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[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-1928\nDescription: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.9.\n\n```diff\nFrom 65e0688a5c9dacad50e71024b7529fdf0e3c2e9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Lauris BH <lauris@nix.lv>\nDate: Sat, 28 May 2022 18:10:14 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix raw endpoint PDF file headers (#19825)\n\n---\n modules/typesniffer/typesniffer.go \| 8 ++++++--\n routers/common/repo.go \| 8 ++++++--\n 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/modules/typesniffer/typesniffer.go b/modules/typesniffer/typesniffer.go\nindex e4bed6595a9c9..b6a6646d50ce9 100644\n--- a/modules/typesniffer/typesniffer.go\n+++ b/modules/typesniffer/typesniffer.go\n@@ -17,8 +17,12 @@ import (\n // Use at most this many bytes to determine Content Type.\n const sniffLen = 1024\n \n-// SvgMimeType MIME type of SVG images.\n-const SvgMimeType = \"image/svg+xml\"\n+const (\n+\t// SvgMimeType MIME type of SVG images.\n+\tSvgMimeType = \"image/svg+xml\"\n+\t// ApplicationOctetStream MIME type of binary files.\n+\tApplicationOctetStream = \"application/octet-stream\"\n+)\n \n var (\n \tsvgTagRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`(?si)\\A\\s(?:(<!--.?-->\|<!DOCTYPE\\s+svg([\\s:]+.?>\|>))\\s)<svg[\\s>\\/]`)\ndiff --git a/routers/common/repo.go b/routers/common/repo.go\nindex d037e151f9331..b3cd749115fb1 100644\n--- a/routers/common/repo.go\n+++ b/routers/common/repo.go\n@@ -88,10 +88,14 @@ func ServeData(ctx context.Context, name string, size int64, reader io.Reader)\n \t\t}\n \t\tif (st.IsImage() \|\| st.IsPDF()) && (setting.UI.SVG.Enabled \|\| !st.IsSvgImage()) {\n \t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Disposition\", fmt.Sprintf(`inline; filename=\"%s\"`, name))\n-\t\t\tif st.IsSvgImage() {\n+\t\t\tif st.IsSvgImage() \|\| st.IsPDF() {\n \t\t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Security-Policy\", \"default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox\")\n \t\t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"X-Content-Type-Options\", \"nosniff\")\n-\t\t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", typesniffer.SvgMimeType)\n+\t\t\t\tif st.IsSvgImage() {\n+\t\t\t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", typesniffer.SvgMimeType)\n+\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Type\", typesniffer.ApplicationOctetStream)\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tctx.Resp.Header().Set(\"Content-Disposition\", fmt.Sprintf(`attachment; filename=\"%s\"`, name))\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-1928\nCWE: CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in go-gitea/gitea\n\nThis patch addresses: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.9.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Open Redirect (CWE-601):\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request, redirect\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/login')\ndef login():\n next_url = request.args.get('next', '/')\n # ... do login ...\n return redirect(next_url)\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Validate that next_url is a relative path or matches allowed domains.\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Open Redirect (CWE-601)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nnext_url is not validated. Attacker can use ?next=http://evil.com for phishing attacks.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Open Redirect) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-14016\nDescription: The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Mini Crash Dump file.\n\n```diff\nFrom eb7deb281df54771fb8ecf5890dc325a7d22d3e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: radare <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 13:55:45 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp (#10683)\n\n---\n libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c \| 15 ++++++++-------\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c b/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\nindex c3d66dd85ff6c..d23cabf85b118 100644\n--- a/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\n+++ b/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\n@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj, struct m\n \t/ We could confirm data sizes but a malcious MDMP will always get around\n \t** this! But we can ensure that the data is not outside of the file /\n \tif (entry->location.rva + entry->location.data_size > obj->b->length) {\n-\t\teprintf(\"[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\\n\");\n+\t\teprintf (\"[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\\n\");\n \t\treturn false;\n \t}\n \n@@ -646,10 +646,7 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj, struct m\n \n static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj) {\n \tint i;\n-\tut8 directory_base;\n-\tstruct minidump_directory entry;\n-\n-\tdirectory_base = obj->b->buf + obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva;\n+\tstruct minidump_directory entry;\n \n \tsdb_num_set (obj->kv, \"mdmp_directory.offset\",\n \t\t\tobj->hdr->stream_directory_rva, 0);\n@@ -658,9 +655,13 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj) {\n \t\t\t\"(mdmp_location_descriptor)Location\", 0);\n \n \t/* Parse each entry in the directory /\n+\tut64 rvadir = obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva;\n \tfor (i = 0; i < (int)obj->hdr->number_of_streams; i++) {\n-\t\tentry = (struct minidump_directory )(directory_base + (i * sizeof (struct minidump_directory)));\n-\t\tr_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry (obj, entry);\n+\t\tut32 delta = i * sizeof (struct minidump_directory);\n+\t\tint r = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, rvadir + delta, (ut8) &entry, sizeof (struct minidump_directory));\n+\t\tif (r) {\n+\t\t\tr_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry (obj, &entry);\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \treturn true;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2018-14016\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry function in mdmp.c in radare2 2.7.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer over-read and application crash) via a crafted Mini Crash Dump file.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7pf6-3qr6-mjfr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 1846f48e5fcdde996e7c27a4bbac5d0aef183e4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Christoph M. Becker\" <cmbecker69@gmx.de>\nDate: Sat, 12 Nov 2016 15:00:31 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #340: System frozen\n\ngdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone\nto DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check\nthat is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().\n\nCVE-2016-9317\n---\n src/gd.c \| 1 +\n tests/CMakeLists.txt \| 1 +\n tests/Makefile.am \| 1 +\n tests/gdimagecreate/.gitignore \| 1 +\n tests/gdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt \| 5 +++++\n tests/gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am \| 5 +++++\n tests/gdimagecreate/bug00340.c \| 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 7 files changed, 47 insertions(+)\n create mode 100644 tests/gdimagecreate/.gitignore\n create mode 100644 tests/gdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt\n create mode 100644 tests/gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am\n create mode 100644 tests/gdimagecreate/bug00340.c\n\ndiff --git a/src/gd.c b/src/gd.c\nindex f0cfacdc2..d5d1a7ecb 100644\n--- a/src/gd.c\n+++ b/src/gd.c\n@@ -188,6 +188,7 @@ BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)\n \tif (overflow2(sx, sy)) {\n \t\treturn NULL;\n \t}\n+\n \tif (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char ), sy)) {\n \t\treturn NULL;\n \t}\ndiff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt\nindex c4fa9ca93..7eef4bf46 100644\n--- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt\n+++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt\n@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ if (BUILD_TEST)\n \t\tgdimagecopy\n \t\tgdimagecopyresampled\n \t\tgdimagecopyrotated\n+\t\tgdimagecreate\n \t\tgdimagecrop\n \t\tgdimagefile\n \t\tgdimagefill\ndiff --git a/tests/Makefile.am b/tests/Makefile.am\nindex fc5ed2b04..5f8b624bc 100644\n--- a/tests/Makefile.am\n+++ b/tests/Makefile.am\n@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ include gdimageconvolution/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagecopy/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagecopyresampled/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagecopyrotated/Makemodule.am\n+include gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagecrop/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagefile/Makemodule.am\n include gdimagefill/Makemodule.am\ndiff --git a/tests/gdimagecreate/.gitignore b/tests/gdimagecreate/.gitignore\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..6300aed1c\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/gdimagecreate/.gitignore\n@@ -0,0 +1 @@\n+/bug00340\ndiff --git a/tests/gdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/gdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..905e79c52\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/gdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+SET(TESTS_FILES\n+\tbug00340\n+)\n+\n+ADD_GD_TESTS()\ndiff --git a/tests/gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am b/tests/gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..886608694\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/gdimagecreate/Makemodule.am\n@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@\n+libgd_test_programs += \\\n+\tgdimagecreate/bug00340\n+\n+EXTRA_DIST += \\\n+\tgdimagecreate/CMakeLists.txt\ndiff --git a/tests/gdimagecreate/bug00340.c b/tests/gdimagecreate/bug00340.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..5babcaab2\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/gdimagecreate/bug00340.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@\n+/\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-7pf6-3qr6-mjfr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rc8x-jrrc-frfv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom cef10551820530632a86fa6f1306fee95c5cac43 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Taylor Otwell <taylor@laravel.com>\nDate: Sun, 7 May 2017 12:49:26 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] force host on password reset notification\n\n---\n src/Illuminate/Auth/Notifications/ResetPassword.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Illuminate/Auth/Notifications/ResetPassword.php b/src/Illuminate/Auth/Notifications/ResetPassword.php\nindex a329c08cd7ec..cd1ca8661d15 100644\n--- a/src/Illuminate/Auth/Notifications/ResetPassword.php\n+++ b/src/Illuminate/Auth/Notifications/ResetPassword.php\n@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ public function toMail($notifiable)\n {\n return (new MailMessage)\n ->line('You are receiving this email because we received a password reset request for your account.')\n- ->action('Reset Password', route('password.reset', $this->token))\n+ ->action('Reset Password', url(config('app.url').route('password.reset', $this->token, false)))\n ->line('If you did not request a password reset, no further action is required.');\n }\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rc8x-jrrc-frfv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Laravel does not properly constrain the host portion of a password-reset URL\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-q3q5-qvh5-cmw5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ecbfb0ca77874ead5b6e79b96a5e1f94e67475a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: liufee <job@feehi.com>\nDate: Tue, 24 Dec 2019 23:48:05 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix:backend upload admin user avatar and artice thumb only\n permit to png/jpg/jpeg/gif/webp\n\n---\n backend/models/User.php \| 10 ++++++++++\n common/models/Article.php \| 10 +++++++++-\n 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/backend/models/User.php b/backend/models/User.php\nindex 7c9edff6..4fc4e37a 100644\n--- a/backend/models/User.php\n+++ b/backend/models/User.php\n@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@\n use common\\helpers\\Util;\n use yii\\base\\Event;\n use yii\\web\\ForbiddenHttpException;\n+use yii\\web\\UploadedFile;\n \n /*\n User model\n@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@\n * @property string $password_reset_token\n * @property string $email\n * @property string $auth_key\n+ * @property string $avatar\n * @property integer $status\n * @property integer $created_at\n * @property integer $updated_at\n@@ -96,6 +98,14 @@ public function attributeLabels()\n ];\n }\n \n+ public function beforeValidate()\n+ {\n+ if($this->avatar !== \"0\") {//为0表示需要删除图片，Util::handleModelSingleFileUpload()会有判断删除图片\n+ $this->avatar = UploadedFile::getInstance($this, \"avatar\");\n+ }\n+ return parent::beforeValidate();\n+ }\n+\n public function beforeSave($insert)\n {\n Util::handleModelSingleFileUpload($this, 'avatar', $insert, '@admin/uploads/avatar/');\ndiff --git a/common/models/Article.php b/common/models/Article.php\nindex bbf3bd4f..45852d6e 100644\n--- a/common/models/Article.php\n+++ b/common/models/Article.php\n@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@\n use Yii;\n use common\\libs\\Constants;\n use yii\\behaviors\\TimestampBehavior;\n+use yii\\web\\UploadedFile;\n \n /*\n This is the model class for table \"{{%article}}\".\n@@ -109,7 +110,6 @@ public function rules()\n 'title',\n 'sub_title',\n 'summary',\n- 'thumb',\n 'seo_title',\n 'seo_keywords',\n 'seo_description',\n@@ -295,6 +295,14 @@ public function afterFind()\n parent::afterFind();\n }\n \n+ public function beforeValidate()\n+ {\n+ if ($this->thumb !== \"0\") {//为0表示需要删除图片，Util::handleModelSingleFileUpload()会有判断删除图片\n+ $this->thumb = UploadedFile::getInstance($this, \"thumb\");\n+ }\n+ return parent::beforeValidate();\n+ }\n+\n public function beforeSave($insert)\n {\n if ($this->thumb) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-q3q5-qvh5-cmw5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: liufee CMS File Upload vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rh8q-83xv-8vw7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 4a7814762adf4f56f932d95146c7e4126d872114 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: woutersioen <wouter.sioen@wijs.be>\nDate: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 08:09:59 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Don't directly inject $_GET parameters in html.\n\nThe Search module created a canonical tag containing a directly injected\n$_GET parameter. This commit makes sure we encode specialcharacters\nmaking XSS impossible. Fixes #1018\n---\n src/Frontend/Modules/Search/Actions/Index.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Frontend/Modules/Search/Actions/Index.php b/src/Frontend/Modules/Search/Actions/Index.php\nindex 573aab0c3d..419cd13865 100644\n--- a/src/Frontend/Modules/Search/Actions/Index.php\n+++ b/src/Frontend/Modules/Search/Actions/Index.php\n@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ private function loadForm()\n // since we know the term just here we should set the canonical url here\n $canonicalUrl = SITE_URL . FrontendNavigation::getURLForBlock('Search');\n if (isset($_GET['q']) && $_GET['q'] != '') {\n- $canonicalUrl .= '?q=' . $_GET['q'];\n+ $canonicalUrl .= '?q=' . \\SpoonFilter::htmlspecialchars($_GET['q']);\n }\n $this->header->setCanonicalUrl($canonicalUrl);\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rh8q-83xv-8vw7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62411\nDescription: LibreNMS is a community-based GPL-licensed network monitoring system. LibreNMS <= 25.8.0 contains a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Alert Transports management functionality. When an administrator creates a new Alert Transport, the value of the Transport name field is stored and later rendered in the Transports column of the Alert Rules page without proper input validation or output encoding. This leads to arbitrary JavaScript execution in the admin’s browser. This vulner\n\n```diff\nFrom 706a77085f4d5964f7de9444208ef707e1f79450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tony Murray <murraytony@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 15:57:37 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix XSS in alert rules page (#18353)\n\nFor transport names\n---\n includes/html/print-alert-rules.php \| 6 +++---\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/includes/html/print-alert-rules.php b/includes/html/print-alert-rules.php\nindex 73f625a64366..2cc6777d4cb3 100644\n--- a/includes/html/print-alert-rules.php\n+++ b/includes/html/print-alert-rules.php\n@@ -337,11 +337,11 @@\n $transport_name = null;\n if ($transport_map['target_type'] == 'group') {\n $transport_name = dbFetchCell('SELECT transport_group_name FROM alert_transport_groups WHERE transport_group_id=?', [$transport_map['transport_or_group_id']]);\n- $transport_edit = \"<a href='' data-toggle='modal' data-target='#edit-transport-group' data-group_id='\" . $transport_map['transport_or_group_id'] . \"' data-container='body' data-toggle='popover' data-placement='$transports_popover' data-content='Edit transport group $transport_name'>\" . $transport_name . '</a>';\n+ $transport_edit = \"<a href='' data-toggle='modal' data-target='#edit-transport-group' data-group_id='\" . $transport_map['transport_or_group_id'] . \"' data-container='body' data-toggle='popover' data-placement='$transports_popover' data-content='Edit transport group \" . e($transport_name) . \"'>\" . e($transport_name) . '</a>';\n }\n if ($transport_map['target_type'] == 'single') {\n $transport_name = dbFetchCell('SELECT transport_name FROM alert_transports WHERE transport_id=?', [$transport_map['transport_or_group_id']]);\n- $transport_edit = \"<a href='' data-toggle='modal' data-target='#edit-alert-transport' data-transport_id='\" . $transport_map['transport_or_group_id'] . \"' data-container='body' data-toggle='popover' data-placement='$transports_popover' data-content='Edit transport $transport_name'>\" . $transport_name . '</a>';\n+ $transport_edit = \"<a href='' data-toggle='modal' data-target='#edit-alert-transport' data-transport_id='\" . $transport_map['transport_or_group_id'] . \"' data-container='body' data-toggle='popover' data-placement='$transports_popover' data-content='Edit transport \" . e($transport_name) . \"'>\" . e($transport_name) . '</a>';\n }\n $transports .= $transport_edit . '<br>';\n }\n@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@\n if (! $transport_count \|\| ! $transports) {\n $default_transports = dbFetchRows('SELECT transport_id, transport_name FROM alert_transports WHERE is_default=1 ORDER BY transport_name', []);\n foreach ($default_transports as $default_transport) {\n- $transport_edit = \"<a href='' data-toggle='modal' data-target='#edit-alert-transport' data-transport_id='\" . $default_transport['transport_id'] . \"' data-container='body' data-toggle='popover' data-placement\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-62411\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Stored XSS in Alert Transport name field in LibreNMS\n\nThis patch addresses: LibreNMS is a community-based GPL-licensed network monitoring system. LibreNMS <= 25.8.0 contains a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Alert Transports management functionality. When an administrator creates a new Alert Transport, the value of the Transport name field is stored and later rendered in the Transports column of the Alert Rules page without proper input validation or output encoding. This leads to arbitrary JavaScript execution in the admin’s browser. This vulner\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-25671\nDescription: TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. There is out-of-bounds access due to mismatched integer type sizes. A fix is included in TensorFlow version 2.12.0 and version 2.11.1.\n\n\n```diff\nFrom 2eedc8f676d2c3b8be9492e547b2bc814c10b367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Tom=C3=A1s=20Longeri?= <tlongeri@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 08:14:22 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] tfg-translate needs to call InitMlir\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 504566500\n---\n tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/BUILD \| 1 +\n tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/tfg-translate.cc \| 2 ++\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/BUILD b/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/BUILD\nindex 8efdf08ee37f85..0572d6683a1ed1 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/BUILD\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/BUILD\n@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ tf_cc_binary(\n \":graphdef_export\",\n \":graphdef_import\",\n \":load_proto\",\n+ \"//tensorflow/compiler/mlir:init_mlir\",\n \"//tensorflow/core:ops\", # Ops need to be registered for import.\n \"//tensorflow/core/ir:Dialect\",\n \"@llvm-project//mlir:IR\",\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/tfg-translate.cc b/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/tfg-translate.cc\nindex be629b01c88ee5..73f81f556d809d 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/tfg-translate.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/tfg-translate.cc\n@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ limitations under the License.\n #include \"mlir/Support/LogicalResult.h\" // from @llvm-project\n #include \"mlir/Tools/mlir-translate/MlirTranslateMain.h\" // from @llvm-project\n #include \"mlir/Tools/mlir-translate/Translation.h\" // from @llvm-project\n+#include \"tensorflow/compiler/mlir/init_mlir.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/ir/dialect.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/graphdef_export.h\"\n #include \"tensorflow/core/ir/importexport/graphdef_import.h\"\n@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ TranslateFromMLIRRegistration mlir_to_graphdef(\n \n int main(int argc, char argv) {\n mlir::registerAsmPrinterCLOptions();\n+ tensorflow::InitMlir y(&argc, &argv);\n return failed(\n mlir::mlirTranslateMain(argc, argv, \"Graph(Def)<->TFG Translation Tool\"));\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-25671\nCWE: CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write\nTitle:** TensorFlow has segmentation fault in tfg-translate \n\nThis patch addresses: TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. There is out-of-bounds access due to mismatched integer type sizes. A fix is included in TensorFlow version 2.12.0 and version 2.11.1.\n\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mgh9-4mwp-fg55\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 1a7e0e37fc4777c824b2386cac4867a66f3480b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Adrian Tam <adrian.tam@okta.com>\nDate: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 15:36:54 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: multiple userset with same type should not use weight 2\n opt (#2643)\n\n---\n CHANGELOG.md \| 2 +\n assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml \| 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++\n internal/graph/check.go \| 5 ++-\n 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md\nindex da688c8678..b066ee7ce0 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG.md\n+++ b/CHANGELOG.md\n@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0\n Try to keep listed changes to a concise bulleted list of simple explanations of changes. Aim for the amount of information needed so that readers can understand where they would look in the codebase to investigate the changes' implementation, or where they would look in the documentation to understand how to make use of the change in practice - better yet, link directly to the docs and provide detailed information there. Only elaborate if doing so is required to avoid breaking changes or experimental features from ruining someone's day.\n \n ## [Unreleased]\n+### Fixed\n+- Do not run weight 2 optimization for cases where there are more than 1 directly assignable userset. [#2643](https://github.com/openfga/openfga/pull/2643)\n \n ## [1.9.4] - 2025-08-13\n ### Fixed\ndiff --git a/assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml b/assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml\nindex 6230c7b468..6d3db8cd7f 100644\n--- a/assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml\n+++ b/assets/tests/consolidated_1_1_tests.yaml\n@@ -10435,4 +10435,56 @@ tests:\n user: user:jdoe\n relation: can_access\n object: deployment:1\n+ expectation: false\n+ - name: weight_2_more_than_one_userset_assignable\n+ stages:\n+ - model: \|\n+ model\n+ schema 1.1\n+ type user\n+ type scope\n+ relations\n+ define public: [user:]\n+ define verified: [user]\n+ type resource\n+ relations\n+ define access: [scope#public, scope#verified]\n+ tuples:\n+ - user: scope:A#verified\n+ relation: access\n+ object: resource:1\n+ - user: user:\n+ relation: public\n+ object: scope:A\n+ checkAssertions:\n+ - tuple:\n+ user: user:bob\n+ relation: access\n+ object: resource:1\n+ expectation: false\n+ - name: weight_infinite_more_than_one_userset_assignable\n+ stages:\n+ - model: \|\n+ model\n+ schema 1.1\n+ type user\n+ type scope\n+ relations\n+ define public: [user:, scope#public]\n+ define verified: [user, scope#verified]\n+ type resource\n+ relations\n+ define access: [scope#public, scope#v\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-mgh9-4mwp-fg55\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: OpenFGA Authorization Bypass\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-27507\nDescription: The Kamailio SIP before 5.5.0 server mishandles INVITE requests with duplicated fields and overlength tag, leading to a buffer overflow that crashes the server or possibly have unspecified other impact.\n\n```diff\nFrom ada3701d22b1fd579f06b4f54fa695fa988e685f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Daniel-Constantin Mierla <miconda@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 9 Oct 2020 22:15:12 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] tm: do not add duplicate headers in local requests\n\n---\n src/modules/tm/t_msgbuilder.c \| 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/modules/tm/t_msgbuilder.c b/src/modules/tm/t_msgbuilder.c\nindex bd75b271be7..cda84b6f5de 100644\n--- a/src/modules/tm/t_msgbuilder.c\n+++ b/src/modules/tm/t_msgbuilder.c\n@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ char build_local_reparse(tm_cell_t Trans,unsigned int branch,\n \tstruct hdr_field reas1, reas_last, hdr;\n \tint hadded = 0;\n \tsr_cfgenv_t cenv = NULL;\n+\thdr_flags_t hdr_flags = 0;\n \n \tinvite_buf = Trans->uac[branch].request.buffer;\n \tinvite_len = Trans->uac[branch].request.buffer_len;\n@@ -361,6 +362,11 @@ char build_local_reparse(tm_cell_t Trans,unsigned int branch,\n \t\tswitch(hf_type) {\n \t\t\tcase HDR_CSEQ_T:\n \t\t\t\t/* find the method name and replace it /\n+\t\t\t\tif(hdr_flags & HDR_CSEQ_F) {\n+\t\t\t\t\tLM_DBG(\"duplicate CSeq header\\n\");\n+\t\t\t\t\tgoto errorhdr;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\thdr_flags \|= HDR_CSEQ_F;\n \t\t\t\twhile ((s < invite_buf_end)\n \t\t\t\t\t&& ((s == ':') \|\| (s == ' ') \|\| (s == '\\t') \|\|\n \t\t\t\t\t\t((s >= '0') && (s <= '9')))\n@@ -381,6 +387,12 @@ char build_local_reparse(tm_cell_t Trans,unsigned int branch,\n \t\t\t\tbreak;\n \n \t\t\tcase HDR_TO_T:\n+\t\t\t\tif(hdr_flags & HDR_TO_F) {\n+\t\t\t\t\tLM_DBG(\"duplicate To header\\n\");\n+\t\t\t\t\tgoto errorhdr;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\thdr_flags \|= HDR_TO_F;\n+\n \t\t\t\tif (to_len == 0) {\n \t\t\t\t\t/* there is no To tag required, just copy paste\n \t\t\t\t\t * the header /\n@@ -395,7 +407,25 @@ char build_local_reparse(tm_cell_t Trans,unsigned int branch,\n \t\t\t\tbreak;\n \n \t\t\tcase HDR_FROM_T:\n+\t\t\t\t/ copy hf /\n+\t\t\t\tif(hdr_flags & HDR_FROM_F) {\n+\t\t\t\t\tLM_DBG(\"duplicate From header\\n\");\n+\t\t\t\t\tgoto errorhdr;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\thdr_flags \|= HDR_FROM_F;\n+\t\t\t\ts = lw_next_line(s, invite_buf_end);\n+\t\t\t\tappend_str(d, s1, s - s1);\n+\t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\tcase HDR_CALLID_T:\n+\t\t\t\t/ copy hf /\n+\t\t\t\tif(hdr_flags & HDR_CALLID_F) {\n+\t\t\t\t\tLM_DBG(\"duplicate Call-Id header\\n\");\n+\t\t\t\t\tgoto errorhdr;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\thdr_flags \|= HDR_CALLID_F;\n+\t\t\t\ts = lw_next_line(s, invite_buf_end);\n+\t\t\t\tappend_str(d, s1, s - s1);\n+\t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\tcase HDR_ROUTE_T:\n \t\t\tcase HDR_MAXFORWARDS_T:\n \t\t\t\t/ copy hf /\n@@ -495,6 +525,7 @@ char build_local_reparse(tm_cell_t Trans,unsigned int branch,\n \t/ HDR_EOH_T was not found in the buffer, the message is corrupt /\n \tLM_ERR(\"HDR_EOH_T was not found\\n\");\n \n+errorhdr:\n \tshm_free(cancel_buf);\n error:\n \tLM_ERR(\"cannot build %.s request\\n\", method_len, method);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-27507\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The Kamailio SIP before 5.5.0 server mishandles INVITE requests with duplicated fields and overlength tag, leading to a buffer overflow that crashes the server or possibly have unspecified other impact.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-6309\nDescription: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Two type confusions have been identified in the parse_file() function. These might lead to invalid read and write operations, controlled by an attacker.\n\n```diff\nFrom 8dccf79857ceeb7a6d3e42c1e762e7b865d5344d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>\nDate: Sun, 19 Feb 2017 19:36:35 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.\n\n---\n src/file.c \| 4 ++++\n src/tnef.c \| 16 +++++++++-------\n 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/file.c b/src/file.c\nindex 4dacda4..4b3d81d 100644\n--- a/src/file.c\n+++ b/src/file.c\n@@ -173,11 +173,13 @@ file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)\n \t switch (a->name)\n \t {\n \t case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:\n+\t\tassert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);\n \t\tif (file->name) XFREE(file->name);\n \t\tfile->name = strdup( (char)a->values[0].data.buf );\n \t\tbreak;\n \n \t case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:\n+\t\tassert((a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) \|\| (a->type == szMAPI_OBJECT));\n \t\tfile->len = a->values[0].len;\n \t\tif (file->data) XFREE (file->data);\n \t\tfile->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);\n@@ -185,12 +187,14 @@ file_add_mapi_attrs (File file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)\n \t\tbreak;\n \n case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:\n+\t\tassert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);\n \t\tif (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);\n \t\tfile->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);\n \t\tmemmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);\n \t\tbreak;\n \n case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:\n+ assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);\n if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);\n file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);\n memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);\ndiff --git a/src/tnef.c b/src/tnef.c\nindex 0f1d9e4..7f74e88 100644\n--- a/src/tnef.c\n+++ b/src/tnef.c\n@@ -165,10 +165,12 @@ get_html_data (MAPI_Attr a)\n int j;\n for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)\n {\n-\tbody[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);\n-\tbody[j]->len = a->values[j].len;\n-\tbody[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);\n-\tmemmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);\n+ if (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) {\n+ \t body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);\n+\t body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;\n+\t body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);\n+\t memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);\n+ }\n }\n return body;\n }\n@@ -306,13 +308,13 @@ parse_file (FILE input_file, char* directory,\n \t\t for (i = 0; mapi_attrs[i]; i++)\n \t\t {\n \t\t\tMAPI_Attr a = mapi_attrs[i];\n-\t\t\t \n-\t\t\tif (a->name == MAPI_BODY_HTML)\n+\t\t\n+\t\t\tif (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY && a->name == MAPI_BODY_HTML)\n \t\t\t{\n \t\t\t body.html_bodies = get_html_data (a);\n html_size = a->num_values;\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\telse if (a->name == MAPI_RTF_COMPRESSED)\n+\t\t\telse if (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY && a->name == MAPI_RTF_COMPRESSED)\n \t\t\t{\n \t\t\t body.rtf_bodies = get_rtf_data (a);\n rtf_size = a->num_values;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2017-6309\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Two type confusions have been identified in the parse_file() function. These might lead to invalid read and write operations, controlled by an attacker.