began using specially overprinted British stamps the following year. The Niger Coast Protectorate, which superseded the Oil Rivers Protectorate and began using its own overprints in 1894. The Southern Nigeria Protectorate, which was created when the Niger Coast Protectorate unified with territories controlled by the Royal Niger Co. in 1900. The Northern Nigeria Protectorate, which began issuing stamps in 1900. Present-day Nigeria took shape in 1914, when the protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria merged, later absorbing parts of British Cameroons. With this, a single unified postal system was established, and stamp denominations and designs were standardized. Some of the stamps in use during this time were based on British designs, while others, such as the George V issues, featured the recently deceased monarch alongside a pictorial depicting aspects of Nigeria’s culture or history. Independence and Onward Nigeria gained its independence from Britain in 1960, and almost immediately, tensions between the northern and southern halves of the new country started flaring up. A civil war waged between 1967 and 1970. Following that, the country was ruled by a series of military juntas. Despite this turmoil, however, the country’s postal system managed to produce some very attractive definitive issues, many of which remain prized Nigeria collectors’ stamps today. Following the adoption of a new currency in 1973, a color series highlighting the various industries and other points of national pride was released. Looking at these stamps, which were printed continuously until 1986, you can see the impact inflation had on the country, as denominations steadily rise. Where to Buy Rare Nigeria Stamps Online Postal authorities have long recognized the importance of the philatelic market and encouraged the printing and sale of Nigerian collectors’ stamps. As a result, starting a collection is relatively easy.
9206	dbpedia	0	1	https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/	en	British West Africa	https://www.banknoteworl…est%20Africa.png	https://www.banknoteworl…est%20Africa.png	[ "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/images/simplecms/logo_Educational_logo-no-tm.png", "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/var/theme/images/shop_btn2x.png 2x", "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/images/simplecms/logo_Educational_logo-no-tm.png", "https://www.bankn...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	British West Africa referred to a collection of British colonies, protectorates, and mandate territories in West Africa. Initially, it was named the Colony of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, and then became British West African Territories, and finally British West African Settlements. The member states included Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and The Gambia, which later became independent countries.The currency used in British West Africa was the pound, equivalent to one pound sterling and divided into 20 shillings, each of 12 pence. In the 19th century, standard British coinage circulated in the West African territories, and the sterling became the currency of choice. However, in 1912, the West African Currency Board was established in London, and a unique set of sterling coinage was issued for use in British West Africa. This move was prompted by the tendency of standard sterling coins shipped to the region to leave and return to circulation in the UK, causing a local shortage of coinage. To deal with the situation, a British West African pound was introduced. Such pounds would not be accepted in British shops, and therefore circulating locally. The British West African pound was also adopted by Liberia in 1907, although it was not served by the West African Currency Board. The currency was also adopted in Togo and Cameroon during World War I when French and British forces ruled over the German colonies. However, beginning in 1958, individual territories in British West Africa started to replace the pound with local currencies.	en	https://www.banknoteworld.org/images/simplecms/favicon.ico	Banknote World Educational	https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/	British West Africa referred to a collection of British colonies, protectorates, and mandate territories in West Africa. Initially, it was named the Colony of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, and then became British West African Territories, and finally British West African Settlements. The member states included Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and The Gambia, which later became independent countries. The currency used in British West Africa was the pound, equivalent to one pound sterling and divided into 20 shillings, each of 12 pence. In the 19th century, standard British coinage circulated in the West African territories, and the sterling became the currency of choice. However, in 1912, the West African Currency Board was established in London, and a unique set of sterling coinage was issued for use in British West Africa. This move was prompted by the tendency of standard sterling coins shipped to the region to leave and return to circulation in the UK, causing a local shortage of coinage. To deal with the situation, a British West African pound was introduced. Such pounds would not be accepted in British shops, and therefore circulating locally. The British West African pound was also adopted by Liberia in 1907, although it was not served by the West African Currency Board. The currency was also adopted in Togo and Cameroon during World War I when French and British forces ruled over the German colonies. However, beginning in 1958, individual territories in British West Africa started to replace the pound with local currencies.
9206	dbpedia	3	28	https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria.htm	en	Nigeria			[ "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-col.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-col2.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng_rnc.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nig_cia1.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng_rnc.gif", "https://www.worldstatesmen.org/ng-...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Ben Cahoon" ]	null					null	Niger Territories 2 Jun 1887 - 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Co. Flag 1 Feb 1888 - 31 Dec 1899 R.N.C. Ensign Map of Niger Territories Headquarters: Asaba Population: N/A Jul 1879 United African Company Limited (U.A.C.), formed by the merger of four trading firms in Niger River Delta area - Alexander Miller Brother & Co., the Central African Trading Co. Ltd., the West African Co. Ltd., and James Pinnock, to exploit resources in the Niger River basin.6 Jun 1882 Renamed The National African Company Limited (N.A.C.) formed to take over the assets of the U.A.C.5 Jun 1885 British protectorate over Niger Districts. 10 Jul 1886 Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited (R.N.C.), granted a royal charter to replace the N.A.C. 10 Jul 1887 British protectorate, R.N.C. formally given right to administer the region by the U.K. (Niger Territories). 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Company surrenders its charter to U.K. government (effective 1 Jan 1900); R.N.C. is renamed The Niger Company Ltd. and in 1929 it is merged into a new United Africa Company.1 Jan 1900 Company transfers its territories to U.K., which are divided between NorthernNigeria Protectorate and Southern Nigeria Protectorate. President of the United African Company 1879 - 1882 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (b. 1815 - d. 1895) Chairman of The National African Company Limited 1882 - 10 Jul 1886 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (s.a.) Presidents of the Royal Niger Company 10 Jul 1886 - 25 Feb 1895 Henry Austin Bruce, Baron Aberdare (s.a.) Mar 1895 - 1 Jan 1900 Sir George Taubman Goldie (b. 1846 - d. 1925) Agent Generals of United African Company; 1882-1886 National African Company; from 10 Jul 1886, Royal Niger Company Jul 1879 - 1888 David MacIntosh (McIntosh) (b. 1844 - d. 1888) (and from Jul 1884, British vice-consul on the Niger) 15 Nov 1888 - 1 Jan 1900 Joseph Flint (b. 1851 - d. 1925) Northern Nigeria 2 Jun 1887 - 31 Dec 1899 Royal Niger Company 1 Jan 1900 - 1 Jan 1914 Map of Northern Nigeria Capital: Lokoja Population: 9,269,000 (1911) 5 Jun 1885 Niger Districts Protectorate (under United African Company). 10 Jul 1886 Niger River Delta Protectorate (under Royal Niger Company). 1 Jan 1900 Protectorate of Northern Nigeria formed from part of Niger Territories. 1 Jan 1914 Part of British Nigeria Colony and Protectorate as northern province. Director 5 Jun 1885 - 10 Jul 1886 Sir George Taubman Goldie (b. 1846 - d. 1925) Governors10 Jul 1886 - 1 Jan 1900 thePresidents of Royal Niger CompanyHigh Commissionersof the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 1 Jan 1900 - Jun 1906 Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (b. 1858 - d. 1945) (from 1 Jan 1901, Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard) 1901 William Wallace (acting for Lugard)(b. 1856 - d. 1916) 1902 Thomas Lethbridge Napier Morland (b. 1856 - d. 1925) (acting for Lugard) 1903 William Wallace (acting for Lugard)(s.a.) 1906 Arthur Willoughby George Lowry Cole(b. 1860 - d. 1915) (acting for Lugard) Jul 1906 - Apr 1907 Sir William Wallace (acting) (s.a.) Apr 1907 - 7 May 1908 Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard (b. 1867 - d. 1932) Governorsof the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria 7 May 1908 - 28 Sep 1909 Edouard Percy Cranwill Girouard (s.a.) 1908 Sir William Wallace (s.a.) (acting for Girouard) 28 Sep 1909 - 1912 Sir Henry Hesketh Bell (b. 1864 - d. 1952) 1911 Charles Lindsay Temple (b. 1871 - d. 1929) (acting for Bell) 1912 Herbert Symonds Goldsmith (b. 1873 - d. 1945) (acting for Bell) 1912 Charles Lindsay Temple (s.a.) (acting for Bell) Oct 1912 - 31 Dec 1913 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Southern Nigeria 1885 - 1893 1893 - 1 Jan 1900 1 Jan 1900 - 16 Feb 1906 16 Feb 1906 - 1 Jan 1914 Map of Southern Nigeria Capital: Lagos (Calabar 1904-1914; Old Calabar 1885-1904; [Bight of Biafra- Bonny 1849-1885; Bight of Benin- Lagos 1852-1867]) Population: 7,855,749 (1911) 30 Jun 1849 Bight of Biafra (also called Bight of Bonny)(south-eastern Nigeria) declared a British protectorate. 1 Feb 1852 Bight of Benin (south-western Nigeria) declared a British protectorate. 16 Jul 1884 British protectorate over Brass, Bonny, Opobo, Aobh, and Old Calabar (excluding Lagos). 29 Jan 1885 - 24 Oct 1885 German protectorate declared over over fifty miles of coastal land to the east of Lagos, called Mahinland (Mahin-Gebiet), by Heinrich Bey agent of G.L. Gaiser. 5 Jul 1885 Bights of Biafra and Benin united as Oil Rivers Protectorate. 1 Aug 1891 Effective British consular administration established. 13 May 1893 Protectorate extended and renamed Niger Coast Protectorate. 1 Jan 1900 United with parts of the Niger Territories to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria.1 May 1906 Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (incorporating Lagos) (by Order in council of 16 Feb 1906). 1 Jan 1914 Part of British Nigeria Colony and Protectorate as Southern provinces. British Consuls of the Bight of Benin(at Lagos) May 1852 - 21 Jul 1853 Louis Frazer (vice consul) (b. 1819 - d. 1883) 21 Jul 1853 - 17 Apr 1859 Benjamin Campbell (b. 1802? - d. 1859) 18 Apr 1859 - 25 Nov 1859 Edward Francis Lodder (acting) (b. 1836 - d. 1894) 25 Nov 1859 - 16 Jun 1860 George Brand (b. 1816 - d. 1860)16 Jun 1860 - 13 Dec 1860 Henry Hand (acting) (d. 1861?) 21 Dec 1860 - 17 May 1861 Henry Grant Foote (b. 1821? - d. 1861) 17 May 1861 - 29 Jan 1862 William McCoskry (acting) 29 Jan 1862 - 1867 the administrators of Lagos 1867 - 5 Jul 1885 the consuls for the Bight of Biafra British Consuls of the Bight of Biafra (Bonny)(from 1867, and Bight of Benin)(at Fernando Poo) (also British Superintendents of Port Clarence [Fernando Póo] to 1855) 30 Jun 1849 - 10 Jun 1854 John Beecroft (b. 1790 - d. 1854) 10 Jun 1854 - 22 Sep 1855 James William Bishop Lynslager (acting)(b. 1810 - d. 1864) 22 Nov 1855 - 6 Jun 1861 Thomas Joseph Hutchinson (b. 1820 - d. 1885) Sep 1861 - Sep 1864 Sir Richard Francis Burton (b. 1821 - d. 1890) 17 Oct 1864 - 1873 Charles Livingstone (b. 1821 - d. 1873) (acting to 3 Dec 1864) 3 Dec 1870 - 31 Mar 1872 David Hopkins (acting for Livingstone) (b. 1838 - d. 1879) 18 Aug 1873 - 1877 George Hartley 11 Jul 1877 - 1878 Henry Chaster Tait (acting) (b. 1844 - d. 1928) Jan 1878 - 13 Sep 1879 David Hopkins (s.a.) 13 Sep 1879 - 5 Jun 1885 Edward Hyde Hewett (b. 1830 - d. 1891) Consuls-general of the Oil Rivers Protectorate 5 Jun 1885 - 1 Jan 1891 Edward Hyde Hewett (s.a.) 1887 - 1888 Henry "Harry" Hamilton Johnston (b. 1858 - d. 1927) (acting for Hewett) 1 Jan 1891 - 28 Jul 1891 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting) (b. 1859 - d. 1949) (from 9 Nov 1911, Henry Lionel Galway) Commissionersand Consuls-general of the Oil Rivers Protectorate 28 Jul 1891 - 1 Jan 1896 Claude Maxwell MacDonald (b. 1852 - d. 1915) (from 4 Aug 1892, Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald) 6 Sep 1892 - 15 Feb 1893 Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (b. 1860 - d. 1909) (acting for MacDonald) 1 Jan 1896 - 31 Dec 1899 Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (s.a.) (from 22 Jun 1897, Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moore) Aug 1896 - Oct 1896 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.)Oct 1896 - 4 Jan 1897 James Robert Phillips (acting for Moor)(b. c.1864 - d. 1897) Feb 1898 - Dec 1898 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.) High Commissioners of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1 Jan 1900 - Jul 1903 Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor (s.a.) Mar 1900 - Nov 1900 Henry Lionel Gallwey (acting for Moor) (s.a.) Jul 1903 - 1903 Leslie Probyn (acting) (b. 1862 - d. 1938) 1903 - 6 Apr 1904 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (b. 1869 - d. 1935) (acting) 2 Apr 1904 - 30 Apr 1906 Walter Egerton (b. 1858 - d. 1947) (from 9 Nov 1905, Sir Walter Egerton) 13 Jan 1905 - 23 Feb 1905 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 24 Feb 1905 - 3 Apr 1905 Algernon John Bernard Harcourt (b. 1863 - d. 1940) (acting for Egerton) 9 May 1905 - 30 Jul 1905 James Jamieson Thorburn (b. 1864 - d. 1929) (acting for Egerton) 3 Aug 1905 - 27 Sep 1905 Frederick Seton James (b. 1870 - d. 1934) (acting for Egerton) 28 Sep 1905 - 22 Dec 1905Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 1 Jan 1906 - 11 Feb 1906 James Jamieson Thorburn (b. 1864 - d. 1929) (acting for Egerton) Governorsand Administrators of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1 May 1906 - 27 Feb 1912 Sir Walter Egerton (s.a.) 10 Jun 1906 - 5 Aug 1906 Widenham Francis Widenham Fosbery (s.a.) (acting for Egerton) 3 Oct 1912 - 31 Dec 1913 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Lagos 1870 - 1886 1886 - 30 Apr 1906 Map of Lagos Colony Capital: Lagos Population: 72,703 (1911) 6 Aug 1861 Lagos and adjacent area ceded to the U.K. 5 Mar 1862 British colony as Lagos; local dynasty continues (see under Nigerian traditional states) (subordinated to Sierra Leone 1866-1874, and then to the Gold Coast 1874-1886). 22 Aug 1862 Lagos Settlement 19 Feb 1866 - 24 Jul 1874 Lagos a territory of British West Africa. 24 Jul 1874 - 13 Jan 1886 Part of Gold Coast Lagos colony. 13 Jan 1886 Lagos a separate colony. 18 Oct 1887 Lagos protectorate in hinterland (Colony and Protectorate of Lagos). 1 May 1906 Incorporated into Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (by Order in council of 16 Feb 1906). Governorsof the Settlement of Lagos 6 Aug 1861 - 22 Jan 1862 William McCoskry (acting) (= Ajele Apongbon) 22 Jan 1862 - Apr 1865 Henry Stanhope Freeman (b. 1836 - d. 1865)1863 25 Jul 1863 William Rice Mulliner (acting) (b. 1834 - d. 1863)Aug 1863 - 24 Mar 1866 John Hawley Glover (b. 1829 - d. 1885) (acting to 21 Apr 1865) Administratorsof the Settlement of Lagos Mar 1866 - Apr 1866 John Hawley Glover (s.a.) Apr 1866 - Nov 1866 Charles George Edward Patey (b. 1813 - d. 1881) (acting) Nov 1866 - Aug 1870 John Hawley Glover (1st time) (s.a.) Aug 1870 - 1870 Henry Towry Miles Cooper (b. 1838 - d. 1877) (acting for Glover) 1870 William Henry Simpson (b. 1830 - d. 1872) (acting for Glover) 1870 - 1871 John Hawley Glover (2nd time) (s.a.) 1871 Josiah Gerard (d. 1872) (acting for Glover) 1871 - Jun 1872 John Hawley Glover (3rd time) (s.a.) Mar 1872 - Jun 1872 John Pope Hennessy (b. 1834 - d. 1891) (acting for Glover) Jun 1872 - Dec 1872 Henry William John Fowler (interim) (b. 1842 - d. 1893)Dec 1872 - Aug 1873 George Berkeley (b. 1819 - d. 1905) Aug 1873 - Oct 1873 Charles Cameron Lees (1st time) (b. 1831 - d. 1898) (acting) Oct 1873 - Jun 1874 George Cumine Strahan (b. 1838 - d. 1889) Jun 1874 - Sep 1874 John Shaw (acting) (b. 1838 - d. 1899) Lieutenant GovernorsAdministering the Government of Lagos Sep 1874 - Jun 1875 Charles Cameron Lees (2nd time) (s.a.) Jun 1875 - Feb 1876 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (1st time) (b. 1830 - d. 1878) (acting) Feb 1876 - Mar 1876 Charles Cameron Lees (3rd time) (s.a.) Mar 1876 - Dec 1876 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (2nd time) (s.a.) Jan 1877 - Nov 1877 Charles Cameron Lees (4th time) (s.a.) Nov 1877 - 9 Apr 1878 John d'Auvergne Dumaresq (3rd time) (s.a.) (acting)6 Apr 1878 - 29 Apr 1878 Frank Simpson (acting) (b. 1836 - d. 1912) 30 Apr 1878 - 16 Aug 1878 Malcolm Janson Brown (acting) 17 Aug 1878 - Sep 1879 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (1st time) (b. 1848 - d. 1913) (acting) Sep 1879 - Oct 1879 Herbert Taylor John Ussher (b. 1836 - d. 1880) Oct 1879 - Dec 1880 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (2nd time) (s.a.) (acting) Dec 1880 - Dec 1880 William Brandford Griffith (b. 1824 - d. 1897)1880 Charles Dennett Turton (acting) (b. c.1840 - d. 1913) Dec 1880 - May 1881 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (3rd time) (s.a.) (acting) May 1881 - Oct 1882 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (1st time) Oct 1882 - Apr 1883 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (acting) (s.a.) Apr 1883 - Aug 1883 Sir Samuel Rowe (acting) (b. 1835 - d. 1888) Aug 1883 - Mar 1884 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (2nd time)Mar 1884 - Aug 1884 Robert Murray Rumsey (acting) (b. 1849 - d. 1922) Aug 1884 - Feb 1885 Robert Knapp Barrow (acting) (b. 1838 - d. 1888) Feb 1885 - May 1885 William Brandford Griffith (s.a.) (3rd time) May 1885 - May 1885 Charles Pike (acting) (b. 1840? - d. 1891) May 1885 - Jan 1886 Frederick Evans (acting) (b. 1849 - d. 1939)Governors and Commanders-in-chief of the Colony of Lagos 13 Jan 1886 - 1889 Cornelius Alfred Moloney (1st time) (s.a.) (from 1 Jan 1890, Sir Cornelius Alfred Moloney) 1889 - 1890 George Chardin Denton (acting) (b. 1851 - d. 1928)1890 - 1891 Sir Cornelius Alfred Moloney (s.a.) (2nd time) Sep 1891 - Oct 1896 Gilbert Thomas Carter (b. 1848 - d. 1927) (from 3 Jun 1893, Sir Gilbert Thomas Carter) Oct 1896 - 1896 Frank Rohrweger (acting) (b. 1859 - d. ....) 1896 - Apr 1897 William Brandford Griffith (acting) (b. 1858 - d. 1939) 23 Apr 1897 - May 1899 Henry Edward McCallum (b. 1852 - d. 1919) (from 4 Jul 1898, Sir Henry Edward McCallum) 1898 - 1899 George Chardin Denton (s.a.) (acting for McCallum) May 1899 - 1902 Sir William MacGregor (1st time) (b. 1847 - d. 1919) 1900 - 1901 George Chardin Denton (s.a.) (acting for MacGregor) 1902 Henry Fenwick Reeve (acting) (b. 1857 - d. 1946) 1902 - 1903 Charles Herbert Harley Moseley (b. 1857 - d. 1933) (1st time)(acting) 1903 - Jan 1904 Sir William MacGregor (2nd time) (s.a.)Jan 1904 - Sep 1904 Charles Herbert Harley Moseley (s.a.) (2nd time)(acting) 16 Sep 1904 - 30 Apr 1906 Walter Egerton (b. 1858 - d. 1947) (from 9 Nov 1905, Sir Walter Egerton) Nigeria 1 Jan 1914 Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria 1 Oct 1954 Federation of Nigeria 1 Oct 1960 Independence 1 Oct 1963 Federal Republic of Nigeria 24 May 1966 Republic of Nigeria 1 Sep 1966 Federal Republic of Nigeria Governor-generaland Commander-in-chief 1 Jan 1914 - 8 Aug 1919 Sir Frederick John Dealtry Lugard (s.a.) Governors and Commanders-in-chief 8 Aug 1919 - 13 Nov 1925 Sir Hugh Charles Clifford (b. 1866 - d. 1941) 13 Nov 1925 - 17 Jun 1931 Sir Graeme Thomson (b. 1875 - d. 1933) 17 Jun 1931 - 1 Nov 1935 Sir Donald Charles Cameron (b. 1872 - d. 1948) 1 Nov 1935 - May 1943 Sir Bernard Henry Bourdillon (b. 1883 - d. 1948) 1 Jul 1940 - 1942 Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh (b. 1877 - d. 1953) (did not take office) 19 May 1942 - 13 Jul 1942 Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell Burns (b. 1887 - d. 1980) (acting for Bourdillon) May 1943 - 18 Dec 1943 Sir Alan Cuthbert Maxwell Burns (s.a.) (acting) 18 Dec 1943 - 14 Oct 1947 Sir Arthur Frederick Richards (b. 1885 - d. 1978) 14 Oct 1947 - 15 Apr 1948 George Beresford-Stooke (acting) (b. 1897 - d. 1983) 15 Apr 1948 - 1 Oct 1954 Sir John Stuart Macpherson (b. 1898 - d. 1971) Queen¹ 1 Oct 1960 - 1 Oct 1963 the Queen of the United KingdomGovernors-general and Commanders-in-chief (representing the British monarch as head of state from 1 Oct 1960) 1 Oct 1954 - 15 Jun 1955 Sir John Stuart Macpherson (s.a.) Non-party 15 Jun 1955 - 15 Nov 1960 Sir James Wilson Robertson (b. 1899 - d. 1983) Non-party 15 Nov 1960 - 1 Oct 1963 Nnamdi Chukwuemeka Azikiwe (b. 1904 - d. 1996) NCNC Presidentand Commander-in-chief 1 Oct 1963 - 16 Jan 1966 Nnamdi Chukwuemeka Azikiwe (s.a.) NCNC Head of the Federal Military Government, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces15 Jan 1966 - 17 Jan 1966 Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (b. 1937 d. 1967) Mil (head of Supreme Council of Revolution of Nigerian Armed Forces, in rebellion) 16 Jan 1966 - 24 May 1966 Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi- (b. 1924 - d. 1966) Mil Ironsi Heads of the National Military Government, Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces 24 May 1966 - 29 Jul 1966 Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi- (s.a.) Mil Ironsi 29 Jul 1966 - 1 Aug 1966 Vacant 1 Aug 1966 - 1 Sep 1966 Yakubu Cinwa Dan-Yumma Gowon (b. 1934) Mil Heads of the Federal Military Government, Supreme Commanders of the Armed Forces (from 17 Mar 1967, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) 1 Sep 1966 - 29 Jul 1975 Yakubu Cinwa Dan-Yumma Gowon (s.a.) Mil 29 Jul 1975 - 13 Feb 1976 Murtala Ramat Mohammed (b. 1938 - d. 1976) Mil 14 Feb 1976 - 1 Oct 1979 Olusegun Fajinmi Okikiolakan Aremu (b. 1937) Mil Obasanjo Presidentand Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 1 Oct 1979 - 31 Dec 1983 Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari (b. 1925 - d. 2018) NPN Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces31 Dec 1983 - 27 Aug 1985 Muhammadu Buhari (b. 1942) Mil President, Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces27 Aug 1985 - 26 Aug 1993 Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (b. 1941) Mil Head of the Interim National Government26 Aug 1993 - 17 Nov 1993 Ernest Adegunle Oladeinde Shonekan (b. 1936 - d. 2022) Non-party Heads of State and Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 17 Nov 1993 - 8 Jun 1998 Sani Abacha (b. 1943 - d. 1998) Mil 9 Jun 1998 - 29 May 1999 Abdulsalam Abubakar (b. 1942) Mil Presidents, Commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces 29 May 1999 - 29 May 2007 Olusegun Fajinmi Okikiolakan Aremu (s.a.) PDP Obasanjo 29 May 2007 - 5 May 2010 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (b. 1951 - d. 2010) PDP (incapacitated by illness from 9 Feb 2010) 9 Feb 2010 - 29 May 2015 Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan (b. 1957) PDP (acting for Yar'Adua to 5 May 2010) 29 May 2015 - 29 May 2023 Muhammadu Buhari (s.a.) APC 6 Jun 2016 - 20 Jun 2016 Yemi Osinbajo (1st time) (b. 1957) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 19 Jan 2017 - 13 Mar 2017 Yemi Osinbajo (2nd time) (s.a.) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 7 May 2017 - 19 Aug 2017 Yemi Osinbajo (3rd time) (s.a.) APC (acting for absent Buhari) 29 May 2023 - Bola Ahmed Adekunle Tinubu (b. 1952) APC Prime ministers30 Aug 1957 - 15 Jan 1966 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (b. 1912 - d. 1966) NPC;1964 (from 1 Jan 1960, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) + NNA15 Jan 1966 - 17 Jan 1966 Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (acting) (b. 1917 - d. 1969) NPC Chairman of the Transitional Council 4 Jan 1993 - 26 Aug 1993 Ernest Adegunle Oladeinde Shonekan (s.a.) Non-party ¹Full style: (a) 1 Oct 1960 - 31 Aug 1961: "By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith"; (b) 31 Aug 1961 - 1 Oct 1963: "By the Grace of God Queen of Nigeria and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth." Territorial Disputes: Joint Border Commission with Cameroon reviewed 2002 ICJ ruling on the entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including Jun 2006 Greentree Agreement that immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phase-out of Nigerian control within two years while resolving patriation issues; the ICJ ruled on an equidistance settlement of Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of Guinea, but imprecisely defined coordinates in the ICJ decision and a sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River all contribute to the delay in implementation; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty which also includes the Chad-Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries; location of Benin-Niger-Nigeria tripoint is unresolved. Party abbreviations (political parties banned 1966-1979, 1983-1989): APC = All Progressives Congress (progressive, merger of ACN, ANPP, CPC, and APGA dissidents, est.6 Feb 2013); APP = All People's Party (coalition of associations, 1998-2003, then ANPP); PDP = People's Democratic Party (social conservative, est.1998);Mil = Military; - Former parties:NNA = Nigerian National Alliance (northern based electoral coalition, incl. NPC and Nigerian National Democratic Party and others, 1964-1966); NPN = National Party of Nigeria (coalition, 1978-1983); NPC Northern People's Congress (northern autonomist, Hausa/Fulani dominated, 1951-1966); NCNC = National Council of Nigerian Citizens (Igbo dominated, until 1959 named National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, 1944-1966); UPN = Unity Party of Nigeria (social democratic, seen pro-Yoruba, 1978-1983) Biafra 30 May 1967 - 12 Jan 1970 Map of Biafra Hear National Anthem "Land of the Rising Sun" Text of National Anthem (1967-1970) Constitution (30 May 1967) Capital: Enugu (Umuahia 1967-69, Owerri 1969-70) Currency: 1968-1970 Biafran Pound (BIAP) National Holiday: 30 May (1967) Independence Day Population: 13,500,000 (1967) GDP: $N/A Exports: $N/A Imports: $N/A Ethnic groups: Igbo (Ibo) 70%, Ibibio, Ijaw, Ogoja, Ekoi, Efik, and others Total Armed Forces: 100,000 (1968) Merchant marine: N/A Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, traditional beliefs International Organizations/Treaties: None 30 May 1967 Secession of the Eastern Region of Nigeria as Republic of Biafra (not widely recognized internationally¹). 10-26 Jul 1967 Nigerian federal troops take Ogoja, Nsukka and Bonny Island. 9 Aug 1967 - 20 Sep 1967 Midwest Region occupied by Biafra, and Republic of Benin declared on 19 Sep 1967 (see Edo under federal states). 28 Sep 1967 Enugu captured, new capital Unuahia. 24 May 1968 Port Harcourt captured. 22 Apr 1969 Unuahia captured, last capital Owerri. 9 Jan 1970 Owerri captured. 12 Jan 1970 Re-integration into Nigeria. 15 Jan 1970 Biafran forces formally surrender. Head of State and Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra 30 May 1967 - 15 Jan 1970 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (b. 1933 - d. 2011) Mil 8 Jan 1970 - 15 Jan 1970 Philip Efiong (b. 1924 - d. 2003) Mil (acting for Odumegwu-Ojukwu) ¹recognized only by: Tanzania (13 Apr 1968), Gabon (8 May 1968), Ivory Coast (9 May 1968), Zambia (20 May 1968), and Haiti (22 Mar 1969). Republic of Benin: see Edo under Federal states © Ben Cahoon
9206	dbpedia	3	53	https://academic.oup.com/book/32096/chapter/268018529	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
9206	dbpedia	0	47	https://althistory.fandom.com/wiki/British_West_Africa_(Twilight_of_a_New_Era)	en	British West Africa (Twilight of a New Era)	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/0/0c/Flag_of_British_West_Africa_%28TNE%29.png/revision/latest?cb=20140501034444	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/0/0c/Flag_of_British_West_Africa_%28TNE%29.png/revision/latest?cb=20140501034444	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210916044045", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/e/e6/Site-logo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210916044045", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/0/0c/Flag_of_British_West_Africa_%28TNE%29....	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Alternative History" ]	null	British West Africa (BWA) is a colony of the Imperial Commonwealth Federation (former British Empire) in western Africa. BWA consists of the Colony of the Gold Coast, Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone and Colony and Protectorate of Gambia. BWA is bordered by French West Africa (all three...	en	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/images/4/4a/Site-favicon.ico/revision/latest?cb=20210916203836	Alternative History	https://althistory.fandom.com/wiki/British_West_Africa_(Twilight_of_a_New_Era)	British West Africa (BWA) is a colony of the Imperial Commonwealth Federation (former British Empire) in western Africa. BWA consists of the Colony of the Gold Coast, Colony and Protectorate of Sierra Leone and Colony and Protectorate of Gambia. BWA is bordered by French West Africa (all three territories of BWA) and Liberia (southeast of Sierra Leone). BWA had previously existed has British West African Territories (1821-1850) and British West African Settlements (1866-1888). Colonial administration and government[] BWA is administered by a Governor-General, who is assisted by the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. The Executive Council is a small advisory body of European officials that recommends laws and votes taxes, subject to the governor's approval. The Legislative Council includes the members of the Executive Council and unofficial members initially chosen from British commercial interests. After 1900 native chiefs and other Africans were added to the Legislative Council, these being chosen from the Europeanized communities of BWA. the Governor-General names all Governor and administrative staff of the BWA. The gradual emergence of centralized colonial government brought about unified control over local services, although the actual administration of these services was still delegated to local authorities. British authorities adopted a system of indirect rule for colonial administration, wherein traditional chiefs maintained power but took instructions from their European supervisors. Indirect rule was cost-effective (by reducing the number of European officials needed), minimized local opposition to European rule, and guaranteed law and order. Many chiefs, who were rewarded with honors, decorations, and knighthood by government commissioners, came to regard themselves as a ruling aristocracy. Specific duties and responsibilities came to be clearly delineated, and the role of traditional states in local administration was also clarified. The structure of local government had its roots in traditional patterns of government. Village councils of chiefs and elders were responsible for the immediate needs of individual localities, including traditional law and order and the general welfare. The councils ruled by consent rather than by right: though chosen by the ruling class, a chief continued to rule because he was accepted by his people. In 1925 provincial councils of chiefs were established in all three territories of the colony, partly to give the chiefs a colony-wide function. The Native Administration Ordinance clarified and regulated the powers and areas of jurisdiction of chiefs and councils. Administrative division[] The territories of BWA are: Territory Administrative center Languages Area (km2) Notes The Gambia Bathurst English, Krio and Mandinka 10,689 Colony and Protectorate Sierra Leone Freetown English, Krio, Tenme and Mende 71,740 Protectorate Gold Coast Accra English, Akan and Krio 238,535 Colony and Protectorate Each territory is divided in regions (colony) or territories (protectorate), however this distinction is only formal. Both regions and territories are subdivided in provinces, districts and town councils. Economy[] The economy of BWA is mainly agricultural. The main crops are rice, cassava, sorghum, maize, millet, sweet potato and groundnut. The main industrial production is cacao. The Gold Coast's earnings are increased further from the export of timber, and gold. Sierra Leone has one of the world's largest deposits of rutile, a titanium ore and a major producer of diamonds. The West African Currency Board (WACB, headquartered in London) acts as the central bank and issues the British West African pound, also used in British Nigeria. Transport and communications[] The Airship Base of Bathurst is operated by the Imperial Airship Services, later Imperial Airway. Education[] The British West African School Boards is in charge of administrating primary and secondary schools, teacher training and the curriculum. Its declared goals are primary education for every African boy and girl; a training college for teachers in every province; better salaries for teachers; and ultimately, a 'Royal College' . The Krio language is the main lingua franca and de facto national language spoken throughout BWA. It became lingua franca through its encouragement by colonial administration for official affairs, usage in large urban centers and the migration of workers through out the territories of the BWA. Finally being officially promoted as instruction medium in the educational system. The Akan language is the other main lingua franca and de facto national language, but mainly in Gold Coast. The Fourah Bay College (founded on 18 February, 1827 in Freetown, Sierra Leone) is the main public university of BWA. It is the oldest university in West Africa and the first western-style university built in West Africa. Armed forces[] The Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) is the army group, that has joint command in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia. is organized in 4 regiments and Volunteer Corps. British officers and noncommissioned officers organize, train, and equip regiments of the RWAFF. See also[]
9206	dbpedia	3	12	https://aarcentre.com/ojs3/index.php/jaash/article/view/300	en	NIGERIAN CURRENCY SYSTEM, 1914-2014: A CENTURY OF TRANSFORMATION	https://aarcentre.com/oj…sue_36_en_US.jpg		[ "https://aarcentre.com/ojs3/../public/journals/1/cover_issue_36_en_US.jpg", "https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png", "https://s01.flagcounter.com/count2/sC/bg_FFFFFF/txt_000000/border_CCCCCC/columns_2/maxflags_20/viewers_0/labels_1/pageviews_1/flags_0/percent_0/", "https://aarcentre.com/ojs3/lib/pk...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Yasin Abubakar", "Mujitaba Liman Arabu" ]	null		en			null	Abstract In 1914, the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Colony and Protectorate of southern Nigeria were merged by Sir Fredrick Lugard. The new territory became known as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Lugard became its first Governor General and ruled between 1914 and 1919. Before then, Southern Nigeria which was a British Protectorate in the coastal areas of modern-day Nigeria formed in 1900, was added to Lagos Colony in 1906, and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. From that time till date, the country has been experiencing transformations in its currency system. This paper sets to offer a historical overview of the transformation of Nigeria’s currency system over a period of one hundred years, from 1914 to 2014. The paper demonstrates how the Nigerian currency system has evolved in the course of hundred years from a cash-based type to an increasingly cashless type. It was concluded that, although it is replete with challenges, the ongoing cashless policy in the country has come to stay. The paper is based on qualitative method of data collection and evaluation. Both primary and secondary sources of historical data have been consulted and utilised on the course of writing the paper.
9206	dbpedia	0	10	https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/	en	The World Factbook	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	[ "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/28e23627b09c310dd199c697bc4d3d18/7cf55/NI-flag.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/28e23627b09c310dd199c697bc4d3d18/7cf55/NI-flag.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/94c718cca623fc859b1b6633b67bd36c/11034/NI-map.jpg", "https://ww...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/the-world-factbook/favicon-32x32.png?v=c3853bf09f084a8b1f66c6c2685054a1		null	Background In ancient and pre-colonial times, the area of present-day Nigeria was occupied by a variety of ethnic groups with different languages and traditions. These included large Islamic kingdoms such as Borno, Kano, and the Sokoto Caliphate dominating the north, the Benin and Oyo Empires that controlled much of modern western Nigeria, and more decentralized political entities and city states in the south and southeast. In 1914, the British amalgamated their separately administered northern and southern territories into a Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Nigeria achieved independence from Britain in 1960 and transitioned to a federal republic with three constituent states in 1963 under President Nnamdi AZIKIWE. This structure served to enflame regional and ethnic tension, contributing to a bloody coup led by predominately southeastern military officers in 1966 and a countercoup later that year masterminded by northern officers. In the aftermath of this tension, the governor of Nigeriaâs Eastern Region, centered on the southeast, declared the region independent as the Republic of Biafra. The ensuring civil war (1967-1970), resulted in more than a million deaths, many from starvation. While the war forged a stronger Nigerian state and national identity, it contributed to long-lasting mistrust of the southeastâs predominantly Igbo population. Wartime military leader Yakubu GOWON ruled until a bloodless coup by frustrated junior officers in 1975. This generation of officers, including Olusegun OBASANJO, Ibrahim BABANGIDA, and Muhammadu BUHARI, who would all later serve as president, continue to exert significant influence in Nigeria to the present day. Military rule predominated until the first durable transition to civilian government and adoption of a new constitution in 1999. The elections of 2007 marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history. National and state elections in 2011 and 2015 were generally regarded as credible. The 2015 election was also heralded for the fact that the then-umbrella opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, defeated the long-ruling (since 1999) People's Democratic Party and assumed the presidency, marking the first peaceful transfer of power from one party to another. Presidential and legislative elections in 2019 and 2023 were deemed broadly free and fair despite voting irregularities, intimidation, and violence. The government of Africa's most populous nation continues to face the daunting task of institutionalizing democracy and reforming a petroleum-based economy whose revenues have been squandered through decades of corruption and mismanagement. In addition, Nigeria faces increasing violence from Islamic terrorism, largely in the northeast, large scale criminal banditry, secessionist violence in the southeast, and competition over land and resources nationwide. Demographic profile Nigeriaâs population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the worldâs fourth most populous country. Nigeriaâs sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families. Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking. Major infectious diseases degree of risk: very high (2023) food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and sexually transmitted diseases: hepatitis B (2024) water contact diseases: schistosomiasis animal contact diseases: rabies respiratory diseases: meningococcal meningitis aerosolized dust or soil contact diseases: Lassa fever note 1: on 4 May 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for a Yellow Fever outbreak in Nigeria; a large, ongoing outbreak of yellow fever in Nigeria began in September 2017; the outbreak is now spread throughout the country with the Nigerian Ministry of Health reporting cases of the disease in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu); the CDC recommends travelers going to Nigeria should receive vaccination against yellow fever at least 10 days before travel and should take steps to prevent mosquito bites while there; those never vaccinated against yellow fever should avoid travel to Nigeria during the outbreak (see attached map) note 2: on 31 August 2023, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Nigeria is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an âinfectedâ person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine note 3: on 20 September 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention updated a Travel Health Alert for a diphtheria outbreak in several states in Nigeria; vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; before travel, discuss the need for a booster dose with your healthcare professional; diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacteria that make a toxin from which people get very sick; diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person through respiratory droplets like from coughing or sneezing; people can also get sick from touching open sores or ulcers of people sick with diphtheria (see attached map) note 1: The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) is reporting yellow fever outbreaks in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu). Unless vaccinated, travelers should not visit these areas. Yellow fever is caused by a virus transmitted through bites of infected mosquitoes. Travelers to Nigeria should take steps to prevent yellow fever by getting vaccinated at least 10 days before travel and taking steps to prevent mosquito bites. Map courtesy of CDC. : note 3: There is an outbreak of diphtheria in several states in Nigeria. Vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease. If you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines. Map courtesy of CDC. : Food insecurity widespread lack of access: due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas,Â floods, high food prices, and an economic slowdown - about 25.3 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity during the June to August 2023 lean season; this would be a significant deterioration compared to last year, when 19.45 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure; acute food insecurity is mostly driven by the deterioration of security conditions and conflicts in northern states, which have led to the displacement of about 3.17 million people as of March 2022 (the latest data available) and are constraining farmersâ access to their lands; widespread flooding in 2022, affecting about 4.5 million people across the country, has further compounded conditions, particularly in areas already facing high levels of insecurity; high food prices and the expected slowdown in economic growth in 2023 are additional drivers of acute food insecurity (2023) Constitution history: several previous; latest adopted 5 May 1999, effective 29 May 1999 amendments: proposed by the National Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote of both houses and approval by the Houses of Assembly of at least two thirds of the states; amendments to constitutional articles on the creation of a new state, fundamental constitutional rights, or constitution-amending procedures requires at least four-fifths majority vote by both houses of the National Assembly and approval by the Houses of Assembly in at least two thirds of the states; passage of amendments limited to the creation of a new state require at least two-thirds majority vote by the proposing National Assembly house and approval by the Houses of Assembly in two thirds of the states; amended several times, last in 2018 Executive branch chief of state: President Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (since 29 May 2023) head of government: President Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (since 29 May 2023) cabinet: Federal Executive Council appointed by the president but constrained constitutionally to include at least one member from each of the 36 states elections/appointments: president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 25 February 2023 (next to be held on 27 February 2027) note - the president is chief of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces election results: 2023: Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU elected president; percent of vote - Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (APC) 36.6%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 29.1%, Peter OBI (LP) 25.4%, Rabiu KWANKWASO (NNPP) 6.4%, other 2.5% 2019: Muhammadu BUHARI elected president; percent of vote - Muhammadu BUHARI (APC) 53%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 39%, other 8% Â Telecommunication systems general assessment: one of the larger telecom markets in Africa subject to sporadic access to electricity and vandalism of infrastructure; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; market competition with affordable access; LTE technologies available but GSM is dominant; mobile penetration high due to use of multiple SIM cards and phones; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; operators to deploy fiber optic cable in six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invested in base stations to deplete network congestion; submarine cable break in 2020 slowed speeds and interrupted connectivity; Nigeria concluded its first 5G spectrum auction in 2021 and granted licenses to two firms; construction of 5G infrastructure has not yet been completed (2022) domestic: fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership is 91 per 100 persons (2021) international: country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC, NCSCS,Â MainOne, Glo-1 & 2, ACE, and EquianoÂ fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and South and West Africa; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2019) Military and security forces Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN): Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC); Ministry of Police Affairs: Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (2024) note 1: the NSCDC is a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters note 2: the Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the NSCDC, the Ministry of Justice, and the NPF; border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, the DSS, the NSCDC, Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, and the AFN note 3: some states have created local security forces akin to neighborhood watches in response to increased violence, insecurity, and criminality that have exceeded the response capacity of federal government security forces but as of January 2024, official security forces remained the constitutional perogative of the federal government Military - note the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africaâs largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the military's primary concerns are internal and maritime security, and it faces a number of challenges; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs--locally referred to as bandits--and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwestern Nigeria are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths) the Navy is focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023) Space program overview has a formal national space program, which is one of the largest in Africa; focused on acquiring satellites for agricultural, environmental, meteorology, mining and disaster monitoring, socio-economic development, and security purposes; designs, builds (mostly with foreign assistance), and operates satellites; processes overhead imagery data for analysis and sharing; developing additional capabilities in satellite and satellite payload production, including remote sensing (RS) technologies; has a sounding rocket program for researching rockets and rocket propulsion systems with goal of launching domestically produced satellites into space from a Nigerian spaceport by 2030; has relations and/or cooperation agreements with a variety of foreign space agencies and industries, including those of Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Ghana, India, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, the US, and Vietnam; has a government-owned satellite company and a small commercial aerospace sector (2024) note: further details about the key activities, programs, and milestones of the countryâs space program, as well as government spending estimates on the space sector, appear in the Space Programs reference guide
9206	dbpedia	3	45	https://www.facebook.com/dejiodulesi/posts/calabar-capital-of-cross-river-state-and-the-first-capital-of-the-southern-prote/747587400690669/	en	Facebook			[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		de	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yT/r/aGT3gskzWBf.ico		null
9206	dbpedia	3	44	https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/ng/ng_full.html	en	Commanding Heights : Nigeria			[ "https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/ng/images/co_report_lo_flagng.jpg", "https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/images/singpix.gif", "https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/countries/images/co_report_lo_logo.gif", "https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/coun...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	British colonial influence becomes more concentrated during the 19th century. Growing economic involvement, particularly in the export of palm oil, leads to the annexation of the port of Lagos in 1861. The Royal Niger Company establishes and expands political and economic administration until transferring authority to the crown in 1900. Protectorates are established in North, South, and East. Britain formally establishes the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914 under the governorship of Sir Frederick Lugard. Separate administrative units are created to allow government through "indirect rule." The British interact with a select few indigenous rulers and institutions, and contact with the majority of the population is limited. Africans are barred from political power. Indirect rule spawns a nationalist movement. Protesting the increased authority granted the traditional elite (kings and tribal chiefs) by the British, nationalists attempt to work within the colonial structure toward a variety of sociopolitical and economic goals. Nationalist positions include opposition to taxation and the establishment of municipal self-government. Economic depression brings hardship, unemployment, and heightened nationalist consciousness. European entities such as the United Africa Company, which controls 40 percent of the import/export trade, stir discontent with colonial domination. Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia and the rise in popularity of journalist and anticolonial nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe help focus unrest on colonial rule. The nationalist movement gains momentum during World War II as Nigerian soldiers are exposed to Allied propaganda that touts liberty, freedom, and equality. India's independence from Britain in 1947 intensifies the movement, and postwar restructuring increases pressure on the British to grant its colonies independence. The economic environment worsens after a wartime growth spurt. Concessions by the colonial government pave the way for Nigerian independence. Maneuvering begins in earnest as ethnic and regional interests that determine loyalties and alliances dominate the political landscape. A British-sponsored 1953 conference in London brings together members of competing political parties and regions to determine the constitution for the soon-to-be independent nation. After 15 years of gradual constitutional reforms and peaceful transfer of power, Nigeria gains independence on October 1, 1960. Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa is elected prime minister. His majority Northern People's Party governs in coalition with Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian National Council, which has the support of the Eastern Igbos. Presidential elections are set for 1963. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is declared on October 1, 1963. Nnamdi Azikiwe is elected president. Brewing regional resentment over perceived Northern domination in the federal government prevents agreement on a long-range economic development plan. The nascent government inherits control of a highly centralized economy from its colonial predecessors. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi assumes power in a military coup fueled by regional hostilities. He dissolves the legislature, suspends the constitution, and establishes a military government. Appointed military governors replace elected civilian representatives. Ironsi is soon killed in a countercoup mounted by Northern elements. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon takes power. Eastern regional leaders refuse to recognize Gowon's authority. Negotiations to resolve the North's ethnic violence and general conflict over economic policy and political administration are fruitless. In May 1967 the East declares the Independent Republic of Biafra. Gowon immediately attacks. By the time the fledgling republic surrenders in 1970, more than one million people have died. Nigeria joins OPEC as the world's seventh largest petroleum-producing country, with crude oil exportation dominating the economy. Although the state controls the oil, it depends on foreign companies for extraction and maintains a role of granting licenses and collecting fees. Gowon's military regime continues to centralize power and reneges on promises to return the government to civilian rule. Gowon's administration is overthrown in a bloodless coup in July 1975. Lt. Gen. Murtala Muhammad takes power, promising political and economic reforms and a return to civilian rule. Within a year, Muhammad is assassinated, and Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo replaces him, earning the respect of the people by continuing both his predecessor's reform programs and the transition to the Second Republic. Alhaji Shehu Shagari is elected president in 1979. Decentralization of power continues as states receive more revenue allocation and the authority to collect taxes. But widespread corruption impedes development prospects. Despite falling oil prices, government spending continues and debt climbs. After bloody ethnic and religious clashes, two million illegal immigrants are expelled. A failing economy, widespread political corruption, and broad civil unrest contribute to the Second Republic's collapse. Muhammadu Buhari, brought to power by military coup, imposes draconian measures on Nigeria, punishing those associated with the civilian government, curtailing press freedom, subordinating the judiciary to the military, and failing to announce a planned return to civilian rule. Gaining power in a 1985 coup, Ibrahim Babangida promises a return to civilian rule and policies designed to address economic woes and rampant corruption. While his regime uses tactics to stall the governmental transition, it also launches the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), a comprehensive economic austerity package meant to deemphasize governmental control of economic interests. Babangida's reign ends in disgrace when he annuls the 1993 elections, of which Moshood Abiola was the clear victor. SAP policies result in devaluation of Naira, unemployment, and a cost of living unbearable for most Nigerians. Babangida resigns, turning the government over to his handpicked transitional council. The council's leader, Ernest Shonekan, is promptly ousted by Gen. Sani Abacha. Widely considered the most corrupt dictator of the post-colonial era, Abacha tramples human rights and brings the country to the brink of destruction while claiming to make plans for another return to civilian rule. Abacha abolishes all state and local governments, the federal legislature, and political activity. Abiola is jailed. Civil unrest builds. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar replaces Abacha. Abubakar reaches out diplomatically to other African nations and the West in an effort to restore Nigeria's image. Human rights violations recede, but the continued expenditure of revenues on debt servicing, rather than on social services and basic necessities, prevents infrastructure improvements and stokes discontent. Olusegun Obasanjo, forced from power almost 25 years earlier, wins the 1999 presidential election. Monetary policy, agricultural revitalization, political stability, a war on corruption, and privatization of parastatals are all announced as reform priorities, but holding the country together amid dramatic civil unrest and violent religious clashes quickly takes precedence. The adoption of sharia (Islamic law) in the Northern states, continued difficulties of economic management, the volatility of oil prices, and ongoing regional and local protest movements make governing Nigeria extremely difficult. Spending outpaces revenue, and President Obasanjo is under constant political pressure. Violence escalates in the Southern provinces during the weeks preceding national and regional elections. Ethnic and tribal tensions flare. As opposing political parties vie for control of Nigeria's richest oilfields, reports of election irregularities in that region are rife. Oil output drops. President Obasanjo wins a sweeping victory amid widespread accusations of election fraud. back to top Of Nigeria's many ethnic groups, the West's Yoruba, the Southeast's Igbo, and the North's Hausa represent the largest regional divisions. The three are divided by language, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions. British colonial administration encourages their deep cultural separation, which reinforces a natural impediment to national and political unity. Governor-General Frederick Lugard implements a local format of indirect rule, borrowed from its perceived successful implementation in India and Sudan. The British colonial administration uses select local leaders to carry out colonial regulations and laws, thereby minimizing direct contact with the people and also opposition to the policies and intrusion of a foreign authority. A nationalist movement led by such charismatic figures as Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe gives voice to anticolonial dissent. Local legislative councils evolve under the hegemony of colonial rule and exchange ideas about nationalization and administrative participation with other councils. Though their demands are rebuffed, a lasting nationalist consciousness is born. The Nigerian National Council is formed in 1944 in response to the colonial administration's refusal to consider nationalist demands. With Herbert Macaulay as president and Nnamdi Azikiwe as secretary general, the council opens membership to all Nigerians in an effort at unity. With a goal of self-governance, the council shuns its past passive willingness to work within the current administration. The British begin to yield to Nigeria's nationalist movement and mounting postwar pressure to decolonize. Constitutional revisions in 1947 allow for the creation of a central legislative body. The following year, large-scale reforms are implemented. Steps are taken to "Nigerianize" the civil service, democratize the local legislatures, and expand social services. The London Conference of 1953 yields a constitution for an independent Nigeria. It calls for the creation of a federation with a strong centralized government and regional administrations led by Nigerian-born premiers and ministers. But regional conflict dominates the political environment, and progress is thwarted by continual scrambling for position in anticipation of independence. Even as Nigeria proclaims independence in 1960, regional conflicts worsen. Population-based regional representation at the federal level makes census-data collection and potential restructuring of geographical regions contentious. The populous North helps elect Prime Minister Balewa. His tenuous coalition government is unable to pursue unified national interests in a bitterly divided climate. Nigeria's governmental structure is modeled on the British parliamentary system and includes three distinct branches -- legislative, judiciary, and executive -- which exist at both federal and regional levels. Newly elected President Nnamdi Azikiwe fails to end increasingly violent regional clashes that result in deadly rioting and the eventual overthrow of the civilian government. Eastern leaders declare the Independent Republic of Biafra after thousands of Igbo settlers die in ethnic clashes in the Muslim-dominated North. The leaders demand greater autonomy and the authority to retain tax and oil revenues. Lt. Col. Gowon's offer to divide the country into 12 states to prevent political domination by the North is rejected, and a brutally divisive civil war begins. Following the civil war, Gowon's military regime continues to centralize power in the federal government. In 1974 he announces that his efforts toward stabilizing the political system will delay a return to civilian rule. Gowon promises to draft a new constitution subject to approval of the people, but a widespread feeling of disillusionment with his regime envelops the country. Murtala Muhammad and Olusegun Obasanjo's military regimes stress commitment to civilian rule. Each continues a four-year transition program to restructure federal government, draft a new constitution, create new states, and hold state and federal elections by 1979. Policy initiatives include decentralizing power, forming national political parties, and combating inflation by reducing money supply. President Alhaji Shehu Shagari governs from minority status amid struggle with opposition leaders. His administration continues the corrupt practices of post-civil war governments, subordinating long-term social and economic development programs to projects that provide potential for personal profit. Despite the turmoil, Shagari wins a second term in controversial 1983 elections. Ibrahim Babangida assumes power in 1985 with an empty promise to return Nigeria to civil rule. His decision to annul a 1993 election won by Moshood Abiola throws the country into a political crisis and forces his resignation. Violent clashes between Muslims and Christians increase dramatically when Nigeria registers as a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1986. Gen. Sani Abacha reinforces military rule. In spite of claims that he is preparing for a return to civilian government, he replaces elected legislatures with military appointees. Abacha lifts the ban on political activity that he himself imposed, but he imprisons Abiola and obstructs the formation of legitimate political parties. Abacha's abrupt death is followed by Abiola's death in prison. Abdulsalami Abubakar guides the country into presidential elections; Olusegun Obasanjo, who led the 1976 military government, wins. Oil production and exportation become lightning rods for unrest as demonstrators use violent protests and strikes to underscore widespread socioeconomic inequalities, including a lack of access to basic resources, rampant unemployment, and environmental degradation. The Northern states implement sharia, underscoring religious and regional differences and challenging the constitution, notably with death sentences for women convicted of adultery. Violent community protests over oil production and economic inequalities continue in the Niger Delta. President Obasanjo trounces his opponents in his bid for reelection, but charges of vote rigging abound. back to top The Royal Niger Company establishes stringent trade controls, including high tariffs on imports and exports and on foreign companies operating in the area. Large-scale processing enterprises spring up as focus shifts from food crops to cash crops in an export-oriented environment. Millions are put to work, migration is limited, and some Nigerian merchants begin to gain wealth, status, and power. Emphasis on production of cash crops for export rather than food crops for sustenance benefits British colonial governors; local farmers, however, struggle to meet demand spurred by modernization of transportation and communication. Capital investment and long-term planning are ignored, as are Nigerian traditions. The South's socioeconomic development and modernization outpace the North's. As Western markets boom, "developmental economics" policies become deeply rooted and centralized. They are embodied by the establishment of state-run marketing boards that artificially regulate the price farmers are paid for their crops. The colonial administration fails to develop a self-sustaining economic infrastructure or to create vehicles that equitably distribute wealth and social services. The Great Depression reduces Britain's willingness to commit new money to the colony. The introduction of the pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange encourages export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil, but agricultural production continues to slide. Other than a handful of elite local businessmen, most Nigerians are excluded from economic participation. Resource shortfalls in Europe brought on by the war effort temporarily increase the demand for raw materials, in particular tin and rubber. Prosperity is short-lived as artificially inflated demand ends with the war itself. Nigeria's strategic importance as a staging area and supply line during the war effort results in rapid development of airports and military bases, and roads to connect them. The economy shows signs of life following a postwar lull. The colonial government's policy of "Nigerianization" opens jobs in the civil service and expands education. Reforms allow businesses to benefit from access to banks, loans, and government contracts. Exports increase dramatically, and new industries are established. Public spending on roads, energy, industry, and education grows. Petroleum exports, firmly under state control, begin in 1958, two years after its discovery. Local officials work with foreign companies to produce and export what becomes the country's dominant economic resource. Nigeria realizes the enormous potential for revenue generation, but at the expense of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The Central Bank is created to monitor monetary policy. Nigeria joins the IMF in 1961 and adheres to the Bretton Woods Agreement, which limits exchange restrictions and controls. A huge increase in government expenditure on administrative, social, and economic services and in revenue from taxes and loans follows. Inflationary pressures emerge as money supply increases by almost 30 percent and the cost of living rises at upwards of 5 percent a year. The transition to the First Republic is difficult, largely because of an inherited colonial legacy that left an export-driven economy, a private sector dominated by foreign interests, and a widening gulf between a small elite class and a growing rural peasantry. Monetary restraint is implemented to curb inflation and stabilize the Naira, and imports are curtailed. Economic focus is war-based, not long-term. Capital expenditure and manufacturing and agricultural sector growth rates fall. Crude oil accounts for 58 percent of total exports by 1970. Inflation continues to rise. Military rule turns a blind eye to abuses in the oil and manufacturing sectors as officials routinely engage in corrupt contract awards, kickbacks, and fraudulent joint enterprises. Oil-generated revenues drive economic recovery and unprecedented budget surpluses. The government undertakes a Second National Development Plan to reconstruct facilities damaged during the war and to promote social and economic development. The economy is increasingly dependent on petroleum, which accounts for 81 percent of Nigeria's total exports by 1974 and is subject to wild price fluctuations. Extreme government spending leads to a bloated money supply, which in turn spawns a food crisis, unemployment, swollen defense budget, and widespread inflation. A Third National Development Plan aims for greater control over oil production, processing, and distribution. A "Nigeria First" campaign encourages foreign business ventures to sell outright to Nigerians or to work as joint ventures. The Second Republic's constitution calls for a mixed economy, but President Shagari helms an administration, like the colonial ones of the past, in which those in power maintain absolute control of all profitable sectors of the economy to ensure personal gain. Global recession, combined with a sharp drop in oil prices in 1981, puts further pressure on the economy. A period of stagflation follows. Despite an economic downturn, public-sector government spending continues unabated as the budget deficit climbs. Significant domestic and external loans taken out to meet basic needs and the subsequent servicing of those loans further drain the economy. Military government leader Buhari fails to negotiate debt rescheduling, refusing IMF austerity measures which include devaluing the Naira. The World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) is launched, emphasizing economic discipline, deregulation, and austerity. SAP allows market forces, not government, to dictate the economic environment. Measures include devaluing the Naira, slashing public spending, stimulating exports and the private sector, removing import licenses, reducing tariffs, and selling parastatals. SAP collapses under the weight of severe currency devaluation and dramatic surges in inflation and the cost of living. External debt skyrockets, and subsequent debt servicing results in public-expenditure cutbacks. Attempts at privatization allow wealthy individuals to gain ownership of previously state-run enterprises, intensifying the inequality of wealth distribution. Oil dependence peaks under Abacha at more than 90 percent of total exports. Oil production and the accompanying environmental degradation devastates other economic sectors, particularly agriculture. Abacha officially abandons SAP and, in keeping with his autocratic regime, favors state control of foreign exchange, finance, and trade. Corruption is unchecked at all levels of the failing economy. As the 1998 federal budget reveals a huge deficit, a devastated economy hits a 20-year low in both manufacturing and industrial output. Inflation is well into the double digits, and Nigeria ranks as the world's 13th poorest country. The Abubakar administration enacts policies aimed at privatizing state-run businesses, reducing government spending, and opening the country to foreign trade. A legacy of mismanagement greets Obasanjo on his return to power, with external debt topping US$30 billion. Facing rising inflation and continued currency devaluation, he legislates macroeconomic programs to liberalize the economy. Most significantly, he promises a firm commitment to "guided deregulation," specifically privatization of state-owned industries, including energy and transportation. Public spending exceeds revenues and results in suspension of foreign debt repayment. Failure to reach agreement with the IMF imperils new international support. As striking oil workers take hundreds hostage on foreign-owned offshore rigs, oil production plummets, wiping out hoped-for short-term gains from hikes in oil prices due to war in Iraq. Obasanjo's efforts finally free the hostages. back to top
9206	dbpedia	2	2	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Nigeria	en	Colonial Nigeria	https://upload.wikimedia…31960%29.svg.png	https://upload.wikimedia…31960%29.svg.png	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f8/Flag_of_Nigeria_%281...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2007-02-05T17:59:34+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Nigeria	British colony and protectorate (1914-1960) Colonial Nigeria was ruled by the British Empire from the mid-nineteenth century until 1 October 1960 when Nigeria achieved independence.[8] Britain annexed Lagos in 1861 and established the Oil River Protectorate in 1884. British influence in the Niger area increased gradually over the 19th century, but Britain did not effectively occupy the area until 1885. Other European powers acknowledged Britain's dominance over the area in the 1885 Berlin Conference. From 1886 to 1899, much of the country was ruled by the Royal Niger Company, authorised by charter, and governed by George Taubman Goldie. In 1900, the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate passed from company hands to the Crown. At the urging of Governor Frederick Lugard, the two territories were amalgamated as the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, while maintaining considerable regional autonomy among the three major regions (Northern protectorate, Southern protectorate and the Colony of Lagos). Progressive constitutions after World War II provided for increasing representation and electoral government by Nigerians. The colonial period proper in Nigeria lasted from 1900 to 1960, after which Nigeria gained its independence.[8] Overview [edit] Through a progressive sequence of regimes, the British imposed Crown Colony government on much of the area of West Africa which came to be known as Nigeria, a form of rule which was both autocratic and bureaucratic. After initially adopting an indirect rule approach, in 1906 the British merged the small Lagos Colony and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate into a new Colony of Southern Nigeria, and in 1914 that was combined with the Northern Nigeria Protectorate to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.[9] Administration and military control of the territory was conducted primarily by white Britons, both in London and in Nigeria.[10] Following military conquest, the British imposed an economic system designed to profit from African labour. The essential basis of this system was a money economy—specifically the British pound sterling—which could be demanded through taxation, paid to cooperative natives, and levied as a fine.[11][12] The amalgamation of different ethnic and religious groups into one federation created internal tension which persists in Nigeria to the present day.[13] Origins of British influence [edit] In the 1700s, the British Empire and other European powers had settlements and forts in West Africa but had not yet established the full-scale plantation colonies which existed in the Americas. Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the African societies were "better established and more populous than those of the Americas, thus creating a more formidable barrier to European expansion. Though the Europeans possessed many considerable settlements both upon the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established in either of those regions such numerous and thriving colonies as those in the islands and continent of the America." [citation needed] Earlier elements related to this were its founding of the Sierra Leone Colony in 1787 as a refuge for freed slaves, the independent missionary movement intended to bring Christianity to the Edo Kingdom, and programs of exploration sponsored by learned societies and scientific groups, such as the London-based African Association. Local leaders, cognizant of the situation in the West Indies, India, and elsewhere, recognised the risks of British expansion. A chief of Bonny in 1860 explained that he refused a British treaty due to the tendency to "induce the Chiefs to sign a treaty whose meaning they did not understand, and then seize upon the country".[14] The Headquarters of Gombe emirate was Gombe-Abba[15] until when the then Emir of Gombe, Umaru Kwairanga (1898–1922), was forced to move from Gombe-Abba, a town founded by his grandfather and the founder of Gombe Emirate, Modibbo Bubayero, to Nafada town in 1913, and then to the current Gombe in 1919, that was after Gombe Emirate was conquered by British colonialists in 1903. Slave trade and abolition [edit] Main article: Slavery in Nigeria European slave trading from West Africa began before 1650, with people taken at a rate of about 3,000 per year. This rate rose to 20,000 per year in the last quarter of the century. The slave trade was heaviest in the period 1700–1850, with an average of 76,000 people taken from Africa each year between 1783 and 1792. At first, the trade centered around West Central Africa, now the Congo. But in the 1700s, the Bight of Benin (also known as the Slave Coast) became the next most important hub. Ouidah (now part of Benin) and Lagos were the major ports on the coast. From 1790 to 1807, predominantly British slave traders purchased 1,000–2,000 slaves each year in Lagos alone. The trade subsequently continued under the Portuguese Empire. In the Bight of Biafra, the major ports were Old Calabar (Akwa Akpa), Bonny and New Calabar.[16] Starting in 1740, the British were the primary European slave trafficker from this area.[17] In 1767, British traders facilitated a notorious massacre of hundreds of people at Calabar after inviting them onto their ships, ostensibly to settle a local dispute.[18] In 1807, the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacted the Slave Trade Act, prohibiting British subjects from participating in the Atlantic slave trade. Britain subsequently lobbied other European powers to stop the slave trade as well. It made anti-slavery treaties with West African powers, which it enforced militarily with the blockade of Africa. Some of the treaties contained prohibitions on diplomacy conducted without British permission, or other promises to abide by British rule.[19] This scenario provided an opportunity for naval expeditions and reconnaissance throughout the region. Britain also annexed Freetown in Sierra Leone, declaring it a Crown Colony in 1808.[20] The decrease in trade indirectly led to the collapse of states like the Edo Empire. Britain withdrew from the slave trade when it was the major transporter of slaves to the Americas. The French had abolished slavery following the French Revolution, although it briefly re-established it in its Caribbean colonies under Napoleon. France sold Louisiana to the United States in 1803, the same year that it gave up on trying to regain Saint-Domingue from the Haitian Revolution. By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, it ended slavery in its possessions. Between them, the French and the British had purchased a majority of the slaves sold from the ports of Edo. The economy suffered from the decline in the slave trade, although considerable smuggling of slaves to the Americas continued for years afterward. Lagos became a major slave port in the late 1700s and into the 1850s. Much of the human trafficking which occurred there was nominally illegal, and records from this time and place are not comprehensive. According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Voyage Database, 308,800 were sold across the Atlantic from Lagos in 1776–1850. British and French traders did a large share of this business until 1807 when they were replaced by the Portuguese and the Spaniards. By 1826–1850, the British Royal Navy was intervening significantly with Lagos slave exports.[21] Whether British conquest of Nigeria resulted from a benevolent motive to end slavery or more instrumental motives of wealth and power, remains a topic of dispute between African and European historians.[22] Many locals remained unconvinced of the Crown's authority to completely reverse the legal and moral attributes of a social institution through fiat.[23] Regardless, slavery had decimated the population and fuelled militarisation and chaos, thereby paving the way for more aggressive colonisation.[21][24] Missionaries [edit] Portuguese Roman Catholic priests who accompanied traders and officials to the West African coast introduced Christianity to the Edo Empire in the fifteenth century. Several churches were built to serve the Edo community and a small number of African converts. When direct Portuguese contacts in the region were withdrawn, however, the influence of the Catholic missionaries waned. By the eighteenth century, evidence of Christianity had disappeared. Although churchmen in Britain had been influential in the drive to abolish the slave trade, significant missionary activity for Africa did not develop until the 1840s. For some time, missionaries operated in the area between Lagos and Ibadan. The first missions were opened by the Church of England's Church Missionary Society (CMS). Other Protestant denominations from Great Britain, Canada, and the United States also opened missions and, in the 1860s, Roman Catholic religious orders established missions. Protestant missionaries tended to divide the country into spheres of activity to avoid competition with each other, and Catholic missions similarly avoided duplication of effort among the several religious orders working there. Catholic missionaries were particularly active among the Igbo; the CMS worked among the Yoruba. The CMS initially promoted Africans to responsible positions in the mission field; for instance, they appointed Samuel Ajayi Crowther as the first Anglican Bishop of the Niger. Crowther, a liberated Yoruba slave, had been educated in Sierra Leone and in Britain, where he was ordained before returning to his homeland with the first group of CMS missionaries. The Anglicans and other religious groups had a conscious "native church" policy to develop indigenous ecclesiastical institutions to become independent of Europeans. Crowther was succeeded as bishop by a British cleric. In the long term, the acceptance of Christianity by large numbers of Nigerians depended on the various denominations adapting to local conditions. They selected an increasingly high proportion of African clergy for the missions. In large measure, European missionaries assumed the value of colonial rule in terms of promoting education, health and welfare measures, thereby effectively reinforcing colonial policy. Some African Christian communities formed their own independent churches.[25][n 1] The missionaries gained in power throughout the 1800s. They caused major transformations in traditional society as they eroded the religious institutions such as human sacrifice, infanticide and secret societies, which had formerly played a role in political authority and community life.[26] Commerce [edit] The principal commodities of legitimate trade were palm oil and palm kernels, which were used in Europe to make soap and as lubricants for machinery before petroleum products were developed for that purpose. Although this trade grew to significant proportions—palm oil exports alone were worth £1 billion a year by 1840—it was concentrated near the coast, where palm trees grew in abundance. Gradually, however, the trade forced major economic and social changes in the interior, although it hardly undermined slavery and the slave trade. The incidence of slavery in local societies increased. Initially, most palm oil (and later kernels) came from Igboland, where palm trees formed a canopy over the densely inhabited areas of the Ngwa, Nri Kingdom, Awka and other Igbo peoples. Palm oil was used locally for cooking, the kernels were a source for food, trees were tapped for palm wine, and the fronds were used for building material. It was a relatively simple adjustment for many Igbo families to transport the oil to rivers and streams that led to the Niger Delta for sale to European merchants. The rapid expansion in exports, especially after 1830, occurred precisely at the time slave exports collapsed. The Igbo redirected slaves into the domestic economy, especially to grow the staple food crop, yams, in northern Igboland for marketing throughout the palm-tree belt. As before, Aro merchants dominated trade in the hinterland, including palm products to the coast and the sale of slaves within Igboland. From 1815 to 1840, palm oil exports increased by a factor of 25, from 800 to 20,000 tons per year. British merchants led the trade in palm oil, while the Portuguese and others continued the slave trade.[17] Much of this oil was sold elsewhere in the British Empire.[27] To produce all this oil, the economy of the southern region crossed over from mostly subsistence to the production of palm oil as a cash crop.[28] The Niger Delta and Calabar, which once had been known for the export of slaves, became notable for the export of palm oil. The Delta streams were called "oil rivers". The basic economic units in each town were "houses", family-operated entities that engendered loyalty for its employees. A "house" included the extended family of the trader, including retainers and slaves. As its head, the master trader taxed other traders who were members of his "house"; he maintained a war vessel, a large dugout canoe that could hold several tons of cargo and dozens of crews, for the defense of the harbor. Whenever a trader had become successful enough to keep a war canoe, he was expected to form his own "house". Economic competition among these "houses" was so fierce that trade often erupted into an armed battle between the crews of the large canoes. Because of the hazards of climate and tropical diseases for Europeans and the absence of any centralized authorities on the mainland responsive to their interests, European merchants moored their ships outside harbours or in the delta and used the ships as trading stations and warehouses. In time, they built depots onshore and eventually moved up the Niger River to establish stations in the interior. An example was that at Onitsha, where they could bargain directly with local suppliers and purchase products likely to turn a profit. Some European traders switched to legitimate business only when the commerce in slaves became too hazardous. The traders suffered from the risks of their position and believed they were at the mercy of the coastal rulers, whom they considered unpredictable. Accordingly, as the volume of trade increased, merchants requested that the Government of the United Kingdom appoint a consul to cover the region. Consequently, in 1849, John Beecroft was accredited as consul for the bights of Benin and Biafra, a jurisdiction stretching from Dahomey to Cameroon. Beecroft was the British representative to Fernando Po, where the African Slave Trade Patrol of the Royal Navy was stationed. In 1850, the British created a "Court of Equity" at Bonny, overseen by Beecroft, which would deal with trade disputes. Another court was established in 1856 at Calabar, based on an agreement with local Efik traders which prohibited them from interfering with British merchants. These courts contained majorities British members and represented a new level of presumptive British sovereignty in the Bight of Biafra.[19] West Africa also bought British exports, supplying 30–40% of the demand for British cotton during the Industrial Revolution of 1750–1790.[27] Exploration [edit] Further information: European exploration of Africa At the same time, British scientists were interested in exploring the course and related settlements along the Niger River. The delta masked the mouth of the great river, and for centuries Nigerians chose not to tell Europeans the secrets of the interior. In 1794, the African Association in Great Britain commissioned Mungo Park, an intrepid Scottish physician and naturalist, to search for the headwaters of the Niger and follow the river downstream. Park reached the upper Niger the next year by travelling inland from the Gambia River. Although he reported on the eastward flow of the Niger, he was forced to turn back when his equipment was lost to Muslim Arab slave traders. In 1805, he set out on a second expedition, sponsored by the British Government, to follow the Niger to the sea. His mission failed, but Park and his party covered more than 1,500 kilometres (930 mi), passing through the western portions of the Sokoto Caliphate, before drowning when their boats overturned in rapids near Bussa. On a subsequent expedition to the Sokoto Caliphate, Scottish explorer Hugh Clapperton learned about the mouth of the Niger River, and where it reached the sea, but after suffering malaria, depression and dysentery, he died before confirming it.[29] His servant, Richard Lander, and Lander's brother John were the ones to demonstrate that the Niger flowed into the sea. The Lander brothers were seized by slave traders in the interior and sold down the river to a waiting European ship. Initial British attempts to open trade with the interior by way of the Niger could not overcome climate and diseases such as malaria. A third of the people associated with an 1842 riverine expedition died. In the 1850s, quinine had been found to combat malaria, and aided by the medicine, a Liverpool merchant, Macgregor Laird, opened the river. Laird's efforts were stimulated by the detailed reports of a pioneer German explorer, Heinrich Barth, who travelled through much of Borno and the Sokoto Caliphate, where he recorded information about the region's geography, economy and inhabitants. First colonial claims [edit] Lagos Colony [edit] Main article: Lagos Colony British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston detested slavery, and in 1851 he took advantage of divisions in native politics, the presence of Christian missionaries, and the maneuvers of British consul John Beecroft to encourage the overthrow of the regime. In 1851 deposed king Akintoye of Lagos sought British help in restoring him to the throne. Beecroft agreed on condition that the slave trade be abolished, and British merchants have a monopoly in commodities. The Royal Navy bombarded Lagos in November 1851, ousted the pro-slavery Oba Kosoko and established a treaty with the newly installed Oba Akintoye, who was expectedly more amenable to British interests. Lagos was annexed as a Crown Colony in 1861 via the Lagos Treaty of Cession.[30] British expansion accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The early history of Lagos Colony was one of repeated attempts to end the Yoruba wars. In the face of threats to the divided Yoruba states from Dahomey and the Sokoto Caliphate, as represented by the emirate of Ilorin, the British Governor—assisted by the CMS—succeeded in imposing peace settlements on the interior. Colonial Lagos was a busy, cosmopolitan port. Its architecture was in both Victorian and Brazilian style, as many of the black elite were English-speakers from Sierra Leone and freedmen repatriated from the Empire of Brazil and Spanish Cuba. Its residents were employed in official capacities and were active in business. Africans also were represented on the Lagos Legislative Council, a largely appointed assembly. The Colony was ultimately governed by the British Colonial Office in London.[31] Captain John Glover, the colony's administrator, created a militia of Hausa troops in 1861. This became the Lagos Constabulary, and subsequently the Nigerian Police Force.