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[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/crash')\ndef main():\n raise Exception()\n\n'''\nRun the flask application.\n'''\napp.run(debug=True)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-215 - CWE-215\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2011-0469\nDescription: Code injection in openSUSE when running some source services used in the open build service 2.1 before March 11 2011.\n\n```diff\nFrom 23c8d21c75242999e29379e6ca8418a14c8725c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Adrian=20Schr=C3=B6ter?= <adrian@suse.de>\nDate: Mon, 14 Mar 2011 11:27:26 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] [backend] verify file names return by source service (do not\n allow files with new lines #679151)\n\n---\n src/backend/bs_srcserver \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/src/backend/bs_srcserver b/src/backend/bs_srcserver\nindex 3e3da245bdd..40e83805fd9 100755\n--- a/src/backend/bs_srcserver\n+++ b/src/backend/bs_srcserver\n@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ sub runservice {\n \tunlink($lockfile);\n \tdie(\"ERROR: bs_service returned a non-_service file\\n\");\n }\n+ BSVerify::verify_filename($pfile);\n $files->{$pfile} = addfile($projid, $packid, \"$odir/$pfile\", $pfile);\n }\n } else {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2011-0469\nCWE: remote code execution\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Code injection in openSUSE when running some source services used in the open build service 2.1 before March 11 2011.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-chr6-8347-2cjg\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 2ca39528c01a933f6689cd6505ce65bd6d68a530 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nDate: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 14:59:33 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve\n\nWhen the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is\nnot cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to\nchildren. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by\nexamining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().\n\nBased on what should be considered \"secret\" about addresses, it only\nmatters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed\nuntil the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,\nthis is where it should be fixed.\n\nGiven the few uses of sa_restorer, a \"set\" function was not written\nsince this would be the only use. Instead, we use\n__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.\n\nExample of the leak before applying this patch:\n\n $ cat /proc/$$/maps\n ...\n 7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so\n ...\n $ ./leak\n ...\n 7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so\n ...\n 1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0\n 2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0\n 3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0\n 4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0\n ...\n\n[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]\nSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>\nReported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>\nCc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>\nCc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>\nCc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>\nCc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>\nCc: \"Eric W. Biederman\" <ebiederm@xmission.com>\nCc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>\nCc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>\nSigned-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>\n---\n kernel/signal.c \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c\nindex d63c79e7e41598..43b0d4a1b7bace 100644\n--- a/kernel/signal.c\n+++ b/kernel/signal.c\n@@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct t, int force_default)\n \t\tif (force_default \|\| ka->sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN)\n \t\t\tka->sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;\n \t\tka->sa.sa_flags = 0;\n+#ifdef SA_RESTORER\n+\t\tka->sa.sa_restorer = NULL;\n+#endif\n \t\tsigemptyset(&ka->sa.sa_mask);\n \t\tka++;\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-chr6-8347-2cjg\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-25184\nDescription: Rack provides an interface for developing web applications in Ruby. Prior to versions 2.2.11, 3.0.12, and 3.1.10, Rack::CommonLogger can be exploited by crafting input that includes newline characters to manipulate log entries. The supplied proof-of-concept demonstrates injecting malicious content into logs. When a user provides the authorization credentials via Rack::Auth::Basic, if success, the username will be put in env['REMOTE_USER'] and later be used by Rack::CommonLogger for logging purpo\n\n```diff\nFrom 074ae244430cda05c27ca91cda699709cfb3ad8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jeremy Evans <code@jeremyevans.net>\nDate: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 19:10:05 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Escape non-printable characters when logging.\n\n---\n lib/rack/common_logger.rb \| 5 +++--\n test/spec_common_logger.rb \| 7 ++++++-\n 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/rack/common_logger.rb b/lib/rack/common_logger.rb\nindex 2feb06746..940b8bead 100644\n--- a/lib/rack/common_logger.rb\n+++ b/lib/rack/common_logger.rb\n@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ class CommonLogger\n # The actual format is slightly different than the above due to the\n # separation of SCRIPT_NAME and PATH_INFO, and because the elapsed\n # time in seconds is included at the end.\n- FORMAT = %{%s - %s [%s] \"%s %s%s%s %s\" %d %s %0.4f\\n}\n+ FORMAT = %{%s - %s [%s] \"%s %s%s%s %s\" %d %s %0.4f }\n \n # +logger+ can be any object that supports the +write+ or +<<+ methods,\n # which includes the standard library Logger. These methods are called\n@@ -66,7 +66,8 @@ def log(env, status, response_headers, began_at)\n length,\n Utils.clock_time - began_at)\n \n- msg.gsub!(/[^[:print:]\\n]/) { \|c\| sprintf(\"\\\\x%x\", c.ord) }\n+ msg.gsub!(/[^[:print:]]/) { \|c\| sprintf(\"\\\\x%x\", c.ord) }\n+ msg[-1] = \"\\n\"\n \n logger = @logger \|\| request.get_header(RACK_ERRORS)\n # Standard library logger doesn't support write but it supports << which actually\ndiff --git a/test/spec_common_logger.rb b/test/spec_common_logger.rb\nindex 595debd47..a767ff54c 100644\n--- a/test/spec_common_logger.rb\n+++ b/test/spec_common_logger.rb\n@@ -107,12 +107,17 @@ def with_mock_time(t = 0)\n (0..1).must_include duration.to_f\n end\n \n- it \"escapes non printable characters except newline\" do\n+ it \"escapes non printable characters including newline\" do\n logdev = StringIO.new\n log = Logger.new(logdev)\n Rack::MockRequest.new(Rack::CommonLogger.new(app_without_lint, log)).request(\"GET\\x1f\", \"/hello\")\n \n logdev.string.must_match(/GET\\\\x1f \\/hello HTTP\\/1\\.1/)\n+\n+ Rack::MockRequest.new(Rack::CommonLogger.new(app, log)).get(\"/\", 'REMOTE_USER' => \"foo\\nbar\", \"QUERY_STRING\" => \"bar\\nbaz\")\n+ logdev.string[-1].must_equal \"\\n\"\n+ logdev.string.must_include(\"foo\\\\xabar\")\n+ logdev.string.must_include(\"bar\\\\xabaz\")\n end\n \n it \"log path with PATH_INFO\" do\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-25184\nCWE: CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection')\nTitle: Possible Log Injection in Rack::CommonLogger\n\nThis patch addresses: Rack provides an interface for developing web applications in Ruby. Prior to versions 2.2.11, 3.0.12, and 3.1.10, Rack::CommonLogger can be exploited by crafting input that includes newline characters to manipulate log entries. The supplied proof-of-concept demonstrates injecting malicious content into logs. When a user provides the authorization credentials via Rack::Auth::Basic, if success, the username will be put in env['REMOTE_USER'] and later be used by Rack::CommonLogger for logging purpo\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-4902\nDescription: A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in eXo Chat Application. Affected is an unknown function of the file application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue of the component Mention Handler. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 3.3.0-20220417 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 26bf307d3658d1403cfd5c3ad423ce4c4d1cb2dc. It is recommended to upgrade the affec\n\n```diff\nFrom 26bf307d3658d1403cfd5c3ad423ce4c4d1cb2dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Romain=20D=C3=A9nari=C3=A9?=\n <romain.denarie@exoplatform.com>\nDate: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 14:58:26 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Task-56304 : XSS issue in chat\n\nBefore this fix, when sending a message with a mention, there is an XSS issue\nThis commit encode html entities in the message before adding markup related to the mention so that, the malicious html is not evaluated\n---\n .../vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue \| 10 ++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue b/application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue\nindex 240944af45..1c8c8cf462 100644\n--- a/application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue\n+++ b/application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue\n@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ export default {\n checkMention(message) {\n message = $('<div />').html(message).text();\n message = message.replace(/\\s\\s+/g, ' ');\n+ message = this.encodeHTMLEntities(message);\n for (let i = 0; i < this.participants.length; i++) {\n if (message.includes(`@${this.participants[i].fullname}`) ){\n this.mentionedUsers.push(this.participants[i].name);\n@@ -352,6 +353,11 @@ export default {\n this.mentionedUsers = [];\n return message;\n },\n+ encodeHTMLEntities(text) {\n+ const textArea = document.createElement('p');\n+ textArea.innerText = text;\n+ return textArea.innerHTML;\n+ },\n paste(e) {\n // consider the first item (can be easily extended for multiple items)\n const item = e.clipboardData.items[0];\n@@ -367,11 +373,11 @@ export default {\n // cancel paste\n e.preventDefault();\n // get text representation of clipboard\n- this.text = (e.originalEvent \|\| e).clipboardData.getData('text/plain');\n+ this.text = this.encodeHTMLEntities((e.originalEvent \|\| e).clipboardData.getData('text/plain'));\n // insert text manually\n $(this.$refs.messageComposerArea).insertAtCaret(this.text);\n }\n },\n }\n };\n-</script>\n\\ No newline at end of file\n+</script>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-4902\nCWE: CWE-79 Cross Site Scripting\nTitle: eXo Chat Application Mention ExoChatMessageComposer.vue cross site scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in eXo Chat Application. Affected is an unknown function of the file application/src/main/webapp/vue-app/components/ExoChatMessageComposer.vue of the component Mention Handler. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 3.3.0-20220417 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is 26bf307d3658d1403cfd5c3ad423ce4c4d1cb2dc. It is recommended to upgrade the affec\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-21375\nDescription: PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C language implementing standard based protocols such as SIP, SDP, RTP, STUN, TURN, and ICE. In PJSIP version 2.10 and earlier, after an initial INVITE has been sent, when two 183 responses are received, with the first one causing negotiation failure, a crash will occur. This results in a denial of service.\n\n```diff\nFrom 97b3d7addbaa720b7ddb0af9bf6f3e443e664365 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Nanang Izzuddin <nanang@teluu.com>\nDate: Mon, 8 Mar 2021 16:09:34 +0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-hvq6-f89p-frvp\n\n---\n pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c \| 14 ++++++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c b/pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c\nindex f4838f75df..9f76b5200b 100644\n--- a/pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c\n+++ b/pjmedia/src/pjmedia/sdp_neg.c\n@@ -304,7 +304,6 @@ PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_sdp_neg_modify_local_offer2(\n {\n pjmedia_sdp_session new_offer;\n pjmedia_sdp_session old_offer;\n- char media_used[PJMEDIA_MAX_SDP_MEDIA];\n unsigned oi; /* old offer media index /\n pj_status_t status;\n \n@@ -323,8 +322,19 @@ PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_sdp_neg_modify_local_offer2(\n / Change state to STATE_LOCAL_OFFER /\n neg->state = PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_STATE_LOCAL_OFFER;\n \n+ / When there is no active local SDP in state PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_STATE_DONE,\n+ * it means that the previous initial SDP nego must have been failed,\n+ * so we'll just set the local SDP offer here.\n+ /\n+ if (!neg->active_local_sdp) {\n+\tneg->initial_sdp_tmp = NULL;\n+\tneg->initial_sdp = pjmedia_sdp_session_clone(pool, local);\n+\tneg->neg_local_sdp = pjmedia_sdp_session_clone(pool, local);\n+\n+\treturn PJ_SUCCESS;\n+ }\n+\n / Init vars /\n- pj_bzero(media_used, sizeof(media_used));\n old_offer = neg->active_local_sdp;\n new_offer = pjmedia_sdp_session_clone(pool, local);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2021-21375\nCWE: CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\nTitle: Crash in receiving updated SDP answer after initial SDP negotiation failed\n\nThis patch addresses: PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C language implementing standard based protocols such as SIP, SDP, RTP, STUN, TURN, and ICE. In PJSIP version 2.10 and earlier, after an initial INVITE has been sent, when two 183 responses are received, with the first one causing negotiation failure, a crash will occur. This results in a denial of service.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-52558\nDescription: In OpenBSD 7.4 before errata 002 and OpenBSD 7.3 before errata 019, a network buffer that had to be split at certain length that could crash the kernel after receiving specially crafted escape sequences.\n\n```diff\nFrom 7b4d35e0a60ba1dd4daf4b1c2932020a22463a89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: bluhm <bluhm@openbsd.org>\nDate: Fri, 20 Oct 2023 16:25:15 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Avoid assertion failure when splitting mbuf cluster.\n\nm_split() calls m_align() to initialize the data pointer of newly\nallocated mbuf. If the new mbuf will be converted to a cluster,\nthis is not necessary. If additionally the new mbuf is larger than\nMLEN, this can lead to a panic.\nOnly call m_align() when a valid m_data is needed. This is the\ncase if we do not refecence the existing cluster, but memcpy() the\ndata into the new mbuf.\n\nReported-by: syzbot+0e6817f5877926f0e96a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com\nOK claudio@ deraadt@\n---\n sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c \| 12 ++++--------\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c b/sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c\nindex ba59f13a9541..5d1f9a7b8028 100644\n--- a/sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c\n+++ b/sys/kern/uipc_mbuf.c\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-/\t$OpenBSD: uipc_mbuf.c,v 1.287 2023/06/23 04:36:49 gnezdo Exp $\t/\n+/\t$OpenBSD: uipc_mbuf.c,v 1.288 2023/10/20 16:25:15 bluhm Exp $\t/\n /\t$NetBSD: uipc_mbuf.c,v 1.15.4.1 1996/06/13 17:11:44 cgd Exp $\t/\n \n /\n@@ -1080,9 +1080,7 @@ m_split(struct mbuf m0, int len0, int wait)\n \t\t\tn->m_len = 0;\n \t\t\treturn (n);\n \t\t}\n-\t\tif (m->m_flags & M_EXT)\n-\t\t\tgoto extpacket;\n-\t\tif (remain > MHLEN) {\n+\t\tif ((m->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0 && remain > MHLEN) {\n \t\t\t/* m can't be the lead packet /\n \t\t\tm_align(n, 0);\n \t\t\tn->m_next = m_split(m, len, wait);\n@@ -1094,8 +1092,7 @@ m_split(struct mbuf m0, int len0, int wait)\n \t\t\t\tn->m_len = 0;\n \t\t\t\treturn (n);\n \t\t\t}\n-\t\t} else\n-\t\t\tm_align(n, remain);\n+\t\t}\n \t} else if (remain == 0) {\n \t\tn = m->m_next;\n \t\tm->m_next = NULL;\n@@ -1104,14 +1101,13 @@ m_split(struct mbuf m0, int len0, int wait)\n \t\tMGET(n, wait, m->m_type);\n \t\tif (n == NULL)\n \t\t\treturn (NULL);\n-\t\tm_align(n, remain);\n \t}\n-extpacket:\n \tif (m->m_flags & M_EXT) {\n \t\tn->m_ext = m->m_ext;\n \t\tMCLADDREFERENCE(m, n);\n \t\tn->m_data = m->m_data + len;\n \t} else {\n+\t\tm_align(n, remain);\n \t\tmemcpy(mtod(n, caddr_t), mtod(m, caddr_t) + len, remain);\n \t}\n \tn->m_len = remain;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-52558\nCWE: CWE-131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size\nTitle: OpenBSD 7.4 and 7.3 m_split() network buffer kernel crash\n\nThis patch addresses: In OpenBSD 7.4 before errata 002 and OpenBSD 7.3 before errata 019, a network buffer that had to be split at certain length that could crash the kernel after receiving specially crafted escape sequences.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qv34-qvqq-q583\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom fd7e0c02e272913a0a8b6d492c7260dfca0b1408 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>\nDate: Sat, 14 May 2016 12:37:37 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB\n\n---\n libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c \| 5 +++++\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c\nindex c2ca85bd3a..b09db0e9a5 100644\n--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c\n+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c\n@@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ archive_read_format_cpio_read_header(struct archive_read a,\n \n \t/ If this is a symlink, read the link contents. /\n \tif (archive_entry_filetype(entry) == AE_IFLNK) {\n+\t\tif (cpio->entry_bytes_remaining > 1024 1024) {\n+\t\t\tarchive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,\n+\t\t\t \"Rejecting malformed cpio archive: symlink contents exceed 1 megabyte\");\n+\t\t\treturn (ARCHIVE_FATAL);\n+\t\t}\n \t\th = __archive_read_ahead(a,\n \t\t\t(size_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining, NULL);\n \t\tif (h == NULL)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qv34-qvqq-q583\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qhfv-w8w8-3r26\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d2b9d2a5ad5ef04ff978c9923d19730cb05efd55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>\nDate: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 15:44:44 +1100\nSubject: [PATCH] powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state\n\nCurrently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on\na signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and\nwill cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).\n\nThis patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals\ncode. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.\n\nFound using a syscall fuzzer.\n\nFixes: 2b0a576d15e0 (\"powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context\")\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+\nSigned-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>\nSigned-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>\n---\n arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h \| 1 +\n arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c \| 14 +++++++++-----\n arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c \| 4 ++++\n 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h\nindex a908ada8e0a535..2220f7a60def31 100644\n--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h\n+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h\n@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@\n #define MSR_TS_T\t__MASK(MSR_TS_T_LG)\t/* Transaction Transactional /\n #define MSR_TS_MASK\t(MSR_TS_T \| MSR_TS_S) / Transaction State bits /\n #define MSR_TM_ACTIVE(x) (((x) & MSR_TS_MASK) != 0) / Transaction active? /\n+#define MSR_TM_RESV(x) (((x) & MSR_TS_MASK) == MSR_TS_MASK) / Reserved /\n #define MSR_TM_TRANSACTIONAL(x)\t(((x) & MSR_TS_MASK) == MSR_TS_T)\n #define MSR_TM_SUSPENDED(x)\t(((x) & MSR_TS_MASK) == MSR_TS_S)\n \ndiff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c\nindex 0dbee465af7a70..ef7c24e84a6238 100644\n--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c\n+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c\n@@ -875,6 +875,15 @@ static long restore_tm_user_regs(struct pt_regs regs,\n \t\treturn 1;\n #endif /* CONFIG_SPE /\n \n+\t/ Get the top half of the MSR from the user context /\n+\tif (__get_user(msr_hi, &tm_sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]))\n+\t\treturn 1;\n+\tmsr_hi <<= 32;\n+\t/ If TM bits are set to the reserved value, it's an invalid context /\n+\tif (MSR_TM_RESV(msr_hi))\n+\t\treturn 1;\n+\t/ Pull in the MSR TM bits from the user context /\n+\tregs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) \| (msr_hi & MSR_TS_MASK);\n \t/ Now, recheckpoint. This loads up all of the checkpointed (older)\n \t * registers, including FP and V[S]Rs. After recheckpointing, the\n \t * transactional versions should be loaded.\n@@ -884,11 +893,6 @@ static long restore_tm_user_regs(struct pt_regs regs,\n \tcurrent->thread.tm_texasr \|= TEXASR_FS;\n \t/ This loads the checkpointed FP/VEC state, if used /\n \ttm_recheckpoint(&current->thread, msr);\n-\t/ Get the top half of the MSR /\n-\tif (__get_user(msr_hi, &tm_sr->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]))\n-\t\treturn 1;\n-\t/ Pull in MSR TM from user context /\n-\tregs->msr = (regs->msr & ~MSR_TS_MASK) \| ((msr_hi<<32) & MSR_TS_MASK);\n \n \t/ This loads the speculativ\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-qhfv-w8w8-3r26\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-4752\nDescription: Use After Free in GitHub repository vim/vim prior to 9.0.1858.\n\n```diff\nFrom ee9166eb3b41846661a39b662dc7ebe8b5e15139 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>\nDate: Sun, 3 Sep 2023 21:24:33 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] patch 9.0.1858: [security] heap use after free in\n ins_compl_get_exp()\n\nProblem: heap use after free in ins_compl_get_exp()\nSolution: validate buffer before accessing it\n\nSigned-off-by: Christian Brabandt <cb@256bit.org>\n---\n src/insexpand.c \| 2 +-\n src/testdir/crash/poc_tagfunc.vim \| 6 ++++++\n src/testdir/test_crash.vim \| 10 ++++++++--\n src/version.c \| 2 ++\n 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n create mode 100644 src/testdir/crash/poc_tagfunc.vim\n\ndiff --git a/src/insexpand.c b/src/insexpand.c\nindex 3cfdface441337..b767b4efddb01d 100644\n--- a/src/insexpand.c\n+++ b/src/insexpand.c\n@@ -3850,7 +3850,7 @@ ins_compl_get_exp(pos_T ini)\n \telse\n \t{\n \t // Mark a buffer scanned when it has been scanned completely\n-\t if (type == 0 \|\| type == CTRL_X_PATH_PATTERNS)\n+\t if (buf_valid(st.ins_buf) && (type == 0 \|\| type == CTRL_X_PATH_PATTERNS))\n \t\tst.ins_buf->b_scanned = TRUE;\n \n \t compl_started = FALSE;\ndiff --git a/src/testdir/crash/poc_tagfunc.vim b/src/testdir/crash/poc_tagfunc.vim\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 00000000000000..49d9b6f719999b\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/src/testdir/crash/poc_tagfunc.vim\n@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@\n+fu Tagfunc(t,f,o)\n+ bw\n+endf\n+set tagfunc=Tagfunc\n+n0\n+sil0norm0i\u0010\ndiff --git a/src/testdir/test_crash.vim b/src/testdir/test_crash.vim\nindex 516d991939620d..27bf7b55d46e1b 100644\n--- a/src/testdir/test_crash.vim\n+++ b/src/testdir/test_crash.vim\n@@ -39,12 +39,17 @@ func Test_crash1()\n \\ ' && echo \"crash 4: [OK]\" >> X_crash1_result.txt' .. \"\\<cr>\")\n \" clean up\n call delete('Xerr')\n-\n \" This test takes a bit longer\n call TermWait(buf, 200)\n \n+ let file = 'crash/poc_tagfunc.vim'\n+ let args = printf(cmn_args, vim, file)\n+ call term_sendkeys(buf, args ..\n+ \\ ' \|\| echo \"crash 5: [OK]\" >> X_crash1_result.txt' .. \"\\<cr>\")\n+\n+ call TermWait(buf, 100)\n+\n \" clean up\n- call delete('Xerr')\n exe buf .. \"bw!\"\n \n sp X_crash1_result.txt\n@@ -54,6 +59,7 @@ func Test_crash1()\n \\ 'crash 2: [OK]',\n \\ 'crash 3: [OK]',\n \\ 'crash 4: [OK]',\n+ \\ 'crash 5: [OK]',\n \\ ]\n \n call assert_equal(expected, getline(1, '$'))\ndiff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c\nindex 13d5d695a69fc9..b604b57f8b37c2 100644\n--- a/src/version.c\n+++ b/src/version.c\n@@ -699,6 +699,8 @@ static char (features[]) =\n \n static int included_patches[] =\n { /* Add new patch number below this line /\n+//\n+ 1858,\n //\n 1857,\n //\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-4752\nCWE: CWE-416 Use After Free\nTitle: Use After Free in vim/vim\n\nThis patch addresses: Use After Free in GitHub repository vim/vim prior to 9.0.1858.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-1039\nDescription: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in user/login.phtml in ZF-Commons ZfcUser before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the redirect parameter.\n\n```diff\nFrom baf0e460796ea92f6c902fa9b007190bccff2b8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Danielss89 <Danielss89@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 8 Jan 2015 14:18:45 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix XSS vulnerability\n\n---\n view/zfc-user/user/login.phtml \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/view/zfc-user/user/login.phtml b/view/zfc-user/user/login.phtml\nindex 3d1df3bd..66dbfd68 100644\n--- a/view/zfc-user/user/login.phtml\n+++ b/view/zfc-user/user/login.phtml\n@@ -28,5 +28,5 @@ $form->setAttribute('method', 'post');\n <?php echo $this->form()->closeTag() ?>\n \n <?php if ($this->enableRegistration) : ?>\n-<?php echo $this->translate('Not registered?'); ?> <a href=\"<?php echo $this->url('zfcuser/register') . ($this->redirect ? '?redirect='.$this->redirect : '') ?>\"><?php echo $this->translate('Sign up!'); ?></a>\n+<?php echo $this->translate('Not registered?'); ?> <a href=\"<?php echo $this->url('zfcuser/register') . ($this->redirect ? '?redirect='.$this->escapeUrl($this->redirect) : '') ?>\"><?php echo $this->translate('Sign up!'); ?></a>\n <?php endif; ?>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-1039\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in user/login.phtml in ZF-Commons ZfcUser before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the redirect parameter.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pw34-qf6c-84fc\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 75a55824012406a08c4debf5ddb7ae41c32a7dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Madhura Jayaratne <madhura.cj@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 10:12:32 +1100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix XSS in DB_search.php\n\nSigned-off-by: Madhura Jayaratne <madhura.cj@gmail.com>\n---\n libraries/DbSearch.class.php \| 3 ++-\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libraries/DbSearch.class.php b/libraries/DbSearch.class.php\nindex bce102f90d45..c79beaddf2cf 100644\n--- a/libraries/DbSearch.class.php\n+++ b/libraries/DbSearch.class.php\n@@ -344,7 +344,8 @@ private function _getResultsRow($each_table, $newsearchsqls, $odd_row, $res_cnt)\n $browse_result_path = 'sql.php' . PMA_URL_getCommon($this_url_params);\n $html_output .= '<td><a name=\"browse_search\" class=\"ajax\" href=\"'\n . $browse_result_path . '\" onclick=\"loadResult(\\''\n- . $browse_result_path . '\\',\\'' . $each_table . '\\',\\''\n+ . $browse_result_path . '\\',\\''\n+ . PMA_escapeJsString(htmlspecialchars($each_table)) . '\\',\\''\n . PMA_URL_getCommon(\n array(\n 'db' => $GLOBALS['db'], 'table' => $each_table\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pw34-qf6c-84fc\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: phpMyAdmin XSS Vulnerability\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-r4f5-rm36-v672\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Michael S. Tsirkin\" <mst@redhat.com>\nDate: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 12:00:26 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] vhost: fix total length when packets are too short\n\nWhen mergeable buffers are disabled, and the\nincoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,\nget_rx_bufs returns success.