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p3pf-mff8-3h47\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 067cb597e485e40b790a267187bf7f00730b1c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bo-Yi Wu <appleboy.tw@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 13 Jul 2024 15:57:36 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] chore(httpd): enhance security and testing protocols (#793)\n\n- Remove nolint comment\n- Update minimum TLS version from 1.0 to 1.2\n\nfix #792\n\nSigned-off-by: Bo-Yi Wu <appleboy.tw@gmail.com>\n---\n router/server_normal.go \| 3 +--\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/router/server_normal.go b/router/server_normal.go\nindex b63c542f1..e88211071 100644\n--- a/router/server_normal.go\n+++ b/router/server_normal.go\n@@ -41,9 +41,8 @@ func RunHTTPServer(ctx context.Context, cfg config.ConfYaml, q queue.Queue, s\n \tif cfg.Core.AutoTLS.Enabled {\n \t\treturn startServer(ctx, autoTLSServer(cfg, q), cfg)\n \t} else if cfg.Core.SSL {\n-\t\t//nolint\n \t\tconfig := &tls.Config{\n-\t\t\tMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS10,\n+\t\t\tMinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12,\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif config.NextProtos == nil {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p3pf-mff8-3h47\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Gorush uses deprecated TLS versions\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8v2m-x872-56fc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom cab025e5fc2bcdad8032d833ebc38e6bd2a13c92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: trevorturk <trevorturk@b8457f37-d9ea-0310-8a92-e5e31aec5664>\nDate: Mon, 3 Oct 2005 05:40:29 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed potential security exploit.\n\ngit-svn-id: https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/secure-files/trunk@3641 b8457f37-d9ea-0310-8a92-e5e31aec5664\n---\n secure-files.php \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/secure-files.php b/secure-files.php\nindex c55fc3b..5cf7bfe 100755\n--- a/secure-files.php\n+++ b/secure-files.php\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n Plugin URI: http://www.almosteffortless.com/wordpress/\n Description: This plugin allows you to upload and download files from outside of your web document root for security purposes. When used in conjunction with a plugin that requires a user to be logged in to see your site, you can restrict file downloads to users that are logged in. It can be found in Manage -> Secure Files.\n Author: Trevor Turk\n-Version: 1.1\n+Version: 1.2\n Author URI: http://www.almosteffortless.com/\n / \n \n@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ function sf_downloads() {\n \t\tif (isset($_GET[\"$sf_prefix\"])) {\n \t\t\t$downloadfile = $_GET[\"$sf_prefix\"];\n \t\t\t$sf_directory = get_option('sf_directory');\n-\t\t\t$downloadfile = $sf_directory . $downloadfile;\n+\t\t\t$downloadfile = $sf_directory . basename($downloadfile);\n \t\t\tif (is_file($downloadfile)) {\n \t\t\t\theader('Content-Description: File Transfer'); \n \t\t\t\theader('Content-Type: application/force-download');\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-8v2m-x872-56fc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-54421\nDescription: NamelessMC is a free, easy to use & powerful website software for Minecraft servers. Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in NamelessMC before 2.2.4 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the default_keywords crafted parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.4.\n\n```diff\nFrom 56d35cff9ee944c061791ef478cabd2bed0223c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sam <1812544+samerton@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 18:28:43 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork\n\nCo-authored-by: Sam <samerton@users.noreply.github.com>\n---\n modules/Core/pages/panel/seo.php \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/modules/Core/pages/panel/seo.php b/modules/Core/pages/panel/seo.php\nindex ee863a8508..2a6ae56e5b 100644\n--- a/modules/Core/pages/panel/seo.php\n+++ b/modules/Core/pages/panel/seo.php\n@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@\n \n $template->getEngine()->addVariables([\n 'DEFAULT_DESCRIPTION' => $language->get('admin', 'default_description'),\n- 'DEFAULT_DESCRIPTION_VALUE' => Settings::get('default_meta_description'),\n+ 'DEFAULT_DESCRIPTION_VALUE' => Output::getClean(Settings::get('default_meta_description')),\n 'DEFAULT_KEYWORDS' => $language->get('admin', 'default_keywords'),\n- 'DEFAULT_KEYWORDS_VALUE' => Settings::get('default_meta_keywords'),\n+ 'DEFAULT_KEYWORDS_VALUE' => Output::getClean(Settings::get('default_meta_keywords')),\n ]);\n \n $template_file = 'core/seo';\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-54421\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: NamelessMC allows Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in SEO component\n\nThis patch addresses: NamelessMC is a free, easy to use & powerful website software for Minecraft servers. Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in NamelessMC before 2.2.4 allows remote authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the default_keywords crafted parameter. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.4.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-j6mr-cm6x-h6jg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b1ac90f7914d91b25144cc4063fa994fb5019ee3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: John Bresnahan <jbresnah@redhat.com>\nDate: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 14:03:38 -1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Add a policy handler to control copy-from functionality\n\nThis patch adds the ability to set a policy handler to control what\nusers can use the 'copy_from' feature in the v1 API.\n\nFixes bug: 1153614\n\nChange-Id: Ie194979a2aa66c9327bf14d7a85ead6f773a6079\n---\n glance/api/v1/images.py \| 2 ++\n glance/tests/unit/v1/test_api.py \| 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/glance/api/v1/images.py b/glance/api/v1/images.py\nindex 8ee40f0783..eafa4cc96b 100644\n--- a/glance/api/v1/images.py\n+++ b/glance/api/v1/images.py\n@@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ def create(self, req, image_meta, image_data):\n is_public = image_meta.get('is_public')\n if is_public:\n self._enforce(req, 'publicize_image')\n+ if Controller._copy_from(req):\n+ self._enforce(req, 'copy_from')\n \n image_meta = self._reserve(req, image_meta)\n id = image_meta['id']\ndiff --git a/glance/tests/unit/v1/test_api.py b/glance/tests/unit/v1/test_api.py\nindex 2dce4f3dd0..f797927cf0 100644\n--- a/glance/tests/unit/v1/test_api.py\n+++ b/glance/tests/unit/v1/test_api.py\n@@ -2363,6 +2363,44 @@ def test_add_publicize_image_authorized(self):\n res = req.get_response(self.api)\n self.assertEquals(res.status_int, httplib.CREATED)\n \n+ def test_add_copy_from_image_unauthorized(self):\n+ rules = {\"add_image\": '@', \"copy_from\": '!'}\n+ self.set_policy_rules(rules)\n+ fixture_headers = {'x-image-meta-store': 'file',\n+ 'x-image-meta-disk-format': 'vhd',\n+ 'x-glance-api-copy-from': 'http://glance.com/i.ovf',\n+ 'x-image-meta-container-format': 'ovf',\n+ 'x-image-meta-name': 'fake image #F'}\n+\n+ req = webob.Request.blank(\"/images\")\n+ req.method = 'POST'\n+ for k, v in fixture_headers.iteritems():\n+ req.headers[k] = v\n+\n+ req.headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/octet-stream'\n+ req.body = \"chunk00000remainder\"\n+ res = req.get_response(self.api)\n+ self.assertEquals(res.status_int, 403)\n+\n+ def test_add_copy_from_image_authorized(self):\n+ rules = {\"add_image\": '@', \"copy_from\": '@'}\n+ self.set_policy_rules(rules)\n+ fixture_headers = {'x-image-meta-store': 'file',\n+ 'x-image-meta-disk-format': 'vhd',\n+ 'x-glance-api-copy-from': 'http://glance.com/i.ovf',\n+ 'x-image-meta-container-format': 'ovf',\n+ 'x-image-meta-name': 'fake image #F'}\n+\n+ req = webob.Request.blank(\"/images\")\n+ req.method = 'POST'\n+ for k, v in fixture_headers.iteritems():\n+ req.headers[k] = v\n+\n+ req.headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-j6mr-cm6x-h6jg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: OpenStack Glance Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w4v7-hwx7-9929\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 58a5c3671e2f36b26810e77ead9e0dd471902f9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Luke Edwards <luke.edwards05@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 25 Aug 2021 09:27:47 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] break: ensure `esc` always returns a string;\n\n- prevents a XSS attack within an array\n---\n docs/api.md \| 8 ++++++--\n src/$index.js \| 2 +-\n src/index.d.ts \| 2 +-\n test/$index.js \| 25 +++++++++++++++----------\n 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/docs/api.md b/docs/api.md\nindex f39c73b..ba4c5a7 100644\n--- a/docs/api.md\n+++ b/docs/api.md\n@@ -6,14 +6,18 @@\n \n \n ### tempura.esc(value)\n-Returns: `string` or `typeof value`\n+Returns: `string`\n \n #### value\n Type: `string` or `unknown`\n \n The value to be HTML-escaped. The following special characters are escaped: `\"`, `&`, and `<`.\n \n-> Note: Any non-`string` values are returned as is.\n+> Note: Any non-`string` values are coerced to a strings!\n+> * `null` and `undefined` become `\"\"`\n+> * `{ foo: 123 }` becomes `\"[object Object]\"`\n+> * `[1, 2, 3]` becomes `\"1,2,3\"`\n+> * `123` becomes `\"123\"`\n \n \n ### tempura.compile(input, options?)\ndiff --git a/src/$index.js b/src/$index.js\nindex a91d366..4062551 100644\n--- a/src/$index.js\n+++ b/src/$index.js\n@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ const ESCAPE = /[&\"<]/g, CHARS = {\n import { gen } from './$utils';\n \n export function esc(value) {\n-\tif (typeof value !== 'string') return value;\n+\tvalue = (value == null) ? '' : '' + value;\n \tlet last=ESCAPE.lastIndex=0, tmp=0, out='';\n \twhile (ESCAPE.test(value)) {\n \t\ttmp = ESCAPE.lastIndex - 1;\ndiff --git a/src/index.d.ts b/src/index.d.ts\nindex 320822a..43e2eea 100644\n--- a/src/index.d.ts\n+++ b/src/index.d.ts\n@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface Options {\n \tasync?: boolean;\n }\n \n-export function esc<T=unknown>(value: T): T\|string;\n+export function esc(value: string\|unknown): string;\n export function transform(input: string, options?: Options & { format?: 'esm' \| 'cjs' }): string;\n \n type CompileOptions = Options & { escape?: typeof esc };\ndiff --git a/test/$index.js b/test/$index.js\nindex 6433bc8..ca7a7db 100644\n--- a/test/$index.js\n+++ b/test/$index.js\n@@ -263,16 +263,21 @@ esc('should be a function', () => {\n \tassert.type(tempura.esc, 'function');\n });\n \n-esc('should echo non-string inputs', () => {\n-\t// @ts-ignore\n-\tassert.is(tempura.esc(), undefined);\n-\tassert.is(tempura.esc(null), null);\n-\tassert.is(tempura.esc(false), false);\n-\tassert.is(tempura.esc(123), 123);\n-\tassert.is(tempura.esc(0), 0);\n-\n-\tassert.equal(tempura.esc([1, 2, 3]), [1, 2, 3]);\n-\tassert.equal(tempura.esc({ foo: 1 }), { foo: 1 });\n+esc('should convert non-string inputs to string', () => {\n+\tassert.is(tempura.esc(), '');\n+\tassert.is(tempura.esc(null), '');\n+\n+\tassert.is(tempura.esc(false), 'false');\n+\tassert.is(tempura.esc(123), '123');\n+\tassert.is(tempura.esc(0), '0');\n+\n+\tassert.equal(tempura.esc([1, 2, 3]), '1,2,3');\n+\tassert.equal(tempura.esc({ foo: 1 }), '[object Object]');\n+});\n+\n+esc('should prevent xss scripting in array', () => {\n+\tlet output = tempura.e\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w4v7-hwx7-9929\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting in tempura\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-8825\nDescription: A null dereference vulnerability has been found in the MIME handling component of LibEtPan before 1.8, as used in MailCore and MailCore 2. A crash can occur in low-level/imf/mailimf.c during a failed parse of a Cc header containing multiple e-mail addresses.\n\n```diff\nFrom 1fe8fbc032ccda1db9af66d93016b49c16c1f22d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Viet Hoa Dinh <dvh@fb.com>\nDate: Sun, 7 May 2017 15:58:41 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed crash #274\n\n---\n src/low-level/imf/mailimf.c \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/low-level/imf/mailimf.c b/src/low-level/imf/mailimf.c\nindex 4554f1ce..b557070d 100644\n--- a/src/low-level/imf/mailimf.c\n+++ b/src/low-level/imf/mailimf.c\n@@ -3083,6 +3083,7 @@ static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,\n struct mailimf_group * group;\n int r;\n int res;\n+ clist * list;\n \n cur_token = * indx;\n \n@@ -3110,6 +3111,17 @@ static int mailimf_group_parse(const char * message, size_t length,\n res = r;\n goto free_display_name;\n }\n+ list = clist_new();\n+ if (list == NULL) {\n+ res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;\n+ goto free_display_name;\n+ }\n+ mailbox_list = mailimf_mailbox_list_new(list);\n+ if (mailbox_list == NULL) {\n+ res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;\n+ clist_free(list);\n+ goto free_display_name;\n+ }\n break;\n default:\n res = r;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-8825\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A null dereference vulnerability has been found in the MIME handling component of LibEtPan before 1.8, as used in MailCore and MailCore 2. A crash can occur in low-level/imf/mailimf.c during a failed parse of a Cc header containing multiple e-mail addresses.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-43788\nDescription: Webpack is a module bundler. Its main purpose is to bundle JavaScript files for usage in a browser, yet it is also capable of transforming, bundling, or packaging just about any resource or asset. The webpack developers have discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack’s `AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an `img` tag with an unsanitized `name`\n\n```diff\nFrom 2411661bd1bedf1b2efc23c76d595c189425d39f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"alexander.akait\" <sheo13666q@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 15:47:34 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH 1/3] security: fix DOM clobbering in auto public path\n\n---\n lib/runtime/AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule.js \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/runtime/AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule.js b/lib/runtime/AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule.js\nindex fcad7ea3a9a..74b40a1e883 100644\n--- a/lib/runtime/AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule.js\n+++ b/lib/runtime/AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule.js\n@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ class AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule extends RuntimeModule {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t`var document = ${RuntimeGlobals.global}.document;`,\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\"if (!scriptUrl && document) {\",\n \t\t\t\t\t\tTemplate.indent([\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"if (document.currentScript)\",\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// Technically we could use `document.currentScript instanceof window.HTMLScriptElement`,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// but an attacker could try to inject `<script>HTMLScriptElement = HTMLImageElement</script>`\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t// and use `<img name=\"currentScript\" src=\"https://attacker.controlled.server/\"></img>`\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"if (document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT')\",\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\tTemplate.indent(\"scriptUrl = document.currentScript.src;\"),\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"if (!scriptUrl) {\",\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\tTemplate.indent([\n\nFrom cbb86ede32ab53d8eade6efee30da2463f0082ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"alexander.akait\" <sheo13666q@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 18:49:35 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH 2/3] test: fix\n\n---\n test/helpers/CurrentScript.js \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/test/helpers/CurrentScript.js b/test/helpers/CurrentScript.js\nindex b198c1b583f..8feb610b6bd 100644\n--- a/test/helpers/CurrentScript.js\n+++ b/test/helpers/CurrentScript.js\n@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ class CurrentScript {\n \tconstructor(path = \"\", type = \"text/javascript\") {\n \t\tthis.src = `https://test.cases/path/${path}index.js`;\n \t\tthis.type = type;\n+\t\tthis.tagName = \"script\";\n \t}\n }\n \n\nFrom 98223873625a029b9903d5ec6c0235b8f9fb5a66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"alexander.akait\" <sheo13666q@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 21 Aug 2024 19:03:48 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH 3/3] test: fix\n\n---\n test/Stats.test.js \| 8 ++++----\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/test/Stats.test.js b/test/Stats.test.js\nindex 685b8d61162..a1965e4123c 100644\n--- a/test/Stats.test.js\n+++ b/test/Stats.test.js\n@@ -190,10 +190,10 @@ describe(\"Stats\", () => {\n \t\t\t \"assets\": Array [\n \t\t\t Object {\n \t\t\t \"name\": \"entryB.js\",\n-\t\t\t \"size\": 3010,\n+\t\t\t \"size\": 3060,\n \t\t\t },\n \t\t\t ],\n-\t\t\t \"assetsSize\": 3010,\n+\t\t\t \"assetsSize\": 3060,\n \t\t\t \"auxiliaryAssets\": undefined,\n \t\t\t \"auxiliaryAssetsSize\": 0,\n \t\t\t \"childAssets\": undefined,\n@@ -238,10 +238,10 @@ describe(\"Stats\", () => {\n \t\t\t \"info\": Object {\n \t\t\t \"javascriptModule\": false,\n \t\t\t \"minimized\": true,\n-\t\t\t \"size\": 3010,\n+\t\t\t \"size\": 3060,\n \t\t\t },\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-43788\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: DOM Clobbering Gadget found in Webpack's AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule that leads to Cross-site Scripting (XSS)\n\nThis patch addresses: Webpack is a module bundler. Its main purpose is to bundle JavaScript files for usage in a browser, yet it is also capable of transforming, bundling, or packaging just about any resource or asset. The webpack developers have discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack’s `AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an `img` tag with an unsanitized `name`\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\ndef check_extension(filename):\n if not filename.endswith('.txt'):\n raise ValueError(\"Only .txt files allowed\")\n return open(filename).read()\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues, their severity, and how to fix them." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\nNull Byte Injection (CWE-626)\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nExplanation:\nIn some contexts, 'malicious.php\\x00.txt' passes the check but opens malicious.php due to null byte termination.\n\nHow to Fix:\nStrip null bytes: filename = filename.replace('\\x00', '')" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-5273\nDescription: The abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users to write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on unpacked.cpio in a pre-created directory with a predictable name in /var/tmp.\n\n```diff\nFrom 50ee8130fb4cd4ef1af7682a2c85dd99cb99424e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>\nDate: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 11:50:18 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] a-a-i-d-to-abrt-cache: make own random temporary directory\n\nThe set-user-ID wrapper must use own new temporary directory in order to\navoid security issues with unpacking specially crafted debuginfo\npackages that might be used to create files or symlinks anywhere on the\nfile system as the abrt user.\n\nWithot the forking code the temporary directory would remain on the\nfilesystem in the case where all debuginfo data are already available.\nThis is caused by the fact that the underlying libreport functionality\naccepts path to a desired temporary directory and creates it only if\nnecessary. Otherwise, the directory is not touched at all.\n\nThis commit addresses CVE-2015-5273\n\nSigned-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>\n---\n src/plugins/Makefile.am \| 1 +\n ...t-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache.c \| 41 +++++++++++++++++--\n 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/plugins/Makefile.am b/src/plugins/Makefile.am\nindex 85e54ab959..005cc9da14 100644\n--- a/src/plugins/Makefile.am\n+++ b/src/plugins/Makefile.am\n@@ -371,6 +371,7 @@ abrt_action_install_debuginfo_to_abrt_cache_CPPFLAGS = \\\n -D_GNU_SOURCE \\\n -DBIN_DIR=\\\"$(bindir)\\\" \\\n -DSBIN_DIR=\\\"$(sbindir)\\\" \\\n+ -DLARGE_DATA_TMP_DIR=\\\"$(LARGE_DATA_TMP_DIR)\\\" \\\n $(LIBREPORT_CFLAGS) \\\n -Wall -Wwrite-strings \\\n -fPIE\ndiff --git a/src/plugins/abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache.c b/src/plugins/abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache.c\nindex 81b14864aa..52d00de629 100644\n--- a/src/plugins/abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache.c\n+++ b/src/plugins/abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache.c\n@@ -108,8 +108,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv)\n build_ids_self_fd = xasprintf(\"/proc/self/fd/%d\", build_ids_fd);\n }\n \n- / name, -v, --ids, -, -y, -e, EXACT, -r, REPO, --, NULL /\n- const char args[11];\n+ char tmp_directory[] = LARGE_DATA_TMP_DIR\"/abrt-tmp-debuginfo.XXXXXX\";\n+ if (mkdtemp(tmp_directory) == NULL)\n+ perror_msg_and_die(\"Failed to create working directory\");\n+\n+ log_info(\"Created working directory: %s\", tmp_directory);\n+\n+ /* name, -v, --ids, -, -y, -e, EXACT, -r, REPO, -t, PATH, --, NULL /\n+ const char args[13];\n {\n const char verbs[] = { \"\", \"-v\", \"-vv\", \"-vvv\" };\n unsigned i = 0;\n@@ -130,6 +136,8 @@ int main(int argc, char argv)\n args[i++] = \"--repo\";\n args[i++] = repo;\n }\n+ args[i++] = \"--tmpdir\";\n+ args[i++] = tmp_directory;\n args[i++] = \"--\";\n args[i] = NULL;\n }\n@@ -204,6 +212,31 @@ int main(int argc, char argv)\n umask(0022);\n }\n \n- execvp(EXECUTABLE, (char )args);\n- error_msg_and_die(\"Can't execute %s\", EXECUTABLE);\n+ pid_t pid = fork();\n+ if (pid < 0)\n+ perror_msg_and_die(\"fork\");\n+\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2015-5273\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The abrt-action-install-debuginfo-to-abrt-cache help program in Automatic Bug Reporting Tool (ABRT) before 2.7.1 allows local users to write to arbitrary files via a symlink attack on unpacked.cpio in a pre-created directory with a predictable name in /var/tmp.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fh37-cx83-q542\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 21cedff205e7d62675949fda2aa4616d77232b76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ian Carroll <iangcarroll+spam-only@icloud.com>\nDate: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 13:47:45 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Add authentication to lineage endpoint for experimental API\n (#13870)\n\n(cherry picked from commit 24a54242d56058846c7978130b3f37ca045d5142)\n---\n airflow/www/api/experimental/endpoints.py \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/airflow/www/api/experimental/endpoints.py b/airflow/www/api/experimental/endpoints.py\nindex ada059b8575ef..e24ed5ef7be61 100644\n--- a/airflow/www/api/experimental/endpoints.py\n+++ b/airflow/www/api/experimental/endpoints.py\n@@ -389,6 +389,7 @@ def delete_pool(name):\n \n \n @api_experimental.route('/lineage/<string:dag_id>/<string:execution_date>', methods=['GET'])\n+@requires_authentication\n def get_lineage(dag_id: str, execution_date: str):\n \"\"\"Get Lineage details for a DagRun\"\"\"\n # Convert string datetime into actual datetime\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fh37-cx83-q542\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Improper Authentication in Apache Airflow\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g4q2-gc49-8q5w\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 54720a14d85bc1197ded7cb09bd3ea790caa0b6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pascal Birchler <pascal.birchler@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 17:26:31 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Upgrade/Install: Sanitize file name in\n `File_Upload_Upgrader`. Built from\n https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@38524\n\ngit-svn-id: http://core.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@38465 1a063a9b-81f0-0310-95a4-ce76da25c4cd\n---\n wp-admin/includes/class-file-upload-upgrader.php \| 6 +++++-\n wp-includes/version.php \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/wp-admin/includes/class-file-upload-upgrader.php b/wp-admin/includes/class-file-upload-upgrader.php\nindex 35baa7faebcd..eb4efe7121eb 100644\n--- a/wp-admin/includes/class-file-upload-upgrader.php\n+++ b/wp-admin/includes/class-file-upload-upgrader.php\n@@ -100,8 +100,12 @@ public function __construct( $form, $urlholder ) {\n \t\t\tif ( ! ( ( $uploads = wp_upload_dir() ) && false === $uploads['error'] ) )\n \t\t\t\twp_die( $uploads['error'] );\n \n-\t\t\t$this->filename = $_GET[$urlholder];\n+\t\t\t$this->filename = sanitize_file_name( $_GET[ $urlholder ] );\n \t\t\t$this->package = $uploads['basedir'] . '/' . $this->filename;\n+\n+\t\t\tif ( 0 !== strpos( realpath( $this->package ), realpath( $uploads['basedir'] ) ) ) {\n+\t\t\t\twp_die( __( 'Please select a file' ) );\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \ndiff --git a/wp-includes/version.php b/wp-includes/version.php\nindex 9f39bc2c38fc..2265a47bd19e 100644\n--- a/wp-includes/version.php\n+++ b/wp-includes/version.php\n@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@\n \n @global string $wp_version\n /\n-$wp_version = '4.7-alpha-38523';\n+$wp_version = '4.7-alpha-38524';\n \n /\n Holds the WordPress DB revision, increments when changes are made to the WordPress DB schema.\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g4q2-gc49-8q5w\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-92pg-8g57-hqpx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9af9efae6e9ed408ca89ff9b5f1b7a74da0a131f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ramon Leon <manuelramonleonjimenez@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 12 Feb 2021 16:18:27 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] SECURITY-2150\n\n---\n .../java/com/cloudbees/jenkins/support/impl/AboutUser.java \| 3 ---\n 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/main/java/com/cloudbees/jenkins/support/impl/AboutUser.java b/src/main/java/com/cloudbees/jenkins/support/impl/AboutUser.java\nindex d3342e069..7cec53060 100644\n--- a/src/main/java/com/cloudbees/jenkins/support/impl/AboutUser.java\n+++ b/src/main/java/com/cloudbees/jenkins/support/impl/AboutUser.java\n@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@\n import com.cloudbees.jenkins.support.api.Container;\n import com.cloudbees.jenkins.support.api.PrefilteredPrintedContent;\n import com.cloudbees.jenkins.support.filter.ContentFilter;\n-import com.cloudbees.jenkins.support.util.Markdown;\n import edu.umd.cs.findbugs.annotations.NonNull;\n import hudson.Extension;\n import hudson.security.Permission;\n@@ -59,8 +58,6 @@ protected void printTo(PrintWriter out, ContentFilter filter) throws IOException\n \"`\", \"`\") + \"`\"));\n }\n }\n- // The raw data has the user name. We print it like code wrapping it with `\n- out.println(\" * Raw: `\" + Markdown.escapeBacktick(ContentFilter.filter(filter, authentication.toString())) + \"`\");\n out.println();\n }\n });\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-92pg-8g57-hqpx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Support bundles can include user session IDs in Jenkins Support Core Plugin\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mm9p-48xr-prf2\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 22f6b4d34fcf039c63a94e7670e0da24f8575a5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>\nDate: Fri, 16 Sep 2016 00:31:22 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] aio: mark AIO pseudo-fs noexec\n\nThis ensures that do_mmap() won't implicitly make AIO memory mappings\nexecutable if the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag is set. Such\nbehavior is problematic because the security_mmap_file LSM hook doesn't\ncatch this case, potentially permitting an attacker to bypass a W^X\npolicy enforced by SELinux.\n\nI have tested the patch on my machine.\n\nTo test the behavior, compile and run this:\n\n #define _GNU_SOURCE\n #include <unistd.h>\n #include <sys/personality.h>\n #include <linux/aio_abi.h>\n #include <err.h>\n #include <stdlib.h>\n #include <stdio.h>\n #include <sys/syscall.h>\n\n int main(void) {\n personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC);\n aio_context_t ctx = 0;\n if (syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx))\n err(1, \"io_setup\");\n\n char cmd[1000];\n sprintf(cmd, \"cat /proc/%d/maps \| grep -F '/[aio]'\",\n (int)getpid());\n system(cmd);\n return 0;\n }\n\nIn the output, \"rw-s\" is good, \"rwxs\" is bad.\n\nSigned-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n fs/aio.c \| 7 ++++++-\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c\nindex fb8e45b88cd4ec..4fe81d1c60f962 100644\n--- a/fs/aio.c\n+++ b/fs/aio.c\n@@ -239,7 +239,12 @@ static struct dentry aio_mount(struct file_system_type fs_type,\n \tstatic const struct dentry_operations ops = {\n \t\t.d_dname\t= simple_dname,\n \t};\n-\treturn mount_pseudo(fs_type, \"aio:\", NULL, &ops, AIO_RING_MAGIC);\n+\tstruct dentry root = mount_pseudo(fs_type, \"aio:\", NULL, &ops,\n+\t\t\t\t\t AIO_RING_MAGIC);\n+\n+\tif (!IS_ERR(root))\n+\t\troot->d_sb->s_iflags \|= SB_I_NOEXEC;\n+\treturn root;\n }\n \n / aio_setup\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mm9p-48xr-prf2\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-3988\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in Frappe. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html of the component Search. The manipulation of the argument q leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is bfab7191543961c6cb77fe267063877c31b616ce. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-213560.\n\n```diff\nFrom bfab7191543961c6cb77fe267063877c31b616ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jll-02 <63648645+jll-02@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 13:41:45 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix(security): prevent xss attack in search (#18847)\n\n---\n frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html b/frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html\nindex 67b4d6505a3e..2602fe1f8c55 100644\n--- a/frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html\n+++ b/frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html\n@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@\n \t<li>\n \t\t<form action='/search'>\n \t\t<input name='q' class='form-control navbar-search' type='text'\n-\t\t\tvalue='{{ frappe.form_dict.q or ''}}'\n+\t\t\tvalue='{{ frappe.form_dict.q\|e or ''}}'\n \t\t\t{% if not frappe.form_dict.q%}placeholder=\"{{ _(\"Search...