[32] In 1880, the British Government and traders demonetised the Maria Theresa dollar, to the considerable dismay of its local holders, in favour of the pound sterling.[11] In 1891, the African Banking Corporation founded the Bank of British West Africa in Lagos.[33] Oil Rivers Protectorate [edit] Main article: Niger Coast Protectorate After the Berlin Conference of 1884, Britain announced the formation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, which included the Niger Delta and extended eastward to Calabar, where the British Consulate General was relocated from Fernando Po. The protectorate was organised to control and develop trade coming down the Niger. Vice consuls were assigned to ports that already had concluded treaties of cooperation with the Foreign Office. Local rulers continued to administer their territories, but consular authorities assumed jurisdiction for the equity courts established earlier by the foreign mercantile communities. A constabulary force was raised and used to pacify the coastal area. In 1894 the territory was redesignated the Niger Coast Protectorate and was expanded to include the region from Calabar to Lagos Colony and Protectorate, including the hinterland, and northward up the Niger River as far as Lokoja, the headquarters of the Royal Niger Company. As a protectorate, it did not have the status of a colony, so its officials were appointed by the Foreign Office and not by the Colonial Office.[31] In 1891, the consulate established the Niger Coast Protectorate Force or "Oil Rivers Irregulars".[32] Royal Niger Company [edit] Main article: Royal Niger Company The legitimate trade in commodities attracted a number of British merchants to the Niger River, as well as some men who had been formerly engaged in the slave trade but who now changed their line of wares. The large companies that subsequently opened depots in the delta cities and in Lagos were as ruthlessly competitive as the delta towns themselves and frequently used force to compel potential suppliers to agree to contracts and to meet their demands. To some extent, competition amongst these companies undermined their collective position vis-à-vis, local merchants. In the 1870s, therefore, George Taubman Goldie began amalgamating companies into the United African Company, soon renamed the National African Company.[19] Ultimately, this became the Royal Niger Company. The Royal Niger Company established its headquarters far inland at Lokoja, which was the main trading port of the company,[34] from where it began to assume responsibility for the administration of areas along the Niger and Benue rivers where it maintained depots. It soon gained a virtual monopoly over trade along the River[11] The company interfered in the territory along the Niger and the Benue, sometimes becoming embroiled in serious conflicts when its British-led native constabulary intercepted slave raids or attempted to protect trade routes. The company negotiated treaties with Sokoto, Gwandu and Nupe that were interpreted as guaranteeing exclusive access to trade in return for the payment of annual tribute. Officials of the Sokoto Caliphate considered these treaties quite differently; from their perspective, the British were granted only extraterritorial rights that did not prevent similar arrangements with the Germans and the French and certainly did not surrender sovereignty. Even before gaining its charter, the Company signed treaties with local leaders which granted it broad sovereign powers. One 1885 treaty read: We, the undersigned King and Chiefs […] with the view to the bettering of the condition of our country and people, do this day cede to the National Africa Company (Limited), their heirs and assigns, forever, the whole of our territory […] We also give the said National African Company (Limited) full power to settle all native disputes arising from any cause whatever, and we pledge ourselves not to enter into any war with other tribes without the sanction of the said National Africa Company (Limited). We also understand that the said National African Company (limited) have full power to mine, farm, and build in any portion of our territory. We bind ourselves not to have any intercourse with any strangers or foreigners except through the said national African Company (Limited), and we give the said National African Company (Limited) full power to exclude all other strangers and foreigners from their territory at their discretion. In consideration of the foregoing, the said National African Company (Limited) bind themselves not to interfere with any of the native laws or customs of the country, consistently with the maintenance of order and good government … [and] agree to pay native owners of land a reasonable amount for any portion they may require. The said National African Company (Limited) bind themselves to protect the said King and Chiefs from the attacks of any neighbouring tribes (Ibid.).[19] The company considered itself the sole legitimate government of the area, with executive, legislative and judicial powers all subordinate to the rule of a council created by the company board of directors in London. The council was headed by a Governor. The Deputy Governor served as political administrator for company territory and appointed three officials in Nigeria to carry out the work of administration. These were the Agent-General, the Senior Judicial Officer, and the Commandant of the Constabulary.[35] However, the company did accept that local kings could act as partners in governance and trade. It, therefore, hired native intermediaries who could conduct diplomacy, trade and intelligence work in the local area.[36] The company, as was common among European businesses in Africa, paid its native workers in barter. At the turn of the century, top wages were four bags of salt (company retail price, 3s 9d) for a month of work.[12] Trade was also conducted through a mechanism of barter and credit. Goods were made available on credit to African middlemen, who were expected to trade them at a pre-arranged price and deliver the proceeds to the company. The company's major imports to the area included gin and low-quality firearms.[11] By the 1880s, the National African Company became the dominant commercial power, increasing from 19 to 39 stations between 1882 and 1893. In 1886, Taubman secured a royal charter and his company became the Royal Niger Company. The charter allowed the company to collect customs and make treaties with local leaders.[12] Under Goldie's direction, the Royal Niger Company was instrumental in depriving France and Germany of access to the region. Consequently, he may well deserve the epithet of the "father of Nigeria", which historians accorded him. He definitely laid the basis for British claims. The Royal Niger Company had its own armed forces.[32] This included a river fleet which it used for retaliatory attacks on uncooperative villages.[11] Britain's imperialistic posture became more aggressive towards the end of the century. The appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as colonial secretary in 1895 especially marked a shift towards new territorial ambitions of the British Empire.[37] Economically, local colonial administrators also pushed for the imposition of British colonial rule, believing that trade and taxation conducted in British pounds would prove far more lucrative than a barter trade which yielded only inconsistent customs duties.[11] Military conquest [edit] The British led a series of military campaigns to enlarge its sphere of influence and expand its commercial opportunities. Most of the fighting was done by Hausa soldiers, recruited to fight against other groups. The superior weapons, tactics and political unity of the British are commonly given as reasons for their decisive ultimate victory.[38][39] In 1892 the British Armed Forces set out to fight the Ijebu Kingdom, which had resisted missionaries and foreign traders. The legal justification for this campaign was a treaty signed in 1886, when the British had interceded as peacemakers to end the Ekiti Parapo war, which imposed free trade requirements and mandated that all parties continue to use British channels for diplomacy.[19] Although the Ijebu had some weapons they were wiped out by British Maxims, the earliest machine gun. With this victory, the British went on to conquer the rest of Yorubaland, which had also been weakened by sixteen years of civil war.[40] By 1893, most of the other political entities in Yorubaland recognised the practical necessity of signing another treaty with the British, this one explicitly joining them with the protectorate of Lagos.[19][41] In 1896–1897 the forces of the Niger Coast Protectorate fought with the remnants of the Edo Empire. Following the defeat of an unsuccessful foray by Consul General James R. Phillips, a larger retaliatory force captured Benin City and drove Ovonramwen, the Oba of Benin, into exile.[42] The British had difficulty conquering Igboland, which lacked a central political organisation. In the name of liberating the Igbos from the Aro Confederacy, the British launched the Anglo-Aro War of 1901–1902. Despite conquering villages by burning houses and crops, continual political control over the Igbo remained elusive.[43][44] The British forces began annual pacification missions to convince the locals of British supremacy.[45] A campaign against the Sokoto Caliphate began in 1900 with the creation of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, under the direction of Governor Lugard. The British captured Kano in 1903. Deadly battles broke out sporadically through 1906.[46] Lugard was slow to describe these excursions to the Colonial Office, which apparently learned of preparations to attack Kano from the newspapers in December 1902. Not wishing to appear out of control or weak, they approved the expedition (two days after it began) on 19 January 1903.,[47] In general, the Colonial Office allowed Lugard's expeditions to continue because they were framed as retaliatory and, as Olivier commented in 1906, "If the millions of people [in Nigeria] who do not want us there once get the notion that our people can be killed with impunity they will not be slow to attempt it."[48] Lugard informed the leaders of conquered Sokoto: The Fulani in old times […] conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They, in turn, have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of state will be appointed by the high Commissioner throughout all this country. The High Commissioner will be guided by all the usual laws of succession and the wishes of the people and chief but will set them aside if he desires for good cause to do so. The Emirs and chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old-time and take such taxes as are approved by the High Commissioner, but they will obey the laws of the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident.[49] Political administration under the Crown [edit] Transition to Crown rule [edit] Concrete plans for transition to Crown rule—direct control by the British Government—apparently began in 1897. In May of this year, Herbert J. Read published a Memorandum on British possessions in West Africa, which remarked upon the "inconvenient and unscientific boundaries" between Lagos Colony, the Niger Coast Protectorate and the Royal Niger Company. Read suggested they be merged, and more use made of Nigeria's natural resources.[50] In the same year, the British created the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF or WAFF), under the leadership of Colonel Frederick Lugard. In one year, Lugard recruited 2600 troops, evenly split between Hausa and Yoruba. The officers of the RWAFF were British. The operations of this force are still not fully known due to a policy of strict secrecy mandated by the British Government.[51] Guidelines for running the Nigerian colony were established in 1898 by the Niger Committee, chaired by the Earl of Selborne, in 1898. The British finalized the border between Nigeria and French West Africa with the Anglo-French Convention of 1898.[52] The territory of the Royal Niger Company became the Northern Nigeria Protectorate, and the Company itself became a private corporation which continued to do business in Nigeria. The company received £865,000 compensation for the loss of its Charter. It continued to enjoy special privileges and maintained a de facto monopoly over commerce. Under Lugard from 1900 to 1906, the Protectorate consolidated political control over the area through military conquest and initiated the use of British currency in substitute for barter.[11][12] Colonial administration [edit] In 1900, the British Government assumed control of the Southern and Northern Protectorates, both of which were ultimately governed by the Colonial Office at Whitehall. The staff of this office came primarily from the British upper-middle class—i.e., university-educated men, primarily not nobility, with fathers in well-respected professions.[53] The first five heads of the Nigeria Department (1898–1914) were Reginald Antrobus, William Mercer, William Baillie Hamilton, Sydney Olivier, and Charles Strachey.[54] Olivier was a member of the Fabian Society and a friend of George Bernard Shaw.[55] Under the Colonial Office was the Governor, who managed the administration of his colony and held powers of emergency rule. The Colonial Office could veto or revise his policies. The seven men who governed Northern Nigeria, Southern Nigeria and Lagos through 1914 were Henry McCallum, William MacGregor, Walter Egerton, Ralph Moor, Percy Girouard, Hesketh Bell and Frederick Lugard. Most of these came from military backgrounds. All were knighted.[56] Walter Egerton's sixfold agenda for 1908, as detailed on 29 November 1907, in a telegram to the Colonial Office, is representative of British priorities.[57] To pacify the country; To establish settled government in the newly won districts; To improve and extend native footpaths throughout the country; To construct properly graded roads in the more populated districts; To clear the numerous rivers in the country and make them suitable for launch and canoe traffic; and To extend the railways. Egerton also supervised improvements to the Lagos harbour and extension of the local telegraph network.[57] From 1895 to 1900, a railway was constructed running from Lagos to Ibadan; it opened in March 1901. This line was extended to Oshogbo, 100 kilometres (62 mi) away, in 1905–1907, and to Zungeru and Minna in 1908–1911. Its final leg enabled it to meet another line, constructed 1907–1911, running from Baro, through Minnia, to Kano.[58] Some of these public work projects were accomplished with the help of forced labour from native black Africans, referred to as "Political Labour". Village Heads were paid 10 shillings for conscripts and fined £50 if they failed to supply. Individuals could be fined or jailed for refusing to comply.[12] Frederick Lugard [edit] Frederick Lugard, who was appointed as High Commissioner of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1900 and served until 1906 in his first term, often has been regarded by the British as their model colonial administrator. Trained as an army officer, he had served in India, Egypt and East Africa, where he expelled Arab slave traders from Nyasaland and established British presence in Uganda. Joining the Royal Niger Company in 1894, Lugard was sent to Borgu to counter inroads made by the French, and in 1897 he was made responsible for raising the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) from local levies to serve under British officers. During his six-year tenure as High Commissioner, Sir Frederick Lugard (as he became in 1901) was occupied with transforming the commercial sphere of influence inherited from the Royal Niger Company into a viable territorial unit under effective British political control. His objective was to conquer the entire region and to obtain recognition of the British protectorate by its indigenous rulers, especially the Fulani emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate. Lugard's campaign systematically subdued local resistance, using armed force when diplomatic measures failed. Borno capitulated without a fight, but in 1903 Lugard's RWAFF mounted assaults on Kano and Sokoto. From Lugard's point of view, clear-cut military victories were necessary because the surrenders of the defeated peoples weakened resistance elsewhere. Lugard's success in northern Nigeria has been attributed to his policy of indirect rule; that is, he governed the protectorate through the rulers defeated by the British. If the emirs accepted British authority, abandoned the slave trade, and cooperated with British officials in modernizing their administrations, the colonial power was willing to confirm them in office. The emirs retained their caliphate titles but were responsible to British district officers, who had final authority. The British High Commissioners could depose emirs and other officials if necessary. Amalgamation [edit] Amalgamation of Nigeria was envisioned from early on in its governance, as is made clear by the report of the Niger Committee in 1898. Combining the three jurisdictions would reduce administrative expenses and facilitate deployment of resources and money between the areas. (Specifically, it would enable direct subsidy of the less profitable Northern jurisdiction.) Antrobus, Fiddes and Strachey in the Colonial Office promoted amalgamation, along with Lugard.[59] Following the order recommended by the Niger Committee, the Colonial Office merged Lagos Colony and the Southern Nigeria Protectorate on 1 May 1906, forming a larger protectorate (still called the Southern Nigeria Protectorate) which spanned the coastline between Dahomey and Cameroon.[59] Lugard advocated constantly for the unification of the whole territory, and in August 1911 the Colonial Office asked Lugard to lead the amalgamated colony.[60] In 1912, Lugard returned to Nigeria from his six-year term as Governor of Hong Kong, to oversee the merger of the northern and southern protectorates. On 9 May 1913, Lugard submitted a formal proposal to the Colonial Office in which Northern and Southern provinces would have separate administrations, under the control of a "strongly authoritarian" Governor-General. The Colonial Office approved most of Lugard's plan but balked at authorising him to pass laws without their approval.[61] John Anderson diplomatically suggested: If it is the necessity for formally submitting the drafts that hurts Sir F. Lugard, I should be quite prepared to omit that provision provided that the period of publication of the draft prior to enactment is extended from one month to two. If an eye is kept on the Gazettes as they come in this will enable us to warn him of any objections we may entertain to legislative proposals, and also give Liverpool and Manchester an opportunity of voicing their objections.[61] The task of unification was achieved on the eve of World War I. From January 1914 onwards, the newly united colony and protectorate was presided over by a proconsul, who was entitled the Governor-General of Nigeria. The militias and RWAFF battalions were reorganized into the RWAFF Nigeria Regiment.[62] Lugard's governmental model for Nigeria was unique and there was apparently not much planning for its future development. Colonial official A. J. Harding commented in 1913: Sir F. Lugard's proposal contemplates a state which it is impossible to classify. It is not a unitary state with local government areas but with one Central Executive and one Legislature. It is not a federal state with federal Executive, Legislature and finances, like the Leewards. It is not a personal union of separate colonies under the same Governor as the Windwards, it is not a Confederation of States. If adopted, his proposals can hardly be a permanent solution and I gather that Sir F. Lugard only regards them as temporary—at any rate in part. With one man in practical control of the Executive and Legislative organs of all the parts, the machine may work passably for sufficient time to enable the transition period to be left behind, by which time the answer to the problem—Unitary v. Federal State—will probably have become clear.[13] The Colonial Office accepted Lugard's proposal that the Governor would not be required to stay in-country full-time; consequently, as Governor, Lugard spent four months out of the year in London. This scheme proved unpopular and confusing to many involved parties and was phased out.[63] Indirect rule [edit] The Protectorate was centrally administered by the Colonial Civil Service, staffed by Britons and Africans called the British Native Staff—many of whom originated from outside the territory. Under the Political Department of the Civil Service were Residents and District Officers, responsible for overseeing operations in each region. The Resident also oversaw a Provincial Court at the region's capital.[64] Each region also had a Native Administration, staffed by locals, and possessing a Native Treasury. The Native Administration was headed by the traditional rulers—mostly emirs in the north and often obas in the south—and their District Heads, who oversaw a larger number of Village Heads. Native Administration was responsible for police, hospitals, public works and local courts. The Colonial Civil Service used intermediaries, as the Royal Niger Company had, in an expanded role which included diplomacy, propaganda and espionage.[65] Half of all taxes went to the colonial government and half went to the Native Treasury. The Treasury used a planned budget for payment of staff and development of public works projects, and therefore could not be spent at the discretion of the local traditional ruler. Herbert Richmond Palmer developed details of this model from 1906 to 1911 as the Governor of Northern Nigeria after Lugard.[66] In 1916 Lugard formed the Nigerian Council, a consultative body that brought together six traditional rulers—including the Sultan of Sokoto, the Emir of Kano and the Oba of Benin—to represent all parts of the colony. The council was promoted as a device for allowing the expression of opinions that could instruct the Governor-General. In practice, Lugard used the annual sessions to inform the traditional rulers of British policy, leaving them with no functions at the council's meetings except to listen and to assent. Unification meant only the loose affiliation of three distinct regional administrations into which Nigeria was subdivided—Northern, Western and Eastern regions. Each was under a Lieutenant Governor and provided independent government services. The Governor was, in effect, the coordinator for virtually autonomous entities that had overlapping economic interests but little in common politically or socially. In the Northern Region, the colonial government took careful account of Islam and avoided any appearance of a challenge to traditional values that might incite resistance to British rule.[67] This system, in which the structure of authority focused on the emir to whom obedience was a mark of religious devotion, did not welcome change. As the emirs settled more and more into their role as reliable agents of indirect rule, colonial authorities were content to maintain the status quo, particularly in religious matters. Christian missionaries were barred, and the limited government efforts in education were harmonized with Islamic institutions.[67] In the south, by contrast, traditional rulers were employed as vehicles of indirect rule in Edoland and Yorubaland, but Christianity and Western education undermined their sacerdotal functions. In some instances, however, a double allegiance—to the idea of sacred monarchy for its symbolic value and to modern concepts of law and administration—was maintained. Out of reverence for traditional kingship, for instance, the Oba of Benin, whose office was closely identified with Edo religion, was accepted as the sponsor of a Yoruba political movement. In the Eastern Region, appointed officials who were given "warrants" and hence called warrant chiefs, were strongly resisted by the people because they lacked traditional claims. In practice, British administrative procedures under indirect rule entailed constant interaction between colonial authorities and local rulers—the system was modified to fit the needs of each region. In the north, for instance, legislation took the form of a decree cosigned by the Governor and the emir, while in the south, the Governor sought the approval of the Legislative Council. Hausa was recognised as an official language in the north, and knowledge of it was expected of colonial officers serving there. In the South, only English had official status. Regional administrations also varied widely in the quality of local personnel and in the scope of the operations they were willing to undertake. British staffs in each region continued to operate according to procedures developed before unification. Economic links among the regions increased, but indirect rule tended to discourage political interchange. There was virtually no pressure for greater unity among the regions until after the end of World War II. Public works, such as harbour dredging and road and railway construction, opened Nigeria to economic development. British soap and cosmetics manufacturers tried to obtain land concessions for growing oil palms, but these were refused. Instead, the companies had to be content with a monopoly of the export trade in these products. Other commercial crops, such as cocoa and rubber, were encouraged, and tin was mined on the Jos Plateau. The only significant interruption in economic development arose from natural disaster—the Great Drought of 1913–14. Recovery came quickly and improvements in port facilities and the transportation infrastructure during World War I furthered economic development. Nigerian recruits participated in the war effort as labourers and soldiers. The Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF, integrating troops from the north and south, saw action against German colonial forces in Cameroon and in German East Africa. During the war, the colonial government earmarked a large portion of the Nigerian budget as a contribution to imperial defence. To raise additional revenues, Lugard took steps to institute a uniform tax structure patterned on the traditional system that he had adopted in the north during his tenure there. Taxes became a source of discontent in the south, however, and contributed to disturbances protesting British policy. In 1920, portions of former German Cameroon were mandated to Britain by the League of Nations and were administered as part of Nigeria. The British entry into World War I saw the confiscation of Nigerian palm oil firms operated by expatriates from the Central Powers. British business interests wanted to use this to create a monopoly over the industry, but Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's Liberal government and subsequent war coalition favored allowing international free trade. In 1916, Sir Edward Carson led the majority of the Conservative and Unionist Party to vote against Party Leader Bonar Law on the issue, forcing it to withdraw from the Asquith coalition and for the government to begin to break apart. It was replaced by a new coalition government led by David Lloyd George featuring Conservatives and Lloyd George's supporters in the Liberal Party, while Asquith and the remainder of the Liberals entered opposition.[69] Until he stepped down as Governor-General in 1918, Lugard primarily was concerned with consolidating British sovereignty and with assuring local administration through traditional rulers. He was contemptuous of the educated and Westernised African elite found more in the South, and he recommended transferring the capital from Lagos, the cosmopolitan city where the influence of these people was most pronounced, to Kaduna in the north. Although the capital was not moved, Lugard's bias in favour of the Muslim north was clear at the time. Lugard bequeathed to his successor a prosperous colony when his term as Governor-General expired. The policy of indirect rule used in Northern Nigeria became a model for British colonies elsewhere in Africa.[70] Developments in colonial policy under Clifford [edit] Lugard's immediate successor (1919–1925), Sir Hugh Clifford, was an aristocratic professional administrator with liberal instincts who had won recognition for his enlightened governorship of the Gold Coast in 1912–1919. The approaches of the two men to colonial development were diametrically opposed. In contrast to Lugard, Clifford argued that colonial government had the responsibility to introduce as quickly as practical the benefits of Western experience. He was aware that the Muslim north would present problems, but he had hopes for progress along the lines which he laid down in the south, where he anticipated "general emancipation" leading to a more representative form of government. Clifford emphasized economic development, encouraging enterprises by immigrant southerners in the north while restricting European participation to capital intensive activity. Missionary forces demanded prohibition of liquor, which proved highly unpopular. Both Africans and Europeans found illegal supplies such as secret stills, obtaining colonial liquor permits, and smuggling. The experiment began in 1890 and was repealed in 1939,[71] Uneasy with the amount of latitude allowed traditional rulers under indirect rule, Clifford opposed further extension of the judicial authority held by the northern emirs. He said that he did "not consider that their past traditions and their present backward cultural conditions afford to any such experiment a reasonable chance of success".[72] In the south, he saw the possibility of building an elite educated in schools modelled on a European method (and numerous elite children attended high-ranking colleges in Britain during the colonial years). These schools would teach "the basic principles that would and should regulate character and conduct".[72] In line with this attitude, he rejected Lugard's proposal for moving the capital from Lagos, the stronghold of the elite in whom he placed so much confidence for the future. Clifford also believed that indirect rule encouraged centripetal tendencies. He argued that the division into two separate colonies was advisable unless a stronger central government could bind Nigeria into more than just an administrative convenience for the three regions. Whereas Lugard had applied lessons learned in the north to the administration of the south, Clifford was prepared to extend to the north practices that had been successful in the south. Sir Richmond Palmer, acting as Lieutenant Governor in the North, disagreed with Clifford and advocated the principles of Lugard and further decentralisation.[67] The Colonial Office, where Lugard was still held in high regard, accepted that changes might be due in the south, but it forbade fundamental alteration of procedures in the north. A.J. Harding, director of Nigerian affairs at the Colonial Office, defined the official position of the British Government in support of indirect rule when he said that "direct government by impartial and honest men of alien race […] never yet satisfied a nation long and […] under such a form of government, as wealth and education increase, so do political discontent and sedition".[72] Influenza Pandemic of 1918 [edit] The Influenza pandemic made its way to the port of Lagos by September 1918 by way of a number of ships including the SS Panayiotis, the SS Ahanti, and the SS Bida.[73] The spread of the disease was quick and deadly, with an estimated 1.5% of the population of Lagos falling victim.[74] The disease first found its home among the many trading ports along the West African coast.[74] But with the advancement and efficiency of colonial transportation networks, it was only a matter of time before the disease began to spread into the interior.[73] Africa as a whole was hit by three waves of H1N1 influenza A, the first and second would be the most deadly for the colony of Nigeria.[75] The colonial government was not equipped nor ready in general for such a situation.[73] In direct reaction to the epidemic, colonial authorities allowed African doctors and medical personnel to work with influenza patients due to the severity of the situation.[73] The colonial government would enact new legislation in reaction to the pandemic including, travel passes for individuals in the colony, increased usage of sanitary practices, and door to door checks on indigenous Nigerian households.[73] Due to the failure of the sanitation officers in Lagos, the virus would continue to spread throughout the southern provinces throughout September and finally make its way into the hinterlands by October.[73] An estimated 500,000 Nigerians would lose their lives due to the pandemic, severely decreasing production capabilities on Nigerian farms and plantations.[76] Economics and finance [edit] The British treasury initially supported the landlocked Northern Nigeria Protectorate with grants, totalling £250,000 or more each year.[77] Its revenue quickly increased, from £4,424 in 1901 to £274,989 in 1910. The Southern Protectorate financed itself from the outset, with revenue increasing from £361,815 to £1,933,235 over the same period.[78] After establishing political control of the country, the British implemented a system of taxation in order to force the indigenous Africans to shift from subsistence farming to wage labour. Sometimes forced labour was used directly for public works projects. These policies were met with resistance.[79][80] Much of the colony's budget went to payments of its military, the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF).[81] In 1936, of £6,259,547 income for the Nigerian state, £1,156,000 went back to England as home pay for British officials in the Nigerian civil service.[82] Oil exploration began in 1906 under John Simon Bergheim's Nigeria Bitumen Corporation, to which the Colonial Office granted exclusive rights. In 1907, the corporation received a loan of £25,000, repayable upon discovery of oil. Other firms applying for licenses were rejected. In November 1908, Bergheim reported striking oil; in September 1909, he reported extracting 2,000 barrels per day. However, development of the Nigerian oilfields slowed when Bergheim died in a car crash in September 1912. Lugard, replacing Egerton as Governor, aborted the project in May 1913. The British turned to Persia for oil.[83] European traders in Nigeria initially made widespread use of the cowrie, which was already valued locally. The influx of cowrie led to inflation. In April 1927, the British colonial government in Nigeria took measures to enforce the Native Revenue (Amendment) Ordinance. Direct taxation on men was introduced in 1928 without major incidents. However, in October 1929 in Oloko a census related to taxation was conducted, and the women in the area suspected that this was a prelude to the extension of direct taxation, which had been imposed on the men the previous year. This led to protests known as the Women's War. Emergence of Southern Nigerian nationalism [edit] Main article: Nigerian nationalism British colonialism created Nigeria, joining diverse peoples and regions in an artificial political entity along the Niger River. The nationalism that became a political factor in Nigeria during the interwar period derived both from an older political particularism and broad pan-Africanism, rather than from any sense among the people of a common Nigerian nationality. The goal of activists initially was not self-determination, but increased participation on a regional level in the governmental process. Inconsistencies in British policy reinforced existing cleavages based on regional animosities, as the British tried both to preserve the indigenous cultures of each area and to introduce modern technology, and Western political and social concepts. In the north, appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs, so that nationalist sentiments were related to Islamic ideals. Modern nationalists in the south, whose thinking was shaped by European ideas, opposed indirect rule, as they believed that it had strengthened what they considered an anachronistic ruling class and shut out the emerging Westernised elite. The southern nationalists were inspired by a variety of sources, including such prominent American-based activists as Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. Nigerian students abroad, particularly at British schools, joined those from other colonies in pan-African groups such as the West African Students Union, founded in London in 1925. Early nationalists tended to ignore Nigeria as the focus of patriotism. Their common denominators tended to be based on newly assertive ethnic consciousness, particularly that of the Yoruba and Igbo. Despite the acceptance of European and North American influences, the nationalists were critical of colonialism for its failure to appreciate the antiquity, richness and complexity of indigenous cultures. They wanted self-government, charging that only colonial rule prevented the unshackling of progressive forces in Nigeria and other states. Political opposition to colonial rule often assumed religious dimensions. Independent Christian churches had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. European interpretations of Christian orthodoxy in some cases refused to allow the incorporation of local customs and practices, although the various mission denominations interpreted Christianity in different ways. Most Europeans tended to overlook their own differences and were surprised and shocked that Nigerians wanted to develop new denominations independent of European control. Protestant sects had flourished in Christianity since the Protestant Reformation; the emergence of independent Christian churches in Nigeria (as of black denominations in the United States) was another phase of this history. The pulpits of the independent congregations became avenues for the free expression of critics of colonial rule. In the 1920s, Nigerians began to form a variety of associations, such as professional and business associations, like the Nigerian Union of Teachers; the Nigerian Law Association, which brought together lawyers, many of whom had been educated in Britain; and the Nigerian Produce Traders' Association, led by Obafemi Awolowo. While initially organised for professional and fraternal reasons, these were centres of educated people who had chances to develop their leadership skills in the organisations, as well as form broad social networks. Ethnic and kinship organisations that often took the form of a tribal union also emerged in the 1920s. These organisations were primarily urban phenomena that arose after numerous rural migrants moved to the cities. Alienated by the anonymity of the urban environment and drawn together by ties to their ethnic homelands—as well as by the need for mutual aid—the new city dwellers formed local clubs that later expanded into federations covering whole regions. By the mid-1940s, the major ethnic groups had formed such associations as the Igbo Federal Union and the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa), a Yoruba cultural movement, in which Awolowo played a leading role. In some cases, British assignment of people to ethnic groups, and treatment based along ethnic lines, led to identification with ethnicity where none had existed before.[84] A third type of organisation that was more pointedly political was the youth or student group, which became the vehicle of intellectuals and professionals. They were the most politically conscious segment of the population and created the vanguard of the nationalist movement. Newspapers, some of which were published before World War I, provided coverage of nationalist views. The 1922 constitution provided Nigerians with the chance to elect a handful of representatives to the Legislative Council. The principal figure in the political activity that ensued was Herbert Macauley, often referred to as the father of Nigerian nationalism. He aroused political awareness through his newspaper, the Lagos Daily News. He also led the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which dominated elections in Lagos from its founding in 1922 until the ascendancy of the National Youth Movement in 1938. His political platform called for economic and educational development, Africanization of the civil service, and self-government for Lagos. Significantly, Macauley's NNDP remained almost entirely a Lagos party, popular only in the area whose people already had experience in elective politics. The National Youth Movement used nationalist rhetoric to agitate for improvements in education. The movement brought to public notice a long list of future leaders, including H.O. Davies and Nnamdi Azikiwe. Although Azikiwe later came to be recognised as the leading spokesman for national unity, when he first returned from university training in the United States, his outlook was pan-African rather than nationalist, and emphasised the common African struggle against European colonialism. (This was also reflective of growing pan-Africanism among American activists of the time.) Azikiwe had less interest in purely Nigerian goals than did Davies, a student of Harold Laski at the London School of Economics, whose political orientation was considered left-wing. By 1938 the NYM was agitating for dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations so that Nigeria would have the same status as Canada and Australia. In elections that year, the NYM ended the domination of the NNDP in the Legislative Council and worked to establish a national network of affiliates. Three years later internal divisions arose that was dominated by major ethnic loyalties. The departure of Azikiwe and other Igbo members of the NYM left the organisation in Yoruba hands. During World War II, Awolowo reorganized it as a predominantly Yoruba political party, the Action Group. The Yoruba-Igbo rivalry became increasingly important in Nigerian politics. Second World War [edit] During World War II, three battalions of the Nigeria Regiment fought against Fascist Italy in the Ethiopian campaign. Nigerian units also contributed to two divisions serving with British forces in Palestine, Morocco, Sicily and Burma, where they won many honours. Wartime experiences provided a new frame of reference for many soldiers, who interacted across ethnic boundaries in ways that were unusual in Nigeria. The war also made the British reappraise Nigeria's political future. The war years brought a polarization between the older, more parochial leaders inclined toward gradualism and the younger intellectuals, who thought in more immediate terms. The rapid growth of organised labour in the 1940s also brought new political forces into play. During the war, union membership increased sixfold to 30,000. The proliferation of labour organisations fragmented the movement, and potential leaders lacked the experience and skill to draw workers together. The Action Group was largely the creation of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, General Secretary of Egbe Omo Oduduwa and leader of the Nigerian Produce Traders' Association. The Action Group was thus the heir of a generation of flourishing cultural consciousness among the Yoruba and also had valuable connections with commercial interests that were representative of the comparative economic advancement of the Western Region. Awolowo had little difficulty in appealing to broad segments of the Yoruba population, but he worked to avoid the Action Group from being stigmatized as a "tribal" group. Despite his somewhat successful efforts to enlist non-Yoruba support, the regionalist sentiment that had stimulated the party initially continued. Segments of the Yoruba community had their own animosities and new rivalries arose. For example, many people in Ibadan opposed Awolowo on personal grounds because of his identification with the Ijebu Yoruba. Despite these difficulties, the Action Group rapidly built an effective organisation. Its program reflected greater planning and was more ideologically oriented than that of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. Although lacking Azikiwe's compelling personality, Awolowo was a formidable debater as well as a vigorous and tenacious political campaigner. He used for the first time in Nigeria modern, sometimes flamboyant, electioneering techniques. Among his leading lieutenants were Samuel Akintola of Ogbomoso and the Oni of Ife, the most important of the Yoruba monarchs. The Action Group consistently supported minority-group demands for autonomous states within a federal structure, as well as the severance of a midwest state from the Western Region. It assumed that comparable alterations would be made elsewhere, an attitude that won the party minority voting support in the other regions. It backed Yoruba irredentism in the Fulani-ruled emirate of Ilorin in the Northern Region, and separatist movements among non-Igbo in the Eastern Region. The Northern People's Congress (NPC) was organised in the late 1940s by a small group of Western-educated Northern Nigerians. They had obtained the assent of the emirs to form a political party to counterbalance the activities of the southern-based parties. It represented a substantial element of reformism in the North. The most powerful figure in the party was Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. Bello wanted to protect northern social and political institutions from southern influence. He insisted on maintaining the territorial integrity of the Northern Region. He was prepared to introduce educational and economic changes to strengthen the north. Although his own ambitions were limited to the Northern Region, Bello backed the NPC's successful efforts to mobilize the north's large voting strength so as to win control of the national government. The NPC platform emphasized the integrity of the north, its traditions, religion and social order. Support for broad Nigerian concerns occupied a clear second place. A lack of interest in extending the NPC beyond the Northern Region corresponded to this strictly regional orientation. Its activist membership was drawn from local government and emirate officials who had access to means of communication and to repressive traditional authority that could keep the opposition in line. The small contingent of northerners who had been educated abroad—a group that included Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Aminu Kano—was allied with British-backed efforts to introduce gradual change to the emirates. The emirs gave support to limited modernization largely from fears of the unsettling presence of southerners in the north, and by observing the improvements in living conditions in the South. Northern leaders committed to modernization were also firmly connected to the traditional power structure. Most internal problems were concealed, and open opposition to the domination of the Muslim aristocracy was not tolerated. Critics, including representatives of the Middle Belt who resented Muslim domination, were relegated to small, peripheral parties or to inconsequential separatist movements.[85] In 1950 Aminu Kano, who had been instrumental in founding the NPC, broke away to form the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), in protest against the NPC's limited objectives and what he regarded as a vain hope that traditional rulers would accept modernization. NEPU formed a parliamentary alliance with the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The NPC continued to represent the interests of the traditional order in the pre-independence deliberations. After the defection of Kano, the only significant disagreement within the NPC was related to moderates. Men such as Balewa believed that only by overcoming political and economic backwardness could the NPC protect the foundations of traditional northern authority against the influence of the more advanced south. In all three regions, minority parties represented the special interests of ethnic groups, especially as they were affected by the majority. They were never able to elect sizeable legislative delegations, but they served as a means of public expression for minority concerns. They received attention from major parties before the elections, at which time either a dominant party from another region or the opposition party in their region sought their alliance. The political parties jockeyed for positions of power in anticipation of the independence of Nigeria. Three constitutions were enacted from 1946 to 1954. While each generated considerable political controversy, they moved the country toward greater internal autonomy, with an increasing role for the political parties. The trend was toward the establishment of a parliamentary system of government, with regional assemblies and a federal House of Representatives. In 1946 a new constitution was approved by the British Parliament at Westminster and promulgated in Nigeria. Although it reserved effective power in the hands of the Governor-General and his appointed Executive Council, the so-called Richards Constitution (after Governor-General Sir Arthur Richards, who was responsible for its formulation) provided for an expanded Legislative Council empowered to deliberate on matters affecting the whole country. Separate legislative bodies, the houses of assembly, were established in each of the three regions to consider local questions and to advise the Lieutenant Governors. The introduction of the federal principle, with deliberative authority devolved on the regions, signalled recognition of the country's diversity. Although realistic in its assessment of the situation in Nigeria, the Richards Constitution undoubtedly intensified regionalism as an alternative to political unification. The pace of constitutional change accelerated after the promulgation of the Richards Constitution. It was suspended in 1950 against a call for greater autonomy, which resulted in an inter-parliamentary conference at Ibadan in 1950. The conference drafted the terms of a new constitution. The so-called Macpherson Constitution, after the incumbent Governor-General John Stuart Macpherson, went into effect the following year. The most important innovations in the new charter reinforced the dual course of constitutional evolution, allowing for both regional autonomy and federal union. By extending the elective principle and by providing for a central government with a Council of Ministers, the Macpherson Constitution gave renewed impetus to party activity and to political participation at the national level. But by providing for comparable regional governments exercising broad legislative powers, which could not be overridden by the newly established 185-seat federal House of Representatives, the Macpherson Constitution also gave a significant boost to regionalism. Subsequent revisions contained in the Lyttleton Constitution, enacted in 1954, firmly established the federal principle and paved the way for independence. Self-governing regions (1957) [edit] Main article: Federation of Nigeria In 1957, the Western and the Eastern regions became formally self-governing under the parliamentary system. Similar status was acquired by the Northern Region two years later. There were numerous differences of detail among the regional systems, but all adhered to parliamentary forms and were equally autonomous in relation to the Nigerian federal government at Lagos. The federal government retained specified powers, including responsibility for banking, currency, external affairs, defence, shipping and navigation and communications, but real political power was centred in the regions. Significantly, the regional governments controlled public expenditures derived from revenues raised within each region. Ethnic cleavages intensified in the 1950s. Political activists in the southern areas spoke of self-government in terms of educational opportunities and economic development. Because of the spread of mission schools and wealth derived from export crops, the southern parties were committed to policies that would benefit the south of the country. In the north, the emirs intended to maintain firm control on economic and political change. Any activity in the north that might include participation by the federal government (and consequently by southern civil servants) was regarded as a challenge to the primacy of the emirates. Broadening political participation and expanding educational opportunities and other social services also were viewed as threats to the status quo. An extensive immigrant population of southerners, especially Igbo, already were living in the north; they dominated clerical positions and were active in many trades. The cleavage between the Yoruba and the Igbo was accentuated by their competition for control of the political machinery. The receding British presence enabled local officials and politicians to gain access to patronage over government jobs, funds for local development, market permits, trade licenses, government contracts, and even scholarships for higher education. In an economy with many qualified applicants for every post, great resentment was generated by any favouritism that authorities showed to members of their own ethnic group. In the immediate post-World War II period, Nigeria benefited from a favourable trade balance. Although per capita income in the country as a whole remained low by international standards, rising incomes among salaried personnel and burgeoning urbanization expanded consumer demand for imported goods. In the meantime, public sector spending increased even more dramatically than export earnings. It was supported not only by the income from huge agricultural surpluses but also by a new range of direct and indirect taxes imposed during the 1950s. The transfer of responsibility for budgetary management from the central to the regional governments in 1954 accelerated the pace of public spending on services and on development projects. Total revenues of central and regional governments nearly doubled in relation to the gross domestic product during the decade. The most dramatic event having a long-term effect on Nigeria's economic development was the discovery and exploitation of petroleum deposits. The search for oil, begun in 1908 and abandoned a few years later, was revived in 1937 by Shell and British Petroleum. Exploration was intensified in 1946, but the first commercial discovery did not occur until 1956, at Olobiri in the Niger Delta. In 1958 exportation of Nigerian oil was initiated at facilities constructed at Port Harcourt. Oil income was still marginal, but the prospects for continued economic expansion appeared bright and accentuated political rivalries on the eve of independence. The election of the House of Representatives after the adoption of the 1954 constitution gave the NPC a total of seventy-nine seats, all from the Northern Region. Among the other major parties, the NCNC took fifty-six seats, winning a majority in both the Eastern and the Western regions, while the Action Group captured only twenty-seven seats. The NPC was called on to form a government, but the NCNC received six of the ten ministerial posts. Three of these posts were assigned to representatives from each region, and one was reserved for a delegate from the Northern Cameroons. As a further step toward independence, the Governor's Executive Council was merged with the Council of Ministers in 1957 to form the all-Nigerian Federal Executive Council. The NPC federal parliamentary leader, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was appointed Prime Minister of Nigeria. Balewa formed a coalition government that included the Action Group as well as the NCNC to prepare the country for the final British withdrawal. His government guided the country for the next three years, operating with almost complete autonomy in internal affairs. Constitutional conferences in the UK (1957–58) [edit] Main article: Lancaster House Conferences (Nigeria) The preparation of a new federal constitution for an independent Nigeria was carried out at conferences held at Lancaster House in London in 1957 and 1958, which were presided over by The Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd, M.P., the British Secretary of State for the Colonies. Nigerian delegates were selected to represent each region and to reflect various shades of opinion. The delegation was led by Balewa of the NPC and included party leaders Awolowo of the Action Group, Azikiwe of the NCNC, and Bello of the NPC; they were also the premiers of the Western, Eastern and Northern regions, respectively. Independence was achieved on 1 October 1960. Elections were held for a new and greatly enlarged House of Representatives in December 1959; 174 of the 312 seats were allocated to the Northern Region on the basis of its larger population. The NPC, entering candidates only in the Northern Region, confined campaigning largely to local issues but opposed the addition of new regimes. The NCNC backed creation of a midwest state and proposed federal control of education and health services. The Action Group, which staged a lively campaign, favoured stronger government and the establishment of three new states while advocating the creation of a West Africa Federation that would unite Nigeria with Ghana and Sierra Leone. The NPC captured 142 seats in the new legislature. Balewa was called on to head an NPC-NCNC coalition government, and Awolowo became the official leader of the opposition. Independent Nigeria (1960) [edit] Main article: First Nigerian Republic By a British Act of Parliament, Nigeria became independent on 1 October 1960.[8] Azikiwe was installed as Governor-General of the federation and Balewa continued to serve as head of a democratically elected parliamentary, but now completely sovereign, government. The Governor-General represented the British monarch as head of state and was appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Nigerian prime minister in consultation with the regional premiers. The Governor-General, in turn, was responsible for appointing the prime minister and for choosing a candidate from among contending leaders when there was no parliamentary majority. Otherwise, the Governor-General's office was essentially ceremonial. The government was responsible to a Parliament composed of the popularly elected 312-member House of Representatives and the 44-member Senate, chosen by the regional legislatures. In general, the regional constitutions followed the federal model, both structurally and functionally. The most striking departure was in the Northern Region, where special provisions brought the regional constitution into consonance with Islamic law and custom. The similarity between the federal and regional constitutions was deceptive, however, and the conduct of public affairs reflected wide differences among the regions. In February 1961, a plebiscite was conducted to determine the disposition of the Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, which were administered by Britain as United Nations Trust Territories. By an overwhelming majority, voters in the Southern Cameroons opted to join formerly French-administered Cameroon over integration with Nigeria as a separate federated region. In the Northern Cameroons, however, the largely Muslim electorate chose to merge with Nigeria's Northern Region. See also [edit] Enclaves of Forcados and Badjibo Bandele Omoniyi Notes [edit] References [edit] Notes [edit] Sources [edit] Country Studies On-Line - Nigeria at the Library of Congress Further reading [edit] Afeadie, Philip Atsu. "The Hidden Hand of Overrule: Political Agents and the Establishment of British Colonial Rule in Northern Nigeria, 1886–1914". PhD dissertation accepted at the Graduate Programme in History, York University, Ontario. September 1996. Asiegbu, Johnson U. J. Nigeria and its British Invaders, 1851–1920: A Thematic Documentary History. New York & Enugu: Nok Publishers International, 1984. ISBN 0-88357-101-3 Ayandele, Emmanuel Ayankanmi. The missionary impact on modern Nigeria, 1842-1914: A political and social analysis (London: Longmans, 1966). Burns, Alan C. History of Nigeria (3rd ed. London, 1942) online free. Carland, John M. The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898–1914. Hoover Institution Press, 1985. ISBN 0-8179-8141-1 Dike, K. O. "John Beecroft, 1790—1854: Her Brittanic Majesty's Consul to the Bights of Benin and Biafra 1849—1854" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 1#1 (1956), pp. 5–14, online Fafunwa, A. Babs. History of education in Nigeria (Routledge, 2018). Falola, Toyin, & Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria (Cambridge UP, 2008, ISBN 978-0-521-68157-5 online free to borrow Falola, Toyin, Ann Genova, and Matthew M. Heaton. Historical dictionary of Nigeria (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). Isichei, Elizabeth. A History of Nigeria. (Longman, Inc., 1983). ISBN 0-582-64331-7 Larymore, Constance. A Resident's wife in Nigeria. (United Kingdom: George Routledge & Sons, Limited, 1908). Mordi, Emmanuel Nwafor. "Nigerian Forces Comforts Fund, 1940–1947: 'The Responsibility of the Nigerian Government to Provide Funds for the Welfare of Its Soldiers'." Itinerario 43.3 (2019): 516–542. Pétré-Grenouilleau, Olivier (ed.). From Slave Trade to Empire: Europe and the colonisation of Black Africa 1780s–1880s. Abingdon, UK, and New York: Routledge, 2004. ISBN 0-714-65691-7 Tamuno, T. N. The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914. New York: Humanities Press, 1972. SBN 391 00232 5 Tamuno, T. N. (1970). "Separatist Agitations in Nigeria Since 1914." The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8(04), 563. doi:10.1017/s0022278x00023909
9206	dbpedia	0	0	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_West_Africa	en	British West Africa	https://upload.wikimedia…31888%29.svg.png	https://upload.wikimedia…31888%29.svg.png	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e8/Flag_of_the_British_...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2005-10-02T18:46:57+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_West_Africa	1821–1888 colonial entity of Britain in West Africa British West Africa was the collective name for British settlements in West Africa during the colonial period, either in the general geographical sense or the formal colonial administrative entity. British West Africa as a colonial entity was originally officially known as Colony of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, then British West African Territories and finally British West African Settlements.[1] The United Kingdom held varying parts of these territories or the whole throughout the 19th century. From west to east, the colonies became the independent countries of The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. Until independence, Ghana was referred to as the Gold Coast. Historical jurisdiction [edit] British West Africa constituted during two periods (17 October 1821, until its first dissolution on 13 January 1850, and again 19 February 1866, until its final demise on 28 November 1888) as an administrative entity under a governor-in-chief (comparable in rank to a governor-general), an office vested in the governor of Sierra Leone (at Freetown).[1] The other colonies originally included in the jurisdiction were the Gambia and the British Gold Coast (modern Ghana). Also western Nigeria, eastern Nigeria and northern Nigeria were included.[2] Africa's present makeup includes Ghana, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Western Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. These countries and areas are artifacts of the post-colonial period, or what the Ghanaian writer Kwame Appiah dubs neo-colonialism.[citation needed] British West Africa was originally founded at the urging of the prominent abolitionist Fowell Buxton, who felt that ending the Atlantic slave trade required some level of British control of the coastline.[3] Development was solely based on modernization, and autonomous educational systems were the first step to modernising indigenous culture. Cultures and interests of indigenous peoples were ignored. A new social order, as well as European influences within schools and libraries [4] and local traditions, helped mould British West Africa's culture. The British West African colonial school curriculum helped play a role in this. Local elites developed, with new values and philosophies, who changed the overall cultural development.[5] Aftermath [edit] Even after its final dissolution, a single currency, the British West African pound, was in effect throughout the region—including Nigeria—from 1907 to 1962.[6] Nigeria gained independence in 1960. Sierra Leone was self-governing by 1958 and gained independence in 1961. Gambia gained independence in 1965. In 1954, the British Gold Coast was allowed by Britain to self-govern and in 1957, the Gold Coast was given independence from Britain, under the name Ghana.[7] See also [edit] British colonisation in Africa British Togoland Colonial Nigeria Gambia Colony and Protectorate Gold Coast (British colony) Royal West African Frontier Force Sierra Leone Colony and Protectorate European colonisation in Africa Brandenburger Gold Coast Danish Gold Coast Dutch Gold Coast Portuguese Gold Coast Swedish Gold Coast Scramble for Africa West Africa cricket team References [edit]
9206	dbpedia	1	26	https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/	en	The World Factbook	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	https://www.cia.gov/the-…1f66c6c2685054a1	[ "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/28e23627b09c310dd199c697bc4d3d18/7cf55/NI-flag.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/28e23627b09c310dd199c697bc4d3d18/7cf55/NI-flag.jpg", "https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/static/94c718cca623fc859b1b6633b67bd36c/11034/NI-map.jpg", "https://ww...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null			/the-world-factbook/favicon-32x32.png?v=c3853bf09f084a8b1f66c6c2685054a1		null	Background In ancient and pre-colonial times, the area of present-day Nigeria was occupied by a variety of ethnic groups with different languages and traditions. These included large Islamic kingdoms such as Borno, Kano, and the Sokoto Caliphate dominating the north, the Benin and Oyo Empires that controlled much of modern western Nigeria, and more decentralized political entities and city states in the south and southeast. In 1914, the British amalgamated their separately administered northern and southern territories into a Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. Nigeria achieved independence from Britain in 1960 and transitioned to a federal republic with three constituent states in 1963 under President Nnamdi AZIKIWE. This structure served to enflame regional and ethnic tension, contributing to a bloody coup led by predominately southeastern military officers in 1966 and a countercoup later that year masterminded by northern officers. In the aftermath of this tension, the governor of Nigeriaâs Eastern Region, centered on the southeast, declared the region independent as the Republic of Biafra. The ensuring civil war (1967-1970), resulted in more than a million deaths, many from starvation. While the war forged a stronger Nigerian state and national identity, it contributed to long-lasting mistrust of the southeastâs predominantly Igbo population. Wartime military leader Yakubu GOWON ruled until a bloodless coup by frustrated junior officers in 1975. This generation of officers, including Olusegun OBASANJO, Ibrahim BABANGIDA, and Muhammadu BUHARI, who would all later serve as president, continue to exert significant influence in Nigeria to the present day. Military rule predominated until the first durable transition to civilian government and adoption of a new constitution in 1999. The elections of 2007 marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in the country's history. National and state elections in 2011 and 2015 were generally regarded as credible. The 2015 election was also heralded for the fact that the then-umbrella opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, defeated the long-ruling (since 1999) People's Democratic Party and assumed the presidency, marking the first peaceful transfer of power from one party to another. Presidential and legislative elections in 2019 and 2023 were deemed broadly free and fair despite voting irregularities, intimidation, and violence. The government of Africa's most populous nation continues to face the daunting task of institutionalizing democracy and reforming a petroleum-based economy whose revenues have been squandered through decades of corruption and mismanagement. In addition, Nigeria faces increasing violence from Islamic terrorism, largely in the northeast, large scale criminal banditry, secessionist violence in the southeast, and competition over land and resources nationwide. Demographic profile Nigeriaâs population is projected to grow from more than 186 million people in 2016 to 392 million in 2050, becoming the worldâs fourth most populous country. Nigeriaâs sustained high population growth rate will continue for the foreseeable future because of population momentum and its high birth rate. Abuja has not successfully implemented family planning programs to reduce and space births because of a lack of political will, government financing, and the availability and affordability of services and products, as well as a cultural preference for large families. Increased educational attainment, especially among women, and improvements in health care are needed to encourage and to better enable parents to opt for smaller families. Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population in order to boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities and away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence. While most movement of Nigerians is internal, significant emigration regionally and to the West provides an outlet for Nigerians looking for economic opportunities, seeking asylum, and increasingly pursuing higher education. Immigration largely of West Africans continues to be insufficient to offset emigration and the loss of highly skilled workers. Nigeria also is a major source, transit, and destination country for forced labor and sex trafficking. Major infectious diseases degree of risk: very high (2023) food or waterborne diseases: bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vectorborne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and sexually transmitted diseases: hepatitis B (2024) water contact diseases: schistosomiasis animal contact diseases: rabies respiratory diseases: meningococcal meningitis aerosolized dust or soil contact diseases: Lassa fever note 1: on 4 May 2022, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued a Travel Health Notice for a Yellow Fever outbreak in Nigeria; a large, ongoing outbreak of yellow fever in Nigeria began in September 2017; the outbreak is now spread throughout the country with the Nigerian Ministry of Health reporting cases of the disease in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu); the CDC recommends travelers going to Nigeria should receive vaccination against yellow fever at least 10 days before travel and should take steps to prevent mosquito bites while there; those never vaccinated against yellow fever should avoid travel to Nigeria during the outbreak (see attached map) note 2: on 31 August 2023, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Africa; Nigeria is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an âinfectedâ person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine note 3: on 20 September 2023, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention updated a Travel Health Alert for a diphtheria outbreak in several states in Nigeria; vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease; if you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines; before travel, discuss the need for a booster dose with your healthcare professional; diphtheria is a serious infection caused by strains of Corynebacterium diphtheriae bacteria that make a toxin from which people get very sick; diphtheria bacteria spread from person to person through respiratory droplets like from coughing or sneezing; people can also get sick from touching open sores or ulcers of people sick with diphtheria (see attached map) note 1: The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) is reporting yellow fever outbreaks in multiple states (Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Ebonyi, and Enugu). Unless vaccinated, travelers should not visit these areas. Yellow fever is caused by a virus transmitted through bites of infected mosquitoes. Travelers to Nigeria should take steps to prevent yellow fever by getting vaccinated at least 10 days before travel and taking steps to prevent mosquito bites. Map courtesy of CDC. : note 3: There is an outbreak of diphtheria in several states in Nigeria. Vaccination against diphtheria is essential to protect against disease. If you are traveling to an affected area, you should be up to date with your diphtheria vaccines. Map courtesy of CDC. : Food insecurity widespread lack of access: due to persistent civil conflict in the northern areas,Â floods, high food prices, and an economic slowdown - about 25.3 million people are projected to face acute food insecurity during the June to August 2023 lean season; this would be a significant deterioration compared to last year, when 19.45 million people were estimated to be acutely food insecure; acute food insecurity is mostly driven by the deterioration of security conditions and conflicts in northern states, which have led to the displacement of about 3.17 million people as of March 2022 (the latest data available) and are constraining farmersâ access to their lands; widespread flooding in 2022, affecting about 4.5 million people across the country, has further compounded conditions, particularly in areas already facing high levels of insecurity; high food prices and the expected slowdown in economic growth in 2023 are additional drivers of acute food insecurity (2023) Constitution history: several previous; latest adopted 5 May 1999, effective 29 May 1999 amendments: proposed by the National Assembly; passage requires at least two-thirds majority vote of both houses and approval by the Houses of Assembly of at least two thirds of the states; amendments to constitutional articles on the creation of a new state, fundamental constitutional rights, or constitution-amending procedures requires at least four-fifths majority vote by both houses of the National Assembly and approval by the Houses of Assembly in at least two thirds of the states; passage of amendments limited to the creation of a new state require at least two-thirds majority vote by the proposing National Assembly house and approval by the Houses of Assembly in two thirds of the states; amended several times, last in 2018 Executive branch chief of state: President Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (since 29 May 2023) head of government: President Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (since 29 May 2023) cabinet: Federal Executive Council appointed by the president but constrained constitutionally to include at least one member from each of the 36 states elections/appointments: president directly elected by qualified majority popular vote and at least 25% of the votes cast in 24 of Nigeria's 36 states; president elected for a 4-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 25 February 2023 (next to be held on 27 February 2027) note - the president is chief of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces election results: 2023: Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU elected president; percent of vote - Bola Ahmed Adekunle TINUBU (APC) 36.6%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 29.1%, Peter OBI (LP) 25.4%, Rabiu KWANKWASO (NNPP) 6.4%, other 2.5% 2019: Muhammadu BUHARI elected president; percent of vote - Muhammadu BUHARI (APC) 53%, Atiku ABUBAKAR (PDP) 39%, other 8% Â Telecommunication systems general assessment: one of the larger telecom markets in Africa subject to sporadic access to electricity and vandalism of infrastructure; most Internet connections are via mobile networks; market competition with affordable access; LTE technologies available but GSM is dominant; mobile penetration high due to use of multiple SIM cards and phones; government committed to expanding broadband penetration; operators to deploy fiber optic cable in six geopolitical zones and Lagos; operators invested in base stations to deplete network congestion; submarine cable break in 2020 slowed speeds and interrupted connectivity; Nigeria concluded its first 5G spectrum auction in 2021 and granted licenses to two firms; construction of 5G infrastructure has not yet been completed (2022) domestic: fixed-line subscribership remains less than 1 per 100 persons; mobile-cellular subscribership is 91 per 100 persons (2021) international: country code - 234; landing point for the SAT-3/WASC, NCSCS,Â MainOne, Glo-1 & 2, ACE, and EquianoÂ fiber-optic submarine cable that provides connectivity to Europe and South and West Africa; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean) (2019) Military and security forces Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN): Army, Navy (includes Coast Guard), Air Force Ministry of Interior: Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC); Ministry of Police Affairs: Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (2024) note 1: the NSCDC is a paramilitary agency commissioned to assist the military in the management of threats to internal security, including attacks and natural disasters note 2: the Office of the National Security Advisor is responsible for coordinating all security and enforcement agencies, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the NSCDC, the Ministry of Justice, and the NPF; border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, the DSS, the NSCDC, Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, and the AFN note 3: some states have created local security forces akin to neighborhood watches in response to increased violence, insecurity, and criminality that have exceeded the response capacity of federal government security forces but as of January 2024, official security forces remained the constitutional perogative of the federal government Military - note the Nigerian military is sub-Saharan Africaâs largest and regarded as one of its most capable forces; the military's primary concerns are internal and maritime security, and it faces a number of challenges; the Army is deployed in all 36 of the country's states; in the northeast, it is conducting counterinsurgency/counterterrorist operations against the Boko Haram (BH) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in West Africa (ISIS-WA) terrorist groups, where it has deployed as many as 70,000 troops at times and jihadist-related violence has killed an estimated 35-40,000 people, mostly civilians, since 2009; in the northwest, it faces growing threats from criminal gangs--locally referred to as bandits--and violence associated with long-standing farmer-herder conflicts, as well as BH and ISIS-WA terrorists; bandits in the northwestern Nigeria are estimated to number in the low 10,000s and violence there has killed more than 10,000 people since the mid-2010s; the military also continues to protect the oil industry in the Niger Delta region against militants and criminal activity; since 2021, additional troops and security forces have been deployed to eastern Nigeria to quell renewed agitation for a state of Biafra (Biafra seceded from Nigeria in the late 1960s, sparking a civil war that caused more than 1 million deaths) the Navy is focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; since 2016, it has developed a maritime strategy, boosted naval training and its naval presence in the Gulf, increased participation in regional maritime security efforts, and acquired a number of new naval platforms, including offshore and coastal patrol craft, fast attack boats, and air assets the Nigerian military traces its origins to the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a multi-regiment force formed by the British colonial office in 1900 to garrison the West African colonies of Nigeria (Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria), Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia; the WAFF served with distinction in both East and West Africa during World War I; in 1928, it received royal recognition and was re-named the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF); the RWAFF went on to serve in World War II as part of the British 81st and 82nd (West African) divisions in the East Africa and Burma campaigns; in 1956, the Nigeria Regiment of the RWAFF was renamed the Nigerian Military Forces (NMF) and in 1958, the colonial government of Nigeria took over control of the NMF from the British War Office; the Nigerian Armed Forces were established following independence in 1960 (2023) Space program overview has a formal national space program, which is one of the largest in Africa; focused on acquiring satellites for agricultural, environmental, meteorology, mining and disaster monitoring, socio-economic development, and security purposes; designs, builds (mostly with foreign assistance), and operates satellites; processes overhead imagery data for analysis and sharing; developing additional capabilities in satellite and satellite payload production, including remote sensing (RS) technologies; has a sounding rocket program for researching rockets and rocket propulsion systems with goal of launching domestically produced satellites into space from a Nigerian spaceport by 2030; has relations and/or cooperation agreements with a variety of foreign space agencies and industries, including those of Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Ghana, India, Japan, Kenya, Mongolia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, the US, and Vietnam; has a government-owned satellite company and a small commercial aerospace sector (2024) note: further details about the key activities, programs, and milestones of the countryâs space program, as well as government spending estimates on the space sector, appear in the Space Programs reference guide
9206	dbpedia	1	10	https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/	en	British West Africa	https://www.banknoteworl…est%20Africa.png	https://www.banknoteworl…est%20Africa.png	[ "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/images/simplecms/logo_Educational_logo-no-tm.png", "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/var/theme/images/shop_btn2x.png 2x", "https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/images/simplecms/logo_Educational_logo-no-tm.png", "https://www.bankn...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	British West Africa referred to a collection of British colonies, protectorates, and mandate territories in West Africa. Initially, it was named the Colony of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, and then became British West African Territories, and finally British West African Settlements. The member states included Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and The Gambia, which later became independent countries.The currency used in British West Africa was the pound, equivalent to one pound sterling and divided into 20 shillings, each of 12 pence. In the 19th century, standard British coinage circulated in the West African territories, and the sterling became the currency of choice. However, in 1912, the West African Currency Board was established in London, and a unique set of sterling coinage was issued for use in British West Africa. This move was prompted by the tendency of standard sterling coins shipped to the region to leave and return to circulation in the UK, causing a local shortage of coinage. To deal with the situation, a British West African pound was introduced. Such pounds would not be accepted in British shops, and therefore circulating locally. The British West African pound was also adopted by Liberia in 1907, although it was not served by the West African Currency Board. The currency was also adopted in Togo and Cameroon during World War I when French and British forces ruled over the German colonies. However, beginning in 1958, individual territories in British West Africa started to replace the pound with local currencies.	en	https://www.banknoteworld.org/images/simplecms/favicon.ico	Banknote World Educational	https://www.banknoteworld.org/british-west-africa/	British West Africa referred to a collection of British colonies, protectorates, and mandate territories in West Africa. Initially, it was named the Colony of Sierra Leone and its Dependencies, and then became British West African Territories, and finally British West African Settlements. The member states included Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and The Gambia, which later became independent countries. The currency used in British West Africa was the pound, equivalent to one pound sterling and divided into 20 shillings, each of 12 pence. In the 19th century, standard British coinage circulated in the West African territories, and the sterling became the currency of choice. However, in 1912, the West African Currency Board was established in London, and a unique set of sterling coinage was issued for use in British West Africa. This move was prompted by the tendency of standard sterling coins shipped to the region to leave and return to circulation in the UK, causing a local shortage of coinage. To deal with the situation, a British West African pound was introduced. Such pounds would not be accepted in British shops, and therefore circulating locally. The British West African pound was also adopted by Liberia in 1907, although it was not served by the West African Currency Board. The currency was also adopted in Togo and Cameroon during World War I when French and British forces ruled over the German colonies. However, beginning in 1958, individual territories in British West Africa started to replace the pound with local currencies.
9206	dbpedia	3	7	https://www.trtworld.com/life/nigeria-s-culture-wars-take-aim-at-the-country-s-currency-41549	en	Nigeria's culture wars take aim at the country's currency	https://cdn-i.pr.trt.com…605615819091.jpg	https://cdn-i.pr.trt.com…605615819091.jpg	[ "https://trtworld.com/trt-logo.svg", "https://www.trtworld.com/icon-homepage.svg", "https://cdn-i.pr.trt.com.tr/trtworld/w664/h374/q70/0m_92477_N1000_1605615819091.jpg", "https://cdn-i.pr.trt.com.tr/trtworld/w212/h120/q80/0m_40648_AminaAbbagana_1536845673955.JPG", "https://cdn-i.pr.trt.com.tr/trtworld/w120/...	[]	[]	[ "turkiye", "turkey", "middle east", "africa", "europe", "china", "us", "germany", "news", "breaking news", "context", "explainer", "opinion", "economy", "business", "trends", "humans", "globalisation", "russia", "rt", "trt", "trt world", "journalism", "human interest" ]	null	[ "Melis Alemdar" ]	2020-11-17T12:44:44+00:00	Nigerian currency of N1,000, N500 and N200 denominations has Ajami – non-Arab language Arabic script – on them. Some argue this is not secular, while others say it is the only way a portion of the population can understand what is written.	en	/favicon.png	Nigeria's culture wars take aim at the country's currency	https://www.trtworld.com/life/nigeria-s-culture-wars-take-aim-at-the-country-s-currency-41549	Nigeria’s colonial past still affects life decades later. Nigeria has three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west and Igbo in the east. It became an independent federal republic on October 1, 1960 after being a British colony in the 19th century, its current formation being shaped by the British by combining the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1914. While the country’s official language is English, the local ethnic languages are also spoken widely. The current problem with the Nigerian banknotes stems from the belief that any Arabic script is an indicator of Islam, while the country is supposed to support freedom of religion, with large populations of Christians in the south and Muslims in the north. Recently, a lawyer in Nigeria’s largest city, Lagos, has demanded that the country’s central bank (NCB) remove the Arabic script from naira banknotes. The Arabic script, in the Hausa language, denotes the currency value of the money. According to Nairametrics, Chief Malcolm Omirhobo, who filed the suit before Justice Mohammed Liman, contends that “having Arabic inscriptions on the naira notes portrays Nigeria as an Islamic state, contrary to the country’s constitutional status of a secular state.” However, in a New Yorker article from December 2015, Musa S. Muhammad, an archivist in the city of Kaduna, tells Caelainn Hogan that he believes “This is politics between South and North.” The letters on the currency, he tells her, are as secular in origin as the Roman alphabet used in modern Bibles. “Any non-Arab language written in Arabic script we call Ajami,” he says. “They feel that this is religious, but it’s not.” Ajami script, that is, non-Arab language written in Arabic script, is also used in some other African countries, Nairametrics says. According to the BBC these include, “among others, Swahili in East Africa, Tamashek, the language of the Tuaregs in North and West Africa, and Nigerian languages like Kanuri, Nupe, Yoruba, Fulfulde and Hausa”. It predates the arrival of Western colonisers and Christian missionaries, and thus the Latin alphabet in Nigeria. Chief Malcolm Omirhobo, who, according to Nairametrics, says he does not know what the Arabic inscriptions mean, has asked the court to order the CBN to replace them with either the country’s official language –English– or any of Nigeria’s three main indigenous languages: Hausa, Yoruba or Igbo. The problem with doing so, however, is that there is a populace in Nigeria who have not had Western education and are only versed in Arabic lettering. Mannir Dan Ali, writing for the BBC, points out “The Ajami writing on each naira note is for the benefit of the tens of millions of Hausa speakers, who can only read and write in that script, which is taught in schools across the north. Such people could go to court to argue that their own rights were being infringed should the Ajami inscription be removed.” The New Yorker article was written a year after a new 100 naira bill was introduced in Nigeria, which proved to be controversial because it replaced Ajami with Latin letters. According to the article, “Some Christians supported the move as a step toward de-Islamizing Nigeria, while many Muslims called it Islamophobic.” According to the BBC, the controversy goes back even further: “The row first began a decade ago when, to commemorate Nigeria's 50th anniversary, the 50 naira note was redesigned. Four years later for the centenary of the country's creation, the 100 naira too was updated.” According to the Cable, “currently, there is Ajami script on N1,000, N500 and N200 notes.” The Cable explains that “the argument against the Arabic inscription on the naira notes is that it is a violation of sections 10 and 55 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Section 10 of 1999 Constitution reads: ‘The Government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion.’” “The notion is that Arabic and Islam are the same, and this has led to accusations that the Arabic “symbol” on the naira connotes religion and promotes Islamisation. However, section 55 specifies that the country’s affairs must be conducted in English, Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa.” The Cable concludes that: “Since Ajami script is in Hausa language and is not a symbol of Islam or any religion, many will argue that no law has been violated.”