\n\nThis was intentional in order for make recvmsg\ntruncate the packet and then handle_rx would\ndetect err != sock_len and drop it.\n\nUnfortunately we pass the original sock_len to\nrecvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully\nvalidated.\n\nFix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop\nimmediately.\n\nCVE-2014-0077\n\nSigned-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n drivers/vhost/net.c \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c\nindex a0fa5de210cf57..026be580d31848 100644\n--- a/drivers/vhost/net.c\n+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c\n@@ -532,6 +532,12 @@ static int get_rx_bufs(struct vhost_virtqueue vq,\n \tiovcount = seg;\n \tif (unlikely(log))\n \t\tlog_num = nlogs;\n+\n+\t/ Detect overrun /\n+\tif (unlikely(datalen > 0)) {\n+\t\tr = UIO_MAXIOV + 1;\n+\t\tgoto err;\n+\t}\n \treturn headcount;\n err:\n \tvhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);\n@@ -587,6 +593,14 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net net)\n \t\t/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. /\n \t\tif (unlikely(headcount < 0))\n \t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t/ On overrun, truncate and discard /\n+\t\tif (unlikely(headcount > UIO_MAXIOV)) {\n+\t\t\tmsg.msg_iovlen = 1;\n+\t\t\terr = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t 1, MSG_DONTWAIT \| MSG_TRUNC);\n+\t\t\tpr_debug(\"Discarded rx packet: len %zd\\n\", sock_len);\n+\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t}\n \t\t/ OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. /\n \t\tif (!headcount) {\n \t\t\tif (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-r4f5-rm36-v672\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-0723\nDescription: Race condition in the tty_ioctl function in drivers/tty/tty_io.c in the Linux kernel through 4.4.1 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) by making a TIOCGETD ioctl call during processing of a TIOCSETD ioctl call.\n\n```diff\nFrom 5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>\nDate: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 22:40:55 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)\n\nioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the\nldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;\nuserspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS) without actually\nchanging the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).\n\nHowever, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is\nunsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline\nis changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.\n\nWait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())\nto retrieve the \"current\" line discipline id.\n\nCc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>\nSigned-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>\n---\n drivers/tty/tty_io.c \| 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c\nindex a1b36bf545e82a..5cec01c75691a6 100644\n--- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c\n+++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c\n@@ -2658,6 +2658,28 @@ static int tiocsetd(struct tty_struct tty, int __user p)\n \treturn ret;\n }\n \n+/\n+ \ttiocgetd\t-\tget line discipline\n+ \t@tty: tty device\n+ \t@p: pointer to user data\n+ \n+ \tRetrieves the line discipline id directly from the ldisc.\n+ \n+ \tLocking: waits for ldisc reference (in case the line discipline\n+ \t\tis changing or the tty is being hungup)\n+ /\n+\n+static int tiocgetd(struct tty_struct tty, int __user p)\n+{\n+\tstruct tty_ldisc ld;\n+\tint ret;\n+\n+\tld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);\n+\tret = put_user(ld->ops->num, p);\n+\ttty_ldisc_deref(ld);\n+\treturn ret;\n+}\n+\n /\n \tsend_break\t-\tperformed time break\n \t@tty: device to break on\n@@ -2884,7 +2906,7 @@ long tty_ioctl(struct file file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)\n \tcase TIOCGSID:\n \t\treturn tiocgsid(tty, real_tty, p);\n \tcase TIOCGETD:\n-\t\treturn put_user(tty->ldisc->ops->num, (int __user )p);\n+\t\treturn tiocgetd(tty, p);\n \tcase TIOCSETD:\n \t\treturn tiocsetd(tty, p);\n \tcase TIOCVHANGUP:\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2016-0723\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Race condition in the tty_ioctl function in drivers/tty/tty_io.c in the Linux kernel through 4.4.1 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory or cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) by making a TIOCGETD ioctl call during processing of a TIOCSETD ioctl call.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-mxvc-vmg9-j3pv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 9c6ba456711687b794dcf285856fc14e2c76074f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>\nDate: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 09:33:40 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors\n\nThe powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its\nprobe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for\nthe number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of\nendpoints on the interface before using them.\n\nThe full report for this issue can be found here:\nhttp://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85\n\nReported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>\nCc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>\nSigned-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>\nSigned-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>\n---\n drivers/input/misc/powermate.c \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/input/misc/powermate.c b/drivers/input/misc/powermate.c\nindex 63b539d3dabae1..84909a12ff36c2 100644\n--- a/drivers/input/misc/powermate.c\n+++ b/drivers/input/misc/powermate.c\n@@ -307,6 +307,9 @@ static int powermate_probe(struct usb_interface intf, const struct usb_device_i\n \tint error = -ENOMEM;\n \n \tinterface = intf->cur_altsetting;\n+\tif (interface->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1)\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\n \tendpoint = &interface->endpoint[0].desc;\n \tif (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))\n \t\treturn -EIO;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-mxvc-vmg9-j3pv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-xxf6-hq9q-9r8q\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 515e592b9bea0612bc63d8e93239ff35bcf645c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: pancake <pancake@nopcode.org>\nDate: Mon, 21 Feb 2022 18:45:06 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix null deref in bin.symbols ##crash\n\n* Reported by cnitlrt via huntr.dev\n---\n libr/bin/p/bin_symbols.c \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/libr/bin/p/bin_symbols.c b/libr/bin/p/bin_symbols.c\nindex 394736cfffbd3..183507d2d2b21 100644\n--- a/libr/bin/p/bin_symbols.c\n+++ b/libr/bin/p/bin_symbols.c\n@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@\n-/* radare - LGPL - Copyright 2018 - pancake /\n+/ radare - LGPL - Copyright 2018-2022 - pancake /\n \n #include <r_types.h>\n #include <r_util.h>\n@@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ static RList symbols(RBinFile bf) {\n \tbool found = false;\n \tfor (i = 0; i < element->hdr->n_lined_symbols; i++) {\n \t\tRCoreSymCacheElementSymbol sym = (RCoreSymCacheElementSymbol )&element->lined_symbols[i];\n+\t\tif (!sym) {\n+\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t}\n \t\tht_uu_find (hash, sym->paddr, &found);\n \t\tif (found) {\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-xxf6-hq9q-9r8q\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport logging\ndef log_login(username):\n logging.info(f\"User logged in: {username}\")\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues, their severity, and how to fix them." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\nLog Injection (CWE-117)\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nExplanation:\nUsername could contain newlines or log format strings. Attacker can inject fake log entries or corrupt log analysis.\n\nHow to Fix:\nSanitize username: remove/escape newlines and control characters." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3x96-m42v-hvh5\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c51285f791e48e536111cd57a9544ccbf7f33961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Peter Ivanov <peter@microweber.com>\nDate: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 14:56:16 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] update\n\n---\n .../toolbar/editor_tools/module_settings/index.php \| 12 +++++++++---\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/userfiles/modules/microweber/toolbar/editor_tools/module_settings/index.php b/userfiles/modules/microweber/toolbar/editor_tools/module_settings/index.php\nindex 1380f7a3120..a6bc6821ccd 100644\n--- a/userfiles/modules/microweber/toolbar/editor_tools/module_settings/index.php\n+++ b/userfiles/modules/microweber/toolbar/editor_tools/module_settings/index.php\n@@ -87,11 +87,13 @@\n if (isset($_GET['autosize'])) {\n $autoSize = $_GET['autosize'];\n }\n+ $autoSize = xss_clean($autoSize);\n \n $type = '';\n if (isset($_GET['type'])) {\n $type = $_GET['type'];\n }\n+ $type = xss_clean($type);\n \n $mod_id = $mod_orig_id = false;\n $is_linked_mod = false;\n@@ -403,7 +405,9 @@\n if (mw.notification) {\n mw.notification.success('<?php _ejs('Settings are saved') ?>');\n }\n+ <?php if (isset($params['id'])) : ?>\n mw.reload_module_parent('#<?php print $params['id'] ?>')\n+ <?php endif; ?>\n \n });\n \n@@ -440,9 +444,11 @@\n <body class=\"mw-external-loading loading\">\n <div id=\"settings-main\">\n <div id=\"settings-container\">\n- <div class=\"mw-module-live-edit-settings <?php print $params['id'] ?>\"\n- id=\"module-id-<?php print $params['id'] ?>\">{content}\n- </div>\n+ <?php if (isset($params['id'])) : ?>\n+ <div class=\"mw-module-live-edit-settings <?php print $params['id'] ?>\"\n+ id=\"module-id-<?php print $params['id'] ?>\">{content}\n+ </div>\n+ <?php endif; ?>\n </div>\n </div>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3x96-m42v-hvh5\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Cross-site Scripting in Microweber\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gvgg-6q8m-jmph\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 529ff26b68febb2ac03062c58452ea0b4c6edbc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Thu, 6 Jul 2017 06:43:32 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] ...\n\n---\n coders/mpc.c \| 1 -\n 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/coders/mpc.c b/coders/mpc.c\nindex 092367a78fd..ed45eac3205 100644\n--- a/coders/mpc.c\n+++ b/coders/mpc.c\n@@ -1008,7 +1008,6 @@ ModuleExport size_t RegisterMPCImage(void)\n entry=SetMagickInfo(\"CACHE\");\n entry->description=ConstantString(\"Magick Persistent Cache image format\");\n entry->module=ConstantString(\"MPC\");\n- entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue;\n entry->stealth=MagickTrue;\n (void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);\n entry=SetMagickInfo(\"MPC\");\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-gvgg-6q8m-jmph\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125037\nDescription: A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in License to Kill. This affects an unknown part of the file models/injury.rb. The manipulation of the argument name leads to sql injection. The patch is named cd11cf174f361c98e9b1b4c281aa7b77f46b5078. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217191.\n\n```diff\nFrom cd11cf174f361c98e9b1b4c281aa7b77f46b5078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Eliza Brock <eliza@elizabrocksoftware.com>\nDate: Thu, 1 May 2014 09:22:12 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix the SQL injection! STRING INTERPOLATION - NEVER AGAIN.\n NEVER!\n\n---\n lib/database.rb \| 4 ++--\n models/injury.rb \| 12 ++++++------\n spec/injury_integration_spec.rb \| 3 +++\n 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/database.rb b/lib/database.rb\nindex 2f00647..416c6c9 100644\n--- a/lib/database.rb\n+++ b/lib/database.rb\n@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ def create_tables\n self.execute(\"CREATE TABLE injuries (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, name varchar(50))\")\n end\n \n- def execute(statement)\n+ def execute(statement, bind_vars = [])\n Environment.logger.info(\"Executing: \" + statement)\n- super(statement)\n+ super(statement, bind_vars)\n end\n end\ndiff --git a/models/injury.rb b/models/injury.rb\nindex b882052..16c5293 100644\n--- a/models/injury.rb\n+++ b/models/injury.rb\n@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ def self.count\n end\n \n def self.find_by_name(name)\n- statement = \"Select * from injuries where name = \\\"#{name}\\\";\"\n- execute_and_instantiate(statement)[0]\n+ statement = \"Select * from injuries where name = ?;\"\n+ execute_and_instantiate(statement, name)[0]\n end\n \n def self.last\n@@ -33,16 +33,16 @@ def save\n @errors << \"#{self.name} already exists.\"\n false\n else\n- statement = \"Insert into injuries (name) values ('#{name}');\"\n- Environment.database_connection.execute(statement)\n+ statement = \"Insert into injuries (name) values (?);\"\n+ Environment.database_connection.execute(statement, name)\n true\n end\n end\n \n private\n \n- def self.execute_and_instantiate(statement)\n- rows = Environment.database_connection.execute(statement)\n+ def self.execute_and_instantiate(statement, bind_vars = [])\n+ rows = Environment.database_connection.execute(statement, bind_vars)\n results = []\n rows.each do \|row\|\n results << Injury.new(row[\"name\"])\ndiff --git a/spec/injury_integration_spec.rb b/spec/injury_integration_spec.rb\nindex 35f074d..c77ed35 100644\n--- a/spec/injury_integration_spec.rb\n+++ b/spec/injury_integration_spec.rb\n@@ -57,12 +57,15 @@\n context \"without alphabet characters\" do\n let(:output){ run_ltk_with_input(\"2\", \"425\") }\n it \"should not save the injury\" do\n+ pending\n Injury.count.should == 1\n end\n it \"should print an error message\" do\n+ pending\n output.should include(\"'425' is not a valid injury name, as it does not include any letters'\")\n end\n it \"should let them try again\" do\n+ pending\n menu_text = \"What is the injury you want to add?\"\n output.should include_in_order(menu_text, \"not a valid\", menu_text)\n end\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-125037\nCWE: CWE-89 SQL Injection\nTitle: License to Kill injury.rb sql injection\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in License to Kill. This affects an unknown part of the file models/injury.rb. The manipulation of the argument name leads to sql injection. The patch is named cd11cf174f361c98e9b1b4c281aa7b77f46b5078. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217191.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2013-2128\nDescription: The tcp_read_sock function in net/ipv4/tcp.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skb consumption, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted splice system call for a TCP socket.\n\n```diff\nFrom baff42ab1494528907bf4d5870359e31711746ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Steven J. Magnani\" <steve@digidescorp.com>\nDate: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 13:56:01 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()\n\ntcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.\nThis can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result\nof the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.\n\nA userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another\nsocket or to a file can trigger this bug.\n\nSigned-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n net/ipv4/tcp.c \| 1 +\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)\n\ndiff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c\nindex 6afb6d8662b2ce..2c75f891914e83 100644\n--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c\n+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c\n@@ -1368,6 +1368,7 @@ int tcp_read_sock(struct sock sk, read_descriptor_t desc,\n \t\tsk_eat_skb(sk, skb, 0);\n \t\tif (!desc->count)\n \t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\ttp->copied_seq = seq;\n \t}\n \ttp->copied_seq = seq;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2013-2128\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The tcp_read_sock function in net/ipv4/tcp.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skb consumption, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted splice system call for a TCP socket.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjxh-hxxv-h4vm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 65b605665997fad54ef39a93199e305af2fe4d7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Bram Moolenaar <Bram@vim.org>\nDate: Tue, 7 Sep 2021 19:26:53 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] patch 8.2.3409: reading beyond end of line with invalid utf-8\n character\n\nProblem: Reading beyond end of line with invalid utf-8 character.\nSolution: Check for NUL when advancing.\n---\n src/regexp_nfa.c \| 3 ++-\n src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim \| 8 ++++++++\n src/version.c \| 2 ++\n 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/regexp_nfa.c b/src/regexp_nfa.c\nindex 9757d7c4755234..c7db9818786714 100644\n--- a/src/regexp_nfa.c\n+++ b/src/regexp_nfa.c\n@@ -5664,7 +5664,8 @@ find_match_text(colnr_T startcol, int regstart, char_u match_text)\n \t\tmatch = FALSE;\n \t\tbreak;\n \t }\n-\t len2 += MB_CHAR2LEN(c2);\n+\t len2 += enc_utf8 ? utf_ptr2len(rex.line + col + len2)\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t : MB_CHAR2LEN(c2);\n \t}\n \tif (match\n \t\t// check that no composing char follows\ndiff --git a/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim b/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim\nindex 9f0ffb9aafc60e..044aeffb639220 100644\n--- a/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim\n+++ b/src/testdir/test_regexp_utf8.vim\n@@ -558,4 +558,12 @@ func Test_match_char_class_upper()\n bwipe!\n endfunc\n \n+func Test_match_invalid_byte()\n+ call writefile(0z630a.765d30aa0a.2e0a.790a.4030, 'Xinvalid')\n+ new\n+ source Xinvalid\n+ bwipe!\n+ call delete('Xinvalid')\n+endfunc\n+\n \" vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab\ndiff --git a/src/version.c b/src/version.c\nindex 54533dc91e6330..0eb6899ed69a76 100644\n--- a/src/version.c\n+++ b/src/version.c\n@@ -755,6 +755,8 @@ static char (features[]) =\n \n static int included_patches[] =\n { /* Add new patch number below this line /\n+//\n+ 3409,\n //\n 3408,\n //\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-wjxh-hxxv-h4vm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-31873\nDescription: An issue was discovered in klibc before 2.0.9. Additions in the malloc() function may result in an integer overflow and a subsequent heap buffer overflow.\n\n```diff\nFrom a31ae8c508fc8d1bca4f57e9f9f88127572d5202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>\nDate: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 04:03:49 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [klibc] malloc: Fail if requested size > PTRDIFF_MAX\n\nmalloc() adds some overhead to the requested size, which may result in\nan integer overflow and subsequent buffer overflow if it is close to\nSIZE_MAX. It should fail if size is large enough for this to happen.\n\nFurther, it's not legal for a C object to be larger than\nPTRDIFF_MAX (half of SIZE_MAX) as pointer arithmetic within it could\noverflow. So return failure immediately if size is greater than that.\n\nCVE-2021-31873\n\nSigned-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>\n---\n usr/klibc/malloc.c \| 9 +++++++++\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/usr/klibc/malloc.c b/usr/klibc/malloc.c\nindex bb57c9f6..abda84c2 100644\n--- a/usr/klibc/malloc.c\n+++ b/usr/klibc/malloc.c\n@@ -147,6 +147,15 @@ void malloc(size_t size)\n \tif (size == 0)\n \t\treturn NULL;\n \n+\t/ Various additions below will overflow if size is close to\n+\t SIZE_MAX. Further, it's not legal for a C object to be\n+\t larger than PTRDIFF_MAX (half of SIZE_MAX) as pointer\n+\t arithmetic within it could overflow. /\n+\tif (size > PTRDIFF_MAX) {\n+\t\terrno = ENOMEM;\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\t}\n+\n \t/ Add the obligatory arena header, and round up /\n \tsize = (size + 2 sizeof(struct arena_header) - 1) & ARENA_SIZE_MASK;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-31873\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An issue was discovered in klibc before 2.0.9. Additions in the malloc() function may result in an integer overflow and a subsequent heap buffer overflow.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-m63h-q4x3-6hwj\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 3c0ba94e879702b3c2f20d4cb4f9120a0bfdd9fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Frederic Massart <fred@moodle.com>\nDate: Wed, 8 May 2013 15:50:33 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] MDL-38885 form: Recursively clean parameters based on right\n type\n\n---\n lib/formslib.php \| 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------\n 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/formslib.php b/lib/formslib.php\nindex 201da0c097c8f..b4decbd0c007d 100644\n--- a/lib/formslib.php\n+++ b/lib/formslib.php\n@@ -1673,6 +1673,80 @@ function setTypes($paramtypes) {\n $this->_types = $paramtypes + $this->_types;\n }\n \n+ /*\n+ Return the type(s) to use to clean an element.\n+ \n+ In the case where the element has an array as a value, we will try to obtain a\n+ * type defined for that specific key, and recursively until done.\n+ \n+ This method does not work reverse, you cannot pass a nested element and hoping to\n+ * fallback on the clean type of a parent. This method intends to be used with the\n+ * main element, which will generate child types if needed, not the other way around.\n+ \n+ Example scenario:\n+ \n+ You have defined a new repeated element containing a text field called 'foo'.\n+ * By default there will always be 2 occurence of 'foo' in the form. Even though\n+ * you've set the type on 'foo' to be PARAM_INT, for some obscure reason, you want\n+ * the first value of 'foo', to be PARAM_FLOAT, which you set using setType:\n+ * $mform->setType('foo[0]', PARAM_FLOAT).\n+ \n+ Now if you call this method passing 'foo', along with the submitted values of 'foo':\n+ * array(0 => '1.23', 1 => '10'), you will get an array telling you that the key 0 is a\n+ * FLOAT and 1 is an INT. If you had passed 'foo[1]', along with its value '10', you would\n+ * get the default value returned.\n+ \n+ @param string $elementname name of the element.\n+ * @param mixed $value value that should be cleaned.\n+ * @return string\|array constant value or array of constant values (PARAM_...)\n+ /\n+ public function getCleanType($elementname, $value, $default = PARAM_RAW) {\n+ $type = $default;\n+ if (array_key_exists($elementname, $this->_types)) {\n+ $type = $this->_types[$elementname];\n+ }\n+ if (is_array($value)) {\n+ $default = $type;\n+ $type = array();\n+ foreach ($value as $subkey => $subvalue) {\n+ $typekey = \"$elementname\" . \"[$subkey]\";\n+ if (array_key_exists($typekey, $this->_types)) {\n+ $subtype = $this->_types[$typekey];\n+ } else {\n+ $subtype = $default;\n+ }\n+ if (is_array($subvalue)) {\n+ $type[$subkey] = $this->getCleanType($typekey, $subvalue, $subtype);\n+ } else {\n+ $type[$subkey] = $subtype;\n+ }\n+ }\n+ \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-m63h-q4x3-6hwj\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Moodle is vulnerable to Improper Input Validation in MoodleQuickForm class\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-9110\nDescription: Studio 42 elFinder before 2.1.37 has a directory traversal vulnerability in elFinder.class.php with the zipdl() function that can allow a remote attacker to download files accessible by the web server process and delete files owned by the account running the web server process. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-9109.\n\n```diff\nFrom e6351557b86cc10a7651253d2d2aff7f6b918f8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: nao-pon <hypweb@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 14:30:48 +0900\nSubject: [PATCH] [php:security] re-fix directory traversal vulnerability for\n windows server\n\nrel. commit 157f471d7e48f190f74e66eb5bc73360b5352fd3\n---\n php/elFinder.class.php \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/php/elFinder.class.php b/php/elFinder.class.php\nindex bd2aa87a24..fec1143d8a 100644\n--- a/php/elFinder.class.php\n+++ b/php/elFinder.class.php\n@@ -1624,7 +1624,7 @@ protected function zipdl($args) {\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\t$file = $targets[1];\n \t\t\t// checking the validity of the file parameter\n-\t\t\tif (strpos($file, DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) !== false) {\n+\t\t\tif (strpos(str_replace('/', DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR, $file), DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) !== false) {\n \t\t\t\treturn array('error' => 'File not found', 'header' => $h404, 'raw' => true);\n \t\t\t}\n \t\t\t$path = $volume->getTempPath().DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$file;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-9110\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Studio 42 elFinder before 2.1.37 has a directory traversal vulnerability in elFinder.class.php with the zipdl() function that can allow a remote attacker to download files accessible by the web server process and delete files owned by the account running the web server process. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2018-9109.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\ndef read_user_file(user_id, filename):\n user_dir = Path(f\"/data/users/{user_id}\")\n filepath = user_dir / filename\n return filepath.read_text()\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues, their severity, and how to fix them." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\nPath Traversal (CWE-22)\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nExplanation:\nfilename can contain '..' to escape user_dir. Even with pathlib, no automatic protection.\n\nHow to Fix:\nResolve path and check: filepath.resolve().is_relative_to(user_dir.resolve())" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6hwh-rqwf-cxxr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8f33a0b5170d7de4f12fc248ec0901234342367b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jeffrey Heer <jheer@trifacta.com>\nDate: Thu, 5 Mar 2020 13:27:57 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix prototype pollution in mergeConfig.\n\n---\n packages/vega-util/src/mergeConfig.js \| 8 ++++++--\n packages/vega-util/test/mergeConfig-test.js \| 12 ++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/packages/vega-util/src/mergeConfig.js b/packages/vega-util/src/mergeConfig.js\nindex 35ba2f5d80..76bd13220f 100644\n--- a/packages/vega-util/src/mergeConfig.js\n+++ b/packages/vega-util/src/mergeConfig.js\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\n import isArray from './isArray';\n import isObject from './isObject';\n \n+const isLegalKey = key => key !== '__proto__';\n+\n export function mergeConfig(...configs) {\n return configs.reduce((out, source) => {\n for (var key in source) {\n@@ -14,7 +16,7 @@ export function mergeConfig(...configs) {\n // for legend block, recurse for the layout entry only\n // for style block, recurse for all properties\n // otherwise, no recursion: objects overwrite, no merging\n- var r = key === 'legend' ? {'layout': 1}\n+ var r = key === 'legend' ? {layout: 1}\n : key === 'style' ? true\n : null;\n writeConfig(out, key, source[key], r);\n@@ -25,13 +27,15 @@ export function mergeConfig(...configs) {\n }\n \n export function writeConfig(output, key, value, recurse) {\n+ if (!isLegalKey(key)) return;\n+\n var k, o;\n if (isObject(value) && !isArray(value)) {\n o = isObject(output[key]) ? output[key] : (output[key] = {});\n for (k in value) {\n if (recurse && (recurse === true \|\| recurse[k])) {\n writeConfig(o, k, value[k]);\n- } else {\n+ } else if (isLegalKey(k)) {\n o[k] = value[k];\n }\n }\ndiff --git a/packages/vega-util/test/mergeConfig-test.js b/packages/vega-util/test/mergeConfig-test.js\nindex c41eca001d..c865fa9223 100644\n--- a/packages/vega-util/test/mergeConfig-test.js\n+++ b/packages/vega-util/test/mergeConfig-test.js\n@@ -78,3 +78,15 @@ tape('mergeConfig handles empty arguments', function(t) {\n t.deepEqual(vega.mergeConfig(null, undefined, c), c);\n t.end();\n });\n+\n+tape('mergeConfig must not allow prototype pollution', function(t) {\n+ const config = {symbol: {shape: 'triangle-right'}},\n+ payload = JSON.parse('{\"__proto__\": {\"vulnerable\": \"Polluted\"}}'),\n+ merged = vega.mergeConfig(config, payload, {symbol: payload});\n+\n+ t.equal(merged.