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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 15, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against House of Philadelphia, Inc., on behalf of an employee who was allegedly fired because she was pregnant. Seeking monetary and injunctive relief for the employee (including economic damage, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages), the EEOC brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. Via private counsel, the employee filed a motion to intervene in the suit, which was automatically granted after the period for filing objections passed without incident. The employee brought claims under Title VII and state law and sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC, except that the complaint specifically sought reinstatement. Eventually the parties came to a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge Kristi K. DuBose) entered as a consent decree on Jan 10, 2009. The terms of the decree, which lasted 3 years, provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee received $8,000, while House of Philadelphia, Inc., was required to institute and follow policies to eliminate sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination from the workplace and to post and distribute the policies to employees. House of Philadelphia also had to provided yearly training to its employees explaining pregnancy and sex discrimination, informing them of its illegality, and explaining how to avoid it, who to file complaints with, and that managers would be evaluated for enforcing the anti-discrimination policies. House of Philadelphia was further required to investigate complaints adequately and report the results of each investigation to the EEOC. The 3-year decree period passed without court involvement and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought a Title VII sex discrimination case against House of Philadelphia, Inc., on behalf of an employee who was allegedly fired because she was pregnant. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employee (including economic damage, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages). The employee later intervened in the suit. The parties came to a settlement that was entered as a consent decree. The decree provided for monetary relief for the employee and subjected House of Philadelphia to a 3-year injunction. The case is now closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
NOTE: This is one of three identically named cases in the Clearinghouse. For the 2005 case generally challenging the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities in New Jersey, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12675">PB-NJ-0007</a>. For the case challenging the long waitlists for community-based services, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11664">PB-NJ-0004</a>. On April 5, 2005, a non-profit organization representing approximately one thousand individuals confined in psychiatric hospitals in New Jersey filed a lawsuit against Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services under Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff, represented by public services counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant failed to provide community placements for individuals currently residing in state psychiatric hospitals that had been adjudicated as no longer meeting the standards for civil commitment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had used the Conditional Extension Pending Placement ("CEPP") to confine individuals for excessive periods of time and has failed to implement an effective plan for discharging these individuals into the community, even though under New Jersey law, the state might use CEPP to continue confinement while the state was still developing an appropriate community placement. On September 30, 2005, the Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2009, after extended negotiations, the parties reached a settlement whereby the state agreed to place 1065 individuals in the community through FY 2014. The agreement was initially set to last until 2014. But, by November 2014, the defendant was not set to meet the requirements of the consent decree. Judge Wolfson therefor extended the agreement until 2016. On March 2, 2017, the parties submitted a letter to the court notifying it of substantial compliancy by the defendants. The consent decree terminated and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
The case was brought by a non-profit organization against the state of New Jersey seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On July 29, 2009, the parties reached a settlement in favor of the plaintiff.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 11, 2006, African-American employees of a restaurant in Berkeley, California filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act against McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurants ("M&S"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages, alleging that McCormick & Schmick's discriminated against African-Americans on the basis of race with respect to hiring, job assignment, compensation, promotion to managerial positions, discipline, and other conditions of employment. Specifically, this action was seeking an end to M&S's discriminatory policies or practices, and recovery of back pay and front pay. On November 28, 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of statistical data. The plaintiffs sought the statistical data to support their contention that the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices were company-wide, and not limited to a single restaurant. <i>Wynne v. McCormick and Schmick's Seafood Restaurants</i>, 2006 WL 3422226 (N.D. C.A. Nov. 28, 2006). On March 16, 2007, Magistrate Judge Bernard Zimmerman issued an order to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt of court or sanctioned for failing to comply with the Court's Discovery Order. The court preliminarily approved a class settlement on April 4, 2008. The court provisionally certified settlement classes, approved class notification, and preliminarily approved the consent decree. On August 7, 2008 the court granted final approval to the settlement and consent decree On the same day, the court granted about $900,000 in attorney fees and costs. The Consent Decree was filed on August 8, 2008. It provided injunctive relief relating to hiring, promotion, training, and reporting and record-keeping. Further, it provided that the defendant would pay $2.1 million for the benefit of the class. The Consent Decree was set to remain in effect for five years after the Court's final approval. The Decree required annual reports to the plaintiffs, but they weren't filed in court. Presumably the case ended after the 2013 report; the last entry in the docket sheet dealt with a procedural matter in 2010.