9206	dbpedia	0	31	https://academic.oup.com/book/32096/chapter/268018529	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
9206	dbpedia	3	64	https://www.ecoi.net/en/countries/nigeria/briefing/	en	Country briefing			[ "https://www.ecoi.net/site/templates/resources/styles/ecoi_small.svg", "https://www.ecoi.net/site/templates/resources/styles/ecoi_footer.svg", "https://www.ecoi.net/site/templates/resources/styles/logo-rk-scaled.png", "https://www.ecoi.net/site/templates/resources/styles/logo-accord-scaled.png", "https://ww...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en			null	Area: 923,768 km² Capital: Abuja Population: approx. 231 million Official languages: English Currency: Naira (NGN)[1] 1. Brief overview of Nigeria Nigeria is a country located on the west coast of Africa, bordering Niger to the north, Chad and Cameroon to the east and Benin to the west. The southern border is formed by the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa,[2] with more than 250 ethnic groups speaking over 500 languages.[3] Nigeria is rich in natural resources and has large oil and gas reserves in particular.[4] The majority of the country's export revenue comes from the oil sector. In the first half of 2022, oil revenues accounted for 29 per cent of total government revenue; the share of gross domestic product (GDP) was 5.6 per cent (as at Q3 2022).[5] The main reason for this is the fact that Nigeria, despite being Africa's largest producer of oil and gas, has to import almost all of its fuel needs as the four state-owned refineries have become dilapidated and unproductive due to mismanagement.[6] Other important raw materials are natural gas and hard coal.[7] Nigeria is also the fourth largest seller of diamonds in Africa.[8] The borders of present-day Nigeria were established in 1914 when the two British protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria were merged to form the colony and protectorate of Nigeria. On 1 October 1960, the country became independent, and in 1963, a new constitution made the transition to a republic.[9] At the time of independence, Nigeria was divided into three major regions - the Eastern, Western and Northern regions. In 1963, the Western Region was divided and a new region - the Midwest Region - was created.[10] The first decades after independence were characterised by several government overthrows, starting with the military coup in 1966 and the civil war of 1967-1970, which broke out after the eastern region declared itself independent under the name "Republic of Biafra". Further military rule from 1983 ended in 1999 with the return to civilian rule.[11] Nigeria is currently divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, which are grouped into six geopolitical zones (South-West, South-South, South-East, North-West, North-Central and North-East). The states are further divided into 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs), each of which is governed by a council responsible for the provision of basic services and receives monthly payments from a national federation account for this purpose.[12] A map showing the current federal states (as of 2015) can be viewed here. 2. Ethnic and religious groups The three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria are the Hausa living in the north of the country, the Yoruba living in the west and the Igbo in the east.[13] According to 2018 estimates, around 30 per cent of the population are Hausa, 15.5 per cent Yoruba and 15.2 per cent Igbo (also known as Ibo). Smaller groups include Fulani (6 per cent), Tiv (2.4 per cent), Kanuri/Beriberi (2.4 per cent), Ibibio (1.8 per cent) and Ijaw/Izon (1.8 per cent). 24.9 per cent of the population belong to other ethnic groups.[14] Hausa and Fulani have integrated into a common group over time and are predominantly Muslim. Fulani living in the city enter into inter-ethnic marriages and speak Hausa, while Fulani living in the countryside as pastoralists generally marry within their own group and speak Fulani. The greatest diversity of ethnic groups - more than 180 - is found in the so-called Middle Belt of Nigeria, with the Tiv and the Nupe as the largest ethnic groups in this region. [15]The term Middle Belt refers to North-Central Nigeria and includes the states of Benue, Plateau, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, Kwara and the Federal Capital Territory. The population living here is predominantly Christian, but there is a significant Muslim population .[16] English is the official national language; the indigenous languages Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo and Fula as well as Pidgin English are widely spoken. Hausa is the most widely spoken language in the country,[17] and is also the language of the Sharia courts in northern Nigeria.[18] The constitution states in Article 55 that the business of the National Assembly shall be conducted in English, but also in Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba if adequate provision has been made for this.[19] The National Education Guidelines of 2013 also contain provisions on the use of national languages as languages of instruction.[20] According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2015, 49.3 percent of the population nationwide are Christian and 48.8 percent are Muslim (as of 2010). Just under 2 per cent belong to another religious community or none at all.[21] In another survey from 2010, 38 per cent of Muslims described themselves as Sunni and 12 per cent as Shiite; 42 per cent identified themselves as "just a Muslim". Of the Christians surveyed, around 37 per cent were Catholic and around 60 per cent belonged to a Protestant church.[22] Islam dominates in the North-West and North-East geopolitical zones, Christianity in the Southern zones. In the North-Central zone, the proportion of Muslims and Christians is roughly equal. However, there is no clear geographical division between the religious groups: Christians also live in the regions dominated by Islam, and conversely there are Muslim populations in the southern regions, which are predominantly inhabited by Christians.[23] The constitution (Article 10) prohibits the introduction of a state religion at national or federal level and guarantees individual freedom of religion, including the right to change religion or belief (Article 38).[24] In October 1999, the state of Zamfara was the first to introduce Sharia law. Eleven other states[25] with a majority Muslim population, including the states of Kano and Kaduna, followed suit, despite protests from Christians. Clashes broke out in which several thousand people, both Christian and Muslim, died.[26] According to a report by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), although non-Muslims are not subject to Sharia criminal laws, they are already subject to some Islamic authorities, such as the censorship authority in Kano state or the Hisbah, an authority responsible for enforcing Sharia law. This is particularly evident in the enforcement of the ban on the sale of alcohol in the state, but there are also reports of discrimination regarding access to land. Not only Christians, but also Shiites and atheists are affected by discrimination.[27] Conversely, Muslims in Christian-dominated regions and followers of traditional religions also report experiences of discrimination .[28] See also the overview of laws on Nigeria compiled by ACCORD. 3. Political situation - #EndSARS protests & elections In October 2020, there were nationwide protests against the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a special police unit accused of widespread human rights violations. The unit was disbanded by President Buhari a few days after the protests began, but the protests continued.[29] The protests, which became known under the hashtag EndSARS and took place between 7 and 20 October 2020 in the states of Ogun, Oyo and Lagos as well as in Abuja, were violently suppressed by security forces. Firearms, water cannons and tear gas were used at close range.[30] An investigation by Amnesty International (AI) showed that 12 people were killed by the Nigerian army and police during the protests in Lagos on 20 October 2020. Detained protesters were also tortured and denied immediate access to a lawyer.[31] Further information on the #EndSARS protests can be found in the following response to the enquiry: ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Query response on Nigeria: End-SARS protests in Lagos (timing, armed clashes, situation of participants and organisers) [a-11918], 3 August 2022 https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2078848.html As well as in this featured topic (that is no longer updated): ACCORD - Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: ecoi.net featured topic on Nigeria: Security Situation, 21 December 2021 https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2106381.html After the protests ended, the federal government set up judicial commissions of enquiry to investigate reports of police violence, including killings. Their work came to a halt after some of the victims received compensation payments.[32] Of those arrested during the protests, at least 15 people were still in custody three years later, in October 2023.[33] (→ ecoi.net search for #EndSARS) Presidential and National Assembly elections were held in Nigeria in February 2023, followed by gubernatorial and state assembly elections on 18 March. The elections reportedly took place against the backdrop of a difficult security situation, rising poverty, fuel and cash shortages. The latter was caused by the fact that the central bank had announced the issue of new banknotes at the end of 2022, but these were not available in sufficient quantities.[34] This also led to protests and social unrest.[35] In the presidential elections, Bola Tinubu, candidate of the previously ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), emerged as the narrow winner with 36.61 per cent of the vote.[36] The electoral law stipulates that the presidential election is won by the candidate who (i) receives the most votes and (ii) receives at least 25 per cent of the votes in at least 24 of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. Only if no candidate fulfils this requirement will there be a run-off between the candidates with the most or second most votes.[37] Bola Tinubu received at least 25 per cent of the votes in 27 federal states and was therefore the only candidate to fulfil both requirements for an election victory.[38] The election process was accompanied by problems, polling stations opened late and the election results were not published in real time during the first phase of counting, as promised by the electoral authorities. According to the final report of the EU Election Observation Mission, there was a "critical failure of the entire election process" during the evaluation. When the election results were announced, a quarter of the forms could not yet be found on the electoral authority's electronic platform and a significant proportion of the documents that could already be viewed were illegible.[39] In addition, voter turnout was at a "record low" of just 27 per cent.[40] The two losing candidates - Atiku Abubakar of the Peoples Democratic Party and Peter Obi of the Labour Party - had challenged the results of the presidential election in court. However, their appeals were finally dismissed as unfounded by the Supreme Court in October 2023.[41] The International Crisis Group points out that the presidential election in February 2023 exposed existing ethnic and religious fault lines: Particularly in Lagos State, ethnic tensions had arisen between Yoruba, who supported Bola Tinubu, and supporters of Peter Obi, an Igbo. Peter Obi would have been the first Igbo president since 1966. The feeling of continued political exclusion and tensions with other ethnic groups could strengthen support for the call for an independent Biafra among the large Igbo population in the south-east and intensify separatist endeavours. In addition, many Christian groups rejected the election result after not only another Muslim was elected president, but Bola Tinubu also appointed a Muslim as vice president (instead of, according to unwritten rules, electing a Christian president after a Muslim president and appointing a vice president of the other denomination).[42] The APC also received the most votes in the National Assembly elections and remains the strongest party in both chambers of parliament, albeit with fewer seats than in the last legislative period, ahead of the Peoples Democratic Party, the Labour Party and smaller parties.[43] (→ ecoi.net search for the 2023 elections) 4. Conflicts The security situation in many parts of the country remains challenging, with the Islamist groups Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the north-east, conflicts between herders and sedentary farmers in the north-west and north-central geopolitical zones, the separatist movement for an independent Biafra in the south-east and criminal groups in the Niger Delta. [44] Boko Haram and ISWAP have been weakened by government military counter-offensives and internal rivalries, and more than 83,000 members and their families surrendered to the army between mid-2021 and the end of 2022. Nevertheless, the two groups remain active in the north-east, especially in the eastern part of Borno state. ISWAP has also expanded its activities into the north-west zone and parts of the north-central zone together with Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram linked to Al-Qaeda. Criminal groups are also active in this region, attacking government security personnel and facilities,[45] but also kidnapping civilians for ransom, extorting protection money, looting or stealing livestock. In the last three months of 2022 alone, 1,090 kidnappings are said to have been recorded in Zamfara State, but a much higher number of unreported cases can be assumed. More than 100 gangs (in Nigeria, armed rural gangs that commit cattle rustling, looting, kidnapping and extortion in villages are called "bandits") are said to be active in the north-west.[46] In this region, the Middle Belt, there is also a long-standing conflict between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists, which is basically about land use rights, but is increasingly linked to ethnic/religious identities - with mostly Christian farmers and Muslim Fulani pastoralists.[47] However, there are indications of links between Boko Haram and shepherdess militias.[48] (→ ecoi.net search Herder) (→ecoi.net search Boko Haram) In the south-east, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network, are fighting for an independent Biafra that would encompass the South-East geopolitical zone and parts of the South-South zone. Since 2021, there have been numerous attacks on government security personnel and facilities for which these two groups are blamed. IPOB rejects these allegations and states that it is only taking action against Fulani herdswomen and criminal groups.[49] (→ecoi.net search Biafra) Footnotes [1] CIA - Central Intelligence Agency: The World Fact Book - Nigeria, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/ [2] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - Country, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria#ref55281 [3] BBC: Nigeria country profile, 28 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13949550 [4] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - Introduction & Quick Facts, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria [5] ITA - International Trade Administration: Nigeria - Country Commercial Guide: Market Overview, last update 5 June 2023, https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/nigeria-market-overview [6] DW - Deutsche Welle: Nigeria: Will ending fuel subsidies boost the economy?, 6 July 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-will-ending-fuel-subsidies-boost-the-economy/a-64668321 [7] Merkur.de: Nigeria: Geschichte, Politik, Bevölkerung und Geografie, 9 September 2022, https://www.merkur.de/welt/nigeria-geschichte-politik-bevoelkerung-und-geografie-91782803.html [8] Merkur.de: Nigeria: Geschichte, Politik, Bevölkerung und Geografie, 9 September 2022, https://www.merkur.de/welt/nigeria-geschichte-politik-bevoelkerung-und-geografie-91782803.html [9] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - Introduction & Quick Facts, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria [10] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - Government and Society, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Government-and-society [11] BBC: Nigeria country profile, 28 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13949550 [12] Nigerian Embassy Germany: Über Nigeria – Regierung und Politik, 29 April 2019, https://nigeriaembassygermany.org/regierung---politik.htm [13] BBC: Nigeria country profile, 28 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13949550 [14] CIA - Central Intelligence Agency: World Factbook - Nigeria, last update 17 January 2024, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/nigeria/#people-and-society [15] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - People, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Climate#ref55288 [16] The Conversation: Violence is endemic in north central Nigeria: what communities are doing to cope, 23 June 2021, https://theconversation.com/violence-is-endemic-in-north-central-nigeria-what-communities-are-doing-to-cope-157349 [17] Encyclopaedia Britannica: Nigeria - People, last updated 17 January 2024, https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Languages [18] USCIRF - United States Commission on International Religious Freedom: Shari'ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, December 2019, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2024440/USCIRF_ShariahLawinNigeria_report_120919+v3R.pdf, p. 5 [19] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 29 May 1999, http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm [20] USAID: Language of Instruction Country Profile: Nigeria, April 2021, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XH27.pdf, p. 6; Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Policy on Education, 2013, https://educatetolead.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/national-education-policy-2013.pdf, p. 8 [21] Pew Research Centre: The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, 2 April 2015, https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf, p. 240 [22] Pew Research Centre: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa, April 2010, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2010/04/sub-saharan-africa-full-report.pdf, pp. 20, 22 [23] USDOS - US Department of State: 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria, 15 May 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2091928.html, section I [24] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 29 May 1999, http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm [25] These are the states of Bauchi, Borno, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger and Gombe (USCIRF, Shari'ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, December 2019, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2024440/USCIRF_ShariahLawinNigeria_report_120919+v3R.pdf, p. 8). [26] DW - Deutsche Welle: 20 Jahre Scharia in Nord-Nigeria, 27 October 2019, https://www.dw.com/de/wie-hat-die-einf%C3%BChrung-der-scharia-vor-20-jahren-nigeria-ver%C3%A4ndert/a-50966065 [27] USCIRF - United States Commission on International Religious Freedom: Shari'ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria, December 2019, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2024440/USCIRF_ShariahLawinNigeria_report_120919+v3R.pdf, p. 3 [28] BBC: Nigeria election: Dangers of being religious in a religious nation, 16 October 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63255695 [29] BBC: Nigeria Sars protest: Army chief denies firing live bullets at protesters in Lagos, 15 November 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54947999 [30] HRW - Human Rights Watch: Nigeria: A Year On, No Justice for #EndSARS Crackdown, 19 October 2021, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2062398.html [31] AI - Amnesty International: Nigeria: No justice for victims of police brutality one year after #EndSARS protests, 19 October 2021, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2062474.html [32] USDOS - US Department of State: 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Nigeria, 20 March 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2089140.html, section 1a [33] AI - Amnesty International: Nigeria: Three years after #EndSARS at least 15 protesters languish in Lagos jail, 20 October 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2099516.html [34] KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Nigeria hat gewählt, April 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2090099/kas-ngr-gew%C3%A4hlt.pdf, p. 2; European Union Election Observation Mission: Nigeria 2023 Final Report. General Elections 25 February and 18 March 2023, 27 June 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2098433/EU+EOM+NGA+2023+FR.pdf, p. 10 [35] BBC: Nigeria's naira shortage: Banks attacked in Warri and Benin City, 15 February 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64654312?at_medium=RSS&at_campaign=KARANGA [36] KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Nigeria hat gewählt, April 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2090099/kas-ngr-gew%C3%A4hlt.pdf, p. 3 [37] European Union Election Observation Mission: Nigeria 2023 Final Report. General Elections 25 February and 18 March 2023, 27 June 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2098433/EU+EOM+NGA+2023+FR.pdf, p. 14 [38] KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Nigeria hat gewählt, April 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2090099/kas-ngr-gew%C3%A4hlt.pdf, p. 3 [39] European Union Election Observation Mission: Nigeria 2023 Final Report. General Elections 25 February and 18 March 2023, 27 June 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2098433/EU+EOM+NGA+2023+FR.pdf, p. 8 [40] KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Nigeria has voted, April 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2090099/kas-ngr-gew%C3%A4hlt.pdf, p. 9 [41] BBC: Nigeria Supreme Court dismisses election challenges by Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi, 26 October 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67227814 [42] International Crisis Group: Calming Tensions amid Nigeria's Post-election Controversy, 26 May 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2094132.html [43] KAS - Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Nigeria has voted, April 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2090099/kas-ngr-gew%C3%A4hlt.pdf, pp. 3-4 [44] International Crisis Group: Mitigating Risks of Violence in Nigeria's 2023 Elections, 10 February 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2087024/311-nigeria-elections.pdf, p. i (Executive Summary) [45] International Crisis Group: Mitigating Risks of Violence in Nigeria's 2023 Elections, 10 February 2023, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2087024/311-nigeria-elections.pdf, p. 4 [46] TNH - The New Humanitarian: 'Everyone knows somebody who has been kidnapped': Inside Nigeria's banditry epidemic, 30 January 2023, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2023/01/30/Nigeria-banditry-Zamfara [47] FR - Frankfurter Rundschau: Nigeria: "Es herrscht viel Misstrauen", 17 February 2023, https://www.fr.de/politik/nigeria-es-herrscht-viel-misstrauen-92094692.html; see also CDD - Centre for Democracy and Development: Threats to state integrity and social cohesion in Nigeria, 23 June 2022, https://www.cddwestafrica.org/uploads/reports/file/TTSTASCIN.pdf, pp. 4-5 [48] Olumba, Ezenwa E.: The Politics of Eco-Violence: Why Is Conflict Escalating in Nigeria's Middle Belt?, 19 October 2022, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/09546553.2022.2129015?needAccess=true, p. 1 and FN 8
9206	dbpedia	1	92	https://northcarolina.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469662893.001.0001/upso-9781469662893-chapter-004	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
9206	dbpedia	0	66	http://www.liganda.ch/ligmohi/NG_monhist.html	en	Monetary History			[]	[]	[]	[ "Money", "Currency", "Linguistics", "Geld", "WÃ¤hrung", "Linguistik" ]	null	[]	null					null	Historical Sketch In the late 15th century, Portuguese navigators arrived at the Nigerian coast, but the local states kept their independence. In 1851, Great Britain took advantage of a power struggle within the local royalty to occupy Lagos and subsequently establish colonial rule. In the 1870, the Royal Niger Company obtained a charter for the exploitation of the coastal areas and the hinterland, while the government defeated further local states such as Benin in 1897 and Sokoto in 1903. The newly acquired territories were administered as Northern and Southern Nigeria protectorates. In 1906, Lagos and Southern Nigeria were merged, and in 1914, also Northern Nigeria joined the new Colony & Protectorate of Nigeria. In 1960, Nigeria attained independence, and the republic was proclaimed in 1963. Monetary History Overview In pre-colonial times, currencies in the form of copper bars and iron, weaponry or tools were used, cowrie snails were common as small change. In the North, the Maria Theresia Thaler entered circulation through the trans-Saharan trade. The colonial administrations adopted the Sterling accounting in an informal manner. Lagos proclaimed the British coinage acts in 1898, and renewed the proclamation after the merger into Southern Nigeria. The vast northern protectorate did not formally adopt the British currency until the Nigerian unification of 1914. During the second half of the 19th century, Great Britain took possession of Lagos and the territories of Southern and Northern Nigeria. In 1907, a special set of subsidiary coins was issued for (Southern) Nigeria since British copper coins were not well accepted and not adequate for the climate, either. Several times, the colonial administration tried to ban the use of manillas and similar in payments. As this could not be implemented, another way of regulating the transactions was gone. The manillas were standardized and produced on industry scale in Great Britain and quickly displaced the hand-made and irregular pieces. The "British manillas" were finally demonetized in early 1949. In June 1913, Great Britain created the West African Currency Board which issued a common currency for the four colonies of Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia. The West African Pound remained current during the colonial rule. In July 1959, one year before independence, the Central Bank of Nigeria began operations and issued the Nigerian Pound as national currency. It was initially pegged to the Pound Sterling, but repegged to the US Dollar as Nigeria did not follow British devaluation. In 1973, the currency got decimalized, and the Nigerian Naira at half a Pound became the new unit. The Naira was floated in 1974 and remained relatively stable for the rest of the decade. The growing political instability that started in the early 1980s damaged the economy and raised the pressure on the Naira. When the currency finally stabilized in the mid-2000s, more than 99% of the Naira's value had gone. In the mid-2010, the depreciation started to accelerate again. The central bank has split the exchange rate into an official and fluctuating effective (bureau-de-change) one in 2015. Nigeria joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 30.03.1961. Currency Units Timeline 1959-1972 Nigerian Pound - - 1973- Nigerian Naira NGN 2 : 1 Currency Institutes Timeline 1959- Central Bank of Nigeria [www]
9206	dbpedia	2	23	https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/europe-africa-colonial-era-lasting-effects-by-stelios-michalopoulos-and-elias-papaioannou-2021-07	en	European Colonialism in Africa Is Alive by Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou	https://webapi.project-s….2-1-super.1.jpg	https://webapi.project-s….2-1-super.1.jpg	[ "https://www.project-syndicate.org/images/PS_Logotype.svg", "https://webapi.project-syndicate.org/library/3da64f6b491eb84565b3e6e8c4938295.2-1-medium.1.jpg", "https://webapi.project-syndicate.org/library/8f0e8443de0fcae0ceebc9f14f92cfdc.16-9-medium.1.jpg", "https://webapi.project-syndicate.org/library/c9229ac...	[]	[]	[ "africa", "slave trade", "corruption", "civil war", "colonial", "stelios michalopoulos", "elias papaioannou" ]	null	[ "Peter Schaeffer", "kurt smithpeters", "Vidvuds Beldavs", "aethelwulf e", "Henk Crop", "john zac", "Ian Maitland", "Fr. Jabriel", "Stelios Michalopoulos", "Elias Papaioannou" ]	2021-07-30T08:41:00+00:00	Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias Papaioannou trace the ongoing social, economic, and political consequences of the centuries-long exploitation of Africa.	en	/favicon/apple-touch-icon.png	Project Syndicate	https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/europe-africa-colonial-era-lasting-effects-by-stelios-michalopoulos-and-elias-papaioannou-2021-07	PROVIDENCE/LONDON – Last year, as the Black Lives Matter movement was intensifying across the United States following Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin’s murder of George Floyd, Europe was facing its own battles over racial justice. And, as in the US, public symbols and monuments were at the center of the fray. In Bristol, demonstrators tore down (and threw into the harbor) a statue of Edward Colston, a seventeenth-century parliamentarian whose company transported more than 80,000 slaves from West Africa to the Americas. In Oxford, students demanded (not for the first time) that a statue of Cecil Rhodes – the personification of European imperialism’s brutal extraction of African riches – be removed from Oriel College’s façade. Meanwhile, in Belgium, protesters forced the removal of statues of King Leopold II, who ruled the Congo ruthlessly as his private fiefdom until images of his atrocities provoked an outcry and forced him to cede control of the territory, which became a Belgian colony. And in France, activists attacked the statue of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the author of the Code Noir that institutionalized slavery and forced labor across French colonies. Of course, removing statues doesn’t solve much in itself. But that doesn’t mean removing them is without justification. Dozens of recent empirical works, narratives, and case studies that we have reviewed in “Historical Legacies and African Development” suggest that the legacy of the slave trade and colonialism is still very much alive. To paraphrase William Faulkner, the European past in Africa is never dead. It is not even past. And it continues to shape the continent. Slave Trades Europe’s involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa long preceded the Scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the continent was arbitrarily carved up among colonial powers. Shortly after Christopher Columbus’s “discovery” of the Americas, Europeans established the transatlantic slave trade. In subsequent centuries, at least 12 million Africans were captured and enslaved – typically by other Africans – and then sold to Europeans in the ports of West Africa, where they were transported under brutal conditions to the sugar and cotton plantations of the Caribbean, Brazil, and the American South. Meanwhile, another eight million Africans were destined for the trans-Saharan and East African slave trades, which provided labor for North Africa, the Middle East, and the sugar islands of Reunion and Mauritius. To what extent, and in what ways, do these developments between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries still matter? One answer comes from Harvard University’s Nathan Nunn, who has merged shipment data on slaves’ ethnic affiliations with anthropological maps delineating ancestral homelands. This work shows that the areas affected the most by the slave trade – such as modern-day Angola and Nigeria – are on average poorer than those that were shielded from it by rugged terrain or remoteness from the coast (as in the case of Botswana). Subsequent studies have uncovered intriguing mechanisms to explain this pattern. For example, by disproportionately targeting males, slave trades affected population dynamics. In addition to reinforcing polygamy and spurring gender violence, changes in sex ratios led to underinvestment in education. To this day, educational attainment rates appear lower for ethnic groups that were more heavily affected by past slave trades. Moreover, a history of enslavement goes hand in hand with social distrust and authoritarian norms and attitudes, most likely stemming from the intergenerational transmission of violence. Hence, Nunn, alongside Princeton University’s Leonard Wantchekon, conclude that “differences in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades.” Continental Rape Though the slave trade began to wane with the abolition of slavery in Europe in the early and mid-nineteenth century, the evils afflicting Africa soon took another form. Rather than providing labor to colonies in the Americas, Africa became a source of minerals and raw materials vital to Western industrialization. At gatherings like the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-85, Europeans carved the largely unexplored continent into protectorates and colonies to feed their hunger for gold, silver, rubber, palm oil, groundnuts, and – after the onset of World War I – cotton. European leaders were in such a rush to partition the continent that they did not even wait for explorers to report their findings. According to Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister at the time: “We have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.” The artificial design of colonial structures had lasting consequences, because most of the lines drawn in Berlin hardened into borders that endured after independence. A cursory glance at Africa’s map illustrates this legacy. African borders follow latitudinal and longitudinal contours more closely than in any other continent, partitioning hundreds of ethnicities, leaving Hausa in Nigeria and Niger, the Maasai in Tanzania and Kenya, the Jolas in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, and so on. Somalia’s national flag speaks directly to the deleterious consequences of the European colonizers’ arbitrary border-making. Its five-edged white star symbolizes the country’s desire to reunite people who were split between Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, French Djibouti, the Italian and British Somalilands, and Kenya’s northern provinces. Because colonial-era divisions have long fueled regional conflicts and instability, the artificiality of African borders is inversely related to the incomes of those living within them. In the literature, “artificial states” are defined as “those in which political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people on the ground.” When Geography Is Destiny In our own research, we combine anthropological maps on the spatial distribution of ethnic groups at the time of independence with geo-referenced data on civil conflict from recent decades. The result is a large sample of evidence on the violent legacy of ethnic partitioning. Not only are partitioned ethnicities’ historic homelands battlegrounds between government forces, militias, and rebel groups, but civilian violence in these areas is more intense compared to non-partitioned areas close to the same border. Since the early 1960s, roughly one-third of partitioned groups have been involved in a vicious cycle of ethnic civil war and repression, compared to one out of five for the non-partitioned groups. But the repercussions of artificial borders don’t stop there. The colonial legacy has left Africa with a large number of landlocked economies. Out of 49 countries, 16 do not have sea access. While the Democratic Republic of the Congo is roughly the size of Western Europe, it must rely on a tiny 30-kilometer (18.6-mile) strip to access the Atlantic Ocean. Fully landlocked countries, like Zambia, Burundi, Uganda, Malawi, and Burkina Faso, continue to struggle to connect to international markets. Moreover, the costs of being landlocked are arguably higher in Africa than elsewhere, owing to the prevalence of conflicts in neighboring countries. For example, Zimbabwe and Malawi depend heavily on the Beira and Nacala corridors to access the Indian ocean; but these were mostly shut during the Mozambican civil war (1977-92). Finally, the Scramble for Africa produced many countries where even rudimentary assertion of state power – collecting taxes and providing security – is a constant challenge, owing to peculiar shape (like Senegal), tiny size (The Gambia and Togo), or sprawling heterogeneous topography (the Congo, Angola, and Mali). The adverse implications for investment, the provision of public goods, and modernization have been obvious. The Great Looting The colonial era still heavily influences African societies, polities, and economies. When colonization started, ideological opponents as far apart as Rhodes and Lenin thought that the continent would benefit from infrastructure investment, the gradual exit from subsistence agriculture, and education. But while there appear to have been some improvements in living conditions and regional development metrics in areas close to colonial railroads and Christian missionary schools, the fact is that Europeans invested hardly anything in Africa. Where they did intervene, it was solely to promote their own narrow interests. Rather than facilitating commerce and local industrialization, railroads were built to connect agricultural or mineral-rich areas with ports, allowing Africa’s riches to be transferred to Europe and the Americas. In Mozambique, which is larger than France, Europeans built only three (non-connected) rail lines, linking the ports of Maputo (Lourenço Marques), Beira, and Nacala with the interior of what is now South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. In Ghana, which is approximately the size of the former West Germany, the British built just two (non-connected) lines, linking the port cities of Sekondi and Accra to inland gold-rich and cocoa-farming areas. Education and health care, meanwhile, were “outsourced” to the missionaries, while other core state functions (security and tax collection) were handed over to private companies that ruled the interior brutally. Under this arrangement, which allowed colonial administrators to reduce financing costs, Rhodes’s British South Africa Company controlled vast areas in Zimbabwe and Zambia, while the Firestone Natural Rubber Company dominated Liberia (and its politics). Concessionary companies also ruled large swaths of French Congo, central and northern Mozambique, Cameroon, and West Africa’s Gold Coast. Leopold designated huge parts of the Congo Free State to private companies like Abir and Anversoise, which then extracted rubber, minerals, and ivory, coercing local chiefs and militias and, when necessary, deploying the infamous mercenary Force Publique. The rule of the chicotte, a bullwhip made of hippopotamus hide, was to have lasting adverse consequences in the Congo. A comparison of areas just within and just outside the historical boundaries of rubber concessions reveals significant negative influences on education, living conditions, and health. Leopold’s ghost continues to haunt the region. His model was copied by the French in the Congo, the Germans in Southwest Africa (Namibia), the Portuguese in Central and North Mozambique, and the British in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), among others. Because colonial administrators assumed so little responsibility, various forms of indirect rule were developed over time. The scant infrastructure that was built came largely from the work of Africans who had been incarcerated without due process. When concessionary companies were short of workers, colonial administrators would often come to the rescue by introducing various forced-labor schemes. Big regions, including what is now Burkina Faso, Botswana, and Mozambique’s, Namibia’s, and Ghana’s northern territories, were designated as “labor reserves” from which chiefs would forcibly recruit workers for plantations, mines, and railroads. The early colonial apparatus thus evolved into a gatekeeper state with minimal if any obligation to the local communities. As Mahmood Mamdani of Columbia University has stressed, colonial-era “native” rule was sustained by empowering favored local elites and tribal chiefs, who then went on to control the politics and economic levers of post-independence African countries, creating the conditions for persistent conflict, poverty, and autocracy. Even today, the resilience and entrenched power of provincial leaders continues to pose a challenge to many central governments’ ability to achieve a monopoly on violence, enforce contracts, or collect revenues. Defining the Future Confucius eloquently counseled that one should “Study the past to define the future.” Former European colonial powers – and Americans, who have their own legacy of slavery and colonialism to reckon with – should take this advice to heart. The darkest episodes of the colonial era should be part of students’ core curriculum. That goes for the Herero and Nama genocide in Namibia, the Salazar-Caetano wars in Angola and Mozambique, Mussolini’s use of chemical weapons in Ethiopia, British brutality in putting down African resistance, such as the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and the cruel forced-labor practices and killings by British and French colonial forces across the continent. As European relations with African countries evolve, Europeans must move beyond offering pity and remorse. They have a responsibility to understand Africa and their own countries’ role there. Germany’s recent offer of financial aid for the Herero and Nama communities in Namibia suggests one constructive way forward. But, of course, no amount of money will make up for the suffering and lasting impact of past atrocities. Even in strictly material terms, the amount that has been looted from the continent is too large for direct compensation. But Africa, too, must look forward, notwithstanding the importance of the past. Locked into poverty-trap dynamics, many parts of the continent need productive investments. The colonial legacy has left deep regional disparities in living standards and education. Foreign aid, when properly targeted with input from local communities, can be beneficial. But it will never be a panacea. Likewise, private initiatives can help, but not if they are completely unfettered. Above all, Europe, the United States, and China must not allow a Scramble for Africa 2.0. They need to hold multinationals accountable for corruption, extortion, tax evasion, and the ruthless exploitation of Africa’s natural resources. Judging historical figures by contemporary standards and toppling their statues may feel satisfying and make for good TV. But, ultimately, this way of engaging with the past is counterproductive if it is not accompanied by a positive alternative. We should erect statues commemorating Africans’ struggle for freedom, like the one of a joyful Nelson Mandela overlooking the Palace of Westminster. Likewise, directing research funds toward Africa-based scholars would help create a more balanced understanding of the European legacy and its impact on the continent today. We must appreciate the past to realize a future that benefits Europeans and Africans alike.
9206	dbpedia	3	14	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/article/economy-within-an-economy-the-manilla-currency-exchange-rate-instability-and-social-conditions-in-southeastern-nigeria-190048/DE66C787A8A464F0CBFDD77200D5A4D9	en	Economy within an Economy: the Manilla Currency, Exchange Rate Instability and Social Conditions in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1900–48	https://static.cambridge…-size-image=true	https://static.cambridge…-size-image=true	[ "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/icn_circle__btn_close_white.svg", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/logo_core.png", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/logo_core.svg", "https://www.cambridge.org/core/cambridge-core/public/images/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Ben Naanen" ]	null	Economy within an Economy: the Manilla Currency, Exchange Rate Instability and Social Conditions in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1900–48 - Volume 34 Issue 3	en	/core/cambridge-core/public/images/favicon.ico	Cambridge Core	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-african-history/article/abs/economy-within-an-economy-the-manilla-currency-exchange-rate-instability-and-social-conditions-in-southeastern-nigeria-190048/DE66C787A8A464F0CBFDD77200D5A4D9	This paper studies the effects of the coexistence of the manilla currency and British currency in south-eastern Nigeria, and the way in which this monetary situation created political tensions which eventually led to the redemption of the manilla. When British control of Southern Nigeria was formalized in 1900 and British currency introduced in the south-east in the following year, the inability of the colonial authorities to put into circulation adequate supplies of British coins, coupled with historically entrenched use of traditional currencies, compelled the colonial state to recognize the latter as legal tender. However, the continuing circulation of these currencies alongside British coins created financial and economic difficulties, causing the colonial state to adopt a number of legislative measures to eradicate them. While other traditional currencies capitulated to these measures, the manilla continued to be popular as a result of objective economic factors, and was strengthened by some of the very instruments designed to eliminate it. Meanwhile, the constantly fluctuating exchange rate of the manilla was generating discontent. These fluctuations were caused primarily by the gyrations of the world market. Improved prices of palm products–the main sources of British currency in the economy of southeastern Nigeria–brought about the appreciation of the manilla. This caused hardship among wage-earners by reducing the exchange value and the purchasing power of their meagre and fixed income which had to be converted to manillas in order to buy food and other locally produced goods and services. Periods of depression, on the other hand, caused manilla depreciation as a result of a diminished inflow of British currency. This reduced the income of peasant producers, while increasing the purchasing power of workers. The ferments generated by fluctuating manilla values have remained, until now, unidentified causal links in the political movements in south-eastern Nigeria, including especially the women's movements of the 1920s. The discontent intensified in the 1940s, when the influx of cash into the Nigerian economy caused by war-time military spending and the post-war commodity boom caused a continuous appreciation of the manilla. This development made life more difficult for workers, whose incomes were already being decimated by inflation. The resulting intensified political tension, as well as the existing obstacles to trade and smooth collection of taxes (also caused by unabating manilla fluctuations), made the demonetization of the manilla through redemption inevitable. With the elimination of the manilla, which had constituted a sub-system within the economic system of colonial Nigeria, the colonial state's economic control of Nigeria can be said to have been completed.
9206	dbpedia	0	16	https://archive.conscientiabeam.com/index.php/26/article/view/2060/5146	en	View of The Colonialists & Indigenous Exchange Currency: Tracing the Genesis of Socioeconomic Woes in Postcolonial Nigeria	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://archive.conscien…avicon_en_US.png		null
9206	dbpedia	0	20	https://globalfinancialdata.com/cameroon	en	Global Financial Data	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	https://globalfinanciald…avicon-32x32.png	[ "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/global/global-financial-data-logo-white.png 1x", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/currency/Cameroun.JPG", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/blog/GFD_Sector_and_Industry_Classification_System_Revised.jpg", "https://globalfinancialdata.com/images/address_icon...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Odin Mayland" ]	2021-04-01T18:40:16-07:00	We are a Global Data provider: For over 25 years Global Financial Data has been providing alternative historical economic and financial data.	en	/templates/shaper_helixultimate/images/favicon.ico		https://globalfinancialdata.com/cameroon	Portuguese arrived on the Cameroon coast in the 1470s. The Portuguese lost the slave trade to the Dutch in the 1600s and it was ended by the British in the 1840s who then colonized Cameroon. Cameroon was established as a German protectorate on July 14, 1884. The French and British began occupying Cameroon on February 20, 1916 and German Cameroon was divided into British Cameroon and French Cameroon on June 28, 1919. Most of the Cameroon became a French Mandate on July 10, 1922 under the League of Nations and on December 13, 1946 under the United Nations. French Cameroon was part of French Equatorial Africa, and it gained its independence as the Republic of Cameroon on January 1, 1960. On October 1, 1961, the northern part of British Cameroon united with Nigeria, and the southern part of British Cameroon united with the Republic of Cameroon (formerly French Cameroon). German marks (DEP) circulated, and the Government of Kamerun issued emergency Cameroon Marks (CMDM) in 1914. The Mark was divisible into 100 Pfennige. British Pounds Sterling (GBP) circulated in British Cameroon along with banknotes issued by the West African Currency Board (XWAP) until northern British Cameroon joined Nigeria in 1961 and the Nigerian Pound (NGP) began to circulate. The French Franc was introduced in French Cameroon in 1916. the first coins were minted for Cameroon in 1924 in Paris. French West Africa issued its own banknotes (XAOF) through the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale. Banknotes and coins from the Banque de France (FRG) also were allowed to circulate in French West Africa, and all monies of Metropolitan France were given legal tender status in French West Africa on August 8, 1920. Some British coins and Maria Theresa Thalers also circulated until the 1920s. The Franc is divisible into 100 Centimes. On December 2, 1941, French Equatorial Africa began issuing its own banknotes, first through the Caisse Centrale de la France Libre from 1941 until 1944, and through the Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer from 1944 until 1957. On December 26, 1945, the Franc des Colonies Francaises d'Afrique (CFA Franc-XEF) was introduced, and the circulation of Banque de France banknotes was no longer tolerated. From 1957 until 1960, banknotes of the Banque de les Etats de l'Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroon circulated in French Cameroons. Upon gaining independence, the government of Cameroon issued its own banknotes through the Banque Centrale du Cameroun before rejoining the CFA Franc BCEAC area in 1962. Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale banknotes issued in Cameroon had a √É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ö‚Äú*√É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ç¬ù on them. On April 1, 1973, the BCEAC was replaced by the Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Central (BEAC). On August 2, 1993, Members of Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) ceased redeeming CFA franc notes issued by BEAC circulating outside their borders, and On 17 December 1993, members of BCEAO suspended redemption of CFA franc notes issued by Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC) circulating in BCEAO countries. Initially, the name of each member country was placed on its own banknotes, but beginning in 1993, all banknotes are the same except for different letters placed on the banknotes for each country. Banknotes from Cameroon have the letter √É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ö‚ÄúE√É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ç¬ù on them to 2003 and √É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ö‚ÄúU√É¬¢√¢‚Äö¬¨√Ç¬ù beginning in 2004.
9206	dbpedia	3	22	https://www.facebook.com/photo.php%3Ffbid%3D366172402180069%26id%3D100063619364681%26set%3Da.170701265060518	en	Facebook	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yb/r/hLRJ1GG_y0J.ico	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yb/r/hLRJ1GG_y0J.ico	[ "https://facebook.com/security/hsts-pixel.gif" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Sieh dir auf Facebook Beiträge, Fotos und vieles mehr an.	de	https://static.xx.fbcdn.net/rsrc.php/yb/r/hLRJ1GG_y0J.ico		https://www.facebook.com/login/
9206	dbpedia	3	59	https://theculturetrip.com/africa/nigeria/articles/a-guide-to-the-indigenous-people-of-nigeria	en	A Guide to the Indigenous People of Nigeria	https://cdn-v2.thecultur…fe-unsplash.webp	https://cdn-v2.thecultur…fe-unsplash.webp	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=786443818164980&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://theculturetrip.com/img/ct-full.svg", "https://theculturetrip.com/img/currency-flags/USD.svg", "https://theculturetrip.com/img/currency-flags/USD.svg", "https://theculturetrip.com/img/currency-flags/EUR.svg", "https://thecult...	[]	[]	[ "Guide", "Indigenous", "People", "Nigeria", "Youve", "heard", "Yorubas", "Igbos", "Hausas", "-", "countrys", "numerous", "Africa" ]	null	[ "Lize Okoh" ]	2018-10-04T18:28:23+00:00	You've probably heard of the Yorubas Igbos and Hausas of Nigeria - but what about the country's other numerous tribes? Read on to learn more about...	en	/img/apple-touch-icon.png	Culture Trip	https://theculturetrip.com/africa/nigeria/articles/a-guide-to-the-indigenous-people-of-nigeria	Nigeria, located in West Africa, is a nation of remarkable diversity, home to approximately 197 million people. This remarkable population size makes it the most populous nation in Africa. With over 300 ethnic tribes, Nigeria has a rich tapestry of cultures and traditions that contribute to its unique and vibrant identity. To truly appreciate the cultural diversity, it’s essential to delve into the rich history of Nigeria, which has shaped the various indigenous peoples that call this country home. Love reading Culture Trip? How about travelling with us! Our Culture Trips are small-group tours that truly immerse you in a destination through authentic travel experiences. You can also embrace slow travel and the joys of journeying by train on our eco-friendly Rail Trips. Brief history Nigeria as a nation has a rich and complex history which can be traced to when it first became a British protectorate in 1901. As a colony, it was initially divided into the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate. The southwest has always been dominated by the Yoruba people, descendants of the Oyo Empire, while the southeast has always been dominated by the Igbo people from the Nri Kingdom. Most of the north is inhabited by the Hausa and Fulani people who are descendants of the Hausa Kingdom, Fulani Empire and Songhai Empire. These tribes, Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo, are the three major tribes in Nigeria. However, there exists a large number of other tribes with over 520 languages, some of which had initially branched out from these main three. This is an ultimate guide to some of the indigenous people of Nigeria. Hausa The Hausa people are the largest tribe in Nigeria, making up approximately 25% of the population. Hausaland is concentrated in northern Nigeria, situated between the River Niger and Lake Chad. The Hausa practise a very homogenised culture, keeping their traditions and way of life during and after colonisation. Islam is the main religion of Hausas and is said to have been brought by traders from Mali and Guinea during their trade exchanges, which they quickly adapted. Aside from English, they primarily speak the Hausa language. Yoruba The Yoruba people make up the second largest tribe, constituting an estimated 21% of the population. The Yoruba states are located in southwest and north central regions of Nigeria. However, Yoruba speakers can also be found in parts of nearby countries, such as Benin Republic and Togo. See privacy policy. The Yoruba people practise Christianity and Islam, while a minority still follow ancestral traditional beliefs. They are people of many cultural traditions, and Ile Ife which in Yoruba mythology is where life began is held as the spiritual centre of the Yoruba tribe. Igbo The Igbo people are descendants of the Nri Kingdom, the oldest in Nigeria. They have many customs and traditions and can be found in southeast Nigeria, consisting of about 18% of the population. This tribe differs from the others in that there is no hierarchical system of governance. Instead, a traditional republican system exists with a consultative assembly of people, which guarantees equality to citizens. The Igbo people also had their traditional beliefs, but after colonisation, the majority (more than 90%) converted to practise Christianity, with a large number becoming Catholic. The Igbo people also play an important part in the Nigerian oil trade since most of this natural resource is found within Igbo land. Ijaw The Ijaw people make up about 10% of Nigerian population and are situated in the delta of the Niger River. Their community is made up of 50 kinship clans who mostly work as fishermen and farmers. Some 70% of Ijaws practise Christianity. Ijaw land is very rich in oil which has led to their communities undergoing extensive oil exploration, effects of which has caused ecological vulnerability. Also, tensions have arisen in the past between the community and the government and oil companies due to the mismanagement of revenue generated from oil. It is argued that a substantial amount of the wealth derived from this natural resource has not made its way to benefitting local communities. Bini Also referred to as the Edo tribe, the Bini people (derived from Benin), can be found in Edo State in the south of Nigeria, although they can also be found spread across the Delta, Ondo, and Rivers states. They are descendants of the Benin Empire and speak Edo language, including several other dialects. The name Benin was derived from “Ubinu” which was used to describe the capital of the kingdom. But was then mispronounced by the Portuguese as “Bini” and then further to Benin around 1485 when the Portuguese began trade relations with Oba Ewuare who was the traditional ruler at the time. Many Binis are Christians or Muslims. It is important to note that according to historical sources, the Bini people today are the descendants of the Yoruba Prince Oranmiyan of Ife who was invited to rule them after they were dissatisfied with their then King. Also, modern-day Lagos was found by the Bini army in the 16th century while they were out on a hunt. At the time Lagos was a forest with no inhabitants. The Bini army settled there and began developing the area which in the local language is known as Eko, even till today. Kanuri It is estimated that the Kanuri people make up 4% of the Nigerian population. This tribe can be found in the northeast of Nigeria. The Kanuri people are mostly Sunni Muslims. Unfortunately, the extremist group, Boko Haram have used Kanuri lands as a base for operations, subjecting Kanuri people to violence and Sharia law. Ibibio The Ibibio people make up about 3.5% of the population of Nigeria. They’re a minority group located mostly in the southeast region of the country. They’ve retained a rich oral history which is passed down through generations. Before Nigeria’s independence, the tribe had made some efforts to create their own sovereign state within Nigeria, even entering into talks with the British Crown. The Ibibio people mostly identify as Christians and are known for their artistry, such as creating intricate wooden masks and carvings.
9206	dbpedia	3	18	https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q585408	en	Northern Nigeria Protectorate	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	[ "https://maps.wikimedia.org/img/osm-intl,13,9.8,6.15,310x180.png?lang=en&domain=www.wikidata.org&title=Q585408&groups=_1aae61a064a8d459263a139a797b7aad261b2738", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fc/Colonial_Africa_1913_Nigeria_North_map.svg/220px-Colonial_Africa_1913_Nigeria_North_map.svg.p...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	1900-1914 UK possession in Western Africa	en	/static/apple-touch/wikidata.png		https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q585408
9206	dbpedia	2	8	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Nigeria_Protectorate	en	Southern Nigeria Protectorate	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	https://upload.wikimedia…31914%29.svg.png	[ "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/icons/wikipedia.png", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-wordmark-en.svg", "https://en.wikipedia.org/static/images/mobile/copyright/wikipedia-tagline-en.svg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/46/Flag_of_the_Southern...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Wikimedia projects" ]	2004-11-18T07:05:35+00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/wikipedia.png		https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Nigeria_Protectorate	British protectorate from 1900 to 1914 Southern Nigeria was a British protectorate in the coastal areas of modern-day Nigeria formed in 1900 from the union of the Niger Coast Protectorate with territories chartered by the Royal Niger Company below Lokoja on the Niger River.[1] The Lagos colony was later added in 1906, and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1914, Southern Nigeria was joined with Northern Nigeria Protectorate to form the single colony of Nigeria.[2] The unification was done for economic reasons and the colonial administration sought to use the budget surpluses in Southern Nigeria to offset this deficit.[3] Sir Frederick Lugard, who took office as governor of both protectorates in 1912, was responsible for overseeing the unification, and he became the first governor of the newly united territory. Lugard established several central institutions to anchor the evolving unified structure.[4] A Central Secretariat was instituted at Lagos, which was the seat of government, and the Nigerian Council (later the Legislative Council), was founded to provide a forum for representatives drawn from the provinces. Certain services were integrated across the Northern and Southern Provinces because of their national significance—military, treasury, audit, posts and telegraphs, railways, survey, medical services, judicial and legal departments—and brought under the control of the Central Secretariat in Lagos.[3] The process of unification was undermined by the persistence of different regional perspectives on governance between the Northern and Southern Provinces, and by Nigerian nationalists in Lagos.[5] While southern colonial administrators welcomed amalgamation as an opportunity for imperial expansion, their counterparts in the Northern Province believed that it was injurious to the interests of the areas they administered because of their relative backwardness and that it was their duty to resist the advance of southern influences and culture into the north. Southerners, on their part, were not eager to embrace the extension of legislation originally meant for the north to the south.[3] From its foundation, southern Nigeria was administered by a high commissioner. The first high commissioner was Ralph Moor. When Lagos was amalgamated with the rest of southern Nigeria in 1906, the then high commissioner Walter Egerton was made into Governor of the territory.[6] When in 1900 the protectorate passed from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, Ralph Moor became High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria and laid the foundations of the new administration, his health failing, he retired on pension on 1 October 1903. Egerton became Governor of Lagos Colony, covering most of the Yoruba lands in the southwest of what is now Nigeria, in 1903. The colonial office wanted to amalgamate the Lagos Colony with the protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and in August 1904 also appointed Egerton as High Commissioner for the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. He held both offices until 28 February 1906. On that date, the two territories were formally united and Egerton was appointed Governor of the new Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, holding office until 1912. In the new Southern Nigeria, the old Lagos Colony became the Western Province, and the former Southern Nigerian Protectorate was split into a Central Province with capital at Warri and an Eastern Province with capital at Calabar. When his predecessor in Southern Nigeria, Sir Ralph Denham Rayment Moor, resigned, a large part of the southeast of Nigeria was still outside British control. On taking office, Egerton began a policy of sending out annual pacification patrols, which generally obtained submission through the threat of force without being required to actually use force. When Egerton became Governor of Lagos he enthusiastically endorsed the extension of the Lagos – Ibadan railway onward to Oshogbo, and the project was approved in November 1904. Construction began in January 1905 and the line reached Oshogbo in April 1907. He favoured rail over river transport, and pushed to have the railway further extended to Kano by way of Zaria. He also sponsored extensive road construction, building on the legislative foundation laid by his predecessor Moor which enabled use of unpaid local labour. Egerton shared Moor's views on the damage that was being done to the Cross River trade by the combination of indigenous middlemen and traders based in Calabar. The established traders at first got the Colonial Office to pass rules inhibiting competition from traders willing to set up bases further inland, but with some difficulty, Egerton persuaded the officials to reverse their ruling. Egerton was a strong advocate of colonial development. He believed in deficit financing at certain periods of a colony's growth, which was reflected in his budgets from 1906 to 1912. He had a constant struggle to obtain approval for these budgets from the colonial office. As early as 1908, Egerton supported the idea of "a properly organized Agricultural Department with an energetic and experienced head", and the Department of Agriculture came into being in 1910. Egerton endorsed the development of rubber plantations, a concept familiar to him from his time in Malaya, and arranged for land to be leased for this purpose. This was the foundation of a highly successful industry. He also thought there could be great potential in the tin fields near Bauchi, and thought that if proven a branch line to the tin fields would be justified. Egerton came into conflict with the administration of Northern Nigeria on a number of issues. There was debate over whether Ilorin should be incorporated into Southern Nigeria since the people were Yoruba, or remain in Northern Nigeria since the ruler was Muslim and for some time Ilorin had been subject to the Uthmaniyya Caliphate. There was argument about the administration of duties on goods landed on the coast and carried into Northern Nigeria. And there was dispute over whether railway lines from the north should terminate at Lagos or should take alternative routes to the Niger River and the coast. Egerton had reason on his side in objecting to the proposed line terminating at Baro on the Niger, since navigation southward to the coast was restricted to the high-water season, and even then was uncertain. Egerton's administration imposed policies that tended towards segregation of Europeans and Africans. These included excluding Africans from the West African Medical Service and saying that no European should take orders from an African, which had the effect of ruling out African doctors from serving with the army. Egerton himself did not always approve of these policies, and they were not strictly upheld. The legal relationship between the Lagos government and the Yoruba states of the Lagos Colony was not clear, and it was not until 1908 that Egerton persuaded the Obas to accept the establishment of the Supreme Court in the main towns. In 1912, Egerton was replaced by Frederick Lugard, who was appointed Governor-General of both Southern and Northern Nigeria with the mandate to unite the two. Egerton was appointed Governor of British Guiana as his next posting, clearly a demotion, which may have been connected to his fights with the Colonial Office officials. Lugard returned to Nigeria as Governor of the two protectorates. His main mission was to complete the amalgamation into one colony. Although controversial in Lagos, where it was opposed by a large section of the political class and the media, the amalgamation did not arouse passion in the rest of the country. From 1914 to 1919, Lugard was made Governor General of the now combined Colony of Nigeria. Throughout his tenure, Lugard sought strenuously to secure the amelioration of the condition of the native people, among other means by the exclusion, wherever possible, of alcoholic liquors, and by the suppression of slave raiding and slavery. Lugard ran the country with half of each year spent in England, distant from realities in Africa where subordinates had to delay decisions on many matters until he returned, and based his rule on a military system.[25] High-Commissioners and Governors[26] Name Tenure Office Portrait Sir Ralph Moor 1900–1903 High Commissioner of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Sir Walter Egerton 1903–1912 High Commissioner of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate 1903–1906 Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria 1906–1912 Sir Frederick Lugard 1912–1914 Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria The British economic policy for Africa at the time was founded on the belief that if African peoples were brought to embrace European civilisation with its emphasis on law and order their economic resources would be more effectively and thoroughly exploited to the benefit of all. It was optimistically and simplistically believed that the problem of African economic development was largely the problem of law and order; that once the slave trade was suppressed the chaos and anarchy believed to be the bane of life in Africa would disappear and African endeavour would be channelled to the collection of the national produce of the tropical forest for the satisfaction of European needs. The view came to be held that Africans by themselves were incapable of maintaining law and order to the level needed to bring about the much-desired economic revolution and that only European rule could do it. It was not enough for the colonial power to impose and maintain law and order though. It was also necessary to promote and develop free movement and natural growth and trade. Also it was the generally accepted assumption that the economic efforts and products of a colony should supplement, rather than compete with or undermine, the economic efforts and products of the metropolitan country. This was a survival of the mercantilist system which had come to grief in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Revenue and expenditure in £s[26] Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus/Deficit 1900 535,902 424,257 +111,645 1901 606,431 564,818 +41,613 1902 801,737 619,687 +182,050 1903 760,230 757,953 +2,277 1904 888,136 863,917 +24,219 1905 951,748 998,564 -46,816 1906 1,088,717 1,056,290 +32,427 1907 1,459,554 1,217,336 +242,218 1908 1,387,975 1,357,763 +30,212 1909 1,361,891 1,648,648 -286,793 1910 1,933,235 1,592,282 +340,953 1911 1,956,176 1,717,259 +238,917 1912 2,235,412 2,110,498 +124,914 1913 2,668,198 2,096,311 +571,887 Postage stamps and postal history of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Southern Nigeria Government Gazette
9206	dbpedia	1	57	https://www.iheart.com/podcast/105-stuff-you-missed-in-histor-21124503/episode/womens-war-of-1929-71232386/	en	Women’s War of 1929 - Stuff You Missed in History Class	https://i.iheart.com/v3/url/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cub21ueWNvbnRlbnQuY29tL2QvcHJvZ3JhbXMvZTczYzk5OGUtNmU2MC00MzJmLTg2MTAtYWUyMTAxNDBjNWIxL2NmYjQyOGVmLWVhZmMtNDRkMC05ZDA5LWFlMjcwMTc0N2U2Zi9pbWFnZS5qcGc_dD0xNjg0OTYxNDM4JnNpemU9TGFyZ2U?ops=contain(1200,630)	https://i.iheart.com/v3/url/aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cub21ueWNvbnRlbnQuY29tL2QvcHJvZ3JhbXMvZTczYzk5OGUtNmU2MC00MzJmLTg2MTAtYWUyMTAxNDBjNWIxL2NmYjQyOGVmLWVhZmMtNDRkMC05ZDA5LWFlMjcwMTc0N2U2Zi9pbWFnZS5qcGc_dD0xNjg0OTYxNDM4JnNpemU9TGFyZ2U?ops=contain(1200,630)	[ "https://i.iheart.com/v3/re/new_assets/5d52ce1f6ba279940ae2376e?ops=fit(120%2C120)", "https://i.iheart.com/v3/re/new_assets/5d52ce3e6ba279940ae23772?ops=fit(120%2C120)", "https://i.iheart.com/v3/catalog/podcast/43034875?ops=fit(480%2C480)", "https://i.iheart.com/v3/catalog/podcast/28888454?ops=fit(480%2C480)"...	[]	[]	[ "Women’s War of 1929", "Stuff You Missed in History Class", "Talk", "Radio", "Listen", "On Demand", "iHeartRadio", "iHeart" ]	null	[]	null	<p>The Women’s War was a response to British colonialism in Nigeria. British authorities described the group as a “hostile mob” because they didn’t recognize that the so-called mob was largely a long-established method for Igbo women to hold men accountable.</p><p> </p> Learn more about your ad-choices at <a href='https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com'>https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com</a><p>See <a href='https://omnystudio.com/listener'>omnystudio.com/listener</a> for privacy information.</p>	en	https://www.iheart.com/static/assets/favicon.ico	iHeart	https://www.iheart.com/podcast/105-stuff-you-missed-in-histor-21124503/episode/womens-war-of-1929-71232386/	The Women’s War was a response to British colonialism in Nigeria. British authorities described the group as a “hostile mob” because they didn’t recognize that the so-called mob was largely a long-established method for Igbo women to hold men accountable. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com
9206	dbpedia	1	3	https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0001/003/article-A008-en.xml	en	Evolution of African Currencies: Part II: The Sterling Area and Unattached Currencies	https://www.elibrary.imf…003/cover-en.jpg	https://www.elibrary.imf…003/cover-en.jpg	[ "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "J. V. Mladek" ]	1964-12-01T00:00:00	Part I of this article, dealing with the franc area, appeared in the September issue of Finance and Development. This second part completes the review of African currencies and offers some general observations on them.	en	/fileasset/fileasset/IMF_Seal_blue.png	IMF eLibrary	https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0001/003/article-A008-en.xml	THE STERLING AREA IN AFRICA All African countries formerly under British sovereignty have remained members of the sterling area, as has the Republic of South Africa. The only exception is British Cameroon, which has merged with French Cameroun into the Republic of Cameroon, which is in one of the CFA franc areas, and former British Somaliland, which has been absorbed in the Republic of Somalia. Similarly, Gambia, which at present is still a member of the sterling area and under the jurisdiction of the West African Currency Board (see below), will become part of the West African Currency Union if it joins the Republic of Senegal. Until recent years, the African territories of the sterling area, with the single exception of Libya, were grouped in four currency unions. One was managed by the South African Reserve Bank, another by the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while two were under the jurisdiction of currency boards, the East African Currency Board and the West African Currency Board. South African Reserve Bank The South African Reserve Bank has been issuing currency not only for the Republic of South Africa but also for the League of Nations’ trusteeship territory of South-West Africa and the British protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Thus, technically, the arrangement may be labeled as a currency union, although the South African monetary authorities are free from the difficulties which are likely to beset any monetary symbiosis of independent states possessing full autonomy in financial policies. South-West Africa is under the direct administration of the Republic and none of the three British protectorates is likely to create problems arising from divergent financial policies. South Africa exercises control over the movement of funds, including transfers to other parts of the sterling area. Restrictions on these and other payments are applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Most of South Africa’s reserves are held in gold, but insofar as currencies are used, sterling appears to be the most important. The rate of the currency unit—the South African pound was replaced in 1961 by the rand, equal to 10 British shillings—is based on a fixed rate for sterling and follows the London market quotations with regard to other currencies. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland It has been known for some time that the political tensions leading to the split of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland would also be an insurmountable obstacle to attempts to maintain the monetary union of the three countries. The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is still operating, but plans for its replacement by three banks are already progressing. The exchange regime prevailing in Rhodesia and Nyasaland resembles that in South Africa; in particular, it subjects to license transfers from resident accounts to other parts of the sterling area. This restriction was introduced in 1961 on a temporary basis but has been renewed from year to year. West African Currency Board The first monetary union which was exposed to the forces of disintegration was the one administered by the West African Currency Board, originally covering what today is Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and former British Cameroon. Early in 1957 Ghana established its central bank, the Bank of Ghana, and introduced the Ghana pound, which in turn is to be replaced by the cedi. Initially, payments from Ghana to other countries in the sterling area were not subject to control, but in 1961 the rapid deterioration of Ghana’s balance of payments position induced the authorities to extend licensing to both capital and current transactions with the sterling area. Ghana has entered into a great number of payments agreements,1 mainly with African and Eastern bloc countries. The Central Bank of Nigeria began its operations in 1959, more than one year before Nigeria’s accession to independence, and replaced the West African shilling by the Nigerian pound. Again, at the outset, Nigeria practiced complete freedom of payments within the sterling area. Nigeria has been for a number of years the net recipient not only of foreign aid but also of private capital. In anticipation of strains resulting from a development program, an Exchange Control Act has been introduced which redefines “foreign currencies” and “nonresidents” in such a fashion that payments within the sterling area could be subject to the same regulations as other transactions. However, the regulations issued maintain a liberal regime for payments within the area. Sierra Leone, independent since 1961, created its institute of issue, the Bank of Sierra Leone, in 1963, and is introducing a new currency unit, the leone. The exchange rate of the leone is based on the fixed rate of the pound sterling, and all payments within the sterling area are free. East African Currency Board The East African shilling issued by the East African Currency Board circulates in three independent states, Kenya, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and the British colony of Aden. Institutionally, the Currency Board and the Common Services Organization are the only important agencies common to the three East African states. The Currency Board has shown considerable alertness in adjusting to the changing scene, and its composition has been progressively modified to give greater representation to the member countries. The scope of operations of the Board has been broadened so that it is no longer limited to the creation of money against sterling but may perform certain credit operations, including extension of credits to governments. Yet it is almost certain that the Board is not going to remain indefinitely. The question before the three governments now is whether eventually the Board should be replaced by a central bank common to the three countries, or by two or three central banks. The answer to this question is, of course, related to the outcome of negotiations on the East African Federation. Obviously, a federal setup would enhance the chances of the monetary union’s survival. In 1960 and 1961, East Africa experienced a considerable outflow of funds, which, however, appears to have subsided in 1963, when some private capital from outside the sterling area entered. Throughout the crisis and until now the East African Currency Board has observed the full and free convertibility of the shilling into sterling. Libya Libya, having attained its independence in 1951, replaced the three currencies (Italian lira, Egyptian pound, and Algerian franc) circulating in the different parts of its territory by the Libyan pound, equal in value to the pound sterling. At the same time, the Provisional Government chose that Libya should be a member of the sterling area. Libya has been benefiting from considerable foreign aid, but with the increase of exchange proceeds and revenue from mineral oil exports, both the budget and balance of payments position have been gaining strength. The exchange rate of the Libyan pound is based on the fixed rate for sterling. Exchange restrictions are not discriminatory in favor of the sterling area. UNATTACHED CURRENCIES Ethiopia in 1945 separated the commercial and central banking functions of the State Bank of Ethiopia and established the National Bank of Ethiopia. The exchange and import system is not severely restrictive and is basically nondiscriminatory. The Ethiopian dollar has remained remarkably stable since 1946. In 1947 Egypt, comprising at that time what today are two countries, the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and the Sudan, left the sterling area. In 1960 the National Bank of Egypt lost its prerogatives of note issue and other central banking to the Central Bank of Egypt. No preferences toward the sterling area remain in effect. The exchange regime of the U.A.R. remains generally restrictive of both current and capital payments, and relies on a great number. of bilateral payments agreements. In the Sudan, independent since 1956, the Currency Board replaced the Egyptian pound by a Sudanese pound. Since 1960 the Bank of Sudan has been the central bank and in charge of the issue of currency. Although the Sudan is not a member of the sterling area, the exchange rates of other currencies are related to the exchange rate between the Sudanese pound and the pound sterling. The Sudan’s reserves are predominantly held in pounds sterling. The attainment of independence by Guinea in 1958 was marked by a dramatic deterioration of relations with France. At that time Guinea belonged to the franc area and to the West African Currency Union. In 1960 the Banque de la République de Guinée was created and began to issue the Guinean franc, at par with the former currency, the CFA franc. Guinea tightened restrictions on payments, concluded many bilateral payments agreements, and suppressed preferences for the franc area, of which it no longer considers itself a member. Somalia, after its accession to independence in 1960, replaced the currencies in the former British and Italian sectors by the Somali shilling, issued by the Banca Nazionale Somala. Somalia has not formally remained part of either the sterling area or the lira area, although it has continued to look to the United Kingdom and Italy for support, and the trade and payments regime provided for mutual preferences with Italy. The exchange control systems in the two sectors have remained different until now, but a new nondiscriminatory exchange control system is being introduced. Until June 30, 1960, Congo (Leopoldville), as well as the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi, was part of the Belgian franc monetary area. The exchange restrictions on payments for settlements to countries outside the area conformed to the Belgian exchange regulations, and there were no restrictions on payments within the area, except that in March 1960 certain controls on capital exports were introduced. The currency was issued and administered by the Central Bank of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, which maintained its reserves also in currencies other than the Belgian franc and in gold. In conformity with the Treaties of Berlin (1885), Brussels (1890), and St.-Germain-en-Laye (1919), Congo pursued an open-door policy for imports, avoiding discrimination both in licensing and in customs duties. Belgian capital was the main, but not exclusive, source of investment in Congo. The monetary area arrangements between Congo and Belgium were terminated in the months following Congo’s independence (June 30, 1960), and restrictions were imposed on all payments, including those to Belgium and Ruanda-Urundi. Both import and payments restrictions have become much stricter as a result of the financial crisis which came in the wake of political events. The Congolese currency unit, the Congo franc, originally at par with the Belgian franc, depreciated as a result of strong inflationary pressures, and has been devalued twice. A few months after Congo (Leopoldville) became independent, the trusteeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi was provided with a new central bank, the Banque d’Emission du Rwanda et du Burundi, which replaced the currency then shared with Congo. When in 1962 the territory became the two independent states of Burundi and Rwanda, the two Governments decided to maintain the common central bank and currency as well as the customs union, but no monetary area with Belgium was formed. However, difficulties developed rapidly and at the end of 1963 the union was denounced. The exchange regimes of the two countries have since become very restrictive. In the spring of 1964 two separate central banks were established and two separate currencies are being introduced. The reasons leading to the dissolution of the union furnish an example of the typical pitfalls threatening any monetary union between independent states: divergence of budgetary policies and problems of foreign exchange allocations had been the bone of contention. The political sentiment between the two countries was not sufficiently cordial to help the union over the first hurdles. CONCLUDING REMARKS The changes in the currency arrangements in Africa that have been described suggest several general observations: 1. The two large monetary areas (sterling and franc) have preserved most of their African membership. Habit, the facility of well-established financial and trade links, and the influence of expatriates in business, have all played a part in this continuance of membership. However, there seem to be also more potent motives, since membership in an area is only part of a more comprehensive relationship, including tangible advantages, such as outlets for exports, sources of capital and investments, and intergovernment aid. 2. The disappearance of the two smaller monetary areas, the Belgian franc and the Italian lira, is attributable less to the size of these areas than to particular circumstances. For Congo (Leopoldville), Burundi, and Rwanda, and also for Belgium, the trade incentive to maintain the area was missing, as Congo’s exports enjoy world-wide marketability and import preferences were absent both in Belgium and in Africa. In any case, the stormy climate surrounding the birth of the independent Republic of Congo ruled out any consideration of its maintaining the area arrangements. Libya’s ties with Italy were severed by war events. Somaliland, consisting of the former British and Italian territories with two entirely different exchange regimes and receiving (until recently) support from both the United Kingdom and Italy, found it difficult to consider a monetary area relationship with either one of them. 3. A scrutiny of the practices within the monetary areas shows signs that relationships are becoming looser. Tunisia and Morocco have unpegged their currencies from the French franc, although in the case of Morocco the difference in exchange rates is small. In many instances exchange reserves are held partly in other than metropolitan currencies, and transactions are channeled through other than metropolitan markets. Even more important, the principle of entirely free intra-area transfers has lost some ground. In the sterling area, only Sierra Leone, Gambia, and East Africa—all of which are only at the threshold of their monetary autonomy—maintain unlimited transfers. In the franc area, the two currency unions and the Malagasy Republic still observe free transferability, but the Maghreb group and Mali have departed from it. The reasons for the imposition of controls on capital movements and some current transactions were not identical in all countries. In some, a general deterioration of the balance of payments was the cause; in others, the tendency for private capital to leave. In some instances, the outflow of private funds was closely related to the exodus of the expatriate population. In others, it reflected the feeling of insecurity, which was intense enough to move out liquid capital but not to cause the relinquishment of enterprises and landed property. In some places, private funds tended to leave for monetary reasons, as a reaction to what was interpreted as a too expansionist inflationary policy which would inescapably lead to the imposition of restrictions. However, in certain countries, particularly those which did not resort to restrictions, there has been a partial return of capital, and there are signs that capital which did not originate in the former metropolitan countries is making an entrance. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the private capital account of many new African countries is likely to remain vulnerable for some time. Many African countries make an effort to encourage foreign capital by various foreign investment codes. While guarantees to capital entering new countries are desirable, it is difficult to attract capital through such assurances when the general attitude toward foreign investments and private enterprise remains unclear or even apparently hostile. In countries where foreign settlers were numerous, the climate will undoubtedly improve once the process of exodus and liquidation comes to an end. 4. As the system of preferential exchange and import measures is modified or abandoned, nonmembers cease to be subjected to discrimination. One may only hope that this nondiscrimination will be achieved through removal of restrictions on nonarea transactions rather than through their introduction on intra-area trade and payments. 5. Under the colonial currency regimes, currency unions were a convenient arrangement, not too difficult to run since the credit and financial policies were centrally controlled, and since in the countries with currency boards no independent credit policies were actually practicable. It was obvious that the real test of currency unions would come with the advent of independence, when participating countries would be endowed with financial and credit autonomy. Two currency unions have actually dissolved before being subjected to such a test. The West African union disappeared gradually as territory after territory gained independence and created central banks and national currencies. The Rhodesia and Nyasaland currency union disintegrated when one of its constituents became an independent state. The Rwanda-Burundi union was subjected to the test and split after one year, on account both of economic and of political divergencies. The two CFA unions have remained operative, and their future depends essentially on the strength of the member countries’ political will to stay together. The fate of the East African currency union is also likely to be determined mainly by the political decisions defining the relations between the three African countries in it. 6. In very recent years a great many bilateral payments agreements have been signed by African governments. Some of these arrangements came to life because they were considered an inevitable concomitant of trade agreements. The expansion and redirection of trade is sought through bilateral arrangements, and indeed in a few instances—and at a high price—a radical geographical redistribution of trade has been achieved. Sometimes countries negotiating these agreements are prompted to do so in order to find outlets for goods that are particularly difficult to market. To the financially hard pressed, the appeal of “swing credits” (the limited credit afforded to the partners in a payments agreement) is not negligible. For some countries, payments agreements enable the traditional metropolitan exchange markets to be avoided. The pitfalls of bilateralism, however, seem to have been unknown on most of the African continent, and only now are they being discovered through experience. Already certain countries find themselves extending credits to considerably wealthier partners in payments agreements, or ending up with imports of nonessential or low quality merchandise. There is, however, another danger arising out of a wide use of bilateral payments agreements, and even from the application of too coercive trade agreements. In order to force trade into the channels prescribed by such agreements, a discriminatory application of restrictions is an obvious expedient. The increasing freedom to pursue Africa’s interests by seizing the best available economic opportunities is the beneficial consequence of gradually receding discrimination in the monetary areas to which so many African countries belong. But this advantage would be lost to the extent that a maze of new discriminatory measures was imposed by the African states themselves in order to implement their bilateral agreements. The fashion of bilateralism, so attractive to all those who seek to put to work the apparatus of exchange or import controls, appears still to be gaining ground in Africa, while in other continents its popularity is waning as a consequence of rich and conclusive experience. It is hoped that African countries will manage, in contrast to the older nations, to learn otherwise than through their own mistakes.