__proto__.vulnerable, undefined);\n+ t.equal(merged.symbol.__proto__.vulnerable, undefined);\n+ t.equal(Object.prototype.vulnerable, undefined);\n+\n+ t.end();\n+});\n\\ No newline at end of file\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6hwh-rqwf-cxxr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes in vega-util\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for ReDoS - Regular Expression Denial of Service (CWE-1333):\n\n```python\nimport re\ndef validate_input(text):\n pattern = r'^(a+)+$'\n return bool(re.match(pattern, text))\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Avoid nested quantifiers. Use r'^a+$' instead, or set regex timeout.\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: ReDoS - Regular Expression Denial of Service (CWE-1333)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nNested quantifiers (a+)+ cause catastrophic backtracking. Input like 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab' will hang.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (ReDoS - Regular Expression Denial of Service) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-10098\nDescription: A vulnerability was found in Broken Link Checker Plugin up to 1.10.5 on WordPress. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function print_module_list/show_warnings_section_notice/status_text/ui_get_action_links. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.10.6 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is f30638869e281461b87548e40b517738b4350e47. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. \n\n```diff\nFrom f30638869e281461b87548e40b517738b4350e47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: whiteshadow <whiteshadow@b8457f37-d9ea-0310-8a92-e5e31aec5664>\nDate: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 15:04:14 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix a CSRF/XSS vulnerability caused by not escaping the URL\n returned by add_query_arg().\n\nVersion 1.10.6 (stable).\n\ngit-svn-id: https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/broken-link-checker/trunk@1139206 b8457f37-d9ea-0310-8a92-e5e31aec5664\n---\n core/core.php \| 8 ++++----\n includes/any-post.php \| 4 ++--\n readme.txt \| 3 ++-\n 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/core/core.php b/core/core.php\nindex 6f78dcc..aeed527 100644\n--- a/core/core.php\n+++ b/core/core.php\n@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ function print_module_list($modules, $current_settings){\n \t\t\t\t\r\n \t\t\t\tprintf(\r\n \t\t\t\t\t' \| <a class=\"blc-toggle-link toggle-module-settings\" id=\"toggle-module-settings-%s\" href=\"#\">%s</a>',\r\n-\t\t\t\t\t$module_id,\r\n+\t\t\t\t\tesc_attr($module_id),\r\n \t\t\t\t\t__('Configure', 'broken-link-checker')\r\n \t\t\t\t);\r\n \t\t\t\t\r\n@@ -2248,13 +2248,13 @@ public function show_warnings_section_notice() {\n \t\t\t\t'The \"Warnings\" page lists problems that are probably temporary or suspected to be false positives.<br> Warnings that persist for a long time will usually be reclassified as broken links.',\r\n \t\t\t\t'broken-link-checker'\r\n \t\t\t),\r\n-\t\t\tadd_query_arg($notice_name, '0'),\r\n+\t\t\tesc_attr(add_query_arg($notice_name, '0')),\r\n \t\t\t_x(\r\n \t\t\t\t'Hide notice',\r\n \t\t\t\t'admin notice under Tools - Broken links - Warnings',\r\n \t\t\t\t'broken-link-checker'\r\n \t\t\t),\r\n-\t\t\tadmin_url('options-general.php?page=link-checker-settings#blc_warning_settings'),\r\n+\t\t\tesc_attr(admin_url('options-general.php?page=link-checker-settings#blc_warning_settings')),\r\n \t\t\t_x(\r\n \t\t\t\t'Change warning settings',\r\n \t\t\t\t'a link from the admin notice under Tools - Broken links - Warnings',\r\n@@ -2783,7 +2783,7 @@ function status_text( $status ){\n \t\t\t\t\"<a href='%s' title='\" . __('View broken links', 'broken-link-checker') . \"'><strong>\". \r\n \t\t\t\t\t_n('Found %d broken link', 'Found %d broken links', $status['broken_links'], 'broken-link-checker') .\r\n \t\t\t\t\"</strong></a>\",\r\n-\t\t\t \tadmin_url('tools.php?page=view-broken-links'), \r\n+\t\t\t \tesc_attr(admin_url('tools.php?page=view-broken-links')),\r\n \t\t\t\t$status['broken_links']\r\n \t\t\t);\r\n \t\t} else {\r\ndiff --git a/includes/any-post.php b/includes/any-post.php\nindex 49d542c..1b1f82c 100644\n--- a/includes/any-post.php\n+++ b/includes/any-post.php\n@@ -432,14 +432,14 @@ function ui_get_action_links($container_field = ''){\n \t\t\t\t\t$actions['trash'] = sprintf(\r\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\"<span class='trash'><a class='submitdelete' title='%s' href='%s'>%s</a>\",\r\n \t\t\t\t\t\tesc_attr(__('Move this item to the Trash')),\r\n-\t\t\t\t\t\tget_delete_post_link($this->container_id, '', false),\r\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tesc_attr(get_delete_post_link($this->container_id, '', false)),\r\n \t\t\t\t\t\t__('Trash')\r\n \t\t\t\t\t);\r\n \t\t\t\t} else {\r\n \t\t\t\t\t$actions['delete'] = sprintf(\r\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\"<span><a class='submitdelete' title='%s' href='%s'>%s</a>\",\r\n \t\t\t\t\t\tesc_attr(__('Delete this \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2015-10098\nCWE: CWE-79 Cross Site Scripting\nTitle: Broken Link Checker Plugin ui_get_action_links cross site scripting\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability was found in Broken Link Checker Plugin up to 1.10.5 on WordPress. It has been rated as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function print_module_list/show_warnings_section_notice/status_text/ui_get_action_links. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be launched remotely. Upgrading to version 1.10.6 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is f30638869e281461b87548e40b517738b4350e47. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jwf8-mjj8-r8hq\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom cc06008f75262510ee135b8cbb14e333a309f651 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Brian Sweeney <brian@eclecticgeek.com>\nDate: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 23:07:13 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Restrict access to sensitive www content to authenticated\n users\n\n---\n www/debugger.php \| 4 +++-\n www/demo.php \| 6 ++++--\n www/setup.php \| 11 +++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/www/debugger.php b/www/debugger.php\nindex dae3dd9b4..c68d823b4 100644\n--- a/www/debugger.php\n+++ b/www/debugger.php\n@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@\n <?php\n+require_once \"functions.inc.php\";\n+\n $allowed_hosts = array(\"::1\", \"127.0.0.1\");\n-if( !in_array($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], $allowed_hosts) ) {\n+if( !auth_ok() \|\| !in_array($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], $allowed_hosts) ) {\n die(\"Access denied to host at \" . $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/www/demo.php b/www/demo.php\nindex 6d07acc29..fff8398ce 100644\n--- a/www/demo.php\n+++ b/www/demo.php\n@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@\n $local = array(\"::1\", \"127.0.0.1\");\n $is_local = in_array($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'], $local);\n \n-if ( isset( $_POST[\"html\"] ) && $is_local ) {\n+if ( auth_ok() && $is_local && isset( $_POST[\"html\"] ) ) {\n \n if ( get_magic_quotes_gpc() )\n $_POST[\"html\"] = stripslashes($_POST[\"html\"]);\n@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@\n <a name=\"demo\"> </a>\n <h2>Demo</h2>\n \n-<?php if ($is_local) { ?>\n+<?php if (auth_ok() && $is_local) { ?>\n \n <p>Enter your html snippet in the text box below to see it rendered as a\n PDF: (Note by default, remote stylesheets, images & inline PHP are disabled.)</p>\n@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@\n User input has been disabled for remote connections.\n </p>\n \n+ <?php echo auth_get_link(); ?>\n+\n <?php } ?>\n \n <?php include(\"foot.inc\"); ?>\n\\ No newline at end of file\ndiff --git a/www/setup.php b/www/setup.php\nindex 27934ff1a..ed0a138ad 100644\n--- a/www/setup.php\n+++ b/www/setup.php\n@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@\n <?php include(\"head.inc\"); ?>\n \n+<?php\n+if (auth_ok()) {\n+?>\n+\n <a name=\"setup\"> </a>\n <h2>Setup</h2>\n \n@@ -296,5 +300,12 @@\n \n </table>\n \n+<?php\n+} else {\n+ echo auth_get_link();\n+}\n+?>\n+\n+\n \n <?php include(\"foot.inc\"); ?>\n\\ No newline at end of file\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-jwf8-mjj8-r8hq\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: DOMPDF Information Disclosure\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-3325\nDescription: Monitorix 3.13.0 allows remote attackers to bypass Basic Authentication in a default installation (i.e., an installation without a hosts_deny option). This issue occurred because a new access-control feature was introduced without considering that some exiting installations became unsafe, upon an update to 3.13.0, unless the new feature was immediately configured.\n\n```diff\nFrom d6816e20da1a98bcdc6372d9c36a093df5238f4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jordi Sanfeliu <jordi@fibranet.cat>\nDate: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 10:45:41 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fixed a security bug introduced in 3.13.0 version that lead\n the HTTP built-in server to bypass Basic Authentication when the option\n 'hosts_deny' is not defined #309\n\n---\n lib/HTTPServer.pm \| 4 ++++\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/HTTPServer.pm b/lib/HTTPServer.pm\nindex c13301a7..b02a8f76 100644\n--- a/lib/HTTPServer.pm\n+++ b/lib/HTTPServer.pm\n@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ sub http_header {\n \t\t# check if the IP address is forced to auth\n \t\tmy $denied;\n \t\tmy $allowed = ip_validity($ENV{REMOTE_ADDR}, $hosts_allow);\n+\n+\t\t# specific behavior\n+\t\t$hosts_deny = \"all\" if !$hosts_deny;\n+\n \t\t$denied = ip_validity($ENV{REMOTE_ADDR}, $hosts_deny) if !$allowed;\n \t\tif(!$allowed && $denied) {\n \t\t\tmy (undef, $encoded_str) = split(' ', $ENV{HTTP_AUTHORIZATION} \|\| \"\");\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-3325\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Monitorix 3.13.0 allows remote attackers to bypass Basic Authentication in a default installation (i.e., an installation without a hosts_deny option). This issue occurred because a new access-control feature was introduced without considering that some exiting installations became unsafe, upon an update to 3.13.0, unless the new feature was immediately configured.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-2336\nDescription: Path Traversal in GitHub repository pimcore/pimcore prior to 10.5.21.\n\n```diff\nFrom 498cadec2292f7842fb10612068ac78496e884b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: robertSt7 <104770750+robertSt7@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Thu, 20 Apr 2023 16:56:53 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] [Security] Admin Authenticated Arbitrary File Read (#14974)\n\n* Fix: disable asset importFromServer for users\n\n* Doc: Add Upgrade Notes\n---\n .../AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Asset/AssetController.php \| 4 ++++\n bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/asset/tree.js \| 2 +-\n .../23_Installation_and_Upgrade/09_Upgrade_Notes/README.md \| 4 ++++\n 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Asset/AssetController.php b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Asset/AssetController.php\nindex c2a6a90b244..f3ec571ee62 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Asset/AssetController.php\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Asset/AssetController.php\n@@ -2459,6 +2459,10 @@ public function importServerAction(Request $request)\n /\n public function importServerFilesAction(Request $request)\n {\n+ if(!Tool\\Admin::getCurrentUser()->isAdmin()) {\n+ throw $this->createAccessDeniedException('Permission denied. You don\\'t have the rights to import files from the server!');\n+ }\n+\n $assetFolder = Asset::getById((int) $request->get('parentId'));\n if (!$assetFolder) {\n throw $this->createNotFoundException('Parent asset not found');\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/asset/tree.js b/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/asset/tree.js\nindex 29072edae4b..6ad46d37747 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/asset/tree.js\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/asset/tree.js\n@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ pimcore.asset.tree = Class.create({\n });\n }\n \n- if (perspectiveCfg.inTreeContextMenu(\"asset.add.importFromServer\")) {\n+ if (perspectiveCfg.inTreeContextMenu(\"asset.add.importFromServer\") && pimcore.currentuser.admin) {\n menuItems.push({\n text: t(\"import_from_server\"),\n handler: this.importFromServer.bind(this, tree, record),\ndiff --git a/doc/Development_Documentation/23_Installation_and_Upgrade/09_Upgrade_Notes/README.md b/doc/Development_Documentation/23_Installation_and_Upgrade/09_Upgrade_Notes/README.md\nindex 37c474f3076..3a870e9a793 100644\n--- a/doc/Development_Documentation/23_Installation_and_Upgrade/09_Upgrade_Notes/README.md\n+++ b/doc/Development_Documentation/23_Installation_and_Upgrade/09_Upgrade_Notes/README.md\n@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@\n # Upgrade Notes\n \n+## 10.5.21\n+- [Assets] The Asset `Import from Server` feature is now only available for admins. It will be removed in Pimcore 11\n+\n ## 10.5.13\n - [Web2Print] Print document twig expressions are now executed in a sandbox with restrictive security policies (ju\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2023-2336\nCWE: CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')\nTitle: Path Traversal in pimcore/pimcore\n\nThis patch addresses: Path Traversal in GitHub repository pimcore/pimcore prior to 10.5.21.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom Crypto.Cipher import \n\n\ndef send_encrypted(secret_key, channel, message):\n '''\n Encrypt the message after creating a cipher,\n and send it over the channel passed as parameter.\n '''\n cipher = DES.new(secret_key)\n encrypted = cipher.encrypt(message)\n channel.send(encrypted)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-327* - CWE-327\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-9f63-6gmg-2983\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom b8acc83781d5a24cc5101e525d15efe0482c280d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com>\nDate: Tue, 6 May 2014 18:20:39 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove loop that kept reading the same offset (Jan Kaluza)\n\n---\n src/cdf.c \| 20 ++++++--------------\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/cdf.c b/src/cdf.c\nindex f7c46aedb5..c591a14a9f 100644\n--- a/src/cdf.c\n+++ b/src/cdf.c\n@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@\n #include \"file.h\"\n \n #ifndef lint\n-FILE_RCSID(\"@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.55 2014/02/27 23:26:17 christos Exp $\")\n+FILE_RCSID(\"@(#)$File: cdf.c,v 1.56 2014/05/05 16:11:21 christos Exp $\")\n #endif\n \n #include <assert.h>\n@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ int\n cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t sst, const cdf_header_t h,\n cdf_summary_info_header_t ssi, cdf_property_info_t info, size_t count)\n {\n-\tsize_t i, maxcount;\n+\tsize_t maxcount;\n \tconst cdf_summary_info_header_t si =\n \t CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t , sst->sst_tab);\n \tconst cdf_section_declaration_t sd =\n@@ -947,21 +947,13 @@ cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t sst, const cdf_header_t h,\n \tssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);\n \tssi->si_class = si->si_class;\n \tcdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);\n-\tssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);\n+\tssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count);\n \tcount = 0;\n \tmaxcount = 0;\n \tinfo = NULL;\n-\tfor (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {\n-\t\tif (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {\n-\t\t\tDPRINTF((\"Unpack summary info loop limit\"));\n-\t\t\terrno = EFTYPE;\n-\t\t\treturn -1;\n-\t\t}\n-\t\tif (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),\n-\t\t info, count, &maxcount) == -1) {\n-\t\t\treturn -1;\n-\t\t}\n-\t}\n+\tif (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset), info,\n+\t count, &maxcount) == -1)\n+\t\treturn -1;\n \treturn 0;\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-9f63-6gmg-2983\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjp8-5g4j-4rjj\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom fadcfa7467b8d68241b9efe6bdb3c57cb9db9348 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Javier Guerra <javier.guerra@konghq.com>\nDate: Mon, 6 Jul 2020 09:21:49 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] replace `is_header()` check pattern\n\nthe original pattern exhibits can take indeterminate time on long\ninput strings. The semantics of:\n\n '(%S+):%s(%S+)'\n\ncan be described as: \"at least one non-space, followed by a colon,\noptional whitespace and at least one non-space\".\n\nbut the captures are not used in the code, and the match isn't\nanchored at either end, so the pattern:\n\n '%S:%s%S'\n\nmatches and rejects the same sets of strings and executes in\nlinear time. The time to reject the text reported in #26 (200000\nchars in length) drops from 150secs to 2msec.\n---\n src/multipart.lua \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/multipart.lua b/src/multipart.lua\nindex 6e74819..bab9251 100644\n--- a/src/multipart.lua\n+++ b/src/multipart.lua\n@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ setmetatable(MultipartData, {\n \n \n local function is_header(value)\n- return match(value, \"(%S+):%s(%S+)\")\n+ return match(value, \"%S:%s%S\")\n end\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wjp8-5g4j-4rjj\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-68953\nDescription: Frappe is a full-stack web application framework. Versions 14.99.5 and below and 15.0.0 through 15.80.1 include requests that are vulnerable to path traversal attacks. Arbitrary files from the server could be retrieved due to a lack of proper sanitization on some requests. This issue is fixed in versions 14.99.6 and 15.88.1. To workaround, changing the setup to use a reverse proxy is recommended.\n\n```diff\nFrom 3867fb112c3f7be1a863e40f19e9235719f784fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Akhil Narang <me@akhilnarang.dev>\nDate: Mon, 10 Nov 2025 11:41:40 +0530\nSubject: [PATCH] fix(middleware): check path before returning file\n\nSigned-off-by: Akhil Narang <me@akhilnarang.dev>\n---\n frappe/middlewares.py \| 13 +++++++------\n 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/frappe/middlewares.py b/frappe/middlewares.py\nindex 168d129ebe3d..1898734917f6 100644\n--- a/frappe/middlewares.py\n+++ b/frappe/middlewares.py\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n # Copyright (c) 2015, Frappe Technologies Pvt. Ltd. and Contributors\n # License: MIT. See LICENSE\n \n-import os\n+from pathlib import Path\n \n from werkzeug.exceptions import NotFound\n from werkzeug.middleware.shared_data import SharedDataMiddleware\n@@ -18,11 +18,12 @@ def __call__(self, environ, start_response):\n \tdef get_directory_loader(self, directory):\n \t\tdef loader(path):\n \t\t\tsite = get_site_name(frappe.app._site or self.environ.get(\"HTTP_HOST\"))\n-\t\t\tpath = os.path.join(directory, site, \"public\", \"files\", cstr(path))\n-\t\t\tif os.path.isfile(path):\n-\t\t\t\treturn os.path.basename(path), self._opener(path)\n-\t\t\telse:\n+\t\t\tfiles_path = Path(directory) / site / \"public\" / \"files\"\n+\t\t\trequested_path = Path(cstr(path))\n+\t\t\tpath = (files_path / requested_path).resolve()\n+\t\t\tif not path.is_relative_to(files_path) or not path.is_file():\n \t\t\t\traise NotFound\n-\t\t\t\t# return None, None\n+\n+\t\t\treturn path.name, self._opener(path)\n \n \t\treturn loader\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-68953\nCWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')\nTitle: Certain Frappe requests are vulnerable to Path Traversal\n\nThis patch addresses: Frappe is a full-stack web application framework. Versions 14.99.5 and below and 15.0.0 through 15.80.1 include requests that are vulnerable to path traversal attacks. Arbitrary files from the server could be retrieved due to a lack of proper sanitization on some requests. This issue is fixed in versions 14.99.6 and 15.88.1. To workaround, changing the setup to use a reverse proxy is recommended.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-7659\nDescription: A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in projectsend up to r1605. Affected is the function generate_random_string of the file includes/functions.php of the component Password Reset Token Handler. The manipulation leads to insufficiently random values. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. Upgrading to version r1720 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is aa27e\n\n```diff\nFrom aa27eb97edc2ff2b203f97e6675d7b5ba0a22a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: ignacionelson <info@subwaydesign.com.ar>\nDate: Thu, 1 Aug 2024 21:21:51 -0300\nSubject: [PATCH] Generate secure random strings. Found by hassan al-khafaji\n\n---\n includes/functions.php \| 7 +------\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/includes/functions.php b/includes/functions.php\nindex e48fc2861..64e540706 100644\n--- a/includes/functions.php\n+++ b/includes/functions.php\n@@ -1231,12 +1231,7 @@ function make_excerpt($string, $length, $break = \"...\")\n /\n function generate_random_string($length = 10)\n {\n- $characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789';\n- $rnd_result = '';\n- for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) {\n- $rnd_result .= $characters[rand(0, strlen($characters) - 1)];\n- }\n- return $rnd_result;\n+ return substr(bin2hex(random_bytes($length)), 0, $length);\n }\n \n function get_file_type_by_mime($full_path)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2024-7659\nCWE: CWE-330 Insufficiently Random Values\nTitle: projectsend Password Reset Token functions.php generate_random_string random values\n\nThis patch addresses: A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in projectsend up to r1605. Affected is the function generate_random_string of the file includes/functions.php of the component Password Reset Token Handler. The manipulation leads to insufficiently random values. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. Upgrading to version r1720 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is aa27e\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-wmh3-2439-2hpr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom eafe4c7a326b163612f10861392622b5da5b1792 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Dmitry Volyntsev <xeioex@nginx.com>\nDate: Wed, 27 Apr 2022 16:31:00 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed Array.prototype.lastIndexOf() with unicode string as\n \"this\".\n\nPreviously, when lastIndexOf() was called with unicode string as \"this\"\nargument and a negative \"fromIndex\" argument null-pointer dererence\nmight occur because njs_string_offset() was called with invalid index\nvalue whereas njs_string_offset() should always be called with valid\nindex argument.\n\nThe fix is to verify that from index is valid.\n\nThis closes #482 issue on Github.\n---\n src/njs_iterator.c \| 9 ++++++---\n src/test/njs_unit_test.c \| 3 +++\n 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/njs_iterator.c b/src/njs_iterator.c\nindex 90c3046fb..043e4483c 100644\n--- a/src/njs_iterator.c\n+++ b/src/njs_iterator.c\n@@ -560,11 +560,14 @@ njs_object_iterate_reverse(njs_vm_t vm, njs_iterator_args_t args,\n } else {\n /* UTF-8 string. /\n \n- p = njs_string_offset(string_prop.start, end, from);\n- p = njs_utf8_next(p, end);\n-\n+ p = NULL;\n i = from + 1;\n \n+ if (i > to) {\n+ p = njs_string_offset(string_prop.start, end, from);\n+ p = njs_utf8_next(p, end);\n+ }\n+\n while (i-- > to) {\n pos = njs_utf8_prev(p);\n \ndiff --git a/src/test/njs_unit_test.c b/src/test/njs_unit_test.c\nindex def152aa8..0b73c77b3 100644\n--- a/src/test/njs_unit_test.c\n+++ b/src/test/njs_unit_test.c\n@@ -5103,6 +5103,9 @@ static njs_unit_test_t njs_test[] =\n { njs_str(\"Array.prototype.lastIndexOf.call({0:'undefined', length:0}, 'undefined')\"),\n njs_str(\"-1\") },\n \n+ { njs_str(\"[1,0,-1,-2].map(v => Array.prototype.lastIndexOf.call('Ф', 'Ф', v))\"),\n+ njs_str(\"0,0,0,-1\") },\n+\n { njs_str(\"[''].lastIndexOf.call('00000000000000000000000000000а00')\"),\n njs_str(\"-1\") },\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-wmh3-2439-2hpr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nimport MySQLdb\nimport hashlib\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\n# register url\n@app.route('/register', methods=['POST'])\ndef register():\n '''\n Get username and password from the request, and check if the username is already in the database.\n If not, add the username and password to the database after hashing the password.\n '''\n username = request.form['username']\n password = request.form['password']\n hashed_password = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()\n db = MySQLdb.connect(host=\"localhost\", user=\"root\", passwd=\"\", db=\"test\")\n cursor = db.cursor()\n cursor.execute(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = %s\", (username,))\n if cursor.fetchone() is not None:\n return \"Username already exists\"\n else:\n cursor.execute(\"INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES (%s, %s)\", (username, hashed_password))\n db.commit()\n return \"Registered successfully\"\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-522 - CWE-522\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import request, send_file, Flask\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/download')\ndef download():\n '''\n Read the file path from the request, \n and return the file contents as an attachment.\n '''\n file = request.args['file']\n return send_file(\"static/%s\" % file, as_attachment=True)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-099 - CWE-099\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28106\nDescription: Pimcore is an open source data and experience management platform. Prior to version 10.5.19, an attacker can use cross-site scripting to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. Users may upgrade to version 10.5.19 to receive a patch or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.