\") }}\"{% endif %}>\n \t\t</form>\n \t</li>\n-{% endif %}\n\\ No newline at end of file\n+{% endif %}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-3988\nCWE: CWE-707 Improper Neutralization -> CWE-74 Injection -> CWE-79 Cross Site Scripting\nTitle: Frappe Search navbar_search.html cross site scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in Frappe. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file frappe/templates/includes/navbar/navbar_search.html of the component Search. The manipulation of the argument q leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. The name of the patch is bfab7191543961c6cb77fe267063877c31b616ce. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-213560.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f6gj-7592-5jxm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom dfdd52e2e80607af433097d940b3834fd96df488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Domingo E. Savoretti\" <esavoretti@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 27 Apr 2017 02:36:35 -0300\nSubject: [PATCH] version 0.10.1 Fixed directory traversal vulnerability\n\n---\n lib/router.js \| 14 +++++++++++---\n package.json \| 2 +-\n src/router.coffee \| 10 ++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/router.js b/lib/router.js\nindex be232b9..d8f8e30 100644\n--- a/lib/router.js\n+++ b/lib/router.js\n@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@\n resp = {\n \"multipart-data\": []\n };\n- // boundary = content_type.split(/;\\s+/)[1].split('=')[1].trim();\n boundary = content_type.split(/;\\s+/)[1];\n if (boundary) {\n boundary = boundary.split('=')[1];\n@@ -390,10 +389,10 @@\n obj.fileLen = obj.fileData.length;\n }\n resp['multipart-data'].push(obj);\n- } \n+ }\n }\n }\n- } \n+ }\n return resp;\n };\n _bodyparser = function(body, contentType) {\n@@ -731,6 +730,9 @@\n dispatch[\"static\"] = function(pathname, req, res) {\n var full_path;\n full_path = \"\" + dispatch.static_route + (unescape(pathname));\n+ if (full_path.indexOf('..') !== -1) {\n+ return dispatch._403(null, res, pathname, \"Trying to get private things through directory traversal is a nasty thing to do.\");\n+ }\n return fs.exists(full_path, function(exists) {\n var e, error;\n if (exists) {\n@@ -1274,6 +1276,12 @@\n }\n });\n };\n+ dispatch._403 = function(req, res, path, message) {\n+ res.writeHead(500, {\n+ 'Content-Type': 'text/html'\n+ });\n+ return res.end(\"<h2>403 - Forbidden: \" + message + \"</h2>\\n<hr/><h3>Served by \" + dispatch.served_by + \" v\" + dispatch.version + \"</h3>\\n<p style=\\\"text-align: center;\\\"><button onclick='history.back();'>Back</button></p>\");\n+ };\n dispatch._405 = function(req, res, path, message) {\n res.writeHead(405, {\n 'Content-Type': 'text/html'\ndiff --git a/package.json b/package.json\nindex 2f53da0..070cbe6 100644\n--- a/package.json\n+++ b/package.json\n@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@\n \"async\",\n \"promises\"\n ],\n- \"version\": \"0.10.0\",\n+ \"version\": \"0.10.1\",\n \"homepage\": \"http://node-simple-router.herokuapp.com\",\n \"author\": \"Ernesto Savoretti <esavoretti@gmail.com>\",\n \"repository\": {\ndiff --git a/src/router.coffee b/src/router.coffee\nindex 6dd7c68..a8b7d14 100644\n--- a/src/router.coffee\n+++ b/src/router.coffee\n@@ -613,6 +613,8 @@ Router = (options = {}) ->\n \n dispatch.static = (pathname, req, res) ->\n full_path = \"#{dispatch.static_route}#{unescape(pathname)}\"\n+ if full_path.indexOf('..') isnt -1\n+ return dispatch._403(null, res, pathname, \"Trying to get private things through directory traversal is a nasty thing to do.\")\n fs.exists full_path, (exists) ->\n if exists\n if ((pathname.indexOf(\"#{dispatch.cgi_dir}/\") isnt - 1) or (p\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f6gj-7592-5jxm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Directory Traversal\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2xvj-j3qh-x8c3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 4068228187db87fea7577f7020099399772bb147 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: John Downey <jdowney@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 3 May 2018 20:05:19 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix TOCTOU bug\n\nThis fixes the time of check to time of use (TOCTOU) bug reported by Sajjad\nHashemian.\n---\n README.md \| 12 +++++++++++-\n lib/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext.rb \| 7 +++----\n test/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext_test.rb \| 6 +++++-\n 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/README.md b/README.md\nindex 8120d4c..4b77c91 100644\n--- a/README.md\n+++ b/README.md\n@@ -61,8 +61,18 @@ To install this gem onto your local machine, run `bundle exec rake install`. To\n \n Bug reports and pull requests are welcome on GitHub at https://github.com/jtdowney/private_address_check. This project is intended to be a safe, welcoming space for collaboration, and contributors are expected to adhere to the [Contributor Covenant](http://contributor-covenant.org) code of conduct.\n \n+## Security\n+\n+If you've found a security issue in `private_address_check`, please reach out to @jtdowney via email to report.\n+\n+### Time of check to time of use\n+\n+A library like `private_address_check` is going to be easily susceptible to attacks like [time of check to time of use](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_of_check_to_time_of_use). DNS entries with a TTL of 0 can trigger this case where the initial resolution is a public address by the subsequent resolution is a private address. There are some possible defenses and workarounds:\n+\n+- Use the TCPSocket extension in this library which checks the address the socket uses. This is most useful if your system is built on native Ruby like Net::HTTP.\n+- Use a feature like the `resolve` capability in curl and [curb](https://www.rubydoc.info/github/taf2/curb/Curl/Easy#resolve=-instance_method) to force the resolution to a pre-checked IP address.\n+- Implement your own caching DNS resolver with something like dnsmasq or unbound. These tools let you set a minimum cache time that can override the TTL of 0.\n \n ## License\n \n The gem is available as open source under the terms of the [MIT License](http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT).\n-\ndiff --git a/lib/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext.rb b/lib/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext.rb\nindex 1ec54c0..83d018a 100644\n--- a/lib/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext.rb\n+++ b/lib/private_address_check/tcpsocket_ext.rb\n@@ -14,11 +14,10 @@ def only_public_connections\n TCPSocket.class_eval do\n alias initialize_without_private_address_check initialize\n \n- def initialize(remote_host, remote_port, local_host = nil, local_port = nil)\n- if Thread.current[:private_address_check] && PrivateAddressCheck.resolves_to_private_address?(remote_host)\n+ def initialize(args)\n+ initialize_without_private_address_check(args)\n+ if Thread.current[:private_address_check] && PrivateAddressCheck.resolves_to_private_address?(remote_address.ip_address)\n raise PrivateAdd\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2xvj-j3qh-x8c3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: private_address_check contains race condition\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-16718\nDescription: In radare2 before 3.9.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient fix for CVE-2019-14745 and improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.\n\n```diff\nFrom 5411543a310a470b1257fb93273cdd6e8dfcb3af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pancake <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Mon, 9 Sep 2019 06:13:45 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745\n\n---\n libr/core/cbin.c \| 12 ++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/core/cbin.c b/libr/core/cbin.c\nindex 2d0fa61b206d2..8373826a3d04c 100644\n--- a/libr/core/cbin.c\n+++ b/libr/core/cbin.c\n@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ static char __filterQuotedShell(const char arg) {\n \t\tswitch (arg) {\n \t\tcase ' ':\n \t\tcase '=':\n+\t\tcase '\"':\n+\t\tcase '\\\\':\n \t\tcase '\\r':\n \t\tcase '\\n':\n \t\t\tbreak;\n@@ -88,15 +90,17 @@ static char __filterShell(const char arg) {\n \t}\n \tchar b = a;\n \twhile (arg) {\n-\t\tswitch (arg) {\n+\t\tchar ch = arg;\n+\t\tswitch (ch) {\n \t\tcase '@':\n \t\tcase '`':\n \t\tcase '\|':\n \t\tcase ';':\n+\t\tcase '=':\n \t\tcase '\\n':\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tdefault:\n-\t\t\tb++ = arg;\n+\t\t\tb++ = ch;\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t}\n \t\targ++;\n@@ -2225,10 +2229,10 @@ static int bin_symbols(RCore r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, ut64 at, const ch\n \t\t\t\t\t\tchar m = __filterShell (module);\n \t\t\t\t\t\tp = 0;\n \t\t\t\t\t\tif (r->bin->prefix) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\tr_cons_printf (\"k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\\n\",\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tr_cons_printf (\"\\\"k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\\\"\\n\",\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmodule, symbol->ordinal, r->bin->prefix, symname);\n \t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\tr_cons_printf (\"k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\\n\",\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tr_cons_printf (\"\\\"k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\\\"\\n\",\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmodule, symbol->ordinal, symname);\n \t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\tfree (symname);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2019-16718\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In radare2 before 3.9.0, a command injection vulnerability exists in bin_symbols() in libr/core/cbin.c. By using a crafted executable file, it's possible to execute arbitrary shell commands with the permissions of the victim. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient fix for CVE-2019-14745 and improper handling of symbol names embedded in executables.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-97r3-f3fh-2pjg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d00745f5e267eba4ca34286d125de685bc3a8034 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Paul Richards <paul@mantisforge.org>\nDate: Mon, 29 Aug 2011 18:55:14 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix issue introduced previously whereby php_Self is now used\n unchecked.\n\nintroduced previously by john attempting to fix symlinks. Since we now use php 5.2, we can make use of filter_var.\n\nThis is a simpler version of what we were trying to do previously aka http://git.mantisforge.org/w/mantisbt.git?a=commitdiff;h=5ac1fdf32717d0c82cca7e7660dd4fd316a6a1b8\n\nDepending on server/mantis config this can lead to XSS issues\n\nDavid: Backported from master branch and removed unreachable code branch.\n\nSigned-off-by: David Hicks <d@hx.id.au>\n---\n config_defaults_inc.php \| 9 +++++++--\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/config_defaults_inc.php b/config_defaults_inc.php\nindex e060900a00..74acccc70e 100644\n--- a/config_defaults_inc.php\n+++ b/config_defaults_inc.php\n@@ -112,10 +112,15 @@\n \t\t\t$t_host = 'localhost';\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t$t_path = str_replace( basename( $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'] ), '', $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'] );\n+\t\t$t_self = $_SERVER['SCRIPT_NAME'];\n+\t\t$t_self = filter_var( $t_self, FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING );\n+\t\t$t_path = str_replace( basename( $t_self ), '', $t_self );\n \t\t$t_path = basename( $t_path ) == \"admin\" ? dirname( $t_path ) . '/' : $t_path;\n \t\t$t_path = basename( $t_path ) == \"soap\" ? dirname( dirname( $t_path ) ) . '/' : $t_path;\n-\t\t\n+\t\tif ( strpos( $t_path, '&#' ) ) {\n+\t\t\techo 'Can not safely determine $g_path. Please set $g_path manually in config_inc.php';\n+\t\t\tdie;\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\t$t_url\t= $t_protocol . '://' . $t_host . $t_path;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-97r3-f3fh-2pjg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6fh2-w324-phpv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom f1b1eb154baa684fad5d65bf4dff79c8ded8b65a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Juerd Waalboer <juerd@tnx.nl>\nDate: Thu, 22 Sep 2016 02:26:09 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix disclosure via filesystem\n\nbuf.pl restores the scrollbuffer between \"/upgrade\"s by writing the\ncontents to a file, and reading that after the new process was spawned.\nThrough that file, the contents of (private) chat conversations may leak to\nother users.\n\nCareful users with a limited umask (e.g. 077) are not affected by this bug.\nHowever, most Linux systems default to a umask of 022, meaning that files\nwritten without further restricting the permissions, are readable by any\nuser.\n\nThis patch sets a safer umask of 077 for the scrollbuffer dump, and will\nremove the temporary file after use to further reduce the attack surface.\nAdditionally, it will remove any remaining temporary scrollbuffer file left\nin place, like those written by previous versions of the script.\n---\n scripts/buf.pl \| 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------\n 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/scripts/buf.pl b/scripts/buf.pl\nindex da50e8219..6d907f127 100644\n--- a/scripts/buf.pl\n+++ b/scripts/buf.pl\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n settings_get_str settings_get_bool channels windows\n \t settings_add_str settings_add_bool get_irssi_dir\n \t window_find_refnum signal_stop);\n-$VERSION = '2.13';\n+$VERSION = '2.20';\n %IRSSI = (\n authors\t=> 'Juerd',\n contact\t=> 'juerd@juerd.nl',\n@@ -13,10 +13,8 @@\n description\t=> 'Saves the buffer for /upgrade, so that no information is lost',\n license\t=> 'Public Domain',\n url\t\t=> 'http://juerd.nl/irssi/',\n- changed\t=> 'Mon May 13 19:41 CET 2002',\n- changes\t=> 'Severe formatting bug removed * oops, I ' .\n- 'exposed Irssi to ircII foolishness * sorry ' .\n-\t\t ' removed logging stuff (this is a fix)',\n+ changed\t=> 'Thu Sep 22 01:37 CEST 2016',\n+ changes\t=> 'Fixed file permissions (leaked everything via filesystem)',\n note1\t=> 'This script HAS TO BE in your scripts/autorun!',\n note2\t=> 'Perl support must be static or in startup',\n );\n@@ -39,9 +37,15 @@\n \n my %suppress;\n \n+sub _filename { sprintf '%s/scrollbuffer', get_irssi_dir }\n+\n sub upgrade {\n- open BUF, q{>}, sprintf('%s/scrollbuffer', get_irssi_dir) or die $!;\n- print BUF join(\"\\0\", map $_->{server}->{address} . $_->{name}, channels), \"\\n\";\n+ my $fn = _filename;\n+ my $old_umask = umask 0077;\n+ open my $fh, q{>}, $fn or die \"open $fn: $!\";\n+ umask $old_umask;\n+\n+ print $fh join(\"\\0\", map $_->{server}->{address} . $_->{name}, channels), \"\\n\";\n for my $window (windows) {\n \tnext unless defined $window;\n \tnext if $window->{name} eq 'status';\n@@ -57,36 +61,39 @@ sub upgrade {\n \t\tredo if defined $line;\n \t }\n \t}\n-\tprintf BUF \"%s:%s\\n%s\", $window->{refnum}, $lines, $buf;\n+\tprintf $fh \"%s:%s\\n%s\", $window->{refnum}, $lines, $buf;\n }\n- close BUF;\n+ close $fh;\n unlink sprintf(\"%s/sessionconfig\", get_irssi_dir);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6fh2-w324-phpv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle:** Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32838\nDescription: Flask-RESTX (pypi package flask-restx) is a community driven fork of Flask-RESTPlus. Flask-RESTX before version 0.5.1 is vulnerable to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) in email_regex. This is fixed in version 0.5.1.\n\n```diff\nFrom bab31e085f355dd73858fd3715f7ed71849656da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: ziirish <ziirish@ziirish.info>\nDate: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 21:53:02 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] optimize email regex (credits: @kevinbackhouse, fix: #372)\n\n---\n flask_restx/inputs.py \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/flask_restx/inputs.py b/flask_restx/inputs.py\nindex b05532f3..9c76d8a0 100644\n--- a/flask_restx/inputs.py\n+++ b/flask_restx/inputs.py\n@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ def my_type(value):\n \n \n email_regex = re.compile(\n- r\"^\" \"(?P<local>[^@][^@.])\" r\"@\" r\"(?P<server>[^@]+(?:\\.[^@]+))\" r\"$\",\n+ r\"^\" \"(?P<local>[^@][^@.])\" r\"@\" r\"(?P<server>[^@\\.]+(?:\\.[^@\\.]+))\" r\"$\",\n re.IGNORECASE,\n )\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32838\nCWE: CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\nTitle: Regular Expression Denial of Service in flask-restx\n\nThis patch addresses: Flask-RESTX (pypi package flask-restx) is a community driven fork of Flask-RESTPlus. Flask-RESTX before version 0.5.1 is vulnerable to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) in email_regex. This is fixed in version 0.5.1.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h2wg-83fc-xvm9\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 15390adbfcd5fd37af4661f992f8873ae5a6b840 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: LinkinStars <linkinstar@foxmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 23 Feb 2023 11:37:42 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix(admin): add restriction about admin modify their password\n\n---\n i18n/en_US.yaml \| 2 ++\n internal/base/reason/reason.go \| 1 +\n internal/service/user_admin/user_backyard.go \| 4 ++++\n 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/i18n/en_US.yaml b/i18n/en_US.yaml\nindex 69a39c12a..237d410c9 100644\n--- a/i18n/en_US.yaml\n+++ b/i18n/en_US.yaml\n@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ backend:\n other: Email and password do not match.\n error:\n admin:\n+ cannot_update_their_password:\n+ other: You cannot modify your password.\n email_or_password_wrong:\n other: Email and password do not match.\n answer:\ndiff --git a/internal/base/reason/reason.go b/internal/base/reason/reason.go\nindex a33e33cc2..86b448d91 100644\n--- a/internal/base/reason/reason.go\n+++ b/internal/base/reason/reason.go\n@@ -64,4 +64,5 @@ const (\n \tTagCannotSetSynonymAsItself = \"error.tag.cannot_set_synonym_as_itself\"\n \tNotAllowedRegistration = \"error.user.not_allowed_registration\"\n \tSMTPConfigFromNameCannotBeEmail = \"error.smtp.config_from_name_cannot_be_email\"\n+\tAdminCannotUpdateTheirPassword = \"error.admin.cannot_update_their_password\"\n )\ndiff --git a/internal/service/user_admin/user_backyard.go b/internal/service/user_admin/user_backyard.go\nindex ae09ce856..5712610d2 100644\n--- a/internal/service/user_admin/user_backyard.go\n+++ b/internal/service/user_admin/user_backyard.go\n@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ func (us UserAdminService) AddUser(ctx context.Context, req schema.AddUserReq)\n \n // UpdateUserPassword update user password\n func (us UserAdminService) UpdateUserPassword(ctx context.Context, req schema.UpdateUserPasswordReq) (err error) {\n+\t// Users cannot modify their password\n+\tif req.UserID == req.LoginUserID {\n+\t\treturn errors.BadRequest(reason.AdminCannotUpdateTheirPassword)\n+\t}\n \tuserInfo, exist, err := us.userRepo.GetUserInfo(ctx, req.UserID)\n \tif err != nil {\n \t\treturn err\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h2wg-83fc-xvm9\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Answer vulnerable to Business Logic Errors\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v977-h4hm-rrff\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d053bc1715b4876d162b2f594ca3d63663751eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"dependabot[bot]\" <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 09:58:23 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] build(deps): bump aws/aws-sdk-php from 3.285.4 to 3.287.0\n\nBumps [aws/aws-sdk-php](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php) from 3.285.4 to 3.287.0.\n- [Release notes](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/releases)\n- [Commits](https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/compare/3.285.4...3.287.0)\n\n---\nupdated-dependencies:\n- dependency-name: aws/aws-sdk-php\n dependency-type: direct:production\n update-type: version-update:semver-minor\n...\n\nSigned-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>\n---\n composer.lock \| 12 ++++++------\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/composer.lock b/composer.lock\nindex b273eaac3a63..e33702dba41c 100644\n--- a/composer.lock\n+++ b/composer.lock\n@@ -281,16 +281,16 @@\n },\n {\n \"name\": \"aws/aws-sdk-php\",\n- \"version\": \"3.285.4\",\n+ \"version\": \"3.287.0\",\n \"source\": {\n \"type\": \"git\",\n \"url\": \"https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php.git\",\n- \"reference\": \"c462af819d81cba49939949032b20799f5ef0fff\"\n+ \"reference\": \"06978bfc63111fccd78b364238bf214b4ade8d18\"\n },\n \"dist\": {\n \"type\": \"zip\",\n- \"url\": \"https://api.github.com/repos/aws/aws-sdk-php/zipball/c462af819d81cba49939949032b20799f5ef0fff\",\n- \"reference\": \"c462af819d81cba49939949032b20799f5ef0fff\",\n+ \"url\": \"https://api.github.com/repos/aws/aws-sdk-php/zipball/06978bfc63111fccd78b364238bf214b4ade8d18\",\n+ \"reference\": \"06978bfc63111fccd78b364238bf214b4ade8d18\",\n \"shasum\": \"\"\n },\n \"require\": {\n@@ -370,9 +370,9 @@\n \"support\": {\n \"forum\": \"https://forums.aws.amazon.com/forum.jspa?forumID=80\",\n \"issues\": \"https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/issues\",\n- \"source\": \"https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/tree/3.285.4\"\n+ \"source\": \"https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/tree/3.287.0\"\n },\n- \"time\": \"2023-11-10T19:25:49+00:00\"\n+ \"time\": \"2023-11-17T20:03:36+00:00\"\n },\n {\n \"name\": \"brick/math\",\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-v977-h4hm-rrff\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: WWBN AVideo Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-2vv7-7crh-jr74\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 82262a46627bebb0febcc26664746c25cef08563 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>\nDate: Wed, 18 Jun 2014 13:32:32 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls\n\nThere are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user\ncontrols. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a\nuser control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process\nthat tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary\ncontrols, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not\nexpect a control to be removed from under its feed.\n\nThe second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the\nuser_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is\nincreased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows\nuserspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace\na control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be\nadded effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.\n\nBoth issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control\nthat is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does\nproper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control\nhas been removed.\n\nNote that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at\nbeginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not\na problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is\nprotecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the\nnew control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different\ncontrol with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily\nthere is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so\nwe'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.\n\nSigned-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>\nAcked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>\n---\n sound/core/control.c \| 25 +++++++++----------------\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c\nindex 00ab034f5fcbee..1f413c2865113d 100644\n--- a/sound/core/control.c\n+++ b/sound/core/control.c\n@@ -1154,8 +1154,6 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file file,\n \tstruct user_element ue;\n \tint idx, err;\n \n-\tif (!replace && card->user_ctl_count >= MAX_USER_CONTROLS)\n-\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n \tif (info->count < 1)\n \t\treturn -EINVAL;\n \taccess = info->access == 0 ? SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_READWRITE :\n@@ -1164,21 +1162,16 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file file,\n \t\t\t\t SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READWRITE));\n \tinfo->id.numid = 0;\n \tmemset(&kctl, 0, sizeof(kctl));\n-\tdown_write(&card->controls_rwsem);\n-\t_kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);\n-\terr = 0;\n-\tif (_kctl) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-2vv7-7crh-jr74\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request, redirect\nimport base64\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/img/upload')\ndef upload_img():\n '''\n Get image file from request and save it to ./pictures folder after encoding\n '''\n img = request.files['img']\n img_name = img.filename\n img_data = img.read()\n img_encoded = base64.b64encode(img_data)\n with open('./pictures/' + img_name, 'wb') as f:\n f.write(img_encoded)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-434 - CWE-434\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pr3h-jjhj-573x\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 18b8a7f07a50c245e9aee7854ecdbe606bbd8bb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: schneems <richard.schneeman+foo@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 16:42:41 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Do not respond to http requests asking for a `file://`\n\nBased on CVE-2018-3760 when the Sprockets server is accidentally being used in production, an attacker can pass in a specifically crafted url that will allow them access to view every file on the system. If the file hit contains a compilable extension such as `.erb` then the code in that file will be executed.\n\nA Rails app will be using the Sprockets file server in production if they have accidentally configured their app to:\n\n```ruby\nconfig.assets.compile = true # Your app is vulnerable\n```\n\nIt is highly recommended to not use the Sprockets server in production and to instead precompile assets to disk and serve them through a server such as Nginx or via the static file middleware that ships with rails `config.public_file_server.enabled = true`.\n\nThis patch mitigates the issue, but explicitly disallowing any requests to any URI resources via the server.\n---\n lib/sprockets/server.rb \| 2 +-\n test/test_server.rb \| 7 +++++++\n 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/sprockets/server.rb b/lib/sprockets/server.rb\nindex e71f41381..29b5fd672 100644\n--- a/lib/sprockets/server.rb\n+++ b/lib/sprockets/server.rb\n@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ def forbidden_request?(path)\n #\n # http://example.org/assets/../../../etc/passwd\n #\n- path.include?(\"..\") \|\| Pathname.new(path).absolute?\n+ path.include?(\"..\") \|\| Pathname.new(path).absolute? \|\| path.include?(\"://\")\n end\n \n # Returns a 403 Forbidden response tuple\ndiff --git a/test/test_server.rb b/test/test_server.rb\nindex 6a8a44be1..29c5d4a95 100644\n--- a/test/test_server.rb\n+++ b/test/test_server.rb\n@@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ def app\n assert_equal 403, last_response.status\n end\n \n+ test \"illegal access of a file asset\" do\n+ absolute_path = fixture_path(\"server/app/javascripts\")\n+\n+ get \"assets/file:%2f%2f//#{absolute_path}/foo.js\"\n+ assert_equal 403, last_response.status\n+ end\n+\n test \"add new source to tree\" do\n filename = fixture_path(\"server/app/javascripts/baz.js\")\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pr3h-jjhj-573x\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Sprockets path traversal leads to information leak\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-28240\nDescription: The GLPI Agent is a generic management agent. A vulnerability that only affects GLPI-Agent installed on windows via MSI packaging can allow a local user to cause denial of agent service by replacing GLPI server url with a wrong url or disabling the service. Additionally, in the case the Deploy task is installed, a local malicious user can trigger privilege escalation configuring a malicious server providing its own deploy task payload. GLPI-Agent 1.7.2 contains a patch for this issue. As a worka\n\n```diff\nFrom 41bbb1169e899bd15350a9e2fdbf9269a3b7a14f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Guillaume Bougard <gbougard@teclib.com>\nDate: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 17:15:39 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: Fix critical security issue on windows MSI packaging\n\n---\n Changes \| 2 ++\n contrib/windows/packaging/MSI_main-v2.wxs.tt \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/Changes b/Changes\nindex 3d59db11c..8bbd2862e 100644\n--- a/Changes\n+++ b/Changes\n@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ packaging:\n * [SECURITY] Fix CVE-2024-28241: A local user could modify the GLPI-Agent installation\n to gain higher privileges, but only when GLPI Agent is not installed in the default\n installation folder\n+* [SECURITY] Fix CVE-2024-28240: A local user could modify the GLPI Agent configuration\n+ to gain higher privileges\n \n 1.7.1 Fri, 22 Dec 2023\n \ndiff --git a/contrib/windows/packaging/MSI_main-v2.wxs.tt b/contrib/windows/packaging/MSI_main-v2.wxs.tt\nindex 44c467c8f..57b1c4aa3 100644\n--- a/contrib/windows/packaging/MSI_main-v2.wxs.tt\n+++ b/contrib/windows/packaging/MSI_main-v2.wxs.tt\n@@ -442,7 +442,14 @@\n <CustomAction Id=\"SetFixLocalDir\" Property=\"FixLocalDir\" Value=\""[SystemFolder]icacls.exe" "[LOCAL]." /inheritance:r\" Execute=\"immediate\" />\n <CustomAction Id=\"FixLocalDir\" BinaryKey=\"WixCA\" DllEntry=\"WixQuietExec\" Execute=\"deferred\" Return=\"check\" Impersonate=\"no\"/>\n \n+ <CustomAction Id=\"SetCheckRunningAsAdmin\" Property=\"WixQuietExecCmdLine\" Value=\""[SystemFolder]net.exe" file\" Execute=\"immediate\" />\n+ <CustomAction Id=\"CheckRunningAsAdmin\" BinaryKey=\"WixCA\" DllEntry=\"WixQuietExec\" Execute=\"immediate\" Return=\"check\" Impersonate=\"yes\" />\n+ <CustomAction Id=\"FatalError\" Error=\"25000\" />\n+\n <InstallExecuteSequence>\n+ <Custom Action=\"SetCheckRunningAsAdmin\" Before=\"CheckRunningAsAdmin\"><![CDATA[Installed AND (NOT REMOVE~=\"ALL\")]]></Custom>\n+ <Custom Action=\"CheckRunningAsAdmin\" After=\"LaunchConditions\"><![CDATA[Installed AND (NOT REMOVE~=\"ALL\")]]></Custom>\n+\n <!-- InstallExecuteSequence is used to define Custom Actions that fire after the UI is finished and the install is starting to execute -->\n <Custom Action=\"CA_SetARPInstallLoc\" Before=\"RegisterProduct\" />\n <Custom Action=\"SetDefaultLogFile\" After=\"CostFinalize\"><![CDATA[NOT LOGFILE]]></Custom>\n@@ -506,6 +513,9 @@\n </InstallExecuteSequence>\n \n <InstallUISequence>\n+ <Custom Action=\"SetCheckRunningAsAdmin\" Before=\"CheckRunningAsAdmin\"><![CDATA[Installed AND (NOT REMOVE~=\"ALL\")]]></Custom>\n+ <Custom Action=\"CheckRunningAsAdmin\" After=\"LaunchConditions\"><![CDATA[Installed AND (NOT REMOVE~=\"ALL\")]]></Custom>\n+\n <!-- InstallUISequence is used to define a dialog or Custom Action that fires in the UI sequence of events during the install -->\n <Custom Action=\"CA_GetARPInstallLoc\" Before=\"CostInitialize\"><![CDATA[UPGRADINGPRODUCTCODE AND UPGRADEDIR]]></Custom>\n <!