9206	dbpedia	3	19	https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Nigeria/Nigeria-as-a-colony	en	History of Nigeria - Nigeria as a colony	https://cdn.britannica.c…Flag-Nigeria.jpg	https://cdn.britannica.c…Flag-Nigeria.jpg	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/68/5068-004-72A3F250/Flag-Nigeria.jpg", "https://cdn.britannica.com/79/5079-004-8542C56D/Nigeria-map-boundaries-cities-locator.jpg", "https:...	[]	[]	[ "history of Nigeria", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "Toyin O. Falola", "Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene" ]	2023-10-27T00:00:00+00:00	History of Nigeria - Nigeria as a colony: After the British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company’s territories, the northern areas were renamed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the land in the Niger delta and along the lower reaches of the river was added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos remained the capital of the south, with Zungeru the new capital of the north. On January 1, 1914, following the recommendations of Frederick Lugard, the two protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under a single governor-general resident in Lagos. Between 1919	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Nigeria/Nigeria-as-a-colony	After the British government assumed direct control of the Royal Niger Company’s territories, the northern areas were renamed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and the land in the Niger delta and along the lower reaches of the river was added to the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was renamed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos remained the capital of the south, with Zungeru the new capital of the north. On January 1, 1914, following the recommendations of Frederick Lugard, the two protectorates were amalgamated to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria under a single governor-general resident in Lagos. Between 1919 and 1954 the title reverted to governor. Following Lugard’s success in the north, he set out the principles of the administrative system subsequently institutionalized as “indirect rule.” Essentially, local government was to be left in the hands of the traditional chiefs, subject to the guidance of European officers. Native institutions were utilized and interference with local customs kept to a minimum, although the British did not always understand the local customs. While this system had built-in contradictions, over the years the Nigerian system developed into a sophisticated form of local government, especially in the emirates and under the banner of “native administration,” which became the hallmark of British colonial rule in Africa. Many changes accompanied British rule: Western education, the English language, and Christianity spread during the period; new forms of money, transportation, and communication were developed; and the Nigerian economy became based on the export of cash crops. Areas with lucrative crops such as cacao and peanuts (groundnuts) profited, while many people in different parts of the country had to migrate to work elsewhere as tenant farmers or use their newly acquired education and skills to work in cities as wage earners, traders, and artisans. Two tiers of government emerged, central and local. The central government, presided over by the governor-general and accountable to the secretary for the colonies in London, was more powerful but distant from the people. Local administration, where the colonial citizens typically experienced colonial authority, was based on the policy of indirect rule first developed in the north. To prevent any united opposition to its authority, the British adopted a divide-and-rule policy, keeping Nigerian groups separate from one another as much as possible. Traditional authorities were co-opted in the north, where the spread of Western education by Christian missionaries was strongly resisted by Muslim leaders. In the south the British occasionally created a political hierarchy where there had been none before; in most cases they ruled through those who were most malleable, whether these people had held traditional positions of authority or not. Because Western education and Christianity spread rapidly in the south and not in the north, development was much slower in the north, and the growing disparity between north and south later caused political tensions. Further dislocation accompanied the outbreak of World War I (1914–18). Locally this involved the immediate invasion of the German-held Kamerun (Cameroon) by Nigerian forces, followed by a costly campaign that lasted until 1916. Later Nigerian troops were sent to East Africa. During World War II (1939–45), they again served in East Africa, as well as in Burma (now Myanmar). In 1922 Kamerun was divided under a League of Nations mandate between France and Britain, Britain administering its area within the government of Nigeria; after 1946 the mandated areas were redesignated as a United Nations (UN) trust territory. Although colonial rule appeared secure in the first two decades of the 20th century, the British struggled to keep control of their Nigerian colony and continued to do so until Nigeria became independent in 1960. The British, when faced with dissent, tended to grant political reforms in an effort to dispel the attractiveness of more radical suggestions. Early on in colonial rule, for example, Nigerians protested the manner in which water rates and head taxes were collected. Nigerians also requested more political representation. The Nigerian Legislative Council was established in 1914 and was given limited jurisdiction; it was replaced in 1922 by a larger one that included elected members from Lagos and Calabar, although its powers also were limited and the northern provinces remained outside its control. A more representative system did not appear until 1946, when each geographic group of provinces had its own House of Assembly, with a majority of nonofficial (though not yet all elected) members; there were also a House of Chiefs and, in Lagos, a central Legislative Council. By 1919 the National Council of British West Africa, an organization consisting of elites across West Africa, was demanding that half the members of the Legislative Council be Africans; they also wanted a university in West Africa and more senior positions for Africans in the colonial civil service. Beginning in the 1920s, a number of Nigerians joined other Blacks in various parts of the world to embark on the wider project of Pan-Africanism, which sought to liberate Black people from racism and European domination. In 1923 Herbert Macaulay, the grandson of Samuel Ajayi Crowther, established the first Nigerian political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which successfully contested three Lagos seats in the Legislative Council. Macaulay was despised by the British, but he came to be regarded as the “father of modern Nigerian nationalism.” After the 1930s political activities focused primarily on ways to end British rule. A national party, the Nigerian Youth Movement, emerged in 1934, and its members won elections to the Legislative Council. After 1940 political activities were broadened to include more people. In 1944 Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo who had been educated in the United States, united more than 40 different groups to establish the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The forces unleashed against the British were now diverse, including soldiers who had served in World War II, the media, restless youth, market women, educated people, and farmers, all of whom became committed to the anticolonial movement. Political leaders resorted to the use of political parties and the media to mobilize millions of Nigerians against the continuation of British rule. The British answered this activity by attempting to create a more representational colonial system. The Macpherson constitution, promulgated in 1951, provided for a central House of Representatives, but friction between the central and regional legislatures, related to the question of where supreme party authority lay, soon caused a breakdown. In response to Azikiwe and other nationalists, the Lyttelton constitution of 1954 created a fully federal system, comprising the three geographic regions of Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons, and the Federal Territory of Lagos. Each region had a governor, premier, cabinet, legislature, and civil service, with the significantly weaker federal government represented in Lagos by a governor-general, bureaucracy, House of Representatives, and Senate. The southern protectorate was divided into two provinces in 1939—Western and Eastern—and in 1954 they, along with the northern protectorate, were renamed the Western, Eastern, and Northern regions as part of Nigeria’s reconstruction into a federal state. Internal self-government was granted to the Western and Eastern regions in 1957. The Eastern region was dominated by Azikiwe and the Western one by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba lawyer who in 1950 founded the Action Group. Demanding immediate self-government, the Action Group was opposed by the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which was composed largely of northerners and headed by several leaders, including Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. At its own request the Northern region was not given internal self-government until 1959, because northerners feared that their region might lose its claim to an equal share in the operation and opportunities of the federal government if it was not given time to catch up with the educationally advanced south. Among the problems needing attention before the British would grant full independence was the minorities’ fear of discrimination by a future government based on majority ethnic groups. After the Willink Commission examined and reported on this issue in 1958, independence was granted. Independent Nigeria Nigeria was granted independence on October 1, 1960. A new constitution established a federal system with an elected prime minister and a ceremonial head of state. The NCNC, now headed by Azikiwe (who had taken control after Macaulay’s death in 1946), formed a coalition with Balewa’s NPC after neither party won a majority in the 1959 elections. Balewa continued to serve as the prime minister, a position he had held since 1957, while Azikiwe took the largely ceremonial position of president of the Senate. Following a UN-supervised referendum, the northern part of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons joined the Northern region in June 1961, while in October the Southern Cameroons united with French Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. On October 1, 1963, Nigeria became a republic. Azikiwe became president of the country, although as prime minister Balewa was still more powerful. After a brief honeymoon period, Nigeria’s long-standing regional stresses, caused by ethnic competitiveness, educational inequality, and economic imbalance, again came to the fore in the controversial census of 1962–63. In an attempt to stave off ethnic conflict, the Mid-West region was created in August 1963 by dividing the Western region. Despite this division, the country still was segmented into three large geographic regions, each of which was essentially controlled by an ethnic group: the west by the Yoruba, the east by the Igbo, and the north by the Hausa-Fulani. Conflicts were endemic, as regional leaders protected their privileges; the south complained of northern domination, and the north feared that the southern elite was bent on capturing power. In the west the government had fallen apart in 1962, and a boycott of the federal election of December 1964 brought the country to the brink of breakdown. The point of no return was reached in January 1966, when, after the collapse of order in the west following the fraudulent election of October 1965, a group of army officers attempted to overthrow the federal government, and Prime Minister Balewa and two of the regional premiers were murdered. A military administration was set up under Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, but his plan to abolish the regions and impose a unitary government met with anti-Igbo riots in the north. The military intervention worsened the political situation, as the army itself split along ethnic lines, its officers clashed over power, and the instigators and leaders of the January coup were accused of favouring Igbo domination. In July 1966 northern officers staged a countercoup, Aguiyi-Ironsi was assassinated, and Lieut. Col. (later Gen.) Yakubu Gowon came to power. The crisis was compounded by intercommunal clashes in the north and threats of secession in the south. Gowon’s attempt to hold a conference to settle the constitutional future of Nigeria was abandoned after a series of ethnic massacres in October. A last-ditch effort to save the country was made in January 1967, when the Eastern delegation, led by Lieut. Col. (later Gen.) Odumegwu Ojukwu, agreed to meet the others on neutral ground at Aburi, Ghana, but the situation deteriorated after differences developed over the interpretation of the accord. In May the Eastern region’s consultative assembly authorized Ojukwu to establish a sovereign republic, while, at the same time, the federal military government promulgated a decree dividing the four regions into 12 states, including 6 in the north and 3 in the east, in an attempt to break the power of the regions. The Nigerian civil war On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu declared the secession of the three states of the Eastern region under the name of the Republic of Biafra, which the federal government interpreted as an act of rebellion. Fighting broke out in early July and within weeks had escalated into a full-scale civil war. In August Biafran troops crossed the Niger, seized Benin City, and were well on their way to Lagos before they were checked at Ore, a small town in Western state (now Ondo state). Shortly thereafter, federal troops entered Enugu, the provisional capital of Biafra, and penetrated the Igbo heartland. The next two years were marked by stiff resistance in the shrinking Biafran enclave and by heavy casualties among civilians as well as in both armies, all set within what threatened to be a military stalemate. Peacemaking attempts by the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) remained ineffective, while Biafra began earning recognition from African states and securing aid from international organizations for what was by then a starving population. The final Biafran collapse began on December 24, 1969, when federal troops launched a massive effort at a time when Biafra was short on ammunition, its people were desperate for food, and its leaders controlled only one-sixth of the territory that had formed the Biafran republic in 1967. Ojukwu fled to Côte d’Ivoire on January 11, 1970, and a Biafran deputation formally surrendered in Lagos four days later. General Gowon was able, through his own personal magnetism, to reconcile the two sides so that the former Biafran states were integrated into the country once again and were not blamed for the war. The oil boom that followed the war allowed the federal government to finance development programs and consolidate its power. In 1974 Gowon postponed until 1976 the target date for a return to civilian rule, but he was overthrown in July 1975 and fled to Great Britain. The new head of state, Brig. Gen. Murtala Ramat Mohammed, initiated many changes during his brief time in office: he began the process of moving the federal capital to Abuja, addressed the issue of government inefficiency, and, most important, initiated the process for a return to civilian rule. He was assassinated in February 1976 during an unsuccessful coup attempt, and his top aide, Lieut. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, became head of the government. Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene Toyin O. Falola The Second Republic of Nigeria Obasanjo pursued Mohammed’s desire to return the country to civilian rule. As a first step, a new constitution was promulgated that replaced the British-style parliamentary system with a presidential one. The president was invested with greater power but could assume office only after winning one-fourth of the votes in two-thirds of the states in the federation. Many political parties emerged, but only five were registered: the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria, the People’s Redemption Party (PRP), the Great Nigeria People’s Party, and the Nigeria People’s Party. All promised to improve education and social services, provide welfare, rebuild the economy and support private industry, and pursue a radical, anti-imperialist foreign policy. The PRP was notable for expressing socialist ideas and rhetoric. Shehu Shagari, the candidate of the dominant party, the right-wing NPN, narrowly won the 1979 presidential election, defeating Chief Obafemi Awolowo. The NPN’s party leaders used political power as an opportunity to gain access to public treasuries and distribute privileges to their followers. Members of the public were angry, and many openly challenged the relevance of a democracy that could not produce leaders who would improve their lives and provide moral authority. Even in this climate, however, Shagari was reelected president in August–September 1983, although his landslide victory was attributed to gross voting irregularities. Shagari was not able to manage the political crisis that followed or to end Nigeria’s continuing economic decline, and the military seized the opportunity to stage a coup on December 31, 1983, that brought Maj. Gen. Muhammad Buhari to power. Military regimes, 1983–99 Buhari justified his coup and subsequent actions by citing the troubles of the Second Republic and the declining economy. The regime declared a “War Against Indiscipline” (WAI), which resulted in the arrest, detention, and jailing of a number of politicians. When the WAI was extended to journalists and others not responsible for the social decay and economic problems, the government’s popularity began to wane. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida assumed power following a bloodless coup in August 1985. Babangida at first presented to the public and the media the image of an affectionate and considerate leader. He released political detainees and promised that public opinion would influence his decisions and those of the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the supreme governing body. The public, however, demanded an end to military rule. Babangida outwardly supported a return to civilian government but worked to undermine the process in order to retain power. A transition program was announced in 1986 that was to terminate in 1990 (later extended to 1993), and the military controlled the process. The government created two political parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC), and produced their agendas for them; freely formed parties were not registered, and many politicians were banned from politics. The 1979 constitution was modified by a Constituent Assembly, and a series of elections were then held for local government councilors, state governors, and legislatures. Although Babangida voided presidential primary elections held in 1992, and all the candidates were banned from politics, a presidential election was slated for June 1993 between two pro-government candidates: Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the SDP and Alhaji Bashir Tofa of the NRC. The Babangida government believed that the elections would never take place and felt that, even if they did, the north-south divide would lead to a stalemate, as Abiola came from the south and Tofa from the north. Contrary to government expectation, however, the election was held on schedule, and it was free, fair, and peaceful. Chief Abiola won, but Babangida annulled the results before they became official. This turned out to be a serious miscalculation that forced him out of power in August 1993, and an Interim National Government (ING) was instituted, led by Yoruba businessman Ernest Shonekan. The ING faced opposition from all sides, and Gen. Sani Abacha, the defense minister under Babangida, overthrew it in November, reinstating military rule. Like Babangida, he promised a transition to civilian rule while pursuing the means to maintain power, but, unlike Babangida, he used excessive force to attain his ambition. If the political future of Nigeria appeared bright with the victory of Chief Abiola in June 1993, Abacha’s seizure of power and subsequent rule reversed most of the gains that the country had made since 1960. At no time since the mid-1960s did so many question the existence of Nigeria as a political entity. When leading politicians did not call for the breakup of the country, they advocated a confederacy with a weakened centre and even a divided army and police force. Opposition forces called for a national conference to renegotiate the basis of Nigerian unity. The country’s international image was damaged, as it suffered serious condemnation and isolation. The Abacha regime ignored due process of law, press freedom, individual liberty, and human rights. The government used violence as a weapon against its opponents and critics; after Abiola proclaimed himself president, he was arrested in June 1994 and died in jail in 1998. Trade union movements were suspended, and protesters were killed, yet opposition to the government, particularly outside of the country, did not abate. Abacha and his loyalists again used the state as an instrument of personal gain. The decisive turning point in military disengagement came with Abacha’s sudden death in June 1998. Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, appointed to replace him, promised to transfer power to civilians. He freed political prisoners, ended the harassment of political opponents, and set forth a timetable for the transition to civilian rule. The country’s international image improved, but economic performance remained sluggish. Return to civilian rule The 1999 elections After Abacha’s death political activity blossomed as numerous parties were formed. Of these, three emerged that were able to contest elections: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the Alliance for Democracy, and the All People’s Party. A series of elections were held in January–March 1999 in which councilors for local governments, legislatures for state and federal assemblies, and state governors were selected. The presidential election took place in February and was carefully monitored by an international team of observers. Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP, who as head of state in 1976–79 had overseen the last transition from military rule, was declared the winner. Nigeria under Olusegun Obasanjo Obasanjo was sworn in on May 29, 1999. A new constitution was also promulgated that month. Nigerians, tired of prolonged and crisis-prone military regimes, welcomed the change of government, as did the international community. In the first civilian-administered elections since the country achieved independence in 1960, Obasanjo was reelected in 2003, although there were widespread reports of voting irregularities. Domestic unrest and insecurity Although conditions in Nigeria were generally improved under Obasanjo, there was still considerable strife within the country. Ethnic conflict—previously kept in check during the periods of military rule—now erupted in various parts of Nigeria, and friction increased between Muslims and Christians when some of the northern and central states chose to adopt Islamic law (the sharia). Demonstrations were held to protest the government’s oil policies and high fuel prices. Residents of the Niger delta also protested the operations of petroleum companies in their area, asserting that the companies exploited their land while not providing a reasonable share of the petroleum profits in return. Their protests evolved into coordinated militant action in 2006. Petroleum companies were targeted: their employees were kidnapped, and refineries and pipelines were damaged as militants attempted to disrupt oil production and inflict economic loss. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was the most active of such militant groups, although its activity decreased after the group declared a unilateral ceasefire, and the government introduced an amnesty program in 2009. Bakassi Peninsula dispute Obasanjo was also faced with resolving an ongoing border dispute with neighbouring Cameroon that included the question of which country had rights to the Bakassi Peninsula, an oil-rich area to which both countries had strong cultural ties. Under the terms of a 2002 International Court of Justice ruling, the region was awarded to Cameroon, and Obasanjo was criticized by the international community when Nigeria did not immediately comply by withdrawing its troops from the area in the subsequent years. He also received much domestic criticism for contemplating withdrawal from the peninsula by those who questioned the fate of the large number of Nigerians living in the region and cited the long-standing cultural ties between the Bakassi Peninsula and Nigeria. Nevertheless, Obasanjo eventually honoured the terms of the ruling in 2006 when Nigeria relinquished its claim to the peninsula and withdrew its forces. The process of transferring the peninsula to Cameroon was not without its problems, including the ongoing issue of resettling Nigerians displaced by the transfer and the dissatisfaction of those who remained but were now under Cameroonian rule. In November 2007 Nigeria’s Senate voted to void the agreement that had ceded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. However, this action did not affect the actual status of the peninsula, and a ceremony held on August 14, 2008, marked the completion of the peninsula’s transfer from Nigeria to Cameroon. Controversies surrounding the 2007 presidential election Meanwhile, Obasanjo was the subject of domestic and international criticism for his attempt to amend the constitution to allow him to stand for a third term as president; the proposed amendment was rejected by the Senate in 2006. With Obasanjo unable to contest the election, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was selected to stand as the PDP’s candidate in the April 2007 presidential poll. He was declared the winner, but international observers strongly condemned the election as being marred by voting irregularities and fraud. Nonetheless, Yar’Adua was sworn in as president on May 29, 2007. Toyin O. Falola The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica Nigeria under Umaru Musa Yar’Adua and Goodluck Jonathan Yar’Adua’s ill health Yar’Adua’s health was the subject of rumours, as he had traveled abroad for medical treatment several times in the years prior to his presidency and continued to do so after the election. His ability to serve as president while dealing with health issues was called into question after he went to Saudi Arabia in late November 2009 for treatment of heart and kidney problems. After he had been absent from Nigeria for several weeks, critics complained of a power vacuum in the country, and there were calls for Yar’Adua to formally transfer power to the vice president, Goodluck Jonathan. Although a ruling by a Nigerian court on January 29, 2010, indicated that Yar’Adua was not obligated to hand over power to the vice president while he was out of the country for medical treatment, the controversy surrounding his prolonged absence remained. On February 9, 2010, the National Assembly voted to have Jonathan assume full power and serve as acting president until Yar’Adua was able to resume his duties. Jonathan agreed and assumed power later that day, but it was unclear whether or not the assumption of power was constitutional. When Yar’Adua returned to Nigeria on February 24, 2010, it was announced that Jonathan would remain as acting president while Yar’Adua continued to recuperate. Yar’Adua never fully recovered, however, and he died on May 5, 2010; Jonathan was sworn in as president the following day. Jonathan’s priorities for the rest of his term included tackling corruption, dealing with the country’s energy problems, and continuing his involvement in peace negotiations with rebels in the Niger delta, something he had focused on while he was vice president. The 2011 elections Another area of focus cited by Jonathan was the reformation of the electoral process. Noting the irregularities associated with the 2007 presidential election, he vowed to make fair and transparent elections a priority, beginning with those scheduled for 2011. Voting in Nigeria’s legislative elections began on April 2, 2011, but, because necessary electoral materials were not available in some areas, voting was halted and postponed until April 9 (April 26 in some locations). As a result, the presidential election that was scheduled for April 9 was delayed until April 16. Jonathan was the overwhelming winner of the presidential election, receiving almost 59 percent of the vote among a field of 19 challengers. Former military leader and head of state Muhammadu Buhari placed second, with about 32 percent of the vote. In other elections, the PDP did not fare as well as in previous years, but it managed to maintain control of the legislature and a majority of state governorship posts. International observers praised the elections as being largely free and fair. The polls were not completely without violence or controversy, however, as supporters of Buhari and other losing candidates rioted, primarily in the north, and accused the ruling PDP of electoral fraud. Rise of Boko Haram Among the most pressing concerns in Jonathan’s first full term as president was the ongoing threat presented by Boko Haram, an Islamic sectarian movement founded in 2002 in northeastern Nigeria; the group claimed to want to end the corruption and injustice in the country and impose sharia, or Islamic law. Boko Haram did not gain widespread notoriety until 2009 when, after an altercation with military and local police forces, it began attacking police and government targets, killing and injuring many; in response, security forces launched a crackdown on the group, killing many members. Shortly thereafter, the group’s leader, Muhammed Yusuf, was captured and killed while in police custody, as were several of his followers. After a hiatus, the group resurfaced under the leadership of Yusuf’s deputy, Abubakar Shekau, and unleashed a campaign of violence in 2010 that continued in the following years. Boko Haram’s attacks grew in intensity and frequency, occurring primarily in northeastern and central Nigeria and typically targeting government buildings, military barracks, the police, and Christian churches and schools. Extrajudicial violence and killings by the police and military while in the pursuit of the group’s members were not uncommon and further heightened tensions in the country; the extrajudicial activity was also widely condemned by human rights groups. In 2012 some estimates held that more than 2,800 people had been killed by Boko Haram or by the security forces pursuing the group. The idea of granting amnesty to the group members if they disarmed—similar to what had been done with the MEND rebels in 2009—had been periodically proposed but dismissed for various reasons. In April 2013, however, with Boko Haram’s violence showing little sign of abatement and the previous strategies of dealing with the group by force clearly proven ineffective, Jonathan appointed a committee to investigate the implementation of an amnesty program, but it bore little fruit. In June Jonathan officially declared Boko Haram a terrorist group and banned it under Nigerian law. The militants and anyone caught helping them could then be prosecuted under the country’s Terrorism Prevention Act, which was expected to facilitate legal prosecution of the accused. Boko Haram’s attacks continued throughout the rest of 2013 and into 2014, with the government unable to do much to stop the group. In April 2014 Boko Haram’s mass kidnapping of more than 275 girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno state brought the group and its unabated campaign of terror into the international spotlight. The kidnapping was widely condemned across the globe and generated an increase in offers of international assistance to Nigeria, which, unlike in the past, the country was now more willing to accept. Neighbouring countries as well as those in the West worked with Nigeria to curtail the group’s actions and to try to locate the missing schoolgirls. The next month the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on individuals in Boko Haram—freezing assets and issuing travel bans and an arms embargo—but, given the nature of the group’s operations, it was unclear if the sanctions would actually have an impact on Boko Haram’s activities. They did not: the group’s attacks continued, and in August Boko Haram declared the areas under its control to be an Islamic state. The 2015 elections and electorate concerns The government’s inability to eliminate the threat from Boko Haram was one of the key issues in the run-up to the 2015 presidential and legislative elections, along with the economy and the persistent complaint of corruption. Economic progress was mixed: Nigeria’s economy grew to be the continent’s largest in 2014, but the oil-reliant economy also experienced sharp decline later that year because of plunging oil prices on the world market. Also, despite overall economic growth during Jonathan’s term, many Nigerians, especially those in rural areas and in the north, lived in poverty. The elections had originally been scheduled for mid-February, but the country’s electoral commission postponed them for six weeks, citing the current level of violence from Boko Haram in the northeast as an impediment to holding elections there. Jonathan, who had been criticized along with the military for not doing enough to combat Boko Haram, accepted assistance from the neighbouring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Plans were made for a regional force comprising troops from Nigeria and the aforementioned countries, and an offensive was launched against the militants. Marked progress was made in the fight against Boko Haram, with forces retaking much of the area previously held by the group. Although there were 14 candidates standing in the March 28, 2015, presidential election, the real contest was seen as being between Jonathan, once again the PDP candidate, and Buhari, the former military head of state (1984–85) who was the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate and enjoyed a reputation as being tough on corruption and adept at handling security issues. The election was the most closely contested ever in Nigeria. When it became clear that Buhari had won the election, Jonathan conceded. The election marked the first time that an incumbent had been defeated and power would be handed from one party to another. Buhari was inaugurated on May 29, 2015. Nigeria under Buhari Recession, fight against corruption, and insecurity Buhari faced several challenges as president. In 2016 declining oil revenue led to Nigeria’s first recession in more than 25 years. Although some recovery progress was evident by 2018, many Nigerian citizens did not see relief, and the country earned the unenviable distinction that year of having the most people in extreme poverty in the world. Many questioned whether Buhari was fit enough to serve as president, as he repeatedly left the country for medical treatment of an undisclosed ailment; in 2017 he was absent for several months. There was progress in the fight against corruption, but it was accompanied by criticism that efforts were focused on members of the opposition while ignoring the corrupt activities of APC allies. Meanwhile, in early March 2015 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and took the name Islamic State (or State’s) West African Province (ISWAP; later more commonly known as Islamic State in West Africa, or ISWA). The next year the group experienced a schism, with one faction retaining that name and the other reverting back to the original appellation. Although the military had made progress against Boko Haram and ISWA by late 2016, attacks later resumed, crushing hopes that the militants would soon be eradicated. Other sources of insecurity were the ongoing clashes between herders and farmers in central Nigeria and unrest in the southeast stemming from the long-running issue of militants disrupting oil production as well as the resurgence of the Biafran secessionist movement. The latter group in 2017 observed the 50th anniversary of the region’s declaration of independence. The 2019 elections In the run-up to the February 2019 general elections, more than 70 candidates declared their intent to stand for president. Within that crowded field, the two leading candidates were Buhari, again the APC’s candidate, and Atiku Abubakar, a seasoned politician who served as vice president under Obasanjo, representing the PDP. The election was originally scheduled for February 16, but, because of logistical problems, it was postponed just hours before it was due to begin and was held a week later, on February 23. Buhari was reelected, taking 56 percent of the vote; Abubakar, his nearest challenger, won 41 percent. Buhari was inaugurated for his second term on May 29, 2019. The 2023 elections Nigeria’s next elections were held on February 25, 2023. There were 18 candidates running in the presidential poll. With Buhari constitutionally limited to serving two terms, the APC selected Bola Tinubu to be the party’s presidential candidate; he, Abubakar of the PDP, and Peter Obi of the Labour Party were the front-runners. During the run-up to the election, the candidates’ campaigns largely focused on the main concerns of Nigerians: the increasing insecurity in the country as well as economic issues such as inflation and unemployment. The 2023 elections were notable for being the first in which Nigeria’s electoral commission relied solely on biometric data for voter verification and on electronic transmission of the results, reforms which were intended to strengthen the integrity of the electoral process. The new system, however, did not operate smoothly, some electoral agents being unable to upload and transmit the results as planned. Furthermore, there were reports of polling stations in areas where the opposition was popular opening late or not at all, disenfranchising voters. These and other reasons likely contributed to a turnout rate of only 27 percent for the election. The electoral commission declared Tinubu the winner, reporting that he had taken the largest percentage of the votes—almost 37 percent—and had satisfied the requirement of winning at least 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the country’s 36 states and Abuja Federal Capital Territory. The APC also won the largest number of seats in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Obi, Abubakar, and others immediately disputed Tinubu’s victory and challenged the results in court, but in September 2023 the presidential election tribunal upheld the election results. Appeals by Abubakar and Obi, heard by the Supreme Court, were dismissed in October 2023. Meanwhile, Tinubu was sworn in as president on May 29, 2023.
9206	dbpedia	3	1	https://www.dcstamps.com/southern-nigeria-protectorate/	en	Southern Nigeria Protectorate (1900 - 1914) - Dead Country Stamps and Banknotes	https://www.dcstamps.com…eria-Bridge1.jpg	https://www.dcstamps.com…eria-Bridge1.jpg	[ "https://www.dcstamps.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/books1.jpg", "http://www.dcstamps.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Southern-Nigeria-Bridge1.jpg", "http://www.dcstamps.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/MAF-Southern-Nigeria-Map.jpg", "http://www.dcstamps.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Southern-Nigeria-Stamp.png...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2011-03-13T16:09:20-04:00	ALBUM – view my Southern Nigeria Protectorate album TRANSITION CHART for the British Nigeria area Fast Facts Region: West Africa Group: British Nigeria Classification: Colony (Britain) Prior Regime: Niger Coast Protectorate Key Dates: 1900, Jan 1 – Southern Nigeria formed by joining … Continue reading →	en		Dead Country Stamps and Banknotes	https://www.dcstamps.com/southern-nigeria-protectorate/	ALBUM – view my Southern Nigeria Protectorate album TRANSITION CHART for the British Nigeria area Fast Facts Region: West Africa Group: British Nigeria Classification: Colony (Britain) Prior Regime: Niger Coast Protectorate Key Dates: 1900, Jan 1 – Southern Nigeria formed by joining Niger Coast Prot. with territories from the Royal Niger Company 1906 – Lagos became part of Southern Nigeria 1914, Jan 1 – Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria were combined to form the colony of Nigeria Following Regime: Nigeria Colony Scott Catalogue: (Southern Nigeria) #1-56 Pick Catalogue: none Tweet History British colonization in western Africa didn’t really begin until after the British Parliament prohibited British subjects from participating in the slave trade, and in 1833 abolishing slavery throughout the British Empire (with the exceptions “of the Territories in the Possession of the East India Company,” the “Island of Ceylon,” and “the Island of Saint Helena”, which were eliminated in 1843). With the collapse of the slave trade, and the decline of the influence of the African Oyo Empire which supported it, interest in the area waned. British influence in the Nigeria area increased gradually over the 19th century, but they did not effectively occupy the area until 1885, when competitive pressure increased from France and Germany. The Royal Niger Company was formed in 1879 as the United African Company; renamed to National African Company in 1881 and to Royal Niger Company in 1886. It was charted by the British government to develop the Niger basin. In parallel, the Niger Coast Protectorate was a British protectorate in the Oil Rivers area of present-day Nigeria, originally established as the Oil Rivers Protectorate in 1885 and expanded and renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate on 12 May 1893. On 1 January, 1900, the chartered territories of the Royal Niger Company merged with the Niger Coast Protectorate to form the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. The colony around Lagos was added in 1906, and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. As consolidation and British influence increased, Southern Nigeria was joined with Northern Nigeria Protectorate to form the single colony of Nigeria in 1914. The unification was done for economic reasons rather than political — Northern Nigeria Protectorate had a budget deficit; and the colonial administration sought to use the budget surpluses in Southern Nigeria to offset this deficit. Stamps ALBUM Southern Nigeria Protectorate initially used postage stamps from the Niger Coast Protectorate until a set of nine values, depicting an image of Queen Victoria, were issued in March 1901. In 1903, new stamps, with the profile of King Edward VII were issued. The design, which was used throughout the entire realm, continued to be used throughout his reign, although there were changes in color, watermark and paper. In 1912, the design was replaced by a set of 12 stamps with a portrait of King George V. Southern Nigeria stamps were replaced by stamps of Nigeria Colony in 1914. Banknotes none Links
9206	dbpedia	3	42	https://thefutureofeuropes.fandom.com/wiki/Nigeria	en	Nigeria	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/thefutureofeuropes/images/7/79/Flag_of_Nigeria.svg/revision/latest?cb=20230609044204	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/thefutureofeuropes/images/7/79/Flag_of_Nigeria.svg/revision/latest?cb=20230609044204	[ "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/thefutureofeuropes/images/7/79/Flag_of_Nigeria.svg/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/125?cb=20230609044204", "https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/thefutureofeuropes/images/a/a6/Coat_of_Arms_of_Nigeria.png/revision/latest/scale-to-width-down/85?cb=20230115223333", "https://stat...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to TheFutureOfEuropes Wiki" ]	2024-07-29T22:27:06+00:00	Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a country in West Africa. It is situated between the Sahel to the north and the Gulf of Guinea to the south in the Atlantic Ocean. It covers an area of 923,769 square kilometres (356,669 sq mi), and with a population of over 225 million, it...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	TheFutureOfEuropes Wiki	https://thefutureofeuropes.fandom.com/wiki/Nigeria	Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a country in West Africa. It is situated between the Sahel to the north and the Gulf of Guinea to the south in the Atlantic Ocean. It covers an area of 923,769 square kilometres (356,669 sq mi), and with a population of over 225 million, it is the most populous country in Africa, and the world's sixth-most populous country. Nigeria borders Niger in the north, Chad in the northeast, Cameroon in the east, and Benin in the west. Nigeria is a federal republic comprising 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, where the capital, Abuja, is located. The largest city in Nigeria is Lagos, one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world and the third-largest in Africa. Nigeria has been home to several indigenous pre-colonial states and kingdoms since the second millennium BC, with the Nok civilization in the 15th century BC, marking the first internal unification in the country. The modern state originated with British colonialization in the 19th century, taking its present territorial shape with the merging of the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1914 by Lord Lugard. The British set up administrative and legal structures while practising indirect rule through traditional chiefdoms in the Nigeria region. Nigeria became a formally independent federation on 1 October 1960. It experienced a civil war from 1967 to 1970, followed by a succession of military dictatorships and democratically elected civilian governments until achieving a stable democracy in the 1999 presidential election. The 2015 general election was the first time an incumbent president would lose re-election. Nigeria is a multinational state inhabited by more than 250 ethnic groups speaking 500 distinct languages, all identifying with a wide variety of cultures. The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbo in the east, together constituting over 60% of the total population. The official language is English, chosen to facilitate linguistic unity at the national level. Nigeria's constitution ensures freedom of religion and it is home to some of the world's largest Muslim and Christian populations, simultaneously. Nigeria is divided roughly in half between Muslims, who live mostly in the north, and Christians, who live mostly in the south; indigenous religions, such as those native to the Igbo and Yoruba ethnicities, are in the minority. Nigeria is a regional power in Africa and a middle and emerging power in international affairs. Nigeria's economy is the largest in Africa, the 31st-largest in the world by nominal GDP, and 26th-largest by PPP. Nigeria is often referred to as the Giant of Africa owing to its large population and economy and is considered to be an emerging market by the World Bank. However, the country ranks very low in the Human Development Index and remains one of the most corrupt nations in the world. Nigeria is a founding member of the African Union and a member of many international organizations, including the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, NAM, the Economic Community of West African States, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and OPEC. It is also a member of the informal MINT group of countries and is one of the Next Eleven economies. Mappers from Nigeria[] Mapper State Subscribers Icon Mapper name State name Number of subscribers List of fictive nations located in Nigeria[] Country Capital Population Area in km² Currency Country name Capital city Population size Area size Currency name Future[] Zarexian Mapper[]
9206	dbpedia	0	40	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war-and-colonial-finance-africa/	en	War and Colonial Finance (Africa)	https://encyclopedia.191…a_thaler_IMG.png	https://encyclopedia.191…a_thaler_IMG.png	[ "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/1418-logo.png", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/eo/Maria_Theresa_thaler_IMG.png", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/worldc...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-07-02T21:38:04+00:00	This article provides a brief overview of the financial contribution of the African colonies to the First World War. It considers the problems faced by the colonial state in raising revenues during the war owing to a dramatic decrease in import and export trade. It shows how the war conditions led to increased impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Finally, it looks at the problems in currency supply and circulation caused by the war.	en	/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/favicon.ico	1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war-and-colonial-finance-africa/	By Karin Pallaver This article provides a brief overview of the financial contribution of the African colonies to the First World War. It considers the problems faced by the colonial state in raising revenues during the war owing to a dramatic decrease in import and export trade. It shows how the war conditions led to increased impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Finally, it looks at the problems in currency supply and circulation caused by the war. Introduction As Hew Strachan noted in his Financing the First World War, historians have generally neglected war finance, probably because its administration was not apparently decisive to the outcome of the war. However, the European powers’ capacity to obtain money to finance the war effort was one of the key elements of the war. Colonies in Africa and elsewhere were an important source of funding and were used by colonial powers to raise funds, both to contribute to the war in Europe and to finance the campaigns in Africa. There is no comprehensive analysis on the financial contribution of the African colonies to the war effort. The subject is treated only incidentally by the works that deal with specific African colonies during First World War. As in the case of the war economies, the lack of a thematic approach, in favor of a more country- or regional- based treatment of the First World War in Africa, has produced a patchy, even if in some cases very detailed, picture of the financial situation of the colonies. The war had important consequences on colonial balances. The limits put on commerce and shipping by the outbreak of hostilities reduced imports and exports and, as a consequence, colonial state revenues. This caused a significant decrease in development expenditure. All over Africa, direct taxation and trade tariffs were increased. Another direct consequence of the war was the reduced supply of money to the African colonies, owing to shipping problems and the lack of metals to produce the coins. This article is an attempt to connect the available evidence and to identify both some general trends in the ways in which the colonies contributed financially to the European war effort, and the consequences of the war on African colonial finances. In order to provide a general overview, this article will analyse the direct contribution of the colonies through an examination of their financial balances, the issues of taxation and revenues, and finally currency policies. African Colonies and the Cost of the War African colonies made an important financial contribution to the European war. To start with, the colonies bore a large part of the burden of the cost of the African campaigns. In West Africa, the costs for the Togoland and Cameroons campaigns were born by the local treasuries. The Gold Coast paid the total cost of the occupation of Togoland (60,000£), but also contributed to the increased costs of the forces in the Cameroons and East Africa. When the war ended in West Africa with the conquest of Cameroon in 1916, West African porters were moved to the campaign in East Africa. Although the imperial exchequer took over responsibility for the payment of the Nigerian carriers sent to East Africa, the Nigerian Carrier corps cost the territory over 46,000£ between December 1916 and December 1918. African colonies contributed to the war effort both directly from colonial budgets, and through individual subscriptions and private collections of funds. The Gold Coast contributed 500,000£ in gifts and loans from revenue. Private contributions and miscellaneous war funds amounted to 100,000£. Madagascar contributed 2,000,000 francs for the fabrication of large calibre artillery, and 100,000 francs were raised for the liberated regions of France. There were also individual contributions by French settlers and colonial officers, through which Madagascar collected 5,248,000 francs (i.e. 1.50 francs for every inhabitant of the colony). In French West Africa, debt subscriptions for a total of 31.2 million francs were obtained between 1914 and 1920. And the individual participation in the Ouvres et Journées (special events held to raise funds for specific war-related purposes) allowed the collection of 3.8 million francs. This was presented by the administration as a demonstration of the patriotism “from the far reaches of Chad to the ports of Senegal,” but, according to Marc Michel, this was really only a demonstration of the incapacity of colonized subjects to pay taxes. Stories about the patriotic spirit of Africans abound in the colonial literature. For instance Hubert Garbit (1869-1933), governor general of Madagascar, tells the story of a village on the island colony where the inhabitants had raised a standing stone in honor to the first Malagasy killed on the battlefield. On that occasion, 100,000 francs were collected for the colonial ambulances and a further 20,000 for the French Red Cross. The outbreak of hostilities disrupted pre-war shipping and trade patterns, dramatically reducing the most important source of revenues for the colonial states: import and export duties and custom tariffs. Many governments, therefore, decided to increase, wherever possible, shipping freights as well as import and export duties. In Nigeria, for example, custom duties were dramatically reduced when the ban on commerce with the enemy interrupted the trade in spirits that had dominated West African-German relations in the pre-war period. In order to increase revenues, Frederick Lugard (1858-1945), Governor of Nigeria, raised custom duties on tobacco and some foodstuffs, such as rice, with the aim of taxing people from the south who had benefited before the war from the rise in the price of palm kernels. Furthermore, the colonial state obtained revenues from a new export duty on three staples and from a 25 percent surtax on all imports. Since 1917, this produced an increase in the government revenues, also thanks to a surtax of 30 percent on railway freights. The war also meant a shortage of credit, because local banks refused to grant loans to companies that, owing to the shipping limits and war situation, were very likely going to be unable to repay them. In West Africa, the Bank of British West Africa, which enjoyed a monopoly in the banking business in all the West African British colonies, refused to make loans, leading to a shortage of silver coins, only obtainable from the bank. This disrupted the local economy since merchants were no longer able to buy local products. In Nigeria, the refusal of the Bank of British West Africa to grant loans to local companies led the colonial state to make loans to the mining companies in order to avoid production stoppages. Despite the general economic and financial crisis, there is also evidence of an increase in personal deposits in local banks. This was especially the case of the colonies where porters and soldiers could save and deposit their wages. In Malawi, for instance, deposits in the Post Office Savings Banks continued to increase during the war, probably owing to the savings of soldiers and carriers who were accumulating money to pay for bridewealth after the war. Another point that must be taken into consideration is the importance of South African gold for the war. Even if during hostilities the gold standard was abandoned, the war created more interest in the precious metal and European powers took special measures to protect their gold reserves. For Great Britain, in particular, South African gold was of great importance, since it represented two thirds of the entire Empire’s output. Before the war, the South African economy revolved around the gold mining industry: gold was sent to London weekly and from there it was sold on the open market. With the beginning of hostilities, this became impossible because of the fear that the enemy could capture the gold and also because of the dramatic increase in freight and insurance charges. It became essential, therefore, for Great Britain to prevent enemy access to South African gold. With the so-called August Agreement, signed on 14 August 1914 between the Bank of England and South African mining companies, the British government stated that it was ready to buy all South African gold at the official rate of £13 17s 9d per standard ounce. If South African mining companies agreed to sell gold only to the bank they obtained an advance of 97 percent of the value of gold when it arrived in London. In principle, the agreement was accepted voluntarily, but in practice, if South African companies tried to sell gold to other countries, the bank intervened to prevent it. The agreement was maintained until almost eight months after the armistice had been signed. No doubt, it was detrimental to South African gold producers, because despite the increase of the gold price during the war, the mining companies had to sell gold at the price fixed in the agreement. The agreement was an integral part of Great Britain’s war strategy and during the war the extent to which Great Britain had become dependent on South African gold to sustain both sterling and the London gold market was starkly revealed. One of the most important consequences of the war on Africans was a revision of the fiscal policy in the colonies. In order to face the reduction in revenues from trade, colonial governments introduced new taxes or increased those already at place. From Trade Tariffs to Direct Taxation: Africans Paying for the European War In many colonies, the war conditions led to an increased burden of impositions on the African populations, especially in the form of higher taxation and the introduction of various restrictive trading regulations. Before the war, colonial balances were largely based on trade revenues and custom duties. The reduction of import and export trade, as well as of shipping space, caused a contraction in trade that dramatically curtailed the main source of revenue for the colonial state. As a consequence, and with the exception of those colonies where military exigencies necessitated them, public works came to a halt and development plans were shelved until after the war. In order to compensate for the reduction in trade revenues, colonial governments both increased import duties and shipping freights and raised or introduced direct taxation. The Kenya administration, for example, faced major deficits both in 1914-15 and in 1917-18, determined by a fiscal crisis during the war: as in other parts of the continent, revenues from custom duties dropped as shipping shortages severely curtailed non-essential imports as well as exports. And after 1916 the protectorate had to contribute to the cost of the East Africa campaign. As a result, the government turned to increased taxation of Africans. Taxes were increased from three to five rupees in 1915. In this way, revenues in some districts could be increased by up to 60 percent. The new tax only applied to some districts of the protectorate, and pastoralist groups, like the Maasai, were not involved. In Northern Nigeria, direct taxation was increased and in Yorubaland taxes were introduced for the first time in 1916, causing strong opposition from the local populations. In the southern part of the colony, additional revenues were obtained from court fees. In South Africa, the need to obtain funds for the war led to the introduction of a new income tax and to an increase in indirect taxation, causing strikes during the last two years of the war that continued into the post-war years. In the Gold Coast, the decrease of imports caused by the outbreak of hostilities led to a reduction of the income from custom duties that had been the main source of revenue for the colonial government. This affected, among other things, railway development, considered by the Governor Sir Hugh Clifford (1866-1941) as the key for the development of the colony. To continue railway construction, in May 1915 Clifford raised railway rates. In this way, work could be resumed on the northern line, also thanks to an increase in the duty on imports from 10 to 12 percent. In September 1916, further funds for public works were obtained from a new export tax on cocoa. In French West Africa, custom duties had provided at least two thirds of the total budget before the war. The money so obtained had been partly used to fund public works in the territories, but after the outbreak of the war these had to be dramatically reduced. In order to address the lack of revenues, the Governor General of French West Africa, Joost van Vollenhoven (1877-1918), reformed fiscal policy in 1917. This produced a general increase of fiscal revenues from 20 to 50 percent, mainly in Guinea and Dahomey and partly also in Senegal and Niger. In general terms, the increase in indirect and direct taxation during the war period led to a general increase of the control of the colonial state over its subjects, especially in some areas such as the Kenya reserves. The capacity of African subjects to pay taxes, and therefore the amount of revenues that the colonial state could collect, was also related to the availability of coins with which to pay taxes. However, the supply of currency was made problematic during the war by shipping problems and by the need for metals to produce munitions instead of coins. Currency Policies during the War With reference to the Gold Coast, Elizabeth Wrangham points out that nothing better illustrates the colonial relationship during the war than “the differing attitudes and responses to the currency problem.” The outbreak of hostilities caused shortages in the circulation of currency all over the continent. There were two main reasons. On one hand, the reduction in trade caused a general decrease in the circulation of money: imports were scarce and more expensive and African traders and peasants could not sell their produce. On the other hand, the war caused a dramatic reduction in the number of coins that could be produced by European mints. The British Royal Mint was employed in the production of munitions and nickel and bronze, generally employed to produce small-denomination coins, were now needed to produce arms. The reduced availability of money caused both problems in trade and in the payment of labor. Various problems arose, owing to the kind of production that each colony could bring to the market during the war years. The demand for currency was clearly connected to trade patterns and to the seasonality of the agricultural production; as a consequence, the disruption of commerce during the war also created dramatic fluctuations in the demand for coins. In the Gold Coast, for example, at the beginning of the war there was a slack in the cocoa trade that produced a surplus of coins. The West Africa Currency Board was required to send these back to London, where they were converted into English silver. A total of 530,000£ were repatriated between August and November 1914. But then cocoa prices quickly recovered and in December 1914 there was a new demand for coins that could not be easily satisfied because of the outbreak of hostilities. In 1915-16 all the colonies in West Africa faced a serious shortage of coins, made worse by the combination of a large crop of Nigerian groundnuts coming on the market at the same time as Gold Coast’s cocoa. In 1915 the serious lack of coins in the Gold Coast risked leaving half of the cocoa crop unsold on the market. Despite the well-known general distrust of people towards paper money, to solve the situation in 1915 paper notes were sent to West Africa. Currency notes were regarded with suspicion by laborers and many refused to work for them. Those workers and soldiers who were paid in notes, frequently exchanged them for coins with money dealers at a loss. They were accepted almost only in those areas involved in the export trade but generally refused elsewhere. Owing to the lack of metals, and since the Royal Mint was employed in producing munitions, beginning in 1917 no coins could be sent to West African colonies. In the German Cameroon, Governor Karl Ebermaier (1862-1943) paid the white staff in bank drafts, whereas askaris were paid in silver. Circulation was partially maintained by taxing the askaris in silver coins whose supply was however seriously limited. French West Africa had to face the same problems in the supply of money. Coins were moved from colony to colony to face temporary shortages and paper notes had to be introduced to replace small-denomination currencies. In Kenya, the government needed money to pay the porters and soldiers employed in the East African campaign. However, no coins could reach East Africa because of the war. To face the problem of the lack of currency circulation, one-rupee notes were issued to pay the military staff and were demonetized shortly after the war. To solve the monetary problems in the colonies, some colonial governments attempted the introduction of new currencies. This was the case, for instance, of the Italian government in Eritrea. Here, the Maria Theresa thaler had been used as the currency of commerce in the trade relationships along the East African coast and the Red Sea since at least the 1760s. The outbreak of the war interrupted the supply of thalers from Vienna. Therefore, the Italians coined a new thaler that replicated the Austrian one. To gain the confidence of the local traders, the new thalers had similar size, design, weight and finesse, as well as the Empress Maria Theresa effigy. In German East Africa, the supply of coins was completely stopped after the British blockade began in 1914. This reduced revenues as well as cash in circulation. As a way to call in cash, the Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Bank increased its rate of interest from 4 to 5 percent. The outflow was sustained by the payment of salaries to government staff monthly rather than quarterly. Nonetheless, by mid-1915 there was no cash in circulation. This caused serious problems for the military campaign because porters and soldiers could not be paid and food for the army could not be bought. To compensate the lack of silver rupees, the government printed rupee notes but they could not be easily circulated because of the general distrust towards paper money. This was made more acute by the British intelligence which forged several million twenty-rupee notes, in this way contributing to the discrediting of German paper currency. To solve the problem of money scarcity, the government started a self-sufficient production of coins, as it had done with the production of other previously-imported items, such as quinine, candles, soap, etc.: brass coins were successfully minted from used Mauser cartridges. In Tabora, which replaced Dar es Salaam during the war as the capital city of the colony, the government struck 16,000 fifteen-rupees gold coins, known as Tabora sovereigns. In many parts of Africa, the process of colonial monetization was still largely incomplete and there were many areas in the continent not yet reached by colonial coins and notes. No doubt, the problems in currency circulation caused by the war contributed to an increase in the distrust towards colonial money, especially currency notes. At the same time, commodity currencies, still largely in circulation, could fill the void left by colonial money. According to Michel, in some areas of French West Africa there was a return to a “cowry economy.” This is confirmed also in some parts of British West Africa, such as in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, where cowries were used as currency during the war. Conclusion Africans paid a heavy price for maintaining the colonial governance of their countries in war-time. The war period showed that trade taxes were an unstable foundation on which to build colonial rule and led to the introduction of more widespread direct taxation. New export and import taxes, as well as trade restrictions such as the imposition of limited numbers of licences to ships, marked both a modification of the policy of laissez-faire that had dominated before the war and an increase in the control of the colonial state. The war also determined a revision of currency policies and a return, in some areas, to the use of commodity currencies. The war also meant an increase in the wealth of some sections of the population, such as carriers and soldiers, who could accumulate money from their wages that could be used to pay for bridewealth or livestock. Karin Pallaver, University of Bologna
9206	dbpedia	0	56	https://journals.econsciences.com/index.php/JSAS/article/view/1801	en	British imperialism and portfolio choice in the currency boards of Palestine, East Africa, and West Africa	https://journals.econsci…avicon_en_US.png	https://journals.econsci…avicon_en_US.png	[ "https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-nc/4.0/88x31.png", "https://journals.econsciences.com/public/site/images/bilalkargi/m.png", "https://journals.econsciences.com/public/site/images/bilalkargi/mceclip0.png", "https://journals.econsciences.com/public/site/images/bilalkargi/mceclip1.png", "https://journals.ec...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Tal BOGER" ]	null		en	https://journals.econsci…avicon_en_US.png		null	Bank of England. (2017). A millennium of macroeconomic data for the UK. Version 3,30 April. [Retrieved from]. Berlin, H.M. (2001). The Coins and Banknotes of Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1929-1947. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company. Butlin, M., Dixon, R., & Lloyd, P. (2014). Statistical Appendix: Selected data series, 1800–2010. In S. Ville & G. Withers (Eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi. 10.1017/CHO9781107445222.033 Cain, P.J. (1996). Gentlemanly imperialism at work: The Bank of England, Canada, and the Sterling Area, 1932-1936. Economic History Review, 49(2), 336-357. doi. 10.2307/2597919 Clauson, G.L.M. (1944). The British Colonial Currency System. The Economic Journal, 54(213), 1-25. doi. 10.2307/2959827 Digital Archive on Currency Boards. Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise. [Retrieved from]. Drummond, I.M. (1974). Imperial Economic Policy 1917-1939. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. East African Currency Board. (1920/1921-1971/1972). Report of the East African Currency Board for the Period Ending the 30th June, 1921 (1920/1921); Report of the East African Currency Board for the Year Ending [the] 30th June, … (1921/1922-1960/1961); Report for the Year Ended 30th June... (1961/1962-1970/1971); The Final Report of the East African Currency Board (1971/1972). London: Waterlow and Sons (1920/1921-1958/1959; from appearances also 1959/1960-1960/1961, although no place or publisher is listed); Nairobi: Government Printer, Kenya(1959/1960-1964/1965); Printing and Packaging Corporation (1965/1966-1970/1971); East AfricanCurrency Board (1971/1972). The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Hopkins, A.G. (1973). An Economic History of West Africa. New York: Columbia University Press. Hopkins, A.G. (1970). The creation of a colonial monetary system: The origins of the West African currency board. African Historical Studies, 3(1), 101-132. doi. 10.2307/216483 Katz, S.I. (1956). Development and stability in Central and West Africa: A study in colonial monetary institutions. Social and Economic Studies, 5(3), 281-294. Kratz, J.W. (1966). The East African currency board. Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund, 13(2), 229-255. doi. 10.2307/3866425 Krozewski, G. (1993). Sterling, the 'Minor' territories, and the end of formal empire, 1939-1958. Economic History Review, 46(2), 239-265. doi. 10.2307/2598016 Krus, N., & Kurt S. (2014). Currency board financial statements. Johns Hopkins University Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise, Studies in Applied Economics No.22. [Retrieved from]. McPhee, A. (1970). The Economic Revolution in British West Africa. New York: Negro Universities Press. Mwangi, W. (2001). Of coins and conquest: The East African currency board, the rupee crisis, and the problem of colonialism in the East African protectorate. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 43(4), 763-787. Narsey, W. (2016). British Imperialism and the Making of Colonial Currency Systems. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Nathan, R.R., (1946). Palestine: Problem & Promise. New York: PublicAffairs Press. Newlyn, W.T. (1966). Separate currencies in East Africa. Transition, 24, 23-25. doi. 10.2307/2934506 Ofonagoro, W.I. (1979). From traditional to British currency in Southern Nigeria: Analysis of a currency revolution, 1880-1948. Journal of Economic History, 39(3), 623-654. doi. 10.1017/S0022050700092949 Ottensooser, R.D. (1955). The Palestine Pound and the Israeli Pound. Geneva: Librairie E. Droz. Palestine Currency Board. (1928-1952). Report of the PalestineCurrency Board for the Period Ended 31st March, London: Waterlow and Sons. The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Reuveny, J. (1991). The financial liquidation of the Palestine mandate. Middle Eastern Studies, 27(1), 112-130. Rowan, D.C. (1954). The origins of the West African currency board. South African Journal of Economics, 22(4), 421-438. doi. 10.1111/j.1813-6982.1954.tb01661.x Schuler, K. (1996). Should Developing Countries Have Central Banks? London: Institute of Economic Affairs. West African Currency Board. (1913/1914-1972/1973). Report of the West African Currency Board for the Period Ended 30th June 1914(1913/1914); Report of the West African Currency Board for the Year Ended 30th June ... (1914/1915-1971/1972); Final Report of the West African Currency Board for the Period 1st July, 1972 to 31stOctober, 1973 (1972/1973). London: Darling and Sons for His Majesty’s Stationery Office (1913/1914-1917/1918); His Majesty’s Stationery Office (1918/1919-1919/1920); Waterlow andSons (1920/1921-1972/1973); from 1965 onward, no publisher is listed, but the typography remainsthe same until 1970, suggesting that the publisher was also the same at least until then). The text lists financial years under the calendar years they end. Wolf, H.C., Atish R., Helge, B., & Gulde, A.M. (2008). Currency Boards in Retrospect and Prospect. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
9206	dbpedia	1	20	https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0001/002/article-A004-en.xml	en	Evolution of African Currencies: Part I: The Franc Area	https://www.elibrary.imf…002/cover-en.jpg	https://www.elibrary.imf…002/cover-en.jpg	[ "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", "https://www.elibrary.imf.org/fileasset//fileasset/elibrary_lockup_RGB.png", ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "J. V. Mladek" ]	1964-09-01T00:00:00	With the coming of independence, African countries have been confronted by the need to organize and concert a rapid evolution in their currencies. In this article an account is given of developments in the franc area. An account of the sterling area, and of unattached currencies, will appear in the December issue of Finance and Development.	en	/fileasset/fileasset/IMF_Seal_blue.png	IMF eLibrary	https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0001/002/article-A004-en.xml	Maghreb Group Although Algeria acceded to independence six years later (1962) than Tunisia and Morocco (1956), the currency regimes in these three countries already show considerable similarity. Each of the three countries started with all the characteristics of full-fledged membership of the franc area: free transferability within the area, free trade with the area, restrictions on payments to, and imports from, the countries outside the area, settlements of foreign exchange transactions through the Paris exchange market, reserves held in French francs (the Banque d’Etat du Maroc was under statutory obligation to hold a part of its reserves in gold), and exchange rates pegged to the French franc. All the three units were at par with the French franc. For about two years after Tunisia’s accession to independence, the Tunisian and Algerian currencies continued to be issued by the same bank, with headquarters in Paris: the Banque de l’Algérie et de la Tunisie. In the autumn of 1958 Tunisia created a bank of its own, the Banque Centrale de Tunisie, and issued its new currency, the dinar, equal to 1,000 old Tunisian francs. Independent Morocco lived for a while with its internationally organized Banque d’Etat du Maroc created by the Treaty of Algeciras. The Moroccan franc was substituted for the peseta of the Spanish Northern Region, and Tangier was stripped of its free exchange privileges. In 1959 a new institute of issue, the Banque du Maroc, fully owned by the Moroccan state, was created and began to issue the dirham, at the rate of 1 dirham per 100 Moroccan francs. Both the new Tunisian and Moroccan central banks faced from the very outset serious balance of payments crises which had been building up for some time. In the postwar years French loans, grants, and expenditures had been strongly underpinning the balance of payments position of the two countries, and so for several years had private capital imports. After 1953, the tide changed. Private funds began to flow out and the balance was maintained more and more precariously by French spending and aid, and later by U.S. aid. The strong tensions prevailing in North Africa, the war in Algeria, the exodus of the European population, the tapering off of French aid, the reduction in French expenditures, and the devaluation of the French franc at the end of 1958, all contributed to a heavy imbalance in the two countries’ payments with France. Tunisia preferred not to follow the devaluation of the franc, whereas Morocco did devalue after some delay. Both countries, however, in 1959 introduced restrictions on payments to the franc area, other than on those connected with trade. Certain imports from the franc area are now restricted, but the import regime favors the area exporters. A number of Tunisian and Moroccan products continue to enjoy preferential treatment in the French market. (At the time of writing, a dispute has flared up between the French and the Tunisian authorities regarding the transfer of French-owned land in Tunisia to Tunisian nationals, and the French financial support and preferential treatment of imports from Tunisia has been suspended.) The two countries maintain a part of their reserves in gold and currencies other than francs, but carry out most of their transactions through the Paris exchange market. Four years later events repeated themselves, only more rapidly, in Algeria, where the exodus of population was a good deal larger. At the end of hostilities independent Algeria became the beneficiary of large French financial aid, and it continues, like its two neighbors, to receive preferential treatment for certain of its exports to France. Yet, like Tunisia and Morocco a few years earlier, Algeria has considered it necessary to impose restrictions on outward payments to the franc area and on certain imports from the area. A new bank of issue, the Banque Centrale d’Algerie, has replaced the Algerian franc by the dinar, which is at par with the new French franc. The CFA Franc Currency Unions The territories of French-governed Africa, including a few rather distant insular dependencies, were using a currency unit which was termed the CFA (Colonies Françhises d’Afrique) franc. Today the CFA francs (or, in the Malagasy Republic, a unit equal to the CFA franc) are issued by six institutions and are legal tender only within each area of issue. As this article is concerned with currencies of independent states only, we shall leave out of our survey the three currencies circulating in French insular dependencies. The various CFA franc currencies have two common characteristics. They are mutually at par and equal to two old French francs, or to two new French centimes. All areas using the CFA franc practice a very liberal regime of payments with the franc area; in relation to countries outside the franc area they apply restrictions of a similar type. The territories of sub-Saharan Africa under French rule were for a number of years grouped in two currency unions: French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. The independent states of these two areas, with the exception of Guinea and Mali, decided to continue the unions on a reorganized basis. The West African Currency Union counts among its members Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta. The highest organ of the Union is the Council of Representatives of each member country at ministerial level. It meets at least once a year in the presence of the President and Director General of the central bank, the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique Occidentale (BCEAO). The Bank has a temporary headquarters in Paris and has branches in each member state. A Treaty of Cooperation between the West African Currency Union and France changed the name of the currency unit to Communauté Financière Africaine franc, thus conserving the CFA abbreviation. The notes issued by the BCEAO are legal tender in all the member states, but not in any other part of what is termed the CFA franc area. Serial markings make it possible to identify the state where the notes have been issued, and notes issued in one member state that are intercepted by the bank of issue or governmental agencies in other states are returned to the branch of BCEAO which originated them. The amounts of notes thus returned are recorded in the credits and debits between the states concerned. The Currency Union of Equatorial Africa and Cameroon is formed by Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, and Cameroon, and its central bank is the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun (BCEAEC). This Bank issues two types of banknotes: one is issued in Cameroon and another in the other four member states. The headquarters of the Bank are located provisionally in Paris, and there is at least one branch in each member state. In both Currency Unions, each member state is represented on the central Board of the Bank, and so is France, although the composition of the Boards is not identical for the two Banks. The role of the Boards is to lay down general policies and establish credit ceilings for each country. In each member country there is a national committee endowed with authority to redistribute credits between the institutions that are eligible to borrow from the Central Banks. (Chad, the Central African Republic, and Congo (Brazzaville) have a common regional committee.) Relations with Other Countries The external relations between the two foregoing Currency Unions can be described by saying that each acts like a full-fledged member of the franc area. Transfers to any part of the area are entirely free, and France guarantees by treaty the convertibility of CFA francs into French francs. Exchange reserves are held exclusively in French francs, and exchange transactions are carried out through the Paris exchange market. With some exceptions for protective reasons, imports from the franc area, which means mainly from France, are free from quantitative restrictions, though not necessarily from tariffs. France reciprocates by granting free admission to most products of the member countries of the two unions. For certain products free entry into the French market results in a price subsidy, as France protects the market against the rest of the world through restrictions and tariffs. Countries producing coffee, groundnuts, groundnut oil, and sugar have been the main beneficiaries of these arrangements. Cotton producers receive a subsidy through a stabilization fund financed by France. Certain countries, producing competitive goods, do not share in such subsidies, but altogether some two thirds of exports from the CFA countries enjoy preferences, the value of which is close to 10 per cent of total export proceeds. The CFA countries also receive direct French aid in various forms and for various purposes; the amount of this aid equals about one half the total imports from the franc area. With the assistance of the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC), plans are being made to render the CFA countries’ production more competitive, and it is expected that preferential trade relations between France and the CFA countries will progressively disappear, initially at least as far as the other EEC countries are concerned. Each state in the two Currency Unions restricts imports from, and payments to, the rest of the world, and the volumes of transactions are governed by agreements with France. The discrimination against the outside world is considerable, but is less severe with regard to the members of the EEC. It is perhaps not incorrect to say that these discriminatory restrictions have the effect, at least in part, of tying the massive French aid to procurement and spending in France, in the same way that much aid in recent years has been tied to purchases in the donating or lending countries. The aid agreements themselves do not contain any provision tying the loan funds to procurement in the metropolitan territory. The members of the two Currency Unions have also established two Customs Unions which aim at removing customs barriers between the members and establishing a common external tariff. (At present Cameroon is not a member of the Equatorial Customs Union.) While certain countries in these Unions show a trade surplus with the franc area and with third-party countries, the balances of payments of the two Unions show a heavy trade deficit with the rest of the franc area and a deficit in private invisibles. Transactions outside the franc area provide only a slight surplus, and the over-all deficit is covered mainly by French public aid. Among the conditions requisite for any currency union, the basic one seems to be a reasonable degree of uniformity in credit policies. The statutes of the two Central Banks ensure this kind of common pace in the expansion of credits, by reserving to the central Board the setting of credit ceilings for each state’s economy. As regards credits to the public sector, the West African Central Bank (BCEAO) is further protected by provisions limiting the duration of such credits and relating their permissible volume to ordinary government revenues. The Bank, however, is not limited in extending credits to public enterprises, although such credits would be governed by the central Board’s ceilings. The Bank of the Equatorial African Union (BCEAEC) can extend credit to the governments only indirectly through the discount of government paper submitted by commercial banks. The statutes impose no limits on credits to the governments, but they are subject to ceilings established by the central Board. The two Currency Unions undoubtedly represent achievements in the field of interstate monetary cooperation. An oft-repeated phrase says that in that part of Africa they have an institutional arrangement which for more developed countries is still a remote goal. Without detracting from the merits of the two systems, it should be remembered that the Unions were not so much created, as adapted from pre-independence years. There is a helpful element of habit and tradition already well engrained. Another element favoring monetary unity is the fact that former French Africa was split into a number of relatively small states, rather insecure as to their economic future and their ability to uphold their own currencies. The difficulties which certain other small African states ran into seem only to have strengthened the cause of those who believe in joining forces. The concept of a “zone” as a cooperative organization, equipped with some lifesaving funds coming from outside, has a considerable appeal. The volume of French aid and the elasticity with which it can be distributed are, of course, instrumental in relieving a great deal of pressure which otherwise would be directed at the Banks, causing critical strains. Yet the negotiations on the West African Currency Union and the accompanying conventions were not entirely smooth in the West African Union, and it would be too sanguine to assume that the concept of currency unions has no opponents and that these unions will not be exposed to attacks. The political climate prevailing in the area will undoubtedly be the main factor determining the success or failure of the two Unions. It should be noted that Guinea and Mali seceded from the Unions for political reasons rather than by way of criticism of their economic shortcomings. This is equally true of threats of further secessions. The Malagasy Republic has a currency unit of its own, the Malagasy franc, equal to the CFA franc. The Institut d’Emission Malgache established in Tananarive has a mixed Malagasy-French Board of Directors. Relations with the franc area and France are analogous to those of the above two Currency Unions. Mali, since mid-1962, has had a central bank of its own, the Banque de la Republique du Mali, issuing Mali francs. In February 1960 Mali separated from Senegal and in September 1960 the country established its own exchange controls covering not only transactions with non-franc area countries (as before), but also current and capital transactions with the franc area (which until then were not subject to exchange control). Since 1961 all foreign transactions have been subject to increasing restrictions, and a good part of Mali’s foreign payments has been channeled through newly concluded bilateral payments agreements. Mali’s membership in the franc area seems to be a borderline case, as none of the usual conditions seem to be fulfilled. France, however, in practice still treats this country as a member of the area, allowing free transfers toward Mali and extending preferential treatment to those Mali exports which continue to be shipped to France.