<|assistant|>
This case was brought by African American employees of McCormick and Schmick's Restaurants seeking equitable relief and damages to remedy alleged discrimination based on race. The case was settled in August 2008, resulting in more than $2 million for Plaintiffs, as well as injunctive relief relating to hiring, promotion, training, and reporting.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Mercer County Geriatric Center ("MCGC"), a public nursing home facility in New Jersey, evidently operated by Mercer County. The investigation resulted in an October 9, 2002, findings letter being sent to the County Executive. The letter stated that in December 2001, DOJ advised county officials of its intent to conduct an investigation of the facility pursuant to CRIPA authority, but the county and its counsel wholly declined to cooperate in the investigation. The investigation occurred nonetheless, even though the county's attorney interfered with the investigators' access to the MCGC's residents. The letter stated that non-cooperation is one factor considered adversely when drawing conclusions about a facility, but the DOJ explained it also relied upon federal and state survey information, news articles, medical records, family interviews, private attorney and advocate interviews, and publicly available data. The letter advised that the DOJ's investigation led it to find that certain conditions at MCGC violated residents' federal rights, in that (1) Mercer County did not maintain sanitary and safe living conditions at MCGC; (2) MCGC residents did not receive adequate medical and mental health care; (3) MCGC residents were denied rehabilitation, restorative care, and freedom from unreasonable restraints; (4) MCGC mealtime assistance, nutrition, and hydration practices were not adequate; (5) MCGC residents were not treated in the most integrated setting appropriate to individual resident needs; and (6) staffing, administration, and policy deficiencies contributed to inadequate care at MCGC. Among the policy deficiencies listed was the county's denial of MCGC residents' First Amendment right to communicate with federal officials who were conducting the CRIPA investigation. The DOJ findings letter proposed remedial actions to remedy the deficiencies, invited the county to address the issues, and alerted the county to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. Negotiations evidently followed, because the county and the DOJ eventually entered into a settlement agreement obligating the county to improve a wide range of policies and practices at MCGC. The settlement contained substantive provisions addressing (A) assessment and care planning, (B) restraints and medication usage, (C) mealtime assistance, resident nutrition, and hydration practices, (D) therapeutic activities, rehabilitation, and restorative care, (E) mental health care, (F) treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate to individualized needs, and (G) management, oversight, and training. The settlement allowed for DOJ and its' consultants to retain access privileges to MCGC, its residents, and documents and records, for monitoring and technical assistance purposes, as well as to have access privileges to alternative placement settings. Further, the agreement called for the county to fund a jointly agreed-upon monitor. The county had 180 days to implement the changes called for in the settlement document which, by its terms, expired in three years. Attorneys for the county signed the agreement on December 28, 2004, followed by relevant DOJ officials' signatures being added on February 18, 2005, when the document and its attached monitoring protocol were received by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The same date, the United States filed its complaint against the county and its subdivision and officials responsible for the operation of the MCGC. The CRIPA-based complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, citing the deficiencies at MCGC and alleging that the defendants' conduct violated residents' federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights, including those provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the nursing home reform provisions of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 and 1396r, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (and implementing regulations). District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., signed the settlement as the order and judgment of the court October 14, 2005. The judge's unpublished order of November 29, 2005, appointed Marie Boltz as monitor in the case. Her subsequent reports were attached as part of the United States' status reports to the court on the case. On Nov. 24, 2008, the parties jointly moved to conditionally dismiss the case with one year of oversight in response to the defendants' progress implementing the settlement agreement. The court granted the motion on Jan. 9, 2009. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on Aug. 6, 2010, which the court granted later that month. The case is closed.