-- Better set ProgressDl\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-28240\nCWE: CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\nTitle: GLPI-Agent's MSI package installation permits local users to change Agent configuration\n\nThis patch addresses: The GLPI Agent is a generic management agent. A vulnerability that only affects GLPI-Agent installed on windows via MSI packaging can allow a local user to cause denial of agent service by replacing GLPI server url with a wrong url or disabling the service. Additionally, in the case the Deploy task is installed, a local malicious user can trigger privilege escalation configuring a malicious server providing its own deploy task payload. GLPI-Agent 1.7.2 contains a patch for this issue. As a worka\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32855\nDescription: Vditor is a browser-side Markdown editor. Versions prior to 3.8.7 are vulnerable to copy-paste cross-site scripting (XSS). For this particular type of XSS, the victim needs to be fooled into copying a malicious payload into the text editor. Version 3.8.7 contains a patch for this issue.\n\n```diff\nFrom 1b2382d7f8a4ee509d9245db4450d926a0b24146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Vanessa <lly219@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 21:34:38 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] :lock: https://github.com/Vanessa219/vditor/issues/1085\n\n---\n src/ts/util/fixBrowserBehavior.ts \| 2 +-\n types/index.d.ts \| 3 +++\n 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/ts/util/fixBrowserBehavior.ts b/src/ts/util/fixBrowserBehavior.ts\nindex 144d26d42..4e24348bc 100644\n--- a/src/ts/util/fixBrowserBehavior.ts\n+++ b/src/ts/util/fixBrowserBehavior.ts\n@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ export const paste = async (vditor: IVditor, event: (ClipboardEvent \| DragEvent)\n if (doc.body) {\n textHTML = doc.body.innerHTML;\n }\n-\n+ textHTML = Lute.Sanitize(textHTML);\n vditor.wysiwyg.getComments(vditor);\n \n // process code\ndiff --git a/types/index.d.ts b/types/index.d.ts\nindex ba578fb69..3427b5b99 100644\n--- a/types/index.d.ts\n+++ b/types/index.d.ts\n@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ declare class Lute {\n \n public static NewNodeID(): string;\n \n+ public static Sanitize(html: string): string;\n+\n private constructor();\n \n public SetJSRenderers(options?: {\n@@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ declare const webkitAudioContext: {\n \n interface ITips {\n [index: string]: string;\n+\n alignCenter: string;\n alignLeft: string;\n alignRight: string;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-32855\nCWE: CWE-79 Cross-site Scripting (XSS)\nTitle: vditor vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: Vditor is a browser-side Markdown editor. Versions prior to 3.8.7 are vulnerable to copy-paste cross-site scripting (XSS). For this particular type of XSS, the victim needs to be fooled into copying a malicious payload into the text editor. Version 3.8.7 contains a patch for this issue.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-ww6f-76ff-phhj\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ff9067ebe9e1c92eff4e25da95070bfd5942da07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ian Halliday <ianhall@microsoft.com>\nDate: Fri, 13 May 2016 17:27:06 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Chakra Assert : sym->HasScopeSlot()\n\nCVE-2016-3202\n\nA let/const bug exposes a bad array indexing operation during bytecode\nemit. A symbol can fail to get a location due to this bug but then the\nlocation is used to offset into an array assuming it is always valid.\nFix the array offset issue by performing a bounds check and throwing\nFatalInternalError if an out of bounds access would occur.\n---\n lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp \| 22 ++++++++++++++++------\n 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp b/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\nindex ea01e89198a..adbb13840f8 100644\n--- a/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\n+++ b/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\n@@ -1799,14 +1799,24 @@ void ByteCodeGenerator::InitScopeSlotArray(FuncInfo * funcInfo)\n propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray[i] = Js::Constants::NoProperty;\n }\n #endif\n+ auto setPropertyIdForScopeSlotArray =\n+ [scopeSlotCount, propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray]\n+ (Js::PropertyId slot, Js::PropertyId propId)\n+ {\n+ if (slot < 0 \|\| (uint)slot >= scopeSlotCount)\n+ {\n+ Js::Throw::FatalInternalError();\n+ }\n+ propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray[slot] = propId;\n+ };\n \n- auto setPropIdsForScopeSlotArray = [funcInfo, propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray](Symbol const sym)\n+ auto setPropIdsForScopeSlotArray = [funcInfo, setPropertyIdForScopeSlotArray](Symbol const sym)\n {\n if (sym->NeedsSlotAlloc(funcInfo))\n {\n // All properties should get correct propertyId here.\n Assert(sym->HasScopeSlot()); // We can't allocate scope slot now. Any symbol needing scope slot must have allocated it before this point.\n- propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray[sym->GetScopeSlot()] = sym->EnsurePosition(funcInfo);\n+ setPropertyIdForScopeSlotArray(sym->GetScopeSlot(), sym->EnsurePosition(funcInfo));\n }\n };\n \n@@ -1814,22 +1824,22 @@ void ByteCodeGenerator::InitScopeSlotArray(FuncInfo * funcInfo)\n \n if (funcInfo->thisScopeSlot != Js::Constants::NoRegister)\n {\n- propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray[funcInfo->thisScopeSlot] = Js::PropertyIds::_lexicalThisSlotSymbol;\n+ setPropertyIdForScopeSlotArray(funcInfo->thisScopeSlot, Js::PropertyIds::_lexicalThisSlotSymbol);\n }\n \n if (funcInfo->newTargetScopeSlot != Js::Constants::NoRegister)\n {\n- propertyIdsForScopeSlotArray[funcInfo->newTargetScopeSlot] = Js::PropertyIds::_lexicalNewTargetSymbol;\n+ setPropertyIdForScopeSlotArray(funcInfo->newTargetScopeSlot, Js::PropertyIds::_lexicalNewTargetSymbol);\n }\n \n if (funcInfo->superScopeSlot != Js::\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-ww6f-76ff-phhj\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: ChakraCore RCE Vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-54141\nDescription: phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. Prior to 4.0.0, phpMyFAQ exposes the database (ie postgreSQL) server's credential when connection to DB fails. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.0.\n\n```diff\nFrom b9289a0b2233df864361c131cd177b6715fbb0fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thorsten Rinne <thorsten@phpmyfaq.de>\nDate: Thu, 5 Dec 2024 17:13:59 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: added SensitiveParameter attribute for database\n usernames and passwords\n\n---\n phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Mysqli.php \| 2 +-\n phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Pgsql.php \| 20 ++++++++++++++------\n phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlite3.php \| 2 +-\n phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlsrv.php \| 4 ++--\n 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Mysqli.php b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Mysqli.php\nindex 220e4b28f0..2b0157c8ca 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Mysqli.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Mysqli.php\n@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ class Mysqli implements DatabaseDriver\n /\n public function connect(\n string $host,\n- string $user,\n+ #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $user,\n #[SensitiveParameter] string $password,\n string $database = '',\n int\|null $port = null\ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Pgsql.php b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Pgsql.php\nindex 70ab39f853..3d809a3d07 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Pgsql.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Pgsql.php\n@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ class Pgsql implements DatabaseDriver\n /\n The connection resource.\n /\n- private Connection\|null $conn = null;\n+ private Connection\|bool $conn = false;\n \n /\n Connects to the database.\n@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ class Pgsql implements DatabaseDriver\n /\n public function connect(\n string $host,\n- string $user,\n- string $password,\n+ #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $user,\n+ #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $password,\n string $database = '',\n int\|null $port = null\n ): ?bool {\n@@ -75,10 +75,18 @@ public function connect(\n $password\n );\n \n- $this->conn = pg_connect($connectionString);\n+ try {\n+ $this->conn = pg_connect($connectionString);\n \n- if ($database === '' \|\| !$this->conn) {\n- Database::errorPage(pg_last_error($this->conn));\n+ if ($this->conn === false) {\n+ throw new Exception('No PostgreSQL connection opened yet');\n+ }\n+\n+ if ($database === '') {\n+ throw new Exception('Database name is empty');\n+ }\n+ } catch (Exception $e) {\n+ Database::errorPage($e->getMessage());\n die();\n }\n \ndiff --git a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlite3.php b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlite3.php\nindex 495007cc3e..d4903e33fd 100644\n--- a/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlite3.php\n+++ b/phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Database/Sqlite3.php\n@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ class Sqlite3 implements DatabaseDriver\n public function connect(\n string $host,\n string $user,\n- string $password,\n+ #[\\SensitiveParameter] string\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2024-54141\nCWE: CWE-209: Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information\nTitle: phpMyFAQ Generates an Error Message Containing Sensitive Information if database server is not available\n\nThis patch addresses: phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application for PHP 8.1+ and MySQL, PostgreSQL and other databases. Prior to 4.0.0, phpMyFAQ exposes the database (ie postgreSQL) server's credential when connection to DB fails. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.0.0.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jmjf-cmq5-7w25\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 333f65bae9106182d12e02d249d4f95e16e93fa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Tom=C3=A1=C5=A1=20Pole=C5=A1ovsk=C3=BD?=\n <tomas.polesovsky@liferay.com>\nDate: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 18:12:10 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] LPS-68469 Missing escape\n\n---\n .../src/main/resources/META-INF/resources/init.jsp \| 5 +++--\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/modules/apps/foundation/frontend-js/frontend-js-spa-web/src/main/resources/META-INF/resources/init.jsp b/modules/apps/foundation/frontend-js/frontend-js-spa-web/src/main/resources/META-INF/resources/init.jsp\nindex 5b66d64044e678..3e402560fb130a 100644\n--- a/modules/apps/foundation/frontend-js/frontend-js-spa-web/src/main/resources/META-INF/resources/init.jsp\n+++ b/modules/apps/foundation/frontend-js/frontend-js-spa-web/src/main/resources/META-INF/resources/init.jsp\n@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ taglib uri=\"http://liferay.com/tld/theme\" prefix=\"liferay-theme\" %>\n \n <%@ page import=\"com.liferay.frontend.js.spa.web.internal.constants.SPAWebKeys\" %><%@\n page import=\"com.liferay.frontend.js.spa.web.internal.servlet.taglib.util.SPAUtil\" %><%@\n-page import=\"com.liferay.portal.kernel.language.LanguageUtil\" %>\n+page import=\"com.liferay.portal.kernel.language.LanguageUtil\" %><%@\n+page import=\"com.liferay.portal.kernel.util.HtmlUtil\" %>\n \n <liferay-theme:defineObjects />\n \n@@ -33,7 +34,7 @@ SPAUtil spaUtil = (SPAUtil)request.getAttribute(SPAWebKeys.SPA_UTIL);\n \tLiferay.SPA.cacheExpirationTime = <%= spaUtil.getCacheExpirationTime(themeDisplay.getCompanyId()) %>;\n \tLiferay.SPA.clearScreensCache = <%= spaUtil.isClearScreensCache(request, session) %>;\n \tLiferay.SPA.excludedPaths = <%= spaUtil.getExcludedPaths() %>;\n-\tLiferay.SPA.loginRedirect = '<%= spaUtil.getLoginRedirect(request) %>';\n+\tLiferay.SPA.loginRedirect = '<%= HtmlUtil.escapeJS(spaUtil.getLoginRedirect(request)) %>';\n \tLiferay.SPA.requestTimeout = <%= spaUtil.getRequestTimeout() %>;\n \tLiferay.SPA.userNotification = {\n \t\tmessage: '<%= LanguageUtil.get(spaUtil.getLanguageResourceBundle(themeDisplay.getLocale()), \"it-looks-like-this-is-taking-longer-than-expected\") %>',\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jmjf-cmq5-7w25\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Liferay Portal Vulnerable to XSS via a Crafted Redirect Field\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125033\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in rails-cv-app. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb. The manipulation with the input ../../../etc/passwd leads to path traversal: '../filedir'. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The patch is identified as 0d20362af0a5f8a126f67c77833868908484a863. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-217178 is the identifier assigne\n\n```diff\nFrom 0d20362af0a5f8a126f67c77833868908484a863 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bertrand Caron <bertrand.fx.caron@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 16 Nov 2014 22:59:19 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] HOTFIX : Another vulnerability picked up by Brakeman\n\n- Potential Path Traversal attack (tested working !)\nI could potentially explore the whole filesystem with root access\n(Ex: filename: '../../../etc/passwd')\n- Added (empty) specs to detect it\n---\n app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb \| 5 +++++\n spec/controllers/helpers_controller_spec.rb \| 12 ++++++------\n spec/controllers/uploaded_file_spec.rb \| 9 +++++++++\n spec/factories/uploaded_file.rb \| 11 +++++++++++\n 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 spec/controllers/uploaded_file_spec.rb\n create mode 100644 spec/factories/uploaded_file.rb\n\ndiff --git a/app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb b/app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb\nindex 9be6ca9..ebc5347 100644\n--- a/app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb\n+++ b/app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb\n@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ def create\n @uploaded_file.name.gsub!(/ /, '-')\n \n # Then write to file\n+ # WARNING : File.open is definitely vulnerable to Path Traversal Attacks\n+ # (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Path_Traversal) \n+ # The following line should take care of it, by only taking the past part of the path (aka filename)\n+ @uploaded_file.name = @uploaded_file.name.split(/\\//)[-1]\n+\n File.open(@uploaded_file.absolute_path, 'wb') do \|file\|\n file.write(uploaded_io.read)\n end\ndiff --git a/spec/controllers/helpers_controller_spec.rb b/spec/controllers/helpers_controller_spec.rb\nindex c8b0cf8..d7ac003 100644\n--- a/spec/controllers/helpers_controller_spec.rb\n+++ b/spec/controllers/helpers_controller_spec.rb\n@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@\n expect(response).to redirect_to(root_url)\n end\n end\n- context 'with session cookie' do\n- it 'corrects incorrect HTML' do\n- post 'html_renderer', content: '<div>Hello', format: :html\n- expect(response.body).to eq('<div>Hello</div>')\n- end\n- end\n+# context 'with session cookie' do\n+# it 'corrects incorrect HTML' do\n+# post 'html_renderer', content: '<div>Hello', format: :html\n+# expect(response.body).to eq('<div>Hello</div>')\n+# end\n+# end\n end\n end\ndiff --git a/spec/controllers/uploaded_file_spec.rb b/spec/controllers/uploaded_file_spec.rb\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..04963d6\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/spec/controllers/uploaded_file_spec.rb\n@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@\n+require 'spec_helper'\n+\n+describe UploadedFilesController, type: :controller do\n+ it 'has a valid factory' do\n+ expect( FactoryGirl.create(:uploaded_file)).to be_valid\n+ end\n+\n+ it 'does not accept relative paths in file name'\n+end\ndiff --git a/spec/factories/uploaded_file.rb b/spec/factories/uploaded_file.rb\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000..1e99b2a\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/spec/factories/uploaded_file.rb\n@@ -0,0\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125033\nCWE: CWE-24 Path Traversal: '../filedir'\nTitle: rails-cv-app uploaded_files_controller.rb path traversal\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in rails-cv-app. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file app/controllers/uploaded_files_controller.rb. The manipulation with the input ../../../etc/passwd leads to path traversal: '../filedir'. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The patch is identified as 0d20362af0a5f8a126f67c77833868908484a863. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. VDB-217178 is the identifier assigne\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-10002\nDescription: UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in SimpleSAMLphp simplesamlphp-module-openid. Affected is an unknown function of the file templates/consumer.php of the component OpenID Handler. The manipulation of the argument AuthState leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. Upgrading to version 1.0 is able to address this issue. T\n\n```diff\nFrom d652d41ccaf8c45d5707e741c0c5d82a2365a9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Olav Morken <olav.morken@uninett.no>\nDate: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 10:42:16 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] openid: Fix cross-site scripting.\n\nCan be exploited by a malicious openid provider to execute scripts\non the host using openid.\n\ngit-svn-id: https://simplesamlphp.googlecode.com/svn/trunk@2444 44740490-163a-0410-bde0-09ae8108e29a\n---\n templates/consumer.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/templates/consumer.php b/templates/consumer.php\nindex 8a709ce..4849347 100644\n--- a/templates/consumer.php\n+++ b/templates/consumer.php\n@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@\n \t\t\tIdentity URL:\n \t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"verify\" />\n \t\t\t<input id=\"openid-identifier\" class=\"openid-identifier\" type=\"text\" name=\"openid_url\" value=\"http://\" />\n-\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"AuthState\" value=\"<?php echo $this->data['AuthState']; ?>\" />\n+\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"AuthState\" value=\"<?php echo htmlspecialchars($this->data['AuthState']); ?>\" />\n \t\t\t<input type=\"submit\" value=\"Login with OpenID\" />\n \t\t</fieldset>\n \t</form>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2010-10002\nCWE: CWE-79 Cross Site Scripting\nTitle: SimpleSAMLphp simplesamlphp-module-openid OpenID consumer.php cross site scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in SimpleSAMLphp simplesamlphp-module-openid. Affected is an unknown function of the file templates/consumer.php of the component OpenID Handler. The manipulation of the argument AuthState leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. Upgrading to version 1.0 is able to address this issue. T\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p5xg-9chh-rh94\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5641588c730cc75dc3b76c34b76271fbd407fb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jeremy Lindop <jeremy.lindop@btconnect.com>\nDate: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:13:06 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] BZ1158017: fix XXE vulnerability when importing a BP from a\n bpmn2 (XML) file.\n\n---\n .../jbpm/designer/bpmn2/resource/JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl.java \| 5 +++++\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/jbpm-designer-backend/src/main/java/org/jbpm/designer/bpmn2/resource/JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl.java b/jbpm-designer-backend/src/main/java/org/jbpm/designer/bpmn2/resource/JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl.java\nindex 578ba6d943..750b87876e 100644\n--- a/jbpm-designer-backend/src/main/java/org/jbpm/designer/bpmn2/resource/JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl.java\n+++ b/jbpm-designer-backend/src/main/java/org/jbpm/designer/bpmn2/resource/JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl.java\n@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ public JBPMBpmn2ResourceImpl(URI uri) {\n this.getDefaultLoadOptions().put(XMLResource.OPTION_DISABLE_NOTIFY, true);\n this.getDefaultLoadOptions().put(XMLResource.OPTION_USE_XML_NAME_TO_FEATURE_MAP, xmlNameToFeatureMap);\n \n+ // Switch off DTD external entity processing\n+ Map parserFeatures = new HashMap();\n+ parserFeatures.put(\"http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities\", false);\n+ this.getDefaultLoadOptions().put(XMLResource.OPTION_PARSER_FEATURES, parserFeatures);\n+\n this.getDefaultSaveOptions().put(XMLResource.OPTION_ENCODING, \"UTF-8\");\n this.getDefaultSaveOptions().put(XMLResource.OPTION_PROCESS_DANGLING_HREF, XMLResource.OPTION_PROCESS_DANGLING_HREF_DISCARD);\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-p5xg-9chh-rh94\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-3573\nDescription: Versions of the package jquery-validation before 1.20.0 are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in the showLabel() function, which may take input from a user-controlled placeholder value. This value will populate a message via $.validator.messages in a user localizable dictionary.\n\n```diff\nFrom 7a490d8f39bd988027568ddcf51755e1f4688902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Volkan Ceylan <volkanceylan@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 13:26:18 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Core: Added escapeHtml option to avoid XSS attacks via\n showLabel methods (#2462)\n\n---\n src/core.js \| 15 ++++++++---\n test/error-placement.js \| 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n test/index.html \| 6 +++++\n 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/core.js b/src/core.js\nindex 5a2fb1ce4..ab891487b 100644\n--- a/src/core.js\n+++ b/src/core.js\n@@ -945,14 +945,23 @@ $.extend( $.validator, {\n \t\t\t\terror.removeClass( this.settings.validClass ).addClass( this.settings.errorClass );\n \n \t\t\t\t// Replace message on existing label\n-\t\t\t\terror.html( message );\n+\t\t\t\tif ( this.settings && this.settings.escapeHtml ) {\n+\t\t\t\t\terror.text( message \|\| \"\" );\n+\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\terror.html( message \|\| \"\" );\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t} else {\n \n \t\t\t\t// Create error element\n \t\t\t\terror = $( \"<\" + this.settings.errorElement + \">\" )\n \t\t\t\t\t.attr( \"id\", elementID + \"-error\" )\n-\t\t\t\t\t.addClass( this.settings.errorClass )\n-\t\t\t\t\t.html( message \|\| \"\" );\n+\t\t\t\t\t.addClass( this.settings.errorClass );\n+\n+\t\t\t\tif ( this.settings && this.settings.escapeHtml ) {\n+\t\t\t\t\terror.text( message \|\| \"\" );\n+\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\terror.html( message \|\| \"\" );\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \n \t\t\t\t// Maintain reference to the element to be placed into the DOM\n \t\t\t\tplace = error;\ndiff --git a/test/error-placement.js b/test/error-placement.js\nindex 7c00ce0cd..05e5c565f 100644\n--- a/test/error-placement.js\n+++ b/test/error-placement.js\n@@ -440,3 +440,60 @@ QUnit.test( \"#1632: Error hidden, but input error class not removed\", function(\n \tassert.equal( v.numberOfInvalids(), 0, \"There is no error\" );\n \tassert.equal( box2.hasClass( \"error\" ), false, \"Box2 should not have an error class\" );\n } );\n+\n+QUnit.test( \"test settings.escapeHtml undefined\", function( assert ) {\n+\tvar form = $( \"#escapeHtmlForm1\" ),\n+\t\tfield = $( \"#escapeHtmlForm1text\" );\n+\n+\tform.validate( {\n+\t\tmessages: {\n+\t\t\tescapeHtmlForm1text: {\n+\t\t\t\trequired: \"<script>console.log('!!!');</script>\"\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t} );\n+\n+\tassert.ok( !field.valid() );\n+\tassert.hasError( field, \"required\" );\n+\n+\tvar label = form.find( \"label\" );\n+\tassert.equal( label.length, 1 );\n+\tassert.equal( label.html(), \"<script>console.log('!!!');</script>\" );\n+\n+\tlabel.html( \"\" );\n+\tassert.ok( !field.valid() );\n+\tassert.equal( label.html(), \"<script>console.log('!!!');</script>\" );\n+\n+\tfield.val( \"foo\" );\n+\tassert.ok( field.valid() );\n+\tassert.noErrorFor( field );\n+} );\n+\n+QUnit.test( \"test settings.escapeHtml true\", function( assert ) {\n+\tvar form = $( \"#escapeHtmlForm2\" ),\n+\t\tfield = $( \"#escapeHtmlForm2text\" );\n+\n+\tform.validate( {\n+\t\tescapeHtml: true,\n+\t\tmessages: {\n+\t\t\tescapeHtmlForm2text: {\n+\t\t\t\trequired: \"<script>console.log('!!!');</script>\"\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t} );\n+\n+\tassert.ok( !field.valid() );\n+\tassert.hasError( field, \"required\" );\n+\n+\tvar label = form.find( \"label\" );\n+\tassert.equal( label.le\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-3573\nCWE: Cross-site Scripting (XSS)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Versions of the package jquery-validation before 1.20.0 are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in the showLabel() function, which may take input from a user-controlled placeholder value. This value will populate a message via $.validator.messages in a user localizable dictionary.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-13310\nDescription: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.\n\n```diff\nFrom 5f21230b657ccd65452dd3d94c5b5401ba691a2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Sun, 23 Jun 2019 11:46:42 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616\n\n---\n MagickWand/mogrify.c \| 3 +++\n MagickWand/operation.c \| 5 ++++-\n 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/MagickWand/mogrify.c b/MagickWand/mogrify.c\nindex 82b3c0c1c4a..150b6792304 100644\n--- a/MagickWand/mogrify.c\n+++ b/MagickWand/mogrify.c\n@@ -7908,6 +7908,8 @@ WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo image_info,\n &distortion,exception);\n if (difference_image == (Image ) NULL)\n break;\n+ reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);\n+ image=DestroyImage(image);\n if (images != (Image ) NULL)\n images=DestroyImageList(images);\n images=difference_image;\n@@ -8295,6 +8297,7 @@ WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo image_info,\n q=GetImageFromList(images,index-1);\n if (q == (Image ) NULL)\n {\n+ p=DestroyImage(p);\n (void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),\n OptionError,\"NoSuchImage\",\"`%s'\",argv[i+1]);\n status=MagickFalse;\ndiff --git a/MagickWand/operation.c b/MagickWand/operation.c\nindex 9005da58870..b8745743469 100644\n--- a/MagickWand/operation.c\n+++ b/MagickWand/operation.c\n@@ -4171,7 +4171,10 @@ WandPrivate MagickBooleanType CLIListOperatorImages(MagickCLI cli_wand,\n {\n index_image=GetImageFromList(_images,index-1);\n if (index_image == (Image ) NULL)\n- CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,\"NoSuchImage\",option,arg1);\n+ {\n+ insert_image=DestroyImage(insert_image);\n+ CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,\"NoSuchImage\",option,arg1);\n+ }\n InsertImageInList(&index_image,insert_image);\n }\n _images=GetFirstImageInList(index_image);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-13310\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport tempfile\n\n\ndef write_results(results):\n '''\n Create a temporary file with UTF-8 encoding,\n write the unicode string results to it,\n and return its path.\n '''\n filename = tempfile.mktemp()\n tmp_file = open(filename, \"w+\")\n tmp_file.write(results.encode(\"utf-8\"))\n return tmp_file\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-379 - CWE-379\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-40576\nDescription: The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a null pointer dereference vulnerability in the gf_isom_get_payt_count function in hint_track.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.\n\n```diff\nFrom ad18ece95fa064efc0995c4ab2c985f77fb166ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jeanlf <jeanlf@gpac.io>\nDate: Wed, 1 Sep 2021 13:45:04 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fixed #1904\n\n---\n src/isomedia/hint_track.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/isomedia/hint_track.c b/src/isomedia/hint_track.c\nindex 304aa2cd8c..385e746257 100644\n--- a/src/isomedia/hint_track.c\n+++ b/src/isomedia/hint_track.c\n@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Bool IsHintTrack(GF_TrackBox trak)\n u32 GetHintFormat(GF_TrackBox trak)\n {\n \tGF_HintMediaHeaderBox hmhd = (GF_HintMediaHeaderBox )trak->Media->information->InfoHeader;\n-\tif (hmhd->type != GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HMHD)\n+\tif (!hmhd \|\| (hmhd->type != GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HMHD))\n \t\treturn 0;\n \t\t\n \tif (!hmhd \|\| !hmhd->subType) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-40576\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a null pointer dereference vulnerability in the gf_isom_get_payt_count function in hint_track.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-16976\nDescription: In FusionPBX up to 4.5.7, the file app\\destinations\\destination_imports.php uses an unsanitized \"query_string\" variable coming from the URL, which is reflected on 2 occasions in HTML, leading to XSS.\n\n```diff\nFrom d6ea02d896b2c57dec491ee3b36ec102639270be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: FusionPBX <markjcrane@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 00:07:29 -0600\nSubject: [PATCH] Update destination_imports.php\n\n---\n app/destinations/destination_imports.php \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/destinations/destination_imports.php b/app/destinations/destination_imports.php\nindex c59271afcf3..13124c28465 100644\n--- a/app/destinations/destination_imports.php\n+++ b/app/destinations/destination_imports.php\n@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ function get_parent($schema,$table_name) {\n \t\t\techo \"<tr>\\n\";\r\n \t\t\techo \"<td align='left' width='30%' nowrap='nowrap'><b>\".$text['header-destinations_import'].\"</b></td>\\n\";\r\n \t\t\techo \"<td width='70%' align='right'>\\n\";\r\n-\t\t\techo \"\t<input type='button' class='btn' name='' alt='\".$text['button-back'].\"' onclick=\\\"window.location='/app/destinations/destinations.php?\".$_GET[\"query_string\"].\"'\\\" value='\".$text['button-back'].\"'>\\n\";\r\n+\t\t\techo \"\t<input type='button' class='btn' name='' alt='\".$text['button-back'].\"' onclick=\\\"window.location='/app/destinations/destinations.php'\\\" value='\".$text['button-back'].\"'>\\n\";\r\n \t\t\techo \"</td>\\n\";\r\n \t\t\techo \"</tr>\\n\";\r\n \t\t\techo \"<tr>\\n\";\r\n@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ function get_parent($schema,$table_name) {\n \techo \"\t\t\".$text['description-destination_import'].\"\\n\";\r\n \techo \"\t</td>\\n\";\r\n \techo \"\t<td valign='top' width='70%' align='right'>\\n\";\r\n-\techo \"\t\t<input type='button' class='btn' name='' alt='\".$text['button-back'].\"' onclick=\\\"window.location='/app/destinations/destinations.php?\".$_GET[\"query_string\"].\"'\\\" value='\".$text['button-back'].\"'>\\n\";\r\n+\techo \"\t\t<input type='button' class='btn' name='' alt='\".$text['button-back'].\"' onclick=\\\"window.location='/app/destinations/destinations.php'\\\" value='\".$text['button-back'].\"'>\\n\";\r\n \t//echo \"\t\t<input name='submit' type='submit' class='btn' id='import' value=\\\"\".$text['button-import'].\"\\\">\\n\";\r\n \techo \"\t</td>\\n\";\r\n \techo \"\t</tr>\\n\";\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-16976\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In FusionPBX up to 4.5.7, the file app\\destinations\\destination_imports.php uses an unsanitized \"query_string\" variable coming from the URL, which is reflected on 2 occasions in HTML, leading to XSS.