9206	dbpedia	2	75	https://academicjournals.org/journal/JASD/article-full-text/C5FE59B68149	en	towards a harmonious view of money: the nigerian experience	https://www.academicjour…s.org/img/aj.png	https://www.academicjour…s.org/img/aj.png	[ "https://academicjournals.org/img/logo.png", "https://academicjournals.org/banners/journal1716380048_JASD.png", "https://crossmark-cdn.crossref.org/widget/v2.0/logos/CROSSMARK_Color_horizontal.svg", "https://academicjournals.org/img/open_access.png", "https://academicjournals.org/img/creative_commons.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Olawoye-Mann Salewa" ]	2021-11-18T00:00:00	This paper approaches the topic of money from a Nigerian perspective. A proper understanding of money and its role in an economy and society as a whole would require a more rounded view of money and its meaning than what has been provided by the field of Economics. This harmonious view will analyze money through the lenses of different disciplines in social science. The aim is to show that money is a social construct that is embedded in culture and society.  Thus, a better understanding of money should reflect this attribute. Beginning with the Nigerian experience, this paper demonstrates the benefit of an interdisciplinary approach to money and finance.   Key words: Money, development, job creation, culture, Nigerian society.	en			null	The historical trends on money are important because they help us answer questions such as, “where are we coming from?” and “where are we going to?” A proper understanding of the past will help one understand the present and future better. A lot of policies are always tied to questions such as “how would we pay for this?” and “would our children have to suffer our debt?” Basically, the issue of money and finance always comes up. So, a proper understanding of money and its history is needed to comprehend its impact in policies. A lot of understanding of ‘money’ actually focuses on it as a money thing. Here, money is seen as that thing which is used to purchase goods and services. In present times, that will be the dollars, yuans, nairas and currencies that we can convert to paper or coin form. Historically, money things have varied in different parts of the world. In Nigeria, like a lot of other countries, things like salt, iron rods, brass rods, manilla, copper wires, cloth, ackies, gold and cowries have been used historically as money things. One of the most common money things among these is the cowry. Cowries Obtained from the shells of small sea snails, cowries are considered the most common pre-colonial currency. They are indigenous to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Cowries were used as trade currency in different parts of the world like Africa, South Asia and East Asia. They were used for internal trade and overseas exchange (Hopkins, 1966). Reports show that cowries have been used in some regions in Africa, like Nigeria, as far back as years before the Portuguese invasion in the fifteenth century (Akinjogbin and Osoba, 1980; Basden, 1921; Egharevba, 1968). Cowries were also the currency used during the African slave trade era (Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986). In some parts of China, they have been used as money since around 2000 BC (Peng and Zhu, 1995; Yang, 2011; Yung-Ti, 2003). This monetary usage of cowries continued in some parts of the world until the early 20th century. This is partly due to the properties that cowries had over other money things that had been used. The properties of cowries that made them suitable to be used as money include longevity, the small shape and size that made them very easy to carry, durability and some unique qualities that made counterfeiting impossible. For the cowries to be used as money in Nigeria, they had to be strung or packed to represent different denominations. This made it easier for traders to use in their accounting system. Payne (1875) shows how cowries were specially strung and used as money. As a cowry by itself, it could not be considered or used as money. There were specific guidelines and signatures used for these cowries to be used as money. A string was made up of 40 cowries while 50 strings made up one head. A bag of cowries comprised of 10 heads and this bag weighed 100 pounds (Aghalino, 2002). However, cowries were not without some problems in their usage. Since only 10 heads of cowries weighed 100 pounds and a lot of these were needed in transactions, the problem of transportation costs and weightiness in large quantities arose. Another problem associated with the cowry currency was the lack of government control in supply as there was no major monetary unit that controlled the cowry currency. Despite other non-cowry money things being used over time, the cowry has been the longest money thing used in a lot of regions. It has since been replaced by gold and then different government-backed state currencies. Non-cowry pre-colonial currencies Manillas came in the form of metal bracelets or armlets. They also came in the form of copper, bronze and brass. It is popularly believed that copper rods were originally a trade currency between Europe and Africa before being adopted as a local currency (Jones, 1958). Latham (1971) points out an opposing view though. He opines that copper rods existed in Calabar before the European invasion of the early nineteenth century (Latham, 1971). Copper wires were indigenous currencies used in Nigeria. Copper rods, manillas and brass rods were widely used in trade especially in the Oil Rivers, Niger Delta and Old Calabar regions (Basden, 1921). Copper rods were also used in Borno before the eighteenth century. Like the cowries, these currencies were cumbersome and difficult to transport and count as well. The use of these currencies created an avenue for a capital market where people could borrow money and help each other within groups. This market led to the provision of internal capital and credit giving to encourage development. Some of these capital markets operated in the form of savings and credit “banking.” Members contributed money and the total contribution would be lent to any member who needs. Another system of internal credit that was prevalent in this time was a system of rotating credit called the ajo and isusu/esusu system of the Yorubas, Igbos and Ibibios (Ardner, 1964). The idea here is that a group of people come together to save copper rods for different individual projects for a period of time. During this period, contributions are made at specific intervals and a different member receives the group’s pool of funds at each interval till everyone has gotten their turn for receipt. These ajo contributions have continued through different money things till this present time of fiat money. Fiat money and coinage There is a metallist’s theory of money that hinges on money being some form of metal, for instance, gold. The belief is that currencies either have gold backing or are metal currencies with intrinsic value (Bell, 2001). Thus, people accepted these currencies because of their intrinsic value or because they could convert it into metal whenever they needed. However, commodity money such as gold and cowries eventually gave way to what is now known as fiat money as a result of colonialism. The advent of British colonialism in West Africa was accompanied with a deliberate attempt to demonetize existing currencies so exploitation of the natives was made easier. As Fuller (2008) said, the introduction of British currency in West Africa forced Africans into colonial enterprises like producing cash crops, as they needed most of the proceeds to pay taxes and other expenses that were only accepted in colonial currency. This led to the creation of the West African Currency Board (WACB). The WACB was responsible for issuing currency notes in Nigeria from 1912 to 1959. The main responsibility was to manage the production and design of a common currency in the British West African Colonies, Protectorates and Trust Territories. It was responsible for the supply of currency and ensuring price stability in these colonies. This was ensured by first demonetizing the prior money things in circulation through formal legislation. Fiat money does not focus on the intrinsic value; rather, the value of the currency is derived from government regulation or law. The 1880 formal legislation issued to British colonies, protectorates and trust territories, Nigeria inclusive, recognized only British coins and a few gold coins as legal tender. This means that people accepted these currencies because of its characteristic as a creature of the state (Lerner, 1947). Like the Carolingian era of medieval France (Innes, 2006), coins were not marked at face value. The nominal value of coins exceeded their intrinsic value. Sole importation rights of these coins into the colonies were given to the African Banking Corporation, which had a headquarters in London. Token currencies were fixed to British sterling and the Nigerian economy did not have autonomy of currency. The British colonialists required these coins as payment for taxes/levies/tithes in public offices and places. Thus they spent the money into existence and created acceptance through demand {Wray, 1990, 2012). The British colonial state played an important role in the history of money in Nigeria. It achieved this by defining the unit of account, imposing tax liabilities on individuals, and passing a law on the acceptable currency to be used in paying these taxes (Forstater, 2005; Peacock, 2006). Unlike the cowry or gold, fiat money has individual governments controlling each currency along with individual central banks for each currency. In the Nigerian colonial era, the central bank was the WACB. However, the reign of the WACB came to an end on July 1, 1959, a little over a year before Nigerian gained her independence from British colonial rule. This was established through the CBN Act of 1958. The establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) led to the creation of the domestic fiat currencies; naira and kobo. The credit theory of money in Nigerian history Regardless of the stance a person may choose, the system of governance in place or the money thing being used, one fact remains, as long as contractual obligations exist, money will exist. This is because money is used to settle contractual obligations (Davidson, 1972). That is, money is used to settle debt. Since the correlative of debt is credit, money is thus credit (Innes, 1913, 1914). Credit and debt express a legal relationship between two opposing sides of exchange. In the Nigerian historical economy, money things like brass rods, cowries and gold were used to designate credit and debt. As instruments on their own, they were not money. This explains why people use cowry shells for ornaments, jewellery and hair accessories, and people melted the British coins to make jewellery. The contractual obligations these money instruments could fulfill were what made them demanded as money and not the money things. Therefore, money has always been credit in the Nigerian economy. However, with the different kinds of money things in place over the years, money has meant different things to different people based on various factors such as culture, experiences, the society, and the sources of the money. As a result, we have to review different approaches of money in order to understand the effects of income targeted policies and other kinds of monetary policies in the Nigerian society. Zelizer (1989) provides a reductive definition of money as “the ultimate objectifier, homogenizing all qualitative distinctions into an abstract quantity.”Another definition of money is gotten from Simmel (1978 [1900]). He defined it as “the reduction of quality to quantity”.These definitions view money as an object that puts a numerical value to quality. More definitions of money can be seen in Parsons (1967) where it is as a “symbolically generalized media of communication associated with the economic subsystem of society.” This means that outside this system, money does not have any meaning. In the case of colonial Nigeria, outside the colonial economic systems, these coins were just things that could be converted to jewellery to show a person’s social class. Over the years, the Nigeria economy, just like the global economy, has experienced various types of crises that have affected people, institutions and the aggregate economy. The COVID-19 pandemic is the most recent crisis to rock the Nigerian economy. This has heightened the role of money and the Central Bank of Nigeria in alleviating the effects of these crises. However, an interdisciplinary understanding of money is needed in order to analyze the effects central bank policies adopted and their efficiency. In sociology The purpose of sociology is to provide scientific training to those who will manage society. Managing a complex interwoven society would lead to multiple contractual obligations that need to be met. Hence, money is important in this discipline. So, it provides different meanings, types and uses of money. In sociology, money is defined based on how it is gotten and how it is used. A child’s allowance is different from money worked for and received as a wage, and lottery earnings are different from salaries. The value of money is dependent on how it is gotten (Zelizer, 1994). To the sociologist, not all forms of a particular currency such as dollars, pounds or naira are equal. A naira in the hands of the rich is different from a naira in the hands of the poor. This is very similar to a bonus point to a student who has 89% versus a student who has 91%. The level of need varies and as a result, it influences the value placed on money. Understanding this is necessary for understanding policy issues and the target recipients of the policies. This includes issues such as the debates on bailouts during a crisis such as the kind of response a government should take, how much of bailouts is enough and who should get the bailouts (Schwarcz, 2017; Wray, 2012). Then, Zelizer (1989) makes a distinction between domestic money and market money. Domestic money refers to money in a home or family setting such as allowances for wives and children, while market money is used to represent wages and salary determined from exchange, value and account keeping. Domestic money can be akin to the household money that is not needed to pay taxes (Bell, 2001). Therefore, the difference between domestic money and market money is that the latter is taxable. Money is much more than the dollar bills in circulation hence non-market money exists. It allows for the existence of money outside the market system, and cultural and social factors (Zelizer, 1989). Also, money is viewed as power and thus a symbolism for attitudes (Parsons and Smelser, 1956). Here, the more money a person has, the more power they wield or the more confidence it gives such a person in society. A person’s income level puts that person in a particular social class. In a Nigerian context, having a lot of money makes a person to become a “big man/woman”, which means there are certain doors that are closed to the average citizen that he or she can enter. It also affords them the opportunity to pass through so many societal hoops and red tapes. Money therefore interacts with power and bureaucracy (Mandel, 1992). This in turn influences a person’s role and stance in society. Furthermore, sociologists believe that money goes beyond coins and bank notes and that there are substitutes to money. This can be seen in the view of social status as a substitute to money (Coleman, 1990). In this case, a person’s social status can be used as a means of payment. A country club may accept a member without payment based on the prestige the said person brings with membership and the potential members that will join just to be associated with this member. In the Nigerian setting, this is called “exposure”. A musician can perform at the event of a popular person because he/she knows there would be other successful potential clients. In fact, it is not uncommon to see celebrities offer “social media exposure” as a sort of payment for services in Nigeria. Social status can also be used as a collateral for bank loans so much so that in the cases of a default, the bank has no collateral to seize and has to find more creative loans for loan repayment such as bank employees going to protest non-payments of loans in the houses of a Nigerian senator. More so, money is important to society in that it acts as a medium in the creation of social ties between people. Money is a structure of social and personal relations (Ingham, 1996, 2004). It is a source of creating relationships and as such goes beyond the impersonal function of quantification. Some of these relationships include relationships between people of the same social class, and individuals within a capital and credit group like the ajo and isusu/esusu group. The Yoruba (a Nigerian language) saying, “olowo l’on se ore olowo”, directly translated as “the wealthy are friends with other wealthy people” comes to play here. A person’s financial level determines the kind of friends they have and as a result, the kind of connections and opportunities available to them. It determines the societal clubs people belong to and to a large extent, sets an economic and class trajectory for their lives. Since societies are made up of a group of inter-connected people with different levels and experiences, the perspectives of money in the society differs based on these. Cultural versus structural perspectives of money A cultural perspective of money lies on the premise that culture determines what money is, how money is used and what is used as money. Culture is the way of life of a people that is usually passed down from generation to generation. Hofstede (1984) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or society from those of another.” Money as an institution is an accepted way of life of people that is dependent on culture in society. It is a socially inherited habit and thing that people are programmed to accept. Children learn about money by seeing their parents and families use it. Another aspect of the culture of money has to do with the pricing of goods and services in different cultures. While some countries, like Nigeria and the United Kingdom, have a culture of including taxes in the prices of goods before telling customers the final prices, Canada and the United States have a culture of including the taxes after the price has been given. So, anyone coming from any of the former countries into the latter would experience a culture shock in the pricing and would have to go through an adjustment period in understanding the culture of money in the new country. For the culture of money to occur, it has to be accepted by all. The acceptability factor is dependent on it being a debt that other people are willing to accept, whether a large number of people in society or even a small number within a family. In the cowry currency era of Nigeria, people accepted these cowries because others were willing to accept it. Acceptance started within regions at different times and culturally spread around the area that geographically became Nigeria. The first region to use cowries was the eastern region. Here, cowries were used before the advent of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century (Basden 1921). The culture of cowry usage gradually spread to other regions. It spread through the Benin Empire in the sixteenth century (Egharevba, 1968) till it got to the western region in the seventeenth century (Akinjogbin and Osoba, 1980). Also, culture has a large influence on money through social constructs such as gender and race (Acker, 2006). Since institutions in society are intertwined, we see a situation where cultural influences on gender, and race, influence cultural influences and stances on money. This explains the differences between domestic and market money based on cultural gender roles. The idea is gotten from and also explains the different views of money that lead to the disparity between what men and women who work outside the home earn. In the patriarchal Nigerian system, the gender power structure culturally views the married woman’s wages as domestic and is used to settle domestic needs in the family such as food. On the other hand, the man’s salary is used as market money for things like rents and mortgages (Zelizer, 1989). This actually fuels gender wage discrimination, as women are paid less because the cultural belief is that their needs are lesser and minor. So, women earn lower wages even though they work in comparable positions with the men and they have the same level of human capital as the men (Baker and Jimerson, 1992). From a structural perspective, money is seen as a tracer of social relationships (Baker and Jimerson, 1992). Relationships such as those between traders and customers, institutions like banks and clients, and employers and employees are formed through money. So, money like many other societal institutions, constructs interactions. Ganssmann (1988) talks about money being used as a weapon of social oppression to produce and reproduce relations of social and economic domination. One of the first steps of domination through colonialism was the introduction of British currency. This led to domination of Nigerians. The Nigerian economy went from being a majorly food crop economy in the pre-colonial era to a cash crop economy for the colonialists (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha, 2009). The capitalist system introduced made farmers value money over production for feeding, thereby empowering the colonialist the more since it was their currency being used in the colonies. In a similar manner, one of the early steps processes of breaking free from colonialism was the creation of the Nigerian Central Bank (CBN). This was done in 1959 before independence in 1960. With the CBN in place, Nigeria was able to create her own money, the naira and kobo, and then pursue economic independence from colonial rule. Therefore, owning her own credit unit allowed Nigeria to have an avenue for creating a new structure in her independence. Micro level versus macro level perspectives of money The macro level perspective of money is built upon the beliefs and attitude towards money from an aggregated point of view. It has to do with the government determining the regulatory context of exchange through legal and political mechanisms. In studying the rise and fall of the British pound from A.D. 760 to 1970, Wisher (1970) makes a macro level money argument that the value of a nation’s currency depicts the collective views of the nation’s capabilities. It goes to show that a country’s monetary value also depends on people’s beliefs, attitudes and perspectives on the power and capability of that country. This view explains the reluctance of the Nigerian economy in letting go of the British sterling till 1973. It took thirteen years post-independence for the people to finally gain confidence in the nation’s capabilities and embrace the naira and kobo. On the other hand, the micro level perspective of money is based on the interpersonal level. It views money as an “object of interpersonal relationships, such as communication and exchange”. This has to do with the influence of individuals on the value of money. It is based on individuals’ values, attitudes and beliefs and how these influence their behavior with respect to money (Coleman, 1990; Baker and Jimmerson, 1992). Here, the individual, isolated situation and context determined the value of money. The value of money is not the same for every individual. A $100 bill in the hands of a poor person who lacks basic needs such as food and clothing is different from the same bill in the hands of a wealthy person who has luxury goods. However, whether based on cultural acceptance or individual needs, money, though perceived in different ways, has still been used as credit. It may be used to meet immediate needs, signify social status, create social ties, dominate a group of people or change the structure of society and the economy. In all the scenarios, regardless of the money thing in use, money signifies the ability to pay debt and is therefore credit. In anthropology The field of anthropology provides symbolic meanings of money with regard to primitive money (Dalton, 1967; Hogendorn and Johnson, 1986). It goes into the history of money and defines it based on its purchasing power and forms a perspective of money that is in between the sociological and economical views. In this field, money is not just from the state but also from people and their accumulated customs (Miller, 1931 {1816}). It addresses money from the purchasing power angle; thus, showing that primitive valuables such as cowries, brass rods and manillas are also money. This is because they could be exchanged for goods and services (Mauss, 1990 {1925}; Egharevba, 1968; Latham 1971). Anthropology approaches money first from a medium of exchange point of view before a unit of account and store of value point of view. From the angle of customs, communities over the years operate through shared implicit rules that have been passed down from generation to generation (Hart, 2005). As the years go by, what money is to a person is based on the customs that have been passed down. Unless a sharp exogenous change occurs, such as a government issuing fiat money or the colonialist insisting on the use of British sterling through law, the money passed down through customs is used. This in turn explains why it took fourteen years post-independence for the British money to stop being used in the Nigerian economy. People accepted the sterling because they were accustomed to it and knew others would accept it from them for exchange. Regardless of the customary approach to money, it is still credit used to settle debt. Also, what drives the demand for money is its general acceptance, which in anthropology is passed down through customs. Even though the quality of the debt may change overtime, based on the value placed on it, what actually changes the money thing are exogenous shocks such the introduction of trading partners like the Portuguese traders in Nigeria, colonialism or governmental decrees. An example is the introduction of the naira and kobo into the Nigerian economy on the 1st of January, 1973, which replaced the pound. This exogenous decree happened in the military rule of General Yakubu Gowon and this ushered in a new kind of custom of money away from the pounds. In philosophy and psychology Psychologically and philosophically, money is defined based on people’s mental view of money. Here, people view money based on how they receive it or perceive it. A bribe is different from a donation and a bonus is different from a wage even if it is in the same amount and as thus viewed as different kinds of money (Thaler, 1985; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Lea et al., 1987). In this view, the subject of the value of money is raised as our perceived notion of money determines how much we value it. Simmel, in his 1900 book The Philosophy of Money, attaches sacrifice to his theory of monetary value. To him, whatever we get without painstaking is worthless. This means that in order to place value on money, we have to suffer pain in getting it. Thus, this distinguishes monies based on gifts like donations and lotteries and those gotten through hard work like wages. Overall, we can define money harmoniously as a demand-induced tracer of relationships used in exchange, which receives its value from sacrifice and labour (Baker and Jimerson, 1992, Bitrus, 2011; Simmel, 1900; Lerner, 1947; Wray, 1990). This means that money is dependent on acceptability, how it is gotten and the relationships surrounding it. Thus, its effectiveness in development will be dependent on its role in policies and its application. The Federal Republic of Nigeria is located in West Africa. According to the 2019 World Bank Database, she has an estimated population size of 201 million and she is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous country in the world. The major contributors to the Nigerian economy are the oil and agriculture sector. For a country so rich in natural and human resources, Nigeria provides a paradox because the people are poor (Nwaobi, 2003). According to the 2019 “Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria” report by the National Bureau of Statistics states that about 40 percent of the total population in Nigeria, which is about 83 million people, live below the country’s poverty line of 137,430 naira (333.45USD) per year. Many of these people depend on working every day for their daily bread (Parkinson and Faucon, 2020; Soludo, 2020). As people value money received from labour, it is not uncommon to see people work every day to survive. The year 2020 ushered in a twin crash that affected the oil-producing Nigerian economy – oil crash and COVID-19. Due to influences on both demand and supply, the global oil market experienced a surplus supply of oil, which led to a fall in oil prices in March 2020 just before the WHO announced the COVID-19 global pandemic (Apergis and Apergis, 2020). This was followed by a fall in demand due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic ushered in an economic crisis that is not unlike other crises like the 2007/8 Global Financial Crisis. Crises like these lead to higher poverty levels for households and a downward spiral for the aggregate economy (Skoufias, 2003). In an economy where about 40 percent live below the country’s poverty line, which is an already low bar of less than a dollar a day, a twin-crises such as this pose disastrous effects on the lives of millions of people in a vulnerable society. The COVID-19 global preventive measures of border closures and ‘stay at home’ orders proved rather difficult for a “daily bread” hand-to-mouth member of the economy. It became a choice between corona virus and hunger virus, which has been termed “suicidal” (Soludo 2020). Then, with a population of about 201 million people in a land area of 923,773 square kilometers, the social distancing measures become impractical in a lot of parts in Nigeria. In response, the Nigerian government and private organizations provided “palliatives” that included food stuffs for citizens in order to encourage the lockdown measures. However, without credible demographic data and proper national identifications numbers, the palliatives are only cosmetic. They did not get to the vulnerable part of the economy that needed them and a lot of the palliatives were hijacked by people of influence (Eranga, 2020). This is not surprising as research has shown that aid has made no significant change in poverty reduction in Nigeria because of issues of corruption, poor policy implementation, poor governance and the risk of dependence on aid (Ugwuanyi et al., 2017; Ibietan et al., 2014). Poor people want pay and not handouts so there has to be more effective means of poverty alleviation. Employer of last resort (ELR) as an alternative to aid The Yoruba people of South-western Nigeria have a saying, “ma fun mi n’isu, fun mi l’oko ki o ko mi lati gbin isu”. This literally translates to “do not give me yams, give me a farm and teach me how to plant yams”. What this proverb means is that once a person puts in the work, they will get the result and hardwork is more reliable than aid. The Yoruba people have been historically known to be farmers and over the years, have placed more value on the proceeds from their individual farms (Akintoye, 2010). The Nigerian culture values labour and training over aid and palliatives. Money gotten from hard work is more valuable than money gotten through aid. There is a general belief that nothing goes for nothings and so aid leads to mismanagement and a societal fear of what a person has to give in return. As a result, policy responses for development in Nigeria should be centered around employment. The problem in Nigeria is not a lack of human and natural resources but a lack of effective mobilization of these resources. Since money makes a difference between when it is gotten through paid labour and when it is freely received, investment strategies for development should encourage real capital investment and employment creation as wages gotten through work are valued, for the dignity in labor. The demand for money in Nigeria has been primarily determined by income (Bitrus, 2011) because value is placed on money that was gotten through hard work based on interpersonal relationships tied to the exchange of goods and services. This means that policies designed for the people in developing Nigeria have to primarily target income levels. After years of unsuccessful international and domestic aid systems in Nigeria (Eranga, 2020; Ugwuanyi et al., 2017), an employment-oriented system is ideal for a developing country like Nigeria. A development strategy for Nigeria would require a proper mobilization of unemployed labour resources through an employer of last resort program (Kregel, 2009). The Employer of Last Resort program is a program where the government employs those willing and able to work (Tcherneva, 2012). The goal is to encourage aggregate demand in the economy (Keynes, 1936). Monetary and fiscal policies would be geared towards expansionary programs that will encourage job creation, not just palliatives and short term donations. These programs will intersect with other programs such as environmental sustainability (Murray and Forstater, 2013). Overall, it creates employment in a society that values money gotten through employment.
28465	yago	2	7	https://realcasadiborbone.it/en/history/the-bourbon-family-three-kingdoms-and-a-duchy/	en	The Bourbon Family: Three Kingdoms and a Duchy – Real Casa di Borbone delle Due Sicilie	https://realcasadiborbon…15x515-32x32.jpg	https://realcasadiborbon…15x515-32x32.jpg	[ "https://realcasadiborbone.it/wp-content/plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/res/flags/en.png", "https://realcasadiborbone.it/wp-content/plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/res/flags/it.png", "https://realcasadiborbone.it/wp-content/plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/res/flags/fr.png", "https://realcasadiborbon...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://realcasadiborbon…15x515-32x32.jpg		https://realcasadiborbone.it/en/history/the-bourbon-family-three-kingdoms-and-a-duchy/	The Royal Line of France After Antonio’s death, his son Henry – the real winner of the Wars of Religion since all the children of Henry II and Catherine of Guise had died – continued his father’s policy. Henry wanted to go to Paris and be crowned King there, but the city strongly opposed his will and imposed him to deny Protestantism and convert to Catholicism if he wanted to become King of France. Henry accepted and in 1594 he was welcomed in Paris and crowned King of France and Navarre in God’s name and with the papal recognition. The Bourbon had become Kings of France. Becoming King in 1594, Henry of Bourbon took the name of Henry IV, King of France and Navarre (1594-1610). After him, the Throne went to his son Louis XIII (1610-1643) under the regency of his mother Maria de’ Medici until he came of age and then, at his death, to his son Louis XIV, who was then aged just five, under the regency of his mother Anne of Austria helped by Mazarine. Louis XIV, the Roi Soleil, ruled for a very long time (his was the longest of all reigns if we count its duration from 1643, the year of his father’s death, in which he officially became Louis XIV King of France and Navarre, although under the regency of his mother). Even if we start to count from 1661 – the year in which Mazarine died and Louis XIV took full possession of the sovereignty also from the point of view of political power (he proclaimed that he was “Prime Minister of himself”) – his reign was one of the longest. Until that moment, the Bourbon Family held only one Throne, the most important and glorious in the world together with the Throne of the Sacred Roman Empire (in fact, the two Thrones had their origin in Charlemagne). In Spain, the Habsburg dynasty reigned from the time of Charles V. In 1556 the Emperor of the Sacred Roman Empire divided his vast dominions between his brother Ferdinand – whom he gave the empire dominions and the title of Emperor – and his son Philip II, to whom he gave the Throne of Madrid and all overseas and European dominions among which the viceroyalty of Naples and Sicily. The line of the Habsburg-Spain was originated in this way, in parallel with the main line of the Habsburg-Austria who held the imperial title. At the end of the XVII century, the Spanish line died out with Charles II, who had no direct heirs. The problem of the succession to the Spanish Throne arose. Both Louis XIV and the Emperor Leopold I of Habsburg claimed rights over it; in fact both had married one of Charles’ sisters (the King of France had married the elder, the Habsburg Emperor the younger). For several reasons, Charles II of Habsburg in his testament appointed as sole heir Philip of Anjou, nephew of Louis XIV and son of the Dauphin, with the clause that he had to renounce his rights over the Crown of France; secondarily he appointed the Archduke Charles of Habsburg, second son of the Emperor Leopold. Charles II died in 1700 and Philip of Anjou ascended the Throne of Madrid with the name of Philip V. This provoked the reaction of Austria and also the other great powers that were afraid of an excessive strengthening of Louis XIV (who already acted as real lord of Spain); therefore these powers supported the candidature of Charles of Habsburg. The War of the Spanish Succession began. The Bourbon on the Throne of Spain-Philip V and the War of Spanish Succession Born in Versailles on 19 December 1683 from Prince Louis, Dauphin of France, and Maria Anne of Bavaria, the Duke of Anjou was only seventeen when he inherited the Crown of Spain. Philip V was unprepared to the task of king, but Louis XIV watched over him and through him expected to rule over Spain: to help him, he established a State Council formed by experienced ministers from Colbert’s school who began to implement reforms also in Spain. His marriage to the thirteen-year-old Maria Louise Gabriella – daughter of Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy – was a blessing for him. The wedding was celebrated by proxy in Turin on 11 September 1701. The Queen was clever and full of energy. A rebellion broken out in Naples forcing him to leave for Italy. He gave the regency to his young wife, who helped by the clergy, government people and mainly Princess Orsini (the “camarera mayor” deliberately chosen as her lady-in-waiting by Louis XIV) protected the French interests at the Court and was up to her task. After restoring order in Naples, the break out of the War of Spanish Succession forced Philip to leave for Piedmont and Lombardy, where he fought against the Austrian army of Archduke Charles and showed to be a brave soldier. Fortune would have smiled on him if the Netherlands and England had not allied with Austria and changed in a decisive way the outcome of the war. The enemy fleet was already entering the harbour of Cadiz and occupying southern Spain, while in Madrid Charles of Habsburg was proclaimed Charles III King of Spain. In 1709 even Louis XIV began to leave his nephew to his destiny, but Philip, also supported by his loyal wife and by Princess Orsini and the Castilians found the necessary inner strength to resist and continue his fought for his Throne. In the end also his grandfather helped him in an active way. However, he was also helped by the fact that, since Emperor Leopold and his first-born Emperor Joseph I had both died (the latter without heirs), the imperial crown went to Charles of Habsburg, who took the name of Emperor Charles VI. At this point, the powers that had supported him against Philip began to withdraw: in fact, if Charles VI had obtained also the Kingdom of Spain and its dominions, the same situation of Charles V would have occurred again, and Louis XIV could not allow this to happen, even if he had to cause a total war in Europe. Nobody liked this prospect. The war lasted until 1712, when the peace negotiations began and Philip V had no other choice but to choose between his rights to the French succession and the Italian territories on one side, and the Kingdom of Spain on the other side, by renouncing the Italian territories in favour of the Empire (in this way the viceroyalty of Naples and Sicily went back to the Habsburg of the Austrian line). On the other hand, the heirs to the French Throne committed themselves to renounce any right to the Spanish Throne and by the Utrecht Treaty of 1713 signed by France, Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Prussia and Savoy, Philip V was recognised as founder of the Bourbon-Spain dynasty; but only provided that he renounced all his rights to the French crown and provided that the main French branch renounced their rights to the Spanish crown. In this way, now the Bourbon family reigned over two separate crowns: the French crown with the Roi Soleil (still alive until 1715, when he died and his grandchild Louis XV became king under the regency of the Duke of Orleans) and the Spanish crown with Philip V. In February 1714 Queen Maria Louise Gabriella died; a year later, the King married Elisabeth Farnese, heir to the Parma and Piacenza Duchy, a woman as clever and skilful (and perhaps even more) as his first wife. Tired of his long subjection to Louis XIV, Philip V, of poor health and prone to depression, completely entrusted his wife and Cardinal Giulio Alberoni (a man of great intelligence) with the government. The Italian influence replaced the French one at the Court: Nino Cortese, who wrote the page on Philip V in the “Enciclopedia Italiana” made the following remark: «And that was a time for revenge, since Spain then tried to reconquer part of its old and now lost positions in Europe». Elisabeth Farnese after a ten-year policy succeeded in assuring the Kingdom of Naples and the Duchy of Parma and Piacenza to her two sons. In January 1724 Philip V abdicated in favour of his son, the Prince of the Asturias (born 16 years before from Maria Louise Gabriella) who had already married Elisabeth of Montpensier, daughter of the Duke of Orléans. He was crowned as Louis I King of Spain. Stroke by smallpox, the young king gave back his crown to his father and died after a few months, and Philip – against his will – had to be king again. However, the real protagonist now was Elisabeth, and she had a very precise goal: assure the Italian States to her children. Philip died in 1746. The throne went to his other son, the one he had from his first wife, Ferdinand VI, who had no heir and then in 1759 to Charles, son of Elisabeth, already King of Naples with the name of Charles III, who assured the succession of the Spanish branch of the Bourbon Family to the Spanish Crown. The Masterpiece of Elisabeth Farnese-Another Throne and a Duchy to the Bourbon In 1714, Cardinal Alberoni had arranged the marriage between the then widower Philip V and Elisabeth Farnese, born in Parma in 1692 (she would die in Madrid in 1766). Elisabeth immediately showed what stuff she was made of by bravely dismissing Princess Orsini and looking for support from Cardinal Alberoni. She gave Philip three sons (one of them became Archbishop of Toledo) and a daughter, and all her policy as Queen was based upon her strong desire to assure the Throne to her sons (in Spain, the heir was Ferdinand, the son that Philip had had from his first marriage, and therefore Elisabeth’s policy aimed at reconquering Naples) and the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza (of which she was the heir due to the fact that the Farnese Family was doomed to die out with Duke Antonio, who died in 1731). The War of Spanish Succession was over after 14 years of fighting, and the Treaties of Utrecht (13 July 1713) and Rastadt (7 March 1714) were signed with the following purpose: “conservandum in Europa equilibrium”. From the birth of Charles in Madrid on 20 January 1716, the Spanish foreign policy would try and obtain (through a series of operations started with the solemn entrance of Spain in the Quadruple Alliance through the Hague Treaty of 17 February 1720) the recognition of Charles’ rights to the double succession of Farnese and Medici. After the Congresses and Treaties of Cambrai (1721), Vienna (1725) and Seville (1729), the Empire would accept this situation with the second Treaty of Vienna in 1731. Charles was therefore heir to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza under the regency of his grandmother, the widow Duchess of Parma, and at the same time in Florence he was proclaimed the heir to the last Grand Duke of Tuscany who become co-tutor of the young prince. In this way, Elisabeth Farnese achieved her first goal, but the King of Spain or his successors could not claim any right to the Italian States or be tutors of their heirs. Here we see the first root, the real motive of the existence of the two Families: Bourbon Two Sicilies and Bourbon Parma. Under the first “family pact” of 1734, which caused the Spanish intervention in the War of Polish Succession, Charles reconquered Naples and Sicily after the decisive battle of Bitonto on 25 May 1734 and was recognised as King of Naples and Sicily by the Treaties of Vienna of 1735; in exchange he had to renounce the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany which would go (without Tuscany but with Guastalla) to his younger brother Philip, Head of the Royal House of the Bourbon-Parma, second-born of Elisabeth Farnese and son-in-law of Louis XV. On 18 October 1748, when Spain was ruled by Ferdinand VI, son of Philip V who had no heir, the Treaty of Aachen (by a special clause) ruled the succession of King Charles to the Spanish Throne. This was the situation when, on 10 August 1759, Ferdinand VI died without direct heirs. Charles, King of Naples and Sicily, was then called to the Spanish Throne; however due to a fundamental law of the Bourbon-Spain Family known as “New Regulation for the Succession of these Kingdoms”, followed just three days later by his Proclamation of 6 October 1759, Charles become King of Spain, renounced the Throne of Naples in favour of his son Ferdinand and the division of the two Royal Families was set up forever. In particular, King Charles stated that «the line of Succession I have established will never lead to the unification of the Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Dominions, so that either the sons or the daughters of my lineage mentioned above can claim rights to the Italian States only if they are not already declared Kings of Spain or Princes of Asturias or to be declared as such». Therefore, the descendants of Childeprando (as well as Charlemagne and St. Louis IX) now sit on four thrones of France and Navarre, Spain (with its domains), Naples and Sicily, and the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza. Four families, a single branch, none of which can claim anything on the domains of the other three, but they are united – not only by the ties of blood – the “family pact” that the allies against domestic and foreign enemy.
28465	yago	3	41	https://kids.kiddle.co/Prince_Felix_of_Bourbon-Parma	en	Prince Felix of Bourbon	https://kids.kiddle.co/i…a_%281916%29.jpg	https://kids.kiddle.co/i…a_%281916%29.jpg	[ "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/wk/kids-robot.svg", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/wk/kids-search-engine.svg", "https://kids.kiddle.co/images/thumb/1/1f/Hermann_Clemens_Kosel_-_Photograph_of_Prince_F%C3%A9lix_of_Bourbon-Parma_%281916%29.jpg/300px-Hermann_Clemens_Kosel_-_Photograph_of_Prince_F%C3%A9lix_of_Bourbon...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Learn Prince Felix of Bourbon-Parma facts for kids	en	/images/wk/favicon-16x16.png		https://kids.kiddle.co/Prince_Felix_of_Bourbon-Parma	Prince Félix of Bourbon-Parma (later Prince Félix of Luxembourg; 28 September 1893 – 8 April 1970) was the husband of Charlotte, Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and the father of her six children, including her successor Jean, Grand Duke of Luxembourg. By birth to his father Robert I, Duke of Parma, he was a member of the House of Bourbon-Parma and one descendant of King Philip V of Spain. Prince Félix was the longest-serving consort of Luxembourg. Early life Prince Félix was one of the 24 children of the deposed Robert I, Duke of Parma, being the duke's sixth child and third son by his second wife, Maria Antonia of Portugal. His maternal grandparents were Miguel of Portugal and Adelaide of Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg. He was born in Schwarzau am Steinfeld. He was also the younger brother (by sixteen months) of Empress Zita of Austria. Of the twelve children of Duke Robert's first marriage to Maria-Pia of the Two Sicilies, three died as infants, six had learning difficulties, and only three married. Despite the loss of his throne, Duke Robert and his family enjoyed considerable wealth, travelling in a private train of more than a dozen cars among his castles at Schwarzau am Steinfeld near Vienna, Villa Pianore [it] in northwest Italy, and the magnificent Château de Chambord in France. Less than four months after Robert's death in 1907 the Grand Marshal of the Austrian Court declared six of the children of his first marriage legally incompetent, at the behest of Duchess Maria Antonia. Nonetheless, Robert's primary heir was Elias, Duke of Parma, (1880–1959), the youngest son of the first marriage and the only one to father children of his own. Duke Elias also became the legal guardian of his six elder siblings. Although Félix's elder brothers, Prince Sixte and Prince Xavier, eventually sued their half-brother Duke Elias to obtain a greater share of the ducal fortune, they lost in the French courts, leaving Prince Félix with modest prospects. Félix served in the Austrian Dragoons as Lieutenant and Captain, but resigned his commission in November 1918. Marriage to Grand Duchess Charlotte On 6 November 1919 in Luxembourg, the prince married his first cousin Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg, having been admitted to the nobility of Luxembourg and also made Prince of Luxembourg by Grand Ducal decree the day before. Unlike some European consorts, Félix neither adopted his wife's dynastic surname (of Nassau), nor relinquished his own title and name "Prince of Bourbon-Parma". His traditional style as a Bourbon prince of the Parmesan branch is the reason that cadet members of the Grand Ducal Family of Luxembourg enjoy the style of Royal Highness (but that style belongs to the Luxembourg monarch and heir apparent by right, as the historical prerogative of grand-ducal dynasties). Felix was president of the Luxembourg Red Cross between 1923 and 1932 and again between 1947 and 1969. He was also Colonel of the Luxembourg Volunteers Company since 1920 and Inspector-General of the Luxembourg Army between 1945 and 1967. Urban legend has it that Félix lost the Grünewald, a forest owned by the Grand Duchess, at a casino in 1934, but this is false; part of the property was sold, along with Berg Castle, to the Luxembourgian government, with the revenue paying for the upkeep of the grand-ducal household, and was not spent on personal consumption, let alone gambling losses. During World War II the grand ducal family left Luxembourg shortly before the arrival of Nazi troops, settling in France until their capitulation, in June 1940. Subsequently, the family and the Grand Duchess' ministers received transit visas to Portugal from the Portuguese consul Aristides de Sousa Mendes, in June 1940. They arrived at Vilar Formoso on 23 June 1940. After travelling through Coimbra and Lisbon, the family first stayed in Cascais, in Casa de Santa Maria, owned by Manuel Espírito Santo, who was then the honorary consul for Luxembourg in Portugal. By July they had moved to Monte Estoril, staying at the Chalet Posser de Andrade. On 10 July 1940, Félix, together with his children, Heir Prince Jean, Princess Elisabeth, Princess Marie Adelaide, Princess Marie Gabriele, Prince Charles and Princess Alix, the nanny Justine Reinard and the chauffeur Eugène Niclou, along with his wife Joséphine, boarded the S.S. Trenton headed for New York City, after which they moved to Canada. Death Prince Félix died at Fischbach Castle on 8 April 1970. His funeral mass was held at the Cathedral of Notre-Dame and he was later buried in the crypt of the cathedral. Marriage and children On 6 November 1919 in Luxembourg, he married Charlotte, Grand Duchess of Luxembourg. They had six children: Jean, Grand Duke of Luxembourg (1921–2019), who married HRH Princess Joséphine-Charlotte of Belgium (1927–2005) Princess Elizabeth of Luxembourg (1922–2011), who married HSH Franz, Duke of Hohenberg (1927–1977) Princess Marie Adelaide of Luxembourg (1924–2007), who married Karl Josef Graf Henckel von Donnersmarck (1928–2008) Princess Marie Gabriele of Luxembourg (1925–2023), who married Knud Johan, Count of Holstein-Ledreborg (1919–2001) Prince Charles of Luxembourg (1927–1977), who married Joan Douglas Dillon (born 1935), the former wife of James Brady Moseley Princess Alix of Luxembourg (1929–2019), who married Antoine, 13th Prince of Ligne (1925–2005) Titles, honours and awards 28 October 1893 – 5 November 1919: His Royal Highness Prince Felix of Bourbon-Parma 5 November 1919 – 6 November 1919: His Royal Highness Prince Felix of Luxembourg 6 November 1919 – 12 November 1964: His Royal Highness The Prince Consort of Luxembourg 12 November 1964 – 8 April 1970: His Royal Highness Prince Felix of Luxembourg Honours National Luxembourg: Knight of the Order of the Gold Lion of the House of Nassau Luxembourg: President of the Luxembourg Red Cross Parmese Ducal Family: Grand Cross of the Order of St. Louis for Civil Merit Foreign Kingdom of Albania Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Fidelity (1931) Austro-Hungarian Imperial and Royal Family: Grand Cross of the Royal Hungarian Order of St. Stephen (1917) Belgium: Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold Norway: Grand Cross of the Royal Norwegian Order of St. Olav (1964) Portugal: Grand Cross of the Military Order of St. Benedict of Aviz (24 February 1950) Sweden: Knight of the Royal Order of the Seraphim (18 July 1951) Thailand: Knight of the Order of the Royal House of Chakri (17 October 1960) The Netherlands: Grand Cross of the Order of the Netherlands Lion See also
28465	yago	3	16	https://constantinianorder.net/the-bourbon-family/%3Flang%3Den	en	Sacro Militare Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio	https://constantinianord…an-maestro-2.jpg		[ "https://constantinianorder.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/follow-us-on-facebook-30x30.jpg", "https://constantinianorder.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/follow-us-on-instagram-30x30.jpg", "https://constantinianorder.net/wp-content/plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/res/flags/it.png", "https://constantinianorde...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2019-04-10T16:58:04+00:00	Il Sacro Militare Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio comunicazione istituzionale News Accedi alla rassegna stampa Comunicati Stampa Riconoscimenti Nazionali ed Internazionali	it	https://constantinianorder.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/favicon.ico	Sacro Militare Ordine Costantiniano di San Giorgio	https://constantinianorder.net/
28465	yago	1	19	https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/zita-of-bourbon-parma/royal-wedding-recollections-archduke-charles-of-austria-zita-of-bourbon-parma/	en	Archduke Charles of Austria & Zita of Bourbon	https://www.historyofroy…arzau_1911bb.jpg	https://www.historyofroy…arzau_1911bb.jpg	[ "https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/wp-content/uploads/moniekheader4-1.png", "https://i0.wp.com/www.historyofroyalwomen.com/wp-content/uploads/Hochzeit_Erzh_Karl_und_Zita_Schwarzau_1911bb.jpg?resize=599%2C381&ssl=1", "https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/49d87a32a97a5b99f4b25d2be2d5ffb7?s=125&d=mm&r=g", "https...	[ "//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/89778164?et=RNb4_CC_S0pAVTTune2iYg&tld=nl&sig=h4FBCpZRpFWTYtPB1xh-v7kOyYtcOpEY8nokg9VklwU=&caption=true&ver=1", "//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/56457500?et=EV42VJfbRfFZfIzQmYfaZg&tld=nl&sig=xAPvEI0lIFdPytOnWEc_gVAOxhJNxLRbwZPfpFnndv8=&caption=true&ver=1", "//embed.gettyimages.com/e...	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Moniek Bloks", "www.facebook.com" ]	2021-10-21T03:00:00+00:00	On 21 October 1911, Zita of Bourbon-Parma married the future Emperor Charles I of Austria. They had known each other since childhood, and Zita’s aunt, Maria Theresa of Austria, was also Charles’s step-grandmother. Their engagement had been announced on 13 June 1911 and was very much welcomed. After the betrothal ceremony, Charles told Zita, “Now [read more]	en	https://i0.wp.com/www.hi…it=32%2C22&ssl=1	History of Royal Women	https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/zita-of-bourbon-parma/royal-wedding-recollections-archduke-charles-of-austria-zita-of-bourbon-parma/	On 21 October 1911, Zita of Bourbon-Parma married the future Emperor Charles I of Austria. They had known each other since childhood, and Zita’s aunt, Maria Theresa of Austria, was also Charles’s step-grandmother. Their engagement had been announced on 13 June 1911 and was very much welcomed. After the betrothal ceremony, Charles told Zita, “Now we will help each other to reach heaven!” Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria had lost his only son to suicide in 1889, and the current heir to the throne was Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had married morganatically and whose children were excluded from the succession. Thus, Archduke Charles was second in line to the throne, and Zita met all the requirements. In the months preceding the wedding, Zita spent a lot of time preparing for her future position – even having an audience with the Pope, who greeted her as a future Empress. When she protested, saying that Franz Ferdinand was the heir, the Pope told her, “No, Charles will be the heir.” The wedding took place at Schwarzau Castle in Reichenau. Zita received a pearl necklace from her future husband and a diamond tiara from the Emperor. Two whole rooms were filled with the wedding presents the couple received. The guest of honour – the Emperor – arrived in St Egyden on a special train and was taken by car to the castle, where he arrived at 11 in the morning. He was greeted by Charles at the bottom of the steps to the castle as Zita, and her mother waited at the top of the steps. He greeted Zita’s mother with a kiss on her hand, and he kissed Zita on both cheeks. Zita was dressed in an ivory satin dress stitched with silver thread, a three-metre long train decorated with the Bourbon lily and the tiara she had been gifted by the Emperor. Her bridal veil was a Braganza family heirloom. Charles was dressed in the uniform of a Cavalry captain. Although a seat had been reserved for the ageing Emperor, he remained standing throughout the ceremony. The wedding ceremony was performed by Monsignor Gaetano Bisleti, a representative of the Pope, who would be created a Cardinal the following month. After the ceremony, the most prominent guests went out onto the balcony, where photos and footage were made of the happy occasion. Afterwards, the Emperor toasted to their happiness during a wedding breakfast before departing for Vienna. Charles and Zita would turn out to be the last Emperor and Empress of Austria, and the footage of their wedding is a small glimpse into the lost splendour of that world.
28465	yago	0	55	https://politics-history.mozello.com/page-1/params/group/128798/	en	Politics & History	http://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/medium/tck.png		[ "https://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/medium/oiz-4.jpg", "http://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/medium/tck.png", "http://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/medium/ju.jpeg", "https://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/medium/AS.jpg", "https://site-756271.mozfiles.com/files/756271/galler...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	/favicon.png?0		null	EMPEROR CHARLES I (KARL I)(1887-1922) ,KARL FRANZ JOSEPH LUDWIG HUBERT GEORG OTTO MARIA AND EMPRESS ZITA OF BOURBON - PARMA (1892-1989),THE LAST MONARCH BELONGING TO THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG - LORRAINE BEFORE THE DISSOLUTION OF AUSTRIA - HUNGARY .AFTER HIS UNCLE ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND OF ASSASSINATED IN 1914. Emperor Karl is the only decent man to come out of the war in a leadership position, no one listened to him. He sincerely wanted peace, and therefore was despised by the whole world. It was a wonderful chance that was lostBlessed Karl was a happy married man. On his wedding day, he famously declared to his beautiful wife, Zita, “Now we have to help each other to get to heaven!” They were even more devoted to God than to each other and they inscribed their relationship with God into their daily lives together. Blessed Karl proposed to his lovely Zita at the Shrine of Mariazell in Austria and they inscribed a prayer inside their wedding bands, “Sub tuum presidium confugimus, sancta Dei Genitrix” (We fly to take refuge under your protection, O Holy Mother of God). Their love was intense and lasted to the end of Karl’s life. For her part, the Empress Zita never remarried but continued to carry the memory of her husband and she blessed others with the title she had received from him. Charles I or Karl I (Karl Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Maria was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary;, and the last monarch belonging to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. After his uncle Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in 1914,he is known to the Catholic Church as Blessed Karl of Austria. He was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary (as Charles IV), and the last monarch belonging to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine. After his uncle Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in 1914, Charles became the designated successor of the Emperor Franz Josef. Charles I reigned from 1916 until 1918, when he "renounced participation" in state affairs, but did not abdicate. He spent the remaining years of his life attempting to restore the monarchy until his death in 1922. Following his beatification by the Catholic Church in 2004, within Catholic community he is commonly known as Blessed Karl of Austria.Karl was born on August 17, 1887, at the Castle of Persenbeug in Lower Austria. As he was the great-nephew of the then ruling Emperor, Franz Joseph, it was not envisioned at his birth that it would one day fall to him to rule. Yet, his education prepared him for the task.Charles parents were Archduke Otto Franz of Austria and Princess Maria Josepha of Saxony. At the time, his granduncle Franz Joseph reigned as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and his uncle Franz Ferdinand became heir presumptive two years later.That as Emperor he would rule wants to be emphasized. The emperors of the Holy Roman Empire and then the Austro-Hungarian one did not merely reign, like the European monarchs who remain today, all of the “constitutional” ones. By the time of Karl’s accession their power was no longer absolute as it still was with the Russian Tsar, but it was real. None was a figurehead unless rendered so by personal incapacity.As a child, Archduke Charles was reared a devout Roman Catholic. He spent his early years wherever his father's regiment happened to be stationed; later on he lived in Vienna and Reichenau an der Rax. He was privately educated, but, contrary to the custom ruling in the imperial family, he attended a public gymnasium for the sake of demonstrations in scientific subjects. On the conclusion of his studies at the gymnasium, he entered the army, spending the years from 1906 to 1908 as an officer chiefly in Prague, where he studied law and political science concurrently with his military duties.In 1907, he was declared of age and Prince Zdenko Lobkowitz was appointed his chamberlain. In the next few years he carried out his military duties in various Bohemian garrison towns. Charles's relations with his granduncle were not intimate, and those with his uncle Franz Ferdinand were not cordial, with the differences between their wives increasing the existing tension between them. For these reasons, Charles, up to the time of the assassination of his uncle in 1914, obtained no insight into affairs of state, but led the life of a prince not destined for a high political position.Charles became heir presumptive after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, the event which precipitated World War I. Only at this time did the old Emperor take steps to initiate the heir-presumptive to his crown in affairs of state. But the outbreak of World War I interfered with this political education. Charles spent his time during the first phase of the war at headquarters at Teschen, but exercised no military influence.Charles then became a Feldmarschall (Field Marshal) in the Austro-Hungarian Army. In the spring of 1916, in connection with the offensive against Italy, he was entrusted with the command of the XX. Corps, whose affections the heir-presumptive to the throne won by his affability and friendliness. The offensive, after a successful start, soon came to a standstill. Shortly afterwards, Charles went to the eastCharles succeeded to the thrones in November 1916, after the death of his grand-uncle, Emperor Franz Joseph.On 2 December 1916, he assumed the title of Supreme Commander of the whole army from Archduke Friedrich. His coronation as King of Hungary occurred on 30 December. In 1917, Charles secretly entered into peace negotiations with France. He employed his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, an officer in the Belgian Army, as intermediary. However, the Allies insisted on Austrian recognition of Italian claims to territory and Charles refused, so no progress was made.Although his foreign minister, Graf Czernin, was only interested in negotiating a general peace which would include Germany, Charles himself went much further in suggesting his willingness to make a separate peace. When news of the overture leaked in April 1918, Charles denied involvement until French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau published letters signed by him. This led to Czernin's resignation, forcing Austria-Hungary into an even more dependent position with respect to its seemingly wronged German ally.The Austro-Hungarian Empire was wracked by inner turmoil in the final years of the war, with much tension between ethnic groups. As part of his Fourteen Points, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson demanded that the Empire allow for autonomy and self-determination of its peoples. In response, Charles agreed to reconvene the Imperial Parliament and allow for the creation of a confederation with each national group exercising self-governance. However, the ethnic groups fought for full autonomy as separate nations, as they were now determined to become independent from Vienna at the earliest possible moment.Foreign minister Baron Istvan Burián asked for an armistice 14 October based on the Fourteen Points, and two days later Charles issued a proclamation that radically changed the nature of the Austrian state. The Poles were granted full independence with the purpose of joining their ethnic brethren in Russia and Germany in a Polish state. The rest of the Austrian lands were transformed into a federal union composed of four parts: German, Czech, South Slav, and Ukrainian. Each of the four parts was to be governed by a federal council, and Trieste was to have a special status. However, Secretary of State Robert Lansing replied four days later that the Allies were now committed to the causes of the Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs. Therefore, autonomy for the nationalities was no longer enough. In fact, a Czechoslovak provisional government had joined the Allies 14 October, and the South Slav national council declared an independent South Slav state 29 October 1918.ern front as commander of an army operating against the Russians and Romanians. Charles and Zita were crowned in Budapest on 30 December 1916. Following the coronation there was a banquet, but after that the festivities ended, as the emperor and empress thought it wrong to have prolonged celebrations during a time of war. At the beginning of the reign, Charles was more often than not away from Vienna, so he had a telephone line installed from Baden (where Charles's military headquarters were located) to the Hofburg. He called Zita several times a day whenever they were separated. Zita had some influence on her husband and would discreetly attend audiences with the Prime Minister or military briefings, and she had a special interest in social policy. However, military matters were the sole domain of Charles. Energetic and strong-willed, Zita accompanied her husband to the provinces and to the front, as well as occupying herself with charitable works and hospital visits to the war-wounded. Karl grew up imbued with a deep personal trust in God and equipped with all the Catholic moral principles whose political application he would combine, as Emperor, with his appreciation for the Church’s social doctrine. He came to the throne in 1916 due to a series of tragic events: the death at Mayerling (some say by suicide and others by assassination) of Franz Joseph’s only son, Archduke Rudolph; the early death of his own father, Otto, in 1906; and the assassination of his uncle Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914.As soon as he succeeded to the throne, Ven. Emperor Karl bent his energies to seeking the end of the carnage of World War I, which had been raging for two years. To that purpose he authorized a brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, an officer in the Belgian army, to deliver a set of peace proposals to President Poincare of France. As testimony to the sincerity of his effort, the Emperor stipulated his readiness to sacrifice his hereditary claim to Lorraine and to cede to Italy the Italian ethnic portion of the Trentino, even though Austrian troops at the moment were well advanced into the northern part of the Italian boot. In a Peace Note of August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV seconded Karl’s initiative. Both the Pope and Emperor foresaw that unless the war was quickly ended, the unstable Kerensky government that had taken power in Russia in March, 1917, could degenerate into something far worse because it would be far more threatening than imperial Russia ever was to what remained of Western Christendom. This is to speak of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in terms of what it was: the last Catholic world power.Unfortunately, Austria’s Western enemies of the moment, who were looking for U.S. intervention to enable them to achieve territorial and other ambitions, were not ready for peace. At the same time Karl’s own ally, the Prussian Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, hoped to beat England and France on the Western Front before effective U.S. aid could arrive. The war continued.It produced great deprivations on the home front. The poor were especially hard hit. In his capital of Vienna, Karl ordered that carriages and coaches of the imperial court be used to deliver coal to them. Further, he established a new Ministry of Social Welfare in his cabinet and gave its portfolio to the redoubtable Msgr. Ignaz Seipel, an apostle of reforms based on Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum and other papal social encyclicals. Karl also acted to restructure the Empire politically along federalist lines. Establishment of a kind of United States of Greater Austria was his aim. In a manifesto of October 16, 1918, he ordered each ethnic group in the Imperial Parliament to caucus and draw up a plan for the government of its portion of the Empire. These were excellent and desirable moves. However, powerful forces were working against Karl, forces within the West itself, forces which had their agents even inside the Empire.Since the beginning of his rule he favored the creation of third Croatian political entity, in his Croatian Coronation oath from 1916 he recognized the union of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia with Rijeka and during his short reign supported trialist suggestions from the Croatian Sabor and Ban, but the suggestions were always vetoed by the Hungarian side which did not want to share power with other nations. After Emperor Karl's manifesto of 14 October 1918 was rejected by the declaration of the National Council in Zagreb. President of the Croatian pro-monarchy political party Pure Party of Rights Dr. Aleksandar Horvat, with other parliament members and generals went to visit the emperor on 21 October 1918 in Bad Ischl, where the emperor agreed and signed the trialist manifest under the proposed terms set by the delegation, on the condition that the Hungarian part does the same since he swore an oath on the integrity of the Hungarian crown. The delegation went the next day to Budapest where it presented the manifest to Hungarian officials and Council of Ministers who signed the manifest and released the king from his oath, creating a third Croatian political entity (Zvonimir's kingdom) After the signing, two parades were held in Zagreb, one for the ending of the K.u.K. monarchy, which was held in front of the Croatian National Theater, and another one for saving the trialist monarchy. The last vote for the support of the trialist reorganization of the empire was, however, too late. On 29 October 1918, the Croatian Sabor (parliament) ended the union and all ties with Hungary and Austria, proclaimed the unification of all Croatian lands and entered the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. The curiosity is that no act of Sabor dethroned King Karl IV, nor did it acknowledge the entering in a state union with Serbia, which is today mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution of Croatia.A Council of Allied and Successor States Ambassadors assembled to decide the fate of the imperial couple. Extreme opinion called for the imprisonment of Karl as a “war criminal.” However, all his life he had been plagued by weak lungs that made him susceptible to pneumonia, and the infirmity was not overlooked by the All-Seeing Eye. Thus, a subtle, more permanent solution to the “Habsburg problem” was crafted. Karl and Zita were exiled to the damp and rainy island of Madeira. Marooned there without any funds on November 19, 1921, they had to accept the offer of a local banker who gave them the use of his unheated summer home 2,000 feet in the mountains. There was fungus growing on the humid walls.The couple’s gloom was somewhat dispelled by the arrival of their children, but in March, 1922, a dense fog and deep chill caused the Emperor to catch a bad cold. There was no money to summon a doctor and the cold developed into a fatal case of pneumonia.As Karl’s end approached, he placed himself with complete resignation into the hands of Our Lord. His eldest son and heir, Archduke Otto, was brought to the side of the deathbed so that as future head of the House of Habsburg he might learn, in Karl’s words, “how one behaves in such circumstances as a Catholic and as an Emperor.”the Emperor’s life and time as a ruler, as they have here been sketched, that recommends canonization.First, he was a champion of peace and reconciliation. His statesmanship in seeking an honorable peace to end World War I provides a model for political leaders today who do not scruple to wage war even in “anticipatory self-defense.” His deathbed forgiveness of his enemies, including the Masons, challenges the many forms of hatred that abound today. His example is instructive to the public as well as to leaders.Second, he was a champion of social justice. Influenced by Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, he established a Ministry of Social Welfare to implement the Church’s social doctrine. His personal commitment to social justice is shown by his use of his carriages and coaches to transport coal to the poor during the war. His implementation of the papal social encyclicals sets an example for public officials looking to solve today’s economic and social problems.Third, he was a champion of Austro-Slavonic unity and minority ethnic rights. Foreseeing Russian domination of the smaller Slavonic and other ethnic nations sandwiched between the Russian and Prussian Empires, Karl strove to transform his own centralized Empire into a confederation of individual ethnic nations, each having internal autonomy, but with their security and other benefits provided by a united defense, a common market, economic and financial union and foreign policy. Had he succeeded, both Hitler and Stalin would have been blocked. The family's first home in exile was Wartegg Castle in Rorschach, Switzerland, a property owned by the Bourbon-Parmas. However, the Swiss authorities, worried about the implication of the Habsburgs living near the Austrian border, compelled them to move to the western part of the country. The next month, therefore, found them moving to Villa Prangins, near Lake Geneva, where they resumed a quiet family life. This abruptly ended in March 1920 when, after a period of instability in Hungary, Miklós Horthy was elected regent. Charles was still technically King (as Charles IV) but Horthy sent an emissary to Prangins advising him not to go to Hungary until the situation had calmed. After the Trianon Treaty Horthy's ambition soon grew. Charles became concerned and requested the help of Colonel Strutt to get him into Hungary. Charles twice attempted to regain control, once in March 1921 and again in October 1921. Both attempts failed, despite Zita's staunch support (she insisted on travelling with him on the final dramatic train journey to Budapest. Zita of Bourbon-Parma (Zita Maria delle Grazie Adelgonda Micaela Raffaela Gabriella Giuseppina Antonia Luisa Agnese; 9 May 1892 – 14 March 1989) was the wife of Emperor Charles of Austria. As such, she was the last Empress of Austria, Queen of Hungary, and Queen of Bohemia.Born as the seventeenth child of the dispossessed Robert I, Duke of Parma and his second wife Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal, Zita married the then Archduke Charles of Austria in 1911. Charles became heir presumptive to the Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria in 1914 after the assassination of his uncle Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, and acceded to the throne in 1916 after the old emperor's death.After the end of World War I in 1918, the Habsburgs were deposed when the new countries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were formed. Charles and Zita left for exile in Switzerland and later Madeira, where Charles died in 1922. After her husband's death, Zita and her son Otto served as the symbols of unity for the exiled dynasty. A devout Catholic, she raised a large family after being widowed at the age of 29, and never remarried.Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma was born at the Villa Pianore in the Italian Province of Lucca, 9 May 1892. The unusual name Zita was given her after a popular Italian Saint who had lived in Tuscany in the 13th century. She was the third daughter and fifth child of the deposed Robert I, Duke of Parma and his second wife, Maria Antonia of Portugal, a daughter of king Miguel of Portugal and Adelaide of Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg. Zita's father had lost his throne as a result of the movement for Italian unification in 1859 when he was still a child. He fathered twelve children during his first marriage to Maria Pia of the Two Sicilies (six of whom were mentally retarded, and three of whom died young). Duke Robert became a widower in 1882, and two years later he married Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal, Zita's mother. The second marriage produced a further twelve children. Zita was the 17th child among Duke Robert's 24 children. Robert moved his large family between Villa Pianore (a large property located between Pietrasanta and Viareggio) and his castle in Schwarzau in lower Austria. It was mainly in these two residences that Zita spent her formative years. The family spent most of the year in Austria moving to Pianore in the Winter and returning in the Summer. To move between them, they took a special train with sixteen coaches to accommodate the family and their belongings.Zita and her siblings were raised to speak Italian, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese and English. She recalled, "We grew up internationally. My father thought of himself first and foremost as a Frenchman, and spent a few weeks every year with the elder children at Chambord, his main property on the Loire. I once asked him how we should describe ourselves. He replied, 'We are French princes who reigned in Italy.' In fact, of the twenty-four children only three including me, were actually born in Italy.At the age of ten, Zita was sent to a boarding school at Zanberg in Upper Bavaria, where there was a strict regime of study and religious instruction. She was summoned home in the autumn of 1907 at the death of her father. Her maternal grandmother sent Zita and her sister Franziska to a convent on the Isle of Wight to complete her education. Brought up as devout Catholics, the Parma children regularly undertook good works for the poor. In Schwarzau the family turned surplus cloth into clothes. Zita and Franziska personally distributed food, clothing, and medicines to the needy in Pianore. Three of Zita's sisters became nuns and, for a time, she considered following the same path. Zita went through a patch of poor health and was sent for the traditional cure at a European spa for two years. She was born on May 9, 1892, the 17th child of Roberto I, Duke of Parma. in Lucca, Italy. Named after a famous Tuscan saint she was only a child when the unification of Italy dethroned the House of Bourbon-Parma and she grew up moving between family homes in Lucca and Lower Austria. Being from a French royal family, reigning in Italy and forced to spend alot of time on the move they were a very international group and Princess Zita grew up speaking Italian, French, Spanish, German, Portuguese and English. Like all her siblings she was given a strict religious education and was raised to be a devout Catholic where regular charitable work was a family tradition. It was this quality which particularly impressed the young Austrian Archduke Charles who she met during stays in Lower Austria. Charles was smitten right away but for Zita the relationship grew over time before the Archduke proposed for fear she might be married to someone else if he did not act quickly.On October 21, 1911 Charles and Zita were married with the full approval of Emperor Francis Joseph I. Over the years the couple had eight children and it was a very happy marriage and a very close and happy family. They shared a love of simple pleasures, family life and devout faith. It came as a great shock in 1914 when the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand suddenly made Zita wife of the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne. Soon after World War I broke out and Charles, a general in the Austrian army, was called to the front. Archduchess Zita was very sorrowful about the war, both because of the risks to her husband, her dislike of Austria's German allies and the fact that her family was split by the hostilities; some fighting in the Austrian army and others (denied permission to fight for France) serving in the Belgian army. When Italy entered the war against the Central Powers some in Austria became suspicious of their Italian archduchess. However, the Emperor was very kind to her, brought her and the children to the palace at Schoenbrunn and often confided in her about his thoughts, concerns and worries about the war and the national situation.n the close vicinity of Schwarzau castle was the Villa Wartholz, residence of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria, Zita’s maternal aunt. She was the stepmother of Archduke Otto, who died in 1906, and the step-grandmother of Archduke Charles of Austria-Este, at that time second-in-line to the Austrian throne. The two daughters of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria were Zita’s first cousins and Charles’ half-aunts. They had met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandeis an der Elbe (Brandýs on the Elbe), from where he visited his aunt at Franzensbad. It was during one of these visits that Charles and Zita became reacquainted. Charles was under pressure to marry (Franz Ferdinand, his uncle and first-in-line, had married morganatically, and his children were excluded from the throne) and Zita had a suitably royal genealogy. Zita later recalled, "We were of course glad to meet again and became close friends. On my side feelings developed gradually over the next two years. He seemed to have made his mind up much more quickly, however, and became even more keen when, in the autumn of 1910, rumours spread about that I had got engaged to a distant Spanish relative, Don Jaime, the Duke of Madrid. On hearing this, the Archduke came down post haste from his regiment at Brandeis and sought out his grandmother, Archduchess Maria Theresa, who was also my aunt and the natural confidante in such matters. He asked if the rumor was true and when told it was not, he replied, 'Well, I had better hurry in any case or she will get engaged to someone else.'"Archduke Charles traveled to Villa Pianore and asked for Zita’s hand and, on 13 June 1911, their engagement was announced at the Austrian court. Zita in later years recalled that after her engagement she had expressed to Charles her worries about the fate of the Austrian Empire and the challenges of the monarchy. Charles and Zita were married at the Schwarzau castle on 21 October 1911. Charles's great-uncle, the 81-year-old Emperor Franz Joseph, attended the wedding. He was relieved to see an heir make a suitable marriage, and was in good spirits, even leading the toast at the wedding breakfast. Archduchess Zita soon conceived a son, and Otto was born 20 November 1912. Seven more children would follow in the next decade.In 1916, when Francis Joseph died, Zita became the last Empress of Austria and Queen of Hungary. She was very involved in national issues and was constantly at her husband's side. When they had to be apart Charles called her several times a day. She also played a major part in 1917 in the effort to make peace. Working secretly through her brother Prince Sixtus, an officer in the Belgian army, messages were sent via Switzerland to try to negotiate a seperate peace between Austria and France. Empress Zita also used her influence to stop a German plan to bomb the residence of the Belgian King and Queen. Unfortunately, the peace efforts went nowhere. King Albert I of the Belgians was in favor but the French and British were not and while Emperor Charles was in favor the Germans were not. The situation became worse when the Allies made the negotiations public which greatly endangered Austria and Charles and Zita in particular. There had never been any love lost between them and the Germans and the news that they had attempted a seperate peace brought threats of a German takeover of Austria.By the fall of the next year Austria-Hungary was coming apart and Charles and Zita and their family were forced to flee the country to Switzerland. Zita was a great source of strength and comfort to her husband in these hard times and the strain on her had to be great. In 1920 she showed again what she was made of when she accompanied Charles in his effort to regain his throne in Hungary. After both attempts failed the family eventually settled on the Portuguese island of Madeira where Charles died not long after. Empress Zita carried on with the same grace and dignity she always showed, raising her children in royal fashion and never giving up hope for a Hapsburg restoration. The family moved to Spain and later to Belgium. When Engelbert Dollfuss became chancellor of Austria the possibility of a restoration seemed good but all hopes were ended when Dollfuss was assassinated and Austria was occupied by Germany. World War II and the invasion of Belgium forced the family to flee to the United States where two of her sons joined the American army. Empress Zita contributed by raising money in the US and Canada. In 1982 she was finally allowed to return to Austria where she died, still loved and respected by all, in 1989 at the age of 96. On 11 November 1918, the same day as the armistice ending the war between the Allied Powers and Germany was signed, Charles issued a carefully worded proclamation in which he recognized the Austrian people's right to determine the form of the state and "relinquish(ed) every participation in the administration of the State." He also released his officials from their oath of loyalty to him. On the same day the Imperial Family left Schönbrunn Palace and moved to Castle Eckartsau, east of Vienna. On 13 November, following a visit of Hungarian magnates, Charles issued a similar proclamation for Hungary.Although it has widely been cited as an "abdication", that word was never mentioned in either proclamation. Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the word abdication in the hope that the people of either Austria or Hungary would vote to recall him.Instead, on 12 November, the day after he issued his proclamation, the independent Republic of German-Austria was proclaimed, followed by the proclamation of the Hungarian Democratic Republic on 16 November. An uneasy truce-like situation ensued and persisted until 23–24 March 1919, when Charles left for Switzerland, escorted by the commander of the small British guard detachment at Eckartsau, Lt. Col. Edward Lisle Strutt. As the Imperial Train left Austria on 24 March, Charles issued another proclamation in which he confirmed his claim of sovereignty, declaring that "whatever the national assembly of German Austria has resolved with respect to these matters since 11 November is null and void for me and my House."Although the newly established republican government of Austria was not aware of this "Manifesto of Feldkirch" at this time (it had been dispatched only to the Spanish King Alfonso XIII and to Pope Benedict XV through diplomatic channels), the politicians now in power were extremely irritated by the Emperor's departure without an explicit abdication. The Austrian Parliament passed the Habsburg Law on 3 April 1919, which permanently barred Charles from returning to Austria. Other Habsburgs were banished from Austrian territory unless they renounced all intentions of reclaiming the throne and accepted the status of ordinary citizens. Another law, passed on the same day, abolished all nobility in Austria.In Switzerland, Charles and his family briefly took residence at Castle Wartegg near Rorschach at Lake Constance and later moved to Château de Prangins at Lake Geneva on 20 May 1919.Encouraged by Hungarian royalists ("legitimists"), Charles sought twice in 1921 to reclaim the throne of Hungary, but failed largely because Hungary's regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy (the last commander of the Imperial and Royal Navy), refused to support him. Horthy's failure to support Charles' restoration attempts is often described as "treasonous" by royalists. Critics suggest that Horthy's actions were more firmly grounded in political reality than those of Charles and his supporters. Indeed, the neighbouring countries had threatened to invade Hungary if Charles tried to regain the throne. Later in 1921, the Hungarian parliament formally nullified the Pragmatic Sanction, an act that effectively dethroned the Habsburgs.After the second failed attempt at restoration in Hungary, Charles and his pregnant wife Zita were briefly quarantined at Tihany Abbey. On 1 November 1921 they were taken to the Hungarian Danube harbour city of Baja, were made to board the British monitor HMS Glowworm and there removed to the Black Sea where they were transferred to the light cruiser HMS Cardiff. They arrived at their final exile, the Portuguese island of Madeira, on 19 November 1921. Determined to prevent a third restoration attempt, the Council of Allied Powers had agreed on Madeira because it was isolated in the Atlantic and easily guarded.Originally the couple and their children, who joined them on 2 February 1922, lived at Funchal at the Villa Vittoria, next to Reid's Hotel and later moved to Quinta do Monte. Compared to the imperial glory in Vienna and even at Eckartsau, conditions there were certainly impoverished.Charles did not leave Madeira again. On 9 March 1922 he had caught a cold in town, which developed into bronchitis and subsequently progressed to severe pneumonia. Having suffered two heart attacks, he died of respiratory failure on 1 April, in the presence of his wife (who was pregnant with their eighth child) and nine-year-old Crown Prince Otto, remaining conscious almost until his last moments. His last words to his wife were "I love you so much." His remains except for his heart are still interred on the island, in the Church of Our Lady of Monte (Igreja de Nossa Senhora do Monte), in spite of several attempts to move them to the Habsburg Crypt in Vienna. His heart and the heart of his wife are entombed in Muri Abbey, Switzerland.Karl was a great leader, a Prince of peace, who wanted to save the world from a year of war; a statesman with ideas to save his people from the complicated problems of his Empire; a King who loved his people, a fearless man, a noble soul, distinguished, a saint from whose grave blessings come."Furthermore, Anatole France, the French novelist, stated:"Emperor Karl is the only decent man to come out of the war in a leadership position, no one listened to him. He sincerely wanted peace, and therefore was despised by the whole world. It was a wonderful chance that was lostBlessed Karl was a happy married man. On his wedding day, he famously declared to his beautiful wife, Zita, “Now we have to help each other to get to heaven!” They were even more devoted to God than to each other and they inscribed their relationship with God into their daily lives together. Blessed Karl proposed to his lovely Zita at the Shrine of Mariazell in Austria and they inscribed a prayer inside their wedding bands, “Sub tuum presidium confugimus, sancta Dei Genitrix” (We fly to take refuge under your protection, O Holy Mother of God). Their love was intense and lasted to the end of Karl’s life. For her part, the Empress Zita never remarried but continued to carry the memory of her husband and she blessed others with the title she had received from him.Charles and Zita were crowned in Budapest on 30 December 1916. Following the coronation there was a banquet, but after that the festivities ended, as the emperor and empress thought it wrong to have prolonged celebrations during a time of war. At the beginning of the reign, Charles was more often than not away from Vienna, so he had a telephone line installed from Baden (where Charles's military headquarters were located) to the Hofburg. He called Zita several times a day whenever they were separated. Zita had some influence on her husband and would discreetly attend audiences with the Prime Minister or military briefings, and she had a special interest in social policy. However, military matters were the sole domain of Charles. Energetic and strong-willed, Zita accompanied her husband to the provinces and to the front, as well as occupying herself with charitable works and hospital visits to the war-wounded.By this time, the war was closing in on the embattled Emperor. A Union of Czech Deputies had already sworn an oath to a new Czechoslovak state independent of the Habsburg Empire on 13 April 1918, the prestige of the German Army had taken a severe blow at the Battle of Amiens, and, on 25 September 1918, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria broke away from his allies in the Central Powers and sued for peace independently. Zita was with Charles when he received the telegram of Bulgaria's collapse. She remembered it "made it even more urgent to start peace talks with the Western Powers while there was still something to talk about. On 16 October, the emperor issued a "People's Manifesto" proposing the empire be restructured on federal lines with each nationality gaining its own state. Instead, each nation broke away and the empire effectively dissolved.Leaving behind their children at Gödöllő, Charles and Zita travelled to the Schönbrunn Palace. By this time ministers had been appointed by the new state of "German-Austria", and by 11 November, together with the emperor's spokesmen, they prepared a manifesto for Charles to sign. Zita, at first glance, mistook it for an abdication and made her famous statement "A sovereign can never abdicate. He can be deposed... All right. That is force. But abdicate — never, never, never! I would rather fall here at your side. Then there would be Otto. And even if all of us here were killed, there would still be other Habsburgs!" Charles gave his permission for the document to be published, and he, his family and the remnants of his Court departed for the Royal shooting lodge at Eckartsau, close to the borders with Hungary and Slovakia. The Republic of German-Austria was pronounced the next day.The family's first home in exile was Wartegg Castle in Rorschach, Switzerland, a property owned by the Bourbon-Parmas. However, the Swiss authorities, worried about the implication of the Habsburgs living near the Austrian border, compelled them to move to the western part of the country. The next month, therefore, found them moving to Villa Prangins, near Lake Geneva, where they resumed a quiet family life. This abruptly ended in March 1920 when, after a period of instability in Hungary, Miklós Horthy was elected regent. Charles was still technically King (as Charles IV) but Horthy sent an emissary to Prangins advising him not to go to Hungary until the situation had calmed. After the Trianon Treaty Horthy's ambition soon grew. Charles became concerned and requested the help of Colonel Strutt to get him into Hungary. Charles twice attempted to regain control, once in March 1921 and again in October 1921. Both attempts failed, despite Zita's staunch support (she insisted on travelling with him on the final dramatic train journey to Budapest).Charles and Zita temporarily resided at Castle Tata, the home of Count Esterházy, until a suitable permanent exile could be found. Malta was mooted as a possibility, but was declined by Lord Curzon, and French territory was ruled out due to the possibility of Zita's brothers intriguing on Charles's behalf. Eventually, the Portuguese island of Madeira was chosen. On 31 October 1921, the former Imperial couple were taken by rail from Tihany to Baja, where the Royal Navy monitor HMS Glowworm was waiting. They finally arrived at Funchal on 19 November. Their children were being looked after at Wartegg Castle in Switzerland by Charles's step-grandmother Maria Theresa, although Zita managed to see them in Zurich when her son Robert needed an operation for appendicitis. The children joined their parents in Madeira in February 1922.