\n\n```diff\nFrom c59d0bf1d03a5037b586fe06230694fa3818dbf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Christian F <christian.feldkirchner@pimcore.com>\nDate: Wed, 15 Mar 2023 15:15:38 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] optimized urlslug input (#14669)\n\n---\n .../Controller/Admin/Document/DocumentControllerBase.php \| 5 +++++\n .../Resources/public/js/pimcore/document/pages/settings.js \| 6 +++++-\n bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/helpers.js \| 4 ++++\n 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Document/DocumentControllerBase.php b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Document/DocumentControllerBase.php\nindex 712cdc85251..de5ab45c1c2 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Document/DocumentControllerBase.php\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Controller/Admin/Document/DocumentControllerBase.php\n@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ protected function addSettingsToDocument(Request $request, Model\\Document $docum\n if ($request->get('settings')) {\n if ($document->isAllowed('settings')) {\n $settings = $this->decodeJson($request->get('settings'));\n+\n+ if(array_key_exists('prettyUrl' , $settings)){\n+ $settings['prettyUrl'] = htmlspecialchars($settings['prettyUrl']);\n+ }\n+\n $document->setValues($settings);\n }\n }\ndiff --git a/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/document/pages/settings.js b/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/document/pages/settings.js\nindex f2b1d13a999..ab612adadbf 100644\n--- a/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/document/pages/settings.js\n+++ b/bundles/AdminBundle/Resources/public/js/pimcore/document/pages/settings.js\n@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ pimcore.document.pages.settings = Class.create(pimcore.document.settings_abstrac\n method: \"POST\",\n params: {\n id: this.document.id,\n- path: el.getValue()\n+ path: pimcore.helpers.sanitizeUrlSlug(el.getValue())\n },\n success: function (res) {\n res = Ext.decode(res.responseText);\n@@ -238,6 +238,10 @@ pimcore.document.pages.settings = Class.create(pimcore.document.settings_abstrac\n }\n }\n });\n+ }.bind(this),\n+ \"change\": function (el) {\n+ const sanitizedValue = pimcore.helpers.sanitizeUrlSlug(el.getValue());\n+ el.setValue(sanitizedValue);\n }.bind(this)\n \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28106\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Pimcore vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting in UrlSlug Data type\n\nThis patch addresses: Pimcore is an open source data and experience management platform. Prior to version 10.5.19, an attacker can use cross-site scripting to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. Users may upgrade to version 10.5.19 to receive a patch or, as a workaround, apply the patch manually.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport hashlib\n\n\ndef certificate_matches(certificate, known_hash):\n '''\n Return true if the certificate matches the known_hash.\n '''\n hash = hashlib.md5(certificate).hexdigest()\n return hash == known_hash\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-327 - CWE-327\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-13145\nDescription: In ImageMagick before 6.9.8-8 and 7.x before 7.0.5-9, the ReadJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c does not properly validate the channel geometry, leading to a crash.\n\n```diff\nFrom acee073df34aa4d491bf5cb74d3a15fc80f0a3aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Cristy <urban-warrior@imagemagick.org>\nDate: Sun, 21 May 2017 10:54:16 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] ...\n\n---\n coders/jp2.c \| 6 +++++-\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/coders/jp2.c b/coders/jp2.c\nindex 20a5960672b..fe2ea13db55 100644\n--- a/coders/jp2.c\n+++ b/coders/jp2.c\n@@ -388,7 +388,11 @@ static Image ReadJP2Image(const ImageInfo image_info,ExceptionInfo exception)\n opj_stream_destroy(jp2_stream);\n for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) jp2_image->numcomps; i++)\n {\n- if ((jp2_image->comps[i].dx == 0) \|\| (jp2_image->comps[i].dy == 0))\n+ if ((jp2_image->comps[0].dx == 0) \|\| (jp2_image->comps[0].dy == 0) \|\|\n+ (jp2_image->comps[0].dx != jp2_image->comps[i].dx) \|\|\n+ (jp2_image->comps[0].dy != jp2_image->comps[i].dy) \|\|\n+ (jp2_image->comps[0].prec != jp2_image->comps[i].prec) \|\|\n+ (jp2_image->comps[0].sgnd != jp2_image->comps[i].sgnd))\n {\n opj_destroy_codec(jp2_codec);\n opj_image_destroy(jp2_image);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2017-13145\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In ImageMagick before 6.9.8-8 and 7.x before 7.0.5-9, the ReadJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c does not properly validate the channel geometry, leading to a crash.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2016-24\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 6d7e13da0f998820800ecb3fe9ccee4189aefb54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Marcel Hellkamp <marc@gsites.de>\nDate: Sat, 10 Dec 2016 14:10:26 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix #913: Harden bottle against malformed headers.\n\nBottle now checks against certain control characters (\\n, \\r and \\0) in header names or values and raises a ValueError if the application tries to set an invalid header.\n---\n bottle.py \| 25 ++++++++++++++-----------\n test/test_environ.py \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/bottle.py b/bottle.py\nindex 5f28dda92..62c00f4aa 100755\n--- a/bottle.py\n+++ b/bottle.py\n@@ -1573,9 +1573,16 @@ def __delattr__(self, name, value):\n raise AttributeError(\"Attribute not defined: %s\" % name)\n \n \n-def _hkey(s):\n- return s.title().replace('_', '-')\n-\n+def _hkey(key):\n+ if '\\n' in key or '\\r' in key or '\\0' in key:\n+ raise ValueError(\"Header names must not contain control characters: %r\" % key)\n+ return key.title().replace('_', '-')\n+\n+def _hval(value):\n+ value = value if isinstance(value, unicode) else str(value)\n+ if '\\n' in value or '\\r' in value or '\\0' in value:\n+ raise ValueError(\"Header value must not contain control characters: %r\" % value)\n+ return value\n \n class HeaderProperty(object):\n def __init__(self, name, reader=None, writer=str, default=''):\n@@ -2170,7 +2177,6 @@ def __getattr__(self, name, default=unicode()):\n return super(FormsDict, self).__getattr__(name)\n return self.getunicode(name, default=default)\n \n-\n class HeaderDict(MultiDict):\n \"\"\" A case-insensitive version of :class:`MultiDict` that defaults to\n replace the old value instead of appending it. \"\"\"\n@@ -2189,16 +2195,13 @@ def __getitem__(self, key):\n return self.dict[_hkey(key)][-1]\n \n def __setitem__(self, key, value):\n- self.dict[_hkey(key)] = [value if isinstance(value, unicode) else\n- str(value)]\n+ self.dict[_hkey(key)] = [_hval(value)]\n \n def append(self, key, value):\n- self.dict.setdefault(_hkey(key), []).append(\n- value if isinstance(value, unicode) else str(value))\n+ self.dict.setdefault(_hkey(key), []).append(_hval(value))\n \n def replace(self, key, value):\n- self.dict[_hkey(key)] = [value if isinstance(value, unicode) else\n- str(value)]\n+ self.dict[_hkey(key)] = [_hval(value)]\n \n def getall(self, key):\n return self.dict.get(_hkey(key)) or []\n@@ -2207,7 +2210,7 @@ def get(self, key, default=None, index=-1):\n return MultiDict.get(self, _hkey(key), default, index)\n \n def filter(self, names):\n- for name in [_hkey(n) for n in names]:\n+ for name in (_hkey(n) for n in names):\n if name in self.dict:\n del self.dict[name]\n \ndiff --git a/test/test_environ.py b/test/test_environ.py\nindex 2312ce4ab..4ee1111f2 100755\n--- a/test/test_environ.py\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2016-24\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-23435\nDescription: decoding.c in android-gif-drawable before 1.2.24 does not limit the maximum length of a comment, leading to denial of service.\n\n```diff\nFrom 9f0f0c89e6fa38548163771feeb4bde84b828887 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Karol=20Wr=C3=B3tniak?= <karol.wrotniak@droidsonroids.pl>\nDate: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 01:56:25 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Limit maximum length of comment\n\n---\n android-gif-drawable/src/main/c/decoding.c \| 13 +++++++++----\n 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/android-gif-drawable/src/main/c/decoding.c b/android-gif-drawable/src/main/c/decoding.c\nindex 38c42644..62984e63 100644\n--- a/android-gif-drawable/src/main/c/decoding.c\n+++ b/android-gif-drawable/src/main/c/decoding.c\n@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@\n #include \"gif.h\"\n+#define COMMENT_LENGTH_MAX 2048\n \n static bool updateGCB(GifInfo info, uint_fast32_t lastAllocatedGCBIndex) {\n \tif (lastAllocatedGCBIndex < info->gifFilePtr->ImageCount) {\n@@ -177,12 +178,16 @@ static int readExtensions(int ExtFunction, GifByteType ExtData, GifInfo info)\n }\n \n static int getComment(GifByteType Bytes, GifInfo info) {\n-\tunsigned int len = (unsigned int) Bytes[0];\n+\tunsigned int length = (unsigned int) Bytes[0];\n \tsize_t offset = info->comment != NULL ? strlen(info->comment) : 0;\n-\tchar ret = reallocarray(info->comment, len + offset + 1, sizeof(char));\n+ unsigned int newLength = length + offset + 1;\n+ if (newLength > COMMENT_LENGTH_MAX) {\n+\t\treturn GIF_OK;\n+\t}\n+ char ret = reallocarray(info->comment, newLength, sizeof(char));\n \tif (ret != NULL) {\n-\t\tmemcpy(ret + offset, &Bytes[1], len);\n-\t\tret[len + offset] = 0;\n+\t\tmemcpy(ret + offset, &Bytes[1], length);\n+\t\tret[length + offset] = 0;\n \t\tinfo->comment = ret;\n \t\treturn GIF_OK;\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2022-23435\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: decoding.c in android-gif-drawable before 1.2.24 does not limit the maximum length of a comment, leading to denial of service.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-194\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7f283ff806b2031f407db64c4d3edcda8fb9f9f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Amit Patankar <amitpatankar@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Apr 2021 15:00:39 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix FPE issue in external Eigen source code issue with\n `tf.raw_ops.SparseMatMul`.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 370992919\nChange-Id: Icfb276fef5fb40928b27c3e44608d2aca72c9fd7\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_matmul_op.cc \| 4 ++++\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_matmul_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_matmul_op.cc\nindex f5747854093c95..a02afafa33e3ad 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_matmul_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/sparse_matmul_op.cc\n@@ -1039,6 +1039,10 @@ class SparseMatMulOp : public OpKernel {\n if (transpose_b) {\n // TODO(agarwal): avoid transposing the matrix here and directly handle\n // transpose in CreateDenseSlices.\n+ OP_REQUIRES(ctx, right->dim_size(0) != 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"b has an entry 0 in it's shape.\"));\n+ OP_REQUIRES(ctx, right->dim_size(1) != 0,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"b has an entry 0 in it's shape.\"));\n right_tr.reset(\n new Tensor(right->dtype(),\n TensorShape({right->dim_size(1), right->dim_size(0)})));\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-194\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-58761\nDescription: Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. The `real_pms_image_proxy` endpoint in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior is vulnerable to path traversal, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the application server's filesystem. The `real_pms_image_proxy` is used to fetch an image directly from the backing Plex Media Server. The image to be fetched is specified through an `img` URL parameter, which can either be a URL or a file path. There is som\n\n```diff\nFrom ec77a70aafc555e1aad0d9981f719d1200c117f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: JonnyWong16 <9099342+JonnyWong16@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Mon, 1 Sep 2025 12:29:57 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Validate image format in pms_image_proxy\n\n---\n plexpy/webserve.py \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/plexpy/webserve.py b/plexpy/webserve.py\nindex 94049a8f2..a7d910783 100644\n--- a/plexpy/webserve.py\n+++ b/plexpy/webserve.py\n@@ -4740,7 +4740,7 @@ def real_pms_image_proxy(self, img=None, rating_key=None, width=750, height=1000\n opacity (str): 25\n background (str): Hex color, e.g. 282828\n blur (str): 3\n- img_format (str): png\n+ img_format (str): png or jpg\n fallback (str): \"poster\", \"cover\", \"art\", \"poster-live\", \"art-live\", \"art-live-full\", \"user\"\n refresh (bool): True or False whether to refresh the image cache\n return_hash (bool): True or False to return the self-hosted image hash instead of the image\n@@ -4800,6 +4800,9 @@ def real_pms_image_proxy(self, img=None, rating_key=None, width=750, height=1000\n if return_hash:\n return {'img_hash': img_hash}\n \n+ if img_format not in ('png', 'jpg'):\n+ img_format = 'png'\n+\n fp = '{}.{}'.format(img_hash, img_format) # we want to be able to preview the thumbs\n c_dir = os.path.join(plexpy.CONFIG.CACHE_DIR, 'images')\n ffp = os.path.join(c_dir, fp)\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-58761\nCWE: CWE-27: Path Traversal: 'dir/../../filename'\nTitle: Tautulli vulnerable to Unauthenticated Path Traversal in `real_pms_image_proxy`\n\nThis patch addresses: Tautulli is a Python based monitoring and tracking tool for Plex Media Server. The `real_pms_image_proxy` endpoint in Tautulli v2.15.3 and prior is vulnerable to path traversal, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the application server's filesystem. The `real_pms_image_proxy` is used to fetch an image directly from the backing Plex Media Server. The image to be fetched is specified through an `img` URL parameter, which can either be a URL or a file path. There is som\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hr5p-hr33-m6qp\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 586cca384be6710b03e14bcbeb7588c1772604ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: iglocska <andras.iklody@gmail.com>\nDate: Thu, 28 Mar 2019 12:05:21 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: [security] Fix to a reflected XSS in the default layout\n template\n\n- as reported by Tuscany Internet eXchange \| Misp Team \| TIX CyberSecurity\n---\n app/View/Layouts/default.ctp \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/View/Layouts/default.ctp b/app/View/Layouts/default.ctp\nindex 9b720d2958c..93139d9c03b 100644\n--- a/app/View/Layouts/default.ctp\n+++ b/app/View/Layouts/default.ctp\n@@ -101,9 +101,9 @@\n var baseurl = '<?php echo $baseurl; ?>';\n var here = '<?php\n if (substr($this->params['action'], 0, 6) === 'admin_') {\n- echo $baseurl . '/admin/' . $this->params['controller'] . '/' . substr($this->params['action'], 6);\n+ echo $baseurl . '/admin/' . h($this->params['controller']) . '/' . h(substr($this->params['action'], 6));\n } else {\n- echo $baseurl . '/' . $this->params['controller'] . '/' . $this->params['action'];\n+ echo $baseurl . '/' . h($this->params['controller']) . '/' . h($this->params['action']);\n }\n ?>';\n $(document).ready(function(){\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-hr5p-hr33-m6qp\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2021-44674\nDescription: An information exposure issue has been discovered in Opmantek Open-AudIT 4.2.0. The vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to read file outside of the restricted directory.\n\n```diff\nFrom d27b649283aa6a01a15e5a3df1520d7aa69a5e18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mark Unwin <marku@opmantek.com>\nDate: Fri, 26 Nov 2021 22:50:04 +1000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix for image upload path traversal issue.\n\n---\n code_igniter/application/controllers/devices.php \| 11 ++---------\n code_igniter/application/models/m_devices.php \| 2 +-\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/code_igniter/application/controllers/devices.php b/code_igniter/application/controllers/devices.php\nindex fbe05f999..7e261a741 100644\n--- a/code_igniter/application/controllers/devices.php\n+++ b/code_igniter/application/controllers/devices.php\n@@ -685,17 +685,10 @@ private function sub_resource_download()\n }\n $attachment = $this->m_devices->read_sub_resource($this->response->meta->id, $this->response->meta->sub_resource, $this->response->meta->sub_resource_id, '', '', '', '');\n $this->load->helper('file');\n- if (php_uname('s') === 'Windows NT') {\n- $temp = explode('\\\\', $attachment[0]->attributes->filename);\n- } else {\n- $temp = explode('/', $attachment[0]->attributes->filename);\n- }\n- $filename = $temp[count($temp)-1];\n- $filename = preg_replace('/'.$this->response->meta->id.'_/', '', $filename, 1);\n header('Content-Type: '.get_mime_by_extension($attachment[0]->attributes->filename));\n- header('Content-Disposition: attachment;filename=\"'.$filename.'\"');\n+ header('Content-Disposition: attachment;filename=\"'.basename($attachment[0]->attributes->filename).'\"');\n header('Cache-Control: max-age=0');\n- readfile($attachment[0]->attributes->filename);\n+ readfile($_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'] . '/open-audit/custom_images/' . basename($attachment[0]->attributes->filename));\n }\n \n /\ndiff --git a/code_igniter/application/models/m_devices.php b/code_igniter/application/models/m_devices.php\nindex c735efa15..7983c4c42 100644\n--- a/code_igniter/application/models/m_devices.php\n+++ b/code_igniter/application/models/m_devices.php\n@@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ public function sub_resource_create($id = 0, $sub_resource = '', $data = '')\n $sql = 'INSERT INTO `image` VALUES (NULL, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, NOW())';\n $data = array(intval($CI->response->meta->id),\n $CI->response->meta->received_data->attributes->name,\n- $CI->response->meta->received_data->attributes->filename,\n+ basename($CI->response->meta->received_data->attributes->filename),\n $CI->response->meta->received_data->attributes->orientation,\n $CI->user->full_name);\n $this->db->query($sql, $data);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2021-44674\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: An information exposure issue has been discovered in Opmantek Open-AudIT 4.2.0. The vulnerability allows an authenticated attacker to read file outside of the restricted directory.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vw4j-wqq5-5pv6\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7194a09353dd24a274678383a4418f2fd3fce6f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Danny Cheok <danny@gimmieworld.com>\nDate: Mon, 8 Sep 2014 17:14:27 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Update trigger_referral.php to prevent SQL Injection\n\n---\n Upload/plugins/gimmie/trigger_referral.php \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/Upload/plugins/gimmie/trigger_referral.php b/Upload/plugins/gimmie/trigger_referral.php\nindex 6db82e1..3bd008c 100644\n--- a/Upload/plugins/gimmie/trigger_referral.php\n+++ b/Upload/plugins/gimmie/trigger_referral.php\n@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@\n require_once(DIR . '/plugins/gimmie/functions.php');\n require_once(DIR . '/plugins/gimmie/OAuth.php');\n \n-$usersql = $vbulletin->db->query_read(\"SELECT `userid`, `username`, `email` FROM \" . TABLE_PREFIX . \"user WHERE `username` = '\" . $_POST['referrername'] . \"'\");\n+$usersql = $vbulletin->db->query_read(\"SELECT `userid`, `username`, `email` FROM \" . TABLE_PREFIX . \"user WHERE `username` = \" . $vbulletin->db->escape_string($_POST['referrername']));\n $user = $vbulletin->db->fetch_array($usersql);\n \n $my_player_uid = $user['email'];\n@@ -28,4 +28,4 @@\n return;\n }\n \n-?>\n\\ No newline at end of file\n+?>\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vw4j-wqq5-5pv6\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-9q9c-vjxh-p795\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 851473490281f82d82560b2368284ef33cf6e8f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: lizhenghao <sculizhenghao@foxmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 10:26:34 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix: Fixed a read(-1) vulnerability caused by boundary\n handling error in #264\n\n---\n source/decoder.c \| 8 +++++++-\n tests/test_decoder.py \| 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/source/decoder.c b/source/decoder.c\nindex 043210b..8b6b842 100644\n--- a/source/decoder.c\n+++ b/source/decoder.c\n@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ decode_definite_long_string(CBORDecoderObject self, Py_ssize_t length)\n char buffer = NULL;\n while (left) {\n // Read up to 65536 bytes of data from the stream\n- Py_ssize_t chunk_length = 65536 - buffer_size;\n+ Py_ssize_t chunk_length = 65536 - buffer_length;\n if (left < chunk_length)\n chunk_length = left;\n \n@@ -829,7 +829,13 @@ decode_definite_long_string(CBORDecoderObject self, Py_ssize_t length)\n memcpy(buffer, bytes_buffer + consumed, unconsumed);\n }\n buffer_length = unconsumed;\n+ } else {\n+ // All bytes consumed, reset buffer_length\n+ buffer_length = 0;\n }\n+\n+ Py_DECREF(chunk);\n+ chunk = NULL;\n }\n \n if (ret && string_namespace_add(self, ret, length) == -1)\ndiff --git a/tests/test_decoder.py b/tests/test_decoder.py\nindex 0a3e8dd..c1dce57 100644\n--- a/tests/test_decoder.py\n+++ b/tests/test_decoder.py\n@@ -260,6 +260,28 @@ def test_string_oversized(impl) -> None:\n (impl.loads(unhexlify(\"aeaeaeaeaeaeaeaeae0108c29843d90100d8249f0000aeaeffc26ca799\")),)\n \n \n+def test_string_issue_264_multiple_chunks_utf8_boundary(impl) -> None:\n+ \"\"\"Test for Issue #264: UTF-8 characters split across multiple 65536-byte chunk boundaries.\"\"\"\n+ import struct\n+\n+ # Construct: 65535 'a' + '€' (3 bytes) + 65533 'b' + '€' (3 bytes) + 100 'd'\n+ # Total: 131174 bytes, which spans 3 chunks (65536 + 65536 + 102)\n+ total_bytes = 65535 + 3 + 65533 + 3 + 100\n+\n+ payload = b'\\x7a' + struct.pack('>I', total_bytes) # major type 3, 4-byte length\n+ payload += b'a' 65535\n+ payload += '€'.encode('utf-8') # U+20AC: E2 82 AC\n+ payload += b'b' * 65533\n+ payload += '€'.encode('utf-8')\n+ payload += b'd' * 100\n+\n+ expected = 'a' * 65535 + '€' + 'b' * 65533 + '€' + 'd' * 100\n+\n+ result = impl.loads(payload)\n+ assert result == expected\n+ assert len(result) == 131170 # 65535 + 1 + 65533 + 1 + 100 characters\n+\n+\n @pytest.mark.parametrize(\n \"payload, expected\",\n [\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-9q9c-vjxh-p795\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pfrc-5hhq-6hvr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom bcdb5e3519285bdf81e618b3c9b90d22bc49e13c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: star7th <xing7th@gmail.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 10:13:59 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Update CatalogController.class.php\n\n---\n .../Application/Api/Controller/CatalogController.class.php \| 7 ++++++-\n 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/server/Application/Api/Controller/CatalogController.class.php b/server/Application/Api/Controller/CatalogController.class.php\nindex 700f0bde0..fe06fadbc 100644\n--- a/server/Application/Api/Controller/CatalogController.class.php\n+++ b/server/Application/Api/Controller/CatalogController.class.php\n@@ -112,7 +112,12 @@ public function save(){\n }\n \n if ($cat_id > 0 ) {\n- \n+ $cat = D(\"Catalog\")->where(\" cat_id = '$cat_id' \")->find();\n+ $item_id = $cat['item_id']; \n+ if (!$this->checkItemPermn($login_user['uid'] , $item_id)) {\n+ $this->sendError(10103);\n+ return;\n+ }\n //如果一个目录已经是别的目录的父目录，那么它将无法再转为level4目录\n if (D(\"Catalog\")->where(\" parent_cat_id = '$cat_id' \")->find() && $data['level'] == 4 ) {\n $this->sendError(10101,\"该目录含有子目录，不允许转为底层目录。\");\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-pfrc-5hhq-6hvr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Showdoc Unauthenticated Access\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-32111\nDescription: The Docker image from acme.sh before 40b6db6 is based on a .github/workflows/dockerhub.yml file that lacks \"persist-credentials: false\" for actions/checkout.\n\n```diff\nFrom a1de13657e79c5471dbc8fa3539ea39160937389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: neil <gitpc@neilpang.com>\nDate: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 20:50:08 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] minor, just copy necessary files\n\n---\n Dockerfile \| 6 +++++-\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile\nindex 3f400283c6..4d7d22b1f2 100644\n--- a/Dockerfile\n+++ b/Dockerfile\n@@ -22,7 +22,11 @@ ARG AUTO_UPGRADE=1\n ENV AUTO_UPGRADE=$AUTO_UPGRADE\n \n #Install\n-COPY ./ /install_acme.sh/\n+COPY ./acme.sh /install_acme.sh/acme.sh\n+COPY ./deploy /install_acme.sh/deploy\n+COPY ./dnsapi /install_acme.sh/dnsapi\n+COPY ./notify /install_acme.sh/notify\n+\n RUN cd /install_acme.sh && ([ -f /install_acme.sh/acme.sh ] && /install_acme.sh/acme.sh --install \|\| curl https://get.acme.sh \| sh) && rm -rf /install_acme.sh/\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-32111\nCWE: CWE-260 Password in Configuration File\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The Docker image from acme.sh before 40b6db6 is based on a .github/workflows/dockerhub.yml file that lacks \"persist-credentials: false\" for actions/checkout.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-0429\nDescription: Stack-based buffer overflow in the Cisco Thor decoder before commit 18de8f9f0762c3a542b1122589edb8af859d9813 allows local users to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) and execute arbitrary code via a crafted non-conformant Thor bitstream.\n\n```diff\nFrom 18de8f9f0762c3a542b1122589edb8af859d9813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Steinar Midtskogen <stemidts@cisco.com>\nDate: Mon, 30 Jul 2018 14:43:35 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit\n streams\n\nFixes CVE-2018-0429\nA vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:\nhttps://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local\nattacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a\nnon-conformant Thor bitstream as input.\nThe vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the\nbitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a\nstack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.\n---\n dec/decode_block.c \| 2 +-\n dec/read_bits.c \| 1 +\n 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/dec/decode_block.c b/dec/decode_block.c\nindex a5cecab..85deeb5 100644\n--- a/dec/decode_block.c\n+++ b/dec/decode_block.c\n@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t decoder_info,int size,int yposY\n \n decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);\n \n- if (split_flag){\n+ if (split_flag && size >= MIN_BLOCK_SIZE){\n int new_size = size/2;\n TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0new_size,xposY+0new_size,sub);\n TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1new_size,xposY+0new_size,sub);\ndiff --git a/dec/read_bits.c b/dec/read_bits.c\nindex 130b53d..6eda9be 100644\n--- a/dec/read_bits.c\n+++ b/dec/read_bits.c\n@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void read_sequence_header(decoder_info_t decoder_info, stream_t stream) {\n decoder_info->width = get_flc(16, stream);\n decoder_info->height = get_flc(16, stream);\n decoder_info->log2_sb_size = get_flc(3, stream);\n+ decoder_info->log2_sb_size = clip(decoder_info->log2_sb_size, log2i(MIN_BLOCK_SIZE), log2i(MAX_SB_SIZE));\n decoder_info->pb_split = get_flc(1, stream);\n decoder_info->tb_split_enable = get_flc(1, stream);\n decoder_info->max_num_ref = get_flc(2, stream) + 1;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2018-0429\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Stack-based buffer overflow in the Cisco Thor decoder before commit 18de8f9f0762c3a542b1122589edb8af859d9813 allows local users to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) and execute arbitrary code via a crafted non-conformant Thor bitstream.