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vj2j-6g3w-4662\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom a6bd22ab2f3b11a054d20be13306a19089510989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Daniel Hensby <dan@hens.by>\nDate: Mon, 18 Apr 2016 17:50:31 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [SS-2016-006] FIX dont disable XSS for login forms\n\n---\n docs/en/04_Changelogs/3.1.19.md \| 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n security/LoginForm.php \| 5 -----\n 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 docs/en/04_Changelogs/3.1.19.md\n\ndiff --git a/docs/en/04_Changelogs/3.1.19.md b/docs/en/04_Changelogs/3.1.19.md\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 00000000000..d911a0bc3b3\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/docs/en/04_Changelogs/3.1.19.md\n@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@\n+# 3.1.19\n+\n+## Upgrading\n+\n+`LoginForm` no longer disables CSRF protection. This may cause regressions on sites that statically publish pages with\n+login forms or other changes. To re-enable this, you'll need to use the `Injector` to create a custom login form.\n+\n+Define a login form:\n+\n+```php\n+class CustomLoginForm extends MemberLoginForm {\n+\n+\tpublic function __construct($controller, $name, $fields = null, $actions = null, $checkCurrentUser = true)\n+\t{\n+\t\tparent::__construct($controller, $name, $fields, $actions, $checkCurrentUser);\n+\n+\t\t$this->disableSecurityToken();\n+\t}\n+\n+}\n+```\n+\n+Add this to mysite/_config/config.yml\n+\n+```yaml\n+Injector:\n+ MemberLoginForm:\n+ class: CustomLoginForm\n+```\n+\n+<!--- Changes below this line will be automatically regenerated -->\n+\n+## Change Log\n+\n+### Security\n+\n+### Bugfixes\ndiff --git a/security/LoginForm.php b/security/LoginForm.php\nindex 6a2d00cd710..026fc2c7d42 100644\n--- a/security/LoginForm.php\n+++ b/security/LoginForm.php\n@@ -10,11 +10,6 @@\n * @subpackage security\n /\n abstract class LoginForm extends Form {\n-\tpublic function __construct($controller, $name, $fields, $actions) {\n-\t\tparent::__construct($controller, $name, $fields, $actions);\n-\t\t\n-\t\t$this->disableSecurityToken();\t\n-\t}\n \n \t/\n \t Authenticator class to use with this login form\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vj2j-6g3w-4662\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Silverstripe Missing CSRF protection in login form\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-65091\nDescription: XWiki Full Calendar Macro displays objects from the wiki on the calendar. Prior to version 2.4.5, users with the right to view the Calendar.JSONService page (including guest users) can exploit a SQL injection vulnerability by accessing database info or starting a DoS attack. This issue has been patched in version 2.4.5.\n\n```diff\nFrom 5fdcf06a05015786492fda69b4d9dea5460cc994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sorin Chiuchiu <104432589+ChiuchiuSorin@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 4 Jul 2025 11:44:43 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge commit from fork\n\n* security fix\n\n* security fix\n\n* security fix\n\n* security fix\n\n* security fix\n---\n .../src/main/resources/Calendar/JSONService.xml \| 12 ++++--------\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/macro-fullcalendar-ui/src/main/resources/Calendar/JSONService.xml b/macro-fullcalendar-ui/src/main/resources/Calendar/JSONService.xml\nindex 2ee166a..3b0af8c 100644\n--- a/macro-fullcalendar-ui/src/main/resources/Calendar/JSONService.xml\n+++ b/macro-fullcalendar-ui/src/main/resources/Calendar/JSONService.xml\n@@ -44,17 +44,13 @@\n #if (\"$!{request.outputSyntax}\" == 'plain')\n $response.setContentType('application/json')\n #end\n- ##\n- #if (\"$!{request.sql}\" != '')\n- #set ($hql = $request.sql)\n- #else\n- #set ($hql =\", BaseObject as obj $!{request.fromsql} where doc.fullName=obj.name and obj.className='${request.classname}' $!{request.wheresql}\")\n- #end\n- ##\n+ #set ($hqlStatement =\", BaseObject as obj $!{request.fromsql} where doc.fullName=obj.name and obj.className=:classname $!{request.wheresql}\")\n #set ($jsonResult = [])\n #set ($started = false)\n #set ($extraFields = $request.extraFields.split(','))\n- #foreach ($item in $services.query.hql($hql).addFilter('currentlanguage').execute())\n+ ## Drop programming rights before executing the query execution to ensure it is properly validated.\n+ #set ($discard = $xcontext.dropPermissions())\n+ #foreach ($item in $services.query.hql($hqlStatement).bindValue(\"classname\", \"$!{request.classname}\").addFilter('currentlanguage').execute())\n #set ($itemdoc = $xwiki.getDocument($item))\n #set ($startField = $request.startfield)\n ##\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-65091\nCWE: CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')\nTitle: XWiki Full Calendar Macro vulnerable to SQL injection through Calendar.JSONService\n\nThis patch addresses: XWiki Full Calendar Macro displays objects from the wiki on the calendar. Prior to version 2.4.5, users with the right to view the Calendar.JSONService page (including guest users) can exploit a SQL injection vulnerability by accessing database info or starting a DoS attack. This issue has been patched in version 2.4.5.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-66gq-3g6r-6hjw\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 605785b65dd356d46d4487faa41dbf90943b8bc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pancake <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Fri, 1 Apr 2022 21:03:24 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix 1 byte oobread in the cris analysis plugin ##crash\n\n---\n libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c \| 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------\n 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c b/libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c\nindex 2b95c37e04f88..db30421edd299 100644\n--- a/libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c\n+++ b/libr/anal/p/anal_cris.c\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-/* radare2 - LGPL - Copyright 2014-2015 - pancake /\n+/ radare2 - LGPL - Copyright 2014-2022 - pancake /\n \n #include <r_asm.h>\n #include <r_lib.h>\n@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \tint opsize = -1;\n \top->type = -1;\n \topsize = 2;\n+\tif (len < 1) {\n+\t\treturn -1;\n+\t}\n \tswitch (buf[0]) {\n \tcase 0x3f:\n \tcase 0x4f:\n@@ -21,9 +24,9 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_LEA;\n \t\tif (len > 5) {\n \t\t\top->ptr = buf[2];\n-\t\t\top->ptr \|= buf[3]<<8;\n-\t\t\top->ptr \|= buf[4]<<16;\n-\t\t\top->ptr \|= ((ut32)(0xff&buf[5]))<<24;\n+\t\t\top->ptr \|= buf[3] << 8;\n+\t\t\top->ptr \|= buf[4] << 16;\n+\t\t\top->ptr \|= ((ut32)(0xff & buf[5])) << 24;\n \t\t\top->ptr += addr;\n \t\t\topsize = 6;\n \t\t} else {\n@@ -35,9 +38,9 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CALL;\n \t\tif (len > 5) {\n \t\t\tst32 delta = buf[2];\n-\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[3]<<8;\n-\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[4]<<16;\n-\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[5]<<24;\n+\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[3] << 8;\n+\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[4] << 16;\n+\t\t\tdelta \|= buf[5] << 24;\n \t\t\top->jump = addr + delta;\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\top->jump = UT64_MAX;\n@@ -46,6 +49,9 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \t\topsize = 6;\n \t\tbreak;\n \tcase 0x00:\n+\t\tif (len < 2) {\n+\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t}\n \t\tif (buf[1] == 0x00) {\n \t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_TRAP;\n \t\t} else {\n@@ -57,11 +63,17 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \t\t}\n \t\tbreak;\n \tcase 0xf0:\n-\t\tif (buf[1]==0xb9) {\n+\t\tif (len < 2) {\n+\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif (buf[1] == 0xb9) {\n \t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_RET;\n \t\t}\n \t\tbreak;\n \tdefault:\n+\t\tif (len < 2) {\n+\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t}\n \t\tswitch (buf[1]) {\n \t\tcase 0x00:\n \t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CJMP; // BCC\n@@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ static int analop(RAnal a, RAnalOp op, ut64 addr, const ut8 buf, int len, RAn\n \t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_SHR;\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tcase 0x96: // move.d r, r\n-\t\t\tif (buf[0] >=0xc0) {\n+\t\t\tif (buf[0] >= 0xc0) {\n \t\t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_CMP;\n \t\t\t} else {\n \t\t\t\top->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_MOV;\n@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@ static bool set_reg_profile(RAnal anal) {\n \t\t\"=PC\tpc\\n\"\n \t\t\"=SP\tr14\\n\" // XXX\n \t\t\"=BP\tsrp\\n\" // XXX\n+\t\t\"=SN\tr0\\n\"\n \t\t\"=A0\tr0\\n\"\n \t\t\"=A1\tr1\\n\"\n \t\t\"=A2\tr2\\n\"\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-66gq-3g6r-6hjw\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-8374\nDescription: UltiMaker Cura slicer versions 5.7.0-beta.1 through 5.7.2 are vulnerable to code injection via the 3MF format reader (/plugins/ThreeMFReader.py). The vulnerability arises from improper handling of the drop_to_buildplate property within 3MF files, which are ZIP archives containing the model data. When a 3MF file is loaded in Cura, the value of the drop_to_buildplate property is passed to the Python eval() function without proper sanitization, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code by craf\n\n```diff\nFrom 285a241eb28da3188c977f85d68937c0dad79c50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Remco Burema <r.burema@ultimaker.com>\nDate: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 09:20:00 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Drop-to-buildplate/3MF-reading: Simplify boolean parsing.\n\nAvoid heavy methods like previously here for a number of reasons.\n---\n plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py \| 3 ++-\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py b/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py\nindex 99852d84ce9..4492d098486 100755\n--- a/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py\n+++ b/plugins/3MFReader/ThreeMFReader.py\n@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@\n from UM.Scene.GroupDecorator import GroupDecorator\n from UM.Scene.SceneNode import SceneNode # For typing.\n from UM.Scene.SceneNodeSettings import SceneNodeSettings\n+from UM.Util import parseBool\n from cura.CuraApplication import CuraApplication\n from cura.Machines.ContainerTree import ContainerTree\n from cura.Scene.BuildPlateDecorator import BuildPlateDecorator\n@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ def _convertSavitarNodeToUMNode(savitar_node: Savitar.SceneNode, file_name: str\n um_node.printOrder = int(setting_value)\n continue\n if key ==\"drop_to_buildplate\":\n- um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, eval(setting_value))\n+ um_node.setSetting(SceneNodeSettings.AutoDropDown, parseBool(setting_value))\n continue\n if key in known_setting_keys:\n setting_container.setProperty(key, \"value\", setting_value)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-8374\nCWE: CWE-94\nTitle: Arbitrary Code Injection in Cura\n\nThis patch addresses: UltiMaker Cura slicer versions 5.7.0-beta.1 through 5.7.2 are vulnerable to code injection via the 3MF format reader (/plugins/ThreeMFReader.py). The vulnerability arises from improper handling of the drop_to_buildplate property within 3MF files, which are ZIP archives containing the model data. When a 3MF file is loaded in Cura, the value of the drop_to_buildplate property is passed to the Python eval() function without proper sanitization, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code by craf\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g26v-2w7v-m2qp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom cea98166008301e614e0d36776bf9435a536136e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: DRC <information@virtualgl.org>\nDate: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 09:54:21 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Server: Fix two issues identified by ASan\n\n1. If the TLSPlain and X509Plain security types were both disabled, then\n rfbOptPamAuth() would overflow the name field in the secTypes\n structure when testing the \"none\" security type, since the name of\n that security type has less than five characters. This issue was\n innocuous, since the overflow was fully contained within the secTypes\n structure, but the ASan error caused Xvnc to abort, which made it\n difficult to detect other errors.\n\n2. If an ill-behaved RFB client sent the TurboVNC Server a fence\n message with more than 64 bytes, then the TurboVNC Server would\n try to read that message and subsequently overflow the stack before\n it detected that the payload was too large. This could never have\n occurred with any of the VNC viewers that currently support the RFB\n flow control extensions (TigerVNC and TurboVNC, namely.) This issue\n was also innocuous, since the stack overflow affected two variables\n (newScreens and errMsg) that were never accessed before the function\n returned.\n---\n unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/auth.c \| 2 +-\n unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/rfbserver.c \| 10 ++++++----\n 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/auth.c b/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/auth.c\nindex 2abc763c8..801afbc93 100644\n--- a/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/auth.c\n+++ b/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/auth.c\n@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ Bool rfbOptPamAuth(void)\n \n for (s = secTypes; s->name != NULL; s++) {\n if ((!strcmp(s->name, \"unixlogin\") \|\|\n- !strcmp(&s->name[strlen(s->name) - 5], \"plain\")) && s->enabled)\n+ strstr(s->name, \"plain\")) && s->enabled)\n return TRUE;\n }\n \ndiff --git a/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/rfbserver.c b/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/rfbserver.c\nindex 03baa6360..58b306665 100644\n--- a/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/rfbserver.c\n+++ b/unix/Xvnc/programs/Xserver/hw/vnc/rfbserver.c\n@@ -1314,13 +1314,15 @@ static void rfbProcessClientNormalMessage(rfbClientPtr cl)\n \n flags = Swap32IfLE(msg.f.flags);\n \n- READ(data, msg.f.length)\n-\n- if (msg.f.length > sizeof(data))\n+ if (msg.f.length > sizeof(data)) {\n rfbLog(\"Ignoring fence. Payload of %d bytes is too large.\\n\",\n msg.f.length);\n- else\n+ SKIP(msg.f.length)\n+ } else {\n+ READ(data, msg.f.length)\n HandleFence(cl, flags, msg.f.length, data);\n+ }\n+\n return;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g26v-2w7v-m2qp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-218\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b1b323042264740c398140da32e93fb9c2c9f33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Thu, 6 May 2021 14:51:41 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix SEGV in CTC ops\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 372430279\nChange-Id: I7ec2ad9d6f4d0980c33de45d27c6b17df5c6e26f\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc\nindex 22681f97437f0c..9efdac60e369c2 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/ctc_decoder_ops.cc\n@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ class CTCDecodeHelper {\n if (inputs_shape.dims() != 3) {\n return errors::InvalidArgument(\"inputs is not a 3-Tensor\");\n }\n+ if (inputs_shape.num_elements() == 0) {\n+ return errors::InvalidArgument(\"inputs must not be empty\");\n+ }\n \n const int64 max_time = inputs_shape.dim_size(0);\n const int64 batch_size = inputs_shape.dim_size(1);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-218\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g3cm-qg2v-2hj5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom fe94451dcc2be90b3889e2fd9d07b483c8a6dccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: GammaC0de <gammac0de@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 00:19:52 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fix GHSA-g3cm-qg2v-2hj5 security advisory\n\n---\n .../webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py \| 10 +++---\n src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py \| 34 +++++++++++--------\n 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py\nindex 73ff742074..9900293155 100644\n--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/app_blueprint.py\n@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ def robots():\n def login():\n api = flask.current_app.config[\"PYLOAD_API\"]\n \n- next = get_redirect_url(fallback=flask.url_for(\"app.dashboard\"))\n+ next_url = get_redirect_url(fallback=\"app.dashboard\")\n \n if flask.request.method == \"POST\":\n user = flask.request.form[\"username\"]\n@@ -57,14 +57,14 @@ def login():\n sanitized_user = user.replace(\"\\n\", \"\\\\n\").replace(\"\\r\", \"\\\\r\")\n if not user_info:\n log.error(f\"Login failed for user '{sanitized_user}'\")\n- return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next, errors=True)\n+ return render_template(\"login.html\", errors=True)\n \n set_session(user_info)\n log.info(f\"User '{sanitized_user}' successfully logged in\")\n flask.flash(\"Logged in successfully\")\n \n if is_authenticated():\n- return flask.redirect(next)\n+ return flask.redirect(next_url)\n \n if api.get_config_value(\"webui\", \"autologin\"):\n allusers = api.get_all_userdata()\n@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ def login():\n # NOTE: Double-check authentication here because if session[name] is empty,\n # next login_required redirects here again and all loop out.\n if is_authenticated():\n- return flask.redirect(next)\n+ return flask.redirect(next_url)\n \n- return render_template(\"login.html\", next=next)\n+ return render_template(\"login.html\")\n \n \n @bp.route(\"/logout\", endpoint=\"logout\")\ndiff --git a/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py b/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\nindex 944df95920..2b50f966ea 100644\n--- a/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n+++ b/src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py\n@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@\n \n import json\n from functools import wraps\n-from urllib.parse import unquote, urljoin, urlparse\n+from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse\n \n import flask\n import flask_themes2\n+import werkzeug.routing.exceptions\n from pyload.core.api import Perms, Role, has_permission\n \n \n@@ -33,22 +34,25 @@ def loads(self, s, kwargs):\n \n #: Checks if location belongs to same host address\n def is_safe_url(location):\n- ref_url = urlparse(flask.request.host_url)\n- test_url = urlparse(urljoin(flask.request.host_url, location))\n- return test_url.scheme in ('http', 'https') and ref_url.netloc == test_url.netloc\n+ location_urlp = urlparse(l\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-g3cm-qg2v-2hj5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle:** pyLoad open redirect vulnerability due to improper validation of the is_safe_url function\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7j98-74jh-cjxh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0740bd0ca8d487301881541028977d120f8b8933 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com>\nDate: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 09:28:17 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Make the TemplatedDictionary objects picklable\n\nThe jinja2 SandboxedEnvironment objects are not guaranteed to be\npickle-serializable (even though they practically are). So let's rather\nstore the environment elsewhere than in the TemplatedDictionary object\nitself to keep it serializable.\n\nNb. TemplatedDictionary is just a wrapper around dict, which is quite\ncommonly subject of (de)serialization (e.g. Mock, the main user of\ntemplated-dictionary library does that through the\nconcurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor logic).\n\nIt would be disadvantageous to introduce additional internal arguments\ninto the object itself (considering we already have the __jinja_expand\ninternal).\n\nHaving a per-application shared environment is kind of expected anyway\n(and even more optimal):\n\n https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/en/3.0.x/api/#basics\n\nNote that this fix is mostly needed for the RHEL 8 environment with\njinja2 v2.10.1; newer versions made the environments (namely the\nincluded filters) picklable: https://github.com/pallets/jinja/pull/1613\n---\n templated_dictionary/__init__.py \| 5 ++---\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/templated_dictionary/__init__.py b/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\nindex ec004c0..be217c0 100644\n--- a/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n+++ b/templated_dictionary/__init__.py\n@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@\n from collections.abc import MutableMapping\n from jinja2 import sandbox\n \n+SANDBOX = sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment(keep_trailing_newline=True)\n \n # pylint: disable=no-member,unsupported-assignment-operation\n class TemplatedDictionary(MutableMapping):\n@@ -19,8 +20,6 @@ def __init__(self, args, alias_spec=None, kwargs):\n '''\n self.__dict__.update(args, kwargs)\n \n- self.sandbox = sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment(keep_trailing_newline=True)\n-\n self._aliases = {}\n if alias_spec:\n for aliased_to, aliases in alias_spec.items():\n@@ -82,7 +81,7 @@ def __render_string(self, value):\n orig = last = value\n max_recursion = self.__dict__.get('jinja_max_recursion', 5)\n for _ in range(max_recursion):\n- value = _to_native(self.sandbox.from_string(value).render(self.__dict__, func=lambda:None))\n+ value = _to_native(SANDBOX.from_string(value).render(self.__dict__, func=lambda:None))\n if value == last:\n return value\n last = value\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7j98-74jh-cjxh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle:** Privilege escalation for users that can access mock configuration\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-41922\nDescription: `yiisoft/yii` before version 1.1.27 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) if the application calls `unserialize()` on arbitrary user input. This has been patched in 1.1.27.\n\n```diff\nFrom 0cb2d7c0402325fe2b6ae0f0ec6beaaba8232713 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Marco van 't Wout <marco@tremani.nl>\nDate: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 17:04:00 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH 1/2] When unserializing CDbCriteria, check if $params is an\n array to prevent object Injection\n\n---\n framework/db/schema/CDbCriteria.php \| 21 ++++++++++++---------\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/framework/db/schema/CDbCriteria.php b/framework/db/schema/CDbCriteria.php\nindex e0e1251491..febc199a88 100644\n--- a/framework/db/schema/CDbCriteria.php\n+++ b/framework/db/schema/CDbCriteria.php\n@@ -168,18 +168,21 @@ public function __wakeup()\n \t{\n \t\t$map=array();\n \t\t$params=array();\n-\t\tforeach($this->params as $name=>$value)\n+\t\tif(is_array($this->params))\n \t\t{\n-\t\t\tif(strpos($name,self::PARAM_PREFIX)===0)\n+\t\t\tforeach($this->params as $name=>$value)\n \t\t\t{\n-\t\t\t\t$newName=self::PARAM_PREFIX.self::$paramCount++;\n-\t\t\t\t$map[$name]=$newName;\n-\t\t\t}\n-\t\t\telse\n-\t\t\t{\n-\t\t\t\t$newName=$name;\n+\t\t\t\tif(strpos($name,self::PARAM_PREFIX)===0)\n+\t\t\t\t{\n+\t\t\t\t\t$newName=self::PARAM_PREFIX.self::$paramCount++;\n+\t\t\t\t\t$map[$name]=$newName;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\telse\n+\t\t\t\t{\n+\t\t\t\t\t$newName=$name;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t$params[$newName]=$value;\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t\t$params[$newName]=$value;\n \t\t}\n \t\tif (!empty($map))\n \t\t{\n\nFrom 5660bc88730c9d3512723fe391be3628959a4fad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Marco van 't Wout <marco@tremani.nl>\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 14:32:43 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH 2/2] Update CHANGELOG\n\n---\n CHANGELOG \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG\nindex 6af126dbef..ac3f8723c6 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG\n+++ b/CHANGELOG\n@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ Version 1.1.27 under development\n --------------------------------\n \n - Bug: PHP 8.1 compatibility: Fix CFileCache call of file_get_contents (Bregi)\n+- Bug: CVE-2022-41922. Prevent RCE when deserializing untrusted user input (fi3wey, marcovtwout)\n \n Version 1.1.26 September 30, 2022\n --------------------------------\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-41922\nCWE: CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data\nTitle: yiisoft/yii before v1.1.27 vulnerable to Remote Code Execution if the application calls `unserialize()` on arbitrary user input\n\nThis patch addresses: `yiisoft/yii` before version 1.1.27 are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) if the application calls `unserialize()` on arbitrary user input. This has been patched in 1.1.27.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nfrom jinja2 import Environment, FileSystemLoader\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/render')\ndef render_response_from_env():\n '''\n Get the argument \"name\" from request, \n create a jinja2 Environment,\n get the template.html from the environment, and render it.\n '''\n name = request.args.get('name', '')\n env = Environment(loader=FileSystemLoader('.'))\n template = env.get_template('template.html')\n return template.render(name=name)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-079 - CWE-079\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-543\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Laura Pak <lpak@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 23 Apr 2021 10:33:00 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent memory overflow in ParseAttrValue from nested\n tensors.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 370108442\nChange-Id: I84d64a5e8895a6aeffbf4749841b4c54d51b5889\n---\n tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc \| 58 +++++++++++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc b/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc\nindex 712e205c587c84..76fe36e7f1e2a6 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/framework/attr_value_util.cc\n@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ namespace {\n // Do not construct large tensors to compute their hash or compare for equality.\n constexpr int kMaxAttrValueTensorByteSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024; // 32mb\n \n+// Limit nesting of tensors to 100 deep to prevent memory overflow.\n+constexpr int kMaxTensorNestDepth = 100;\n+\n // Return the size of the tensor represented by this TensorProto. If shape is\n // not fully defined return -1.\n int64 TensorByteSize(const TensorProto& t) {\n@@ -224,6 +227,54 @@ string SummarizeFunc(const NameAttrList& func) {\n return strings::StrCat(func.name(), \"[\", absl::StrJoin(entries, \", \"), \"]\");\n }\n \n+bool ParseAttrValueHelper_TensorNestsUnderLimit(int limit, string to_parse) {\n+ int nests = 0;\n+ int maxed_out = to_parse.length();\n+ int open_curly = to_parse.find('{');\n+ int open_bracket = to_parse.find('<');\n+ int close_curly = to_parse.find('}');\n+ int close_bracket = to_parse.find('>');\n+ if (open_curly == -1) {\n+ open_curly = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ if (open_bracket == -1) {\n+ open_bracket = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ int min = std::min(open_curly, open_bracket);\n+ do {\n+ if (open_curly == maxed_out && open_bracket == maxed_out) {\n+ return true;\n+ }\n+ if (min == open_curly) {\n+ nests += 1;\n+ open_curly = to_parse.find('{', open_curly + 1);\n+ if (open_curly == -1) {\n+ open_curly = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ } else if (min == open_bracket) {\n+ nests += 1;\n+ open_bracket = to_parse.find('<', open_bracket + 1);\n+ if (open_bracket == -1) {\n+ open_bracket = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ } else if (min == close_curly) {\n+ nests -= 1;\n+ close_curly = to_parse.find('}', close_curly + 1);\n+ if (close_curly == -1) {\n+ close_curly = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ } else if (min == close_bracket) {\n+ nests -= 1;\n+ close_bracket = to_parse.find('>', close_bracket + 1);\n+ if (close_bracket == -1) {\n+ close_bracket = maxed_out;\n+ }\n+ }\n+ min = std::min({open_curly, open_bracket, close_curly, close_bracket});\n+ } while (nests < 100);\n+ return false;\n+}\n+\n } // namespace\n \n string SummarizeAttrValue(const AttrValue& attr_value) {\n@@ -448,7 +499,12 @@ bool ParseAttrValue(StringPiece type, StringPiece text, AttrValue* out) {\n } else {\n to_parse = strings::StrCat(field_name, \": \",\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-543\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-79rq-pp6p-6hmr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom fe5155cf047252d1c4cb91602048bfa682af0ea7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jeanlf <jeanlf@gpac.io>\nDate: Mon, 10 May 2021 11:18:59 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fixed #1783 (fuzz)\n\n---\n src/isomedia/isom_intern.c \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c b/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c\nindex e7c41d69b3..74ee92f765 100644\n--- a/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c\n+++ b/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c\n@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ static GF_Err gf_isom_parse_movie_boxes_internal(GF_ISOFile mov, u32 boxType,\n \t\t\t\t\tif (pos<0) pos=0;\n \t\t\t\t\tgf_list_insert(mov->TopBoxes, brand, pos);\n \t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\tgf_isom_box_del(a);\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tbreak;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-79rq-pp6p-6hmr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rmh2-65xw-9m6q\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 91ac96899e492584984ded0c8f9a08f10b473717 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Allen <leloucharcher@163.com>\nDate: Sun, 22 Mar 2020 02:54:10 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix issue 188 (#192)\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nDescription: This pr fix issue #188. If `findKeyStart` meets a `[` or `{`, it should not add i with `blockEnd`’s return value directly because it may return -1 if it did not find the close symbol\n---\n parser.go \| 10 ++++++++--\n parser_test.go \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/parser.go b/parser.go\nindex 513125f..2da0323 100644\n--- a/parser.go\n+++ b/parser.go\n@@ -98,9 +98,15 @@ func findKeyStart(data []byte, key string) (int, error) {\n \t\t\t}\n \n \t\tcase '[':\n-\t\t\ti = blockEnd(data[i:], data[i], ']') + i\n+\t\t\tend := blockEnd(data[i:], data[i], ']')\n+\t\t\tif end != -1 {\n+\t\t\t\ti = i + end\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\tcase '{':\n-\t\t\ti = blockEnd(data[i:], data[i], '}') + i\n+\t\t\tend := blockEnd(data[i:], data[i], '}')\n+\t\t\tif end != -1 {\n+\t\t\t\ti = i + end\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t}\n \t\ti++\n \t}\ndiff --git a/parser_test.go b/parser_test.go\nindex 18045f1..40685cf 100644\n--- a/parser_test.go\n+++ b/parser_test.go\n@@ -185,6 +185,18 @@ var deleteTests = []DeleteTest{\n \t\tpath: []string{\"b\"},\n \t\tdata: `{\"a\": \"1\" , \"c\": 3}`,\n \t},\n+\t{\n+\t\tdesc: \"Issue #188: infinite loop in Delete\",\n+\t\tjson: `^_ï¿½^C^A^@[`,\n+\t\tpath: []string{\"\"},\n+\t\tdata: `^_ï¿½^C^A^@[`,\n+\t},\n+\t{\n+\t\tdesc: \"Issue #188: infinite loop in Delete\",\n+\t\tjson: `^_ï¿½^C^A^@{`,\n+\t\tpath: []string{\"\"},\n+\t\tdata: `^_ï¿½^C^A^@{`,\n+\t},\n }\n \n var setTests = []SetTest{\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-rmh2-65xw-9m6q\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Infinite Loop in jsonparser\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jc7g-x28f-3v3h\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d27d2c32cf3af2d0b24e29ea5a686ba149b49b3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Kailash Nadh <kailash@nadh.in>\nDate: Sun, 8 Jun 2025 15:06:56 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove dangerous tpl funcs in Sprig that's enabled by\n default.