28465	yago	0	96	https://commons.wikimedi…warzau_1911c.jpg	en	File:Hochzeit Erzh Karl und Zita Schwarzau 1911c.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…warzau_1911c.jpg	https://upload.wikimedia…warzau_1911c.jpg	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/bf/Hochzeit_Erzh_Karl_und_Zita_Schwarzau_1911c.jpg/800px-Hochzeit_Erzh_Karl_und_Zita_Schwarzau_1911c.jpg?20100727205636", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/62/PD-icon.svg/64px-PD-icon.svg.png", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	1911-10-21T00:00:00		en	/static/apple-touch/commons.png		https://commons.wikimedi…warzau_1911c.jpg	This work is in the public domain in its country of origin and other countries and areas where the copyright term is the author's life plus 70 years or fewer. You must also include a United States public domain tag to indicate why this work is in the public domain in the United States. Note that a few countries have copyright terms longer than 70 years: Mexico has 100 years, Jamaica has 95 years, Colombia has 80 years, and Guatemala and Samoa have 75 years. This image may not be in the public domain in these countries, which moreover do not implement the rule of the shorter term. Honduras has a general copyright term of 75 years, but it does implement the rule of the shorter term. Copyright may extend on works created by French who died for France in World War II (more information), Russians who served in the Eastern Front of World War II (known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) and posthumously rehabilitated victims of Soviet repressions (more information).
28465	yago	0	79	https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/visual-archive/20th-and-21st-centuries/charles-iv-of-hungary-1887-1922	en	Charles IV of Hungary (1887	https://trc-leiden.nl/tr…6ecb29ce08_S.jpg	https://trc-leiden.nl/tr…6ecb29ce08_S.jpg	[ "https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/templates/beez_20/images/system/arrow.png", "https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/templates/beez_20/images/system/arrow.png", "https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/templates/beez_20/images/system/arrow.png", "https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/media/k2/items/cache/c7eef8c6c60458ac3...	[]	[]	[ "charlesivofhungary" ]	null	[ "Willem" ]	2015-03-16T14:02:03	A photograph of Karl Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Marie von Habsburg (1887-1922) was taken shortly after his coronation in Budapest on 30th D...	en	/trc-needles/templates/beez_20/favicon.ico		https://trc-leiden.nl/trc-needles/visual-archive/20th-and-21st-centuries/charles-iv-of-hungary-1887-1922	In the photograph he is shown in the company of his wife, Zita of Bourbon-Parma (1892-1989) and their son, Crown Prince Otto von Habsburg (1912-2011). Charles IV is wearing the densely embroidered Hungarian coronation mantle, which dates to the eleventh century AD. This was the last time the mantle was worn for this purpose. Empress Zita is shown wearing a very elaborate coronation gown and robe that appear to have been decorated with metal thread embroidery. Charles I/Charles IV was beatified by the Catholic Church in 2004, and is since known as the Blessed Charles of Austria. Wikipedia and YouTube. Digital source of illustration (retrieved 7 June 2016). GVE
28465	yago	3	94	https://royalmusingsblogspotcom.blogspot.com/2018/07/prince-michel-of-bourbon-parma.html	en	Royal Musings: Prince Michel of Bourbon	https://blogger.googleus…k-no-nu/Scan.jpg	https://blogger.googleus…k-no-nu/Scan.jpg	[ "https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLUkKbPbruyfCuYEfzhW_9J_M9RgCFyt59wXxQ4r1gCug-SSd026ANvij5vGP0Z50LNPu4-lXgmG-2fG2XqU_YLysFb9NAvi8Ahd_wmnRp1-8WWpHb1TbOeqj-sNqH8hKsQ8Bv8hs9xw/s640/Scan.jpg", "https://resources.blogblog.com/img/icon18_email.gif", "https://resources.blogblog.com/img/icon...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Marlene Eilers Koenig" ]	null		en	https://royalmusingsblogspotcom.blogspot.com/favicon.ico		https://royalmusingsblogspotcom.blogspot.com/2018/07/prince-michel-of-bourbon-parma.html
28465	yago	2	37	https://www.emperorcharles.org/christian-family-man	en	A Christian Family Man — Blessed Karl of Austria	http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/t/65a95e1c0d2ae0023a34de3b/1705598492644/Cat+No+284--Relaxing+with+His+Family%2Cc.+1919--Photograph.jpg?format=1500w	http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/t/65a95e1c0d2ae0023a34de3b/1705598492644/Cat+No+284--Relaxing+with+His+Family%2Cc.+1919--Photograph.jpg?format=1500w	[ "https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/f79ed5df-c33f-44b7-bc6e-d771fe3bb528/Gebetsliga_Coat_of_Ams_Outlines.png?format=1500w", "https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/f79ed5df-c33f-44b7-bc6e-d771fe3bb528/Gebetsliga_Coat_of_Ams_Outlines.png?format=15...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/1462760186641-BAWQVNRTQO7HHE9QY0EW/favicon.ico?format=100w	Blessed Karl of Austria	https://www.emperorcharles.org/christian-family-man	As a young boy, Archduke Karl frequently met and played with the children of Duke Robert of Parma at their home in Schwarzau, which was near his boyhood home in Reichenau. When he began to look seriously for a wife he remembered the young Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, one of Duke Robert's 24 children. Karl's mother had originally tried to interest him in one of Zita's older sisters, but his heart was set on Zita. After a short courtship, their engagement was announced on June 13, 1911, and they were married in the Bourbon-Parma family chapel at Schwarzau on October 21, 1911. Their union produced eight children: Otto, Adelheid, Robert, Felix, Karl Ludwig, Rudolph, Charlotte, and Elizabeth (who was born after Karl's death). Both Karl and Zita were devout Catholics, and from the very beginning they brought their faith to their relationship. Karl proposed to Zita in front of the Blessed Sacrament at the Marian Shrine of Mariazell. They made their wedding retreat with the famous Jesuit preacher, Fr. Karl Maria Andlau, and on the eve of their wedding, Karl told Zita: "Now we must help each other attain heaven." His devotion to the Blessed Mother is apparent on his wedding band, where he had the following antiphon inscribed: "Sub tuum praesidium confugimus, sancta Dei Genitrix" (We take refuge under your protection, O Holy Mother of God). The wedding ceremony was conducted by Monsignor (later Cardinal) Bisleti, Papal Legate of Pius X, who read a nuptial blessing prepared by the Pope, and presented them with a gift from the Pope as well. While on their honeymoon, they returned to Mariazell to place their union under the protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Karl and Zita had a loving relationship, and were each other's soul mate. They were devoted to each other, supported each other, and had the same Christian values. Their children were brought into this loving environment, and each child was cherished as a gift from God. They were taught their prayers and catechism as soon as they could understand, and many of these religious lessons Karl taught the children himself. The family prayed together daily and First Friday devotions were observed. When Otto, the oldest child, made his first Holy Communion, Blessed Karl consecrated his family to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Likewise, the first Holy Communions of all their children were important family events that were celebrated with special joy. As a father, Karl was loving, devoted, and caring. In the midst of some of his greatest trials-war, rejection, poverty and exile-his children brought him his greatest joy and comfort. His only consolation in losing his throne was the fact that he could spend more time with his wife and family. This time of being together-whether all in one room reading, playing and praying together, or outdoors walking and hiking together, or doing other activities such as hunting, boating and fishing-was a great treasure for him. As he lay dying, he prayed for all of the children by name, and one of his frequent prayers was: "Look after my little ones. Let them die rather than commit a mortal sin- keep them in body and soul." Text by Br. Nathan Cochran, OSB
28465	yago	2	21	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2020/09/the-marriage-of-prince-henri-of-bourbon.html	en	The Marriage of Prince Henri of Bourbon-Parma and Archduchess Gabriella of Austria	https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_ueEqU1OHsZDcnnAzwVPgfKgyLOtfg3BeKxSZmWqhmKCpMR3InKLpfLWMz1s6J4ndh9DqOTaZs7nnOE6J9pIU_d4--dqInFpWimN5evr9034AGWUKkXTSHWnQwaMUNx3TfxDwR0WeoqnO_Ona1DaR7vynEp5BOeyg0ciaPVoFcplHhIVFqctk3dSbAM83D4x8mVaDwzm5rV8NDpV8FWA9S_Xt5jiuLBeld3UXUupOAhSpoitatf7Bwnwa0KHfjsLle49VLVnPcgbF581OHMaZ31o7DuSXbYeZftnm1jBHmK6O45mG5ttBZyJi8jcndhvrJFoUv2DdL1VWwgkIv2ywqUadMKPMcqZ8kb5vwNJazLFgoSmpPoJ9ysShbdjZn_u7zm-jhkV792JYeDk5-ZNKeH16tj4RABxnQcVhIza-Ip39x6zTKy3ztjDgyQ440K=w1200-h630-p-k-no-nu	https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/blogger_img_proxy/AEn0k_ueEqU1OHsZDcnnAzwVPgfKgyLOtfg3BeKxSZmWqhmKCpMR3InKLpfLWMz1s6J4ndh9DqOTaZs7nnOE6J9pIU_d4--dqInFpWimN5evr9034AGWUKkXTSHWnQwaMUNx3TfxDwR0WeoqnO_Ona1DaR7vynEp5BOeyg0ciaPVoFcplHhIVFqctk3dSbAM83D4x8mVaDwzm5rV8NDpV8FWA9S_Xt5jiuLBeld3UXUupOAhSpoitatf7Bwnwa0KHfjsLle49VLVnPcgbF581OHMaZ31o7DuSXbYeZftnm1jBHmK6O45mG5ttBZyJi8jcndhvrJFoUv2DdL1VWwgkIv2ywqUadMKPMcqZ8kb5vwNJazLFgoSmpPoJ9ysShbdjZn_u7zm-jhkV792JYeDk5-ZNKeH16tj4RABxnQcVhIza-Ip39x6zTKy3ztjDgyQ440K=w1200-h630-p-k-no-nu	[ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0OMUjV7ocn4/XQ2qb8hlzQI/AAAAAAAABGw/mMSC1KS8Yl02jzUWLENzZeAYQ8rOkfkwQCK4BGAYYCw/s752/Screen%2BShot%2B2018-04-22%2Bat%2B11.47.40%2BAM-2.png", "https://web.archive.org/web/20210922044542im_/https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhvB60xJqrkBCQfoH0mh0WjvO_6Xjo8vsJuqiehI...	[ "//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/3268473?et=ouKncMDNSDZIkVoa5KpWdg&tld=com&sig=YLVkoZa0i2xDnE4ydWpoh_zUzwjGMnhB34PEb57NEtM=&caption=true&ver=2" ]	[]	[ "euro history", "euro journal", "erhj", "perry pearson", "princess elizabeth of yugoslavia", "peregrine pearson" ]	null	[]	null	The Bourbon-Parma/Austria nuptials HRH Prince Henri of Bourbon-Parma and HI&RH Archduchess Gabriella of Austria were married to...	en	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/favicon.ico		https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2020/09/the-marriage-of-prince-henri-of-bourbon.html	The Bourbon-Parma/Austria nuptials HRH Prince Henri of Bourbon-Parma and HI&RH Archduchess Gabriella of Austria were married today at Schloß Tratzberg in Jenbach, Austria. Archduchess Gabriella wore the Grand Duchess Adelaide Tiara. Father Paul Habsburg (b.1968; né Archduke of Austria; son of Archduke Michael of Austria and Archduchess Christina [née Princess zu Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenburg]), a cousin of the bride, was one of the officiants. Among the guests were Bourbon-Parmas, Habsburgs, Hohenbergs, Holstein-Ledreborgs, Liechtensteins, and Luxembourgs. Prince Henri Luitpold Antoine Victor Marie Joseph of Bourbon-Parma was born at Roskilde, Denmark, on 14 October 1991. Henri is the youngest child and second son of Prince Erik of Bourbon-Parma (b.1953) and Countess Lydia Holstein-Ledreborg (b.1955), who married in 1980 and divorced in 1999. Henri's paternal grandparents are Prince Michel of Bourbon-Parma (1926-2018) and Princess Yolande of Broglie-Revel (1928-2014). Henri's maternal grandparents are Count Knud Holstein-Ledreborg (1919-2001) and Princess Marie Gabrielle of Luxembourg (b.1925). Archduchess Gabriella Maria Pilar Yolande Joséphine-Charlotte of Austria was born at Geneva on 26 March 1994. Gabriella is the youngest child and second daughter of Archduke Carl Christian of Austria (b.1954) and Princess Marie-Astrid of Luxembourg (b.1954), who married in 1982. Gabriella's paternal grandparents are Archduke Carl Ludwig of Austria (1918-2007) and Princess Yolande de Ligne (b.1923). Gabriella's maternal grandparents are Grand Duke Jean of Luxembourg (1921-2019) and Princess Joséphine-Charlotte of Belgium (1927-2005).
28465	yago	1	23	https://europeanroyalhistory.wordpress.com/tag/zita-of-bourbon-parma/	en	European Royal History	https://europeanroyalhis…g_5728.png?w=200	https://europeanroyalhis…g_5728.png?w=200	[ "https://europeanroyalhistory.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/cropped-fb_img_1671979413412.jpg", "https://europeanroyalhistory.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/emperorcharlesiofaustria.jpg?w=529", "https://europeanroyalhistory.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/empresszitaofaustria-hungar...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Posts about Zita of Bourbon-Parma written by liamfoley63	en	https://europeanroyalhis…mg_5728.png?w=32	European Royal History	https://europeanroyalhistory.wordpress.com/tag/zita-of-bourbon-parma/	Archduke Charles of Austria-Este, the son of Archduke Otto of Austria and Princess Maria Josepha of Saxony, fifth child of King Georg of Saxony and Infanta Maria Anna of Portugal, herself the eldest surviving daughter of Queen Maria II of Portugal and her King Consort, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Koháry. Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Koháry was the son Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Princess Maria Antonia Koháry de Csábrág who founded the Catholic cadet branch of the House of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, after their marriage. Charles became heir presumptive of Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary after his uncle Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in 1914. Franz Ferdinand’ assassination was the spark that set off World War I. Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, born as the seventeenth child of the dispossessed Roberto I, Duke of Parma, and his second wife, Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal, herself the seventh and last child of King Miguel of Portugal and Adelaide of Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg. The unusual name Zita was given to her after Zita, a popular Italian Saint who had lived in Tuscany in the 13th century. In the close vicinity of Schwarzau castle was the Villa Wartholz, residence of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria, Zita’s maternal aunt. Archduchess Maria Theresa was born as Infanta Maria Theresa of Portugal and the second daughter of Miguel I of Portugal and Princess Adelaide of Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg. She was the stepmother of Archduke Otto, who died in 1906, and the step-grandmother of Archduke Charles of Austria-Este, at that time second-in-line to the Austrian throne. Archduchess Maria Theresa’s sister was Princess Zita’s mother, Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal. Archduchess Maria Annunziata and Archduchess Elisabeth Amalie of Austria, were the two daughters of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria were Zita’s first cousins and Charles’ half-aunts. Charles and Zita had met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandýs nad Labem, from where he visited his aunt at Františkovy Lázně. It was during one of these visits that Charles and Zita became reacquainted.,Charles was under pressure to marry (Franz Ferdinand, his uncle and first-in-line, had married morganatically, and his children were excluded from the throne) and Zita had a suitably royal genealogy. Zita later recalled: We were of course glad to meet again and became close friends. On my side feelings developed gradually over the next two years. He seemed to have made his mind up much more quickly, however, and became even more keen when, in the autumn of 1910, rumours spread about that I had got engaged to a distant Spanish relative, Don Jaime, the Duke of Madrid. On hearing this, the Archduke came down post haste from his regiment at Brandýs and sought out his grandmother, Archduchess Maria Theresa, who was also my aunt and the natural confidante in such matters. He asked if the rumor was true and when told it was not, he replied, “Well, I had better hurry in any case or she will get engaged to someone else.” Archduke Charles traveled to Villa Pianore and asked for Zita’s hand and, on June 13, 1911, their engagement was announced at the Austrian court.: Zita in later years recalled that after her engagement she had expressed to Charles her worries about the fate of the Austrian Empire and the challenges of the monarchy. Charles and Zita were married at the Schwarzau castle on October 21, 1911. Charles’s great-uncle, the 81-year-old Emperor Franz Joseph, attended the wedding. He was relieved to see an heir make a suitable marriage, and was in good spirits, even leading the toast at the wedding breakfast. Archduchess Zita soon conceived a son, and Archduke Otto, future Crown Prince of Austria, was born November 20, 1912. Seven more children followed in the next decade. In 1916, Emperor Franz Joseph died and Charles became Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary (as Charles IV), King of Croatia, and King of Bohemia (as Charles III), and the last of the monarchs belonging to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine to rule over Austria-Hungary. At the end of the Great War, on the day of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Charles issued a carefully worded proclamation in which he recognized the Austrian people’s right to determine the form of the state and “relinquish[ed] every participation in the administration of the State.” He also released his officials from their oath of loyalty to him. On the same day, the Imperial Family left Schönbrunn Palace and moved to Castle Eckartsau, east of Vienna. On November 13, following a visit with Hungarian magnates, Charles issued a similar proclamation—the Eckartsau Proclamation—for Hungary. Although it has widely been cited as an “abdication”, the word itself was never used in either proclamation. Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the word abdication in the hope that the people of either Austria or Hungary would vote to recall him. Encouraged by Hungarian royalists (“legitimists”), Charles sought twice in 1921 to reclaim the throne of Hungary, but failed largely because Hungary’s regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy (the last commander of the Imperial and Royal Navy), refused to support Charles’s restoration. After the second failed attempt at restoration in Hungary, Charles and his pregnant wife Zita were arrested and quarantined at Tihany Abbey. On 1 November 1921 they were taken to the Hungarian Danube harbour city of Baja, were taken on board the monitor HMS Glowworm, and there removed to the Black Sea where they were transferred to the light cruiser HMS Cardiff. On November 19, 1921 they arrived at their final exile, the Portuguese island of Madeira. Compared to the imperial glory in Vienna and even at Eckartsau, conditions there were certainly impoverished. Charles did not leave Madeira. On March 9, 1922 he had caught a cold in town, which developed into bronchitis and subsequently progressed to severe pneumonia. Having suffered two heart attacks, he died of respiratory failure on April 1, in the presence of his wife (who was pregnant with their eighth child) and nine-year-old former Crown Prince Otto, remaining conscious almost until his last moments. His last words to his wife were “I love you so much.” He was 34 years old. . After her husband’s death, Zita and her son Otto served as symbols of unity for the exiled dynasty. A devout Catholic, she raised a large family after being widowed at the age of 29, and never remarried. Zita lived a long life. After a memorable 90th birthday, at which she was surrounded by her now vast family, Zita’s habitually robust health began to fail. She developed inoperable cataracts in both eyes. Her last big family gathering took place at Zizers, in 1987, when her children and grandchildren joined in celebrating Empress Zita’s 95th birthday. While visiting her daughter, in summer 1988, she developed pneumonia and spent most of the autumn and winter bedridden. Finally, she called Archduke Otto, in early March 1989, and told him she was dying. He and the rest of the family travelled to her bedside and took turns keeping her company until she died in the early hours of March 14, 1989. She was 96 years old, and was the last surviving child of Roberto, Duke of Parma from both his marriages. Her funeral was held in Vienna on April 1. The government allowed it to take place on Austrian soil providing that the cost was borne by the Habsburgs themselves. Zita’s body was carried to the Imperial Crypt under Capuchin Church in the same funeral coach she had walked behind during the funeral of Emperor Franz Joseph in 1916. Her funeral was attended by over 200 members of the Habsburg and Bourbon-Parma families, and the service had 6,000 attendees including leading politicians, state officials and international representatives, including a representative of Pope John Paul II. Following an ancient custom, the Empress had asked that her heart, which was placed in an urn, stay behind at Muri Abbey, in Switzerland, where the Emperor’s heart had rested for decades. In doing so, Zita assured herself that, in death, she and her husband would remain by each other’s side. On the day of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Charles issued a carefully worded proclamation in which he recognized the Austrian people’s right to determine the form of the state and “relinquish[ed] every participation in the administration of the State.” He also released his officials from their oath of loyalty to him. On the same day, the Imperial Family left Schönbrunn Palace and moved to Castle Eckartsau, east of Vienna. On November 13, following a visit with Hungarian magnates, Charles issued a similar proclamation—the Eckartsau Proclamation—for Hungary. Charles I-IV Charles I-IV Although it has widely been cited as an “abdication”, the word itself was never used in either proclamation. Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the word abdication in the hope that the people of either Austria or Hungary would vote to recall him. Privately, Charles left no doubt that he believed himself to be the rightful emperor. He wrote to Friedrich Gustav Piffl, the Archbishop of Vienna: “I did not abdicate, and never will […] I see my manifesto of November 11, as the equivalent to a cheque which a street thug has forced me to issue at gunpoint […] I do not feel bound by it in any way whatsoever.” Instead, on November 12, the day after he issued his proclamation, the independent Republic of German-Austria was proclaimed, followed by the proclamation of the First Hungarian Republic on November 16. An uneasy truce-like situation ensued and persisted until March, 23 to 24, 1919, when Charles left for Switzerland, escorted by the commander of the small British guard detachment at Eckartsau, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lisle Strutt. As the imperial train left Austria on March 24, 1919, Charles issued another proclamation in which he confirmed his claim of sovereignty, declaring that “whatever the national assembly of German Austria has resolved with respect to these matters since November 11, 1918 is null and void for me and my House.” The newly established republican government of Austria was not aware of this “Manifesto of Feldkirch” at this time—it had been dispatched only to King Alfonso XIII of Spain and to Pope Benedict XV through diplomatic channels—and politicians in power were irritated by the Emperor’s departure without explicit abdication. The Austrian Parliament responded on April 3, with the Habsburg Law, which dethroned and banished the Habsburgs. Charles was barred from ever returning to Austria. Other male Habsburgs could only return if they renounced all intentions of reclaiming the throne and accepted the status of ordinary citizens. Another law passed on the same day abolished all nobility in Austria. In Switzerland, Charles and his family briefly took residence at Castle Wartegg near Rorschach at Lake Constance, and later moved to Château de Prangins at Lake Geneva on May 20. Attempts to reclaim throne of Hungary Charles sought twice in 1921 to reclaim the throne of Hungary, but failed largely because Hungary’s regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy (the last commander of the Imperial and Royal Navy), refused to support Charles’ restoration. Horthy’s action was declared “treasonous” by royalists. Critics suggest that Horthy’s actions were more firmly grounded in political reality than those of Charles and his supporters. Indeed, neighbouring countries had threatened to invade Hungary if Charles tried to regain the throne. Later in 1921, the Hungarian parliament formally nullified the Pragmatic Sanction, an act that effectively dethroned the Habsburgs. After the second failed attempt at restoration in Hungary, Charles and his pregnant wife Zita were arrested and quarantined at Tihany Abbey. On November 1, 1921 they were taken to the Hungarian Danube harbour city of Baja, were taken onboard the monitor HMS Glowworm, and there removed to the Black Sea where they were transferred to the light cruiser HMS Cardiff. On November 19, 1921 they arrived at their final exile, the Portuguese island of Madeira. Determined to prevent a third restoration attempt, the Council of Allied Powers had agreed on Madeira because it was isolated in the Atlantic Ocean and easily guarded. The couple and their children, who joined them on February 2, 1922, lived first at Funchal at the Villa Vittoria, next to Reid’s Hotel, and later moved to Quinta do Monte. Compared to the imperial glory in Vienna and even at Eckartsau, conditions there were certainly impoverished. Charles did not leave Madeira. On March 9, 1922 he had caught a cold in town, which developed into bronchitis and subsequently progressed to severe pneumonia. Having suffered two heart attacks, he died of respiratory failure on April 1, in the presence of his wife (who was pregnant with their eighth child) and nine-year-old former Crown Prince Otto, remaining conscious almost until his last moments. His last words to his wife were “I love you so much.” His remains except for his heart are still on the island, resting in state in a chapel devoted to the Emperor in the Church of Our Lady of The Hill (Igreja de Nossa Senhora do Monte), in spite of several attempts to move them to the Habsburg Crypt in Vienna. His heart and the heart of his wife are entombed in Muri Abbey, Switzerland. Charles I (Charles Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Maria; August 17, 1887 – April 1, 1922) was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary (as Charles IV), the last King of Bohemia (as Charles III), and the last monarch belonging to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Charles I-IV, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary Archduke Charles was born on August 17, 1887, in the Castle of Persenbeug, in Lower Austria. His parents were Archduke Otto-Franz of Austria and Princess Maria-Josepha of Saxony, the daughter of the future King Georg of Saxony (1832–1904) and Infanta Maria Anna of Portugal (1843–1884). Archduke Otto-Franz of Austria (Father) Princess Maria-Josepha of Saxony (Mother) At the time of his birth, his great-uncle Franz-Joseph reigned as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. Upon the death of Crown Prince Rudolph in 1889, the Emperor’s brother, Archduke Charles-Ludwig, was next in line to the Austro-Hungarian throne. However, his death in 1896 from typhoid made his eldest son, Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, the new heir presumptive. Franz-Joseph, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary Archduke Charles was reared a devout Catholic. He spent his early years wherever his father’s regiment happened to be stationed; later on, he lived in Vienna and Reichenau an der Rax. He was privately educated, but, contrary to the custom ruling in the imperial family, he attended a public gymnasium for the sake of demonstrations in scientific subjects. On the conclusion of his studies at the gymnasium, he entered the army, spending the years from 1906-08 as an officer chiefly in Prague, where he studied Law and Political Science concurrently with his military duties. In 1911, Charles married Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, the seventeenth child of the dispossessed Robert I, Duke of Parma, and his second wife, Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal. Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma They had met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandýs nad Labem in Bohemia, from where he visited his aunt at Franzensbad. It was during one of these visits that Charles and Zita became reacquainted. Due to Franz-Ferdinand’s morganatic marriage in 1900, his children were excluded from the succession. As a result, the Emperor pressured Charles to marry. Zita not only shared Charles’ devout Catholicism, but also an impeccable royal lineage. Archduke Charles traveled to Villa Pianore, the Italian winter residence of Zita’s parents, and asked for her hand; on June 13, 1911, their engagement was announced at the Austrian court. Charles and Zita were married at the Bourbon-Parma castle of Schwarzau in Austria on October 21, 1911. The wedding of Zita and Charles, 21 October 1911. (the man in the back with the mustache is Archduke Franz-Ferdinand) Charles’s great-uncle, the 81-year-old Emperor Franz-Joseph, attended the wedding. He was relieved to see an heir make a suitable marriage, and was in good spirits, even leading the toast at the wedding breakfast. Archduchess Zita soon conceived a son, and Otto was born November 20, 1912. Seven more children followed in the next decade. Heir presumptive Charles became heir presumptive after the assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, the event which precipitated World War I. Only at this time did the old Emperor take steps to initiate the heir-presumptive to his crown in affairs of state. But the outbreak of World War I interfered with this political education. Charles spent his time during the first phase of the war at headquarters at Teschen, but exercised no military influence. Charles then became a Feldmarschall (Field Marshal) in the Austro-Hungarian Army. In the spring of 1916, in connection with the offensive against Italy, he was entrusted with the command of the XX. Corps, whose affections the heir-presumptive to the throne won by his affability and friendliness. The offensive, after a successful start, soon came to a standstill. Shortly afterwards, Charles went to the eastern front as commander of an army operating against the Russians and Romanians. Karl I (Karl Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Maria; August 17, 1887 – April 1, 1922) was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary (as Karl IV), last King of Bohemia (as Karl III), and the last monarch belonging to the House of Habsburg-Lorraine before the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Karl, Emperor of Austria and King of Bohemia Karl was born August 17, 1887 in the Castle of Persenbeug in Lower Austria. His parents were Archduke Otto Franz of Austria and Princess Maria Josepha of Saxony. At the time, his granduncle Franz Joseph reigned as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. Upon the death of Crown Prince Rudolph in 1889, the Emperor’s brother, Archduke Karl Ludwig, was next in line to the Austro-Hungarian throne. However, his death in 1896 from typhoid made his eldest son, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the new heir presumptive. Marriage In 1911, Archduke Karl of Austria-Este married Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, the seventeenth child of the dispossessed Robert I, Duke of Parma, and his second wife, Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal. Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria, Zita’s maternal aunt, was the stepmother of Archduke Otto, who died in 1906, and the step-grandmother of Archduke Charles of Austria-Este, at that time second-in-line to the Austrian throne. The two daughters of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria were Zita’s first cousins and Karl half-aunts. Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma Karl and Zita met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandeis an der Elbe (Brandýs on the Elbe), from where he visited his aunt. It was during one of these visits that Karl and Zita became reacquainted. Karl was under pressure to marry (Franz Ferdinand, his uncle and first-in-line, had married morganatically, and his children were excluded from the throne) and Zita had a suitably royal genealogy. At this time in their marriage Archduke Karl was in his twenties and did not expect to become emperor for some time, especially while Archduke Franz Ferdinand remained in good health. This changed on June 28, 1914 when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb nationalists, Gavrilo Princep. Karl and Zita received the news by telegram that day. She said of her husband, “Though it was a beautiful day, I saw his face go white in the sun.” Emperor Franz Joseph died in the Schönbrunn Palace on the evening of November 21, 1916, at the age of 86 in the midst of World War I. His death was a result of developing pneumonia of the right lung several days after catching a cold while walking in Schönbrunn Park with the King Ludwig III of Bavaria. He was succeeded by his grandnephew as Emperor Karl I End of the Habsburg Monarchy On the day of the Armistice of 11 November 1918, Karl issued a carefully worded proclamation in which he recognized the Austrian people’s right to determine the form of the state and “relinquish[ed] every participation in the administration of the State.” He also released his officials from their oath of loyalty to him. On the same day, the Imperial Family left Schönbrunn Palace and moved to Castle Eckartsau, east of Vienna. On 13 November, following a visit with Hungarian magnates, Karl issued a similar proclamation—the Eckartsau Proclamation—for Hungary. Although it has widely been cited as an “abdication”, the word itself was never used in either proclamation. Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the word abdication in the hope that the people of either Austria or Hungary would vote to recall him. Privately, Karl left no doubt that he believed himself to be the rightful emperor. He wrote to Friedrich Gustav Piffl, the Archbishop of Vienna: “I did not abdicate, and never will […] I see my manifesto of November 11 as the equivalent to a cheque which a street thug has forced me to issue at gunpoint […] I do not feel bound by it in any way whatsoever.” Instead, on 12 November, the day after he issued his proclamation, the independent Republic of German-Austria was proclaimed, followed by the proclamation of the First Hungarian Republic on 16 November. An uneasy truce-like situation ensued and persisted until 23 to 24 March 1919, when Karl left for Switzerland, escorted by the commander of the small British guard detachment at Eckartsau, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lisle Strutt. As the imperial train left Austria on 24 March, Karl issued another proclamation in which he confirmed his claim of sovereignty, declaring that “whatever the national assembly of German Austria has resolved with respect to these matters since November 11 is null and void for me and my House.” The newly established republican government of Austria was not aware of this “Manifesto of Feldkirch” at this time—it had been dispatched only to King Alfonso XIII of Spain and to Pope Benedict XV through diplomatic channels—and politicians in power were irritated by the Emperor’s departure without explicit abdication. The Austrian Parliament responded on April 3, 1919 with the Habsburg Law, which dethroned and banished the Habsburgs. Karl was barred from ever returning to Austria. Other male Habsburgs could only return if they renounced all intentions of reclaiming the throne and accepted the status of ordinary citizens. Another law passed on the same day abolished all nobility in Austria. In Switzerland, Karl and his family briefly took residence at Castle Wartegg near Rorschach at Lake Constance, and later moved to Château de Prangins at Lake Geneva on May 20.
28465	yago	0	80	https://www.lookandlearn.com/history-images/XE420133/Archduchess-Zita-of-Bourbon-and-Parma-with-her-husband-Archduke-Charles-of-Austria-later-the-last-Emperor-of-Austria	en	Archduchess Zita of Bourbon and Parma with her husband, Archduke Charles of Austria, later the last Emperor of Austria …	https://www.lookandlearn…20/XE420133_.jpg	https://www.lookandlearn…20/XE420133_.jpg	[ "https://www.lookandlearn.com/images/logos/masthead.png", "https://www.lookandlearn.com/images/masthead/search-images.png", "https://www.lookandlearn.com/history-images/preview/XE/XE420/XE420133_.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "postcard;20th Century;Austria;Austrian;Archduke;prince;princess;king;queen;royal;royalty;monarch;monarchy;family;portrait;Habsburg;Queen Of Hungary;Empress Of Austria;Zita Of Bourbon And Parma;Emperor Of Austria;King Of Hungary;Charles I;man;wife;husband;woman;Austria-Hungary;Austro-Hungarian Empire;emperor;empres...	null	[]	null	Download stock image of “Archduchess Zita of Bourbon and Parma with her husband, Archduke Charles of Austria, later the last Emperor of Austria as Charles I. Postcard.” from the Look and Learn History Picture Archive			Look and Learn History Picture Library	https://www.lookandlearn.com/history-images/XE420133/	License this premium image Available worldwide for immediate download up to 5,099 x 3,138 pixels. This image may be licensed for any specified use. Instructions Log in or Register (in 30 seconds) image(s) Click on Go to cart Choose intended use or request a quote Confirm terms & conditions Pay by card, PayPal or bank transfer Can we help? Look and Learn is one of the world’s leading sources of historical and cultural images for personal and commercial use. Feel free to contact us with any questions or requests. Links
28465	yago	2	56	https://www.wikitree.com/wiki/De_Borb%25C3%25B3n-Parma-2	en	WikiTree			[ "https://www.wikitree.com/images/wikitree-small.png.pagespeed.ce.5G9g5z_Ayb.png" ]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	/favicon.ico		null	WIKITREE HOME \| ABOUT \| G2G FORUM \| HELP \| SEARCH IMPORTANT PRIVACY NOTICE & DISCLAIMER: YOU HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO USE CAUTION WHEN DISTRIBUTING PRIVATE INFORMATION. WIKITREE PROTECTS MOST SENSITIVE INFORMATION BUT ONLY TO THE EXTENT STATED IN THE TERMS OF SERVICE AND PRIVACY POLICY. © 2008 - 2023 INTERESTING.COM, INC. CONTENT MAY BE COPYRIGHTED BY WIKITREE COMMUNITY MEMBERS.
28465	yago	1	0	https://www.habsburger.net/en/chapter/zita-last-empress	en	Zita, the last empress	https://www.habsburger.n…pg?itok=fJDkCAc4	https://www.habsburger.n…pg?itok=fJDkCAc4	[ "https://www.habsburger.net/files/styles/large/public/originale/kaiserin_zita_original.jpg?itok=v8KX2QTq&timestamp=1332180462", "https://www.habsburger.net/files/styles/large/public/originale/skb_2144.jpg?itok=KOSif0kI&timestamp=1349377615", "https://www.habsburger.net/files/styles/large/public/originale/pf527c...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null	Zita grew up in a large family in which several languages were spoken, and her upbringing and education were shaped by strict Catholic principles. Her childhood was spent partly at the Villa Borbone delle Pianore in Camaiore on the coast of Liguria (Italy) and partly at Schloss Schwarzau in Lower Austria. There the family cultivated close contacts with exiled monarchs and	en		Die Welt der Habsburger	https://www.habsburger.net/en/chapter/zita-last-empress	Zita grew up in a large family in which several languages were spoken, and her upbringing and education were shaped by strict Catholic principles. Her childhood was spent partly at the Villa Borbone delle Pianore in Camaiore on the coast of Liguria (Italy) and partly at Schloss Schwarzau in Lower Austria. There the family cultivated close contacts with exiled monarchs and their supporters who had been granted exile in Lower Austria as guests of Emperor Franz Joseph. Frohsdorf for example was the seat in exile of the Spanish Carlists, while the Portuguese Miguelists had settled in Seebenstein. This background was to have an enduring influence on Zita’s views, confirming her legitimist principles. It was at Schwarzau that Zita was married to Archduke Karl of Austria on 21 October 1911. The occasion was recorded on film, one of the very few cinematic documents of the imperial family’s private life. The marriage of Zita and the designated heir to the Austrian throne and later emperor Karl I seems to have been very happy. Biographers unanimously agree that Zita had great influence over Karl. With her energetic personality and her unbending will she pushed her vacillating husband to arrive at decisions. As empress she had a politically significant position and accompanied her husband, who was her intellectual inferior, wherever he went. Her influence on Karl’s politics can be seen clearly in the Sixtus Affair, in which she was heavily involved. When this secret peace initiative failed, Zita was vilified as a traitor by German Nationalists because of her Bourbon descent. Even after Karl’s fall from power Zita continued to be his most important source of support in exile. She accompanied her husband on his second failed attempt to restore himself to the throne in Hungary and followed him into exile. After his early death in 1922 Zita assumed the role of defender of the dynastic rights of her eight children, the last of whom was born after Karl’s death. She systematically brought together all the legitimist monarchist movements in Central Europe and built up her eldest son Otto as pretender to the Habsburg throne, actively supporting him in his political ambitions after he gained his majority. Thanks to her authority, the former empress became the central figure in the Habsburg-Lorraine family in the difficult times after the loss of the crown. During the Second World War, which she spent in exile in Canada, she became an influential advocate for the restoration of Austria’s independence, but after 1945 she mainly focused her energies on the beatification process for her late husband. From the early 1960s Zita lived a secluded life in a Catholic old-age home in Zizers in Switzerland. She gave numerous interviews in which she proved to be an interesting witness to her times. However, her memoirs give a very subjective and in some respects historically distorted picture, glorifying her as the militant defender of Habsburg claims. Reconciliation with the Republic of Austria was finally achieved in 1982, when the former empress, who had been denied entry to Austria, was allowed to set foot on Austrian soil for the first time again on the initiative of Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. Zita died on 14 March 1989 in Zizers at the age of 96. She was interred according to Habsburg dynastic tradition in the crypt of the Church of the Capuchin Friars in Vienna. However, her heart was buried in the new Habsburg family crypt at Muri Abbey in the northern Swiss canton of Aargau, in keeping with her last wishes as recorded in her will.
28465	yago	2	40	https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/napoleons-marriage-to-marie-louise/	en	Napoleon’s Marriage to Marie-Louise	https://s3-us-west-2.ama…4895_medium.jpeg		[ "https://textbooks.opensuny.org/wp-content/uploads/OST-SOS-SUNY-logos_SOS-white.png", "https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/courses-images/wp-content/uploads/sites/2529/2017/10/04231300/media_34895_medium.jpeg", "https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/wp-content/themes/bombadil/assets/images/Fo...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "John McLean" ]	null		en	https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/wp-content/themes/bombadil/favicon.ico		https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-hccc-worldhistory2/chapter/napoleons-marriage-to-marie-louise/	23.2.6: Napoleon’s Marriage to Marie-Louise Napoleon and Josephine: Divorce When after a few years of marriage it became clear that Josephine could not have a child, Napoleon began to think seriously about the possibility of divorce even though he still loved his wife. The final die was cast when Josephine’s grandson Napoleon Charles Bonaparte, declared Napoleon’s heir, died of croup in 1807. Napoleon began to create lists of eligible princesses. He let Josephine know that in the interest of France, he must find a wife who could produce an heir. Despite her anger, Josephine agreed to the divorce so the Emperor could remarry in the hope of having an heir. The divorce ceremony took place in 1810 and was a grand but solemn social occasion. Both Josephine and Napoleon read a statement of devotion to the other. Despite the divorce, Napoleon showed his dedication to her for the rest of his life. When he heard the news of her death while on exile in Elba, he locked himself in his room and would not come out for two full days. Her name would also be his final word on his deathbed in 1821. However, in 1810, he married 19-year old Marie-Louise, Archduchess of Austria, and a great niece of Marie Antoinette by proxy. Thus, he married into a German royal and imperial family. Marie-Louise Archduchess Marie-Louise of Austria was born in 1791 to Archduke Francis of Austria and his second wife, Maria Theresa of Naples and Sicily. Her father became Holy Roman Emperor a year later as Francis II. Marie-Louise was a great granddaughter of Empress Maria Theresa through her father and thus a great niece of Marie Antoinette. She was also a maternal granddaughter of Queen Maria Carolina of Naples, Marie Antoinette’s favorite sister. Marie-Louise’s formative years overlapped with a period of conflict between France and her family; she was thus brought up to detest France and French ideas. She was influenced by her grandmother Maria Carolina, who despised the French Revolution that ultimately caused the death of her sister, Marie Antoinette. Maria Carolina’s Kingdom of Naples also came into direct conflict with French forces led by Napoleon. The War of the Third Coalition brought Austria to the brink of ruin, increasing Marie-Louise’s resentment towards Napoleon. The Imperial family was forced to flee Vienna in 1805; Marie-Louise took refuge in Hungary and later Galicia before returning to Vienna in 1806. Napoleon also contributed directly to the final dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and Maria-Louise’s father relinquished the title of Holy Roman Emperor although he remained Emperor of Austria. Another war broke out between France and Austria in 1809, resulting in another defeat for the Austrians. The Imperial family had to flee Vienna again. Napoleon and Marie-Louise: Marriage In addition to the desire to have an heir, Napoleon sought the validation and legitimization of his Empire by marrying a member of one of the leading royal families of Europe. His wish to marry Tsar Paul I of Russia’s daughter Grand Duchess Anna caused alarm in Austria, whose officials grew concerned about being sandwiched between two great powers allied with each other. At the persuasion of Count Metternich, a marriage between Napoleon and Marie-Louise was suggested. Frustrated by the Russians delaying the marriage negotiations, Napoleon rescinded his proposal and began negotiations to marry Marie-Louise. The civil wedding and the religious wedding ceremony the next day were held in 1810. The excitement surrounding the wedding ushered in a period of peace and friendship between France and Austria, at war for most of the previous two decades. Marie-Louise was an obedient wife and settled in quickly in the French court. Napoleon initially remarked that he had “married a womb,” but their relationship soon matured. While he loved Josephine and claimed she remained his greatest friend even after their divorce, he was critical of her affairs and extravagant lifestyle leading to massive debts, whereas with Marie-Louise, there was reportedly “never a lie, never a debt.” However, the marriage was not without tension. Napoleon sometimes remarked to aides that Marie-Louise was too shy and timid compared to the outgoing and passionate Josephine, whom he remained in close contact with, upsetting Marie-Louise. During public occasions, Marie-Louise spoke little due to reserve and timidity, which some observers mistook for haughtiness. She was regarded as a virtuous woman and never interfered in politics. Marie-Louise gave birth to a son in 1811. The boy, Napoléon François Joseph Charles Bonaparte, was given the title King of Rome in accordance with the practice where the heir apparent to the Holy Roman Empire was called the King of the Romans. Collapse of the Empire The weakened French position triggered the Sixth Coalition (1813-14). Prussia and the United Kingdom joined Russia in declaring war on France, but Austria stayed out due to relations between the Imperial families. In 1813, Marie Louise was appointed Regent as Napoleon set off for battle in Germany. The regency was only de jure, as all decisions were still taken by Napoleon and implemented by his most senior officials. Marie-Louise tried unsuccessfully to get her father to ally with France, but Austria too joined the opposition to France. She maintained a correspondence with Napoleon, informing him of increasing demands for peace in Paris and the provinces. In January 1814, Marie-Louise was appointed Regent for the second time and two days later Napoleon embraced Marie-Louise and his son for the last time. He left to lead a hastily formed army to stave off the Allied invasion from the north. As the Allies neared Paris, Marie-Louise was reluctant to leave. She felt that as the daughter of the sovereign of Austria, one of the allied members, she would be treated with respect by allied forces. In addition, her son would be a possible successor to the throne should Napoleon be deposed. She was also afraid that her departure would strengthen the royalist supporters of the Bourbons. Marie-Louise was finally persuaded to leave but she did not expect her father to dethrone Napoleon and deprive her son of the crown of France. In April 1814, the Senate, at the instigation of Talleyrand, announced the deposition of the Emperor. Marie-Louise was astonished to discover the turn of events. Napoleon abdicated the throne in April 1814. The Treaty of Fontainebleau exiled him to Elba, allowed Marie-Louise to retain her imperial rank and style, and made her ruler of the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, with her son as heir. Marie-Louise was strongly dissuaded by her advisers from rejoining her husband, who had heard accounts of Napoleon’s distraught grief over the death of Josephine. When Napoleon escaped in 1815 and reinstated his rule, the Allies once again declared war. Marie-Louise was asked by her stepmother to join in the processions to pray for the success of the Austrian armies but rejected the insulting invitation. Napoleon was defeated for the last time at the Battle of Waterloo, was exiled to Saint Helena in 1815, and made no further attempt to contact his wife personally. The Congress of Vienna recognized Marie-Louise as ruler of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, but prevented her from bringing her son to Italy. It also made her Duchess of Parma for her life only, as the Allies did not want a descendant of Napoleon to have a hereditary claim over Parma. Attributions
28465	yago	0	9	https://www.emperorcharles.org/christian-family-man	en	A Christian Family Man — Blessed Karl of Austria	http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/t/65a95e1c0d2ae0023a34de3b/1705598492644/Cat+No+284--Relaxing+with+His+Family%2Cc.+1919--Photograph.jpg?format=1500w	http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/t/65a95e1c0d2ae0023a34de3b/1705598492644/Cat+No+284--Relaxing+with+His+Family%2Cc.+1919--Photograph.jpg?format=1500w	[ "https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/f79ed5df-c33f-44b7-bc6e-d771fe3bb528/Gebetsliga_Coat_of_Ams_Outlines.png?format=1500w", "https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/f79ed5df-c33f-44b7-bc6e-d771fe3bb528/Gebetsliga_Coat_of_Ams_Outlines.png?format=15...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5716340cc6fc084899f6c126/1462760186641-BAWQVNRTQO7HHE9QY0EW/favicon.ico?format=100w	Blessed Karl of Austria	https://www.emperorcharles.org/christian-family-man	As a young boy, Archduke Karl frequently met and played with the children of Duke Robert of Parma at their home in Schwarzau, which was near his boyhood home in Reichenau. When he began to look seriously for a wife he remembered the young Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, one of Duke Robert's 24 children. Karl's mother had originally tried to interest him in one of Zita's older sisters, but his heart was set on Zita. After a short courtship, their engagement was announced on June 13, 1911, and they were married in the Bourbon-Parma family chapel at Schwarzau on October 21, 1911. Their union produced eight children: Otto, Adelheid, Robert, Felix, Karl Ludwig, Rudolph, Charlotte, and Elizabeth (who was born after Karl's death). Both Karl and Zita were devout Catholics, and from the very beginning they brought their faith to their relationship. Karl proposed to Zita in front of the Blessed Sacrament at the Marian Shrine of Mariazell. They made their wedding retreat with the famous Jesuit preacher, Fr. Karl Maria Andlau, and on the eve of their wedding, Karl told Zita: "Now we must help each other attain heaven." His devotion to the Blessed Mother is apparent on his wedding band, where he had the following antiphon inscribed: "Sub tuum praesidium confugimus, sancta Dei Genitrix" (We take refuge under your protection, O Holy Mother of God). The wedding ceremony was conducted by Monsignor (later Cardinal) Bisleti, Papal Legate of Pius X, who read a nuptial blessing prepared by the Pope, and presented them with a gift from the Pope as well. While on their honeymoon, they returned to Mariazell to place their union under the protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Karl and Zita had a loving relationship, and were each other's soul mate. They were devoted to each other, supported each other, and had the same Christian values. Their children were brought into this loving environment, and each child was cherished as a gift from God. They were taught their prayers and catechism as soon as they could understand, and many of these religious lessons Karl taught the children himself. The family prayed together daily and First Friday devotions were observed. When Otto, the oldest child, made his first Holy Communion, Blessed Karl consecrated his family to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Likewise, the first Holy Communions of all their children were important family events that were celebrated with special joy. As a father, Karl was loving, devoted, and caring. In the midst of some of his greatest trials-war, rejection, poverty and exile-his children brought him his greatest joy and comfort. His only consolation in losing his throne was the fact that he could spend more time with his wife and family. This time of being together-whether all in one room reading, playing and praying together, or outdoors walking and hiking together, or doing other activities such as hunting, boating and fishing-was a great treasure for him. As he lay dying, he prayed for all of the children by name, and one of his frequent prayers was: "Look after my little ones. Let them die rather than commit a mortal sin- keep them in body and soul." Text by Br. Nathan Cochran, OSB
28465	yago	0	75	https://periodicolaesperanza.com/archivos/14787	en	First Centennial of the death of Blessed Charles of Austria	https://periodicolaesper…2/10/wedding.jpg	https://periodicolaesper…2/10/wedding.jpg	[ "https://periodicolaesperanza.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/cropped-cropped-LaEsperanza-v3.png", "https://periodicolaesperanza.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/wedding.jpg", "https://periodicolaesperanza.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/c-y-zita.jpg", "https://periodicolaesperanza.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "CIRCULO CARLISTA CAMINO REAL DE TEJAS" ]	2022-10-14T14:28:13+00:00	April 1, 2022, marks the first centennial of the death of Blessed Charles, the last Emperor of Austria-Hungary, an event whose commemoration is obligatory in these pages for various reasons	es	https://periodicolaesper…logo-1-32x32.png	La Esperanza	https://periodicolaesperanza.com/archivos/14787	Originally published by: Círculo Cultural Juan Vázquez de Mella – Asturias. April 1, 2022. April 1, 2022, marks the first centennial of the death of Blessed Charles, the last Emperor of Austria-Hungary, an event whose commemoration is obligatory in these pages for various reasons. In the first place, because of the context in which Blessed Charles of Austria had to exercise his government, with many similarities to ours; secondly, for the exalted degree of virtue with which he fulfilled his obligations as a Christian ruler, an example that he should guide those who today have such an important task; and thirdly, because of the close relationship with which Divine Providence has wanted to intertwine the destinies of his family and that of Spanish legitimacy. Born on August 18, 1887 in Austria, the then Archduke Charles always led a life away from state affairs, without much political relationship with Emperor Franz Josef and his heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. However, the Sarajevo bombing of June 28, 1914, which killed Franz Ferdinand and his wife, would not only trigger the First World War, but would make Archduke Charles the Emperor’s successor. Emperor Franz Josef, in the words of Vázquez de Mella «man of sorrows, wiseman of the Kings», despite his advanced age, was still able to withstand the tragedy and deal with the start of the war until November 21, 1916, the date on which he died at the age of eighty-six. A month later, Archduke Charles and his wife, Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma, were solemnly crowned Emperor and Empress of Austria-Hungary. The Empress was the daughter of Robert I of Parma, brother-in-law of Don Carlos VII and under whose orders he had fought in the Third Carlist War. Doña Zita was, therefore, first cousin of Don Jaime III. As time passed, Don Jaime and his uncle Don Alfonso Carlos died, the dynastic legitimacy would fall to his family, in the person of Don Javier of Bourbon-Parma (Javier I), brother of the Empress and father of our August Chief, HRH Sixtus Henry of Bourbon. Empress Zita came, then, from a family closely linked to the Spanish royal legitimacy. However, Emperor Franz Josef, initially a supporter of Carlist legitimacy, adopted a position of growing hostility after the wedding of the usurpers of the Spanish throne, Alfonso and María Cristina, —not so the Emperor’s younger brother, Archduke Charles Louis, always loyal to the Cause— which materialized, among other actions, in the captivity of Don Jaime III in the castle of Frohsdorf at the outbreak of the war. This measure was intended to prevent Don Jaime from using his personal and political influence against the Empire and against Germany. It must be remembered that Don Jaime had already served Czar Nicholas II of Russia with arms, «whose affection for the Spanish Carlist Cause —says Melchor Ferrer in his History of Spanish traditionalism— did not detract from that which the Imperial House of Russia always had». However, when Franz Josef died and Archduke Charles and Princess Zita were finally crowned Emperor and Empress of Austria-Hungary, they had Don Jaime released with only a few restrictions. Melchor Ferrer narrates it in the following way: «In Frohsdorf he continues, but now in a regime of greater freedom and knowing that in the Court two good friends are at heart with him: the Emperor and Empress Zita». Already Emperor, Blessed Charles of Austria had to face the calamities of war, and he did so with a true Christian spirit of service and sacrifice. In domestic politics, he carried out extensive legislative reforms inspired by the social magisterium of the Church. In foreign policy, he did not cease to support the peace that Pope Benedict XV sought with so much effort without success. Empress Zita’s brothers, Prince Sixtus Ferdinand and Prince Javier (future Javier I), participated very actively in the arduous work of mediation. Despite the efforts, their attempts were unsuccessful and the end of the war took place under very different conditions. An editorial in El Siglo Futuro of November 1918 described it thus: «The peace of God, which was the peace of the Pope, was not wanted, and the world will have to suffer with general damage the peace of England and Wilson». The United States had supported the independence of the peoples that made up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on November 11 Emperor Charles signed a proclamation renouncing «all participation in the administration of the State» in Austria, and on November 13 another similar one for Hungary. Both proclamations were, as he himself admitted, «the equivalent of a check that a street thug has forced me to write at gunpoint». However, aware of his legitimacy, and encouraged by the Pope himself, who feared the spread of communism in Central Europe, he tried to reestablish his authority in Hungary on two occasions at the head of the Hungarian legitimists, but both attempts failed, as the Emperor wanted avoid at all times the outbreak of a civil war. After the second attempt, the imperial family was sent into exile on the Island of Madeira. Emperor Charles never abdicated his rights, perhaps aware of the same thoughts that Czar Nicholas II was thinking when he said to Don Jaime: «do not forget that your life does not belong to you. We come into the world to fulfill a sacred mission, and under penalty of being cowards, we cannot renounce it». The Emperor did not renounce his mission, he incorruptibly endured his suffering and died in the poverty of exile, in the presence of his wife, on April 1, 1922, as a result of severe pneumonia caused by the extremely modest conditions in which they remained confined. Blessed Charles of Austria was a faithful devotee, an exemplary husband and a great ruler who knew how to fulfill his duties as a Christian in all aspects of his life. Shortly before he died, he said: «My whole commitment is always, in all things, to know as clearly as possible and to follow the will of God, and this in the most perfect way». His beatification ceremony was held on October 3, 2004, in the presence of HRH Sixtus Henry of Bourbon, who also presided over the traditional Holy Mass that the Roman section of Una Voce organized the following day in thanksgiving. According to the corresponding dispatch from the FARO Agency According to the corresponding dispatch from the FARO Agency, the sermon was delivered by Monsignor Barreiro Carámbula, who «after highlighting various aspects of the holiness of Blessed Charles of Austria, emphasized how in the Emperor he had both the legitimacy of blood and the legitimacy of exercise. He also pointed out that this beatification is a strong sign of hope that the Lord will raise Kings who will restore traditional society». On the centennial of the death of Blessed Charles of Austria, we make these words our own and renew our commitment to the restoration of traditional society in the face of its enemies, the same yesterday as today. Manuel Sanjuán, Círculo Cultural Juan Vázquez de Mella
28465	yago	3	20	https://www.britannica.com/topic/house-of-Bourbon	en	House of Bourbon \| Definition, History, Dynasty, Members, & Facts	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel-resources/3-124/images/shared/default3.png?v=3.124.31", "https://cdn.britannica.com/19/153419-131-91ADC6E8/Ruins-statues-Karnak-Egypt.j...	[]	[]	[ "house of Bourbon", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "John Graham Royde-Smith" ]	1998-07-20T00:00:00+00:00	House of Bourbon, one of the most important ruling houses of Europe. Its members were descended from Louis I, duc de Bourbon from 1327 to 1342, the grandson of the French king Louis IX (ruled 1226–70). It provided reigning kings of France from 1589 to 1792 and from 1814 to 1830.	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/topic/house-of-Bourbon	house of Bourbon, one of the most important ruling houses of Europe. Its members were descended from Louis I, duc de Bourbon from 1327 to 1342, the grandson of the French king Louis IX (ruled 1226–70). It provided reigning kings of France from 1589 to 1792 and from 1814 to 1830, after which another Bourbon reigned as king of the French until 1848; kings or queens of Spain from 1700 to 1808, from 1814 to 1868, from 1874 to 1931, and since 1975; dukes of Parma from 1731 to 1735, from 1748 to 1802, and from 1847 to 1859; kings of Naples and of Sicily from 1734 to 1808 and of the Two Sicilies from 1816 to 1860; kings of Etruria from 1801 to 1807; and ducal sovereigns of Lucca from 1815 to 1847. The present article attempts a rapid survey of the dynasty as a whole, relying mainly on genealogical tables to display necessary details. In these tables the names and titles of sovereigns are mostly Anglicized, but those of other persons are mostly given in the original form, except where princesses, having married into another country, are better known under that country’s name for them. The tables also omit perforce the Bourbons born outside of marriage, whose multitude lends some colour to the popular notion that the “Bourbon nose” (larger and more prominent than the normal aquiline) betokens a “Bourbon temperament” or enormous appetite for sexual intercourse. Origins The house of Bourbon is a branch of the house of Capet, which constituted the so-called third race of France’s kings. King Louis IX, a Capetian of the “direct line,” was the ancestor of all the Bourbons through his sixth son, Robert, comte de Clermont. When the “direct line” died out in 1328, the house of Valois, genealogically senior to the Bourbons, prevented the latter from accession to the French crown until 1589. The Valois, however, established the so-called Salic Law of Succession, under which the crown passed through males according to primogeniture, not through females. On this principle, the senior Bourbon became the rightful king of France on the extinction of the legitimate male line of the Valois. Robert de Clermont had married the heiress of the lordship of Bourbon (Bourbon-l’Archambault, in the modern département of Allier). This lordship was made a duchy for his son Louis I in 1327 and so gave its name to the dynasty. From this duchy, the nucleus of the future province of Bourbonnais, the elder Bourbons, mainly through marriages, expanded their territory southeastward and southward. On their western frontier, meanwhile, the countship of La Marche (acquired by Louis I in 1322 in exchange for Clermont) was held from 1327 by a junior line of Louis I’s descendants, who soon added the distant countship of Vendôme to their holdings. Britannica Quiz History Buff Quiz The title of duc de Bourbon passed in 1503 to Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier, who was to become famous as constable of France. His later treason led to the confiscation of his lands by the French crown in the year of his death, 1527. Headship of the house of Bourbon then passed to the line of La Marche–Vendôme. The line of La Marche–Vendôme had been subdivided since the end of the 15th century between a senior line, that of Vendôme (with ducal rank from 1515 onward), and a junior one, that of La Roche-sur-Yon. The latter line obtained Montpensier from the constable’s forfeited heritage (with ducal rank from 1539). Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Subscribe Now Antoine de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme and head of the house of Bourbon from 1537, became titular king consort of Navarre in 1555 through his marriage in 1548 to Jeanne d’Albret. The son of that marriage, titular king of Navarre in succession to his mother from 1572, became king of France, as Henry IV, on the death of the last Valois king in 1589. From Henry IV descended all the Bourbon sovereigns. The great house of Condé, with its ramifications of Soissons and of Conti, was descended from Louis, prince de Condé, one of Henry IV’s uncles. The Bourbon sovereignties Henry IV’s heirs were kings of France uninterruptedly from 1610 to 1792, when the monarchy was “suspended” during the first Revolution. Most illustrious among them was Louis XIV, who brought absolute monarchy to its zenith in western Europe. During the Revolution, monarchists declared Louis XVII titular king (1793–95), but he never reigned, and he died under the Revolution’s house arrest. Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1814 by the Quadruple Alliance, Louis XVIII became king (1814–24), followed upon his death by Charles X (1824–30), who was overthrown by the Revolution of 1830. Legitimists then recognized the pretender Henry V (Henri Dieudonné d’Artois, count de Chambord), the grandson of Charles X. The 1830 Revolution brought Louis-Philippe and the house of Orléans to power. His descendants included not only the potential pretenders to the French succession but also the Bourbon descendants of the heiress of the last emperor of Brazil. Later princes constituted the house of Bourbon-Brazil, or of Orléans-Braganza, which is not to be confused with the house of Borbón-Braganza, a Spanish branch originating in the Portuguese marriage of the infante Don Gabriel (a son of Charles III of Spain). The Bourbon accession to Spain came about partly because the descendants of Louis XIV’s consort, the Spanish infanta Marie-Thérèse, were in 1700 the closest surviving relatives of the childless Charles II of Spain (see Habsburg; Spain, history of: The early Bourbons, 1700–53) and partly because, although at her marriage the infanta had renounced her Spanish rights, Charles by his testament named one of her descendants as his successor. Since the other powers, however, would not have tolerated the union of the Spanish kingdom with the French, Charles named neither Louis XIV’s heir apparent nor the latter’s eldest son but, rather, the second of Louis XIV’s grandsons—namely, Philippe, duc d’Anjou, who became king of Spain as Philip V. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Peace of Utrecht (1713) left Philip in possession of Spain and Spanish America but obliged him to renounce any natural right that he or his descendants might have to France. The infante Don Carlos, the future Charles III of Spain, was the founder of the Bourbon fortunes in Italy. The eldest son of Philip V’s second marriage, he became duke of Parma in 1731 by right of his mother, heiress of the last Farnese dukes, and in 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, he conquered the Kingdom of Naples-Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) for himself. Though the settlement of 1735–38 obliged him to renounce Parma in order to win international recognition as king of Naples-Sicily, Parma was eventually secured for his brother Philip (Don Felipe) under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748—with the proviso, however, that he and his heirs should renounce it in the event that they succeeded to Naples-Sicily or to Spain. Finally, when Don Carlos became king of Spain as Charles III in 1759, he resigned Naples-Sicily to his third son Ferdinand on the express condition that that kingdom and Spain should never be united under one sovereign. The Kingdom of Etruria (1801–07) was a contrivance of the Napoleonic period. Devised by the French for the house of Bourbon-Parma in compensation for the impending annexation of Parma to France at a time when France still needed the goodwill of the Spanish Bourbons, it was dissolved as soon as Napoleon was ready to depose the latter. The Bourbon Duchy of Lucca (1815–47), on the other hand, was a creation of the Congress of Vienna: having assigned Parma to Napoleon’s estranged consort Marie-Louise for her lifetime, the Congress had to find some alternative compensation for the still-dispossessed Bourbons. The Treaty of Paris of 1817, however, prescribed that on Marie-Louise’s death Parma should revert to the Bourbons, who in 1847 renounced Lucca to the Habsburgs of Tuscany nine weeks before succeeding her. In France the senior or “legitimate” line of the Bourbons, restored to sovereignty in France after the Napoleonic Wars, was deposed at the Revolution of 1830. The house of Orléans, which took the legitimate line’s place, was in turn deposed in the Revolution of 1848. The Bourbons of Parma and of the Two Sicilies were dethroned in 1859–60, in the course of the unification of Italy under the house of Savoy. The Spanish Bourbons, after many disturbances in the 19th century, lost their sovereignty in 1931, but the Law of Succession promulgated in Spain in 1947 and General Francisco Franco’s subsequent choice of Juan Carlos as his successor resulted in the restoration of the monarchy in 1975.
28465	yago	3	2	https://royalwatcherblog.com/2024/07/12/wedding-of-princess-elisabeth-of-bourbon-parma/	en	Wedding of Princess Élisabeth of Bourbon	https://royalwatcherblog…2024/07/6.2-.jpg	https://royalwatcherblog…2024/07/6.2-.jpg	[ "https://cdn-0.royalwatcherblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/unnamed-file-2.jpg", "https://64.media.tumblr.com/5e940f4ea678217ef759fa38b13b4da1/e1abf140d38e4500-60/s540x810/cd9fe43ff88cca8cdacc694d24c780898eff0c6f.jpg", "https://64.media.tumblr.com/a6c1bdede723e2fbc0d5638b60ee859d/e1abf140d38e4500-27/s1280x19...	[ "https://streaming.humix.com/contents/pTZSW1_JB4rj/1723933410/index.m3u8" ]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Saad719" ]	2024-07-12T00:00:00	Royal and Noble Guests and Relatives gathered to celebrate the Wedding of Princess Élisabeth of Bourbon-Parma and Xavier Denis in Tourouvre-au-Perche in Normandy on July 6th. https://www.instagram.com/p/C9UwsrBxhke/ Princess Élisabeth of Bourbon-Parma, daughter of Prince Charles-Emmanuel and Princess Constance of Bourbon-Parma, married Xavier Denis at the Église Saint-Aubin in Tourouvre-au-Perche in Normandy. Princess Élisabeth is the	en	https://royalwatcherblog…named-file-2.jpg	The Royal Watcher -	https://royalwatcherblog.com/2024/07/12/wedding-of-princess-elisabeth-of-bourbon-parma/	Royal and Noble Guests and Relatives gathered to celebrate the Wedding of Princess Élisabeth of Bourbon-Parma and Xavier Denis in Tourouvre-au-Perche in Normandy on July 6th. Princess Élisabeth of Bourbon-Parma, daughter of Prince Charles-Emmanuel and Princess Constance of Bourbon-Parma, married Xavier Denis at the Église Saint-Aubin in Tourouvre-au-Perche in Normandy. Princess Élisabeth is the granddaughter of Prince Michel of Bourbon-Parma and Princess Yolande de Broglie-Revel and a great-granddaughter of Prince René of Bourbon-Parma and Princess Margaret of Denmark, as well as the sister of Prince Amaury of Bourbon-Parma. Princess Élisabeth wore a striking Diamond Tiara from her maternal de Ravinel Family, which was previously worn by her mother, Constance de Ravinel, and sister, Princess Charlotte, at their Weddings. Bourbon Parma Tiara Floral Tiara Boucheron Pearl Circle Tiara Chaumet Bourbon-Parma Tiara Pearl Earrings Share this: Like this: Like Loading...
28465	yago	3	36	https://www.royal-news.org/features/taking-a-look-at-the-wedding-of-princess-irene-of-the-netherlands-prince-carlos-hugo-of-bourbon-parma/	en	Taking a look at the wedding of Princess Irene of the Netherlands & Prince Carlos Hugo of Bourbon	https://www.royal-news.o…r_916-3668-1.jpg	https://www.royal-news.o…r_916-3668-1.jpg	[ "https://www.royal-news.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/cropped-RNnew2.png", "https://www.royal-news.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Huwelijk_Prinses_Irene_en_Prins_Hugo_Charles_te_Rome_vanaf_televisie_bruidspaar_Bestanddeelnr_916-3668-1-777x437.jpg", "https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/wp-content/uploads/800px-...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Moniek Bloks", "www.facebook.com" ]	2024-04-29T10:00:37+00:00	On 29 April 1964, Princess Irene of the Netherlands married Prince Carlos Hugo of Bourbon-Parma, future titular Duke of Parma, without her family by her side.	en	https://www.royal-news.o…avicon-32x32.png	Royal News	https://www.royal-news.org/features/taking-a-look-at-the-wedding-of-princess-irene-of-the-netherlands-prince-carlos-hugo-of-bourbon-parma/	On 29 April 1964, Princess Irene of the Netherlands married Prince Carlos Hugo of Bourbon-Parma, future titular Duke of Parma, without her family by her side. Princess Irene, the second daughter of the then Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, had met Prince Carlos Hugo during her studies in Madrid. He was the eldest son of the Carlist claimant to the Spanish throne, Xavier. She secretly converted to Roman Catholicism in the summer of 1963. This news only became public after a photo was released showing her receiving communion. A plane was sent to bring Irene home, but it ended up returning to the Netherlands without her. While a conversion did not necessarily remove her from the line of succession, the family is known to be traditionally protestant. Rumours soon circulated that she was to marry a Spanish nobleman , which along with the conversion, caused quite an uproar in the Netherlands. Eventually, the news was released that Princess Irene was to be married to Prince Carlos Hugo and that she would not ask parliamentary permission for the marriage, which would exclude her from the line of succession. The New York Times wrote, “Princess Irene renounced her rights to the Netherlands throne and decided to live in exile rather than give up marriage to the man of her heart, a Roman Catholic Spanish prince.” Queen Juliana and her husband, Prince Bernhard, said, “We rejoice ourselves full-heartedly in her happiness and that of her future husband, and our best wishes will always accompany them.” The wedding took place on 29 April 1964 in the Borghese Chapel at the Basilica di Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome, but none of her family felt it was appropriate to attend. Shortly before the wedding, Irene announced her intention to support her future husband’s claim to the Spanish throne. The family reportedly watched the ceremony on television. Pope Paul VI received the newlyweds in a private audience afterwards. Princess Irene wore a white silk gown trimmed with Dutch lace made by Pierre Balmain. She wore a tulle veil, which was secured with a diamond tiara which belonged to her husband’s family. It had been made in 1884 for Carlos Hugo’s grandmother, Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal. Princess Irene and Prince Carlos Hugo went on to have four children together: Carlos (born 1970), Margarita (born 1972), Jaime (born 1972) and Carolina (born 1974). The marriage ended in divorce in 1981.
28465	yago	3	37	https://royalty.miraheze.org/wiki/Princess_Margherita_of_Parma	en	Princess Margherita of Parma	https://static.miraheze.…o_background.png	https://static.miraheze.…o_background.png	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4e/Margarita_de_los_carlistas.jpg/210px-Margarita_de_los_carlistas.jpg", "https://login.miraheze.org/wiki/Special:CentralAutoLogin/start?type=1x1", "https://static.miraheze.org/commonswiki/f/ff/Powered_by_Miraheze.svg", "https://royalty.miraheze.org/1.42...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Royalpedia" ]	2024-05-28T17:55:41+00:00		en	https://static.miraheze.…Wiki_Favicon.jpg	Royalpedia	https://royalty.miraheze.org/wiki/Princess_Margherita_of_Parma	Princess Margherita of Parma (Margherita Maria Teresa Enrichetta; ; 1 January 1847 – 29 January 1893) was the eldest child and daughter of Charles III, Duke of Parma and Princess Louise Marie Thérèse of France, the eldest daughter of Charles Ferdinand, Duke of Berry and Princess Caroline Ferdinande Louise of the Two Sicilies. Titles and styles[edit] 1 January 1847 – 4 February 1867 Her Royal Highness Princess Margherita of Parma. 4 February 1867 – 29 January 1893 Her Royal Highness The Duchess of Madrid.