<|assistant|>
Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Mercer County Geriatric Center ("MCGC"), a public nursing home facility in New Jersey, evidently operated by Mercer County. The investigation led the DOJ to find that certain conditions at MCGC violated residents' federal rights. The parties settled and the case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 30, 2015, the Freedom of the Press Foundation (a non-profit organization focusing on First Amendment press rights) sued the U.S. Department of Justice in the Northern District of California seeking injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act. Plaintiff sought the expedited processing and release of records from the FBI concerning the procedures by which the Bureau issues National Security Letters ("NSLs") and exigent letters to investigate members of the press. Plaintiff believes that the records met FOIA’s requirements for expedited processing as they are are “of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect public confidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II). 18 U.S.C. § 2709 authorizes the FBI to NSLs to obtain subscriber information, toll billing records, and transactional records from wire or electronic communications service providers in national security investigations. The FBI issues these NSLs without any prior judicial review, and Section 2709(c) allows the FBI to impose an indefinite nondisclosure order on an NSL recipient. Similarly, exigent letters allow the FBI to obtain phone records in emergency situations without serving prior legal process. In three cases simultaneously before the Ninth Circuit, the constitutionality of the NSL framework was being challenged, though the practice of issuing NSLs continues. See Under Seal v. Lynch, Nos. 13-15957, 13-16731, 13-16732 (9th Cir. argued Oct. 8, 2014). FBI procedures for interacting with the media are contained in a publicly available document called “Media Guidelines.” The latest update to the Guidelines in January 2015 contains no procedures for issuing NSLs or exigent letters, so Plaintiff requested this information in a FOIA request dated March 10, 2015. While the FBI granted the request for expedited processing only ten days later, the agency has yet to make a final determination to release the records. Plaintiff appealed the constructive denial in May 2015, and received a letter in July indicating that the request would take a further seven months to be decided upon. This is far beyond the generally applicable twenty-day deadline for processing any FOIA request. A hearing schedule was set on January 21, 2016 and the hearing occurred on August 18, 2016. On March 13, 2017, the Court (Judge Haywood S. Gilliam) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court found that the defendant conducted an adequate search in response to the request, and properly invoked exemption 1 (authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense by Executive Order), exemption 3 (exempted from disclosure by statute), exemption 5 (exempted from disclosure because document is an interagency or intra-agency memorandum which should not be available by law to a party other than an agency unless in litigation with the agency), exemption 7(E) (exempted from disclosure as it is a law enforcement record that would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations, prosecutions, or guidelines for investigations or prosecutions). The Court also found the plaintiff did not sufficiently specify how the withheld material matched previously disclosed material and thus could not raise Official Acknowledgment over the FOIA exemptions. Next, the Court found the defendant appropriated segregated and disclosed the portions of documents that were not exempted. Finally, the Court denied a request of in camera review, finding the defendant sufficiently supported its exemptions. 241 F. Supp. 3d 986. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
A non-profit organization dealing with rights of the press sued the USDOJ over its unreasonable withholding of a FOIA request about the FBI's use of National Security Letters and exigent letters to retain information about the press. These methods of investigation allow for seizure of phone records and other telecom info without prior legal process. The FBI's criteria for issuing NSLs and exigent letters was not contained in the most recent version of its Media Guidelines, so Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request in March 2015. In March 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the defendant properly withheld information under FOIA exemptions 1, 3, 5, and 7(E).
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 4, 2010, the United States of America filed this lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against AIG Federal Savings Bank in the United States District Court, District of Delaware. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's office asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that AlG had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the U.S. claimed that from July 2003 to May 2006, black borrowers nationwide were charged broker fees 20 basis points higher, on average, than the broker fees charged to white borrowers. On March 19, 2010, the parties entered into a consent decree in which the bank agreed to: 1) refrain from engaging in any act or practice in wholesale home mortgage lending that discriminates on the basis of race or color; 2) maintain during the period of the order annual fair lending training; 3) develop and implement specific, nonracial standards for the assessment of direct broker fees on residential real estate-related loans; 4) post and prominently display in each location where loan applications are received by the lender a notice of nondiscrimination; 5) require brokers to make certain disclosures to applicants; 6) participate in a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the provisions of the consent decree; 7) provide a minimum of $1 million to certain organizations to provide credit counseling, financial literacy; and other related educational programs to African-American borrowers; 8) provide employees with equal credit opportunity training; and 9) pay $6.1 million in damages to those affected by AIG's discriminatory lending practices. On July 7, 2011, the Court (Judge Leonard P. Stark) entered an order for distribution of the funds remaining in the settlement fund ($1,268,372.92) among the National Urban League, Operation HOPE and the American Financial Services Association Education Foundation.