\n\n`env` and `expandenv` template functions in the Sprig library allow\naccessing system environment variables within campaign templates.\n---\n cmd/init.go \| 6 +++++-\n internal/manager/manager.go \| 6 +++++-\n 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/cmd/init.go b/cmd/init.go\nindex be2edbffa..65a762284 100644\n--- a/cmd/init.go\n+++ b/cmd/init.go\n@@ -988,7 +988,11 @@ func initTplFuncs(i i18n.I18n, u UrlConfig) template.FuncMap {\n \t}\n \n \t// Copy spring functions.\n-\tmaps.Copy(funcs, sprig.GenericFuncMap())\n+\tsprigFuncs := sprig.GenericFuncMap()\n+\tdelete(sprigFuncs, \"env\")\n+\tdelete(sprigFuncs, \"expandenv\")\n+\n+\tmaps.Copy(funcs, sprigFuncs)\n \n \treturn funcs\n }\ndiff --git a/internal/manager/manager.go b/internal/manager/manager.go\nindex 588c7f59b..314454b61 100644\n--- a/internal/manager/manager.go\n+++ b/internal/manager/manager.go\n@@ -621,7 +621,11 @@ func (m Manager) makeGnericFuncMap() template.FuncMap {\n \t}\n \n \t// Copy spring functions.\n-\tmaps.Copy(funcs, sprig.GenericFuncMap())\n+\tsprigFuncs := sprig.GenericFuncMap()\n+\tdelete(sprigFuncs, \"env\")\n+\tdelete(sprigFuncs, \"expandenv\")\n+\n+\tmaps.Copy(funcs, sprigFuncs)\n \n \treturn funcs\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-jc7g-x28f-3v3h\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: listmonk's Sprig template Injection vulnerability leads to reading of Environment Variable for low privilege user\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-50356\nDescription: Press, a Frappe custom app that runs Frappe Cloud, manages infrastructure, subscription, marketplace, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). The password could be reset by anyone who have access to the mail inbox circumventing the 2FA. Even though they wouldn't be able to login by bypassing the 2FA. Only users who have enabled 2FA are affected. Commit ba0007c28ac814260f836849bc07d29beea7deb6 patches this bug.\n\n```diff\nFrom ba0007c28ac814260f836849bc07d29beea7deb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bread Genie <msuhailbh07@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 11:41:21 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] fix(LoginPage): verify 2FA on reset password\n\n---\n dashboard/src2/pages/LoginSignup.vue \| 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----\n 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/dashboard/src2/pages/LoginSignup.vue b/dashboard/src2/pages/LoginSignup.vue\nindex bd27a353c5c..5961d5f6fd8 100644\n--- a/dashboard/src2/pages/LoginSignup.vue\n+++ b/dashboard/src2/pages/LoginSignup.vue\n@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@\n \t\t\t\t\t<div v-if=\"!(resetPasswordEmailSent \|\| accountRequestCreated)\">\n \t\t\t\t\t\t<form class=\"flex flex-col\" @submit.prevent=\"submitForm\">\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t<!-- Forgot Password Section -->\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<template v-if=\"hasForgotPassword\">\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<template v-if=\"hasForgotPassword && !is2FA\">\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<FormControl\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlabel=\"Email\"\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttype=\"email\"\n@@ -74,11 +74,16 @@\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<Button v-else class=\"mt-4\" variant=\"solid\">\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tLog in with {{ oauthProviderName }}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t</Button>\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ErrorMessage class=\"mt-2\" :message=\"$session.login.error\" />\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<ErrorMessage\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"mt-2\"\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t:message=\"\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$session.login.error \|\| $resources.is2FAEnabled.error\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t/>\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t</template>\n \n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t<!-- 2FA Section -->\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<template v-else-if=\"isLogin && is2FA\">\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<template v-else-if=\"is2FA\">\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<FormControl\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlabel=\"2FA Code from your Authenticator App\"\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"123456\"\n@@ -372,7 +377,13 @@ export default {\n \t\t\treturn {\n \t\t\t\turl: 'press.api.account.verify_2fa',\n \t\t\t\tonSuccess: async () => {\n-\t\t\t\t\tawait this.login();\n+\t\t\t\t\tif (this.isLogin) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tawait this.login();\n+\t\t\t\t\t} else if (this.hasForgotPassword) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tawait this.$resources.resetPassword.submit({\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\temail: this.email\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t};\n \t\t}\n@@ -404,7 +415,7 @@ export default {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthis.$router.push({\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname: 'Login',\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tquery: {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttwo_factor: true\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttwo_factor: 1\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n@@ -415,9 +426,26 @@ export default {\n \t\t\t\t\t);\n \t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t} else if (this.hasForgotPassword) {\n-\t\t\t\tthis.$resources.resetPassword.submit({\n-\t\t\t\t\temail: this.email\n-\t\t\t\t});\n+\t\t\t\tawait this.$resources.is2FAEnabled.submit(\n+\t\t\t\t\t{ user: this.email },\n+\t\t\t\t\t{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tonSuccess: async two_factor_enabled => {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif (two_factor_enabled) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthis.$router.push({\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname: 'Login',\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tquery: {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttwo_factor: 1,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tforgot: 1\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tawait this.$resources.resetPassword.submit({\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\temail: this.email\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t});\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\t\t\t\t);\n \t\t\t} else {\n \t\t\t\tthis.$resources.signup.submit();\n \t\t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-50356\nCWE: CWE-640: Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password\nTitle: Press has a potential 2FA bypass\n\nThis patch addresses: Press, a Frappe custom app that runs Frappe Cloud, manages infrastructure, subscription, marketplace, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). The password could be reset by anyone who have access to the mail inbox circumventing the 2FA. Even though they wouldn't be able to login by bypassing the 2FA. Only users who have enabled 2FA are affected. Commit ba0007c28ac814260f836849bc07d29beea7deb6 patches this bug.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mhjc-hmmf-jc58\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom bed844f109b6c222816740555068de2e101e8018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Gordon Williams <gw@pur3.co.uk>\nDate: Mon, 21 May 2018 10:44:08 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] remove strncpy usage as it's effectively useless, replace\n with an assertion since fn is only used internally (fix #1426)\n\n---\n src/jslex.c \| 27 ++++++++++++++-------------\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/jslex.c b/src/jslex.c\nindex 190209c51..c3e90d5cb 100644\n--- a/src/jslex.c\n+++ b/src/jslex.c\n@@ -713,6 +713,7 @@ void jslFunctionCharAsString(unsigned char ch, char str, size_t len) {\n }\n \n void jslTokenAsString(int token, char str, size_t len) {\n+ assert(len>28); // size of largest string\n // see JS_ERROR_TOKEN_BUF_SIZE\n if (token>32 && token<128) {\n assert(len>=4);\n@@ -723,18 +724,19 @@ void jslTokenAsString(int token, char str, size_t len) {\n return;\n }\n \n+\n switch (token) {\n- case LEX_EOF : strncpy(str, \"EOF\", len); return;\n- case LEX_ID : strncpy(str, \"ID\", len); return;\n- case LEX_INT : strncpy(str, \"INT\", len); return;\n- case LEX_FLOAT : strncpy(str, \"FLOAT\", len); return;\n- case LEX_STR : strncpy(str, \"STRING\", len); return;\n- case LEX_UNFINISHED_STR : strncpy(str, \"UNFINISHED STRING\", len); return;\n- case LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, \"TEMPLATE LITERAL\", len); return;\n- case LEX_UNFINISHED_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strncpy(str, \"UNFINISHED TEMPLATE LITERAL\", len); return;\n- case LEX_REGEX : strncpy(str, \"REGEX\", len); return;\n- case LEX_UNFINISHED_REGEX : strncpy(str, \"UNFINISHED REGEX\", len); return;\n- case LEX_UNFINISHED_COMMENT : strncpy(str, \"UNFINISHED COMMENT\", len); return;\n+ case LEX_EOF : strcpy(str, \"EOF\"); return;\n+ case LEX_ID : strcpy(str, \"ID\"); return;\n+ case LEX_INT : strcpy(str, \"INT\"); return;\n+ case LEX_FLOAT : strcpy(str, \"FLOAT\"); return;\n+ case LEX_STR : strcpy(str, \"STRING\"); return;\n+ case LEX_UNFINISHED_STR : strcpy(str, \"UNFINISHED STRING\"); return;\n+ case LEX_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strcpy(str, \"TEMPLATE LITERAL\"); return;\n+ case LEX_UNFINISHED_TEMPLATE_LITERAL : strcpy(str, \"UNFINISHED TEMPLATE LITERAL\"); return;\n+ case LEX_REGEX : strcpy(str, \"REGEX\"); return;\n+ case LEX_UNFINISHED_REGEX : strcpy(str, \"UNFINISHED REGEX\"); return;\n+ case LEX_UNFINISHED_COMMENT : strcpy(str, \"UNFINISHED COMMENT\"); return;\n }\n if (token>=_LEX_OPERATOR_START && token<_LEX_R_LIST_END) {\n const char tokenNames[] =\n@@ -809,11 +811,10 @@ void jslTokenAsString(int token, char str, size_t len) {\n n--; // next token\n }\n assert(n==0);\n- strncpy(str, &tokenNames[p], len);\n+ strcpy(str, &tokenNames[p]);\n return;\n }\n \n- assert(len>=10);\n espruino_snprintf(str, len, \"?[%d]\", token);\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mhjc-hmmf-jc58\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h246-cgh4-7475\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8310bf8dd188ff780e7fc53245058215a05bdbe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Antonio Sanchez <cantonios@google.com>\nDate: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 16:07:27 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix crash caused by large broadcasting error. There was an\n int32 overflow.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 475677838\n---\n tensorflow/core/util/bcast.h \| 4 ++--\n tensorflow/core/util/bcast_test.cc \| 7 +++++++\n 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/util/bcast.h b/tensorflow/core/util/bcast.h\nindex cbd7a6f8693e35..531c47aec3dab8 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/util/bcast.h\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/util/bcast.h\n@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ BCastList<N>::BCastList(const BCastList::Vec (&x)[N],\n typedef BCastList::Vec Vec;\n \n // Safely multiplies dimensions taking into account symbolic shapes.\n- auto mul_dims = [](int64_t dim1, int64_t dim2) -> int64 {\n+ auto mul_dims = [](int64_t dim1, int64_t dim2) -> int64_t {\n return dim1 != 0 && dim2 != 0 && (dim1 < 0 \|\| dim2 < 0) ? -1 : dim1 * dim2;\n };\n \n@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ BCastList<N>::BCastList(const BCastList::Vec (&x)[N],\n }\n Vec output;\n bool output_dim_set = false;\n- int output_dim = -1;\n+ int64_t output_dim = -1;\n bool none_is_one = true;\n bool set_one = false;\n for (int j = 0; j < largest_rank; ++j) {\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/util/bcast_test.cc b/tensorflow/core/util/bcast_test.cc\nindex 60eb7859ec3f15..f33483a5846d67 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/util/bcast_test.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/util/bcast_test.cc\n@@ -375,6 +375,13 @@ TEST(BCastTest, Basic_Tensor_Scalar) {\n \"[11,7,5,3,2]\"\n \"[11,7,5,3,2]\"\n \"[0,1,2,3,4][]\");\n+\n+ // int32 edge-case:\n+ EXPECT_EQ(BCast({1, 2147483648}, {1}),\n+ \"[2147483648][1][1][2147483648]\"\n+ \"[2147483648]\"\n+ \"[1,2147483648]\"\n+ \"[0][0,1]\");\n }\n \n TEST(BCastTest, Basic_Tensor_With_DimSize_1_Scalar) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h246-cgh4-7475\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: `CHECK` fail in `BCast` overflow\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qf6x-7g55-4wgc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom be9f8d395bbd196e3812e9cd80708f06bcc206f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Aurelien David <aurelien.david@telecom-paristech.fr>\nDate: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 15:42:23 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] mhas: check idx not oob (#2398)\n\n---\n src/filters/reframe_mhas.c \| 5 ++---\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/filters/reframe_mhas.c b/src/filters/reframe_mhas.c\nindex fc0edb28cd..f459d5b08d 100644\n--- a/src/filters/reframe_mhas.c\n+++ b/src/filters/reframe_mhas.c\n@@ -198,12 +198,11 @@ static void mhas_dmx_check_dur(GF_Filter filter, GF_MHASDmxCtx ctx)\n \t\t\tif (!mhas_last_cfg) mhas_sap = 0;\n \t\t//config\n \t\t} else if (mhas_type==1) {\n-\t\t\tu32 sr = 0;\n \t\t\t/u32 pl = /gf_bs_read_u8(bs);\n \t\t\tu32 idx = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);\n \t\t\tif (idx==0x1f)\n \t\t\t\tduration.den = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 24);\n-\t\t\telse if (sr < nb_usac_sr) {\n+\t\t\telse if (idx < nb_usac_sr) {\n \t\t\t\tduration.den = USACSampleRates[idx];\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tidx = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);\n@@ -621,7 +620,7 @@ GF_Err mhas_dmx_process(GF_Filter filter)\n \t\t\tu32 idx = gf_bs_read_int(ctx->bs, 5);\n \t\t\tif (idx==0x1f)\n \t\t\t\tsr = gf_bs_read_int(ctx->bs, 24);\n-\t\t\telse if (sr < nb_usac_sr) {\n+\t\t\telse if (idx < nb_usac_sr) {\n \t\t\t\tsr = USACSampleRates[idx];\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\tctx->nb_unknown_pck = 0;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-qf6x-7g55-4wgc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-34438\nDescription: AVideo versions prior to 20.1 contain an insecure direct object reference vulnerability allowing users with upload permissions to modify the rotation metadata of any video. The endpoint verifies upload capability but fails to enforce ownership or management rights for the targeted video.\n\n```diff\nFrom 4a53ab2056ece7a780404d4ffc5fe7e86f902551 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Daniel Neto <me@danielneto.com>\nDate: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 11:54:02 -0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Security hardening: resolve reported vulnerabilities (AVideo\n v20)\n\nThis PR upgrades AVideo to version 20, which includes a full remediation of all security issues reported in the recent vulnerability disclosure\n\nAVideo-Security-Vulnerabilities\n\n.\n\nSummary of fixes:\n\nCritical RCE & Cryptography\n\nReplaced insecure salt generation with cryptographically secure randomness.\n\nRemoved legacy decryption fallback logic.\n\nEliminated all eval()-based execution paths and replaced them with safe, whitelisted logic.\n\nAuthentication & Authorization\n\nAdded missing User::isLogged() checks where required.\n\nEnforced per-video authorization using Video::canEdit() / Video::userCanManageVideo().\n\nFixed all reported IDOR issues for upload, delete, comment media, and metadata updates.\n\nOpen Redirects\n\nValidated redirect parameters to allow only relative or same-origin URLs.\n\nPrevented external redirection via user-controlled parameters.\n\nInformation Disclosure\n\nRemoved exposure of sensitive user data (email, admin status, last login) from public APIs.\n\nEliminated filesystem path leakage from API responses and media metadata.\n\nConsistency & Defense in Depth\n\nSearched the codebase for similar patterns and applied the same fixes consistently.\n\nAligned all endpoints with least-privilege and secure-by-default principles.\n\nThis release significantly improves the overall security posture of AVideo and closes the full set of issues described in the report.\n---\n install/checkConfiguration.php \| 2 +-\n updatedb/updateDb.v20.0.sql \| 2 ++\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n create mode 100644 updatedb/updateDb.v20.0.sql\n\ndiff --git a/install/checkConfiguration.php b/install/checkConfiguration.php\nindex 33fa0a99b01e..3cdde3000d4b 100644\n--- a/install/checkConfiguration.php\n+++ b/install/checkConfiguration.php\n@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@\n }\n \n \n-$installationVersion = \"18.1\";\n+$installationVersion = \"20.1\";\n \n require_once '../objects/functionsSecurity.php';\n \ndiff --git a/updatedb/updateDb.v20.0.sql b/updatedb/updateDb.v20.0.sql\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000000..8715cd960d17\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/updatedb/updateDb.v20.0.sql\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+-- Security: Update checkpoint\n+UPDATE configurations SET version = '20.0', modified = now() WHERE id = 1;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-34438\nCWE: CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key\nTitle: AVideo < 20.1 IDOR Arbitrary Video Rotation\n\nThis patch addresses: AVideo versions prior to 20.1 contain an insecure direct object reference vulnerability allowing users with upload permissions to modify the rotation metadata of any video. The endpoint verifies upload capability but fails to enforce ownership or management rights for the targeted video.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vcqx-6wc6-5ghv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c7595cbb092e410a487f03c0eb536cf19e538860 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mark Unwin <marku@opmantek.com>\nDate: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 16:07:18 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Improve - Add a utility function to calculate the number of\n hosts in a range or subnet.\n\n---\n code_igniter/application/controllers/util.php \| 16 ++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/code_igniter/application/controllers/util.php b/code_igniter/application/controllers/util.php\nindex e14011a5e..d01e267fe 100644\n--- a/code_igniter/application/controllers/util.php\n+++ b/code_igniter/application/controllers/util.php\n@@ -73,6 +73,22 @@ public function index()\n return;\n }\n \n+ public function subnet_size()\n+ {\n+ $command = \"nmap -n -sL \" . $_POST['subnet'];\n+ exec($command, $output, $return_var);\n+ $count = 0;\n+ if ($return_var === 0) {\n+ foreach ($output as $line) {\n+ if (stripos($line, 'Nmap scan report for') === 0) {\n+ $count = $count + 1;\n+ }\n+ }\n+ }\n+ echo $count;\n+ return;\n+ }\n+\n /*\n Process the supplied data and return a padded version string\n \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-vcqx-6wc6-5ghv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-41222\nDescription: TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. In affected versions the implementation of `SplitV` can trigger a segfault is an attacker supplies negative arguments. This occurs whenever `size_splits` contains more than one value and at least one value is negative. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.7.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.6.1, TensorFlow 2.5.2, and TensorFlow 2.4.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n```diff\nFrom 25d622ffc432acc736b14ca3904177579e733cc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Antonio Sanchez <cantonios@google.com>\nDate: Tue, 5 Oct 2021 11:31:15 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] A negative size in one of the split sizes allowed the\n computed size of another to exceed the total dimension, leading to a segfault\n and security vulnerability. Adding a check for negative sizes prevents this.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 401035665\nChange-Id: I79bbe329787dac82aa4bf60397a9129b716aedab\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/split_v_op.cc \| 7 +++++++\n tensorflow/core/ops/array_ops.cc \| 6 ++++++\n .../python/kernel_tests/split_op_test.py \| 18 ++++++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/split_v_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/split_v_op.cc\nindex 24efc6eff0d670..d7711dad3be10e 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/split_v_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/split_v_op.cc\n@@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ class SplitVOpBase : public OpKernel {\n (split_sizes_vec)[neg_one_dim] = input_size_split_dim - determined_size;\n }\n \n+ for (int i = 0; i < split_sizes_vec->size(); ++i) {\n+ const Tlen& split_size = (split_sizes_vec)[i];\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, split_size >= Tlen(0),\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Split size at index \", i,\n+ \" must be >= 0. Got: \", split_size));\n+ }\n+\n // Special case 2: split along the 1st dimension. The requirements are that\n // either we are splitting the outer dimension of two or more such that\n // every outer subpart is aligned or that the split sizes mean that they are\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/ops/array_ops.cc b/tensorflow/core/ops/array_ops.cc\nindex 34d09931c0408f..775a4cc469664a 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/ops/array_ops.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/ops/array_ops.cc\n@@ -681,6 +681,12 @@ REGISTER_OP(\"SplitV\")\n if (data[i] == -1 && c->ValueKnown(split_dim_size)) {\n size = split_dim_size - total_size;\n }\n+ // If we have a negative known size (either explicit, or computed\n+ // via -1), then the split sizes are invalid.\n+ if (size < -1 \|\| (size == -1 && c->ValueKnown(split_dim_size))) {\n+ return errors::InvalidArgument(\"Split size at index \", i,\n+ \" must be >= 0. Got: \", size);\n+ }\n TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(\n c->ReplaceDim(input, split_dim, c->MakeDim(size), &output_shape));\n c->set_output(i, output_shape);\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/split_op_test.py b/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/split_op_test.py\nindex 78eef5aadf8a77..a89715c743be1b 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/split_op_test.py\n+++ b/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/split_op_test.py\n@@ -384,6 +384,24 @@ def testNonexistentDimTensor(self):\n \"must have exactly one element\"):\n sess.run(y, {x: np.array([], dtype=np.int32), splits: [4, 11, 15]})\n \n\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-41222\nCWE: CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation\nTitle: Segfault due to negative splits in `SplitV`\n\nThis patch addresses: TensorFlow is an open source platform for machine learning. In affected versions the implementation of `SplitV` can trigger a segfault is an attacker supplies negative arguments. This occurs whenever `size_splits` contains more than one value and at least one value is negative. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.7.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.6.1, TensorFlow 2.5.2, and TensorFlow 2.4.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, make_response, request\n\napp = Flask(\"dummy\")\n\n\ndef configure_app(app):\n '''\n Add database link to the SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI config of app.\n '''\n app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = \"postgresql://user:@domain.com\"\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-521 - CWE-521\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-52g2-334m-q3qr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom eb7deb281df54771fb8ecf5890dc325a7d22d3e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: radare <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 13:55:45 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp (#10683)\n\n---\n libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c \| 15 ++++++++-------\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c b/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\nindex c3d66dd85ff6c..d23cabf85b118 100644\n--- a/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\n+++ b/libr/bin/format/mdmp/mdmp.c\n@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj, struct m\n \t/ We could confirm data sizes but a malcious MDMP will always get around\n \t** this! But we can ensure that the data is not outside of the file /\n \tif (entry->location.rva + entry->location.data_size > obj->b->length) {\n-\t\teprintf(\"[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\\n\");\n+\t\teprintf (\"[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\\n\");\n \t\treturn false;\n \t}\n \n@@ -646,10 +646,7 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj, struct m\n \n static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj) {\n \tint i;\n-\tut8 directory_base;\n-\tstruct minidump_directory entry;\n-\n-\tdirectory_base = obj->b->buf + obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva;\n+\tstruct minidump_directory entry;\n \n \tsdb_num_set (obj->kv, \"mdmp_directory.offset\",\n \t\t\tobj->hdr->stream_directory_rva, 0);\n@@ -658,9 +655,13 @@ static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj obj) {\n \t\t\t\"(mdmp_location_descriptor)Location\", 0);\n \n \t/* Parse each entry in the directory /\n+\tut64 rvadir = obj->hdr->stream_directory_rva;\n \tfor (i = 0; i < (int)obj->hdr->number_of_streams; i++) {\n-\t\tentry = (struct minidump_directory )(directory_base + (i * sizeof (struct minidump_directory)));\n-\t\tr_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry (obj, entry);\n+\t\tut32 delta = i * sizeof (struct minidump_directory);\n+\t\tint r = r_buf_read_at (obj->b, rvadir + delta, (ut8) &entry, sizeof (struct minidump_directory));\n+\t\tif (r) {\n+\t\t\tr_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry (obj, &entry);\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \n \treturn true;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-52g2-334m-q3qr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-9420\nDescription: The rock_continue function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 does not restrict the number of Rock Ridge continuation entries, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and system crash or hang) via a crafted iso9660 image.\n\n```diff\nFrom f54e18f1b831c92f6512d2eedb224cd63d607d3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>\nDate: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:22:46 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries\n\nRock Ridge extensions define so called Continuation Entries (CE) which\ndefine where is further space with Rock Ridge data. Corrupted isofs\nimage can contain arbitrarily long chain of these, including a one\ncontaining loop and thus causing kernel to end in an infinite loop when\ntraversing these entries.\n\nLimit the traversal to 32 entries which should be more than enough space\nto store all the Rock Ridge data.\n\nReported-by: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>\nCC: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>\n---\n fs/isofs/rock.c \| 6 ++++++\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/fs/isofs/rock.c b/fs/isofs/rock.c\nindex f488bbae541ac8..bb63254ed8486f 100644\n--- a/fs/isofs/rock.c\n+++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c\n@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct rock_state {\n \tint cont_size;\n \tint cont_extent;\n \tint cont_offset;\n+\tint cont_loops;\n \tstruct inode inode;\n };\n \n@@ -73,6 +74,9 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state rs, struct inode inode)\n \trs->inode = inode;\n }\n \n+/ Maximum number of Rock Ridge continuation entries /\n+#define RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES 32\n+\n /\n * Returns 0 if the caller should continue scanning, 1 if the scan must end\n * and -ve on error.\n@@ -105,6 +109,8 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_state rs)\n \t\t\tgoto out;\n \t\t}\n \t\tret = -EIO;\n+\t\tif (++rs->cont_loops >= RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES)\n+\t\t\tgoto out;\n \t\tbh = sb_bread(rs->inode->i_sb, rs->cont_extent);\n \t\tif (bh) {\n \t\t\tmemcpy(rs->buffer, bh->b_data + rs->cont_offset,\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2014-9420\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The rock_continue function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.18.1 does not restrict the number of Rock Ridge continuation entries, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (infinite loop, and system crash or hang) via a crafted iso9660 image.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-15862\nDescription: Net-SNMP through 5.8 has Improper Privilege Management because SNMP WRITE access to the EXTEND MIB provides the ability to run arbitrary commands as root.\n\n```diff\nFrom 77f6c60f57dba0aaea5d8ef1dd94bcd0c8e6d205 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Wes Hardaker <opensource@hardakers.net>\nDate: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 16:17:27 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] make the extend mib read-only by default\n\n---\n agent/mibgroup/agent/extend.c \| 18 ++++++++++++------\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/agent/mibgroup/agent/extend.c b/agent/mibgroup/agent/extend.c\nindex 379ea603bc..bd8143057f 100644\n--- a/agent/mibgroup/agent/extend.c\n+++ b/agent/mibgroup/agent/extend.c\n@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@\n #define SHELLCOMMAND 3\n #endif\n \n+/* This mib is potentially dangerous to turn on by default, since it\n+ * allows arbitrary commands to be set by anyone with SNMP WRITE\n+ * access to the MIB table. If all of your users are \"root\" level\n+ * users, then it may be safe to turn on. /\n+#define ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS 0\n+\n netsnmp_feature_require(extract_table_row_data);\n netsnmp_feature_require(table_data_delete_table);\n #ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT\n@@ -742,7 +748,7 @@ handle_nsExtendConfigTable(netsnmp_mib_handler handler,\n \n ********/\n \n-#ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT\n+#if !defined(NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT) && ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS\n case MODE_SET_RESERVE1:\n /\n * Validate the new assignments\n@@ -1068,7 +1074,7 @@ handle_nsExtendConfigTable(netsnmp_mib_handler handler,\n }\n }\n break;\n-#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT / \n+#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT and ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS /\n \n default:\n netsnmp_set_request_error(reqinfo, request, SNMP_ERR_GENERR);\n@@ -1076,7 +1082,7 @@ handle_nsExtendConfigTable(netsnmp_mib_handler handler,\n }\n }\n \n-#ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT\n+#if !defined(NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT) && ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS\n /\n If we're marking a given row as active,\n * then we need to check that it's ready.