28465	yago	3	3	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2021/06/prince-charles-emmanuel-of-bourbon.html	en	Prince Charles-Emmanuel of Bourbon-Parma Turns Sixty	https://blogger.googleus…emmanueldebp.jpg	https://blogger.googleus…emmanueldebp.jpg	[ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0OMUjV7ocn4/XQ2qb8hlzQI/AAAAAAAABGw/mMSC1KS8Yl02jzUWLENzZeAYQ8rOkfkwQCK4BGAYYCw/s752/Screen%2BShot%2B2018-04-22%2Bat%2B11.47.40%2BAM-2.png", "https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi9fctxBuBylrR9ESDGZclpBqM4HFraFLiiGfurge-9j3S3o8-zKg_uLZwAsOkmpHxi676tRADeXPJXV-cNvhZ...	[]	[]	[ "euro history", "euro journal", "erhj", "perry pearson", "princess elizabeth of yugoslavia", "peregrine pearson" ]	null	[]	null	Prince Charles-Emmanuel. Today, Prince Charles-Emmanuel of Bourbon-Parma celebrates his sixtieth birthday! Princess Yolande...	en	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/favicon.ico		https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2021/06/prince-charles-emmanuel-of-bourbon.html	Prince Charles-Emmanuel. Today, Prince Charles-Emmanuel of Bourbon-Parma celebrates his sixtieth birthday! Princess Yolande de Broglie-Revel and Prince Michel of Bourbon-Parma on their wedding day. Born on 3 June 1961 at Paris, Prince Charles-Emmanuel Marie Joseph Jacques Hély of Bourbon-Parma was the fifth child and second son of Prince Michel of Bourbon-Parma (1926-2018) and Princess Yolande de Broglie-Revel (1928-2014), who married in 1951. Charles-Emmanuel has four older siblings from his parents' marriage: Prince Eric (1953-2021), Princess Inès (1952-1981), Princess Sybil (b.1954), and Princess Victoire (1957-2001). Charles-Emmanuel's parents divorced in 1999. Afterward, his father Michel married long-time companion Princess Maria Pia of Savoy in 2003. Prince Charles-Emmanuel and Princess Constance on the day of their religious wedding. On 18 May 1991, Prince Charles-Emmanuel of Bourbon-Parma civilly married Constance de Ravinel (b.Boulogne-Billancourt 18 July 1970). Charles-Emmanuel and Constance celebrated their religious wedding on 25 May 1991 at Dampierre. Constance was the daughter of Baron Yves de Ravinel and his wife Countess Alexe de Castellane. Charles-Emmanuel and Constance of Bourbon-Parma with their children. Prince Charles-Emmanuel and Princess Constance of Bourbon-Parma have had four children during their thirty years of marriage: Prince Amaury (b.1991), Princess Charlotte (b.1993), Princess Elisabeth (b.1996), and Princess Zita (b.1999).
28465	yago	2	16	https://royalty.miraheze.org/wiki/Carlos,_Duke_of_Parma	en	Carlos, Duke of Parma	https://static.miraheze.…o_background.png	https://static.miraheze.…o_background.png	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/6f/Carlos_de_Bourbon_de_Parme_%282017%29.jpg/210px-Carlos_de_Bourbon_de_Parme_%282017%29.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4a/Prinses_Irene_met_zoon_Prins_Carlos.jpg/300px-Prinses_Irene_met_zoon_Prins_Carlos.jpg", "https://uploa...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Royalpedia" ]	2024-06-16T12:27:56+00:00		en	https://static.miraheze.…Wiki_Favicon.jpg	Royalpedia	https://royalty.miraheze.org/wiki/Carlos,_Duke_of_Parma	Carlos Carlos Xavier Bernardo Sixto Marie, Duke of Parma and Piacenza (born 27 January 1970) is the current head of the House of Bourbon-Parma, as well a member of the Dutch Royal Family. He is the claimant to the defunct throne of the extinct Duchy of Parma. In addition, he is considered by some a contested pretender to the Carlist claim to the throne of Spain under the name Carlos Javier I (English: Charles Xavier I).[1] In 2016, Carlos told the Spanish press that, while (like his father in 2005) he "does not abandon" his claim to the throne, it is "not a priority" in his life, and he "will not dispute" [no planteo pleito] the legitimacy of King Felipe VI.[2] Since 15 May 1996, he has been part of the enlarged Dutch royal family with the title – conferred on him by the Queen of the Netherlands – of "Prince de Bourbon de Parme" in the Dutch nobility. Early life[edit] Carlos was born in Nijmegen in the Netherlands as the eldest child of Carlos Hugo, Duke of Parma, and Princess Irene of the Netherlands. He has two younger sisters, Princess Margarita and Princess Carolina, and a younger brother, Prince Jaime. He was baptized in the Catholic faith on 10 February 1970 by Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre. Carlos spent his youth in several countries including the Netherlands, Spain, France, England, and the United States. In 1981, when he was eleven, his parents divorced. Together with his mother and his siblings, he then moved to Soestdijk Palace (Baarn) in the Netherlands. He lived at the palace for a number of years with his grandparents, Queen Juliana of the Netherlands and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands. Education and career[edit] Carlos studied political science at Wesleyan University in Connecticut and demography and philosophy at Cambridge University in England. After completing his studies, Carlos worked for the company ABN AMRO in Amsterdam, where he was involved with preparations for the introduction of the euro. He then worked for a period in Brussels as a public affairs consultant for the company European Public Policy Advisors (EPPA). Since 2007, he has been engaged in projects concerning sustainability in the business world. Dutch royal house[edit] Carlos is sometimes present at representative occasions concerning the royal house of the Netherlands. In 2003, he was involved, together with his aunt, Queen Beatrix, in the inauguration of the "Prince Claus Leerstoel", a professorship named after the Queen's husband, Prince Claus. During special events of the royal house, he is regularly present. For example, he was one of the organizers of the wedding celebration of Prince Constantijn of the Netherlands and Princess Laurentien of the Netherlands. Personal life[edit] Relationship with Brigitte Klynstra and son[edit] Prince Carlos had a relationship with Brigitte Klynstra (born 10 January 1959), the stepdaughter of Count Adolph Roderik van Rechteren Limpurg. During this relationship he fathered a son: Carlos Hugo Roderik Sybren Klynstra (born 20 January 1997 in Nijmegen). In December 2015, the then 18-year-old Carlos Klynstra started the legal procedure to attempt to change his surname to that of his biological father[3] which would also allow him to use the title of "Prince". The Duke of Parma opposed this on the basis that it was in contravention of the traditions of the House of Bourbon-Parma. On 9 March 2016 the Minister of Security and Justice declared his family name request valid.[4] Later that year a court in The Hague concurred with the minister in declaring the claim valid under Dutch law.[5] According to the judgement, Carlos Hugo will be entitled to be known as "Zijne Koninklijke Hoogheid Carlos Hugo Roderik Sybren prins de Bourbon de Parme" (His Royal Highness Prince Carlos Hugo Roderik Sybren of Bourbon-Parma); this will come only into effect once the Dutch king has signed the royal decree. According to the press release of the Council of State of 28 February 2018, the name change does not mean that Klynstra is now also a member of the Royal House of Bourbon-Parma. That is a private matter of the House itself and this is outside the jurisdiction of the Dutch Nobility Law.[6] Marriage to Annemarie Gualthérie van Weezel[edit] On 7 October 2009, it was announced through his mother's private secretary that Prince Carlos would marry Annemarie Cecilia Gualthérie van Weezel. The civil marriage took place on 12 June 2010 at Wijk bij Duurstede. The church wedding was to have taken place at the La Cambre Abbey in Ixelles on 28 August, but it was postponed owing to his father's illness. Prince Carlos Hugo died shortly afterwards. Annemarie (born The Hague, 18 December 1977) is the daughter of Johan (Hans) Stephan Leonard Gualthérie van Weezel and Gerarda Gezine Jolande (Ank) de Visser. Her father was a member of the House of Representatives of the Netherlands for the Christian Democratic Party, the Dutch ambassador to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and the ambassador to Luxembourg. Gualthérie van Weezel's paternal grandfather was Jan Hans Gualthérie van Weezel, who was the head of the police in The Hague and member of the Dutch resistance during the Second World War. Annemarie Gualthérie van Weezel went to secondary school in Strasbourg and obtained a Master of Laws degree at the University of Utrecht. Subsequently, she completed a post-graduate study in Radio and Television journalism at the University of Groningen. Gualthérie van Weezel works as a parliamentary journalist in The Hague and Brussels for the Dutch public channel Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS). In Brussels, she met Prince Carlos for the first time. On 2 August 2010, it was revealed that the health of his father, the Duke of Parma, was quickly deteriorating due to cancer. As a consequence, the church wedding of the prince Carlos and his fiancée was delayed. In a final announcement about his condition, the Duke confirmed Carlos as the next Head of the House of Bourbon-Parma.[7] Just before his death the old Duke of Parma named Annemarie as "Contessa di Molina" (Countess of Molina).[8] Prince Carlos's father died on 18 August 2010 in Barcelona, Spain, at the age of 80; Carlos subsequently became the next head of the House of Bourbon-Parma. The new Duke of Parma and Annemarie were married on 20 November 2010 in La Cambre Abbey.[9] Together, they have two daughters and a son: Her Royal Highness Princess Luisa of Bourbon-Parma, Marchioness of Castell'Arquato (born on 9 May 2012 in The Hague); Her Royal Highness Princess Cecilia of Bourbon-Parma, Countess of Berceto (born 17 October 2013 in The Hague); His Royal Highness Prince Carlos Enrique, Prince of Piacenza , (born 24 April 2016 in The Hague). In 2016, at the baptism of Prince Carlos Enrique, Prince Carlo conferred on his son the title of "Principe di Piacenza" (Prince of Piacenza), which is the traditional title assigned to a crown prince of the House of Bourbon Parma, the continuer of the dynasty, and future Duke of Parma and Piacenza.[10] In September 2017, the Duke of Parma named his daughter Luisa as "Marchesa di Castell'Arquato" (Marquise of Castell'Arquato), and her younger sister Cecilia was named as "Contessa di Berceto" (Countess of Berceto).[11] His rights as the Carlist pretender[edit] Carlos Xavier, in an interview with the newspaper La Vanguardia, said: I don't set out dynastic lawsuits.[12] — Barcelona, October 11th, 2010 Titles, styles and honours[edit] Titles and styles[edit] 27 January 1970 - 2 September 1996: His Royal Highness Prince Carlos of Parma 2 September 1996 – 18 August 2010: His Royal Highness The Prince of Piacenza[13] 18 August 2010 – present: His Royal Highness The Duke of Parma and Piacenza Ancestry[edit] Notes[edit] References[edit] [edit] Official website of the House of Bourbon-Parma
28465	yago	0	58	https://timenote.info/en/Zita-of-Bourbon-Parma	en	Zita of Bourbon-Parma	https://media2.nekropole…on-Parmskaja.jpg	https://media2.nekropole…on-Parmskaja.jpg	[ "https://media2.nekropole.info/2017/01/Cita-Burbon-Parmskaja_idx-sq.jpg", "https://timenote.info/img/ajax-loader.gif", "https://media2.nekropole.info/2017/01/Robert-I--gercog-Parmskij-_idx-sq.jpg", "https://media2.nekropole.info/2017/01/Otto-fon-Gabsburg_idx-sq.jpg", "https://media2.nekropole.info/2017/01/M...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-08-21T13:27:13-04:00	Zita of Bourbon-Parma (Zita Maria delle Grazie Adelgonda Micaela Raffaela Gabriella Giuseppina Antonia Luisa Agnese; 9 May 1892 – 14 March 1989) was the wife of	en	/img/icons/apple-touch-icon-152x152.png		https://timenote.info/en/Zita-of-Bourbon-Parma	Zita of Bourbon-Parma (Zita Maria delle Grazie Adelgonda Micaela Raffaela Gabriella Giuseppina Antonia Luisa Agnese; 9 May 1892 – 14 March 1989) was the wife of Emperor Charles of Austria. As such, she was the last Empress of Austria, Queen of Hungary, and Queen of Bohemia. Born as the seventeenth child of the dispossessed Robert I, Duke of Parma and his second wife Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal, Zita married the then Archduke Charles of Austria in 1911. Charles became heir presumptive to the Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria in 1914 after the assassination of his uncle Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, and acceded to the throne in 1916 after the old emperor's death. After the end of World War I in 1918, the Habsburgs were deposed when the new countries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs were formed. Charles and Zita left for exile in Switzerland and later Madeira, where Charles died in 1922. After her husband's death, Zita and her son Otto served as the symbols of unity for the exiled dynasty. A devout Catholic, she raised a large family after being widowed at the age of 29, and never remarried. Asteroid 689 Zita is named in her honour. Early life Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma was born at the Villa Pianore in the Italian Province of Lucca, 9 May 1892. The unusual name Zita was given her after a popular Italian Saint who had lived in Tuscany in the 13th century. She was the third daughter and fifth child of the deposed Robert I, Duke of Parma and his second wife, Maria Antonia of Portugal, a daughter of king Miguel of Portugal and Adelaide of Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg. Zita's father had lost his throne as a result of the movement for Italian unification in 1859 when he was still a child. He fathered twelve children during his first marriage to Maria Pia of the Two Sicilies (six of whom were mentally retarded, and three of whom died young). Duke Robert became a widower in 1882, and two years later he married Infanta Maria Antonia of Portugal, Zita's mother. The second marriage produced a further twelve children. Zita was the 17th child among Duke Robert's 24 children. Robert moved his large family between Villa Pianore (a large property located between Pietrasanta and Viareggio) and his castle in Schwarzau in lower Austria. It was mainly in these two residences that Zita spent her formative years. The family spent most of the year in Austria moving to Pianore in the Winter and returning in the Summer. To move between them, they took a special train with sixteen coaches to accommodate the family and their belongings. Zita and her siblings were raised to speak Italian, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese and English. She recalled, "We grew up internationally. My father thought of himself first and foremost as a Frenchman, and spent a few weeks every year with the elder children at Chambord, his main property on the Loire. I once asked him how we should describe ourselves. He replied, 'We are French princes who reigned in Italy.' In fact, of the twenty-four children only three including me, were actually born in Italy. At the age of ten, Zita was sent to a boarding school at Zanberg in Upper Bavaria, where there was a strict regime of study and religious instruction. She was summoned home in the autumn of 1907 at the death of her father. Her maternal grandmother sent Zita and her sister Franziska to a convent on the Isle of Wight to complete her education. Brought up as devout Catholics, the Parma children regularly undertook good works for the poor. In Schwarzau the family turned surplus cloth into clothes. Zita and Franziska personally distributed food, clothing, and medicines to the needy in Pianore. Three of Zita's sisters became nuns and, for a time, she considered following the same path. Zita went through a patch of poor health and was sent for the traditional cure at a European spa for two years. Marriage In the close vicinity of Schwarzau castle was the Villa Wartholz, residence of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria, Zita’s maternal aunt. She was the stepmother of Archduke Otto, who died in 1906, and the step-grandmother of Archduke Charles of Austria-Este, at that time second-in-line to the Austrian throne. The two daughters of Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria were Zita’s first cousins and Charles’ half-aunts. They had met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandeis an der Elbe (Brandýs on the Elbe), from where he visited his aunt at Franzensbad. It was during one of these visits that Charles and Zita became reacquainted. Charles was under pressure to marry (Franz Ferdinand, his uncle and first-in-line, had married morganatically, and his children were excluded from the throne) and Zita had a suitably royal genealogy. Zita later recalled, "We were of course glad to meet again and became close friends. On my side feelings developed gradually over the next two years. He seemed to have made his mind up much more quickly, however, and became even more keen when, in the autumn of 1910, rumours spread about that I had got engaged to a distant Spanish relative, Don Jaime, the Duke of Madrid. On hearing this, the Archduke came down post haste from his regiment at Brandeis and sought out his grandmother, Archduchess Maria Theresa, who was also my aunt and the natural confidante in such matters. He asked if the rumor was true and when told it was not, he replied, 'Well, I had better hurry in any case or she will get engaged to someone else.'" Archduke Charles traveled to Villa Pianore and asked for Zita’s hand and, on 13 June 1911, their engagement was announced at the Austrian court. Zita in later years recalled that after her engagement she had expressed to Charles her worries about the fate of the Austrian Empire and the challenges of the monarchy. Charles and Zita were married at the Schwarzau castle on 21 October 1911. Charles's great-uncle, the 81-year-old Emperor Franz Joseph, attended the wedding. He was relieved to see an heir make a suitable marriage, and was in good spirits, even leading the toast at the wedding breakfast. Archduchess Zita soon conceived a son, and Otto was born 20 November 1912. Seven more children would follow in the next decade. Wife of the heir to Austrian throne At this time, Archduke Charles was in his twenties and did not expect to become emperor for some time, especially while Franz Ferdinand remained in good health. This changed on 28 June 1914 when the heir and his wife Sophie were assassinated in Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb nationalists. Charles and Zita received the news by telegram that day. She said of her husband, "Though it was a beautiful day, I saw his face go white in the sun. In the war that followed, Charles was promoted to General in the Austrian army, taking command of the 20th Corps for an offensive in Tyrol. The war was personally difficult for Zita, as several of her brothers fought on opposing sides in the conflict (Prince Felix and Prince René had joined the Austrian army, while Prince Sixtus and Prince Xavier lived in France before the war and enlisted in the Belgian army.) Also her country of birth, Italy, joined the war against Austria in 1915, and so rumours of the 'Italian' Zita began to be muttered. Even as late as 1917, The German ambassador in Vienna, Count Otto Wedel would write to Berlin saying "The Empress is descended from an Italian princely house... People do not entirely trust the Italian and her brood of relatives." At Franz Joseph's request, Zita and her children left their residence at Hetzendorf and moved into a suite of rooms at Schönbrunn Palace. Here, Zita spent many hours with the old Emperor on both formal and informal occasions, where Franz Joseph confided in her his fears for the future. Emperor Franz Joseph died of bronchitis and pneumonia at the age of 86 on 21 November 1916. "I remember the dear plump figure of Prince Lobkowitz going up to my husband," Zita later recounted, "and, with tears in his eyes, making the sign of the cross on Charles's forehead. As he did so he said, 'May God bless Your Majesty.' It was the first time we had heard the Imperial title used to us." Empress and Queen Charles and Zita were crowned in Budapest on 30 December 1916. Following the coronation there was a banquet, but after that the festivities ended, as the emperor and empress thought it wrong to have prolonged celebrations during a time of war. At the beginning of the reign, Charles was more often than not away from Vienna, so he had a telephone line installed from Baden (where Charles's military headquarters were located) to the Hofburg. He called Zita several times a day whenever they were separated. Zita had some influence on her husband and would discreetly attend audiences with the Prime Minister or military briefings, and she had a special interest in social policy. However, military matters were the sole domain of Charles. Energetic and strong-willed, Zita accompanied her husband to the provinces and to the front, as well as occupying herself with charitable works and hospital visits to the war-wounded. The Sixtus affair By the spring of 1917, the War was dragging on towards its fourth year, and Zita's brother Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, a serving officer in the Belgian Army, was a main mover behind a plan for Austria-Hungary to make a separate peace with France. Charles initiated contact with Sixtus through contacts in neutral Switzerland, and Zita wrote a letter inviting him to Vienna. Zita's mother Maria Antonia delivered the letter in person. Sixtus arrived with conditions for talks which had been agreed with the French — the restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine (annexed by Germany after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870); restoration of the independence of Belgium; independence for the kingdom of Serbia; and the handover of Constantinople to Russia. Charles agreed, in principle, to the first three points and wrote a letter to Sixtus dated 25 March 1917 which sent "the secret and unofficial message" to the President of France that "I will use all means and all my personal influence". This attempt at dynastic diplomacy eventually foundered. Germany refused to negotiate over Alsace-Lorraine, and, seeing a Russian collapse on the horizon, was loath to give up the war. Sixtus continued his efforts, even meeting Lloyd George in London about Italy's territorial demands on Austria in the Treaty of London of 1915, but the Prime Minister could not persuade his generals that Britain should make peace with Austria. Zita managed a personal achievement during this time by stopping the German plans to send airplanes to bomb the home of the King and Queen of Belgium on their name days. In April 1918, after the German-Russian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin made a speech attacking incoming French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau as being the main obstacle to a peace favouring the Central Powers. Clemenceau was incensed and, after seeing the Emperor Charles's letter of 24 March 1917, had it published. For a while, the life of Sixtus appeared to be in danger, and there were even fears that Germany might occupy Austria. Czernin persuaded Charles to send a 'Word of Honour' to Austria's allies saying that Sixtus had not been authorised to show the letter to the French Government, that Belgium had not been mentioned, and that Clemenceau had lied about the mentioning of Alsace. Czernin had actually been in contact with the German Embassy throughout the whole crisis and attempted to persuade the Emperor to step down because of the Affair. After failing to do so, Czernin resigned as Foreign Minister. End of Empire By this time, the war was closing in on the embattled Emperor. A Union of Czech Deputies had already sworn an oath to a new Czechoslovak state independent of the Habsburg Empire on 13 April 1918, the prestige of the German Army had taken a severe blow at the Battle of Amiens, and, on 25 September 1918, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria broke away from his allies in the Central Powers and sued for peace independently. Zita was with Charles when he received the telegram of Bulgaria's collapse. She remembered it "made it even more urgent to start peace talks with the Western Powers while there was still something to talk about. On 16 October, the emperor issued a "People's Manifesto" proposing the empire be restructured on federal lines with each nationality gaining its own state. Instead, each nation broke away and the empire effectively dissolved. Leaving behind their children at Gödöllő, Charles and Zita travelled to the Schönbrunn Palace. By this time ministers had been appointed by the new state of "German-Austria", and by 11 November, together with the emperor's spokesmen, they prepared a manifesto for Charles to sign. Zita, at first glance, mistook it for an abdication and made her famous statement "A sovereign can never abdicate. He can be deposed... All right. That is force. But abdicate — never, never, never! I would rather fall here at your side. Then there would be Otto. And even if all of us here were killed, there would still be other Habsburgs!" Charles gave his permission for the document to be published, and he, his family and the remnants of his Court departed for the Royal shooting lodge at Eckartsau, close to the borders with Hungary and Slovakia. The Republic of German-Austria was pronounced the next day. Exile After a difficult few months at Eckartsau, the Imperial Family received aid from an unexpected source. Prince Sixtus had met King George V and appealed to him to help the Habsburgs. George was reportedly moved by the request, it being only months since his imperial relatives in Russia had been executed by revolutionaries, and promised "We will immediately do what is necessary." Several British Army officers were sent to help Charles, most notably Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Lisle Strutt, who was a grandson of Lord Belper and a former student at the University of Innsbruck. On 19 March 1919, orders were received from the War Office to "get the Emperor out of Austria without delay". With some difficulty, Strutt managed to arrange a train to Switzerland, enabling the Emperor to leave the country with dignity without having to abdicate. Charles, Zita, their children and their household left Eckartsau on 24 March escorted by a detachment of British soldiers from the Honourable Artillery Company under the command of Strutt. Hungary and exile in Madeira The family's first home in exile was Wartegg Castle in Rorschach, Switzerland, a property owned by the Bourbon-Parmas. However, the Swiss authorities, worried about the implication of the Habsburgs living near the Austrian border, compelled them to move to the western part of the country. The next month, therefore, found them moving to Villa Prangins, near Lake Geneva, where they resumed a quiet family life. This abruptly ended in March 1920 when, after a period of instability in Hungary, Miklós Horthy was elected regent. Charles was still technically King (as Charles IV) but Horthy sent an emissary to Prangins advising him not to go to Hungary until the situation had calmed. After the Trianon Treaty Horthy's ambition soon grew. Charles became concerned and requested the help of Colonel Strutt to get him into Hungary. Charles twice attempted to regain control, once in March 1921 and again in October 1921. Both attempts failed, despite Zita's staunch support (she insisted on travelling with him on the final dramatic train journey to Budapest). Charles and Zita temporarily resided at Castle Tata, the home of Count Esterházy, until a suitable permanent exile could be found. Malta was mooted as a possibility, but was declined by Lord Curzon, and French territory was ruled out due to the possibility of Zita's brothers intriguing on Charles's behalf. Eventually, the Portuguese island of Madeira was chosen. On 31 October 1921, the former Imperial couple were taken by rail from Tihany to Baja, where the Royal Navy monitor HMS Glowworm was waiting. They finally arrived at Funchal on 19 November. Their children were being looked after at Wartegg Castle in Switzerland by Charles's step-grandmother Maria Theresa, although Zita managed to see them in Zurich when her son Robert needed an operation for appendicitis. The children joined their parents in Madeira in February 1922. Death of Charles Charles had been in poor health for some time. After going shopping on a chilly day in Funchal to buy toys for Carl Ludwig, he was struck by an attack of bronchitis. This rapidly worsened into pneumonia, not helped by the inadequate medical care available. Several of the children and staff were also ill, and Zita (at the time eight months pregnant) helped nurse them all. Charles weakened and died on 1 April, his last words to his wife being "I love you so much." After his funeral, a witness said of Zita "This woman really is to be admired. She did not, for one second, lose her composure... she greeted the people on all sides and then spoke to those who had helped out with the funeral. They were all under her charm." Zita wore mourning black in Charles's memory throughout sixty-seven years of widowhood. Widowhood After Charles's death, the former Austrian imperial family were soon to move again. Alfonso XIII of Spain had approached the British Foreign Office via his ambassador in London, and they agreed to allow Zita and her seven (soon to be eight) children to relocate to Spain. Alfonso duly sent the warship Infanta Isabel to Funchal and this took them to Cadiz. They were then escorted to the Pardo Palace in Madrid, where shortly after her arrival Zita gave birth to a posthumous child, Archduchess Elisabeth. Alfonso XIII offered his exiled Habsburg relatives the use of Palacio Uribarren at Lekeitio in the Bay of Biscay. This appealed to Zita, who did not want to be a heavy burden to the state that harboured her. For the next six years Zita settled in Lekeitio, where she got on with the job of raising and educating her children. They lived with straitened finances, mainly living on income from private property in Austria, income from a vineyard in Johannisberg, and voluntary collections. Other members of the exiled Habsburg dynasty, however, claimed much of this money, and there were regular petitions for help from former Imperial officials. Move to Belgium By 1929, several of the children were approaching the age to attend university and the family sought to move somewhere of a more congenial educational climate than Spain. That September, they moved to the Belgian village of Steenokkerzeel near Brussels, where they were closer to several members of their family. Zita continued her political lobbying on behalf of the Habsburg family, even sounding out links with Mussolini's Italy. There was even a possibility of a Habsburg restoration under the Austrian Chancellors Engelbert Dollfuss and Kurt Schuschnigg, with Crown Prince Otto visiting Austria numerous times. These overtures were abruptly ended by the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938. As exiles, the Habsburg family took the lead in resisting the Nazis in Austria, but this foundered because of opposition between monarchists and socialists. Flight to America With the Nazi invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940, Zita and her family became war refugees. They narrowly missed being killed by a direct hit on the castle by German bombers and fled to Prince Xavier's French Castle in Bostz. The Habsburgs then fled to the Spanish border, reaching it on 18 May. They moved on to Portugal where the U.S. Government granted the family exit visas on 9 July. After a perilous journey they arrived in New York City on 27 July, having family in Long Island and Newark, New Jersey.; at one point, Zita and several of her children lived, as long-term house-guests, in Tuxedo Park, New York. The Austrian imperial refugees eventually settled in Quebec, which had the advantage of being French-speaking (the younger children were not yet fluent in English). As they were cut off from all European funds, finances were more stretched than ever. At one stage, Zita was reduced to making salad and spinach dishes from dandelion leaves. However, all her sons were active in the war effort. Otto promoted the dynasty's role in a post-war Europe and met regularly with Franklin Roosevelt; Robert was the Habsburg representative in London; Carl Ludwig and Felix joined the United States Army, serving with several American-raised relatives of the Mauerer line; Rudolf smuggled himself into Austria in the final days of the war to help organise the resistance. In 1945 Empress Zita celebrated her birthday on the first day of peace, 9 May. She was to spend the next two years touring the United States and Canada to raise funds for war-ravaged Austria and Hungary. Post-War After a period of rest and recovery, Zita found herself regularly going back to Europe for the weddings of her children. She decided to move back to the continent full-time, in 1952, to Luxembourg, in order to look after her aging mother. Maria Antonia died at the age of 96 in 1959. The bishop of Chur proposed to Zita that she move into a residence that he administered (formerly a castle of the Counts de Salis) at Zizers, Graubünden in Switzerland. As the castle had enough space for visits from her large family and a nearby chapel (a necessity for the devoutly Catholic Zita), she accepted with ease. Zita occupied her final years with her family. Although the restrictions on the Habsburgs entering Austria had been lifted, this only applied to those born after 10 April 1919. This meant Zita could not attend the funeral of her daughter Adelheid in 1972, which was painful for her. She also involved herself in the efforts to have her deceased husband, the "Peace Emperor" canonised. In 1982, the restrictions were eased, and she returned to Austria after having been absent for six decades. Over the next few years, the Empress made several visits to her former Austrian homeland, even appearing on Austrian television. In a series of interviews with the Viennese tabloid newspaper Kronen Zeitung, Zita expressed her belief that the deaths of Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria and his mistress Baroness Mary Vetsera, at Mayerling, in 1889, were not a double suicide, but rather murder by French or Austrian agents. Death After a memorable 90th birthday, where she was surrounded by her now vast family, Zita's strong health began to fail. She developed inoperable cataracts in both eyes. Her last big family gathering took place at Zizers, in 1987, when her children and grandchildren joined in celebrating Empress Zita's 95th birthday. While visiting her daughter, in summer 1988, she developed pneumonia and spent most of the autumn and winter bedridden. Finally, she called Otto, in early March 1989, and told him she was dying. He and the rest of the family travelled to her bedside and took turns keeping her company until she died in the early hours of 14 March 1989. She was 96 years old. Her funeral was held in Vienna on 1 April. The government allowed it to take place on Austrian soil providing that the cost was borne by the Habsburgs themselves. Zita's body was carried to the Imperial Crypt under Capuchin Church in the same funeral coach she had walked behind during the funeral of Emperor Franz Joseph in 1916. It was attended by over 200 members of the Habsburg and Bourbon-Parma families, and the service had 6,000 attendees including leading politicians, state officials and international representatives, including a representative of Pope John Paul II. Following an ancient custom, the Empress had asked that her heart, which was placed in an urn, stay behind at Muri Abbey, in Switzerland, where the Emperor's heart had rested for decades. In doing so, Zita assured herself that, in death, she and her husband would remain by each other's side. When the procession of mourners arrived at the gates of the Imperial Crypt, the herald who knocked on the door during this traditional "admission ceremony" introduced her as Zita, Her Majesty the Empress and Queen. Cause of beatification On 10 December 2009, Mgr Yves Le Saux, Bishop of Le Mans, France, opened the diocesan process for the beatification of Zita. Zita was in the habit of spending several months each year in the diocese of Le Mans at St. Cecilia's Abbey, Solesmes, where three of her sisters were nuns. The actor is the French Association pour la Béatification de l'Impératrice Zita. The postulator for the cause is Father Alexander Leonhardt. The judge of the tribunal is Father Bruno Bonnet. The promoter of justice is the Father François Scrive. With the opening of her cause, the late Empress has been accorded the title Servant of God. Titles, styles, honours and arms Titles and styles 9 May 1892 – 21 October 1911: Her Royal Highness Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma 21 October 1911 – 21 November 1916: Her Imperial and Royal Highness Archduchess and Princess Zita of Austria, Princess of Hungary and Bohemia, Princess of Bourbon-Parma 21 November 1916 – 11 November 1918: Her Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty The Empress of Austria, Apostolic Queen of Hungary 11 November 1918 – 14 March 1989: Her Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Empress Zita of Austria, Apostolic Queen of Hungary (used outside Austria) Zita, Duchess of Bar (inscribed in her passport) Zita Habsburg-Lothringen (used in Austria) 10 December 2009 - present: Servant of God, in recognition of her cause for beatification Honours Zita was Grand Mistress of the following orders: Order of the Starry Cross Order of Elizabeth Order of Elizabeth and Theresa She was the last grand mistress of these orders to be an effective empress. Children Charles I, Emperor of Austria and Zita of Bourbon-Parma had eight children and thirty three grandchildren. Issue:
28465	yago	2	41	https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/zita-parma-1892-1989	en	Zita of Parma (1892–1989)			[ "https://www.encyclopedia.com/themes/custom/trustme/images/header-logo.jpg" ]	[]	[]	[ "Zita of Parma (1892–1989)Empress of Austria and queen of Hungary", "a key participant in the Austrian monarchist movement in both Austria and Hungary until the end of the 1930s", "who served for more than two generations as a symbol of the ideals of monarchists and political-cultural traditionalists in Central...	null	[]	null	Zita of Parma (1892–1989)Empress of Austria and queen of Hungary, a key participant in the Austrian monarchist movement in both Austria and Hungary until the end of the 1930s, who served for more than two generations as a symbol of the ideals of monarchists and political-cultural traditionalists in Central Europe. Name variations: Zita of Bourbon-Parma; Zita von Bourbon-Parma; Zita von Habsburg; Zita Habsburg; Zita von Parma. Reigned from November 1916 to November 1918. Source for information on Zita of Parma (1892–1989): Women in World History: A Biographical Encyclopedia dictionary.	en	/sites/default/files/favicon.ico		https://www.encyclopedia.com/women/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/zita-parma-1892-1989	Empress of Austria and queen of Hungary, a key participant in the Austrian monarchist movement in both Austria and Hungary until the end of the 1930s, who served for more than two generations as a symbol of the ideals of monarchists and political-cultural traditionalists in Central Europe. Name variations: Zita of Bourbon-Parma; Zita von Bourbon-Parma; Zita von Habsburg; Zita Habsburg; Zita von Parma. Reigned from November 1916 to November 1918. Born Zita Maria Grazia Adelgonda Michela Raffaella Gabriella Giuseppina Antonia Luisa Agnese of Bourbon-Parma in Pianore near Lucca, Italy, on May 9, 1892; died in Zizers, Switzerland, on March 14, 1989, and was buried on April 1, 1989, in the Habsburg crypt in Vienna's Capuchin Church; daughter of Maria Antonia of Portugal (1862–1959) and Robert I, duke of Bourbon-Parma; had 18 brothers and sisters; married Karl von Habsburg-Lothringen or Karl Franz Josef (1887–1922), also known as Charles I of Austria or Carol, Karoly, or Charles IV of Hungary, on October 21, 1911; children: Otto (b. 1912, who married Regina of Saxe-Meinigen); Adelheid or Adelaide (b. 1914); Robert (b. 1915, who married Margarita of Savoy); Felix (b. 1916, who married Anna von Arenberg); Karl Ludwig or Charles Louis (b. 1918, who married Yolande de Ligne); Rudolf (b. 1919, who married Xenia Chernicheva); Charlotte (b. 1921, who married George Alexander, duke of Mecklenburg); Elisabeth or Elizabeth (b. 1922, who married Henry of Liechtenstein). Born in 1892, almost a decade before the death of Queen Victoria , Zita of Parma died in the momentous year of 1989, only months before the demise of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communist rule in Europe. In her long life, she reigned as empress of Austria-Hungary, a multinational state dating back to the Middle Ages, survived the collapse of monarchical rule in the heart of Europe, witnessed astonishing technological and social changes, and managed to survive all vicissitudes, living as a widow for 67 years and raising eight children. Born in the castle of Lucca near Viareggio, Italy, in 1892, Zita was one of the many children of Robert I, formerly the ruling duke of Parma. Robert was an impoverished descendant of the French dynasty of Bourbon kings, while his second wife Maria Antonia of Portugal was a member of that nation's royal family, the Braganzas. Beautiful and intelligent, Zita grew up in Pianore as well as in a family residence in Schwarzau, Lower Austria. Her private education enabled her to master several languages. Raised in a strict and conservative Roman Catholic environment, she was enrolled in a Konvikt (hostel) in Zangberg, Upper Bavaria, staffed by Salesian teachers, members of the Society of St. Francis de Sales. Here Zita was exposed to assumptions and beliefs that would remain with her for the rest of her life, including her firm conviction in the divine right of families like the Bourbons and Habsburgs to rule their lands and peoples. Whenever Zita returned to visit with her family at Schwarzau, she would accompany them to the Villa Wartholz, where they socialized with the family of her aunt, Archduchess Maria Theresa of Austria . Maria Theresa was a good friend of Zita's mother, and the two looked with favor on the growing friendship between Zita and a member of Maria Theresa's family, Habsburg Archduke Charles I, son of Archduke Otto of Habsburg and Princess Maria Josepha of Saxony . The fondness shown toward one another by Zita and Charles ripened into affection, feelings that met with the approval not only of their respective mothers but of the venerable ruler of the vast Habsburg domains, Emperor Franz Joseph himself. With these blessings, Charles and Zita were married at Schwarzau on October 21, 1911. The wedding ceremonies were immortalized on film, thus preserving for posterity not only images of the young and happy couple but of the aged emperor and his heir, the ill-fated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The marriage would prove to be happy, and eight children would be born to Zita between 1912 and 1922. Charles' father had died in 1906. His uncle Archduke Franz Ferdinand was heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, occupied since 1848 by the much-beloved Emperor Franz Joseph. But upon his marriage in 1900 to Sophie Chotek , Franz Ferdinand had renounced the right of succession to the throne by any children of this union. Thus, upon Franz Ferdinand's death, which presumably lay a number of decades in the future, Charles would succeed as heir to the throne. On June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand and Sophie Chotek were assassinated in Sarajevo, igniting a chain of events that within a few weeks would plunge Europe and eventually the globe into a devastating world conflict. Charles' relations with Emperor Franz Joseph had not been close, but when Franz Ferdinand's death made him heir, the aged ruler took steps to initiate him in various aspects of affairs of state. The complex Habsburg Empire was now engaged in a war for its very survival, however, and immediate military matters soon took up most of Franz Joseph's time. An amiable man of excellent intentions, Charles was intellectually mediocre and had little preparation to rule a complex and fractious realm. He lacked calmness in crisis, displayed little emotional or physical endurance, and was prone to impetuous, rash and even reckless actions. The personal qualities of the ruler remained important despite the fact that since the 1860s Austria-Hungary had evolved into a viable parliamentary state. The emperor was a stabilizing element in the political system of Austria-Hungary because he retained considerable powers and, even more important, played an important symbolic role as a father figure to many competing nationalities whose only significant state loyalty was to the crown and dynasty. Franz Joseph was revered by many of his subjects and was able to dampen their mutual animosities through his unsophisticated yet convincing personality. With his death on November 21, 1916, Charles succeeded to the throne as Emperor Charles I. At the same time, Zita became empress. Charles became emperor at a difficult time. His vast nation was war-weary and old national hatreds were once again threatening to destroy the union of peoples that constituted the Habsburg Empire. Charles and Zita experienced some of the miseries of their subjects at the very start of their reign. While in Budapest in December 1916 for their coronation as king and queen of Hungary (they would never be crowned in Vienna as emperor and empress of Austria), the couple was confronted with the horrors of war. Traditionally the new king of Hungary created new knights of the Order of the Golden Spur, using the venerable sword of St. Stephen to knight a few worthy nobles and, certainly on this occasion, a few military officers for the bravery in the war. But the organizer of the ceremonies, Count Miklós Bánffy, had the idea of bringing men from the front lines to the ceremony, men who were crippled, wounded and even limbless, not dressed in ceremonial attire, so as to "let the battlefield, the muddy, wet nights, the thunder of cannons, and the shell-shock enter with them into the coronation church." The sight was shocking to all present, particularly to Charles and Zita. According to eyewitnesses, it was a miracle that the new king (known as Charles IV in Hungary) was able to get through the ceremony without collapsing. Zita too was deeply affected. Both Charles and Zita were convinced by early 1917 that their empire could not long survive unless it were able to withdraw from the war. Strongly supported by her mother Maria Antonia, Zita took the initiative for a bringing about separate peace between Austria-Hungary and France. Zita's brothers Prince Sixtus and Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma, both of whom were serving at the time as French Army officers, met in Switzerland with their mother, who handed them a secret letter from Zita endorsed by Emperor Charles. The basis for a separate peace treaty between Austria-Hungary and France included the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the restoration of Belgium, the restoration of Serbia with the addition of Albania, and the cession of Constantinople to Russia. In return for accepting these major territorial changes, mostly at the expense of Vienna's powerful German ally, Austria-Hungary would get a treaty of peace. In late March, Sixtus and Xavier went on a secret mission to Vienna to negotiate with their brother-in-law Emperor Charles. Complex and highly secret talks would drag on for several months in the highest Allied councils of state, but as time passed doubts arose on the details of a separate peace settlement, including the fear that Italy might sign a separate peace with Vienna and thus seriously weaken the Allied side. There was also concern over whether Charles could pressure German allies to accept the terms of such a deal. By late June 1917, the diplomatic effort had collapsed and press reports began to divulge tantalizing parts of the episode. The failed diplomatic initiative served to discredit Charles in the eyes of his German allies, who would never again trust him. Equally important was the crucial role assigned to Zita in the Sixtus Affair. In a confidential report to the German Foreign Office, the journalist Dr. Paul Goldmann reported that not only had Empress Zita been able to exert considerable political influence on her husband, she was indeed a partisan sympathizer of the enemy. The empress, noted Goldmann, had forbidden retaliatory air strikes against Italian cities, was in favor of ceding Austrian territories to Italy, and strongly favored pressuring Germany to surrender Alsace-Lorraine to France. Alarmingly, Zita and a circle around her were placing pressure on the irresolute and inexperienced Charles, who was ever more desirous of peace and fearful of Austria-Hungary becoming completely subordinated to a Prussian-German Reich. The Sixtus Affair and Zita's role in it also triggered strong anti-Habsburg sentiments within Austria where segments of the Pan-German press launched a bitter campaign against her. Political enemies of the Habsburgs went so far as to accuse the empress of having betrayed the failed, Austrian offensive against Italy on the Piave River in June 1918. For Austria's Pan-Germans, from this point on Zita was evil personified. By the late summer of 1918, Austrian armies had been defeated and on the home front millions of civilians were destitute and in a state of nearstarvation. Even at this late date, many in Vienna and the court itself continued to live in a world of self-deception and false illusions, perhaps based on a time-honored Austrian tradition of durchwursteln (muddling through). By October 1918, however, it was clear that a catastrophe was taking place and the dynasty might not survive. Desperately, Charles tried to reform the state, putting in place a federal structure, but it was too late. Starting with the Czechs and Slovaks in late October, the various nationalities of the ancient empire began to declare their independence. The deteriorating situation on the battlefields and in the streets raised the possibility of abdication, but Zita strongly urged her husband not to renounce his throne, crying out in his presence, "Abdicate, never, never!" To the last minute, she strongly supported him in his belief that he could not renounce duties which had been hereditarily transferred to him by history and sacred dynastic traditions. Hoping to save something for the future, Charles took the advice of one of his ministers, Ignaz Seipel, by signing a document on November 11, 1918, in which he declared his intention to "renounce all participation in the affairs of state." Subtly crafted by the Catholic prelate Seipel, the document appeared to be an instrument of abdication but did not in fact state this, leaving open the possibility for a future return to the throne. In later years, after the politically adroit Seipel became chancellor of Austria, his political realism caused him to virtually ignore Zita's political ambitions for a Habsburg restoration, attitudes for which she never forgave him. At the time of Seipel's funeral in 1932, the former empress very pointedly chose not to send a wreath to adorn his grave. With Charles' de facto abdication, Austria became a republic. The emperor and empress and their children remained in Austria in Eckartsau Castle, but finally departed for exile in Switzerland on March 24, 1919, where they stayed first at Schloss Gstaad and later at Prangins, in a castle on Lake Geneva. In April 1919, the Republic of Austria passed a Habsburg Exclusion Act which nullified all proprietal and political privileges the dynasty had enjoyed. In Switzerland, Zita and her husband began to dream of a restoration of their throne, not so much in Austria, which had come under Social Democratic influence particularly in "Red Vienna," but in Hungary. Ruled by former Habsburg admiral Nicolas Horthy, Hungary technically remained a kingdom, but under Allied pressure could not invite Charles back to his throne. By 1921, Zita had been able to infuse Charles with sufficient optimism about their prospects for a successful return to the throne. Suddenly and without warning, Charles appeared in Admiral Horthy's chambers in Budapest's Royal Palace on March 27, 1921, informing the regent that he had returned to Hungary to perform his functions as that nation's rightful sovereign. Polite but firm, Horthy informed Charles that he had to leave the country promptly, as the times were not yet ripe for change. The next day Charles was on a car with drawn curtains on the Budapest-Vienna-Zurich express. The episode had been a fiasco. The next attempt to return to power was much more serious, given the fact that it was largely planned not by Charles but by Zita, who saw the issue clearly as one between a usurper, Horthy, and the anointed king of Hungary, her husband Charles. Zita planned for a coup based on energetic action, one that was carefully conceived and backed by military force in the form of Hungarian legitimists led by Colonel Anton Lehár. Zita had not even informed her children when she and Charles left their castle to fly from Switzerland in a chartered airplane that landed on an improvised landing strip in western Hungary on October 21, 1921. Locals learned of the presence of Charles and Zita, giving them a torchlight parade that night. For the next three days, they marched on Budapest with a steadily growing army of supporters. From Budaörs, on the outskirts of the capital, they could see the Royal Palace on the Danube. Unfortunately, they also saw the trenches that their leisurely overland trip had enabled Regent Horthy's troops to dig. At Torbagy near Budapest, Charles and Zita were surrounded by police and formally arrested two days later. The Hungarian people had not risen to the defense of Charles and Zita. In later years, Zita would argue that the only reason this attempt to restore the Habsburg monarchy had failed was because during that season all Hungarian railroad cars were so full of the sugar beet crop that there was no transportation available to move Habsburg supporters to Budapest. Fearful of a Habsburg regime in Hungary, the governments in Prague and Belgrade ordered military mobilization. Charles and Zita were now "guests," i.e., prisoners of the Hungarian Royal Government, incarcerated in the monastery of Tihany overlooking Lake Balaton. Here they occupied two rooms hardly larger than cells. They spent their time praying and gazing at the enchanting scene at their feet, where precipitous rocks rose out of the lake. The Swiss government, noting that the couple had broken their pledge not to engage in political actions, refused to readmit them. The British government responded to a request from Budapest, and provided space on a destroyer that took Charles, Zita and their children into a secure exile. The final destination of the imperial family was Funchal, on the Portuguese island of Madeira in the Atlantic. Charles' fragile constitution broke down from the stresses of recent months and the penury he and his family now found themselves living in and he died of pneumonia in Funchal on April 1, 1922. Several months later, already living in Madrid as a guest of Spain's King Alphonso XIII, Zita gave birth to the couple's last child, a daughter she named Elisabeth . A widow with eight children to support, Zita was fortunate for her royal blood ties. The Spanish king provided lodgings for her family in Lequeito in the Basque region. Later the family moved to Uribarren palace near Madrid. Strongly attached to the traditions of the House of Habsburg, Zita spent the next years in Spain attending to her children's education. Private tutors taught them history, foreign languages and other subjects based on curricula in Austria-Hungary before 1918. The children were raised as devout Roman Catholics, in a context of beliefs centering around the concept of the continuing validity of monarchy as a source of social and political stability. In 1929, Zita moved her family to a château at Steenockerzeel near Brussels, Belgium. She continued to dream of a Habsburg restoration, and carried on countless conversations with those who promised to assist her. In 1930, her oldest son Otto began his studies at the University of Louvain, and within a few years it was Otto who would play an active role in the political activities of the Habsburg family. Many of these schemes amounted to little more than dreams that exploded like soap bubbles, such as a 1933 plan to send Otto to London to help organize an anti-Nazi alliance based on British support of a Habsburg restoration in Austria. The British Foreign Office vetoed the idea. Throughout the 1930s, as her son Otto became increasingly confident in his ability to represent his own interests and those of his family, Zita continued to involve herself in behind-thescenes political activities on behalf of a Habsburg restoration. She and Otto were also received by the pope in August 1936. An important political upheaval favoring the Habsburgs took place in Austria in 1934 when an ultra-conservative dictatorship was created after a civil war crushed the Social Democrats and ended parliamentary government. Led first by Engelbert Dollfuss, who was assassinated by the Nazis, and then by his successor Kurt von Schuschnigg, at first the New Austria appeared to be receptive to the idea of a restored Habsburg monarchy. Otto and Kurt von Schuschnigg met secretly on two occasions, with von Schuschnigg pledging to Otto that he would resist Hitler by force. But in March 1938, Nazi Germany annexed Austria without firing a shot. In Hungary in 1937, Tibor Eckhardt, leader of the Independent Peasant Party, proclaimed that he favored a Habsburg restoration with Otto as the nation's king. In this instance, it was Zita's intervention that appears to have brought down the plan, given the fact that she insisted on such details as Otto's income and how many castles would be at his disposal. The poor peasants who backed Eckhardt's party feared that they would lose their plots of land, or have higher taxes levied on them, if such a restoration actually took place. Zita and her children were barely able to escape the advancing German forces when Belgium was invaded in May 1940. Fleeing across France, they arrived at the Spanish border, where a French officer who had decided to join General Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement allowed the endangered foes of Hitler to cross into Spain and safety. Except for her son Robert, who remained in London in order to lobby for the Habsburg cause with Winston Churchill, Zita and her seven remaining children crossed the Atlantic for the United States, arriving there in late July 1940. During World War II, Austrian monarchists were active in exile politics, and Zita had several meetings with President Franklin Roosevelt, who gave her vague assurances of support for her (and Otto's) plans for a postwar Danubian federation, one presumably with a place for the Habsburg family. She emphasized the need to create a stable order in Central Europe that would weaken Communist influences in that strategically important region. Her dreams could not be achieved and although Austria was restored as a sovereign nation in 1945, it was as a republic rather than a monarchy. For the next 45 years, Soviet influence dominated Hungary and virtually all of the rest of Central Europe. Zita could not return to Europe after 1945, and lived in Tuxedo Park, New York, where she would be seen taking lonely walks near her home, "a strange black-veiled figure wearing high-button shoes." Ex-empress Zita returned to Europe in 1962, settling in Zizers, a village in eastern Switzerland where she lived in a modest tworoom apartment in a home for the elderly run by the Catholic Church. Because of its lingering fear of a Habsburg restoration, Austria forbade members of the family from setting foot on its soil. Things began to change, however, when in 1961 Zita's oldest son Dr. Otto von Habsburg renounced all claims to the throne and became a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany. A noted publicist, he went on to become a highly respected member of the Council of Europe. In 1982, Zita finally was permitted to return to Austria for a visit. (One of her Bourbon relatives, King Juan Carlos of Spain, had interceded on her behalf with Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who approved the visit.) On her appearance outside Vienna's St. Stephen's Cathedral, where she attended mass, the elderly Zita received a tumultuous welcome from thousands of cheering Austrians. Zita, last empress of Austria-Hungary, died in Zizers, Switzerland, on March 14, 1989. Before her burial in the fabled Kapuzinergruft—the Habsburg crypt of Vienna's Capuchin Church—on April 1, the 67th anniversary of Emperor Charles' death on Madeira, Zita lay in state in St. Stephens' Cathedral, her bier festooned with candles. Six black horses drew her hearse through Vienna's narrow, winding streets under overcast skies and intermittent rain, and she was accompanied by a 21-gun salute normally reserved for heads of state. The carriage was the same one that had in 1916 carried the coffin of her fatherin-law, Emperor Franz Joseph, in Vienna's last imperial funeral. In keeping with long-standing Habsburg family traditions, Zita's heart was removed from her body after her death in order to be buried separately. Dating back to the Middle Ages, the tradition reflects the idea that as the center of emotions, the heart deserves a special resting place apart from the rest of the body. Throughout her exile, she carried with her the preserved heart of her husband Charles. The two hearts of the last Habsburg emperor and empress were now to be buried together. sources: Albon und St. André, Baron Eugen d'. Prinzessin Zita. Vienna: Verlag Gerlach & Wiedling, 1911. Bogle, Joanna, and James Bogle. A Heart for Europe: The Lives of Emperor Charles and Empress Zita of Austria-Hungary. Leominster: Gracewing, 1993. Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. The Last Empress: The Life and Times of Zita of Austria-Hungary, 1892–1989. London: HarperCollins, 1991. ——. The Last Habsburg. NY: Weybright and Talley, 1968. ——. "The Secrets of the Last Empress," in The Sunday Telegraph [London]. November 17, 1991, p. 108. "Empress Zita," in Deborah Andrews, ed., The Annual Obituary 1989. Chicago, IL: St. James Press, 1990, pp. 203–205. Feigl, Erich, ed. Kaiser Karl I: Persönliche Aufzeichnungen, Zeugnisse und Dokumente. 2nd rev. ed. Vienna: Amalthea, 1987. ——, ed. Zita, Kaiserin und Königin. 5th rev. ed. Vienna: Amalthea, 1991. Fichtner, Paula Sutter. "The Habsburg Empire in World War I: A Final Episode in Dynastic History," in East European Quarterly. Vol. 11, no. 4. Winter 1977, pp. 445–461. Gehrig, Emmy. Umjubelt, Verkannt, Verbannt: Kaiserin und Königin Zita. Wels: P. Reisinger, 1955. Hamann, Brigitte, ed. Die Habsburger: Ein biographisches Lexikon. Vienna: Verlag Ueberreuter, 1988. Harding, Bertita. Imperial Twilight: The Story of Karl and Zita of Hungary. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1939. Illenyi, Balázs. "The Adventures of the Holy Crown of Hungary," in The Hungarian Quarterly. Vol. 41, no. 158. Summer 2000, pp. 32–41. Kann, Robert A. A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974. Keleher, Edward P. "Emperor Karl and the Sixtus Affair: Politico-Nationalist Repercussions in the Reich German and Austro-German Camps, and the Disintegration of Habsburg Austria, 1916–1918," in East European Quarterly. Vol. 26, no. 2, 1992, pp. 163–184. Klemperer, Klemens von. Ignaz Seipel: Christian Statesman in a Time of Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972. "Landesmutter!," in Der Österreicher [Vienna]. Vol. 9, no. 17. April 27, 1934, p. 1. "Last Empress of Austria-Hungary, Zita, Is Dead in Switzerland at 96," in The New York Times Biographical Service. March 1989, p. 254. Lehár, Anton. Erinnerungen: Gegenrevolution und Retaurationsversuche in Ungarn 1918–1921. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1973. Lengyel, Emil. 1,000 Years of Hungary. NY: John Day, 1958. Der letzte Kaiser, Karl I von Österreich: Sonderausstellung, 27. April bis 31. Oktober 1996. St. Pölten and Pottenbrunn: Landeshauptstadt St. Pölten-Museumsverein Pottenbrunn, 1996. Manteyer, Georges de. Austria's Peace Offer, 1916–1917. London: Constable, 1921. "Memorial Service in Budapest for Empress Zita," in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. April 6, 1989, Eastern Europe 0427/B/1. Parker, Robert. Headquarters Budapest. NY: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944. Polzer-Hoditz und Wolframitz, Graf Arthur von. The Emperor Karl. Trans. by Dorothy Fraser Tait and Frank Stewart Flint. NY: Putnam, 1930. Redier, Antoine. "L'impératrice Zita et l'offre de paix séparée," in Revue des deux Mondes [Paris]. Vol. 60, 1930, pp. 174–202. Scheer, Maximilian. "Die Verschwörung um Mindszenty," in Aufbau [Berlin]. Vol. 5, no. 11, 1949, pp. 1032–1034. Sencourt, Robert. Heirs of Tradition: Tributes of a New Zealander. London: Carroll & Nicholson, 1949. Thanner, Erich. "Die Odyssee der Kaiserin Zita," in Zeitbühne. Vol. 8, no. 1. January 1979, pp. 35–40. Várdy, Steven Béla. Historical Dictionary of Hungary. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1997. Wagemut, Karl. Was ich im Elternhause der Exkaiserin Zita von Österreich erlebte: Bruchstücke aus demLeben eines ehemaligen katholischen Hofgeistlichen. Dresden: A. Köhler, 1920. Wagner, Renate. Heimat bist Du grosser Töchter: Weitere Portraits. Vienna: Edition S/Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1995. Wheatcroft, Andrew. "Tragic Operetta of the Last Habsburg Queen," in The Guardian [London]. March 20, 1989. Z., H. Die kaiserliche Familie in Lequeitio: Reiseerinnerungen eines Österreichers. Vienna: Vogelsang-Verlag Ges. m.b.H., 1924. "Zita, die meist verleumdete Frau der Welt!," in Der Österreicher [Vienna]. Vol. 9, no. 35. August 31, 1934, p. 4. "Zita of Bourbon-Parma: End of the Habsburg Empire," in The Times [London]. March 15, 1989, p. 22.
28465	yago	2	57	https://www.nationaljeweler.com/articles/8189-sotheby-s-adds-lots-to-bourbon-parma-jewelry-auction	en	Sotheby’s Adds Lots to Bourbon-Parma Jewelry Auction	https://uploads.national…ce04bdf1f800.jpg	https://uploads.national…ce04bdf1f800.jpg	[ "https://www.facebook.com/tr?id=925762564811793&ev=PageView&noscript=1", "https://www.nationaljeweler.com/packs/media/components/shared/header/static/header_logo-7e3600e0647068028b4c0dc19df4a186.svg", "https://uploads.nationaljeweler.com/uploads/84a16b723c9fd93cc6b94d8a0f49e93e.jpg", "https://uploads.national...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "gemstones at National Jeweler", "covering sourcing", "Natalie Francisco", "Michelle Graff", "Lenore Fedow", "Lauren McLemore", "Amanda Gizzi", "Emmanuel Raheb" ]	null	There are now even more jewels from Marie Antoinette to go around.	en	/packs/media/images/favicons/apple-touch-icon-22d629f293b3e6ed1a817f3595f48cc2.png	nationaljeweler.com	https://nationaljeweler.com/articles/8189-sotheby-s-adds-lots-to-bourbon-parma-jewelry-auction	Geneva—There are now even more jewels from Marie Antoinette to go around. In June, Sotheby’s announced that it would hold a jewelry auction this fall featuring pieces with exceptional historical provenance. “Royal Jewels from the Bourbon-Parma Family” features lots once owned by Queen Marie Antoinette, King Charles X of France, the archdukes of Austria and the dukes of Parma. It will be held in Geneva on Nov. 14. In September, Sotheby’s unveiled more pieces it was adding to the sale, including a pair of natural pearl and diamond earrings owned by Marie Antoinette and estimated to sell for between $200,000 and $300,000, pictured below. The six-strand pearl necklace seen below also has a direct link to the iconic queen of France. Its clasp, which is unaltered, was part of her collection and features five large and 18 smaller natural pearls. In Marie Antoinette’s day, it formed the clasp of a six-row natural pearl bracelet, one of a pair. The necklace was commissioned by later generations of the Bourbon-Parma family and strung with cultured pearls. It could go for between $5,000 and $8,000. There are also five more diamond jewels to be auctioned come November that are linked to Antoinette, among them a diamond brooch from the late 18th century featuring a yellow diamond. The double ribbon bow was formerly part of her collection, and it is believed the yellow diamond pendant was added later ($50,000-$80,000). Also passed down through Marie Antoinette’s descendants is a diamond ring featuring her portrait, made in the late 18th century. It is estimated to sell for between $8,000 and $12,000. With the recently announced additions from Sotheby’s, the jewelry auction now has a total of 10 pieces once owned by Antoinette. The sale also now includes jewels that belonged to King Charles X (1757-1836)—the last King of France and last of the Bourbon rulers—his son the Duke of Angoulême, and their descendants. This includes a diamond tiara, estimated at between $350,000 and $550,000 and seen below, which Sotheby’s said offers insight into how precious objects were disassembled so diamonds and gemstones could be re-used as fashion changed. The diamonds in the piece came from a badge of the Royal Order of the Holy Spirit, a French order of chivalry founded by King Henri III in 1578; the insignia was originally owned by Charles X, Marie Antoinette’s brother-in-law. The diamonds were passed down to
28465	yago	1	1	https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/en/the-last-grand-wedding-in-the-habsburg-empire-the-wedding-of-zita-and-charles/	en	The last grand wedding in the Habsburg Empire – The wedding of Zita and Charles	https://habsburgottoalap…U060-masolat.jpg	https://habsburgottoalap…U060-masolat.jpg	[ "https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/logoW_en-01-01.svg", "https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/HOAL_I-5-c_U060-masolat.jpg", "https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/HOAL_I-5-c_U064-1-280x190.jpg", "https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/wp-con...	[ "https://www.youtube.com/embed/W3C8eKVKQT8" ]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Balázs Laura" ]	2022-10-21T08:58:44+00:00	This year marked the 100th anniversary of the death of the last Austrian Emperor and King of Hungary, Charles von Habsburg, whom Pope John Paul II beatified in 2004. The liturgical day commemorating the saintly king was 21 October, coinciding with the anniversary of his marriage. With this decision, the Roman Catholic Church wished to	en	https://habsburgottoalap…avi_ho-32x32.png	Otto von Habsburg Foundation -	https://habsburgottoalapitvany.hu/en/the-last-grand-wedding-in-the-habsburg-empire-the-wedding-of-zita-and-charles/	This year marked the 100th anniversary of the death of the last Austrian Emperor and King of Hungary, Charles von Habsburg, whom Pope John Paul II beatified in 2004. The liturgical day commemorating the saintly king was 21 October, coinciding with the anniversary of his marriage. With this decision, the Roman Catholic Church wished to draw attention to his exemplary married life and one of the possible paths to sainthood.[1] Zita was born as a princess of the Bourbon-Parma family, and Charles of Habsburg-Lothringen was the grandson of Franz Joseph’s brother, Charles Louis. Austrian historian Erich Feigl described this important day of their lives as “the last grand wedding in Europe”.[2] We think it is essential to underline that it was a marriage of love, not a marriage dictated by politics. A journalist from the Budapest newspaper wrote this about the occasion: “this glorious, fairy-tale wedding is the happy ending of a romantic love story”.[3] With the use of the press of the time and published scientific literature, this article aims to be a brief, pictorial summary of the big day. There are plenty of pictures of the event for posterity, as numerous photographers and cinematographers attended the event. They met as children in the Chateau of Schwarzau, owned by the Bourbon-Parma family, but the defining encounter occurred in 1909 at the famous spa of Franzensbad[4]. Two years later, on 13 June 1911, they became engaged in Zita’s birthplace, the Pianore Palace, in a small family circle. The betrothal was reported in several Hungarian newspapers, and preparations began immediately after the engagement.[5] The couple signed a marriage contract, which the commissioners drafted for several weeks. During this time, the Duchess studied Hungarian and Czech at the Schwarzau Castle and toured Vienna, where she had her wedding dress made in a fashion salon on Kärtner Strasse. These were exhibited before the wedding so that the public could inspect them and the press could report the contents of the finished chemise in detail. Charles was at the Brandeis barracks but visited his bride several times and gifted her a necklace of twenty-two rows of pearls as a wedding present.[6] To honour the occasion, the Parma family had the castle renovated to make it a fitting venue for the wedding. They renovated drawing rooms, replaced the benches in the chapel of the castle with chairs to provide more seating for guests, and even installed a special telephone to receive congratulations from those who were unable to attend the big day. Around the castle, houses in the villages were decorated with garlands and flags, a special post office was set up in the park to receive wedding gifts and telegrams, and chancel arches were placed on the road to the castle. [7] A separate salon in the castle was used to keep the arriving wedding gifts. Archduchess Maria Josepha presented Princess Zita with a brilliant brooch, while Franz Ferdinand gave her a diamond ring set with rubies. Other gifts included a silver box, a porcelain coffee set, handicrafts, presents from various institutions and a Zita waltz composed by the court conductor. A memorable attraction was the bronze statue of Zita, which was transported by airship from the barracks in Vienna by the young aviation officers, who knew how interested Zita was in flying. Even more joyful was the photograph presented by the mayor of Franzensbad, which captured the square where the couple had walked so many times after the engagement and the locals christened Zita Square. Among the gifts, many point out the copy of Leonardo da Vinci’s portrait of Christ in Milan in an ornate frame, sent by Pope Pius X, for the original was placed in the Maria Delle Grazie chapel because Zita’s full name is Zita Maria Delle Grazie. Some guests arrived several days before the wedding and stayed in the surrounding castles and villas. In attendance were King Frederick Augustus III of Saxon, Franz Ferdinand and his wife, members of the Habsburg, Parma, Bragança, Spanish Bourbon, Orléans, Liechtenstein, Saxe-Koburg, Wittelsbach, Württemberg families and descendants of several princely and count families. The Hungarian guests appeared at the event in Hungarian court dress, ‘díszmagyar’. On 20 October, the representative of Pope Pius X, Papal Major-Domo Gaetano Bisleti, arrived. In the afternoon of that day, the guests were entertained by a school choir of 800 people, followed by dinner and a soirée with the 67th Infantry Regiment’s orchestra. Afterwards, the villagers held a torch-light procession and fireworks, and the couple then concluded with a short carriage ride around the village. Charles also received his appointment as a Major that evening. The wedding day’s events have been recorded in great detail for posterity. The colourful press reports recorded every detail. Kaiserwetter, in other words, bright sunshine, greeted the crowds of guests. The most eagerly awaited attendee at the wedding was the Emperor himself, Franz Joseph, of whom every surviving account has a special mention. The Emperor arrived by special court train and was greeted with a huge ovation, and the so-called ‘Emperor’s Gate’ was reopened after 30 years. [8] The small chapel of Schwarzau Castle was the venue for the nuptial ceremony. It is noted in several places that seventy gilded chairs awaited the participants, and a massive chair of honour for Franz Joseph was set up to the left of the altar.[9] The Pope’s representative, Papal Major General Gaetano Bisleti, celebrated the ceremony in French. According to reports, the bride’s dress was made of heavy satin (Duchesse) material with a three-metre-long fin, on which were sewn silver embroidered Bourbon lilies and orange blossoms surrounded by myrtle garlands. Zita’s four sisters held the long tail during the procession to the chapel. The waist part of the dress was made of the same lace worn by her grandmother, the Queen of Portugal, at her wedding, and a bouquet of myrtles was placed at the bust. Princess Zita’s hairstyle was simple, yet made glamorous by wearing a myrtle wreath with a lace Brussels veil that reached down to the fin. The headpiece was adorned with the diamond tiara that Franz Joseph had given Zita. [10] The groom wore his dragoon captain’s uniform, and on his chest hung the Order of the Golden Fleece, along with the military medal and the order of the King of Saxony. The couple’s wedding ring bore, next to their names, a line from the deeply religious Charles’ favourite prayer: ‘Sub tuum praesidium confugimus, sancta Dei Genitrix’.[11] The ceremony ended with the blessing of Pope Pius X: “In the many bitter hours of life, which will surely not spare you, may your faith in God be your support and may happy family life always be your refuge”.[12] The newlyweds then received their congratulations in the castle, followed by the wedding lunch, where Francis Joseph toasted them: “The wedding which has filled us all with joy and which we have gathered here today to celebrate is a great joy and great satisfaction. Archduke Charles has chosen Princess Zita of Parma as his life partner. I salute him and his heart for this choice, and I welcome Archduchess Zita with inward joy as a member of the family of my house […]”. [13] The meal is always a crucial part of a wedding ceremony. At the reception, delicacies such as venison dishes, roast lamb and turkey were served on golden platters. The menu was: ‘Creamy lettuce salad, wild rabbit puree St Hubert’s style, renaissance roast lamb, Parisian-style langoustine, roast turkey, seasonal salad, asparagus with butter, pineapple and strawberry ice cream, cheese, fruits, dessert.’ [14] The banquet preceding the wedding was plated in silverware. The preserved menu card was written in French, as was the longstanding custom of the courts. The ten-course meal included poultry (chicken, pheasant), veal loin, salmon, trout, artichokes, cheesecakes and fruits, served with a variety of delicious sauces. [15] Immediately after the dinner, the newlyweds sent a telegram to the Pope, thanking him for his blessing and wedding gift.[16] Shortly after Francis Joseph’s departure, they took a car and travelled to Wartholz Castle in Reichenau, where they spent a few days on their honeymoon. It is reported that after the event, a limited number of commemorative coins were minted on the orders of Franz Joseph and distributed among the top aristocracy. On one side of the coin, the newlyweds were depicted with the inscription ‘Carolus Franciscus Josephus Archidux Austriae and Zita Bourbonica Ducissa Parmensis’. The two coats of arms were on the other side, with the inscription “In Memoriam Felicissimi Matroninii. Biac 21. Octobris 1911.”[17] Charles and Zita’s marriage could only have lasted eleven years because the former monarch died on the island of Madeira at the age of 34. The couple had eight children. Their exemplary marriage and devotion to each other endured through difficult times and exile until Charles’ death. For half a century afterwards, Zita, dressed in mourning, raised their children and kept her husband’s memory alive. Eszter Gaálné Barcs, Beáta Vitos-Merza
28465	yago	0	81	https://www.myheritage.com/names/zita_parma	en				[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null
28465	yago	1	22	http://www.beatification-imperatrice-zita.org/pages/english/biography/a-grandmother-for-europe-1953-1989.html	en	Association pour la bÃ©atification de l'ImpÃ©ratrice Zita			[ "http://www.beatification-imperatrice-zita.org/media/Depart-de-Tuxedo-Charlotte-et-Rodolphe.jpg", "http://www.beatification-imperatrice-zita.org/media/1953-Charlotte-de-Luxembourg.jpg", "http://www.beatification-imperatrice-zita.org/media/Zizers.jpg", "http://www.beatification-imperatrice-zita.org/media/Appar...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null					null	Zita in Luxemburg, Then with Her Children in Germany and Belgium After her son Rudolf’s wedding, which closed the American phase, the Empress’ presence in the United States no longer made sense. Because once again, the center of gravity of her family had shifted back to Europe, with the children’s marriages. Two more of her children were married (only Archduchess Adelheid remained single): - On December 28, 1953, Robert, now bearing the title of Austria-Este that formerly belonged to Franz-Ferdinand, married Princess Marguerite of Savoy-Aosta at Bourg-en-Bresse. - On July 21, 1956, Archduchess Charlotte married Prince Alexander of Mecklemburg-Strelitz, both of whom were older. The couple did not have any children. Since her mother, Duchess Maria-Antonia, was elderly, Zita decided in 1953 to relocate to Europe in order to take care of her at the castle of Berg, the residence of the Grand-Dukes of Luxemburg (her brother Felix was the Prince-Consort). The Servant of God cared for her until her death in 1959, but was refused the right to attend her own mother’s funeral because she was buried at the castle of Puchheim, property of the Bourbon-Parma Family, in Upper Austria. After the death of her mother, she alternated visits with some of her children, especially in Pöcking and Brussels. She also enjoyed vacationing in Davos, at the Saint Joseph House, with the Dominicans of Ilanz, which also ended up being her residence for a short period of time (1960-1962). The last years of her life in Switzerland, in Zizers (1960-1989) In honor of her 70th birthday, on May 9, 1962, a family reunion was organized at Pöcking-am-Starnberg in Bavaria, at her son Otto’s home. The Servant of God felt the need to have a home of her own. She found it for the last 27 years of her life in Zizers, in the Canton of Grisons, Switzerland. This was a centralized location in regard to her children, close to Austria, Bavaria and not far from Belgium. She thus found a home at St. Johannesstift, property of the Diocese of Coire (Chur). This house was used as a retirement and nursing home, under the care of the Franciscan Missionary Sisters of Mary Immaculate (founded by St. Marie Charitas Brader). Her apartment was composed of three small rooms with a veranda, with simple furniture belonging to the sisters. She gave to Thérèse, Countess Korff-Schmising-Kersenbrock, her lady-in-waiting since 1917, the room with the balcony, keeping for herself the least sunny. Zita cared for her and looked after her as she became weaker, until her death on February 10, 1973, faithful to the end. The Servant of God continued to live an austere life, rising at 5:30 and spending much of her time in prayer, such as part of the Liturgy of the Hours, attending several masses daily (usually three), and reciting her rosary. But she was always very interested in current events, both in the Church and in the world, keeping up her very voluminous correspondence to which she usually responded personally or through her family. She did not live as a recluse, however, and received many visitors and traveled abroad for religious occasions such as a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1962; then to Madeira in 1967 and again in 1968 for the blessing of her husband’s new tomb. Also, she went to Rome three times, once for the canonization of three Austrians by Paul VI in 1975, and again for two private audiences with Pope John-Paul II in May of 1979 and January of 1984. Formal family events, cheerful and painful, also gave her many occasions to travel. Return to Austria Among her greatest joys, was her triumphant return to Austria in 1982, which was made possible despite the fact that she absolutely refused to sign any renunciation of her titles, thus remaining faithful to her principles that even if she was forced into banishment she would not discard the mission she received from God (the oath taken by her husband during the Hungarian coronation ceremony bound her before God as well). Her son Otto, however, for pragmatic reasons signed several declarations renouncing his rights between 1958 and 1961, but he was not successful in his attempts to return to Austria until 1966. Indeed, a decree from the High Court of Administrative Justice recognized that as a member of the Habsburg family by marriage only, the anti-Habsburg law of exile did not apply to Zita[1]. Therefore, the 63 years of exile had been unduly imposed upon the Empress. She returned through Feldkirch, the way she had left Austria soil, with a Spanish passport dating back to before the war. Her arrival in Vienna, on November 13, 1982, was a triumph, with more than 20,000 people wanting to attend the mass offered in her honor at the Cathedral of Saint Stephen. She returned regularly from that time on, with her daughter Elisabeth, Princess of Liechtenstein, or for a pilgrimage to the shrine at Mariazell.