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-42439\nDescription: GeoNode is an open source platform that facilitates the creation, sharing, and collaborative use of geospatial data. A SSRF vulnerability exists starting in version 3.2.0, bypassing existing controls on the software. This can allow a user to request internal services for a full read SSRF, returning any data from the internal network. The application is using a whitelist, but the whitelist can be bypassed. The bypass will trick the application that the first host is a whitelisted address, but the\n\n```diff\nFrom 79ac6e70419c2e0261548bed91c159b54ff35b8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alessio Fabiani <alessio.fabiani@geosolutionsgroup.com>\nDate: Thu, 14 Sep 2023 13:17:12 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Merge pull request from GHSA-pxg5-h34r-7q8p\n\n* fixes advisory\n\n* - fix tests\n---\n geonode/proxy/tests.py \| 10 ++++++++++\n geonode/utils.py \| 21 +++++++++++++++++++--\n 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/geonode/proxy/tests.py b/geonode/proxy/tests.py\nindex f44315c52a7..807a64f3f7e 100644\n--- a/geonode/proxy/tests.py\n+++ b/geonode/proxy/tests.py\n@@ -213,6 +213,16 @@ class Response:\n response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n \n+ url = f\"{settings.SITEURL.rstrip('/')}@geoserver:8080/web/index.html\"\n+\n+ response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n+\n+ url = f\"{settings.SITEURL.rstrip('/')}%40geoserver:8080/web/index.html\"\n+\n+ response = self.client.get(f\"{self.proxy_url}?url={url}\")\n+ self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)\n+\n # Legit requests using the local host (SITEURL)\n url = f\"/\\\\@%23{urlsplit(settings.SITEURL).hostname}\"\n \ndiff --git a/geonode/utils.py b/geonode/utils.py\nindex d9c67345344..d15dafe3162 100755\n--- a/geonode/utils.py\n+++ b/geonode/utils.py\n@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@\n urlparse,\n urlsplit,\n urlencode,\n+ urlunparse,\n parse_qsl,\n ParseResult,\n )\n@@ -1907,11 +1908,27 @@ def build_absolute_uri(url):\n return url\n \n \n+def remove_credentials_from_url(url):\n+ # Parse the URL\n+ parsed_url = urlparse(url)\n+\n+ # Remove the username and password from the parsed URL\n+ parsed_url = parsed_url._replace(netloc=parsed_url.netloc.split(\"@\")[-1])\n+\n+ # Reconstruct the URL without credentials\n+ cleaned_url = urlunparse(parsed_url)\n+\n+ return cleaned_url\n+\n+\n def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n+ # Decode the URL to handle percent-encoded characters\n+ _url = remove_credentials_from_url(unquote(url))\n+\n ip_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://\|https://)(\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}\\\\.\\\\d{1,3})\")\n domain_regex = re.compile(\"^(?:http://\|https://)([a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)\")\n \n- match = ip_regex.findall(url)\n+ match = ip_regex.findall(_url)\n if len(match):\n ip_address = match[0]\n try:\n@@ -1920,7 +1937,7 @@ def extract_ip_or_domain(url):\n except ValueError:\n pass\n \n- match = domain_regex.findall(url)\n+ match = domain_regex.findall(_url)\n if len(match):\n return match[0]\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-42439\nCWE: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\nTitle: GeoNode SSRF Bypass to return internal host data\n\nThis patch addresses: GeoNode is an open source platform that facilitates the creation, sharing, and collaborative use of geospatial data. A SSRF vulnerability exists starting in version 3.2.0, bypassing existing controls on the software. This can allow a user to request internal services for a full read SSRF, returning any data from the internal network. The application is using a whitelist, but the whitelist can be bypassed. The bypass will trick the application that the first host is a whitelisted address, but the\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport time\n\n\ndef currentTime():\n '''\n Print the current processor time in seconds.\n '''\n pro_time = time.clock()\n print(\"Current processor time (in seconds):\", pro_time)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-477 - CWE-477\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-10088\nDescription: The sg implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.9 does not properly restrict write operations in situations where the KERNEL_DS option is set, which allows local users to read or write to arbitrary kernel memory locations or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging access to a /dev/sg device, related to block/bsg.c and drivers/scsi/sg.c. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-9576.\n\n```diff\nFrom 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>\nDate: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 13:42:06 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under\n KERNEL_DS\n\nBoth damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;\nworse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad\nAPI design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.\nBail out early if that happens.\n\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>\n---\n block/bsg.c \| 3 +++\n drivers/scsi/sg.c \| 3 +++\n 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/block/bsg.c b/block/bsg.c\nindex 8a05a404ae7085..a57046de2f07f0 100644\n--- a/block/bsg.c\n+++ b/block/bsg.c\n@@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file file, const char __user buf, size_t count, loff_t ppos)\n \n \tdprintk(\"%s: write %Zd bytes\\n\", bd->name, count);\n \n+\tif (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\n \tbsg_set_block(bd, file);\n \n \tbytes_written = 0;\ndiff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c\nindex 070332eb41f33d..dbe5b4b95df0d9 100644\n--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c\n+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c\n@@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ sg_write(struct file filp, const char __user buf, size_t count, loff_t ppos)\n \tsg_io_hdr_t hp;\n \tunsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];\n \n+\tif (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\n \tif ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd ) filp->private_data)) \|\| (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))\n \t\treturn -ENXIO;\n \tSCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2016-10088\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The sg implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.9 does not properly restrict write operations in situations where the KERNEL_DS option is set, which allows local users to read or write to arbitrary kernel memory locations or cause a denial of service (use-after-free) by leveraging access to a /dev/sg device, related to block/bsg.c and drivers/scsi/sg.c. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-9576.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2014-10068\nDescription: The inert directory handler in inert node module before 1.1.1 always allows files in hidden directories to be served, even when `showHidden` is false.\n\n```diff\nFrom 08931fcef7e67b3f6aac7b207eafa31d3754f1ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Gil Pedersen <git@gpost.dk>\nDate: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:14:44 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Don't allow files in hidden directories to be served\n\n---\n lib/directory.js \| 2 +-\n package.json \| 2 +-\n test/directory.js \| 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--\n 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/directory.js b/lib/directory.js\nindex 8880676..e15c78c 100755\n--- a/lib/directory.js\n+++ b/lib/directory.js\n@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ internals.generateListing = function (path, resource, selection, hasTrailingSlas\n \n internals.isFileHidden = function (path) {\n \n- return /^\\./.test(Path.basename(path));\n+ return /(^\|[\\\\\\/])\\.([^\\\\\\/]\|[\\\\\\/]?$)/.test(path); // Starts with a '.' or contains '/.' or '\\.', and not followed by a '/' or '\\' or end\n };\n \n \ndiff --git a/package.json b/package.json\nindex e03a559..7c375ed 100755\n--- a/package.json\n+++ b/package.json\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n {\n \"name\": \"inert\",\n \"description\": \"Static file and directory handlers for hapi.js\",\n- \"version\": \"1.1.0\",\n+ \"version\": \"1.1.1\",\n \"repository\": \"git://github.com/hapijs/inert\",\n \"main\": \"index\",\n \"keywords\": [\ndiff --git a/test/directory.js b/test/directory.js\nindex 5b435e1..3cc3f58 100755\n--- a/test/directory.js\n+++ b/test/directory.js\n@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ describe('handler()', function () {\n });\n });\n \n- it('returns the index when found in hidden folder', function (done) {\n+ it('returns the index when served from a hidden folder', function (done) {\n \n var server = provisionServer({ files: { relativeTo: __dirname } });\n server.route({ method: 'GET', path: '/{path}', handler: { directoryTest: { path: './directory/.dot' } } });\n@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ describe('handler()', function () {\n });\n });\n \n- it('returns listing when found in hidden folder', function (done) {\n+ it('returns listing when served from a hidden folder', function (done) {\n \n var server = provisionServer({ files: { relativeTo: __dirname } });\n server.route({ method: 'GET', path: '/{path}', handler: { directoryTest: { path: './directory/.dot', index: false, listing: true } } });\n@@ -373,6 +373,35 @@ describe('handler()', function () {\n });\n });\n \n+ it('returns a 404 response when requesting a file in a hidden directory when showHidden is disabled', function (done) {\n+\n+ var server = provisionServer({ files: { relativeTo: __dirname } });\n+ server.route({ method: 'GET', path: '/noshowhidden/{path}', handler: { directoryTest: { path: './directory', listing: true } } });\n+\n+ server.inject('/noshowhidden/.dot/index.html', function (res) {\n+\n+ expect(res.statusCode).to.equal(404);\n+\n+ server.inject('/noshowhidden/.dot/', function (res) {\n+\n+ expect(res.statusCode).to.equal(404);\n+ done();\n+ });\n+ });\n+ });\n+\n+ it('re\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2014-10068\nCWE: Path Traversal (CWE-22)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The inert directory handler in inert node module before 1.1.1 always allows files in hidden directories to be served, even when `showHidden` is false.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-538\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c5b0d5f8ac19888e46ca14b0e27562e7fbbee9a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Amit Patankar <amitpatankar@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 10:39:05 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix the CHECK failure in tf.raw_ops.QuantizeAndDequantizeV2.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 371361603\nChange-Id: Ia70e34d41adaadddf928e95e5e5c5c97d5bc60d0\n---\n tensorflow/core/kernels/quantize_and_dequantize_op.cc \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantize_and_dequantize_op.cc b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantize_and_dequantize_op.cc\nindex f01a70114591bf..540d900f9f8696 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantize_and_dequantize_op.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/kernels/quantize_and_dequantize_op.cc\n@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ class QuantizeAndDequantizeV2Op : public OpKernel {\n \n void Compute(OpKernelContext* ctx) override {\n const Tensor& input = ctx->input(0);\n+ OP_REQUIRES(\n+ ctx, axis_ >= -1,\n+ errors::InvalidArgument(\"Axis must be at least -1. Found \", axis_));\n OP_REQUIRES(\n ctx, (axis_ == -1 \|\| axis_ < input.shape().dims()),\n errors::InvalidArgument(\"Shape must be at least rank \", axis_ + 1,\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-538\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-32305\nDescription: aiven-extras is a PostgreSQL extension. Versions prior to 1.1.9 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability, allowing elevation to superuser inside PostgreSQL databases that use the aiven-extras package. The vulnerability leverages missing schema qualifiers on privileged functions called by the aiven-extras extension. A low privileged user can create objects that collide with existing function names, which will then be executed instead. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow a low privileged\n\n```diff\nFrom 8682ae01bec0791708bf25791786d776e2fb0250 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Thomas Krennwallner <teakay@aiven.io>\nDate: Mon, 8 May 2023 12:04:11 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Qualify function calls with pg_catalog schema\n\nThe security definer functions `aiven_extras.pg_create_publication` and\n`aiven_extras.set_pgaudit_parameter` are missing explicit `pg_catalog`\nschema qualifications for array and string function calls such as\n`array_length`, `format`, and `left`.\n\nCo-authored-by: Etienne Stalmans <etienne.stalmans@aiven.io>\nCo-authored-by: Kevin Michel <kevin.michel@aiven.io>\nCo-authored-by: Thomas Krennwallner <teakay@aiven.io>\n---\n sql/aiven_extras.sql \| 16 ++++++++--------\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/sql/aiven_extras.sql b/sql/aiven_extras.sql\nindex d6a0fc1..f1e4a5e 100644\n--- a/sql/aiven_extras.sql\n+++ b/sql/aiven_extras.sql\n@@ -426,16 +426,16 @@ DECLARE\n l_parsed_ident TEXT[];\n l_parsed_arg_tables TEXT[];\n BEGIN\n- l_table_count = array_length(arg_tables, 1);\n+ l_table_count = pg_catalog.array_length(arg_tables, 1);\n IF l_table_count >= 1\n THEN\n l_parsed_arg_tables = ARRAY[]::TEXT[];\n l_tables_command = 'CREATE PUBLICATION %I FOR TABLE ';\n FOREACH l_ident IN ARRAY arg_tables LOOP\n l_parsed_ident = parse_ident(l_ident);\n- ASSERT array_length(l_parsed_ident, 1) <= 2, 'Only simple table names or tables qualified with schema names allowed';\n+ ASSERT pg_catalog.array_length(l_parsed_ident, 1) <= 2, 'Only simple table names or tables qualified with schema names allowed';\n -- Make sure we pass in a simple list of identifiers, so separate the tables from parent schemas\n- IF array_length(l_parsed_ident, 1) = 2\n+ IF pg_catalog.array_length(l_parsed_ident, 1) = 2\n THEN\n l_tables_command = l_tables_command \|\| '%I.%I, ';\n ELSE\n@@ -444,12 +444,12 @@ BEGIN\n l_parsed_arg_tables = l_parsed_arg_tables \|\| l_parsed_ident;\n END LOOP;\n -- Remove trailing comma and whitespace, add the rest\n- l_tables_command = left(l_tables_command, -2) \|\| ' WITH (publish = %I)';\n- EXECUTE format(l_tables_command, VARIADIC array[arg_publication_name] \|\| l_parsed_arg_tables \|\| arg_publish);\n+ l_tables_command = pg_catalog.left(l_tables_command, -2) \|\| ' WITH (publish = %I)';\n+ EXECUTE pg_catalog.format(l_tables_command, VARIADIC array[arg_publication_name] \|\| l_parsed_arg_tables \|\| arg_publish);\n ELSE\n- EXECUTE format('CREATE PUBLICATION %I WITH (publish = %I)', arg_publication_name, arg_publish);\n+ EXECUTE pg_catalog.format('CREATE PUBLICATION %I WITH (publish = %I)', arg_publication_name, arg_publish);\n END IF;\n- EXECUTE format('ALTER PUBLICATION %I OWNER TO %I', arg_publication_name, session_user);\n+ EXECUTE pg_catalog.format('ALTER PUBLICATION %I OWNER TO %I', arg_publication_name, session_user);\n END;\n $$;\n \n@@ -489,7 \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-32305\nCWE: CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\nTitle: aiven-extras PostgreSQL Privilege Escalation Through Overloaded Search Path\n\nThis patch addresses: aiven-extras is a PostgreSQL extension. Versions prior to 1.1.9 contain a privilege escalation vulnerability, allowing elevation to superuser inside PostgreSQL databases that use the aiven-extras package. The vulnerability leverages missing schema qualifiers on privileged functions called by the aiven-extras extension. A low privileged user can create objects that collide with existing function names, which will then be executed instead. Exploiting this vulnerability could allow a low privileged\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-2104\nDescription: Improper Access Control in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.\n\n```diff\nFrom 75b24735767868344193fb2cc56e17ee4b9ac4be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alex Tselegidis <alextselegidis@gmail.com>\nDate: Sat, 15 Apr 2023 14:39:12 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Do not return appointments of a different user to the another\n provider or secretary on the default calendar screen.\n\n---\n application/controllers/Calendar.php \| 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/application/controllers/Calendar.php b/application/controllers/Calendar.php\nindex f130a46232..694631c2db 100644\n--- a/application/controllers/Calendar.php\n+++ b/application/controllers/Calendar.php\n@@ -671,6 +671,62 @@ public function get_calendar_appointments()\n $unavailability['provider'] = $this->providers_model->find($unavailability['id_users_provider']);\n }\n \n+ unset($appointment);\n+\n+ $user_id = session('user_id');\n+\n+ $role_slug = session('role_slug');\n+\n+ // If the current user is a provider he must only see his own appointments.\n+ if ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER)\n+ {\n+ foreach ($response['appointments'] as $index => $appointment)\n+ {\n+ if ((int)$appointment['id_users_provider'] !== (int)$user_id)\n+ {\n+ unset($response['appointments'][$index]);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n+ $response['appointments'] = array_values($response['appointments']);\n+\n+ foreach ($response['unavailabilities'] as $index => $unavailability)\n+ {\n+ if ((int)$unavailability['id_users_provider'] !== (int)$user_id)\n+ {\n+ unset($response['unavailabilities'][$index]);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n+ $response['unavailabilities'] = array_values($response['unavailabilities']);\n+ }\n+\n+ // If the current user is a secretary he must only see the appointments of his providers.\n+ if ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_SECRETARY)\n+ {\n+ $providers = $this->secretaries_model->find($user_id)['providers'];\n+\n+ foreach ($response['appointments'] as $index => $appointment)\n+ {\n+ if ( ! in_array((int)$appointment['id_users_provider'], $providers))\n+ {\n+ unset($response['appointments'][$index]);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n+ $response['appointments'] = array_values($response['appointments']);\n+\n+ foreach ($response['unavailabilities'] as $index => $unavailability)\n+ {\n+ if ( ! in_array((int)$unavailability['id_users_provider'], $providers))\n+ {\n+ unset($response['unavailabilities'][$index]);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n+ $response['unavailabilities'] = array_va\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-2104\nCWE: CWE-284 Improper Access Control\nTitle: Improper Access Control in alextselegidis/easyappointments\n\nThis patch addresses: Improper Access Control in GitHub repository alextselegidis/easyappointments prior to 1.5.0.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-28037\nDescription: is_blog_installed in wp-includes/functions.php in WordPress before 5.5.2 improperly determines whether WordPress is already installed, which might allow an attacker to perform a new installation, leading to remote code execution (as well as a denial of service for the old installation).\n\n```diff\nFrom 2ca15d1e5ce70493c5c0c096ca0c76503d6da07c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Jonathan Desrosiers <desrosj@git.wordpress.org>\nDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 18:03:35 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Upgrade/install: Improve logic check when determining\n installation status.\n\nImprove handling of ambiguous return values to determine if a blog is installed.\n\nProps zieladam, xknown.\nMerges [49377] to trunk.\n\ngit-svn-id: https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@49386 602fd350-edb4-49c9-b593-d223f7449a82\n---\n src/wp-includes/functions.php \| 3 ++-\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/wp-includes/functions.php b/src/wp-includes/functions.php\nindex 537425d8981ab..3d0412630e1ca 100644\n--- a/src/wp-includes/functions.php\n+++ b/src/wp-includes/functions.php\n@@ -1756,7 +1756,8 @@ function is_blog_installed() {\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tif ( ! $wpdb->get_results( \"DESCRIBE $table;\" ) ) {\n+\t\t$described_table = $wpdb->get_results( \"DESCRIBE $table;\" );\n+\t\tif ( is_array( $described_table ) && count( $described_table ) === 0 ) {\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n \t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-28037\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: is_blog_installed in wp-includes/functions.php in WordPress before 5.5.2 improperly determines whether WordPress is already installed, which might allow an attacker to perform a new installation, leading to remote code execution (as well as a denial of service for the old installation).\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):\n\n```python\nfrom urllib.parse import urljoin\nimport requests\ndef fetch_resource(base, path):\n url = urljoin(base, path)\n return requests.get(url).content\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Validate that resulting URL is within expected domain after urljoin.\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\nurljoin allows path to be an absolute URL, completely overriding base. path='http://evil.com' ignores base entirely.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Server-Side Request Forgery) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f4hc-rvh5-8phv\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5e6d1796106df8ba6bc1973ee0917c170d929086 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 02:33:07 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests\n\nFor consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work\neven if the password has expired or needs changing.\n\nAlso, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,\ntreat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the\nrealm.\n\n[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited\ncommit message]\n\nticket: 8763 (new)\ntags: pullup\ntarget_version: 1.17\n---\n src/kdc/kdc_util.c \| 5 +++++\n src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c \| 2 +-\n src/tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py \| 8 ++++++++\n 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c\nindex 6d53173fb01..6517a213cd2 100644\n--- a/src/kdc/kdc_util.c\n+++ b/src/kdc/kdc_util.c\n@@ -1607,6 +1607,11 @@ kdc_process_s4u2self_req(kdc_realm_t kdc_active_realm,\n \n memset(&no_server, 0, sizeof(no_server));\n \n+ / Ignore password expiration and needchange attributes (as Windows\n+ * does), since S4U2Self is not password authentication. /\n+ princ->pw_expiration = 0;\n+ clear(princ->attributes, KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE);\n+\n code = validate_as_request(kdc_active_realm, request, princ,\n no_server, kdc_time, status, &e_data);\n if (code) {\ndiff --git a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c\nindex d2fdcb3f16a..614ed41908f 100644\n--- a/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c\n+++ b/src/lib/krb5/krb/s4u_creds.c\n@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ s4u_identify_user(krb5_context context,\n code = k5_get_init_creds(context, &creds, &client, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,\n opts, krb5_get_as_key_noop, &userid, &use_master,\n NULL);\n- if (code == 0 \|\| code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED) {\n+ if (!code \|\| code == KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED \|\| code == KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP) {\n canon_user = userid.user;\n userid.user = NULL;\n code = 0;\ndiff --git a/src/tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py b/src/tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py\nindex fd29e1a270a..84f3fbd752b 100755\n--- a/src/tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py\n+++ b/src/tests/gssapi/t_s4u.py\n@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@\n # Get forwardable creds for service1 in the default cache.\n realm.kinit(service1, None, ['-f', '-k'])\n \n+# Try S4U2Self for user with a restricted password.\n+realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '+needchange', realm.user_princ])\n+realm.run(['./t_s4u', 'e:user', '-'])\n+realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '-needchange',\n+ '-pwexpire', '1/1/2000', realm.user_princ])\n+realm.run(['./t_s4u', 'e:user', '-'])\n+realm.run([kadminl, 'modprinc', '-pwexpire', 'never', realm.user_princ])\n+\n # Try krb5 -> S4U2Proxy with forwardable user creds. This should fail\n # at the S4U2Proxy step since the DB2 back end currently has no\n # support for allowing it.\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-f4hc-rvh5-8phv\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-12893\nDescription: The SMB/CIFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in smbutil.c:name_len().\n\n```diff\nFrom 6f5ba2b651cd9d4b7fa8ee5c4f94460645877c45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>\nDate: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 16:56:57 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\nAfter we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make\nsure it points to something in the captured data.\n\nThis fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security\nresearchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.\n\nAdd a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).\n---\n smbutil.c \| 1 +\n tests/TESTLIST \| 3 +++\n tests/nbns-valgrind.out \| 16 ++++++++++++++++\n tests/nbns-valgrind.pcap \| Bin 0 -> 108 bytes\n 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)\n create mode 100644 tests/nbns-valgrind.out\n create mode 100644 tests/nbns-valgrind.pcap\n\ndiff --git a/smbutil.c b/smbutil.c\nindex b38d73afb..fc9b3cc6f 100644\n--- a/smbutil.c\n+++ b/smbutil.c\n@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ name_len(netdissect_options ndo,\n \t return(-1);\t/ name goes past the end of the buffer /\n \tND_TCHECK2(s, 1);\n \ts += (s) + 1;\n+\tND_TCHECK2(s, 1);\n }\n return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);\n \ndiff --git a/tests/TESTLIST b/tests/TESTLIST\nindex 5e3ea8d51..514076410 100644\n--- a/tests/TESTLIST\n+++ b/tests/TESTLIST\n@@ -449,6 +449,9 @@ decnet-oobr\t\tdecnet-oobr.pcap\t\tdecnet-oobr.out\n # bad packets from Wilfried Kirsch\n slip-bad-direction\tslip-bad-direction.pcap\t\tslip-bad-direction.out\t-ve\n \n+# bad packets from Otto Airamo and Antti Levomäki\n+nbns-valgrind\t\tnbns-valgrind.pcap\t\tnbns-valgrind.out\t-vvv -e\n+\n # RTP tests\n # fuzzed pcap\n rtp-seg-fault-1 rtp-seg-fault-1.pcap rtp-seg-fault-1.out -v -T rtp\ndiff --git a/tests/nbns-valgrind.out b/tests/nbns-valgrind.out\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..bb9cc4973\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/nbns-valgrind.out\n@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@\n+00:0c:85:0e:a5:ff > 00:00:0c:07:ac:f0, ethertype IPv4 (0x0800), length 92: (tos 0x0, ttl 127, id 38615, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 78)\n+ 10.49.248.228.137 > 10.48.161.241.137: \n+>>> NBT UDP PACKET(137): QUERY; REQUEST; UNICAST\n+TrnID=0x8D40\n+OpCode=0\n+NmFlags=0x10\n+Rcode=0\n+QueryCount=1\n+AnswerCount=0\n+AuthorityCount=0\n+AddressRecCount=0\n+QuestionRecords:\n+Name=\n+WARNING: Short packet. Try increasing the snap length\n+\n+\ndiff --git a/tests/nbns-valgrind.pcap b/tests/nbns-valgrind.pcap\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..57657f02b5e01d870eabfcef03de10df610bf0fe\nGIT binary patch\nliteral 108\nzcmca\|c+)~A1{MYwZ~-zHfw)n{z`1z\|F9V1l1D51rU-N;1r<HH%e+~v$1_r-rBKb<\ns1;0+<GW_v`%V6P0hE5=~3TCm0O\|)B0R#%J?rzSmey&b#4sI?k0PP\|erT_o{\n\nliteral 0\nHcmV?d00001\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2017-12893\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The SMB/CIFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in smbutil.c:name_len().\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28459\nDescription: pretalx 2.3.1 before 2.3.2 allows path traversal in HTML export (a non-default feature). Users were able to upload crafted HTML documents that trigger the reading of arbitrary files.\n\n```diff\nFrom 60722c43cf975f319e94102e6bff320723776890 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tobias Kunze <r@rixx.de>\nDate: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 13:04:03 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix path traversal in static HTML export\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered by Sonar,\nhttps://www.sonarsource.com/, who provided a detailled description of\nthe vulnerability, and also the fix as it is applied here.\n\nThe fix will be backported to the last release, v2.3.1, and released as\nv2.3.2. A blog post will be published on pretalx.com.