\n@@ -1101,7 +1107,7 @@ handle_nsExtendConfigTable(netsnmp_mib_handler handler,\n }\n }\n }\n-#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT /\n+#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT && ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS /\n \n return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR;\n }\n@@ -1587,7 +1593,7 @@ fixExec2Error(int action,\n idx = name[name_len-1] -1;\n exten = &compatability_entries[ idx ];\n \n-#ifndef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT\n+#if !defined(NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT) && ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS\n switch (action) {\n case MODE_SET_RESERVE1:\n if (var_val_type != ASN_INTEGER) {\n@@ -1608,7 +1614,7 @@ fixExec2Error(int action,\n case MODE_SET_COMMIT:\n netsnmp_cache_check_and_reload( exten->efix_entry->cache );\n }\n-#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT /\n+#endif / !NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT && ENABLE_EXTEND_WRITE_ACCESS /\n return SNMP_ERR_NOERROR;\n }\n #endif / USING_UCD_SNMP_EXTENSIBLE_MODULE /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2020-15862\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Net-SNMP through 5.8 has Improper Privilege Management because SNMP WRITE access to the EXTEND MIB provides the ability to run arbitrary commands as root.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8j3w-26mp-75xh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 43aaaa528646877789ec028d87924ba1accf5242 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Aleksander Machniak <alec@alec.pl>\nDate: Sun, 19 May 2024 10:20:09 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in handling SVG\n animate attributes\n\nReported by Valentin T. and Lutz Wolf of CrowdStrike.\n---\n CHANGELOG.md \| 1 +\n program/lib/Roundcube/rcube_washtml.php \| 2 +-\n tests/Framework/Washtml.php \| 4 ++++\n 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md\nindex 7fd7c82595..53261a2270 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG.md\n+++ b/CHANGELOG.md\n@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@\n - Fix missing field labels in CSV import, for some locales (#9393)\n - Fix command injection via crafted im_convert_path/im_identify_path on Windows\n - Fix cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in handling list columns from user preferences\n+- Fix cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in handling SVG animate attributes\n \n ## Release 1.6.6\n \ndiff --git a/program/lib/Roundcube/rcube_washtml.php b/program/lib/Roundcube/rcube_washtml.php\nindex 542174588f..ca4e8d5198 100644\n--- a/program/lib/Roundcube/rcube_washtml.php\n+++ b/program/lib/Roundcube/rcube_washtml.php\n@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ private static function attribute_value($node, $attr_name, $attr_value)\n \n foreach ($node->attributes as $name => $attr) {\n if (strtolower($name) === $attr_name) {\n- if (strtolower($attr_value) === strtolower($attr->nodeValue)) {\n+ if (strtolower($attr_value) === strtolower(trim($attr->nodeValue))) {\n return true;\n }\n }\ndiff --git a/tests/Framework/Washtml.php b/tests/Framework/Washtml.php\nindex f9757f3871..6bfbc14c84 100644\n--- a/tests/Framework/Washtml.php\n+++ b/tests/Framework/Washtml.php\n@@ -473,6 +473,10 @@ function data_wash_svg_tests()\n . 'ZWY9IngiIG9uZXJyb3I9ImFsZXJ0KCcxJykiLz48L3N2Zz4=#x\"></svg></html>',\n '<svg><use x-washed=\"href\"></use></svg>'\n ],\n+ [\n+ '<html><svg><animate attributeName=\"href \" values=\"javascript:alert(\\'XSS\\')\" href=\"#link\" /></animate></svg></html>',\n+ '<svg><!-- animate blocked --></svg>',\n+ ],\n ];\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8j3w-26mp-75xh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-grv7-4qw2-wr4j\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3169ace6d63f6f517a64e8df0298f44a490c4a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jean-Francois Moine <moinejf@free.fr>\nDate: Tue, 27 Apr 2021 16:39:19 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: crash when accidental without a note at start of line\n after K:\n\nIssue #84.\n---\n abcparse.c \| 17 ++++++++++-------\n 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/abcparse.c b/abcparse.c\nindex 07ee3e4..f803fb3 100644\n--- a/abcparse.c\n+++ b/abcparse.c\n@@ -2040,10 +2040,10 @@ static int parse_line(char p)\n \t\tcase CHAR_NOTE:\n \t\t\tp = parse_note(p - 1, flags);\n \t\t\tflags &= ABC_F_GRACE;\n-\t\t\tparse.last_sym->u.note.slur_st = slur;\n-\t\t\tslur = 0;\n-\t\t\tif (parse.last_sym->u.note.notes[0].len > 0) / if not space /\n-\t\t\t\tcurvoice->last_note = parse.last_sym;\n+\t\t\tif (slur && parse.last_sym->u.note.notes[0].len) {\n+\t\t\t\tparse.last_sym->u.note.slur_st = slur;\n+\t\t\t\tslur = 0;\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tcase CHAR_SLASH:\t\t/ '/' /\n \t\t\tif (flags & ABC_F_GRACE)\n@@ -2078,9 +2078,10 @@ static int parse_line(char p)\n \t\t\tif (p[1] != ':') {\n \t\t\t\tp = parse_note(p - 1, flags); /* chord /\n \t\t\t\tflags &= ABC_F_GRACE;\n-\t\t\t\tparse.last_sym->u.note.slur_st = slur;\n-\t\t\t\tslur = 0;\n-\t\t\t\tcurvoice->last_note = parse.last_sym;\n+\t\t\t\tif (slur && parse.last_sym->u.note.notes[0].len) {\n+\t\t\t\t\tparse.last_sym->u.note.slur_st = slur;\n+\t\t\t\t\tslur = 0;\n+\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\tbreak;\n \t\t\t}\n \n@@ -2511,6 +2512,8 @@ static char parse_note(char p,\n \t\tsyntax(\"Not a note in grace note sequence\", p);\n \t\tgoto err;\n \t}\n+\tif (s->u.note.notes[0].len > 0) / if not space /\n+\t\tcurvoice->last_note = s;\n \treturn p;\n \n err:\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-grv7-4qw2-wr4j\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import request\nimport re\n\n\n@app.route(\"/direct\")\ndef direct():\n '''\n Get the regex from the 'pattern' in the GET request,\n get the 'text' from the GET request,\n and search the 'text' with the provided regex.\n '''\n pattern = request.args[\"pattern\"]\n re.search(pattern, request.args[\"text\"])\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-730 - CWE-730\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fwfg-vprh-97ph\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3bde48a9fbb331f9cc92123234a970fa1e747313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Gina=20H=C3=A4u=C3=9Fge?= <gina@octoprint.org>\nDate: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 16:35:08 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=94=92=EF=B8=8F=20Use=20sandboxed=20jinja?=\n =?UTF-8?q?=20env=20for=20gcode=20scripts?=\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nWithout this patch, an attacker with admin rights could configure\na specially crafted GCODE Script to allow for code execution during\nrendering of that script. An attacker might use this to extract data\nmanaged by OctoPrint, or manipulate data managed by OctoPrint,\nas well as execute arbitrary commands with the rights of the\nOctoPrint process on the server system.\n\nFixes a reported security issue, CVE pending.\n---\n src/octoprint/settings/__init__.py \| 7 ++++---\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/octoprint/settings/__init__.py b/src/octoprint/settings/__init__.py\nindex 4ca274dda0..0a0d5eb930 100644\n--- a/src/octoprint/settings/__init__.py\n+++ b/src/octoprint/settings/__init__.py\n@@ -593,9 +593,10 @@ def _get_default_folder(self, type):\n return folder\n \n def _init_script_templating(self):\n- from jinja2 import BaseLoader, ChoiceLoader, Environment, TemplateNotFound\n+ from jinja2 import BaseLoader, ChoiceLoader, TemplateNotFound\n from jinja2.ext import Extension\n from jinja2.nodes import Include\n+ from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n \n from octoprint.util.jinja import FilteredFileSystemLoader\n \n@@ -664,9 +665,9 @@ def get_source(self, environment, template):\n def list_templates(self):\n return self._default.list_templates()\n \n- class RelEnvironment(Environment):\n+ class RelEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):\n def __init__(self, prefix_sep=\":\", args, kwargs):\n- Environment.__init__(self, args, *kwargs)\n+ super().__init__(args, kwargs)\n self._prefix_sep = prefix_sep\n \n def join_path(self, template, parent):\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fwfg-vprh-97ph\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle:** OctoPrint vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5fmg-x3vm-cm8v\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2d20c58597c9f7065e5362e603a5c348141c45ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: AIMOTO NORIHITO <aimoto@osstech.co.jp>\nDate: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 17:09:23 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix open redirect starting with a slash and backslash\n\n---\n src/mod_auth_openidc.c \| 8 ++++++++\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/mod_auth_openidc.c b/src/mod_auth_openidc.c\nindex 2467a42b..b47a6973 100644\n--- a/src/mod_auth_openidc.c\n+++ b/src/mod_auth_openidc.c\n@@ -3063,6 +3063,14 @@ static apr_byte_t oidc_validate_post_logout_url(request_rec r, const char url,\n url);\n oidc_error(r, \"%s: %s\", err_str, err_desc);\n return FALSE;\n+ } else if ((uri.hostname == NULL) && (strstr(url, \"/\\\\\") == url)) {\n+ err_str = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, \"Malformed URL\");\n+ err_desc =\n+ apr_psprintf(r->pool,\n+ \"No hostname was parsed and starting with '/\\\\': %s\",\n+ url);\n+ oidc_error(r, \"%s: %s\", err_str, err_desc);\n+ return FALSE;\n \t}\n \n \t/* validate the URL to prevent HTTP header splitting /\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-5fmg-x3vm-cm8v\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-15506\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenColorIO up to 2.5.0. This issue affects the function ConvertToRegularExpression of the file src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp. Performing a manipulation results in out-of-bounds read. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named ebdbb75123c9d5f4643e041314e2bc988a13f20d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The fix was added to the 2.5.1 milestone.\n\n```diff\nFrom ebdbb75123c9d5f4643e041314e2bc988a13f20d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"cuneyt.ozdas\" <cuneyt.ozdas@autodesk.com>\nDate: Mon, 5 Jan 2026 13:39:29 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Addressing Issue #2228 - Heap-use-after-free in\n OpenColorIO::ThrowInvalidRegex\n\nThis turned out to be not a UAF issue but an out-of-bounds-access issue where the throw was accessing the incorrect (and potentially shorter) string with an index derived from another (and potentially longer) string.\n\nSigned-off-by: cuneyt.ozdas <cuneyt.ozdas@autodesk.com>\n---\n src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp b/src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp\nindex e0df0d0276..19cbd47bf7 100644\n--- a/src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp\n+++ b/src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp\n@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ std::string ConvertToRegularExpression(const char * globPattern, bool ignoreCase\n \n if (globString[idx] == ']')\n {\n- ThrowInvalidRegex(globPattern, globPattern + idx);\n+ ThrowInvalidRegex(globPattern, &globString[idx]);\n }\n \n // Full processing from '[' to ']'.\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-15506\nCWE: Out-of-Bounds Read\nTitle: AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenColorIO FileRules.cpp ConvertToRegularExpression out-of-bounds\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenColorIO up to 2.5.0. This issue affects the function ConvertToRegularExpression of the file src/OpenColorIO/FileRules.cpp. Performing a manipulation results in out-of-bounds read. The attack needs to be approached locally. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named ebdbb75123c9d5f4643e041314e2bc988a13f20d. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch. The fix was added to the 2.5.1 milestone.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-1199\nDescription: A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. This flaw allows an attacker to crash the Linux kernel by simulating amateur radio from the user space, resulting in a null-ptr-deref vulnerability and a use-after-free vulnerability.\n\n```diff\nFrom 4e0f718daf97d47cf7dec122da1be970f145c809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>\nDate: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 12:47:15 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] ax25: improve the incomplete fix to avoid UAF and NPD bugs\n\nThe previous commit 1ade48d0c27d (\"ax25: NPD bug when detaching\nAX25 device\") introduce lock_sock() into ax25_kill_by_device to\nprevent NPD bug. But the concurrency NPD or UAF bug will occur,\nwhen lock_sock() or release_sock() dereferences the ax25_cb->sock.\n\nThe NULL pointer dereference bug can be shown as below:\n\nax25_kill_by_device() \| ax25_release()\n \| ax25_destroy_socket()\n \| ax25_cb_del()\n ... \| ...\n \| ax25->sk=NULL;\n lock_sock(s->sk); //(1) \|\n s->ax25_dev = NULL; \| ...\n release_sock(s->sk); //(2) \|\n ... \|\n\nThe root cause is that the sock is set to null before dereference\nsite (1) or (2). Therefore, this patch extracts the ax25_cb->sock\nin advance, and uses ax25_list_lock to protect it, which can synchronize\nwith ax25_cb_del() and ensure the value of sock is not null before\ndereference sites.\n\nThe concurrency UAF bug can be shown as below:\n\nax25_kill_by_device() \| ax25_release()\n \| ax25_destroy_socket()\n ... \| ...\n \| sock_put(sk); //FREE\n lock_sock(s->sk); //(1) \|\n s->ax25_dev = NULL; \| ...\n release_sock(s->sk); //(2) \|\n ... \|\n\nThe root cause is that the sock is released before dereference\nsite (1) or (2). Therefore, this patch uses sock_hold() to increase\nthe refcount of sock and uses ax25_list_lock to protect it, which\ncan synchronize with ax25_cb_del() in ax25_destroy_socket() and\nensure the sock wil not be released before dereference sites.\n\nSigned-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming@zju.edu.cn>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n net/ax25/af_ax25.c \| 9 ++++++---\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c\nindex 02f43f3e2c5640..44a8730c26acce 100644\n--- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c\n+++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c\n@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device dev)\n {\n \tax25_dev ax25_dev;\n \tax25_cb s;\n+\tstruct sock sk;\n \n \tif ((ax25_dev = ax25_dev_ax25dev(dev)) == NULL)\n \t\treturn;\n@@ -85,13 +86,15 @@ static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device dev)\n again:\n \tax25_for_each(s, &ax25_list) {\n \t\tif (s->ax25_dev == ax25_dev) {\n+\t\t\tsk = s->sk;\n+\t\t\tsock_hold(sk);\n \t\t\tspin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);\n-\t\t\tlock_sock(s->sk);\n+\t\t\tlock_sock(sk);\n \t\t\ts->ax25_dev = NULL;\n-\t\t\trelease_sock(s->sk);\n+\t\t\trelease_sock(sk);\n \t\t\tax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH);\n \t\t\tspin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock);\n-\n+\t\t\tsock_put(sk);\n \t\t\t/ The entry could have been deleted from the\n \t\t\t * list meanwhile and thus the next pointer is\n \t\t\t * no longer valid. Play it safe \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-1199\nCWE: CWE-416 - Use After Free, CWE-476 - NULL Pointer Dereference.\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. This flaw allows an attacker to crash the Linux kernel by simulating amateur radio from the user space, resulting in a null-ptr-deref vulnerability and a use-after-free vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-9463\nDescription: Nextcloud Server before 9.0.54 and 10.0.1 & ownCloud Server before 9.1.2, 9.0.6, and 8.2.9 suffer from SMB User Authentication Bypass. Nextcloud/ownCloud include an optional and not by default enabled SMB authentication component that allows authenticating users against an SMB server. This backend is implemented in a way that tries to connect to a SMB server and if that succeeded consider the user logged-in. The backend did not properly take into account SMB servers that have any kind of anonymo\n\n```diff\nFrom b85ace6840b8a6704641086bc3b8eb8e81cb2274 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>\nDate: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 10:58:01 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Double verify the SMB response\n\nIn case anonymous auth is allowed this can otherwise lead to unexpected actions.\n---\n user_external/lib/smb.php \| 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------\n 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/user_external/lib/smb.php b/user_external/lib/smb.php\nindex 5b19199d8..f2595a158 100644\n--- a/user_external/lib/smb.php\n+++ b/user_external/lib/smb.php\n@@ -32,18 +32,14 @@ public function __construct($host) {\n \t}\n \n \t/*\n-\t Check if the password is correct without logging in the user\n-\t \n-\t @param string $uid The username\n-\t * @param string $password The password\n-\t \n-\t @return true/false\n+\t * @param string $uid\n+\t * @param string $password\n+\t * @return bool\n \t /\n-\tpublic function checkPassword($uid, $password) {\n-\t\t$uidEscaped=escapeshellarg($uid);\n-\t\t$password=escapeshellarg($password);\n-\t\t$result=array();\n-\t\t$command=self::SMBCLIENT.' '.escapeshellarg('//' . $this->host . '/dummy').' -U'.$uidEscaped.'%'.$password;\n+\tprivate function tryAuthentication($uid, $password) {\n+\t\t$uidEscaped = escapeshellarg($uid);\n+\t\t$password = escapeshellarg($password);\n+\t\t$command = self::SMBCLIENT.' '.escapeshellarg('//' . $this->host . '/dummy').' -U'.$uidEscaped.'%'.$password;\n \t\t$lastline = exec($command, $output, $retval);\n \t\tif ($retval === 127) {\n \t\t\tOCP\\Util::writeLog(\n@@ -66,8 +62,33 @@ public function checkPassword($uid, $password) {\n \t\t\treturn false;\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tlogin:\n+\t\t\treturn $uid;\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\t/\n+\t Check if the password is correct without logging in the user\n+\t \n+\t @param string $uid The username\n+\t * @param string $password The password\n+\t \n+\t @return true/false\n+\t /\n+\tpublic function checkPassword($uid, $password) {\n+\t\t// Check with an invalid password, if the user authenticates then fail\n+\t\t$attemptWithInvalidPassword = $this->tryAuthentication($uid, base64_encode($password));\n+\t\tif(is_string($attemptWithInvalidPassword)) {\n+\t\t\treturn false;\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\t// Check with valid password\n+\t\t$attemptWithValidPassword = $this->tryAuthentication($uid, $password);\n+\t\tif(is_string($attemptWithValidPassword)) {\n \t\t\t$this->storeUser($uid);\n \t\t\treturn $uid;\n \t\t}\n+\n+\t\treturn false;\n \t}\n }\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2016-9463\nCWE: Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithms (CWE-303)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Nextcloud Server before 9.0.54 and 10.0.1 & ownCloud Server before 9.1.2, 9.0.6, and 8.2.9 suffer from SMB User Authentication Bypass. Nextcloud/ownCloud include an optional and not by default enabled SMB authentication component that allows authenticating users against an SMB server. This backend is implemented in a way that tries to connect to a SMB server and if that succeeded consider the user logged-in. The backend did not properly take into account SMB servers that have any kind of anonymo\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-168\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 26eb323554ffccd173e8a79a8c05c15b685ae4d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Amit Patankar <amitpatankar@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 13:03:47 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix null CHECK issue with `tf.raw_ops.EncodePng`.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 369717714\nChange-Id: I24136cd99c20b8466671f4f93b670ef6f6dd1250\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/image/encode_png_op.cc \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/image/encode_png_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/image/encode_png_op.cc\nindex 8dbe1d377df5c6..09bcdbe5e3db0b 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/image/encode_png_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/image/encode_png_op.cc\n@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ class EncodePngOp : public OpKernel {\n OP_REQUIRES(context, image.dims() == 3,\n errors::InvalidArgument(\"image must be 3-dimensional\",\n image.shape().DebugString()));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, image.NumElements() > 0,\n+ errors::Internal(\"Invalid image provided.\"));\n OP_REQUIRES(\n context,\n FastBoundsCheck(image.NumElements(), std::numeric_limits<int32>::max()),\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-168\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-0358\nDescription: A flaw was found in the QEMU virtio-fs shared file system daemon (virtiofsd) implementation. This flaw is strictly related to CVE-2018-13405. A local guest user can create files in the directories shared by virtio-fs with unintended group ownership in a scenario where a directory is SGID to a certain group and is writable by a user who is not a member of the group. This could allow a malicious unprivileged user inside the guest to gain access to resources accessible to the root group, potentiall\n\n```diff\nFrom 449e8171f96a6a944d1f3b7d3627ae059eae21ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>\nDate: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 13:51:14 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups\n (CVE-2022-0358)\n\nAt the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is\nnot required.\n\nIf we have membership of \"root\" supplementary group and when we switch\nuid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing\nsupplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not\nnormally allowed.\n\nFor example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.\n\n$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir\n\nThis sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into\nthis dir.\n\nAnd now as unprivileged user open file as follows.\n\n$ su test\n$ fd = open(\"test_dir/priviledge_id\", O_RDWR\|O_CREAT\|O_EXCL, 02755);\n\nThis will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.\n\nAnd that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it,\nget egid=0 and get access to resources owned by \"root\" group. This is\nprivilege escalation.\n\nFixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044863\nFixes: CVE-2022-0358\nReported-by: JIETAO XIAO <shawtao1125@gmail.com>\nSuggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>\nReviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>\nReviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>\nSigned-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>\nMessage-Id: <YfBGoriS38eBQrAb@redhat.com>\nSigned-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>\n dgilbert: Fixed missing {}'s style nit\n---\n tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c \| 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c\nindex 64b5b4fbb1..b3d0674f6d 100644\n--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c\n+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c\n@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@\n #include <sys/wait.h>\n #include <sys/xattr.h>\n #include <syslog.h>\n+#include <grp.h>\n \n #include \"qemu/cutils.h\"\n #include \"passthrough_helpers.h\"\n@@ -1161,6 +1162,30 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t parent, const char name)\n #define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid\n #endif\n \n+static void drop_supplementary_groups(void)\n+{\n+ int ret;\n+\n+ ret = getgroups(0, NULL);\n+ if (ret == -1) {\n+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, \"getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\\n\",\n+ errno, strerror(errno));\n+ exit(1);\n+ }\n+\n+ if (!ret) {\n+ return;\n+ }\n+\n+ / Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it /\n+ ret = setgroups(0, NULL);\n+ if (ret == -1) {\n+ fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, \"setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\\n\",\n+ errno, strerror(errno));\n+ exit(1);\n+ }\n+}\n+\n /\n * Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with\n * ownership of caller.\n@@ -3926,6 +3951,8 @@ int main(int argc, char argv[])\n \n qemu_init_exec_dir(argv[0]);\n \n+ drop_supplementary_groups();\n+\n pthread_mutex_init(&lo.mutex, NULL);\n lo.inode\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2022-0358\nCWE: CWE-273 - Improper Check for Dropped Privileges.\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A flaw was found in the QEMU virtio-fs shared file system daemon (virtiofsd) implementation. This flaw is strictly related to CVE-2018-13405. A local guest user can create files in the directories shared by virtio-fs with unintended group ownership in a scenario where a directory is SGID to a certain group and is writable by a user who is not a member of the group. This could allow a malicious unprivileged user inside the guest to gain access to resources accessible to the root group, potentiall\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-9pjf-jw9q-fx49\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom f569048eb2bd823525bce4ef52316e7a83e3345c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Laurent Destailleur <eldy@destailleur.fr>\nDate: Sat, 11 Feb 2023 13:50:40 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #hunter7a048bb7-bfdd-4299-931e-9bc283e92bc8\n\n---\n htdocs/main.inc.php \| 6 +++++-\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/htdocs/main.inc.php b/htdocs/main.inc.php\nindex 98de8c12e5c6d..44ee262b70058 100644\n--- a/htdocs/main.inc.php\n+++ b/htdocs/main.inc.php\n@@ -167,16 +167,20 @@ function testSqlAndScriptInject($val, $type)\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture\|offline\|online\|pagehide\|pageshow)\\s=/i', $val);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(paste\|pause\|play\|playing\|progress\|ratechange\|reset\|resize\|scroll\|search\|seeked\|seeking\|show\|stalled\|start\|submit\|suspend)\\s=/i', $val);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate\|toggle\|unload\|volumechange\|waiting\|wheel)\\s=/i', $val);\n+\t// More not into the previous list\n+\t$inj += preg_match('/on(repeat\|begin\|finish\|beforeinput)\\s=/i', $val);\n \n \t// We refuse html into html because some hacks try to obfuscate evil strings by inserting HTML into HTML. Example: <img on<a>error=alert(1) to bypass test on onerror\n \t$tmpval = preg_replace('/<[^<]+>/', '', $val);\n \t// List of dom events is on https://www.w3schools.com/jsref/dom_obj_event.asp and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/GlobalEventHandlers\n-\t$inj += preg_match('/on(mouse\|drag\|key\|load\|touch\|pointer\|select\|transition)([a-z])\\s=/i', $val); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>\n+\t$inj += preg_match('/on(mouse\|drag\|key\|load\|touch\|pointer\|select\|transition)([a-z])\\s=/i', $tmpval); // onmousexxx can be set on img or any html tag like <img title='...' onmouseover=alert(1)>\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(abort\|afterprint\|animation\|auxclick\|beforecopy\|beforecut\|beforeprint\|beforeunload\|blur\|cancel\|canplay\|canplaythrough\|change\|click\|close\|contextmenu\|cuechange\|copy\|cut)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(dblclick\|drop\|durationchange\|emptied\|end\|ended\|error\|focus\|focusin\|focusout\|formdata\|gotpointercapture\|hashchange\|input\|invalid)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(lostpointercapture\|offline\|online\|pagehide\|pageshow)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(paste\|pause\|play\|playing\|progress\|ratechange\|reset\|resize\|scroll\|search\|seeked\|seeking\|show\|stalled\|start\|submit\|suspend)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n \t$inj += preg_match('/on(timeupdate\|toggle\|unload\|volumechange\|waiting\|wheel)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n+\t// More not into the previous list\n+\t$inj += preg_match('/on(repeat\|begin\|finish\|beforeinput)\\s=/i', $tmpval);\n \n \t//$inj += preg_match('/on[A-Z][a-z]+\\=/', $val); // To lock event handlers onAbort(), ...\n \t$inj += preg_match('/:\|&#0000058\|&#x3A/i', $val); // refused string ':' encoded (no reason to have it encoded) to lock 'javascript:...'\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-9pjf-jw9q-fx49\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in dolibarr/dolibarr\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jmxr-w2jc-qp7w\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d6fd95688ae2052bf9ac7158bc2579c755167fe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Carroll Chiou <cchiou@cloudbees.com>\nDate: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 16:02:22 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] SECURITY-2655\n\n---\n .../integrations/jobdsl/PromotionsExtensionPoint.java \| 2 ++\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/promoted_builds/integrations/jobdsl/PromotionsExtensionPoint.java b/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/promoted_builds/integrations/jobdsl/PromotionsExtensionPoint.java\nindex 0331d648..44e71f48 100755\n--- a/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/promoted_builds/integrations/jobdsl/PromotionsExtensionPoint.java\n+++ b/src/main/java/hudson/plugins/promoted_builds/integrations/jobdsl/PromotionsExtensionPoint.java\n@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@\n import javaposse.jobdsl.plugin.ContextExtensionPoint;\n import javaposse.jobdsl.plugin.DslEnvironment;\n import javaposse.jobdsl.plugin.DslExtensionMethod;\n+import jenkins.model.Jenkins;\n \n /*\n The Job DSL Extension Point for the Promotions. \n@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ public void notifyItemCreated(Item item, DslEnvironment dslEnvironment, boolean\n Set<String> names = (Set<String>) dslEnvironment.get(\"processNames\");\n if (names != null && names.size() > 0) {\n for (String name : names) {\n+ Jenkins.checkGoodName(name);\n JobDslPromotionProcess promotionProcess = promotionProcesses.get(name);\n XSTREAM.registerConverter(new JobDslPromotionProcessConverter(XSTREAM.getMapper(), XSTREAM.getReflectionProvider()));\n XSTREAM.registerConverter(new ManualConditionConverter(XSTREAM.getMapper(), XSTREAM.getReflectionProvider()));\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jmxr-w2jc-qp7w\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Promotion names in Jenkins promoted builds Plugin are not validated when using Job DSL\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h29f-7f56-j8wh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 93208deb17238af9d9d6bb9cdebeca45e7624c8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: namusyaka <namusyaka@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 11 Feb 2018 16:07:40 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH 1/2] add v2.0.1 section in CHANGELOG\n\n---\n CHANGELOG.md \| 16 ++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md\nindex 0737fbdc54..f468b60836 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG.md\n+++ b/CHANGELOG.md\n@@ -1,3 +1,19 @@\n+## 2.0.1 / not released yet\n+\n+* Repair nested namespaces, by avoiding prefix duplication #1322. Fixes #1310 by Kunpei Sakai\n+\n+* Add pattern matches to values for Mustermann::Concat #1333. Fixes #1332 by Dawa Ometto\n+\n+* Ship the VERSION file with the gem, to allow local unpacking #1338 by Olle Jonsson\n+\n+* Fix issue with custom error handler on bad request #1351. Fixes #1350 by Jordan Owens\n+\n+* Override Rack::ShowExceptions#pretty to set custom template #1377. Fixes #1376 by Jordan Owens\n+\n+* Enhanced path validation in Windows #1379 by Orange Tsai\n+\n+* Improve development support and documentation by Faheel Ahmad, Shota Iguchi, Olle Jonsson, Manabu Niseki, John Hope, Horacio, Ice-Storm, GraniteRock, Raman Skaskevich, Carlos Azuaje, 284km, Dan Rice and Zachary Scott\n+\n ## 2.0.0 / 2017-04-10\n \n * Use Mustermann for patterns #1086 by Konstantin Haase\n\nFrom e3343b6a64e2b2c709d83d1febce7bfe6bbfc41a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: namusyaka <namusyaka@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 12 Feb 2018 23:38:52 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH 2/2] bump version to 2.0.1.rc1\n\n---\n CHANGELOG.md \| 2 +-\n VERSION \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md\nindex f468b60836..2dfab79bdb 100644\n--- a/CHANGELOG.md\n+++ b/CHANGELOG.md\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-## 2.0.1 / not released yet\n+## 2.0.1 / 2018-02-12\n \n * Repair nested namespaces, by avoiding prefix duplication #1322. Fixes #1310 by Kunpei Sakai\n \ndiff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION\nindex 227cea2156..28a79e2ad5 100644\n--- a/VERSION\n+++ b/VERSION\n@@ -1 +1 @@\n-2.0.0\n+2.0.1.rc1\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-h29f-7f56-j8wh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Sinatra Path Traversal vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-15149\nDescription: core.py in Mitogen before 0.2.8 has a typo that drops the unidirectional-routing protection mechanism in the case of a child that is initiated by another child. The Ansible extension is unaffected. NOTE: the vendor disputes this issue because it is exploitable only in conjunction with hypothetical other factors, i.e., an affected use case within a library caller, and a bug in the message receiver policy code that led to reliance on this extra protection mechanism\n\n```diff\nFrom 5924af1566763e48c42028399ea0cd95c457b3dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: David Wilson <dw@botanicus.net>\nDate: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 23:03:43 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [security] core: undirectional routing wasn't respected in\n some cases\n\nWhen creating a context using Router.method(via=somechild),\nunidirectional mode was set on the new child correctly, however if the\nchild were to call Router.method(), due to a typing mistake the new\nchild would start without it.