<|assistant|>
The United States of America filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against AIG Federal Savings Bank, claiming that AlG had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the U.S. claimed that from July 2003 to May 2006, black borrowers nationwide were charged higher broker fees than white borrowers. The parties entered into a consent decree in which the lender agreed to implement policies designed to aid in the prevention of racial discrimination, to provide monetary relief to the affected parties, and to assist in funding financial education programs. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 1, 2013, three same-sex couples and the minor child of one of the couples filed a lawsuit against Kanawha County, West Virginia in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, asked the court to declare unconstitutional any West Virginia laws banning same-sex marriage, to enjoin West Virginia from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages undertaken in other states, and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution were violated. They further asserted that the ban on same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, sex, and parental status. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were being denied a multitude of other social and legal rights that marriage provides. On December 2, 2013, the Court (Judge Robert C. Chambers) granted the State of West Virginia's Motion to intervene as a defendant. On January 29, 2014, The District Court (Robert C. Chambers, Chief Judge) held that: the Court would consider the case law, but not legal argument, contained in untimely notice of supplemental authority filed by plaintiffs; the action did not present difficult questions of state law, therefore the case would remain in federal court; the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of the non-recognition statute, however, the plaintiffs were allowed to challenge the other parts the West Virginia marriage ban. 993 F. Supp .2d 639. The Court <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detailDocument.php?id=75611">stayed the case</a> on June 10, 2014, pending the outcome of <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12807">Bostic v. Schafer</a>, a Fourth Circuit case that had a substantial overlap in issues with McGee v. Cole. The holding in Bostic, that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional, controlled this case. On November 7, 2014, the Court, in keeping with <i>Bostic</i>, applied strict scrutiny to the marriage ban and found that it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, and decided in favor of the plaintiffs. It issued an opinion and order that granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, while denying the State of West Virginia's motion to dismiss. In the order, the Court disagreed that there would be uniformity problems regarding the enforcement of the marriage ban across the counties of West Virginia. While the defendants claimed that the decision would only ban the named clerks from denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, the Court found that would not be the case. The Court further held that the marriage ban was not a narrowly-tailored state interest and that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case ended on November 7, 2014. On July 16, 2015, Judge Chambers awarded the plaintiffs $92,125 in attorneys’ fees, including paralegal fees, and $7,679.64 in costs and expenses. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On October 1, 2013, three same-sex couples and the minor child of one of the couples filed a lawsuit against Kanawha County, West Virginia. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare unconstitutional any West Virginia laws banning same-sex marriage, enjoin West Virginia from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages undertaken in other states, and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. The case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, who were granted summary judgment in November 2014 and awarded attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 1, 2013, two men who were arrested for trespassing on property open to the public filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the City of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and two individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the National ACLU and ACLU of Michigan, asked the court for a declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief concerning the use of "No Trespass Letters." The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights. According to the amended complaint, the Grand Rapids Police Department ("GRPD") had arrested individuals for trespassing based on a City trespass ordinance, under which the City solicits No Trespass Letters from area businesses indicating their intent to prosecute trespassers. The plaintiffs alleged they were arrested for trespassing while sitting in their vehicles in a business's parking lot, without any warning or complaint from the business itself. The plaintiffs claimed their arrests were without probable cause and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance violated the void-for-vagueness doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On December 3, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief because they were not suffering an imminent threat of repeated future misconduct. Additionally, defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not ripe because the City had changed the No Trespass Letters following the plaintiffs' filling of the Complaint. Defendants did not challenge the Court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claim for damages. On August 4, 2014, the Judge Paul L. Maloney dismissed the claims of one of the plaintiffs against the defendants according to the parties' stipulation. However, the other plaintiffs' claims remained. While the motion to dismiss was still pending, the defendants and the plaintiffs both filed motions for summary judgment. In April 2015, the court postponed the trial date pending the resolution of multiple motions made by both the defendants and the plaintiffs. Following a hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss, as well as both parties' motions for summary judgment, Judge Maloney granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief on June 21, 2017. 