\n---\n .../management/commands/export_schedule_html.py \| 12 +++++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\nindex 031960585d..1910f71221 100644\n--- a/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n+++ b/src/pretalx/agenda/management/commands/export_schedule_html.py\n@@ -115,7 +115,9 @@ def dump_content(destination, path, getter):\n if path.endswith(\"/\"):\n path = path + \"index.html\"\n \n- path = Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")\n+ path = (Path(destination) / path.lstrip(\"/\")).resolve()\n+ if not Path(destination) in path.parents:\n+ raise CommandError(\"Path traversal detected, aborting.\")\n path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n \n with open(path, \"wb\") as f:\n@@ -131,6 +133,14 @@ def get_mediastatic_content(url):\n else:\n raise FileNotFoundError()\n \n+ # Prevent directory traversal, make sure the path is inside the media or static root\n+ local_path = local_path.resolve(strict=True)\n+ if not any(\n+ path in local_path.parents\n+ for path in (settings.MEDIA_ROOT, settings.STATIC_ROOT)\n+ ):\n+ raise FileNotFoundError()\n+\n with open(local_path, \"rb\") as f:\n return f.read()\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28459\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: pretalx 2.3.1 before 2.3.2 allows path traversal in HTML export (a non-default feature). Users were able to upload crafted HTML documents that trigger the reading of arbitrary files.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3jh2-wmv7-m932\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 08050020861230ff96a6507b309cc172a9e70af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tony Murray <murraytony@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 16 Sep 2022 11:59:48 -0500\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix scheduled maintenance xss (#14360)\n\nFix for fields title, notes, and maybe recurring_day. Other fields can't store html.\n\nhttps://huntr.dev/bounties/bcb6ee68-1452-4fdb-932a-f1031d10984f/\n---\n app/Http/Controllers/Table/AlertScheduleController.php \| 6 +++---\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/app/Http/Controllers/Table/AlertScheduleController.php b/app/Http/Controllers/Table/AlertScheduleController.php\nindex 0285ce24d8d3..d636de714ca7 100644\n--- a/app/Http/Controllers/Table/AlertScheduleController.php\n+++ b/app/Http/Controllers/Table/AlertScheduleController.php\n@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ protected function sortFields($request)\n public function formatItem($schedule)\n {\n return [\n- 'title' => $schedule->title,\n- 'notes' => $schedule->notes,\n+ 'title' => htmlentities($schedule->title),\n+ 'notes' => htmlentities($schedule->notes),\n 'id' => $schedule->schedule_id,\n 'start' => $schedule->recurring ? '' : $schedule->start->toDateTimeString('minutes'),\n 'end' => $schedule->recurring ? '' : $schedule->end->toDateTimeString('minutes'),\n@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ public function formatItem($schedule)\n 'end_recurring_dt' => $schedule->recurring ? $schedule->end_recurring_dt : '',\n 'end_recurring_hr' => $schedule->recurring ? $schedule->end_recurring_hr : '',\n 'recurring' => $schedule->recurring ? __('Yes') : __('No'),\n- 'recurring_day' => $schedule->recurring ? implode(',', $schedule->recurring_day) : '',\n+ 'recurring_day' => $schedule->recurring ? htmlentities(implode(',', $schedule->recurring_day)) : '',\n 'status' => $schedule->status,\n ];\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-3jh2-wmv7-m932\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: LibreNMS stored Cross-site Scripting via Schedule Maintenance `Title` parameter\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-26141\nDescription: Versions of the package sidekiq before 7.1.3 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to insufficient checks in the dashboard-charts.js file. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the localStorage value which will cause excessive polling requests.\n\n```diff\nFrom 62c90d7c5a7d8a378d79909859d87c2e0702bf89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mike Perham <mperham@gmail.com>\nDate: Tue, 5 Sep 2023 10:33:19 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Validate page refresh interval to ensure a minimum amount of\n delay\n\n---\n web/assets/javascripts/application.js \| 1 +\n web/assets/javascripts/dashboard-charts.js \| 4 +++-\n 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/web/assets/javascripts/application.js b/web/assets/javascripts/application.js\nindex 6628af5a5e..9f50ca8019 100644\n--- a/web/assets/javascripts/application.js\n+++ b/web/assets/javascripts/application.js\n@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ function checkResponse(resp) {\n \n function scheduleLivePoll() {\n let ti = parseInt(localStorage.sidekiqTimeInterval) \|\| 5000;\n+ if (ti < 2000) { ti = 2000 }\n livePollTimer = setTimeout(livePollCallback, ti);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/web/assets/javascripts/dashboard-charts.js b/web/assets/javascripts/dashboard-charts.js\nindex 0565a0c098..7c249c2eda 100644\n--- a/web/assets/javascripts/dashboard-charts.js\n+++ b/web/assets/javascripts/dashboard-charts.js\n@@ -57,7 +57,9 @@ class DashboardChart extends BaseChart {\n class RealtimeChart extends DashboardChart {\n constructor(el, options) {\n super(el, options);\n- this.delay = parseInt(localStorage.sidekiqTimeInterval) \|\| 5000;\n+ let d = parseInt(localStorage.sidekiqTimeInterval) \|\| 5000;\n+ if (d < 2000) { d = 2000; }\n+ this.delay = d\n this.startPolling();\n document.addEventListener(\"interval:update\", this.handleUpdate.bind(this));\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-26141\nCWE: Denial of Service (DoS)\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Versions of the package sidekiq before 7.1.3 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to insufficient checks in the dashboard-charts.js file. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by manipulating the localStorage value which will cause excessive polling requests.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-3501\nDescription: The squidclamav_check_preview_handler function in squidclamav.c in SquidClamav 5.x before 5.8 and 6.x before 6.7 passes an unescaped URL to a system command call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a URL with certain characters, as demonstrated using %0D or %0A.\n\n```diff\nFrom 80f74451f628264d1d9a1f1c0bbcebc932ba5e00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Darold Gilles <gilles@darold.net>\nDate: Tue, 24 Jul 2012 15:44:54 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Add a workaround for a squidGuard bug that unescape the URL\n and send it back unescaped. This could conduct in wrong result and\n ssquidclamav crash especially with URL containing the %0D or %0A character.\n John Xue\n\n---\n src/squidclamav.c \| 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--\n 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/squidclamav.c b/src/squidclamav.c\nindex 7aa63a7..44e614e 100644\n--- a/src/squidclamav.c\n+++ b/src/squidclamav.c\n@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ void cfgreload_command(char , int, char );\n int create_pipe(char command);\n int dconnect (void);\n int connectINET(char serverHost, uint16_t serverPort);\n-\n+char replace(const char s, const char old, const char new);\n \n / ----------------------------------------------------- /\n \n@@ -365,10 +365,14 @@ int squidclamav_check_preview_handler(char preview_data, int preview_data_len,\n \n /* Check URL header against squidGuard /\n if (usepipe == 1) {\n+\tchar rbuff = NULL;\n \tci_debug_printf(2, \"DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Sending request to chained program: %s\\n\", squidguard);\n \tci_debug_printf(2, \"DEBUG squidclamav_check_preview_handler: Request: %s %s %s %s\\n\", httpinf.url,clientip,username,httpinf.method);\n-\tfprintf(sgfpw,\"%s %s %s %s\\n\",httpinf.url,clientip,username,httpinf.method);\n+\t/* escaping escaped character to prevent unescaping by squidguard /\n+\trbuff = replace(httpinf.url, \"%\", \"%25\");\n+\tfprintf(sgfpw,\"%s %s %s %s\\n\",rbuff,clientip,username,httpinf.method);\n \tfflush(sgfpw);\n+\txfree(rbuff);\n \t/ the chained redirector must return empty line if ok or the redirection url /\n \tchain_ret = (char )malloc(sizeof(char)MAX_URL_SIZE);\n \tif (chain_ret != NULL) {\n@@ -1628,3 +1632,40 @@ connectINET(char serverHost, uint16_t serverPort)\n return asockd;\n }\n \n+\n+/*\n+ Searches all occurrences of old into s\n+ * and replaces with new\n+ /\n+char \n+replace(const char s, const char old, const char new)\n+{\n+\tchar ret;\n+\tint i, count = 0;\n+\tsize_t newlen = strlen(new);\n+\tsize_t oldlen = strlen(old);\n+\n+\tfor (i = 0; s[i] != '\\0'; i++) {\n+\t\tif (strstr(&s[i], old) == &s[i]) {\n+\t\t\tcount++;\n+\t\t\ti += oldlen - 1;\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tret = malloc(i + 1 + count * (newlen - oldlen));\n+\tif (ret != NULL) {\n+\t\ti = 0;\n+\t\twhile (s) {\n+\t\t\tif (strstr(s, old) == s) {\n+\t\t\t\tstrcpy(&ret[i], new);\n+\t\t\t\ti += newlen;\n+\t\t\t\ts += oldlen;\n+\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\tret[i++] = s++;\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tret[i] = '\\0';\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn ret;\n+}\n+\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2012-3501\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: The squidclamav_check_preview_handler function in squidclamav.c in SquidClamav 5.x before 5.8 and 6.x before 6.7 passes an unescaped URL to a system command call, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a URL with certain characters, as demonstrated using %0D or %0A.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2013-4587\nDescription: Array index error in the kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a large id value.\n\n```diff\nFrom 338c7dbadd2671189cec7faf64c84d01071b3f96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>\nDate: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 16:09:22 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)\n\nIn multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag\nmalicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or\nclear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the\nkernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.\nThe api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than\nmax_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.\n\nReported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>\nSigned-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>\n---\n virt/kvm/kvm_main.c \| 3 +++\n 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c\nindex a0aa84b5941ac9..4f588bc941861b 100644\n--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c\n+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c\n@@ -1898,6 +1898,9 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm kvm, u32 id)\n \tint r;\n \tstruct kvm_vcpu vcpu, v;\n \n+\tif (id >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS)\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\n \tvcpu = kvm_arch_vcpu_create(kvm, id);\n \tif (IS_ERR(vcpu))\n \t\treturn PTR_ERR(vcpu);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* CVE-2013-4587\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Array index error in the kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu function in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.12.5 allows local users to gain privileges via a large id value.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-c92m-rrrc-q5wf\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0f764a1720a3a68fd2842e21377c8bfad6d7126f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Ivan=20Ne=C4=8Das?= <inecas@redhat.com>\nDate: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 12:36:13 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Remove `inspect` from allowed methods\n\nThe `inspect` method is pretty unsafe, as by default it includes\na lot of data from the object.\n---\n lib/safemode/blankslate.rb \| 4 ++--\n test/test_jail.rb \| 4 ++--\n 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/safemode/blankslate.rb b/lib/safemode/blankslate.rb\nindex 39d0fa1..88a8340 100644\n--- a/lib/safemode/blankslate.rb\n+++ b/lib/safemode/blankslate.rb\n@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@\n module Safemode\n class Blankslate\n- @@allow_instance_methods = ['class', 'inspect', 'methods', 'respond_to?', 'respond_to_missing?', 'to_s', 'instance_variable_get']\n- @@allow_class_methods = ['methods', 'new', 'name', 'inspect', '<', 'ancestors', '=='] # < needed in Rails Object#subclasses_of\n+ @@allow_instance_methods = ['class', 'methods', 'respond_to?', 'respond_to_missing?', 'to_s', 'instance_variable_get']\n+ @@allow_class_methods = ['methods', 'new', 'name', '<', 'ancestors', '=='] # < needed in Rails Object#subclasses_of\n \n silently { undef_methods(instance_methods.map(&:to_s) - @@allow_instance_methods) }\n class << self\ndiff --git a/test/test_jail.rb b/test/test_jail.rb\nindex 57e324a..42ce3ef 100644\n--- a/test/test_jail.rb\n+++ b/test/test_jail.rb\n@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ def test_sending_to_jail_to_an_object_should_return_a_jail\n end\n \n def test_jail_instances_should_have_limited_methods\n- expected = [\"class\", \"inspect\", \"method_missing\", \"methods\", \"respond_to?\", \"respond_to_missing?\", \"to_jail\", \"to_s\", \"instance_variable_get\"]\n+ expected = [\"class\", \"method_missing\", \"methods\", \"respond_to?\", \"respond_to_missing?\", \"to_jail\", \"to_s\", \"instance_variable_get\"]\n expected.delete('respond_to_missing?') if RUBY_VERSION > '1.9.3' # respond_to_missing? is private in rubies above 1.9.3\n objects.each do \|object\|\n assert_equal expected.sort, reject_pretty_methods(object.to_jail.methods.map(&:to_s).sort)\n@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ def test_jail_instances_should_have_limited_methods\n end\n \n def test_jail_classes_should_have_limited_methods\n- expected = [\"new\", \"methods\", \"name\", \"inherited\", \"method_added\", \"inspect\",\n+ expected = [\"new\", \"methods\", \"name\", \"inherited\", \"method_added\",\n \"allow\", \"allowed?\", \"allowed_methods\", \"init_allowed_methods\",\n \"<\", # < needed in Rails Object#subclasses_of\n \"ancestors\", \"==\" # ancestors and == needed in Rails::Generator::Spec#lookup_class\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-c92m-rrrc-q5wf\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: safemode gem allows context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information via the inspect method\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7jrv-2x6r-vjmr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 5338aac7b8b880b0c5e0c15e27dadc44c5559284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Francois-Xavier Le Bail <devel.fx.lebail@orange.fr>\nDate: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 17:07:47 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] CVE-2017-13025/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before\n fetching data\n\nThis fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,\nSecT/TU Berlin.\n\nAdd a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified\nso the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'\n---\n extract.h \| 3 +++\n print-mobility.c \| 1 +\n tests/TESTLIST \| 1 +\n tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.out \| 2 ++\n tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.pcap \| Bin 0 -> 256 bytes\n 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+)\n create mode 100644 tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.out\n create mode 100644 tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.pcap\n\ndiff --git a/extract.h b/extract.h\nindex 04367546c..5969c2257 100644\n--- a/extract.h\n+++ b/extract.h\n@@ -281,3 +281,6 @@ EXTRACT_64BITS(const void p)\n \n #define ND_TTEST_64BITS(p) ND_TTEST2((p), 8)\n #define ND_TCHECK_64BITS(p) ND_TCHECK2((p), 8)\n+\n+#define ND_TTEST_128BITS(p) ND_TTEST2((p), 16)\n+#define ND_TCHECK_128BITS(p) ND_TCHECK2((p), 16)\ndiff --git a/print-mobility.c b/print-mobility.c\nindex 21a0fbade..44c9a77f4 100644\n--- a/print-mobility.c\n+++ b/print-mobility.c\n@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options ndo,\n \t\t\t\tND_PRINT((ndo, \"(altcoa: trunc)\"));\n \t\t\t\tgoto trunc;\n \t\t\t}\n+\t\t\tND_TCHECK_128BITS(&bp[i+2]);\n \t\t\tND_PRINT((ndo, \"(alt-CoA: %s)\", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));\n \t\t\tbreak;\n \t\tcase IP6MOPT_NONCEID:\ndiff --git a/tests/TESTLIST b/tests/TESTLIST\nindex e0caaa34b..2f3ab1ab5 100644\n--- a/tests/TESTLIST\n+++ b/tests/TESTLIST\n@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ icmp6_mobileprefix_asan\ticmp6_mobileprefix_asan.pcap\ticmp6_mobileprefix_asan.out\n ip_printroute_asan\tip_printroute_asan.pcap\t\tip_printroute_asan.out\t-v\n mobility_opt_asan\tmobility_opt_asan.pcap\t\tmobility_opt_asan.out\t-v\n mobility_opt_asan_2\tmobility_opt_asan_2.pcap\tmobility_opt_asan_2.out\t-v\n+mobility_opt_asan_3\tmobility_opt_asan_3.pcap\tmobility_opt_asan_3.out\t-v\n \n # RTP tests\n # fuzzed pcap\ndiff --git a/tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.out b/tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.out\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 000000000..7e2ce3a60\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.out\n@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@\n+IP6 (class 0x50, flowlabel 0x00004, hlim 0, next-header Mobile IP (old) (62) payload length: 7168) d400:7fa1:200:400::6238:2949 > 9675:86dd:7300:2c:1c7f:ffff:ffc3:b2a1: mobility: CoT nonce id=0x74 Care-of Init Cookie=80570f80:00000004[\|MOBILITY]\n+IP6 (class 0x50, flowlabel 0x00004, hlim 0, next-header Mobile IP (old) (62) payload length: 7168) ffc3:b2a1:200:400::6238:2949 > 9675:86dd:73f0:2c:1c7f:ffff:ebc3:b2a1: mobility: BU seq#=39837 lifetime=261452[\|MOBILITY]\ndiff --git a/tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.pcap b/tests/mobility_opt_asan_3.pcap\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3926ac9270ef8f0cf805efb5f1ce486c6fa16e16\nGIT binary patch\nliteral 256\nzcmca\|c\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-7jrv-2x6r-vjmr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-4722\nDescription: Integer Overflow or Wraparound in GitHub repository gpac/gpac prior to 2.3-DEV.\n\n```diff\nFrom de7f3a852bef72a52825fd307cf4e8f486401a76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: jeanlf <jeanlf@gpac.io>\nDate: Fri, 1 Sep 2023 11:58:14 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fixed #2579\n\n---\n src/filters/mux_isom.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/filters/mux_isom.c b/src/filters/mux_isom.c\nindex 08f9ff51d4..4044ef11fc 100644\n--- a/src/filters/mux_isom.c\n+++ b/src/filters/mux_isom.c\n@@ -5713,7 +5713,7 @@ static GF_Err mp4_mux_initialize_movie(GF_MP4MuxCtx ctx)\n \t\tif (p && p->value.lfrac.den) {\n \t\t\ttkw->pid_dur = p->value.lfrac;\n \t\t\tif (tkw->pid_dur.num<0) tkw->pid_dur.num = -tkw->pid_dur.num;\n-\t\t\tif (max_dur.num (s64) tkw->pid_dur.den < (s64) max_dur.den * tkw->pid_dur.num) {\n+\t\t\tif (gf_timestamp_less(max_dur.num, max_dur.den, tkw->pid_dur.num, tkw->pid_dur.den)) {\n \t\t\t\tmax_dur.num = tkw->pid_dur.num;\n \t\t\t\tmax_dur.den = tkw->pid_dur.den;\n \t\t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-4722\nCWE: CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound\nTitle: Integer Overflow or Wraparound in gpac/gpac\n\nThis patch addresses: Integer Overflow or Wraparound in GitHub repository gpac/gpac prior to 2.3-DEV.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-1000204\nDescription: Linux Kernel version 3.18 to 4.16 incorrectly handles an SG_IO ioctl on /dev/sg0 with dxfer_direction=SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV and an empty 6-byte cmdp. This may lead to copying up to 1000 kernel heap pages to the userspace. This has been fixed upstream in https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a45b599ad808c3c982fdcdc12b0b8611c2f92824 already. The problem has limited scope, as users don't usually have permissions to access SCSI devices. On the other hand, e.g. the Nero user manual suggests doing `chm\n\n```diff\nFrom a45b599ad808c3c982fdcdc12b0b8611c2f92824 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>\nDate: Fri, 18 May 2018 16:23:18 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()\n\nThis shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when\ncalling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.\n\nReported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>\nAcked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>\nReviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>\nSigned-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>\n---\n drivers/scsi/sg.c \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c\nindex c198b96368dd69..5c40d809830f85 100644\n--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c\n+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c\n@@ -1894,7 +1894,7 @@ sg_build_indirect(Sg_scatter_hold * schp, Sg_fd * sfp, int buff_size)\n \t\tnum = (rem_sz > scatter_elem_sz_prev) ?\n \t\t\tscatter_elem_sz_prev : rem_sz;\n \n-\t\tschp->pages[k] = alloc_pages(gfp_mask, order);\n+\t\tschp->pages[k] = alloc_pages(gfp_mask \| __GFP_ZERO, order);\n \t\tif (!schp->pages[k])\n \t\t\tgoto out;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2018-1000204\nCWE: n/a\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: Linux Kernel version 3.18 to 4.16 incorrectly handles an SG_IO ioctl on /dev/sg0 with dxfer_direction=SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV and an empty 6-byte cmdp. This may lead to copying up to 1000 kernel heap pages to the userspace. This has been fixed upstream in https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a45b599ad808c3c982fdcdc12b0b8611c2f92824 already. The problem has limited scope, as users don't usually have permissions to access SCSI devices. On the other hand, e.g. the Nero user manual suggests doing `chm\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28098\nDescription: OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. Prior to versions 3.1.7 and 3.2.4, a specially crafted Authorization header causes OpenSIPS to crash or behave in an unexpected way due to a bug in the function `parse_param_name()` . This issue was discovered while performing coverage guided fuzzing of the function parse_msg. The AddressSanitizer identified that the issue occurred in the function `q_memchr()` which is being called by the function `parse_param_name()`. This i\n\n```diff\nFrom dd9141b6f67d7df4072f3430f628d4b73df5e102 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Liviu Chircu <liviu@opensips.org>\nDate: Wed, 27 Oct 2021 14:16:48 +0300\nSubject: [PATCH] parse_param_name(): Improve param parsing macros\n\nIssue discovered during OpenSIPS Security Audit 2021,\n by Alfred Farrugia & Sandro Gauci (Enable Security)\n\nhttps://github.com/OpenSIPS/opensips/security/advisories/GHSA-jrqg-vppj-hr2h\n---\n parser/digest/param_parser.c \| 21 ++++++++++++---------\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/parser/digest/param_parser.c b/parser/digest/param_parser.c\nindex 5b6ab29eba6..cb913f6eaa3 100644\n--- a/parser/digest/param_parser.c\n+++ b/parser/digest/param_parser.c\n@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@\n #define READ(val) \\\n ((val + 0) + ((val + 1) << 8) + ((val + 2) << 16) + ((val + 3) << 24))\n \n+#define NEED(bytes) do { if (end - p < (bytes)) goto other; } while (0)\n \n #define name_CASE \\\n switch(LOWER_DWORD(val)) { \\\n@@ -83,28 +84,30 @@\n \n \n #define user_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(4); \\\n val = READ(p); \\\n name_CASE; \\\n goto other;\n \n \n #define real_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(1); \\\n if (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'm') { \\\n \t\t_type = PAR_REALM; \\\n p++; \\\n \t\tgoto end; \\\n-\t}\n+\t} \\\n+ goto other;\n \n \n #define nonc_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(1); \\\n if (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'e') { \\\n \t _type = PAR_NONCE; \\\n p++; \\\n \t\tgoto end; \\\n-\t}\n+\t} \\\n+ goto other;\n \n \n #define onse_CASE \\\n@@ -117,14 +120,14 @@\n \n \n #define resp_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(4); \\\n val = READ(p); \\\n onse_CASE; \\\n goto other;\n \n \n #define cnon_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(2); \\\n if (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'c') { \\\n \t\tp++; \\\n \t\tif (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'e') { \\\n@@ -137,7 +140,7 @@\n \n \n #define opaq_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(2); \\\n if (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'u') { \\\n \t\tp++; \\\n \t\tif (LOWER_BYTE(p) == 'e') { \\\n@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@\n \n \n #define algo_CASE \\\n- p += 4; \\\n+ p += 4; NEED(5); \\\n val = READ(p); \\\n rith_CASE; \\\n goto other\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-28098\nCWE: CWE-20: Improper Input Validation\nTitle: OpenSIPS has vulnerability in the Digest Authentication Parser\n\nThis patch addresses: OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. Prior to versions 3.1.7 and 3.2.4, a specially crafted Authorization header causes OpenSIPS to crash or behave in an unexpected way due to a bug in the function `parse_param_name()` . This issue was discovered while performing coverage guided fuzzing of the function parse_msg. The AddressSanitizer identified that the issue occurred in the function `q_memchr()` which is being called by the function `parse_param_name()`. This i\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-47637\nDescription: Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. In affected versions the `/admin/object/grid-proxy` endpoint calls `getFilterCondition()` on fields of classes to be filtered for, passing input from the request, and later executes the returned SQL. One implementation of `getFilterCondition()` is in `Multiselect`, which does not normalize/escape/validate the passed value. Any backend user with very basic permissions can execute arbitrary SQL statements and thus alter any data or \n\n```diff\nFrom d164d99c90f098d0ccd6b72929c48b727e2953a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: robertSt7 <robert.steinkellner@pimcore.com>\nDate: Tue, 7 Nov 2023 09:27:56 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix: escape filter values\n\n---\n models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php \| 4 ++--\n 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php b/models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php\nindex 06af6de4a55..07cda341501 100644\n--- a/models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php\n+++ b/models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Multiselect.php\n@@ -302,8 +302,8 @@ public function getFilterConditionExt(mixed $value, string $operator, array $par\n }\n \n $value = $operator === '='\n- ? \"'%,\".$value.\",%'\"\n- : \"'%,%\".$value.\"%,%'\";\n+ ? $db->quote(\"%,\". $value . \",%\")\n+ : $db->quote(\"%,%\" .Helper::escapeLike($value). \"%,%\");\n \n return $key.' LIKE '.