\n\nThis doesn't impact the Ansible extension, as only forked tasks are\nstarted directly by children, and they are not responsible for routing\nmessages.\n\nAdd test so it can't happen again.\n---\n mitogen/core.py \| 2 +-\n tests/router_test.py \| 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------\n 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/mitogen/core.py b/mitogen/core.py\nindex 8428a479d..c228079d3 100644\n--- a/mitogen/core.py\n+++ b/mitogen/core.py\n@@ -3623,7 +3623,7 @@ def _setup_master(self):\n self.broker = Broker(activate_compat=False)\n self.router = Router(self.broker)\n self.router.debug = self.config.get('debug', False)\n- self.router.undirectional = self.config['unidirectional']\n+ self.router.unidirectional = self.config['unidirectional']\n self.router.add_handler(\n fn=self._on_shutdown_msg,\n handle=SHUTDOWN,\ndiff --git a/tests/router_test.py b/tests/router_test.py\nindex 1bd6c26af..2b4a9d789 100644\n--- a/tests/router_test.py\n+++ b/tests/router_test.py\n@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@\n+import sys\n import time\n import zlib\n \n import unittest2\n \n import testlib\n+import mitogen.core\n import mitogen.master\n import mitogen.parent\n import mitogen.utils\n@@ -341,22 +343,42 @@ def test_previously_alive_context_returns_dead(self):\n ))\n \n \n+def test_siblings_cant_talk(router):\n+ l1 = router.local()\n+ l2 = router.local()\n+ logs = testlib.LogCapturer()\n+ logs.start()\n+\n+ try:\n+ l2.call(ping_context, l1)\n+ except mitogen.core.CallError:\n+ e = sys.exc_info()[1]\n+\n+ msg = mitogen.core.Router.unidirectional_msg % (\n+ l2.context_id,\n+ l1.context_id,\n+ )\n+ assert msg in str(e)\n+ assert 'routing mode prevents forward of ' in logs.stop()\n+\n+\n+@mitogen.core.takes_econtext\n+def test_siblings_cant_talk_remote(econtext):\n+ mitogen.parent.upgrade_router(econtext)\n+ test_siblings_cant_talk(econtext.router)\n+\n+\n class UnidirectionalTest(testlib.RouterMixin, testlib.TestCase):\n- def test_siblings_cant_talk(self):\n+ def test_siblings_cant_talk_master(self):\n self.router.unidirectional = True\n- l1 = self.router.local()\n- l2 = self.router.local()\n- logs = testlib.LogCapturer()\n- logs.start()\n- e = self.assertRaises(mitogen.core.CallError,\n- lambda: l2.call(ping_context, l1))\n+ test_siblings_cant_talk(self.router)\n \n- msg = self.router.unidirectional_msg % (\n- l2.context_id,\n- \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2019-15149\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: core.py in Mitogen before 0.2.8 has a typo that drops the unidirectional-routing protection mechanism in the case of a child that is initiated by another child. The Ansible extension is unaffected. NOTE: the vendor disputes this issue because it is exploitable only in conjunction with hypothetical other factors, i.e., an affected use case within a library caller, and a bug in the message receiver policy code that led to reliance on this extra protection mechanism\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-503\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom ecf768cbe50cedc0a45ce1ee223146a3d3d26d23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 5 May 2021 12:07:57 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Add missing validations to reverse_sequence_op\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 372178683\nChange-Id: Iac97ebab5b342f1262c77a7d9bcb4267b305ce5b\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/reverse_sequence_op.cc \| 4 ++++\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/reverse_sequence_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/reverse_sequence_op.cc\nindex b5b62bc76ca524..1282deb26e8cd6 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/reverse_sequence_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/reverse_sequence_op.cc\n@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@ class ReverseSequenceOp : public OpKernel {\n : OpKernel(context) {\n OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->GetAttr(\"batch_dim\", &batch_dim_));\n OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->GetAttr(\"seq_dim\", &seq_dim_));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, batch_dim_ >= 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Invalid batch_dim \", batch_dim_));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(context, seq_dim_ >= 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Invalid seq_dim \", seq_dim_));\n }\n \n void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-503\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r6jv-7mgh-x66r\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org>\nDate: Sun, 6 Jan 2019 15:13:56 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Error out in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer if length can\n not be allocated\n\nre #273\n---\n libvncserver/rfbserver.c \| 14 ++++++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c\nindex 6ca511fee..e210a32f5 100644\n--- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c\n+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c\n@@ -1461,11 +1461,21 @@ char rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)\n int n=0;\n \n FILEXFER_ALLOWED_OR_CLOSE_AND_RETURN(\"\", cl, NULL);\n+\n /\n- rfbLog(\"rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(%dlen)\\n\", length);\n+ We later alloc length+1, which might wrap around on 32-bit systems if length equals\n+ 0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF\n+ will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1\n+ without problems as length is a uint32_t.\n /\n+ if(length == SIZE_MAX) {\n+\trfbErr(\"rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u\", (unsigned int)length);\n+\trfbCloseClient(cl);\n+\treturn NULL;\n+ }\n+\n if (length>0) {\n- buffer=malloc((uint64_t)length+1);\n+ buffer=malloc((size_t)length+1);\n if (buffer!=NULL) {\n if ((n = rfbReadExact(cl, (char )buffer, length)) <= 0) {\n if (n != 0)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r6jv-7mgh-x66r\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wmmx-qvvm-hr27\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 49de453c8d4942d09fab230e8f242300c831e2a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: CollectiveAccess <seth@collectiveaccess.org>\nDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 10:25:48 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Print potential XSS in error message handler\n\n---\n app/controllers/system/ErrorController.php \| 2 --\n app/lib/ApplicationError.php \| 4 ++--\n app/lib/Controller/Request/RequestHTTP.php \| 5 ++++-\n 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/controllers/system/ErrorController.php b/app/controllers/system/ErrorController.php\nindex 00de38abe5..d37c64b339 100644\n--- a/app/controllers/system/ErrorController.php\n+++ b/app/controllers/system/ErrorController.php\n@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@\n require_once(__CA_LIB_DIR__.\"/ApplicationError.php\");\n \n class ErrorController extends ActionController {\n-\t# -------------------------------------------------------\n-\t\n \t# -------------------------------------------------------\n \tfunction Show() {\n \t\t$o_purify = caGetHTMLPurifier();\ndiff --git a/app/lib/ApplicationError.php b/app/lib/ApplicationError.php\nindex 505debc330..629b4a6734 100755\n--- a/app/lib/ApplicationError.php\n+++ b/app/lib/ApplicationError.php\n@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ public function __construct($pn_error_number=0, $ps_error_description='', $ps_er\n * @return integer Always returns 1\n /\t\t\n \tpublic function setError ($pn_error_number, $ps_error_description='', $ps_error_context='', $ps_error_source='') {\n-\t\t$this->opn_error_number = $pn_error_number;\n+\t\t$this->opn_error_number = (int)$pn_error_number;\n \t\t$this->ops_error_description = $ps_error_description;\n \t\t$this->ops_error_context = $ps_error_context;\n \t\t$this->ops_error_source = $ps_error_source;\n@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ public function getErrorMessage() {\n \t\tif ($vs_error_message) {\n \t\t\treturn $vs_error_message;\n \t\t} else {\n-\t\t\treturn \"Unknown error: \".$this->opn_error_number;\n+\t\t\treturn \"Unknown error: \".(int)$this->opn_error_number;\n \t\t}\n \t}\n \t\ndiff --git a/app/lib/Controller/Request/RequestHTTP.php b/app/lib/Controller/Request/RequestHTTP.php\nindex 0885006099..dc10a4643a 100644\n--- a/app/lib/Controller/Request/RequestHTTP.php\n+++ b/app/lib/Controller/Request/RequestHTTP.php\n@@ -576,12 +576,15 @@ public function getParameter($pa_name, $pn_type, $ps_http_method=null, $pa_optio\n \t\tif (!isset($vm_val)) { return \"\"; }\n \t\t\n \t\t$vm_val = str_replace(\"\\0\", '', $vm_val);\n+\t\t\n+\t\t$purified = false;\n \t\tif((caGetOption('purify', $pa_options, true) && $this->config->get('purify_all_text_input')) \|\| caGetOption('forcePurify', $pa_options, false)) {\n \t\t if(is_array($vm_val)) {\n \t\t $vm_val = array_map(function($v) { return is_array($v) ? $v : str_replace(\"&\", \"&\", RequestHTTP::getPurifier()->purify(rawurldecode($v))); }, $vm_val);\n \t\t } else {\n \t\t $vm_val = str_replace(\"&\", \"&\", RequestHTTP::getPurifier()->purify(rawurldecode($vm_val)));\n \t\t }\n+\t\t $purified = true;\n \t\t}\n \t\t\n \t\tif ($vm_val == \"\") { return ($pn_type == pArray) ? [] : ''; }\n@@ -607,7 +610,7 @@ public function getParameter($p\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-wmmx-qvvm-hr27\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-w68r-5p45-5rqp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 897d107775737a958dbd0b2f3ea37877c7526371 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Taylor Otwell <taylor@laravel.com>\nDate: Fri, 7 Aug 2020 10:01:01 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] [6.x] Verify column names are actual columns when using\n guarded (#33777)\n\n* verify column names are actual columns when using guarded\n\n* Apply fixes from StyleCI (#33778)\n\n* remove json check\n---\n .../Eloquent/Concerns/GuardsAttributes.php \| 31 +++++++++++++++++--\n tests/Database/DatabaseEloquentModelTest.php \| 13 +++++++-\n 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/Illuminate/Database/Eloquent/Concerns/GuardsAttributes.php b/src/Illuminate/Database/Eloquent/Concerns/GuardsAttributes.php\nindex e89f65d1cdbb..d663a3835547 100644\n--- a/src/Illuminate/Database/Eloquent/Concerns/GuardsAttributes.php\n+++ b/src/Illuminate/Database/Eloquent/Concerns/GuardsAttributes.php\n@@ -27,6 +27,13 @@ trait GuardsAttributes\n /\n protected static $unguarded = false;\n \n+ /\n+ The actual columns that exist on the database and can be guarded.\n+ \n+ @var array\n+ /\n+ protected static $guardableColumns = [];\n+\n /\n Get the fillable attributes for the model.\n \n@@ -164,12 +171,30 @@ public function isFillable($key)\n /\n public function isGuarded($key)\n {\n- if (strpos($key, '->') !== false) {\n- $key = Str::before($key, '->');\n+ if (empty($this->getGuarded())) {\n+ return false;\n }\n \n return $this->getGuarded() == [''] \|\|\n- ! empty(preg_grep('/^'.preg_quote($key).'$/i', $this->getGuarded()));\n+ ! empty(preg_grep('/^'.preg_quote($key).'$/i', $this->getGuarded())) \|\|\n+ ! $this->isGuardableColumn($key);\n+ }\n+\n+ /\n+ Determine if the given column is a valid, guardable column.\n+ \n+ @param string $key\n+ * @return bool\n+ /\n+ protected function isGuardableColumn($key)\n+ {\n+ if (! isset(static::$guardableColumns[get_class($this)])) {\n+ static::$guardableColumns[get_class($this)] = $this->getConnection()\n+ ->getSchemaBuilder()\n+ ->getColumnListing($this->getTable());\n+ }\n+\n+ return in_array($key, static::$guardableColumns[get_class($this)]);\n }\n \n /\ndiff --git a/tests/Database/DatabaseEloquentModelTest.php b/tests/Database/DatabaseEloquentModelTest.php\nindex f0e56677fd64..acb9598ea8c8 100755\n--- a/tests/Database/DatabaseEloquentModelTest.php\n+++ b/tests/Database/DatabaseEloquentModelTest.php\n@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@\n use Illuminate\\Contracts\\Events\\Dispatcher;\n use Illuminate\\Database\\Connection;\n use Illuminate\\Database\\ConnectionResolverInterface;\n+use Illuminate\\Database\\ConnectionResolverInterface as Resolver;\n use Illuminate\\Database\\Eloquent\\Builder;\n use Illuminate\\Database\\Eloquent\\Collection;\n use Illuminate\\Database\\Eloquent\\JsonEncodingException;\n@@ -1014,11 +1015,21 @@ public function testUnderscoreProper\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-w68r-5p45-5rqp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Improper Input Validation in Laravel\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-q73m-3q7r-fpf7\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom aa41c83e0cc5079fb39e04d9f630571ffb8bbf22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ajaysen R <40132420+ajaysenr@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 12:24:33 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Update AttachmentModel.class.php\n\n---\n server/Application/Api/Model/AttachmentModel.class.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/server/Application/Api/Model/AttachmentModel.class.php b/server/Application/Api/Model/AttachmentModel.class.php\nindex 3ce94ceaf..ac9666c1f 100644\n--- a/server/Application/Api/Model/AttachmentModel.class.php\n+++ b/server/Application/Api/Model/AttachmentModel.class.php\n@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ public function isAllowedFilename($filename){\n \t\t$allow_array = array(\n \t\t\t'.jpg','.jpeg','.png','.bmp','.gif','.ico','.webp',\n \t\t\t'.mp3','.wav','.m4a','.ogg','.webma','.mp4','.flv',\n-\t\t\t'.mov','.webmv','.m3u8a','.flac','.mkv',\n+\t\t\t'.mov','.webmv','.flac','.mkv',\n \t\t\t'.zip','.tar','.gz','.tgz','.ipa','.apk','.rar','.iso','.bz2','.epub',\n \t\t\t'.pdf','.ofd','.swf','.epub','.xps',\n \t\t\t'.doc','.docx','.odt','.rtf','.docm','.dotm','.dot','.dotx','.wps','.wpt',\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-q73m-3q7r-fpf7\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting in ShowDoc\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-10109\nDescription: A vulnerability in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository, as of commit 5c40419, allows low privilege users to access the sensitive API endpoint \"/api/system/custom-models\". This access enables them to modify the model's API key and base path, leading to potential API key leakage and denial of service on chats.\n\n```diff\nFrom 8d302c3f670c582b09d47e96132c248101447a11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Sean Hatfield <seanhatfield5@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 31 Dec 2024 06:58:26 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Patch custom models endpoint (#2903)\n\n* prevent non admin users from changing llm settings via custom-models endpoint\n\n* permission middleware to JSDOC\n\n---------\n\nCo-authored-by: timothycarambat <rambat1010@gmail.com>\n---\n server/endpoints/system.js \| 2 +-\n server/utils/middleware/multiUserProtected.js \| 17 ++++++++++++-----\n 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/server/endpoints/system.js b/server/endpoints/system.js\nindex d060e503f0b..3b578f94a21 100644\n--- a/server/endpoints/system.js\n+++ b/server/endpoints/system.js\n@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ function systemEndpoints(app) {\n \n app.post(\n \"/system/custom-models\",\n- [validatedRequest],\n+ [validatedRequest, flexUserRoleValid([ROLES.admin])],\n async (request, response) => {\n try {\n const { provider, apiKey = null, basePath = null } = reqBody(request);\ndiff --git a/server/utils/middleware/multiUserProtected.js b/server/utils/middleware/multiUserProtected.js\nindex 4f128ace141..cf7e58cfe1b 100644\n--- a/server/utils/middleware/multiUserProtected.js\n+++ b/server/utils/middleware/multiUserProtected.js\n@@ -8,8 +8,12 @@ const ROLES = {\n };\n const DEFAULT_ROLES = [ROLES.admin, ROLES.admin];\n \n-// Explicitly check that multi user mode is enabled as well as that the\n-// requesting user has the appropriate role to modify or call the URL.\n+/*\n+ Explicitly check that multi user mode is enabled as well as that the\n+ * requesting user has the appropriate role to modify or call the URL.\n+ * @param {string[]} allowedRoles - The roles that are allowed to access the route\n+ * @returns {function}\n+ /\n function strictMultiUserRoleValid(allowedRoles = DEFAULT_ROLES) {\n return async (request, response, next) => {\n // If the access-control is allowable for all - skip validations and continue;\n@@ -33,9 +37,12 @@ function strictMultiUserRoleValid(allowedRoles = DEFAULT_ROLES) {\n };\n }\n \n-// Apply role permission checks IF the current system is in multi-user mode.\n-// This is relevant for routes that are shared between MUM and single-user mode.\n-// Checks if the requesting user has the appropriate role to modify or call the URL.\n+/\n+ Apply role permission checks IF the current system is in multi-user mode.\n+ * This is relevant for routes that are shared between MUM and single-user mode.\n+ * @param {string[]} allowedRoles - The roles that are allowed to access the route\n+ * @returns {function}\n+ /\n function flexUserRoleValid(allowedRoles = DEFAULT_ROLES) {\n return async (request, response, next) => {\n // If the access-control is allowable for all - skip validations and continue;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2024-10109\nCWE: CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization\nTitle: Incorrect Authorization in mintplex-labs/anything-llm\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm repository, as of commit 5c40419, allows low privilege users to access the sensitive API endpoint \"/api/system/custom-models\". This access enables them to modify the model's API key and base path, leading to potential API key leakage and denial of service on chats.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2014-99\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d3fc5eb142ff16d55d158afb050af18d5ff09120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Eugene Pankov <john.pankov@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 8 Jun 2014 13:05:59 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] [http] fix traceback page xss\n\n---\n ajenti/routing.py \| 3 ++-\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/ajenti/routing.py b/ajenti/routing.py\nindex 6df2e49a0..cc460f517 100644\n--- a/ajenti/routing.py\n+++ b/ajenti/routing.py\n@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@\n+import cgi\n import socketio\n import traceback\n \n@@ -90,4 +91,4 @@ def respond_error(self, context, exception):\n </pre>\n </body>\n </html>\n- \"\"\" % stack\n+ \"\"\" % cgi.escape(stack)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2014-99\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6f6v-26gj-6crp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 45582f1f97f49e2abfdba1463d1e1027682d9856 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Petteri Aimonen <jpa@git.mail.kapsi.fi>\nDate: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 18:40:45 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix invalid free() after failed realloc()\n (GHSA-gcx3-7m76-287p)\n\n---\n pb_decode.c \| 6 +++---\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/pb_decode.c b/pb_decode.c\nindex 27c89c4e5..f16837bdb 100644\n--- a/pb_decode.c\n+++ b/pb_decode.c\n@@ -720,11 +720,11 @@ static bool checkreturn decode_pointer_field(pb_istream_t stream, pb_wire_type_\n if (!check_wire_type(wire_type, field))\n PB_RETURN_ERROR(stream, \"wrong wire type\");\n \n- (size)++;\n- if (!allocate_field(stream, field->pField, field->data_size, size))\n+ if (!allocate_field(stream, field->pField, field->data_size, (size_t)(size + 1)))\n return false;\n \n- field->pData = (char)field->pField + field->data_size (size - 1);\n+ field->pData = (char*)field->pField + field->data_size (size);\n+ (size)++;\n initialize_pointer_field(field->pData, field);\n return decode_basic_field(stream, field);\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6f6v-26gj-6crp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-842\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2b6e3c542908750c0c303ee8e4787eb209afbd9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Yong Tang <yong.tang.github@outlook.com>\nDate: Sat, 28 Aug 2021 17:14:02 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix tf.math.segment_max/min/mean/sun/prod crashes(aborts)\n when segment_ids is large\n\nThis PR fixes the issue raised in 46888 where\ntf.math.segment_max/min/mean/sun/prod crashes(aborts) when segment_ids is large.\n\nThis PR fixes 46888.\n\nSigned-off-by: Yong Tang <yong.tang.github@outlook.com>\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/segment_reduction_ops_impl.h \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/segment_reduction_ops_impl.h b/tensorflow/core/kernels/segment_reduction_ops_impl.h\nindex 6ad7bdae331b4d..0fb5087c51743f 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/segment_reduction_ops_impl.h\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/segment_reduction_ops_impl.h\n@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ class SegmentReductionOp : public OpKernel {\n errors::InvalidArgument(\"Shape must be at least rank 1\"));\n \n TensorShape output_shape = input.shape();\n- output_shape.set_dim(0, output_rows);\n+ OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, output_shape.SetDimWithStatus(0, output_rows));\n \n // Note that we do not initialize the output buffer with a default value, so\n // we need to explicitly set missing indices to the default value.\n@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ class SegmentReductionGPUOp : public AsyncOpKernel {\n \n if (num_indices == 0) {\n TensorShape output_shape = input.shape();\n- output_shape.set_dim(0, 0);\n+ OP_REQUIRES_OK_ASYNC(context, output_shape.SetDimWithStatus(0, 0), done);\n \n Tensor* output = nullptr;\n OP_REQUIRES_OK_ASYNC(\n\nFrom ab5a569b93ae1f7a3f3d1147fb347a2e7f65b5c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Yong Tang <yong.tang.github@outlook.com>\nDate: Sat, 28 Aug 2021 17:15:23 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH 2/2] Add test case for GitHub isseu 46888.\n\nSigned-off-by: Yong Tang <yong.tang.github@outlook.com>\n---\n .../kernel_tests/segment_reduction_ops_test.py \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/segment_reduction_ops_test.py b/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/segment_reduction_ops_test.py\nindex 3ef7183f02d65c..98652b11515a43 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/segment_reduction_ops_test.py\n+++ b/tensorflow/python/kernel_tests/segment_reduction_ops_test.py\n@@ -267,6 +267,20 @@ def testDataInvalid(self):\n data=np.uint16(10), segment_ids=np.array([]).astype(\"int64\"))\n self.evaluate(s)\n \n+ def testInvalidIds(self):\n+ # Test case for GitHub issue 46888.\n+ for op in [\n+ math_ops.segment_max,\n+ math_ops.segment_min,\n+ math_ops.segment_mean,\n+ math_ops.segment_sum,\n+ math_ops.segment_prod,\n+ ]:\n+ with self.cached_session():\n+ with self.assertRaises((ValueError, errors_impl.InternalError)):\n+ s = op(data=np.ones((1, 10, 1)), segment_ids=[1676240524292489355])\n+ self.evaluate(s)\n+\n \n class\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-842\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-793\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 537bc7c723439b9194a358f64d871dd326c18887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 16 Jul 2021 09:35:48 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix a null pointer exception caused by branching on\n uninitialized data.\n\nThis is due to not checking that the params for the quantization exists. If there is no quantization, we should not access the `.params` field.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 385163909\nChange-Id: I2beb8d50649b6542db224c163033fbcbaa49314f\n---\n tensorflow/lite/kernels/svdf.cc \| 7 +++++++\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/lite/kernels/svdf.cc b/tensorflow/lite/kernels/svdf.cc\nindex 6c02508e26b1da..41a71c54a8c922 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/lite/kernels/svdf.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/lite/kernels/svdf.cc\n@@ -256,14 +256,21 @@ TfLiteStatus Prepare(TfLiteContext* context, TfLiteNode* node) {\n output_temp_size_array));\n \n // Calculate effective scales.\n+ TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, input->quantization.type != kTfLiteNoQuantization);\n auto* input_params =\n reinterpret_cast<TfLiteAffineQuantization>(input->quantization.params);\n+ TF_LITE_ENSURE(context,\n+ weights_feature->quantization.type != kTfLiteNoQuantization);\n auto weights_feature_params = reinterpret_cast<TfLiteAffineQuantization>(\n weights_feature->quantization.params);\n+ TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, state->quantization.type != kTfLiteNoQuantization);\n auto state_params =\n reinterpret_cast<TfLiteAffineQuantization>(state->quantization.params);\n+ TF_LITE_ENSURE(context,\n+ weights_time->quantization.type != kTfLiteNoQuantization);\n auto weight_time_params = reinterpret_cast<TfLiteAffineQuantization>(\n weights_time->quantization.params);\n+ TF_LITE_ENSURE(context, output->quantization.type != kTfLiteNoQuantization);\n auto output_params = reinterpret_cast<TfLiteAffineQuantization>(\n output->quantization.params);\n const double effective_scale_1 = input_params->scale->data[0] \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-793\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-35185\nDescription: Minder is a software supply chain security platform. Prior to version 0.0.49, the Minder REST ingester is vulnerable to a denial of service attack via an attacker-controlled REST endpoint that can crash the Minder server. The REST ingester allows users to interact with REST endpoints to fetch data for rule evaluation. When fetching data with the REST ingester, Minder sends a request to an endpoint and will use the data from the body of the response as the data to evaluate against a certain rule.\n\n```diff\nFrom 065049336aac0621ee00a0bb2211f8051d47c14b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Juan Antonio Osorio <ozz@stacklok.com>\nDate: Thu, 16 May 2024 00:49:03 -0600\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-fjw8-3gp8-4cvx\n\nThis ensures that a malicious (or faulty) REST server does not crash\nminder with too big requests. Minder will thus limit requests body reads\nto 1Mb.\n\nSigned-off-by: Juan Antonio Osorio <ozz@stacklok.com>\n---\n internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest.go \| 10 ++++-\n internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest_test.go \| 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest.go b/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest.go\nindex 8965e34e37..61863d700d 100644\n--- a/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest.go\n+++ b/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest.go\n@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ import (\n const (\n \t// RestRuleDataIngestType is the type of the REST rule data ingest engine\n \tRestRuleDataIngestType = \"rest\"\n+\n+\t// MaxBytesLimit is the maximum number of bytes to read from the response body\n+\t// We limit to 1MB to prevent abuse\n+\tMaxBytesLimit int64 = 1 << 20\n )\n \n type ingestorFallback struct {\n@@ -201,16 +205,18 @@ func (rdi Ingestor) parseBody(body io.Reader) (any, error) {\n \t\treturn nil, nil\n \t}\n \n+\tlr := io.LimitReader(body, MaxBytesLimit)\n+\n \tif rdi.restCfg.Parse == \"json\" {\n \t\tvar jsonData any\n-\t\tdec := json.NewDecoder(body)\n+\t\tdec := json.NewDecoder(lr)\n \t\tif err := dec.Decode(&jsonData); err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot decode json: %w\", err)\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tdata = jsonData\n \t} else {\n-\t\tdata, err = io.ReadAll(body)\n+\t\tdata, err = io.ReadAll(lr)\n \t\tif err != nil {\n \t\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"cannot read response body: %w\", err)\n \t\t}\ndiff --git a/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest_test.go b/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest_test.go\nindex 9f444f8f4a..ab97b98405 100644\n--- a/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest_test.go\n+++ b/internal/engine/ingester/rest/rest_test.go\n@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ package rest\n \n import (\n \t\"context\"\n+\t\"encoding/binary\"\n \t\"encoding/json\"\n \t\"net/http\"\n \t\"net/http/httptest\"\n@@ -319,3 +320,54 @@ func TestRestIngest(t testing.T) {\n \t\t})\n \t}\n }\n+\n+func TestIngestor_parseBodyDoesNotReadTooLargeRequests(t testing.T) {\n+\tt.Parallel()\n+\n+\ttests := []struct {\n+\t\tname string\n+\t\tcfg pb.RestType\n+\t\tbody string\n+\t\twantErr bool\n+\t}{\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname: \"raw\",\n+\t\t\tcfg: &pb.RestType{},\n+\t\t\t// really large body\n+\t\t\t// casting to `int` should work.\n+\t\t\tbody: strings.Repeat(\"a\", int(MaxBytesLimit)+1),\n+\t\t\t// This case does not error, it simply truncates.\n+\t\t\twantErr: false,\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname: \"json\",\n+\t\t\tcfg: &pb.RestType{\n+\t\t\t\tParse: \"json\",\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t// really large body\n+\t\t\t// casting to `int` should work.\n+\t\t\tbody: \"{\\\"a\\\":\\\"\" + strings.Repeat(\"a\", int(MaxBytesLimit)+1) + \"\\\"}\",\n+\t\t\t// This case will error out, as truncating\n+\t\t\t// makes the JSON invalid.\n+\t\t\twantErr: true,\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor _, tt := range tests {\n+\t\tt.Run(tt.name, func(t testing.T) {\n+\t\t\tt.Parallel()\n+\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2024-35185\nCWE: CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\nTitle: Denial of service of Minder Server with attacker-controlled REST endpoint\n\nThis patch addresses: Minder is a software supply chain security platform. Prior to version 0.0.49, the Minder REST ingester is vulnerable to a denial of service attack via an attacker-controlled REST endpoint that can crash the Minder server. The REST ingester allows users to interact with REST endpoints to fetch data for rule evaluation. When fetching data with the REST ingester, Minder sends a request to an endpoint and will use the data from the body of the response as the data to evaluate against a certain rule.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]

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