256 F.Supp.3d 742. The Court held that, because the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to present a threat of an imminent, as opposed to a speculative, injury, they lacked standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court also noted that the City's changes to the No Trespass Letters following the filing of this case rendered the requests for prospective relief unripe. The Court did not, however, grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for damages. Notably, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the same issue of whether the Grand Rapids ordinance is constitutional and held that it is unconstitutional. People v. Maggitt, 903 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017). Following the Michigan Court of Appeals' ruling, the City effectively ended its practice of arresting individuals pursuant to the No Trespass Letters. On October 17, 2018, Judge Maloney held that both sides were entitled to partial summary judgment. 407 F.Supp.3d 707. The Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on their municipal liability claim against the City of Grand Rapids. The Court found that the City had an unconstitutional policy or custom whereby police officers arrested individuals for trespassing on property covered by a no-trespass letter without first informing the suspect that he or she must leave the property. However, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the City's trespass ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants because it found that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the arrests, it was not clearly established law what knowledge the officers must have before concluding that they had probable cause to arrest a suspect for violating the City's ordinance. After a February 4, 2019 conference with Judge Maloney, the parties appeared to move into settlement negotiations. Judge Maloney filed an order on April 12 stating that he had received word from the parties that they had settled the issue on the matter of damages. A damages amount was not publicly disclosed; the ACLU <a href="https://www.aclu.org/cases/hightower-v-city-grand-rapids">described</a> it as a "favorable settlement agreement resulting in significant compensation for each of our four plaintiffs." The parties continued litigating over attorney fees, but came to a private agreement on the matter on December 23, 2019. Judge Maloney dismissed the case on January 24, 2020.
<|assistant|>
Two men who were arrested for trespassing on property of businesses open to the public filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the city of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and two individual officers. The plaintiffs claimed that the Grand Rapids Police Department's policy and practice of arresting individuals for trespass -- without probable cause and based on general Letters of Intent to Prosecute signed by Grand Rapids businesses -- results in unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The parties came to a private settlement agreement for damages and attorney's fees in late 2019. The Judge dismissed the case in early 2020.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit alleged that Allstate sought to convert all of its employee-agents into independent contractors. Employee-agents were informed that they would all be terminated by June 30, 2000. However, if employees signed a broad release, they could continue working for Allstate as independent contractors. The release encompassed all claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and Title VII. The EEOC alleged that requiring employees to sign these agreements constituted retaliation in violation of the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII and interference, coercion, and intimidation in violation of the ADA. The EEOC filed this lawsuit on behalf of approximately 300 persons who had filed charges with the EEOC. The EEOC sought declaratory relief that the release was invalid. The case was assigned to Judge Gerald J. Pappert. On February 6, 2002, Judge Pappert granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate the case with Romero v. Allstate, a private lawsuit that also alleged the issue of retaliation as well as numerous other challenges to company reorganization actions. Judge John Fullam presided over the newly consolidated case. Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment. On March 30, 2004, Judge Fullam entered a declaratory judgment, holding, in part, that the releases were voidable so long as the employees tendered back all benefits received in connection with signing those releases. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion for reconsideration challenging only the propriety of the “tender back” requirement imposed by the Court. While that reconsideration motion was still pending, Allstate filed a second motion for summary judgment in December of 2005, as to all of the plaintiffs' underlying causes of action. That motion remained undecided until March 2007, when the plaintiffs asked the court to reassign its case to a different judge because of Judge Fullam's failure act on numerous pending motions. Right after the plaintiffs made this request, Judge Fullam announced his intentions to reverse his original finding as to the validity of the Releases. Ultimately, on June 20, 2007, Judge Fullam held that he erred in his 2004 Declaratory Judgment and vacated that decision. He further granted summary judgment in Allstate's favor on the entirety of the plaintiffs' actions in Romero v. Allstate and in EEOC v. Allstate. On