$value.' ';\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2023-47637\nCWE: CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')\nTitle: SQL Injection in Admin Grid Filter API in Pimcore\n\nThis patch addresses: Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. In affected versions the `/admin/object/grid-proxy` endpoint calls `getFilterCondition()` on fields of classes to be filtered for, passing input from the request, and later executes the returned SQL. One implementation of `getFilterCondition()` is in `Multiselect`, which does not normalize/escape/validate the passed value. Any backend user with very basic permissions can execute arbitrary SQL statements and thus alter any data or \n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-j97g-77fj-9c4p\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 813ad0b9894673b1bdd489a2e9ab60a44fe990af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: aichy126 <16996097+aichy126@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 16:30:21 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] update VerifyCaptcha\n\n---\n internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go \| 8 ++++++++\n internal/service/action/captcha_service.go \| 7 +++++++\n 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go b/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\nindex bda41d1e3..382e45e70 100644\n--- a/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\n+++ b/internal/repo/captcha/captcha.go\n@@ -68,3 +68,11 @@ func (cr captchaRepo) GetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (captcha stri\n \t}\n \treturn captcha, nil\n }\n+\n+func (cr captchaRepo) DelCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (err error) {\n+\terr = cr.data.Cache.Del(ctx, key)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Debug(err)\n+\t}\n+\treturn nil\n+}\ndiff --git a/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go b/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\nindex a6ee8e045..84a189ed2 100644\n--- a/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\n+++ b/internal/service/action/captcha_service.go\n@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (\n type CaptchaRepo interface {\n \tSetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key, captcha string) (err error)\n \tGetCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (captcha string, err error)\n+\tDelCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key string) (err error)\n \tSetActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string, amount int) (err error)\n \tGetActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string) (amount int, err error)\n \tDelActionType(ctx context.Context, ip, actionType string) (err error)\n@@ -143,6 +144,12 @@ func (cs CaptchaService) GenerateCaptcha(ctx context.Context) (key, captchaBase\n func (cs CaptchaService) VerifyCaptcha(ctx context.Context, key, captcha string) (isCorrect bool, err error) {\n \trealCaptcha, err := cs.captchaRepo.GetCaptcha(ctx, key)\n \tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(\"VerifyCaptcha GetCaptcha Error\", err.Error())\n+\t\treturn false, nil\n+\t}\n+\terr = cs.captchaRepo.DelCaptcha(ctx, key)\n+\tif err != nil {\n+\t\tlog.Error(\"VerifyCaptcha DelCaptcha Error\", err.Error())\n \t\treturn false, nil\n \t}\n \treturn strings.TrimSpace(captcha) == realCaptcha, nil\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-j97g-77fj-9c4p\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Answer vulnerable to account takeover because password reset links do not expire\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fw6g-56pg-38xh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom cf970c002d270c36202bd5b9c2804d3097a52da0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>\nDate: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 07:07:45 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name\n\nA plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for\nNULL pointer first.\n\nSigned-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>\nSigned-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>\n---\n net/ipv4/ping.c \| 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------\n 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c\nindex aacefa0caa36af..91bfe0437e7a01 100644\n--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c\n+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c\n@@ -870,11 +870,13 @@ int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb iocb, struct sock sk, struct msghdr msg,\n \tif (family == AF_INET) {\n \t\tstruct sockaddr_in sin = (struct sockaddr_in )msg->msg_name;\n \n-\t\tsin->sin_family = AF_INET;\n-\t\tsin->sin_port = 0 / skb->h.uh->source /;\n-\t\tsin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;\n-\t\tmemset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));\n-\t\taddr_len = sizeof(sin);\n+\t\tif (sin) {\n+\t\t\tsin->sin_family = AF_INET;\n+\t\t\tsin->sin_port = 0 / skb->h.uh->source /;\n+\t\t\tsin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;\n+\t\t\tmemset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));\n+\t\t\taddr_len = sizeof(sin);\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\tif (isk->cmsg_flags)\n \t\t\tip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);\n@@ -886,16 +888,18 @@ int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb iocb, struct sock sk, struct msghdr msg,\n \t\tstruct sockaddr_in6 sin6 =\n \t\t\t(struct sockaddr_in6 )msg->msg_name;\n \n-\t\tsin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;\n-\t\tsin6->sin6_port = 0;\n-\t\tsin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;\n-\t\tsin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;\n-\t\tif (np->sndflow)\n-\t\t\tsin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);\n-\n-\t\tsin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t IP6CB(skb)->iif);\n-\t\taddr_len = sizeof(sin6);\n+\t\tif (sin6) {\n+\t\t\tsin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;\n+\t\t\tsin6->sin6_port = 0;\n+\t\t\tsin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;\n+\t\t\tsin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;\n+\t\t\tif (np->sndflow)\n+\t\t\t\tsin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);\n+\t\t\tsin6->sin6_scope_id =\n+\t\t\t\tipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t IP6CB(skb)->iif);\n+\t\t\taddr_len = sizeof(sin6);\n+\t\t}\n \n \t\tif (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)\n \t\t\tpingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-fw6g-56pg-38xh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-99jc-wqmr-ff2q\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0a50562369d823689c9b946066d1e49d3c2df226 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Victor Boctor <vboctor@gmail.com>\nDate: Sun, 5 May 2024 12:54:53 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix access level check for note links\n\nFixes #34434\n---\n core/string_api.php \| 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------\n 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/core/string_api.php b/core/string_api.php\nindex 3bf9a8e41c..ddcb2d9229 100644\n--- a/core/string_api.php\n+++ b/core/string_api.php\n@@ -420,24 +420,32 @@ function( $p_array ) use( $p_detail_info, $p_fqdn ) {\n \t\t\t\t\tif( bugnote_exists( $c_bugnote_id ) ) {\n \t\t\t\t\t\t$t_bug_id = bugnote_get_field( $c_bugnote_id, 'bug_id' );\n \t\t\t\t\t\tif( bug_exists( $t_bug_id ) ) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$g_project_override = bug_get_field( $t_bug_id, 'project_id' );\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif( access_compare_level(\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tuser_get_access_level( auth_get_current_user_id(),\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbug_get_field( $t_bug_id, 'project_id' ) ),\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconfig_get( 'private_bugnote_threshold' )\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t )\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\|\| bugnote_get_field( $c_bugnote_id, 'reporter_id' ) == auth_get_current_user_id()\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\|\| bugnote_get_field( $c_bugnote_id, 'view_state' ) == VS_PUBLIC\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t) {\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$g_project_override = null;\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn $p_array[1] .\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstring_get_bugnote_view_link(\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_bug_id,\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$c_bugnote_id,\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(boolean)$p_detail_info,\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(boolean)$p_fqdn\n-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t);\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_project_id = bug_get_field( $t_bug_id, 'project_id' );\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_user_id = auth_get_current_user_id();\n+\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$g_project_override = $t_project_id;\n+\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_can_view_issue = access_has_bug_level( config_get( 'view_bug_threshold' ), $t_bug_id, $t_user_id );\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif( $t_can_view_issue ) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_can_view_note = access_compare_level(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tuser_get_access_level( $t_user_id, $t_project_id ),\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconfig_get( 'private_bugnote_threshold' )\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t)\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\|\| bugnote_get_field( $c_bugnote_id, 'reporter_id' ) == $t_user_id\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\|\| bugnote_get_field( $c_bugnote_id, 'view_state' ) == VS_PUBLIC;\n+\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tif( $t_can_view_note ) {\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$g_project_override = null;\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treturn $p_array[1] .\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstring_get_bugnote_view_link(\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$t_bug_id,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$c_bugnote_id,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(boolean)$p_detail_info,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(boolean)$p_fqdn\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t);\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n+\n \t\t\t\t\t\t\t$g_project_override = null;\n \t\t\t\t\t\t}\n \t\t\t\t\t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-99jc-wqmr-ff2q\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: MantisBT Vulnerable to Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vwg4-846x-f94v\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom dca35bde877aab6e64ef51b52e590b5d48f692f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: boojack <stevenlgtm@gmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 23 Dec 2022 18:38:24 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] fix: disable decode patch id (#831)\n\n---\n api/memo.go \| 2 +-\n api/resource.go \| 2 +-\n api/shortcut.go \| 2 +-\n api/user.go \| 2 +-\n 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/api/memo.go b/api/memo.go\nindex 29d0ebe66bb81..01aa42ff003ca 100644\n--- a/api/memo.go\n+++ b/api/memo.go\n@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ type MemoCreate struct {\n }\n \n type MemoPatch struct {\n-\tID int\n+\tID int `json:\"-\"`\n \n \t// Standard fields\n \tCreatedTs int64 `json:\"createdTs\"`\ndiff --git a/api/resource.go b/api/resource.go\nindex b833f913c1d12..90e47c7f789ee 100644\n--- a/api/resource.go\n+++ b/api/resource.go\n@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ type ResourceFind struct {\n }\n \n type ResourcePatch struct {\n-\tID int\n+\tID int `json:\"-\"`\n \n \t// Standard fields\n \tUpdatedTs int64\ndiff --git a/api/shortcut.go b/api/shortcut.go\nindex b4aa803a5d458..5eaedd3ccc572 100644\n--- a/api/shortcut.go\n+++ b/api/shortcut.go\n@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ type ShortcutCreate struct {\n }\n \n type ShortcutPatch struct {\n-\tID int\n+\tID int `json:\"-\"`\n \n \t// Standard fields\n \tUpdatedTs int64\ndiff --git a/api/user.go b/api/user.go\nindex 4e6afec026ff8..529f3fc22e57f 100644\n--- a/api/user.go\n+++ b/api/user.go\n@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func (create UserCreate) Validate() error {\n }\n \n type UserPatch struct {\n-\tID int\n+\tID int `json:\"-\"`\n \n \t// Standard fields\n \tUpdatedTs int64\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vwg4-846x-f94v\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: usememos/memos vulnerable to improper authorization\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5264\nDescription: In PrestaShop before version 1.7.6.5, there is a reflected XSS while running the security compromised page. It allows anyone to execute arbitrary action. The problem is patched in the 1.7.6.5.\n\n```diff\nFrom 0d649bc9c2cdd1241d4510d67d85a39a87fd91ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pierre RAMBAUD <pierre.rambaud@prestashop.com>\nDate: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 15:12:19 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Test if it's a correct url before continue\n\n---\n .../Controller/Admin/SecurityController.php \| 15 ++++++++++++---\n 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/PrestaShopBundle/Controller/Admin/SecurityController.php b/src/PrestaShopBundle/Controller/Admin/SecurityController.php\nindex e01ca912ab8ef..db09ea14790f2 100644\n--- a/src/PrestaShopBundle/Controller/Admin/SecurityController.php\n+++ b/src/PrestaShopBundle/Controller/Admin/SecurityController.php\n@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@\n \n use PrestaShopBundle\\Service\\Routing\\Router as PrestaShopRouter;\n use Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\Request;\n+use Symfony\\Component\\Validator\\Constraints as Assert;\n \n /*\n Admin controller to manage security pages.\n@@ -37,6 +38,11 @@ class SecurityController extends FrameworkBundleAdminController\n public function compromisedAccessAction(Request $request)\n {\n $requestUri = urldecode($request->query->get('uri'));\n+ $url = new Assert\\Url();\n+ $violations = $this->get('validator')->validate($requestUri, [$url]);\n+ if ($violations->count()) {\n+ return $this->redirect('dashboard');\n+ }\n \n // getToken() actually generate a new token\n $username = $this->get('prestashop.user_provider')->getUsername();\n@@ -47,8 +53,11 @@ public function compromisedAccessAction(Request $request)\n \n $newUri = PrestaShopRouter::generateTokenizedUrl($requestUri, $newToken);\n \n- return $this->render('@PrestaShop/Admin/Security/compromised.html.twig', array(\n- 'requestUri' => $newUri,\n- ));\n+ return $this->render(\n+ '@PrestaShop/Admin/Security/compromised.html.twig',\n+ array(\n+ 'requestUri' => $newUri,\n+ )\n+ );\n }\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5264\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Reflected XSS in security compromised page of PrestaShop\n\nThis patch addresses: In PrestaShop before version 1.7.6.5, there is a reflected XSS while running the security compromised page. It allows anyone to execute arbitrary action. The problem is patched in the 1.7.6.5.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-cv9j-mg9w-v7wm\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom efdbdbce73605ecd13b1a5e60f5186cc59f09c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Brian I. Kim\" <il.kim@liferay.com>\nDate: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 08:50:59 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] LPD-41243 We need to check whether the user has permissions\n to assign members of the role instead\n\n---\n .../src/com/liferay/portal/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/portal-impl/src/com/liferay/portal/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java b/portal-impl/src/com/liferay/portal/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java\nindex cc20450803235b..158580ff949638 100644\n--- a/portal-impl/src/com/liferay/portal/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java\n+++ b/portal-impl/src/com/liferay/portal/service/impl/UserServiceImpl.java\n@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ public int getOrganizationUsersCount(long organizationId, int status)\n \t@Override\n \tpublic long[] getRoleUserIds(long roleId) throws PortalException {\n \t\tRolePermissionUtil.check(\n-\t\t\tgetPermissionChecker(), roleId, ActionKeys.VIEW);\n+\t\t\tgetPermissionChecker(), roleId, ActionKeys.ASSIGN_MEMBERS);\n \n \t\treturn userLocalService.getRoleUserIds(roleId);\n \t}\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-cv9j-mg9w-v7wm\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Liferay Portal JSONWS API endpoint shares sensitive information\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5w65-6875-rhq8\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 4a456f44141ae2d5aed8cb32a82063356dcc318f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pavlo Zhukov <pahan35@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 23:02:40 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix config variable exposing to global scope\n\n---\n lib/sailsCacheman.js \| 2 +-\n 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/sailsCacheman.js b/lib/sailsCacheman.js\nindex 9505d79..bc4a6ab 100644\n--- a/lib/sailsCacheman.js\n+++ b/lib/sailsCacheman.js\n@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ var Cache = function (name) {\n var _ = require('underscore');\n var options = {};\n // Get configuration\n- config = sails.config.cacheman;\n+ var config = sails.config.cacheman;\n if (config === undefined) {\n throw new Error('No configuration file found. Please add the configuration app/config/cacheman.js');\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5w65-6875-rhq8\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Undefined Behavior in sailsjs-cacheman\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5gmm-6m36-r7jh\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom c4bcd39fabca9a31a401d0cc42d4090869b5a37a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Elliott Mahler <join.together@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 19 Feb 2024 19:41:53 -0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Use checked_mul instead of raw multiplication. Fixes #11\n\n---\n src/in_place.rs \| 2 +-\n src/out_of_place.rs \| 4 ++--\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/in_place.rs b/src/in_place.rs\nindex 699138e..5f38361 100644\n--- a/src/in_place.rs\n+++ b/src/in_place.rs\n@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ fn multiplicative_inverse(a: usize, n: usize) -> usize {\n /// \n /// Panics if `input.len() != input_width * input_height` or if `output.len() != input_width * input_height`\n pub fn transpose_inplace<T: Copy>(buffer: &mut [T], scratch: &mut [T], width: usize, height: usize) {\n-\tassert_eq!(widthheight, buffer.len());\n+\tassert_eq!(width.checked_mul(height), Some(buffer.len()));\n \tassert_eq!(core::cmp::max(width, height), scratch.len());\n \n \tlet gcd = StrengthReducedUsize::new(num_integer::gcd(width, height));\ndiff --git a/src/out_of_place.rs b/src/out_of_place.rs\nindex acc700e..292ac14 100644\n--- a/src/out_of_place.rs\n+++ b/src/out_of_place.rs\n@@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ fn transpose_recursive<T: Copy>(input: &[T], output: &mut [T], row_start: usize,\n /// \n /// Panics if `input.len() != input_width input_height` or if `output.len() != input_width * input_height`\n pub fn transpose<T: Copy>(input: &[T], output: &mut [T], input_width: usize, input_height: usize) {\n- assert_eq!(input_widthinput_height, input.len());\n- assert_eq!(input_widthinput_height, output.len());\n+ assert_eq!(input_width.checked_mul(input_height), Some(input.len()));\n+ assert_eq!(input.len(), output.len());\n if input.len() <= SMALL_LEN {\n unsafe { transpose_small(input, output, input_width, input_height) };\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-5gmm-6m36-r7jh\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: transpose: Buffer overflow due to integer overflow\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f82m-w3p3-cgp3\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0d376025bae61bf5ee19d992c7f336b99ac69240 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Lance Bragstad <lbragstad@gmail.com>\nDate: Mon, 2 May 2016 19:16:11 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix fernet audit ids for v2.0\n\nThe fernet token provider was doing some weird things with audit ids that\ncaused token rescoping to not work because audit ids were never pulled from the\noriginal token. This commit also enables some tests for v2.0 authentication\nwith the Fernet as the token provider.\n\nCloses-Bug: 1577558\nChange-Id: Iffbaf505ef50a6c6d97c5340645acb2f6fda7e0e\n---\n keystone/tests/unit/test_auth.py \| 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++\n keystone/token/controllers.py \| 3 ++-\n keystone/token/providers/fernet/core.py \| 9 ++-------\n 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/keystone/tests/unit/test_auth.py b/keystone/tests/unit/test_auth.py\nindex bc03fe4564..5c276ff7a9 100644\n--- a/keystone/tests/unit/test_auth.py\n+++ b/keystone/tests/unit/test_auth.py\n@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@\n from keystone.models import token_model\n from keystone.tests import unit\n from keystone.tests.unit import default_fixtures\n+from keystone.tests.unit import ksfixtures\n from keystone.tests.unit.ksfixtures import database\n from keystone import token\n from keystone.token import provider\n@@ -671,6 +672,27 @@ def test_revoke_with_no_audit_info(self):\n token_id=token_2_id)\n \n \n+class FernetAuthWithToken(AuthWithToken):\n+ def config_overrides(self):\n+ super(FernetAuthWithToken, self).config_overrides()\n+ self.config_fixture.config(group='token', provider='fernet')\n+ self.useFixture(ksfixtures.KeyRepository(self.config_fixture))\n+\n+ def test_token_auth_with_binding(self):\n+ self.config_fixture.config(group='token', bind=['kerberos'])\n+ body_dict = _build_user_auth()\n+ self.assertRaises(exception.NotImplemented,\n+ self.controller.authenticate,\n+ self.context_with_remote_user,\n+ body_dict)\n+\n+ def test_revoke_with_no_audit_info(self):\n+ self.skipTest('Fernet with v2.0 and revocation is broken')\n+\n+ def test_deleting_role_revokes_token(self):\n+ self.skipTest('Fernet with v2.0 and revocation is broken')\n+\n+\n class AuthWithPasswordCredentials(AuthTest):\n def test_auth_invalid_user(self):\n \"\"\"Verify exception is raised if invalid user.\"\"\"\ndiff --git a/keystone/token/controllers.py b/keystone/token/controllers.py\nindex d8fe2e4f1b..ecffa29643 100644\n--- a/keystone/token/controllers.py\n+++ b/keystone/token/controllers.py\n@@ -180,7 +180,8 @@ def _authenticate_token(self, context, auth):\n try:\n token_model_ref = token_model.KeystoneToken(\n token_id=old_token,\n- token_data=self.token_provider_api.validate_token(old_token))\n+ token_data=self.token_provider_api.validate_v2_token(old_token)\n+ )\n except exception.NotFound as e:\n \n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-f82m-w3p3-cgp3\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: OpenStack Identity Keystone Improper Access Control\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport os\n\n\ndef invalidUsername(username):\n pass\n\n\ndef raisePrivileges():\n pass\n\n\ndef lowerPrivileges():\n pass\n\n\ndef makeNewUserDir(username):\n '''\n Check whether the username is invalid by invoking the invalidUsername() function.\n If username is valid, temporarily raises the program's privileges by invoking raisePrivileges().\n Create a new user folder within /home/{username}, then invoke lowerPrivileges().\n Return True if the user folder was successfully created, False otherwise.\n '''\n if invalidUsername(username):\n # avoid CWE-22 and CWE-78\n print('Usernames cannot contain invalid characters')\n return False\n\n try:\n raisePrivileges()\n os.mkdir('/home/' + username)\n lowerPrivileges()\n except OSError:\n print('Unable to create new user directory for user:' + username)\n return False\n\n return True\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-269 - CWE-269\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-29041\nDescription: Express.js minimalist web framework for node. Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.0 and all pre-release alpha and beta versions of 5.0 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs. When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode [using `encodeurl`](https://github.com/pillarjs/encodeurl) on the contents before passing it to the `location` header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redir\n\n```diff\nFrom 0867302ddbde0e9463d0564fea5861feb708c2dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: FDrag0n <34733637+FDrag0n@users.noreply.github.com>\nDate: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 15:49:01 +0800\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent open redirect allow list bypass due to encodeurl\n\nCo-authored-by: Jon Church <me@jonchurch.com>\n---\n lib/response.js \| 20 ++++++++++++++++++-\n test/res.location.js \| 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-\n 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/response.js b/lib/response.js\nindex fede486c06d..f7c94d10e78 100644\n--- a/lib/response.js\n+++ b/lib/response.js\n@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ var extname = path.extname;\n var mime = send.mime;\n var resolve = path.resolve;\n var vary = require('vary');\n+var urlParse = require('url').parse;\n \n /*\n Response prototype.\n@@ -911,8 +912,25 @@ res.location = function location(url) {\n loc = this.req.get('Referrer') \|\| '/';\n }\n \n+ var lowerLoc = loc.toLowerCase();\n+ var encodedUrl = encodeUrl(loc);\n+ if (lowerLoc.indexOf('https://') === 0 \|\| lowerLoc.indexOf('http://') === 0) {\n+ try {\n+ var parsedUrl = urlParse(loc);\n+ var parsedEncodedUrl = urlParse(encodedUrl);\n+ // Because this can encode the host, check that we did not change the host\n+ if (parsedUrl.host !== parsedEncodedUrl.host) {\n+ // If the host changes after encodeUrl, return the original url\n+ return this.set('Location', loc);\n+ }\n+ } catch (e) {\n+ // If parse fails, return the original url\n+ return this.set('Location', loc);\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n // set location\n- return this.set('Location', encodeUrl(loc));\n+ return this.set('Location', encodedUrl);\n };\n \n /\ndiff --git a/test/res.location.js b/test/res.location.js\nindex 158afac01e7..38cab027a83 100644\n--- a/test/res.location.js\n+++ b/test/res.location.js\n@@ -1,13 +1,27 @@\n 'use strict'\n \n var express = require('../')\n- , request = require('supertest');\n+ , request = require('supertest')\n+ , url = require('url');\n \n describe('res', function(){\n describe('.location(url)', function(){\n it('should set the header', function(done){\n var app = express();\n \n+ app.use(function(req, res){\n+ res.location('http://google.com/').end();\n+ });\n+\n+ request(app)\n+ .get('/')\n+ .expect('Location', 'http://google.com/')\n+ .expect(200, done)\n+ })\n+\n+ it('should preserve trailing slashes when not present', function(done){\n+ var app = express();\n+\n app.use(function(req, res){\n res.location('http://google.com').end();\n });\n@@ -31,6 +45,36 @@ describe('res', function(){\n .expect(200, done)\n })\n \n+ it('should not encode bad \"url\"', function (done) {\n+ var app = express()\n+\n+ app.use(function (req, res) {\n+ // This is here to show a basic check one might do which\n+ // would pass but then the location header would still be bad\n+ if (url.parse(req.query.q).host !== 'google.com') {\n+ res.status(400).end('Bad url');\n\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-29041\nCWE: CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')\nTitle:** Express.js Open Redirect in malformed URLs\n\nThis patch addresses: Express.js minimalist web framework for node. Versions of Express.js prior to 4.19.0 and all pre-release alpha and beta versions of 5.0 are affected by an open redirect vulnerability using malformed URLs. When a user of Express performs a redirect using a user-provided URL Express performs an encode [using `encodeurl`](https://github.com/pillarjs/encodeurl) on the contents before passing it to the `location` header. This can cause malformed URLs to be evaluated in unexpected ways by common redir\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-67897\nDescription: In Sequoia before 2.1.0, aes_key_unwrap panics if passed a ciphertext that is too short. A remote attacker can take advantage of this issue to crash an application by sending a victim an encrypted message with a crafted PKESK or SKESK packet.\n\n```diff\nFrom b59886e5e7bdf7169ed330f309a6633d131776e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: \"Neal H. Walfield\" <neal@sequoia-pgp.org>\nDate: Fri, 7 Nov 2025 14:50:42 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] openpgp: Fix an underflow in aes_key_unwrap.\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n\n - The `aes_key_unwrap` function would panic if passed a ciphertext\n that was too short. In a debug build, it would panic due to a\n subtraction underflow. In a release build, it would use the small\n negative quantity to allocate a vector. Since the allocator\n expects an unsigned quantity, the negative value would be\n interpreted as a huge allocation. The allocator would then fail\n to allocate the memory and panic.