28465	yago	2	20	https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/1334644/royal-wedding-2020-news-royal-news-Archduchess-Gabriella-of-Austria-Henri-of-Bourbon-Parma	en	Royal Wedding 2020: Royal whose mother was linked to Prince Charles will marry this month	https://cdn.images.expre…x445/1334644.jpg	https://cdn.images.expre…x445/1334644.jpg	[ "https://cdn.images.express.co.uk/img/logo/dr/logo.png", "https://cdn.images.express.co.uk/img/dynamic/106/590x/royal-wedding-2020-news-royal-news-Archduchess-Gabriella-of-Austria-Henri-of-Bourbon-Parma-1334644.jpg?r=1599898707343", "https://cdn.images.express.co.uk/img/dynamic/106/590x/secondary/royal-wedding-...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Alice Scarsi" ]	2020-09-12T09:18:27+01:00	THE DAUGHTER of a princess once considered the ideal wife for Prince Charles is set to marry this month.	en	https://cdn.images.express.co.uk/favicon.ico	Express.co.uk	https://www.express.co.uk/news/royal/1334644/royal-wedding-2020-news-royal-news-Archduchess-Gabriella-of-Austria-Henri-of-Bourbon-Parma	Imperial and Royal Highness Archduchess Gabriella of Austria will reportedly marry her fiancé HRH Prince Henri of Bourbon-Parma this September. Henri asked 26-year-old Gabriella to tie the knot on October 22 2017, just a week before the birth of their daughter Victoria Antonia Marie-Astrid Lydia. After they maintained a long-distance relationship while Henri was studying law in Copenhagen, the couple settled down in Switzerland. Henri and Gabriella are second cousins as they are both great-grandchildren of Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg and her husband Prince Félix. But Gabriella's side of the family also has an interesting link with the British Royal Family. Her mother, Princess Marie-Astrid of Luxembourg, is the elder daughter and eldest child of Grand Duke Jean of Luxembourg and Joséphine-Charlotte of Belgium. This made her one of the few remaining princesses from European reigning houses - and considered by match-makers an ideal candidate for marriage to Charles, the Prince of Wales. Reports flurried about the prospects of such a marriage between two royal households in the 1970s. At the beginning of that decade, Prince Charles had already met Camilla Parker Bowles, who in 2005 would become his second wife. READ MORE: Sophie Wessex 'proud' to teach Lady Louise royal ways - expert Invalid email We use your sign-up to provide content in ways you've consented to and to improve our understanding of you. This may include adverts from us and 3rd parties based on our understanding. You can unsubscribe at any time. Read our Privacy Policy But over the following 10 years, the Prince of Wales reportedly dated several women, including the grand-daughter of Lord Louis Mountbatten, his mentor, Lady Amanda Ellingworth. He eventually married Princess Diana in July 1981. Prince Henri is the member of the Bourbon-Parma house, a cadet branch of the Spanish Royal Family whose members once ruled as King of Etruria and as Duke of the Italian cities of Parma and Piacenza, Guastalla, and Lucca. DON'T MISS A member of the Bourbon-Parma house, Prince Sixtus Henry, is considered the Regent of Spain by some Carlists, a movement aiming to establish in Madrid a different branch of the Bourbon dynasty. Henri is the son of Prince Erik of Bourbon-Parma and Countess Lydia Holstein-Ledreborg. Prince Henri’s paternal grandfather, Prince Michel of Bourbon-Parma, famously became a racing car driver after World War 2. The aristocrat grew up in Paris before fleeing to New York to escape the German invasion. Aged 17, he joined the US Army and was parachuted into Nazi-occupied France to operate behind enemy lines. In 1945 he was moved to Indochina to fight a national independence coalition called Viet Minh born in 1935. However, he was found and held captive for 11 months with five more soldiers - four of which were killed. After being freed, Prince Michel was awarded the British Military Cross and the Croix de Guerre. Prince Michel died last year aged 95.
28465	yago	0	39	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Charles_I_of_Austria	en	Charles I of Austria	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/ucp-internal-test-starter-commons/images/a/aa/FandomFireLogo.png/revision/latest?cb=20210713142711	[ "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/24/Charles_I_of_Austria.jpg/180px-Charles_I_of_Austria.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/ca/Zitawed.jpg/180px-Zitawed.jpg", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f7/Karloath.jpg/180px-Karloath.jpg", "https://...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Contributors to Military Wiki" ]	2024-07-29T22:27:06+00:00	Charles I of Austria or Charles IV of Hungary (Karl Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Marie; 17 August 1887 – 1 April 1922) was, among other titles, the last ruler of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary,[1] and the last monarch of the...	en	/skins-ucp/mw139/common/favicon.ico	Military Wiki	https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Charles_I_of_Austria	"Karl I" redirects here. For the Prince of Liechtenstein, see Karl I of Liechtenstein. Charles I of Austria or Charles IV of Hungary (Karl Franz Joseph Ludwig Hubert Georg Otto Marie; 17 August 1887 – 1 April 1922) was, among other titles, the last ruler of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He was the last Emperor of Austria, the last King of Hungary,[1] and the last monarch of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine. He reigned from 1916 until 1918, when he "renounced participation" in state affairs, but did not abdicate. He spent the remaining years of his life attempting to restore the monarchy until his death in 1922. Following his beatification by the Catholic Church, he has become commonly known as Blessed Charles of Austria. Early life[] Charles was born on 17 August 1887 in the Castle of Persenbeug in Lower Austria. His parents were Archduke Otto Franz of Austria and Princess Maria Josepha of Saxony. At the time, his granduncle Franz Joseph reigned as Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and his uncle Franz Ferdinand became heir presumptive two years later. As a child, Charles was reared a devout Roman Catholic. He spent his early years wherever his father's regiment happened to be stationed; later on he lived in Vienna and Reichenau. He was privately educated, but, contrary to the custom ruling in the imperial family, he attended a public gymnasium for the sake of demonstrations in scientific subjects. On the conclusion of his studies at the gymnasium, he entered the army, spending the years from 1906-1908 as an officer chiefly in Prague, where he studied law and political science concurrently with his military duties.[2] In 1907 he was declared of age and Prince Zdenko Lobkowitz was appointed his chamberlain. In the next few years he carried out his military duties in various Bohemian garrison towns. Charles's relations with his granduncle were not intimate, and those with his uncle not cordial, the differences between their wives increasing the existing tension between them. For these reasons, Charles, up to the time of the murder of Franz Ferdinand, obtained no insight into affairs of state, but led the life of a prince not destined for a high political position.[2] Marriage[] In 1911, Charles married Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma. They had met as children but did not see one another for almost ten years, as each pursued their education. In 1909, his Dragoon regiment was stationed at Brandeis an der Elbe (Brandýs nad Labem), from where he visited his aunt at Franzensbad.[3]:5 It was during one of these visits that Charles and Zita became reacquainted.[3]:5 Due to Franz Ferdinand's morganatic marriage, his children were excluded from the succession. As a result, the Emperor severely pressured Charles to marry. Zita not only shared Charles' devout Catholicism, but also an impeccably royal lineage.[4]:16 Zita later recalled, "We were of course glad to meet again and became close friends. On my side feelings developed gradually over the next two years. He seemed to have made his mind up much more quickly, however, and became even more keen when, in the autumn of 1910, rumours spread about that I had got engaged to a distant Spanish relative, Jaime, Duke of Madrid. On hearing this, the Archduke came down post haste from his regiment at Brandeis and sought out his grandmother, Archduchess Maria Theresa, who was also my aunt and the natural confidante in such matters. He asked if the rumor was true and when told it was not, he replied, 'Well, I had better hurry in any case or she will get engaged to someone else.'"[3]:8 Heir presumptive[] Charles became heir presumptive after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, the event which precipitated World War I. Only at this time did the old Emperor, moved by an innate sense of duty, take steps to initiate the heir-presumptive to his crown in affairs of state. But the outbreak of World War I interfered with this political education. Charles spent his time during the first phase of the war at headquarters at Teschen, but exercised no military influence.[2] Charles then became a Generalfeldmarschall in the Austro-Hungarian Army. In the spring of 1916, in connection with the offensive against Italy, he was entrusted with the command of the XX. Corps, whose affections the heir-presumptive to the throne won by his affability and friendliness. The offensive, after a successful start, soon came to a standstill. Shortly afterwards, Charles went to the eastern front as commander of an army operating against the Russians and Romanians.[2] Reign[] Charles succeeded to the thrones in November 1916, after the death of Emperor Franz Joseph. On 2 December 1916, he took over the title of Supreme Commander of the whole army from Archduke Frederick. His coronation occurred on 30 December. In 1917, Charles secretly entered into peace negotiations with France. He employed his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, an officer in the Belgian Army, as intermediary. Although his foreign minister, Ottokar Czernin, was only interested in negotiating a general peace which would include Germany, Charles himself went much further in suggesting his willingness to make a separate peace. When news of the overture leaked in April 1918, Charles denied involvement until French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau published letters signed by him. This led to Czernin's resignation, forcing Austria-Hungary into an even more dependent position with respect to its seemingly wronged German ally. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was wracked by inner turmoil in the final years of the war, with much tension between ethnic groups. As part of his Fourteen Points, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson demanded that the Empire allow for autonomy and self-determination of its peoples. In response, Charles agreed to reconvene the Imperial Parliament and allow for the creation of a confederation with each national group exercising self-governance. However, the ethnic groups fought for full autonomy as separate nations, as they were now determined to become independent from Vienna at the earliest possible moment. Foreign minister Baron Istvan Burián asked for an armistice based on the Fourteen Points on 14 October, and two days later Charles issued a proclamation that radically changed the nature of the Austrian state. The Poles were granted full independence with the purpose of joining their ethnic brethren in Russia and Germany in a Polish state. The rest of the Austrian lands were transformed into a federal union composed of four parts: German, Czech, South Slav, and Ukrainian. Each of the four parts was to be governed by a federal council, and Trieste was to have a special status. However, Secretary of State Robert Lansing replied four days later that the Allies were now committed to the causes of the Czechs, Slovaks and South Slavs. Therefore, autonomy for the nationalities was no longer enough. In fact, a Czechoslovak provisional government had joined the Allies on 14 October, and the South Slav national council declared an independent South Slav state on 29 October 1918. The Lansing note effectively ended any efforts to keep the Empire together. One by one, the nationalities proclaimed their independence; even before the note the national councils had been acting more like provisional governments. Charles' political future became uncertain. On 31 October, Hungary officially ended the personal union between Austria and Hungary. Nothing remained of Charles' realm except the Danubian and Alpine provinces, and he was challenged even there by the German Austrian State Council. His last prime minister, Heinrich Lammasch, advised him that it was fruitless to stay on. Proclamation of 11 November[] On 11 November 1918—the same day as the armistice ending the war between allies and Germany—Charles issued a carefully worded proclamation in which he recognized the Austrian people's right to determine the form of the state and "relinquish(ed) every participation in the administration of the State."[5] He also released his officials from their oath of loyalty to him. On the same day the Imperial Family left Schönbrunn and moved to Castle Eckartsau, east of Vienna. On 13 November, following a visit of Hungarian magnates, Charles issued a similar proclamation for Hungary. Although it has widely been cited as an "abdication", that word was never mentioned in either proclamation.[6] Indeed, he deliberately avoided using the word abdication in the hope that the people of either Austria or Hungary would vote to recall him. Privately, Charles left no doubt that he believed himself to be the rightful emperor. Addressing Cardinal Friedrich Gustav Piffl, he wrote: I did not abdicate, and never will. (...) I see my manifesto of 11 November as the equivalent to a cheque which a street thug has forced me to issue at gunpoint. (...) I do not feel bound by it in any way whatsoever.[7] Instead, on 12 November, the day after he issued his proclamation, the independent Republic of German-Austria was proclaimed, followed by the proclamation of the Hungarian Democratic Republic on 16 November. An uneasy truce-like situation ensued and persisted until 23 March 1919, when Charles left for Switzerland, escorted by the commander of the small British guard detachment at Eckartsau, Lt. Col. Edward Lisle Strutt. As the Imperial Train left Austria on 24 March, Charles issued another proclamation in which he confirmed his claim of sovereignty, declaring that "whatever the national assembly of German Austria has resolved with respect to these matters since 11 November is null and void for me and my House."[8] Although the newly established republican government of Austria was not aware of this "Manifesto of Feldkirch" at this time (it had been dispatched only to the Spanish King and to the Pope through diplomatic channels), the politicians now in power were extremely irritated by the Emperor's departure without an explicit abdication. On 3 April 1919, the Austrian Parliament passed the Habsburg Law, which permanently barred Charles and Zita from returning to Austria. Other Habsburgs were banished from Austrian territory unless they renounced all intentions of reclaiming the throne and accepted the status of ordinary citizens. Another law, passed on the same day, abolished all nobility in Austria. In Switzerland, Charles and his family briefly took residence at Castle Wartegg near Rorschach at Lake Constance, and moved to Château de Prangins at Lake Geneva on 20 May 1919. Attempts to reclaim throne of Hungary[] Main article: Charles IV of Hungary's conflict with Miklós Horthy Encouraged by Hungarian royalists ("legitimists"), Charles sought twice in 1921 to reclaim the throne of Hungary, but failed largely because Hungary's regent, Miklós Horthy (the last admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Navy), refused to support him. Horthy's failure to support Charles' restoration attempts is often described as "treasonous" by royalists. Critics suggest that Horthy's actions were more firmly grounded in political reality than those of Charles and his supporters. Indeed, the neighbouring countries had threatened to invade Hungary if Charles tried to regain the throne. Later in 1921, the Hungarian parliament formally nullified the Pragmatic Sanction—an act that effectively dethroned the Habsburgs. Exile in Madeira and death[] After the second failed attempt at restoration in Hungary, Charles and pregnant Zita were briefly quarantined at Tihany Abbey. On 1 November 1921 they were taken to the Danube harbor city of Baja, made to board the British monitor HMS Glowworm, and were removed to the Black Sea where they were transferred to the light cruiser HMS Cardiff.[9][10] They arrived in their final exile, the Portuguese island of Madeira, on 19 November 1921. Determined to prevent a third restoration attempt, the Council of Allied Powers had agreed on Madeira because it was isolated in the Atlantic and easily guarded.[11] Originally the couple and their children (who joined them only on 2 February 1922) lived at Funchal at the Villa Vittoria, next to Reid's Hotel, and later moved to Quinta do Monte. Compared to the imperial glory in Vienna and even at Eckartsau, conditions there were certainly impoverished.[12] Charles would not leave Madeira again. On 9 March 1922 he caught a cold walking into town and developed bronchitis, which subsequently progressed to severe pneumonia. Having suffered two heart attacks, he died of respiratory failure on 1 April in the presence of his wife (who was pregnant with their eighth child) and 9-year-old former Crown Prince Otto, retaining consciousness almost to the last moment.[13] His remains except for his heart are still kept on the island, in the Church of Our Lady of Monte, in spite of several attempts to move them to the Habsburg Crypt in Vienna. Assessment[] Historians have been mixed in their evaluations of Charles and his reign. One of the most critical has been Helmut Rumpler, head of the Habsburg commission of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, who has described Charles as "a dilettante, far too weak for the challenges facing him, out of his depth, and not really a politician." However, others have seen Charles as a brave and honourable figure who tried as Emperor-King to halt World War I. The English writer, Herbert Vivian, wrote: "Karl was a great leader, a Prince of peace, who wanted to save the world from a year of war; a statesman with ideas to save his people from the complicated problems of his Empire; a King who loved his people, a fearless man, a noble soul, distinguished, a saint from whose grave blessings come." Furthermore, Anatole France, the French novelist, stated: "Emperor Karl is the only decent man to come out of the war in a leadership position, yet he was a saint and no one listened to him. He sincerely wanted peace, and therefore was despised by the whole world. It was a wonderful chance that was lost." Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, who at the time of Charles' reign was the commander in chief of the Imperial German Army, commented in his memoirs: "He tried to compensate for the evaporation of the ethical power which emperor Franz Joseph had represented by offering ethnical reconciliation. Even as he dealt with elements who were sworn to the goal of destroying his empire he believed that his acts of political grace would have an impact on their conscience. These attempts were totally futile; those people had long ago lined up with our common enemies, and were far from being deterred."[14] Beatification[] Catholic Church leaders have praised Charles for putting his Christian faith first in making political decisions, and for his role as a peacemaker during the war, especially after 1917. They have considered that his brief rule expressed Roman Catholic social teaching, and that he created a social legal framework that in part still survives. Pope John Paul II declared Charles "Blessed" in a beatification ceremony held on 3 October 2004,[15] and stated: The decisive task of Christians consists in seeking, recognizing and following God's will in all things. The Christian statesman, Charles of Austria, confronted this challenge every day. To his eyes, war appeared as "something appalling". Amid the tumult of the First World War, he strove to promote the peace initiative of my Predecessor, Benedict XV.[16] From the beginning, the Emperor Charles conceived of his office as a holy service to his people. His chief concern was to follow the Christian vocation to holiness also in his political actions. For this reason, his thoughts turned to social assistance. The cause or campaign for his canonization began in 1949, when testimony of his holiness was collected in the Archdiocese of Vienna. In 1954, the cause was opened and he was declared "servant of God", the first step in the process. The League of Prayers established for the promotion of his cause has set up a website,[17] and Cardinal Christoph Schönborn of Vienna has sponsored the cause. Recent milestones[] On 14 April 2003, the Vatican's Congregation for the Causes of Saints in the presence of Pope John Paul II, promulgated Charles of Austria's "heroic virtues, and he thereby acquired the title of venerable. On 21 December 2003, the Congregation certified, on the basis of three expert medical opinions, that a miracle in 1960 occurred through the intercession of Charles. The miracle attributed to Charles was the scientifically inexplicable healing of a Brazilian nun with debilitating varicose veins; she was able to get out of bed after she prayed for his beatification. On 3 October 2004, he was beatified by Pope John Paul II. The Pope also declared 21 October, the date of Charles' marriage in 1911 to Princess Zita, as Charles' feast day. The beatification has caused controversy because Charles authorized the Austro-Hungarian Army's use of poison gas during World War I.[18] On 31 January 2008, a Church tribunal, after a 16-month investigation, formally recognized a second miracle attributed to Charles I (required for his canonization as a saint in the Catholic Church); in an uncommon twist, the Florida woman claiming the miracle cure was not Catholic, but Baptist. However, due to her experiences, she converted to Catholicism soon thereafter.[19][20][21] Quotes[] "Now, we must help each other to get to Heaven."[22] Addressing Empress Zita on 22 October 1911, the day after their wedding. "I am an officer with all my body and soul, but I do not see how anyone who sees his dearest relations leaving for the front can love war."[23] Addressing Empress Zita after the outbreak of World War I. "I have done my duty, as I came here to do. As crowned King, I not only have a right, I also have a duty. I must uphold the right, the dignity and honor of the Crown.... For me, this is not something light. With the last breath of my life I must take the path of duty. Whatever I regret, Our Lord and Savior has led me."[24] Addressing Cardinal János Csernoch after the defeat of his attempt to regain the Hungarian throne in 1921. The British Government had vainly hoped that the Cardinal would be able to persuade him to renounce his title as King of Hungary. "I must suffer like this so my people will come together again."[25] Spoken in Madeira, during his last illness. "I can't go on much longer... Thy will be done... Yes... Yes... As you will it... Jesus!"[26] Reciting his last words while contemplating a crucifix held by Empress Zita. Official grand title[] His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Charles the First, By the Grace of God, Emperor of Austria, Apostolic King of Hungary, of this name the Fourth, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, and Galicia, Lodomeria, and Illyria; King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Tuscany and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine and of Salzburg, of Styria, of Carinthia, of Carniola and of the Bukovina; Grand Prince of Transylvania; Margrave of Moravia; Duke of Upper and Lower Silesia, of Modena, Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, of Auschwitz and Zator, of Teschen, Friuli, Ragusa and Zara; Princely Count of Habsburg and Tyrol, of Kyburg, Gorizia and Gradisca; Prince of Trent and Brixen; Margrave of Upper and Lower Lusatia and in Istria; Count of Hohenems, Feldkirch, Bregenz, Sonnenberg; Lord of Trieste, of Cattaro, and in the Windic March; Grand Voivode (Grand Duke) of the Voivodship (Duchy) of Serbia. Children[] Name Birth Death Notes Crown Prince Otto 20 November 1912 4 July 2011( ) (aged 98) married (1951) Princess Regina of Saxe-Meiningen and Hildburghausen (1925–2010); seven children. Archduchess Adelheid 3 January 1914 2 October 1971( ) (aged 57) Archduke Robert 8 February 1915 7 February 1996( ) (aged 80) married (1953) Princess Margherita of Savoy-Aosta (born 7 April 1930); five children. Archduke Felix 31 May 1916 6 September 2011( ) (aged 95) married (1952) Princess Anna-Eugénie of Arenberg (5 July 1925 – 9 June 1997); seven children. Archduke Karl Ludwig 10 March 1918 11 December 2007( ) (aged 89) married (1950) Princess Yolanda of Ligne (born 6 May 1923); four children. Archduke Rudolf 5 September 1919 15 May 2010( ) (aged 90) married (1953) Countess Xenia Tschernyschev-Besobrasoff (11 June 1929 – 20 September 1968); four children. Second marriage (1971) Princess Anna Gabriele of Wrede (born 11 September 1940); one child. Archduchess Charlotte (1921-03-01)1 March 1921 23 July 1989( ) (aged 68) married (1956) George, Duke of Mecklenburg (5 October [O.S. 22 September] 1899 – 6 July 1963). Archduchess Elisabeth 31 May 1922 7 January 1993( ) (aged 70) married (1949) Prince Heinrich of Liechtenstein (5 August 1916 – 17 April 1991); five children. Decorations and awards[] Grand Master of the following Orders: Order of the Golden Fleece Royal Order of Saint Stephen of Hungary Military Order of Maria Theresa Order of the Iron Crown Order of Leopold Order of Franz Joseph Order of Elizabeth Gold Medal of Military Merit (Signum Laudis) Military Cross for the 60th year of the reign of Franz Joseph Knight of the Order of the Black Eagle Knight Grand Cross of the Military Order of Max Joseph Knight Grand Cross of the Military Order of St. Henry Pour le Mérite Iron Cross Bailiff Grand Cross of Honour and Devotion of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta Ancestors[] See also[] Otto von Habsburg, Charles' oldest son and head of the Habsburg family until 2011. Austria-Hungary Ukrainian Austrian internment List of heirs to the Austrian throne Notes[] Further reading[] G. Brook-Shepherd, The Last Empress: The Life & Times of Zita of Austria-Hungary, 1892-1989, 1991. ISBN 0-00-215861-2. (Italian) Flavia Foradini, Otto d'Asburgo. L'ultimo atto di una dinastia, mgs press, Trieste: 2004. ISBN 88-89219-04-1. [] Karl von Habsburg-Lothringen Blessed Emperor Charles League of Prayers
28465	yago	3	95	https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/zita-of-bourbon-parma/royal-wedding-recollections-archduke-charles-of-austria-zita-of-bourbon-parma/	en	Archduke Charles of Austria & Zita of Bourbon	https://www.historyofroy…arzau_1911bb.jpg	https://www.historyofroy…arzau_1911bb.jpg	[ "https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/wp-content/uploads/moniekheader4-1.png", "https://i0.wp.com/www.historyofroyalwomen.com/wp-content/uploads/Hochzeit_Erzh_Karl_und_Zita_Schwarzau_1911bb.jpg?resize=599%2C381&ssl=1", "https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/49d87a32a97a5b99f4b25d2be2d5ffb7?s=125&d=mm&r=g", "https...	[ "//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/89778164?et=RNb4_CC_S0pAVTTune2iYg&tld=nl&sig=h4FBCpZRpFWTYtPB1xh-v7kOyYtcOpEY8nokg9VklwU=&caption=true&ver=1", "//embed.gettyimages.com/embed/56457500?et=EV42VJfbRfFZfIzQmYfaZg&tld=nl&sig=xAPvEI0lIFdPytOnWEc_gVAOxhJNxLRbwZPfpFnndv8=&caption=true&ver=1", "//embed.gettyimages.com/e...	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Moniek Bloks", "www.facebook.com" ]	2021-10-21T03:00:00+00:00	On 21 October 1911, Zita of Bourbon-Parma married the future Emperor Charles I of Austria. They had known each other since childhood, and Zita’s aunt, Maria Theresa of Austria, was also Charles’s step-grandmother. Their engagement had been announced on 13 June 1911 and was very much welcomed. After the betrothal ceremony, Charles told Zita, “Now [read more]	en	https://i0.wp.com/www.hi…it=32%2C22&ssl=1	History of Royal Women	https://www.historyofroyalwomen.com/zita-of-bourbon-parma/royal-wedding-recollections-archduke-charles-of-austria-zita-of-bourbon-parma/	On 21 October 1911, Zita of Bourbon-Parma married the future Emperor Charles I of Austria. They had known each other since childhood, and Zita’s aunt, Maria Theresa of Austria, was also Charles’s step-grandmother. Their engagement had been announced on 13 June 1911 and was very much welcomed. After the betrothal ceremony, Charles told Zita, “Now we will help each other to reach heaven!” Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria had lost his only son to suicide in 1889, and the current heir to the throne was Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who had married morganatically and whose children were excluded from the succession. Thus, Archduke Charles was second in line to the throne, and Zita met all the requirements. In the months preceding the wedding, Zita spent a lot of time preparing for her future position – even having an audience with the Pope, who greeted her as a future Empress. When she protested, saying that Franz Ferdinand was the heir, the Pope told her, “No, Charles will be the heir.” The wedding took place at Schwarzau Castle in Reichenau. Zita received a pearl necklace from her future husband and a diamond tiara from the Emperor. Two whole rooms were filled with the wedding presents the couple received. The guest of honour – the Emperor – arrived in St Egyden on a special train and was taken by car to the castle, where he arrived at 11 in the morning. He was greeted by Charles at the bottom of the steps to the castle as Zita, and her mother waited at the top of the steps. He greeted Zita’s mother with a kiss on her hand, and he kissed Zita on both cheeks. Zita was dressed in an ivory satin dress stitched with silver thread, a three-metre long train decorated with the Bourbon lily and the tiara she had been gifted by the Emperor. Her bridal veil was a Braganza family heirloom. Charles was dressed in the uniform of a Cavalry captain. Although a seat had been reserved for the ageing Emperor, he remained standing throughout the ceremony. The wedding ceremony was performed by Monsignor Gaetano Bisleti, a representative of the Pope, who would be created a Cardinal the following month. After the ceremony, the most prominent guests went out onto the balcony, where photos and footage were made of the happy occasion. Afterwards, the Emperor toasted to their happiness during a wedding breakfast before departing for Vienna. Charles and Zita would turn out to be the last Emperor and Empress of Austria, and the footage of their wedding is a small glimpse into the lost splendour of that world.
28465	yago	0	97	https://www.factinate.com/people/charles-i-austria-facts	en	Charles I Might Be The Worst Emperor Of All Time	https://www.factinate.co…6/25/CIthumb.jpg	https://www.factinate.co…6/25/CIthumb.jpg	[ "https://www.factinate.com/themes/MainTheme/assets/logos/factinate-logo.webp", "https://www.factinate.com/storage/app/media/factinate/2024/6/25/1471px-Charles_I_of_Austria.jpg 1471w, https://www.factinate.com/storage/app/media/factinate/2024/6/25/1471px-Charles_I_of_Austria-1024x840.jpg 1024w, https://www.factina...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-06-24T12:49:04+00:00	Charles I was the last Emperor of Austria, and watching his dramatic decline is like watching a car crash in slow motion. It's so brutal, but you can't look away...	en	https://www.factinate.com/themes/MainTheme/assets/logos/factinate-favicon.ico	Factinate	https://www.factinate.com/people/charles-i-austria-facts	Charles I was the last Emperor of Austria, and watching his dramatic decline is like watching a car crash in slow motion. It's so brutal, but you can't look away... 1. He Had One Love The final Habsburg to rule over Austria, Charles I's fall from grace was slow, painful, and inevitable. The tragic story of his steady decline includes backstabbing politicians, an epidemic, and even a train escape. Thankfully, his story also has romance. Charles had only one love, and his last words to her should go down in romance history. 2. It Was Like A Fairy Tale On August 17, 1887, Charles I—originally named Karl—was born near the Danube river in the Castle of Persenbeug, Austria. His father was Archduke Otto Franz and his mother was Princess Maria Josepha. The reason baby Charles' birthplace was a castle was that his grand-uncle—Franz Joseph—was the Emperor Of Austria. Little Charles had blue blood, but he was not directly in line to be an Emperor. Then one dark day changed his fate forever. 3. There Was A Shooter The reason Charles never really had much of a chance to be emperor was because of his uncle, the Emperor's son Archduke Franz Ferdinand. But on June 28, 1914 a teenager named Gavrilo Princip put an end to Franz’s chance to be emperor. In Sarajevo, Princip assassinated both the Archduke and his wife in their car. The attack threw Europe into chaos—and an unprepared Charles into the role of heir to the Austrian Empire. 4. He Wanted A Royal Charles wasn't meant to become emperor, but he was already prepared for it in one way: He'd already married a princess, Zita of Bourbon-Parma. With his royal bride, his children would be eligible to succeed him as Emperor of Austria. The weird thing was that the princess Charles chose had more than a few skeletons in her family’s closet. 5. He Didn’t Find The Perfect Princess If Charles was looking for a royal princess for a wife, Zita was perhaps not the best choice. Her country had deposed her father, so she was actually a princess without a kingdom. Not only that, Zita came from a family that suffered from “severe intellectual disabilities”. Charles didn’t seem bothered by Zita’s shady past, and he brought her on board as his wife. The poor woman had no idea what she was getting herself into. 6. He Joined The Fight The shooting of Franz Ferdinand was the catalyst that started WWI—and Charles's Austrian Empire was right at the center. His education had to come to an abrupt halt, and he moved to military headquarters on the border of Poland. However, he still didn't have much in the way of real responsibilities. Then a strange twist of fate altered the course of history forever. 7. He Took A Walk In 1916, Charles’ grand-uncle, Emperor Franz Joseph, went for a walk with King Ludwig of Bavaria, and he caught a cold. The Emperor was no spring chicken, and his cold quickly turned into bronchitis and pneumonia. Charles' time was coming, and he was not ready. 8. He Had Tears In His Eyes On November 21, 1916, Charles' chamberlain came to him with eyes were full of tears. He took Charles’ head in his hands, made the sign of the cross on his forehead, then spoke these life changing words: “May God Bless Your Majesty”. The Emperor was dead. Long live the emperor. As Europe faced the greatest crisis in its history, a 30-year-old Charles was about to take Austria’s highest position. 9. He Got The Job Less than a month after the Emperor’s passing, Charles was crowned Emperor and named Supreme Commander of the Austro-Hungarian Army. He also became the King of Hungary, plus a couple more titles for good measure. Once all the ceremonies were behind him, Charles had one thing on his mind. He had to prove himself to the people. 10. He Had A Nickname Charles quickly proved himself to be a brash and impulsive ruler, acting without fully thinking through the consequences. This led many in the Austrian court believe that Charles was maybe not quite up to the task. It also earned him an embarrassing nickname. Using his birth name, they called him “Karl the Sudden”. Charles's early days as emperor were far from impressive—and if he went to cry on his wife’s shoulder, she wasn’t there. 11. They Stayed In Touch As the emperor, Charles had to spend a lot of time away from his new wife. The two really missed each other, so Charles found a way to get around this using brand-new technology. He had a special telephone line installed from Baden, where he had to be, to Hofburg, where his wife was. These two lovebirds apparently talked on the phone many times each day. But as it turned out, Zita had an ulterior motive for gabbing on the phone with Charles. 12. She Wanted A Voice Behind every great man is a great woman, and Zita wielded influence over what her husband did as a ruler. These numerous phone calls with her husband weren’t just about how much they missed each other. The calls allowed Zita to give her opinion to Charles about how to run the country. Giving support was one thing, but some historians believe that Zita was doing much, much more. 13. He Was Inferior Many biographers agree that Zita was far cleverer than Charles. So, instead of being just a support for him, it could’ve been that she was actually calling the shots. Later some speculated that it wasn’t only Zita’s intelligence that Charles needed. He also benefited from her dynamic personality and iron will. Zita was clearly Charles’ better half, but there was something about her past that created an air of distrust. 14. They Didn’t Trust Her During WWI, Charles’ wife Zita must have felt quite torn. You see, she had brothers fighting on both sides of the conflict. Making matters worse was the fact that Zita herself was from Italy. This meant that technically she was on the side of the enemy. Charles was depending on Zita for intellectual support, and yet many people in Austria didn’t trust her at all. That made his next move even riskier. 15. It Was Dangerous At around this same time, the people of Russia had forced their Tsar to abdicate and put his whole family under house arrest. No one was more terrified by the news that Charles. He didn’t want the same thing happening to him and his family, so he did something extremely risky. He went behind his allies' backs and had secret meetings with France to try and get Austria out of WWI. If Germany found out about these meetings, Charles would be in very serious trouble. 16. He Denied It When Charles’ attempts to get Austria out of WWI failed, he turned to his plan B. This was using Zita’s brother—Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma—as a go between. As was usual for a guy like Charles, he only made things worse. Suddenly, rumors started swirling about the new emperor’s secret attempts at making peace with France. When Germany called Charles out, he played the oldest trick in the book: Deny, deny, deny. After all there was no proof. And then proof came out. 17. He Wrote Letters Charles had denied meeting with France about a possible end to WWI, and France decided to call him out as a liar. To do this, the Prime Minister of France—George Clemenceau—took some very revealing letters Charles had sent him and published them in the newspaper. Suddenly Charles’ secret plan to get Austria out of WWI was out there for everyone to see. Now, Charles had to face some very angry Germans. 18. He Needed A Spin Doctor It soon became clear that Germany was not just a little angry—they were actually ready to invade Austria. Charles had really done it now. He turned to his Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin, for guidance. Czernin’s idea was for Charles to send a “Word of Honor” to the allies that explained how none of this was Charles’ fault and that the Prime Minister was lying. Great idea. But that wasn't all. As it turned out, Czernin had a second plan that would not be at all good for Charles. 19. He Couldn’t Be Trusted During this whole scandal, Czernin was staying in close contact with Germany and harboring a secret ambition. Sure, he had advised Charles to send his “Word of Honor,” but at the same time, he was trying to talk Charles into abdicating the throne. That's definitely what he was saying to Germany, who’d had it with Charles’ antics. All Czernin had to do was persuade Charles that quitting was the only way out. But he was greatly underestimating Charles's pride. 20. He Hung On Try as he might, Czernin could not convince Charles to abdicate. He was going to go down with the ship. This failure led Czernin to have a nervous breakdown and quit as the Foreign Minister. Charles had weathered the storm and remained emperor, but he still had the enraged Germans to contend with. They still wanted blood—and it was going to be a political nightmare for Charles. 21. He Handed It Over Charles was still in hot water with Germany, and the questions about his wife Zita's allegiances were only getting louder. The Germans said they wanted “unconditional adherence” from Charles and Zita. This meant Charles had to hand over the control of his army, his factories, and the rail system all to Germany. This was a devastating embarrassment—but for Charles it was only the beginning. Rock bottom was still a long ways off. 22. He Had Problems At Home As if dealing with WWI wasn’t enough, Austria had conflicts going on within its own borders. Tensions between ethnic groups in the empire got so bad that it caught the attention of US President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson demanded that Charles give these his people autonomy and self-government. You know, the exact opposite of an empire. Charles knew he had to do something to save his skin. But, like most things he tried, it failed miserably. 23. He Was Losing Everything Charles tried to comply with the US president by making one confederation for all the competing ethnic groups. But no, this wasn’t enough. These smaller groups within his realm now all wanted complete independence from Austria. Basically, Charles’ world was collapsing right before his very eyes. It was time for action, but Charles didn't know where to turn. 24. He Lost Two The US wanted Charles to grant complete independence to the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the South Slavs. As it turned out, this would happen with or without Charles’ approval. In fact, by 1918, the Czech provisional government flipped their allegiance and joined up with the Allies. The South Slavs soon followed suit with their own independent state. Everything seemed to be slipping through Charles’ fingers. 25. He Had To Sign Charles and Zita left the children in Budapest and headed to Vienna to face the music. Here they found out that the new state of “Germany-Austria” had already appointed ministers. This certainly looked like the end of Charles’ reign. The ministers had even put together a manifesto, and they insisted that Charles sign it. The people of Austria were about to get a very surprising message from their leader. 26. It Was A Startling Announcement On November 11, 1918, the ministers released the manifesto to the public. It said that Charles would no longer take part in administering the state. It went on to say that his officials no longer needed to be loyal to him. Now this may sound like a flat out abdication, but the wording was careful. The word “abdication” did not appear anywhere. But if anyone didn't see what was happening, his next move made it painfully obvious. 27. They Made A Move On the same day as Charles’ announcement, he and his family packed up their things and moved out the emperor's official residence. Charles then turned around and made it clear to Hungary that he was no longer their king—while again, still not officially abdicating the throne. Everyone was confused. But Charles knew what he was doing. At least, he thought he was. 28. He Wanted Them To Beg Charles moved to an estate in the country, where he waited for a response from the people. He secretly wanted them to beg him to return. But he was in for a rude awakening. Instead of begging to get their Emperor back, the people of Austria happily proclaimed the independent Republic of German-Austria. Four days later, the Hungarians did something very similar. This public response shattered Charles. He couldn't deny it anymore: No one wanted him. 29. He Had Three Options The new government in Austria did not enjoy playing Charles's games, so they gave him an ultimatum. He could formally abdicate and stay in Austria as a “non-royal” citizen, his family could leave of Austria altogether...or he could go to prison. Charles and his family were clearly in a precarious position. It would take a miracle to get them out of it. 30. They Needed Help Zita’s brother Prince Sixtus saw that Charles and his sister and in-laws were in trouble. He went to the Britain's King George V to get help. George, who was shocked by what happened to his cousin Nicholas, quickly sent out an order to get Charles and his family out of Austria immediately. We can't have people out here taking out Divine Heads of State! A British colonel named Edward Lisle Strutt heard King Edward’s order and stepped up. Strutt’s plan involved a very top secret train ride. 31. He Sent A Last Minute Message Strutt got Charles and his family safely into neighboring Switzerland. This could have been the end of the story, but Charles was not ready to give everything up just yet. As his train was crossing into Switzerland, Charles sent out an announcement stating that he was still the sovereign of Austria. In his opinion, whatever the new German-Austrian assembly had decided about him was now “null and void”. Charles was playing with fire, and he was about to get burned. 32. They Made A New Law This new move by Charles really made the new parliament of Germany-Austria angry. They were so mad that they issued something called the Habsburg Law. Not only did it remove any sovereign rights for Charles and his family, it also made it impossible for Charles to ever visit Austria again. But this wasn’t the end, the Austrians had more to dish out to their ex-emperor. 33. He Had No Second Chance On April 3, 1919, the German-Austrian government created the Abolition of Nobility, which completely abolished nobility from the country. If Charles thought he still had a chance to return as emperor, this must have been the final nail in the coffin. 34. They Were In Danger At this time, Charles and his family were living close to the Swiss/Austrian border and some Swiss authorities thought this was too close for comfort. After all, they didn't need angry Austrians invading their border. To stay safe, Charles moved his family to a town near Lake Geneva, which finally gave him some time to think. It was time for another one of Charles’ last ditch efforts to get his family back in power. 35. He Wanted To Be King Sure Charles had no hope of returning as Emperor of Austria, but there was always Hungary, right! There's always Hungary! There were, in fact, Hungarians who still supported having a royal family, so Charles figured this was a good place to start. There was just one obstacle: A man named Admiral Miklos Horthy, who was not at all in favor of having Charles back as king. To be fair, he had a very good reason for not wanting Charles back. 36. He Was Not Popular Some countries bordering Hungary went as far as to say that if Charles returned as king, they would invade. Horthy, who the people had elected as a regent in Charles's stead, told the ex-emperor in no uncertain terms that it would not be safe for him to return to Hungary. He must not have realized who he was talking to. Charles didn’t take Horthy’s warning seriously. He was returning to Hungary no matter what. 37. He Wouldn’t Give Up Getting back into Hungary was becoming an obsession, so Charles once again turned to Colonel Strutt. This was the man who got him and his family safely out of Austria, and now Charles was asking him to put him back in danger. Against his better judgment, Strutt did as he was asked. Before making the dangerous trip into Hungary, Charles turned to an ally who he thought would make his return to Hungary safe. He didn’t get exactly what he wanted. 38. He Had An Ally Charles knew he had one ally in Europe, and that was France. To try and pave his return to Hungary, Charles made an informal agreement with the French prime minister, Aristide Briand. This agreement stated that if Charles became King of Hungary, France would support him. Charles must have thought this was a big win, and he needed a win. There's just one problem: He didn't get it in writing. Oh Charles, Charles, Charles... 39. He Tried Twice Charles, with the help of Colonel Strutt and the verbal promise from France, tried to regain his position as King of Hungary. When his attempts—there were two of them—failed, Briand categorically denied that the agreement existed. Then Hungary turned around and created something called the Pragmatic Sanction, which forbade Charles, or any Habsburg, from ever ruling in Hungary. It was another slap in the face for Charles—but Hungary was just getting started. 40. He Got Locked Up The Hungarians were okay with Charles trying to return as king once. But twice? That was the last straw. They forcefully took him and his wife—who was pregnant at the time—and threw them in Tihany Abbey, a monastery that served as their prison. But the Abbey wasn’t their final destination. The powers in the West all agreed that they couldn’t trust Charles. They wanted him somewhere where they could keep an eye on him. 41. They Didn’t Know Where To Put Them Finding a suitable location to exile Charles and his family was a real problem. They talked about Malta, but there was some objection. Then someone mentioned that none of the French territories would work because Zita’s brothers may get up to something illicit to help Charles. The people deciding Charles’ fate finally came up with a solution—and it was not going to please Charles one bit. 42. He Took A Trip It was a cool day in November 1921 when Charles and Zita boarded the HMS Glowworm. While the name may conjure images of a cute little boat, it was actually a warship which took them down the Danube. Next, they got on the HMS Cardiff, which took them across the Black Sea. It was a long and arduous journey. Were they headed to a horrible prison in a desolate environment? Well…not exactly. 43. He Lived In Exile Where Charles and his family were going was the sunny isle of Madeira. While this may sound like a lovely holiday, at the time, Madeira was still very isolated and undeveloped at the time. Charles and Zita now had to prepare themselves for a hard life away from the glamor of royal life. 44. He Lived Simply Charles and Zita’s kids soon joined them on Madeira, and the family spent their first years in Funchal, the capital. They then moved to a very modest home outside the city. Charles had gone from an emperor and king, to living a simple life. On the bright side, he still had his family. This could have been Charles’ happy ever after, even if he didn't really deserve. But didn’t have much of a life left to live. 45. They Used Bizarre Remedies While living in exile, Charles caught a cold like his predecessor before him. And, just like Emperor Franz Joseph, Charles soon had both bronchitis and severe pneumonia. The doctors who treated him used bizarre treatments like caffeine injections, turpentine, and cupping therapy. Believe it or not, those treatments weren't working. Then doctors finally realized what was wrong—and that there was nothing they could do. 46. He Neared The End As it turned out, Charles had the Spanish Flu, and the prognosis was not good. During his illness, Charles forgot about himself and lovingly worried more about his wife and children. His biggest concern was about passing the flu to Zita, who was pregnant with child number eight at the time. Soon, Charles’ end was drawing near. What he said to his wife would make even the biggest cynic cry. 47. He Said Goodbye Charles was fully conscious as he saw the end of his life before him. At the very end, he turned to his wife and said “I love you so much" with his last breath. He was only 34 years old. Young Prince Otto was there to witness his father’s passing and when it was over Zita said to him: "Your father is now sleeping the eternal sleep—you are now emperor and king". The truth was, there was no kingdom left, and even Charles’ final resting place would bring further torment to the family. 48. They Laid Him To Rest Zita had Charles’ body put in a tomb on Madeira Island. Well, most of his body. His loved ones wanted at least some of him to return to his birthplace. For this reason they removed Charles’ heart, and the plan was to place it in the Habsburg tomb in Vienna. Sadly, Austrians were still not ready to accept Charles—even his heart—in Austria. Now they had a heart, and no place to put it. 49. They Came Together Again The closest place to Austria they could take Charles’ heart was Switzerland, so they laid it to rest in Muri Abbey near Zurich. Zita lived a remarkably long life and passed in 1989 at the age of 96. Still grieving her husband, she had said in her will that she wanted her heart next to his. After 67 years apart, these two love birds finally reconnected in a tomb in Muri Abbey. It seemed that Charles would go down in history as the last Emperor of Austria—but no, his story continued even beyond the grave. 50. He Was A Saint The Catholic Church began the long process to canonize Charles and in 1972, they had a chilling job to do. They had to look in his tomb. You see, Catholics believe that a truly holy person’s body will not decompose like other bodies. When they opened the tomb they saw that his body had not gone through decomposition. In 2004, Pope John Paul II finally “beatified” Charles.
28465	yago	0	78	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/charles-i-emperor-of-austria/	en	Charles I, Emperor of Austria	https://encyclopedia.191…o/Karl_I_IMG.jpg	https://encyclopedia.191…o/Karl_I_IMG.jpg	[ "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/1418-logo.png", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/eo/Karl_I_IMG-211x300.jpg", "https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/eo/Charles_and_Wilhelm_IMG.jpg", ...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2024-07-02T21:42:21+00:00	In his youth, the archduke was introduced to the idea of federalism by Archduke Franz Ferdinand. During the first part of World War I, he became a skillful military leader without any political influence. The young emperor’s two main aims, the reform of the Austrian Constitution and an acceptable peace, proved to be out of reach. Nevertheless, he consistently refused to resign and died in exile.	en	/wp-content/themes/encyclopedia19141918/assets/img/favicon.ico	1914-1918-Online (WW1) Encyclopedia	https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/charles-i-emperor-of-austria/	By Robert Rill In his youth, the archduke was introduced to the idea of federalism by Archduke Franz Ferdinand. During the first part of World War I, he became a skillful military leader without any political influence. The young emperor’s two main aims, the reform of the Austrian Constitution and an acceptable peace, proved to be out of reach. Nevertheless, he consistently refused to resign and died in exile. Youth and Education Archduke Karl Franz Joseph (1887-1922) was born on 17 August 1887 in the Castle of Persenbeug. His grandfather, Charles Louis, Archduke of Austria (1833-1896) was the brother of Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria (1830-1916). His father, Otto Franz, Archduke of Austria (1865-1906), had married Maria Josepha, Princess of Saxony (1867-1944), in 1877, who was strongly committed to the Catholic education of her children. Therefore, Godfried Marschall (1840-1911), later suffragan bishop, was selected as the teacher for religious education, and Onno Klopp (1822-1903), a conservative Catholic refugee from Prussian-occupied Hannover, who continually published writings against Prussian expansionism, became Charles’ teacher of history. Moreover, in 1906, the successor to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria-Este (1863-1914), became Charles’ guardian and succeeded in inspiring him with enthusiasm for his own ideas for profound reform of the constitution. These were based to a certain extent on federalism, but also on the strengthening of conservative monarchic principles. Additionally, Charles was sent to the famous Viennese secondary school “Schottengymnasium” to acquire some expertise in scientific subjects. Military Career and Engagement during World War One Charles’ career as an officer of the Austro-Hungarian Army started in 1903, when he became a Lieutenant in the Regiment of Lancers (Ulanen-Regiment) Nr. 1; having transferred to the Dragoons (Dragoner-Regiment) Nr. 7 in 1905, he advanced to the rank of First Lieutenant in 1906, and Captain in 1909. Then he transferred to the infantry (Regiment Nr. 39), became a major, and, on 1 May 1914, a lieutenant colonel. After some training in the general staff and after 28 June 1914, the new successor to the throne, now a colonel, served as liaison officer to the German army in Galicia. In July 1915, he was promoted to the rank of major general, and in March 1916, to field marshal lieutenant. In spring 1916, he took part in the successful Austrian offensive in South Tyrol. In spring 1915, the German army used gas on the Western Front, which proved to guarantee quick advancement with a minimum of German casualties. In June 1916, the Austrian army decided to use this rather new weapon, too, on the Italian Front. Contemporaries, but also historians, had already criticized Charles’ role when it came to the use of gas, in particular, that he did nothing to stop it. In summer 1916, Charles became general of cavalry and on 1 November 1916, three weeks before ascending the throne of the Empire, he was promoted to the ranks of colonel general and great admiral. Succession to the Throne When Franz Joseph died on 21 November 1916, Charles succeeded to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones and immediately assumed the title of supreme commander of the Empire’s forces, in an attempt to diminish the overwhelming German influence in their joint warfare. He and his wife, Zita, consort of Charles I, Emperor of Austria (1892-1989), were crowned King and Queen of Hungary on 30 December 1916. Thus, he was obliged to accept the political system of dualism, but, on the other hand, this system enabled him to demand universal suffrage in the Hungarian kingdom. During the two years of his regency, he was occupied with various attempts to conclude a peace treaty, even accepting serious sacrifices concerning the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, like ceding parts of Tyrol to Italy. The most famous of these secret negotiations for a peace compromise is known as the Sixtus Affair, which – finally brought into focus by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ottokar Graf Czernin (1872-1932) – caused the disastrous decline of independent Austro-Hungarian foreign politics and warfare. The Struggle for Peace It was in spring 1915 that the archduke proposed, for the first time, to deliver Alsace-Lorraine to France. Soon afterwards, he supported diplomatic efforts to keep Italy out of the war by means of territorial concessions. In August 1917, the Austrian diplomat Nikolaus Graf Revertera von Salandra (1866-1951) negotiated with officers of the French general staff about a separate Austro-Hungarian peace treaty, which also gave Great Britain the opportunity to present its conceptions of post-war Europe. At the same time, Pope Benedict XV (1854-1922) called for peace without any annexations and contributions. Although Charles promised to enter into an exchange of views about the future of South Tyrol with Italy, Germany refused any discussion on withdrawal from Belgium or negotiation about a cession of Alsace-Lorraine, even after Charles had offered Austrian Silesia as the utmost compensation for those territories indispensably demanded by France. Final Efforts and Exile As for interior affairs, Charles tried to stop the increasing famine by founding the Ministry of Social Welfare (1917) and the Ministry of Public Health (1918). In August 1918, he ordered Heinrich Lammasch (1853-1920) and Johannes Andreas von Eichhoff (1871-1963) to draft a new constitution based on the idea of an Austrian Commonwealth of Nations (Staatenbund). On 16 October 1918, he declared a new federalist constitution by himself which, because of the armistice on 3 November 1918 and the foundation of the Austrian republic on 12 November 1918, never came into force. On 11 November 1918, influenced by his Minister Ignaz Seipel (1876-1932) and the Archbishop of Vienna, Friedrich Gustav Piffl (1864-1932), Charles renounced any participation in government. After the armistice, the Austrian parliament demanded his abdication, which was refused by the emperor, who retired to Swiss exile on 23 March 1919. He stayed in Rorschach and Pragins, before twice moving to Hungary to push for restoration (in March and October 1921). But as he did not want to provoke a civil war after Regent Miklós Horthy (1868-1957) refused to hand over power, he was forced to give up those efforts. The first attempt at restoration started on 26 March 1921. Having secretly negotiated with the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand (), Charles believed that France would support him against menacing interventions from Hungary’s neighbors. Charles managed to travel to Szombathely for preliminary negotiations with the Hungarian Prime Minister Pál Teleki (1879-1941). On the next day, he succeeded in meeting Regent Miklós Horthy in the Castle of Budapest, but even after an emotional two-hour discussion, Horthy refused to hand over power to the king, with the argument that this would necessarily lead to a civil war. Despite this, Charles stayed in Szombathely until 5 April 1921, expecting Horthy to change his mind. Disappointed he then returned to Switzerland. On 20 October 1921, accompanied by his wife Zita, Charles tried again, having landed near Sopron with a small airplane. Without intending to seek compromise with Horthy, he formed a provisional government. Supported by Hungarian legitimist politicians and officers, and parts of the army, Charles tried to march to Budapest. Horthy made a military proclamation that he would retain power and demanded loyalty from his army. On 23 October, the legitimists arrived at Budaörs, a village close to the capital. The following confrontation might have led to civil war. Nineteen victims remained on the battlefield, dead. To avoid further bloodshed, Charles reluctantly agreed to armistice negotiations. He then dictated a surrender order. Together with his family, he was sent into exile on the island of Madeira, where he died on 1 April 1922 as a result of pneumonia. In 1954, the process of beatification was initiated. Fifty years later, on 3 October 2004, he was beatified by Pope John Paul II (1920-2005). Robert Rill, Austrian State Archives and War Archive Austria
28465	yago	3	56	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-century-since-birth-of-prince-jacques.html	en	A Century Since the Birth of Prince Jacques of Bourbon-Parma	https://blogger.googleus…-nu/IMG_4899.JPG	https://blogger.googleus…-nu/IMG_4899.JPG	[ "https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-0OMUjV7ocn4/XQ2qb8hlzQI/AAAAAAAABGw/mMSC1KS8Yl02jzUWLENzZeAYQ8rOkfkwQCK4BGAYYCw/s752/Screen%2BShot%2B2018-04-22%2Bat%2B11.47.40%2BAM-2.png", "https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhc7NKkW2uVi-yGj_XmWw0fCTG21lDqEvAJ1G2rA_lQkteID_F2otxbCOckidtuI8_0Y1kF21fWfQthOEWn5AG...	[]	[]	[ "euro history", "euro journal", "erhj", "perry pearson", "princess elizabeth of yugoslavia", "peregrine pearson" ]	null	[]	null	A young Prince Jacques. Photo (c) Getty Images / Keystone-France. Prince Jacques and his sister Princess Anne. Photo (c) Getty Images / Key...	en	https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/favicon.ico		https://eurohistoryjournal.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-century-since-birth-of-prince-jacques.html	The Plantagenet Family Tree: The Intriguing History of England's Plantagenet Dynasty Kings The Plantagenet Family Tree: A Royal History The Plantagenet family was one of the most powerful royal dynasties in European history, rul...
28465	yago	3	17	https://www.instagram.com/royals_without_throne/p/C4s0ixsIqMe/	en	Instagram	https://static.cdninstag…/VsNE-OHk_8a.png	https://static.cdninstag…/VsNE-OHk_8a.png	[]	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	null		en	https://static.cdninstag…/VsNE-OHk_8a.png		null
28465	yago	2	6	https://www.ranker.com/list/members-of-the-house-of-bourbon-parma/reference	en	Members of the House Of Bourbon-Parma	https://imgix.ranker.com/list_img_v2/4285/524285/original/members-of-the-house-of-bourbon-parma-u4	https://imgix.ranker.com/list_img_v2/4285/524285/original/members-of-the-house-of-bourbon-parma-u4	[ "https://sb.scorecardresearch.com/p?c1=2&c2=10600724&cv=3.6&cj=1", "https://static.ranker.com/img/brand/ranker-logo.svg?v=1&auto=format&q=60&fit=crop&fm=png&dpr=2&w=104", "https://static.ranker.com/img/brand/wordmark.svg?v=1&auto=format&q=60&fit=crop&fm=png&dpr=2&w=210", "https://imgix.ranker.com/img/icons/me...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "Reference" ]	2012-05-05T00:00:00	List of the members of the House of Bourbon-Parma, listed alphabetically with photos when available. This list includes the names of each famous person in the ...	en	/img/icons/touch-icon-iphone.png	Ranker	https://www.ranker.com/list/members-of-the-house-of-bourbon-parma/reference	List of the members of the House of Bourbon-Parma, listed alphabetically with photos when available. This list includes the names of each famous person in the House of Bourbon-Parma, along with information like where each person was born. If you're doing research on historic members of the House of Bourbon-Parma, then this list is the perfect jumping off point for finding out which notable people are included. The House of Bourbon-Parma has held prominence in the world dating back many years, so it's no wonder that many people have a fascination with its members. While this is not an exact family tree, it does show a list of many popular members of the House of Bourbon-Parma. People on this list include Princess Alexandra of Luxembourg and Prince Félix of Luxembourg. The information on this page of prominent House of Bourbon-Parma members can help answer the questions, “Who was in the House of Bourbon-Parma?” and "Who is part of the House of Bourbon-Parma?
28465	yago	1	13	https://baxofthings.wordpress.com/2021/05/14/zita-the-last-empress-of-austria/	en	Zita, the last Empress of Austria	https://baxofthings.word…a-1200x675-1.jpg	https://baxofthings.word…a-1200x675-1.jpg	[ "https://baxofthings.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/bax-of-things.jpg?w=80", "https://baxofthings.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/empress-zita-1200x675-1.jpg?w=816", "https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Empress_Zita_with_her_parents_and_siblings.jpg", "https://i.redd.it/35et...	[ "https://www.youtube.com/embed/TbQcHxjpRxI?version=3&rel=1&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&fs=1&hl=en&autohide=2&wmode=transparent" ]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[]	2021-05-14T00:00:00	I've written a couple of blogs about Sisi, Empress of Austria. But her successor is as impressive as she was. Who was Zita, the last Empress of Austria. Let me tell her her story.	en	https://baxofthings.word…-things.jpg?w=32	Bax of Things	https://baxofthings.wordpress.com/2021/05/14/zita-the-last-empress-of-austria/	I’ve written a couple of blogs about Sisi, Empress of Austria. But her successor is as impressive as she was. Who was Zita, the last Empress of Austria. Let me tell her her story. Youth Princess Zita of Bourbon-Parma was born at the Villa Pianore in the Italian Province of Lucca, 9 May 1892. She was the 17th (!) child among Robert’s 24 children (with two marriages). In 1907, Zita’s father died and she and her sister Francesca were sent to a convent on the Isle of Wight. Faith was very important in the family. Three of Zita’s sisters became nuns. Zita considered it for a while, but destiny took her somewhere else. Marriage Empress and queen Charles and Zita were crowned in Budapest on 30 December 1916. Following the coronation there was a banquet, but after that the festivities ended, as the emperor and empress thought it wrong to have prolonged celebrations during a time of war. Charles and Zita had by then zeven children. There would be eight in total. Click on the image below for the full family tree: End of Empire By 1918, the war was closing in on the embattled Emperor. On 16 October, the emperor issued a “People’s Manifesto” proposing the empire to be restructured on federal lines with each nationality gaining its own state. Instead, each nation broke away and the empire effectively dissolved. In Vienna, ministers had been appointed by the new state of “German-Austria”, and by 11 November, together with the emperor’s spokesmen, they prepared a manifesto for Charles to sign. The Republic of German-Austria was proclaimed the next day. Life in Exile After a difficult few months at Eckartsau, the Imperial Family received aid from an unexpected source. Zita’s brother Prince Sixtus had met King George V and appealed to him to help the Habsburgs. George was reportedly moved by the request, it being only months since his imperial relatives in Russia had been executed by revolutionaries, and promised “We will immediately do what is necessary.” By March 1919, the Emperor had to leave the country as soon as possible. A train to Switzerland was arranged with some difficulty. The family’s first home in exile was Wartegg Castle in Rorschach, Switzerland, a property owned by the Bourbon-Parmas. However, the Swiss authorities, was worried as the location was so close to the Austrian border. Soon the whole family moved to Villa Prangins, near Lake Geneva. Eventually, it was decided that the family would stay on the Portuguese island of Madeira. First Charles and Zita went alone. The children joined their parents in Madeira in February 1922. Death of Charles Charles had been in poor health for some time. After a shopping trip, he was struck by an attack of bronchitis. This rapidly worsened into pneumonia, not helped by the inadequate medical care available. Several of the children and staff were also ill, and Zita (at the time eight months pregnant) helped nurse them all. Charles weakened and died on 1 April 1922. 67 years of Widowhood After Charles’s death, the family was to move again. Alfonso XIII of Spain had arranged the family to relocate to Spain. Travelling with the warship Infanta Isabel to Funchal, they then arrived in Cadiz. They were then escorted to the Pardo Palace in Madrid. Soon after her arrival, Zita gave birth to Archduchess Elisabeth. The Spanish king offered his exiled relatives the use of Palacio Uribarren at Lekeitio in the Bay of Biscay. Continuously on the move By 1929, the elder children were about to go to university and it was decided to move closer to other relatives ner Brussels and the family moved to the Belgian village of Steenokkerzeel. There were some talke with the Austrian government for a Habsburg restoration with Crown Prince Otto. But the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938 stopped all descussions. With the Nazi invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940, Zita and her family became war refugees. The castle was bombed by the Germans, but they survived. They fled to Zita’s brother Prince Xavier’s castle at Bostz in France. The moved on to the Spanish border, then on to Portugal. After a perilous journey overseas, they arrived in New York City in July. They eventually settled in Quebec. Post-War In the years after the war, Zita travelled several times to Europe for the weddings of her children. She decided to move back to Luxembour in 1952, in order to look after her aging mother. Maria Antonia died at the age of 96 in 1959. The bishop of Chur suggested that Zita could stay in a residence that he administered at Zizers, Graubünden in Switzerland. She accepted with ease. On YouTube, I found this interview with her, dating from 1972. It’s really great to hear her talk: In her final years, Zita was involved in the efforts to have her deceased husband, the “Peace Emperor” canonised. In 1982, she was allowed to return to Austria after being away for over 60 years. Death After her 90th birthday, her health began to decline. While visiting her daughter, in summer 1988, she developed pneumonia and spent most of the autumn and winter bedridden. Finally, she called her family to say goodbuy and she died in the early hours of 14 March 1989. She was 96 years old. She was allowed to rest in the Imperial Crypt in Vienna. Following an ancient custom, the Empress had asked that her heart, which was placed in an urn, stay behind at Muri Abbey, in Switzerland, where the Emperor’s heart had rested for decades. In doing so, Zita assured herself that, in death, she and her husband would remain by each other’s side. On 10 December 2009, Mgr Yves Le Saux, Bishop of Le Mans, France, opened the diocesan process for the beatification of Zita. By starting this cause, the late Empress has been accorded the title Servant of God.
28465	yago	2	11	https://www.britannica.com/topic/house-of-Bourbon	en	House of Bourbon \| Definition, History, Dynasty, Members, & Facts	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	https://cdn.britannica.c…e.jpg?v=3.124.31	[ "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel/eb-logo/MendelNewThistleLogo.png", "https://cdn.britannica.com/mendel-resources/3-124/images/shared/default3.png?v=3.124.31", "https://cdn.britannica.com/19/153419-131-91ADC6E8/Ruins-statues-Karnak-Egypt.j...	[]	[]	[ "house of Bourbon", "encyclopedia", "encyclopeadia", "britannica", "article" ]	null	[ "John Graham Royde-Smith" ]	1998-07-20T00:00:00+00:00	House of Bourbon, one of the most important ruling houses of Europe. Its members were descended from Louis I, duc de Bourbon from 1327 to 1342, the grandson of the French king Louis IX (ruled 1226–70). It provided reigning kings of France from 1589 to 1792 and from 1814 to 1830.	en	/favicon.png	Encyclopedia Britannica	https://www.britannica.com/topic/house-of-Bourbon	house of Bourbon, one of the most important ruling houses of Europe. Its members were descended from Louis I, duc de Bourbon from 1327 to 1342, the grandson of the French king Louis IX (ruled 1226–70). It provided reigning kings of France from 1589 to 1792 and from 1814 to 1830, after which another Bourbon reigned as king of the French until 1848; kings or queens of Spain from 1700 to 1808, from 1814 to 1868, from 1874 to 1931, and since 1975; dukes of Parma from 1731 to 1735, from 1748 to 1802, and from 1847 to 1859; kings of Naples and of Sicily from 1734 to 1808 and of the Two Sicilies from 1816 to 1860; kings of Etruria from 1801 to 1807; and ducal sovereigns of Lucca from 1815 to 1847. The present article attempts a rapid survey of the dynasty as a whole, relying mainly on genealogical tables to display necessary details. In these tables the names and titles of sovereigns are mostly Anglicized, but those of other persons are mostly given in the original form, except where princesses, having married into another country, are better known under that country’s name for them. The tables also omit perforce the Bourbons born outside of marriage, whose multitude lends some colour to the popular notion that the “Bourbon nose” (larger and more prominent than the normal aquiline) betokens a “Bourbon temperament” or enormous appetite for sexual intercourse. Origins The house of Bourbon is a branch of the house of Capet, which constituted the so-called third race of France’s kings. King Louis IX, a Capetian of the “direct line,” was the ancestor of all the Bourbons through his sixth son, Robert, comte de Clermont. When the “direct line” died out in 1328, the house of Valois, genealogically senior to the Bourbons, prevented the latter from accession to the French crown until 1589. The Valois, however, established the so-called Salic Law of Succession, under which the crown passed through males according to primogeniture, not through females. On this principle, the senior Bourbon became the rightful king of France on the extinction of the legitimate male line of the Valois. Robert de Clermont had married the heiress of the lordship of Bourbon (Bourbon-l’Archambault, in the modern département of Allier). This lordship was made a duchy for his son Louis I in 1327 and so gave its name to the dynasty. From this duchy, the nucleus of the future province of Bourbonnais, the elder Bourbons, mainly through marriages, expanded their territory southeastward and southward. On their western frontier, meanwhile, the countship of La Marche (acquired by Louis I in 1322 in exchange for Clermont) was held from 1327 by a junior line of Louis I’s descendants, who soon added the distant countship of Vendôme to their holdings. Britannica Quiz History Buff Quiz The title of duc de Bourbon passed in 1503 to Charles de Bourbon-Montpensier, who was to become famous as constable of France. His later treason led to the confiscation of his lands by the French crown in the year of his death, 1527. Headship of the house of Bourbon then passed to the line of La Marche–Vendôme. The line of La Marche–Vendôme had been subdivided since the end of the 15th century between a senior line, that of Vendôme (with ducal rank from 1515 onward), and a junior one, that of La Roche-sur-Yon. The latter line obtained Montpensier from the constable’s forfeited heritage (with ducal rank from 1539). Get a Britannica Premium subscription and gain access to exclusive content. Subscribe Now Antoine de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme and head of the house of Bourbon from 1537, became titular king consort of Navarre in 1555 through his marriage in 1548 to Jeanne d’Albret. The son of that marriage, titular king of Navarre in succession to his mother from 1572, became king of France, as Henry IV, on the death of the last Valois king in 1589. From Henry IV descended all the Bourbon sovereigns. The great house of Condé, with its ramifications of Soissons and of Conti, was descended from Louis, prince de Condé, one of Henry IV’s uncles. The Bourbon sovereignties Henry IV’s heirs were kings of France uninterruptedly from 1610 to 1792, when the monarchy was “suspended” during the first Revolution. Most illustrious among them was Louis XIV, who brought absolute monarchy to its zenith in western Europe. During the Revolution, monarchists declared Louis XVII titular king (1793–95), but he never reigned, and he died under the Revolution’s house arrest. Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1814 by the Quadruple Alliance, Louis XVIII became king (1814–24), followed upon his death by Charles X (1824–30), who was overthrown by the Revolution of 1830. Legitimists then recognized the pretender Henry V (Henri Dieudonné d’Artois, count de Chambord), the grandson of Charles X. The 1830 Revolution brought Louis-Philippe and the house of Orléans to power. His descendants included not only the potential pretenders to the French succession but also the Bourbon descendants of the heiress of the last emperor of Brazil. Later princes constituted the house of Bourbon-Brazil, or of Orléans-Braganza, which is not to be confused with the house of Borbón-Braganza, a Spanish branch originating in the Portuguese marriage of the infante Don Gabriel (a son of Charles III of Spain). The Bourbon accession to Spain came about partly because the descendants of Louis XIV’s consort, the Spanish infanta Marie-Thérèse, were in 1700 the closest surviving relatives of the childless Charles II of Spain (see Habsburg; Spain, history of: The early Bourbons, 1700–53) and partly because, although at her marriage the infanta had renounced her Spanish rights, Charles by his testament named one of her descendants as his successor. Since the other powers, however, would not have tolerated the union of the Spanish kingdom with the French, Charles named neither Louis XIV’s heir apparent nor the latter’s eldest son but, rather, the second of Louis XIV’s grandsons—namely, Philippe, duc d’Anjou, who became king of Spain as Philip V. After the War of the Spanish Succession, the Peace of Utrecht (1713) left Philip in possession of Spain and Spanish America but obliged him to renounce any natural right that he or his descendants might have to France. The infante Don Carlos, the future Charles III of Spain, was the founder of the Bourbon fortunes in Italy. The eldest son of Philip V’s second marriage, he became duke of Parma in 1731 by right of his mother, heiress of the last Farnese dukes, and in 1734, during the War of the Polish Succession, he conquered the Kingdom of Naples-Sicily (Kingdom of the Two Sicilies) for himself. Though the settlement of 1735–38 obliged him to renounce Parma in order to win international recognition as king of Naples-Sicily, Parma was eventually secured for his brother Philip (Don Felipe) under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748—with the proviso, however, that he and his heirs should renounce it in the event that they succeeded to Naples-Sicily or to Spain. Finally, when Don Carlos became king of Spain as Charles III in 1759, he resigned Naples-Sicily to his third son Ferdinand on the express condition that that kingdom and Spain should never be united under one sovereign. The Kingdom of Etruria (1801–07) was a contrivance of the Napoleonic period. Devised by the French for the house of Bourbon-Parma in compensation for the impending annexation of Parma to France at a time when France still needed the goodwill of the Spanish Bourbons, it was dissolved as soon as Napoleon was ready to depose the latter. The Bourbon Duchy of Lucca (1815–47), on the other hand, was a creation of the Congress of Vienna: having assigned Parma to Napoleon’s estranged consort Marie-Louise for her lifetime, the Congress had to find some alternative compensation for the still-dispossessed Bourbons. The Treaty of Paris of 1817, however, prescribed that on Marie-Louise’s death Parma should revert to the Bourbons, who in 1847 renounced Lucca to the Habsburgs of Tuscany nine weeks before succeeding her. In France the senior or “legitimate” line of the Bourbons, restored to sovereignty in France after the Napoleonic Wars, was deposed at the Revolution of 1830. The house of Orléans, which took the legitimate line’s place, was in turn deposed in the Revolution of 1848. The Bourbons of Parma and of the Two Sicilies were dethroned in 1859–60, in the course of the unification of Italy under the house of Savoy. The Spanish Bourbons, after many disturbances in the 19th century, lost their sovereignty in 1931, but the Law of Succession promulgated in Spain in 1947 and General Francisco Franco’s subsequent choice of Juan Carlos as his successor resulted in the restoration of the monarchy in 1975.
28465	yago	2	85	https://people.com/parents/princess-margar-2/	en	Princess Margarita of Bourbon-Parma expecting first child	https://people.com/thmb/…5f2c29dbe25b.png	https://people.com/thmb/…5f2c29dbe25b.png	[ "https://people.com/thmb/YtcznQ3wmpmU1tq34ctlMevS898=/400x0/filters:no_upscale():max_bytes(150000):strip_icc()/jennifer-lopez-ben-afflect-tout-052024-ba78ddf03d644f9b9043de95962b533a.jpg", "https://people.com/thmb/YtcznQ3wmpmU1tq34ctlMevS898=/400x0/filters:no_upscale():max_bytes(150000):strip_icc()/jennifer-lopez...	[]	[]	[ "" ]	null	[ "www.facebook.com" ]	2008-02-21T12:23:58-05:00	Princess Margarita of Bourbon-Parma expecting first child	en	/favicon.ico	Peoplemag	https://people.com/parents/princess-margar-2/	Princess Margarita of Bourbon-Parma, 35, is expecting her first child with fiancé, lawyer Tjalling Ten Cate in August. The newly-engaged pair will be married in a low-key ceremony in May. Princess Margarita is the older daughter of Princess Irene of Netherlands, 68, sister of Queen Beatrix; hence she is the cousin of Crown Prince Willem-Alexander, 40. Source: Hello! Thanks to CBB reader Christine.