November 26, 2007, the plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Reviewing the history of this case, the Third Circuit noted that Plaintiffs had not received the benefit of full discovery as to issues regarding the validity of the Releases, and determined that these issues were dispositive as to the rest of the plaintiffs' claims. The court went on to vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 344 F. App'x 785. On January 29, 2010, after remand from the Court of Appeals in Romero, the three cases were reassigned to Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint in Romero and, on July 28, 2010, this Court granted the requested leave, resulting in the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. Consistent with the Third Circuit's mandate, this court then permitted discovery to proceed in bifurcated fashion, with the parties limited to discovery only on the validity of the release. During approximately the next three years, the parties engaged in this targeted discovery and related motion practice. On September 12, 2012, the court consolidated Romero and EEOC v. Allstate for administrative purposes. It is not clear from the docket or the court's summary of the procedural history how the 2012 consolidation differs from the 2002 consolidation. 1 F.Supp.3d 319. In compliance with the court's scheduling order, the parties began filing summary judgment motions in early April 2013. The individual plaintiffs and Defendants Allstate and Edward Liddy, the former President and CEO of Allstate, filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On February 27, 2014, Judge Ronald Buckwalter ultimately denied the cross-motions and determined that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily signed. 2014 WL 796005. On March 13, 2014, Judge Buckwalter ruled on the remaining motions for summary judgment that the EEOC and Allstate had filed. He found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, holding that the release did not constitute a substantive violation of the anti-retaliation provisions set forth in any federal anti-discrimination law at issue. Accordingly, Judge Buckwalter granted Allstate's motion and denied the EEOC's, ultimately dismissing the EEOC's action in its entirety. 3 F.Supp.3d 313. The EEOC appealed and the case was assigned to Judges Thomas Hardiman, Anthony Scircica, and Maryanne Barry on the Third Circuit. On March 26, 2015, writing for the court, Judge Hardiman affirmed Judge Buckwalter's ruling. 778 F.3d 444. On May 23, 2014, the plaintiffs from the Romero cases filed a motion for class certification with respect to four issues in the litigation. On October 6, 2014, Judge Buckwalter denied the motion for class certification, finding that issue certification would be unmanageable. 52 F.Supp.3d 715. On February 26, 2015, the Romero plaintiffs sought leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in order to add 368 employee-agents as named plaintiffs. On April 21, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion. From June 1, 2015 to June 17, 2015, the court conducted its first trial in the matter. The jury decided exclusively the issue of whether ten of the plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily signed the release of claims that Allstate used. The jury found that, as to eight of the Plaintiffs, the Release was not knowingly and voluntarily signed, but, as to the remaining two Plaintiffs, the Release had been knowingly and voluntarily signed. These remaining plaintiffs then asserted two defenses -- "unclean hands" and "unconscionability." Because these are equitable defenses, the court, rather than the jury, had to decide whether the defenses were applicable. On January 28, 2016, Judge Buckwalter concluded that the defenses were not applicable. Judge Buckwalter retired from serving as an active judge and Judge Pappert subsequently took control of the case. On February 10, 2016, Judge Pappert entered an order upholding Judge Buckwalter's findings as to the defenses but noted that this finding would not apply to any of the subsequent trials on the matter. 158 F.Supp.3d 369. Only July 28, 2015, defendants Allstate and Liddy filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint and complaints of two intervenors. On November 12, 2015, Judge Buckwalter held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were barred by doctrines of "tender back" and "ratification" and thus granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the state law claims. The plaintiffs immediately filed motions for reconsideration which Judge Pappert granted. 170 F.Supp.3d 779. The plaintiffs moved to amend Judge Buckwalter's January 28 finding and Judge Pappert's February 10 order. On April 12, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Mark A. Kearney. On May 3, 2016, Judge Kearney determined that there was no basis for modifying Judge Buckwalter's findings. However, he ordered that Judge Pappert's order be amended to reflect the parties' agreement that the release was unenforceable as to state law claims (the court had already found the agreement unenforceable as to federal law claims). 2016 WL 2595102. Allstate contested the jury verdict for the eight plaintiffs and filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. On May 4, 2016, Judge Kearney denied the motions, writing that a careful review of the record showed that the verdict was proper and that no prejudicial error occurred. 2016 WL 2619853. On July 6, 2016, Judge Kearney denied defendants Allstate and Liddy's motions to dismiss the third amended complaint, finding that the complaint stated valid claims under ERISA and the ADEA. 2016 WL 3654265. Allstate filed a motion for partial summary judgment on certain ERISA claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims. On November 22, 2016, Judge Kearney granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion, allowing plaintiffs to proceed on certain ERISA claims. 