\n\n An attacker could trigger this panic by sending a victim an\n encrypted message whose PKESK or SKESK packet has been specially\n modified. When the victim decrypts the message, the program would\n crash.\n\n - Fix it.\n\n - Reported-by: Jan Różański.\n---\n openpgp/NEWS \| 13 ++++++++++\n openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs \| 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/openpgp/NEWS b/openpgp/NEWS\nindex 12a1ee7c1..9897543ff 100644\n--- a/openpgp/NEWS\n+++ b/openpgp/NEWS\n@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@\n RedHat systems, which caused the memory encryption module to\n abort the process because it relied on OCB being always available.\n \n+ - The `aes_key_unwrap` function would panic if passed a ciphertext\n+ that was too short. In a debug build, it would panic due to a\n+ subtraction underflow. In a release build, it would use the\n+ small negative quantity to allocate a vector. Since the\n+ allocator expects an unsigned quantity, the negative value would\n+ be interpreted as a huge allocation. The allocator would then\n+ fail to allocate the memory and panic.\n+\n+ An attacker could trigger this panic by sending a victim an\n+ encrypted message whose PKESK or SKESK packet has been specially\n+ modified. When the victim decrypts the message, the program\n+ would crash.\n+\n New functionality\n - crypto::symmetric::Encryptor\n - crypto::symmetric::Decryptor\ndiff --git a/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs b/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs\nindex 26404ae97..a7e779faf 100644\n--- a/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs\n+++ b/openpgp/src/crypto/ecdh.rs\n@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@ pub fn aes_key_unwrap(algo: SymmetricAlgorithm, key: &Protected,\n // Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64-bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and\n // Key, K (the KEK).\n // Outputs: Plaintext, n 64-bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}.\n+ if ciphertext.len() < 16 {\n+ return Err(Error::InvalidArgument(\n+ \"Ciphertext must be at least 16 bytes\".into()).into());\n+ }\n+\n let n = ciphertext.len() / 8 - 1;\n let mut plaintext = Vec::with_capacity(ciphertext.len() - 8);\n \n@@ -590,4 +595,52 @@ mod tests {\n \n Ok(())\n }\n+\n+ #[test]\n+ fn aes_key_unw\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2025-67897\nCWE: CWE-195 Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error\nTitle:** Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: In Sequoia before 2.1.0, aes_key_unwrap panics if passed a ciphertext that is too short. A remote attacker can take advantage of this issue to crash an application by sending a victim an encrypted message with a crafted PKESK or SKESK packet.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8gvg-8vhf-h26g\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 7827e117753052d479fabe19a25cfece88059bca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Paul Leathers <pleath@microsoft.com>\nDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 15:42:35 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] [CVE-2019-0937]\n\n---\n lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp \| 10 ++++++++++\n 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp b/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\nindex 5c07982b92b..933a21d385d 100644\n--- a/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\n+++ b/lib/Runtime/ByteCode/ByteCodeEmitter.cpp\n@@ -4006,6 +4006,11 @@ void ByteCodeGenerator::StartEmitCatch(ParseNodeCatch pnodeCatch)\n sym->SetIsGlobalCatch(true);\n }\n \n+ if (sym->NeedsScopeObject())\n+ {\n+ scope->SetIsObject();\n+ }\n+\n Assert(sym->GetScopeSlot() == Js::Constants::NoProperty);\n if (sym->NeedsSlotAlloc(this, funcInfo))\n {\n@@ -4029,6 +4034,11 @@ void ByteCodeGenerator::StartEmitCatch(ParseNodeCatch pnodeCatch)\n sym->SetIsGlobalCatch(true);\n }\n \n+ if (sym->NeedsScopeObject())\n+ {\n+ scope->SetIsObject();\n+ }\n+\n if (scope->GetMustInstantiate())\n {\n if (sym->IsInSlot(this, funcInfo))\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-8gvg-8vhf-h26g\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Out-of-bounds write\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6vqp-h455-42mr\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 8c47be1011c11dc47300faecffd8ab32fba3646f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: =?UTF-8?q?Andreas=20Lehmk=C3=BChler?= <lehmi@apache.org>\nDate: Sun, 7 Mar 2021 13:18:31 +0000\nSubject: [PATCH] PDFBOX-5112: SonarCube fix, throw NoSuchElementException if\n no more elements are available\n\ngit-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/pdfbox/branches/2.0@1887295 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68\n---\n .../org/apache/pdfbox/pdfparser/PDFXrefStreamParser.java \| 5 +++++\n 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/pdfbox/src/main/java/org/apache/pdfbox/pdfparser/PDFXrefStreamParser.java b/pdfbox/src/main/java/org/apache/pdfbox/pdfparser/PDFXrefStreamParser.java\nindex c4ab305e01a..2aad117a2ee 100755\n--- a/pdfbox/src/main/java/org/apache/pdfbox/pdfparser/PDFXrefStreamParser.java\n+++ b/pdfbox/src/main/java/org/apache/pdfbox/pdfparser/PDFXrefStreamParser.java\n@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@\n import java.io.IOException;\n import java.util.Arrays;\n import java.util.Iterator;\n+import java.util.NoSuchElementException;\n \n import org.apache.pdfbox.cos.COSArray;\n import org.apache.pdfbox.cos.COSBase;\n@@ -212,6 +213,10 @@ public boolean hasNext()\n @Override\n public Long next()\n {\n+ if (currentNumber >= maxValue)\n+ {\n+ throw new NoSuchElementException();\n+ }\n if (currentNumber < currentEnd)\n {\n return currentNumber++;\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-6vqp-h455-42mr\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Uncontrolled Memory Allocation in Apache PDFBox\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nimport lxml.etree\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\n@app.post(\"/upload\")\ndef upload():\n '''\n Get the xml_src from the request, parse it and return it as string.\n '''\n xml_src = request.get_data()\n doc = lxml.etree.fromstring(xml_src)\n return lxml.etree.tostring(doc)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-611 - CWE-611\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request, make_response\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('/view', methods =['GET'])\ndef viewName():\n '''\n Get the param \"name\" from the request.\n Open the \"templates/xss_shared.html\" file and replace \"{{name}}\" with the \"name\" param.\n return the html file as a response.\n '''\n param = request.args.get('name', '')\n html = open('templates/xss_shared.html').read()\n response = make_response(html.replace('{{ name }}', param))\n return response\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-079 - CWE-079\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5269\nDescription: In PrestaShop between versions 1.7.6.1 and 1.7.6.5, there is a reflected XSS on AdminFeatures page by using the `id_feature` parameter. The problem is fixed in 1.7.6.5\n\n```diff\nFrom 39ba79d98028741ea9b08b8fceb23f55fb9ad9e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Pierre RAMBAUD <pierre.rambaud@prestashop.com>\nDate: Tue, 17 Mar 2020 17:06:21 +0100\nSubject: [PATCH] Escape the document location link and always cast ids\n\n---\n .../themes/default/template/helpers/list/list_content.tpl \| 2 +-\n controllers/admin/AdminFeaturesController.php \| 4 ++--\n 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/admin-dev/themes/default/template/helpers/list/list_content.tpl b/admin-dev/themes/default/template/helpers/list/list_content.tpl\nindex 653cdcf8e3e96..2acdc17b5cfa2 100644\n--- a/admin-dev/themes/default/template/helpers/list/list_content.tpl\n+++ b/admin-dev/themes/default/template/helpers/list/list_content.tpl\n@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@\n \t\t\t\t\t{if isset($params.align)} {$params.align}{/if}{/strip}\"\n \t\t\t\t\t{if (!isset($params.position) && !$no_link && !isset($params.remove_onclick))}\n {if isset($tr.link) }\n- onclick=\"document.location = '{$tr.link}'\">\n+ onclick=\"document.location = '{$tr.link\|addslashes\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}'\">\n {else}\n onclick=\"document.location = '{$current_index\|addslashes\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}&{$identifier\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}={$tr.$identifier\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}{if $view}&view{else}&update{/if}{$table\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}{if $page > 1}&page={$page\|intval}{/if}&token={$token\|escape:'html':'UTF-8'}'\">\n {/if}\ndiff --git a/controllers/admin/AdminFeaturesController.php b/controllers/admin/AdminFeaturesController.php\nindex e7f72984e9362..5117e4e3efb0f 100644\n--- a/controllers/admin/AdminFeaturesController.php\n+++ b/controllers/admin/AdminFeaturesController.php\n@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ protected function setTypeFeature()\n \n public function renderView()\n {\n- if (($id = Tools::getValue('id_feature'))) {\n+ if (($id = (int) Tools::getValue('id_feature'))) {\n $this->setTypeValue();\n $this->list_id = 'feature_value';\n $this->lang = true;\n@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ public function initToolbarTitle()\n \n case 'editFeatureValue':\n if (Tools::getValue('id_feature_value')) {\n- if (($id = Tools::getValue('id_feature'))) {\n+ if (($id = (int) Tools::getValue('id_feature'))) {\n if (Validate::isLoadedObject($obj = new Feature((int) $id))) {\n $bread_extended[] = '<a href=\"' . Context::getContext()->link->getAdminLink('AdminFeatures') . '&id_feature=' . $id . '&viewfeature\">' . $obj->name[$this->context->employee->id_lang] . '</a>';\n }\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2020-5269\nCWE: CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')\nTitle: Reflected XSS on AdminFeatures page of PrestaShop\n\nThis patch addresses: In PrestaShop between versions 1.7.6.1 and 1.7.6.5, there is a reflected XSS on AdminFeatures page by using the `id_feature` parameter. The problem is fixed in 1.7.6.5\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code for security vulnerabilities:\n\n```python\nimport subprocess\n\ndef executeCommand():\n '''\n Read a command from a user input, validate it, and execute it\n '''\n user_input = input(\"Enter a command: \")\n subprocess.call([user_input], shell=True)\n```\n\nIdentify any security issues." }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Issue Found:\n\n- CWE-078 - CWE-078\n- Severity: Critical\n- Location: See code above\n\nThe code contains a security vulnerability that should be addressed before deployment." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "This code was flagged for Integer Overflow (CWE-190):\n\n```python\ndef allocate_items(count, size):\n \"\"\"Allocate buffer for items.\"\"\"\n total = count * size\n buffer = bytearray(total)\n return buffer\n```\n\nThe suggested fix is: Check for overflow: if count > MAX_SIZE // size: raise ValueError\n\nIs this fix appropriate? What should developers watch out for?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Yes, the fix is appropriate.\n\nOriginal Issue: Integer Overflow (CWE-190)\n\nWhy the Original Code is Vulnerable:\ncount * size can overflow in languages with fixed-width integers. In Python 3 integers are arbitrary precision, but downstream systems may truncate.\n\nKey Points for Developers:\n1. This vulnerability class (Integer Overflow) is commonly missed in code reviews\n2. The fix addresses the root cause, not just symptoms\n3. Always consider this pattern when reviewing similar code" } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-2309\nDescription: NULL Pointer Dereference allows attackers to cause a denial of service (or application crash). This only applies when lxml is used together with libxml2 2.9.10 through 2.9.14. libxml2 2.9.9 and earlier are not affected. It allows triggering crashes through forged input data, given a vulnerable code sequence in the application. The vulnerability is caused by the iterwalk function (also used by the canonicalize function). Such code shouldn't be in wide-spread use, given that parsing + iterwalk wou\n\n```diff\nFrom 86368e9cf70a0ad23cccd5ee32de847149af0c6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Stefan Behnel <stefan_ml@behnel.de>\nDate: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 21:06:10 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix a crash when incorrect parser input occurs together with\n usages of iterwalk() on trees generated by the same parser.\n\n---\n src/lxml/apihelpers.pxi \| 7 ++++---\n src/lxml/iterparse.pxi \| 11 ++++++-----\n src/lxml/tests/test_etree.py \| 20 ++++++++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/lxml/apihelpers.pxi b/src/lxml/apihelpers.pxi\nindex c16627629..9fae9fb12 100644\n--- a/src/lxml/apihelpers.pxi\n+++ b/src/lxml/apihelpers.pxi\n@@ -246,9 +246,10 @@ cdef dict _build_nsmap(xmlNode* c_node):\n while c_node is not NULL and c_node.type == tree.XML_ELEMENT_NODE:\n c_ns = c_node.nsDef\n while c_ns is not NULL:\n- prefix = funicodeOrNone(c_ns.prefix)\n- if prefix not in nsmap:\n- nsmap[prefix] = funicodeOrNone(c_ns.href)\n+ if c_ns.prefix or c_ns.href:\n+ prefix = funicodeOrNone(c_ns.prefix)\n+ if prefix not in nsmap:\n+ nsmap[prefix] = funicodeOrNone(c_ns.href)\n c_ns = c_ns.next\n c_node = c_node.parent\n return nsmap\ndiff --git a/src/lxml/iterparse.pxi b/src/lxml/iterparse.pxi\nindex 138c23a6a..a7299da6d 100644\n--- a/src/lxml/iterparse.pxi\n+++ b/src/lxml/iterparse.pxi\n@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ cdef int _countNsDefs(xmlNode* c_node):\n count = 0\n c_ns = c_node.nsDef\n while c_ns is not NULL:\n- count += 1\n+ count += (c_ns.href is not NULL)\n c_ns = c_ns.next\n return count\n \n@@ -431,9 +431,10 @@ cdef int _appendStartNsEvents(xmlNode* c_node, list event_list) except -1:\n count = 0\n c_ns = c_node.nsDef\n while c_ns is not NULL:\n- ns_tuple = (funicode(c_ns.prefix) if c_ns.prefix is not NULL else '',\n- funicode(c_ns.href))\n- event_list.append( (u\"start-ns\", ns_tuple) )\n- count += 1\n+ if c_ns.href:\n+ ns_tuple = (funicodeOrEmpty(c_ns.prefix),\n+ funicode(c_ns.href))\n+ event_list.append( (u\"start-ns\", ns_tuple) )\n+ count += 1\n c_ns = c_ns.next\n return count\ndiff --git a/src/lxml/tests/test_etree.py b/src/lxml/tests/test_etree.py\nindex e5f084692..285313f6e 100644\n--- a/src/lxml/tests/test_etree.py\n+++ b/src/lxml/tests/test_etree.py\n@@ -1460,6 +1460,26 @@ def test_iterwalk_getiterator(self):\n [1,2,1,4],\n counts)\n \n+ def test_walk_after_parse_failure(self):\n+ # This used to be an issue because libxml2 can leak empty namespaces\n+ # between failed parser runs. iterwalk() failed to handle such a tree.\n+ try:\n+ etree.XML('''<anot xmlns=\"1\">''')\n+ except etree.XMLSyntaxError:\n+ pass\n+ else:\n+ assert False, \"invalid input did not fail to parse\"\n+\n+ et = etree.XML('''<root> </root\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2022-2309\nCWE: CWE-476 NULL Pointer Dereference\nTitle: NULL Pointer Dereference in lxml/lxml\n\nThis patch addresses: NULL Pointer Dereference allows attackers to cause a denial of service (or application crash). This only applies when lxml is used together with libxml2 2.9.10 through 2.9.14. libxml2 2.9.9 and earlier are not affected. It allows triggering crashes through forged input data, given a vulnerable code sequence in the application. The vulnerability is caused by the iterwalk function (also used by the canonicalize function). Such code shouldn't be in wide-spread use, given that parsing + iterwalk wou\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-ppv3-px64-q9mx\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 0efd112bb62f566877750ad62ee828bff579b4e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: babelouest <github@babelouest.org>\nDate: Mon, 14 Jun 2021 19:40:56 -0400\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix fido2 signature validation bug\n\n---\n src/scheme/webauthn.c \| 9 ++++++++-\n 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/src/scheme/webauthn.c b/src/scheme/webauthn.c\nindex 282405528..5b4eb8a4f 100644\n--- a/src/scheme/webauthn.c\n+++ b/src/scheme/webauthn.c\n@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ static json_t * check_attestation_fido_u2f(json_t * j_params, unsigned char * cr\n gnutls_pubkey_t pubkey = NULL;\n gnutls_x509_crt_t cert = NULL;\n gnutls_datum_t cert_dat, data, signature, cert_issued_by;\n- unsigned char data_signed[200], client_data_hash[32], cert_export[32], cert_export_b64[64];\n+ unsigned char * data_signed = NULL, client_data_hash[32], cert_export[32], cert_export_b64[64];\n size_t data_signed_offset = 0, client_data_hash_len = 32, cert_export_len = 32, cert_export_b64_len = 0;\n \n if (j_error != NULL) {\n@@ -1632,6 +1632,12 @@ static json_t * check_attestation_fido_u2f(json_t * j_params, unsigned char * cr\n break;\n }\n \n+ if ((data_signed = o_malloc(rpid_hash_len+client_data_hash_len+credential_id_len+cert_x_len+cert_y_len+2)) == NULL) {\n+ y_log_message(Y_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, \"check_attestation_fido_u2f - Error allocating data_signed\");\n+ json_array_append_new(j_error, json_string(\"Internal error\"));\n+ break;\n+ }\n+ \n // Build bytestring to verify signature\n data_signed[0] = 0x0;\n data_signed_offset = 1;\n@@ -1666,6 +1672,7 @@ static json_t * check_attestation_fido_u2f(json_t * j_params, unsigned char * cr\n }\n \n } while (0);\n+ o_free(data_signed);\n \n if (json_array_size(j_error)) {\n j_return = json_pack(\"{sisO}\", \"result\", G_ERROR_PARAM, \"error\", j_error);\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: GHSA-ppv3-px64-q9mx\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: GHSA-vhrg-v3cv-p247\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 6ce32ffd18facac6abdbbf559c817b47fcb622c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Tatu Saloranta <tatu.saloranta@iki.fi>\nDate: Thu, 13 Apr 2017 15:08:10 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Fix #1599 for 2.7(.10)\n\n---\n release-notes/VERSION \| 2 +\n .../deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java \| 23 +++++++++++\n .../interop/IllegalTypesCheckTest.java \| 40 +++++++++++++++++++\n 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+)\n create mode 100644 src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/interop/IllegalTypesCheckTest.java\n\ndiff --git a/release-notes/VERSION b/release-notes/VERSION\nindex 573e710786..62f74650db 100644\n--- a/release-notes/VERSION\n+++ b/release-notes/VERSION\n@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ Project: jackson-databind\n \n 2.7.10 (not yet released)\n \n+#1599: Jackson Deserializer security vulnerability\n+ (reported by ayound@github)\n - Minor robustification of method resolution in `AnnotatedClass`\n \n 2.7.9 (04-Feb-2017)\ndiff --git a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java\nindex 9fcb68b4f6..ad37dd1700 100644\n--- a/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java\n+++ b/src/main/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/deser/BeanDeserializerFactory.java\n@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ public JsonDeserializer<Object> createBeanDeserializer(DeserializationContext ct\n if (!isPotentialBeanType(type.getRawClass())) {\n return null;\n }\n+ // For checks like [databind#1599]\n+ checkIllegalTypes(ctxt, type, beanDesc);\n // Use generic bean introspection to build deserializer\n return buildBeanDeserializer(ctxt, type, beanDesc);\n }\n@@ -834,4 +836,25 @@ protected boolean isIgnorableType(DeserializationConfig config, BeanDescription\n // We default to 'false', i.e. not ignorable\n return (status == null) ? false : status.booleanValue(); \n }\n+\n+ /*\n+ @since 2.8.9\n+ /\n+ protected void checkIllegalTypes(DeserializationContext ctxt, JavaType type,\n+ BeanDescription beanDesc)\n+ throws JsonMappingException\n+ {\n+ // There are certain nasty classes that could cause problems, mostly\n+ // via default typing -- catch them here.\n+ Class<?> raw = type.getRawClass();\n+ String name = raw.getSimpleName();\n+\n+ if (\"TemplatesImpl\".equals(name)) { // [databind#1599] \n+ if (raw.getName().startsWith(\"com.sun.org.apache.xalan\")) {\n+ throw JsonMappingException.from(ctxt,\n+ String.format(\"Illegal type (%s) to deserialize: prevented for security reasons\",\n+ name));\n+ }\n+ }\n+ }\n }\ndiff --git a/src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/interop/IllegalTypesCheckTest.java b/src/test/java/com/fasterxml/jackson/databind/interop/IllegalTypesCheckTest.java\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000..1906eadb6a\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* GHSA-vhrg-v3cv-p247\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Spring Security\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: PYSEC-2021-417\nDescription: \n\n```diff\nFrom 68867bf01239d9e1048f98cbad185bf4761bedd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Mihai Maruseac <mihaimaruseac@google.com>\nDate: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 09:20:25 -0700\nSubject: [PATCH] Prevent unitialized variable use in grappler.\n\nPiperOrigin-RevId: 399702928\nChange-Id: Id7e75451fbff297692dfb687f60ea04b25c96b24\n---\n .../core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel.cc \| 2 +-\n .../grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel_test.cc \| 24 +++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel.cc b/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel.cc\nindex 097a57ce364b61..0865892796b898 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel.cc\n@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ Status AutoParallel::Initialize(const GrapplerItem& item) {\n TF_RETURN_IF_ERROR(ComputeTransitiveFanin(graph_, item.fetch, &train_nodes));\n LOG(INFO) << \"Number of training nodes: \" << train_nodes.size();\n \n- const NodeDef* dequeue_node;\n+ const NodeDef* dequeue_node = nullptr;\n for (const auto& train_node : train_nodes) {\n if (IsDequeueOp(train_node)) {\n dequeue_node = train_node;\ndiff --git a/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel_test.cc b/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel_test.cc\nindex 1c3186f1ee6e68..3af03a09613883 100644\n--- a/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel_test.cc\n+++ b/tensorflow/core/grappler/optimizers/auto_parallel_test.cc\n@@ -126,6 +126,30 @@ TEST_F(AutoParallelTest, SimpleParallel) {\n EXPECT_EQ(\"^AutoParallel-Control-Fetch\", node_gradient.input(0));\n }\n \n+TEST_F(AutoParallelTest, SimpleParallelNoDequeue) {\n+ tensorflow::Scope s = tensorflow::Scope::DisabledShapeInferenceScope();\n+ Output constant_a = ops::Const(s.WithOpName(\"constant_a\"), 1.0f, {1});\n+ Output constant_c = ops::Const(s.WithOpName(\"constant_c\"), 1.0f, {1});\n+ Output constant_b = ops::Const(s.WithOpName(\"constant_b\"), 1, {1});\n+ Output var = ops::Variable(s.WithOpName(\"var\"), {1}, DT_FLOAT);\n+ Output assign = ops::Assign(s.WithOpName(\"assign\"), {var}, {constant_a});\n+ Output add = ops::AddN(s.WithOpName(\"add\"), {constant_a, constant_c});\n+ Output learning_rate = ops::Const(s.WithOpName(\"learning_rate\"), 0.01f, {1});\n+ Output apply_gradient = ops::ApplyGradientDescent(\n+ s.WithOpName(\"apply_gradient\"), {var}, {learning_rate}, {add});\n+\n+ GrapplerItem item;\n+ item.init_ops.push_back(\"assign\");\n+ item.fetch.push_back(\"apply_gradient\");\n+ item.init_ops.push_back(\"assign\");\n+ TF_CHECK_OK(s.ToGraphDef(&item.graph));\n+\n+ AutoParallel parallel(2);\n+ GraphDef output;\n+ Status status = parallel.Optimize(nullptr, item, &output);\n+ TF_EXPECT_OK(status);\n+}\n+\n } // namespace\n } // namespace grappler\n } // namespace tensorflow\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE:* PYSEC-2021-417\nCWE: Unknown\nTitle: Security fix\n\nThis patch addresses: A security vulnerability.\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]
[ { "role": "user", "content": "Review this code change for security implications:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-32020\nDescription: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repositor\n\n```diff\nFrom 1204e1a824c34071019fe106348eaa6d88f9528d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>\nDate: Mon, 15 Apr 2024 13:30:41 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] builtin/clone: refuse local clones of unsafe repositories\n\nWhen performing a local clone of a repository we end up either copying\nor hardlinking the source repository into the target repository. This is\nsignificantly more performant than if we were to use git-upload-pack(1)\nand git-fetch-pack(1) to create the new repository and preserves both\ndisk space and compute time.\n\nUnfortunately though, performing such a local clone of a repository that\nis not owned by the current user is inherently unsafe:\n\n - It is possible that source files get swapped out underneath us while\n we are copying or hardlinking them. While we do perform some checks\n here to assert that we hardlinked the expected file, they cannot\n reliably thwart time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) style races. It\n is thus possible for an adversary to make us copy or hardlink\n unexpected files into the target directory.\n\n Ideally, we would address this by starting to use openat(3P),\n fstatat(3P) and friends. Due to platform compatibility with Windows\n we cannot easily do that though. Furthermore, the scope of these\n fixes would likely be quite broad and thus not fit for an embargoed\n security release.\n\n - Even if we handled TOCTOU-style races perfectly, hardlinking files\n owned by a different user into the target repository is not a good\n idea in general. It is possible for an adversary to rewrite those\n files to contain whatever data they want even after the clone has\n completed.\n\nAddress these issues by completely refusing local clones of a repository\nthat is not owned by the current user. This reuses our existing infra we\nhave in place via `ensure_valid_ownership()` and thus allows a user to\noverride the safety guard by adding the source repository path to the\n\"safe.directory\" configuration.\n\nThis addresses CVE-2024-32020.\n\nSigned-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>\nSigned-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>\n---\n builtin/clone.c \| 14 ++++++++++++++\n t/t0033-safe-directory.sh \| 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)\n\ndiff --git a/builtin/clone.c b/builtin/clone.c\nindex 4b80fa0870b625..9ec500d427e315 100644\n--- a/builtin/clone.c\n+++ b/builtin/clone.c\n@@ -321,6 +321,20 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf src, struct strbuf dest,\n \tstruct dir_iterator iter;\n \tint iter_status;\n \n+\t/\n+\t * Refuse copying directories by default which aren't owned by us. The\n+\t * code that performs either the copying or hardlinking is not prepared\n+\t * to handle various edge cases where an adversary may for example\n+\t * racily swap out files for symlinks. This can cause us to\n+\t * inadvertently use the wrong source file.\n+\t \n+\t Furthermore, even if we were prepared to handle such races safely,\n+\t * creating hardlinks across user bou\n```\n\nWhat security issue does this patch address?" }, { "role": "assistant", "content": "Security Patch Analysis:\n\nCVE: CVE-2024-32020\nCWE: CWE-281: Improper Preservation of Permissions\nTitle: Cloning local Git repository by untrusted user allows the untrusted user to modify objects in the cloned repository at will\n\nThis patch addresses: Git is a revision control system. Prior to versions 2.45.1, 2.44.1, 2.43.4, 2.42.2, 2.41.1, 2.40.2, and 2.39.4, local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's object database when source and target repository reside on the same disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the untrusted user. Cloning local repositories will cause Git to either copy or hardlink files of the source repositor\n\nThe changes in the diff fix the vulnerability by implementing proper security controls." } ]

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