2016 WL 6876307. The court ordered the plaintiffs to proceed to trial by dividing common federal questions into two separate phases. Phase I would address certain ERISA questions and Phase II would address any remaining common federal questions. Following the Phase I bench trial, the court concluded that Allstate's policies functioned as an unlawful "cutback" of employee benefits with respect to certain plaintiffs. On April 27, 2017, the court ordered that Allstate disclose to plaintiffs the benefits they would have received the benefit of their early retirement subsidy. If the plaintiffs would have received the benefit, then those plaintiffs will proceed to individual trials. 2017 WL 1508879. On the same day that the court released its Phase I findings of law and fact, the court granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment on ADEA disparate impact claims and certain ERISA claims that were a part of Phase II of the trial. All remaining Phase II issues, including the plaintiffs' ADEA disparate treatment claims, were inappropriate for common resolution and needed to be tried individually. Accordingly, Judge Kearney closed Phase II of the trial. 251 F.Supp.3d 867. Allstate filed another motion for partial summary judgment on the eight agents residing in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania who were scheduled for trial. Allstate specifically sought summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Judge Kearney found that there were unresolved factual questions relating to the "tender back" requirement that precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, Judge Kearney denied Allstate's motion on September 5, 2017, and ordered that the cases proceed to trial. 2017 WL 3881215. On the same day, Judge Kearney granted one of Allstate's other motions for summary judgment. There, Allstate claimed that the group of six plaintiffs bringing age discrimination complaints failed to file complaints with the EEOC, thereby failing to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement. Judge Kearney agreed with Allstate, granted the motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the six plaintiffs' claims. 2017 WL 3881217. On January 29, 2018, Judge Kearney ruled on another one of Allstate's motions for partial summary judgment. In this motion, Allstate asserted that they was no factual dispute as to whether they unlawfully retaliated against several plaintiffs. Judge Kearney granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. Specifically, he granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims that Allstate's counterclaims violated the anti-retaliation provisions of ADEA and ERISA. He denied summary judgment on five plaintiffs' additional claims of retaliation. 2018 WL 627116. On May 22, 2018, Judge Kearney again ruled an Allstate motion for partial summary judgment. In this motion, Allstate alleged that twelve plaintiffs' claims were barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. Judge Kearney disagreed and denied Allstate's motion, finding the statute of limitations was tolled per a Congressional mandate. 2018 WL 2325405. On May 30, 2018, 369 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their suits because they had reached a settlement agreement with the defendants. The voluntary dismissal had no bearing on the 28 remaining plaintiffs. On June 13, 2018, five additional plaintiffs reached a settlement. On August 17, 2018, another nine plaintiffs settled with the defendants, leaving 16 remaining plaintiffs. On September 19, 2018, Allstate filed another motion for summary judgment on the remaining plaintiffs' claims. On September 20, 2018, eleven additional plaintiffs settled with the defendants. The following day, two additional plaintiffs reached a settlement, leaving three plaintiffs remaining. On October 31, 2018, the remaining plaintiffs settled, thereby leading Judge Kearney to dismiss the case in its entirety. All settlement agreements between the plaintiffs and defendants appear to be private and confidential.
<|assistant|>
On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit alleged that Allstate violated the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Title VII by requiring employees to sign a broad release in order to continue working for Allstate as contractors. The EEOC sought declaratory relief that the release was invalid. The court consolidated this suit with several related suits that employees brought on behalf of themselves. The court ultimately dismissed the EEOC's claims. After extensive, protracted litigation that lasted nearly two decades, Allstate reached a settlement with all the plaintiffs whose claims had not been dismissed. The settlement was private and thus not available.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 31, 2015, three prisoner-plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that MDOC was discriminating against them and other deaf and hard of hearing prisoners. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and was assigned to Judge Sean Cox. The plaintiffs were represented by Michigan Protection and Advocacy, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee and private counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that MDOC consistently failed to provide them with effective communication opportunities, depriving them of full participation in prison programs, services, and activities, including visitation, religious activities, and disciplinary and parole proceedings. They also alleged that since they couldn’t hear guards’ orders, they were sometimes unable to obey prison regulations and were then unfairly disciplined. The plaintiffs alleged that this treatment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. They also alleged that the absence of devices enabling them to communicate with their families and others violated their free speech rights under the First Amendment. MDOC sought summary judgment on May 1, 2015. On October 30, 2015, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation to deny the motion. The court adopted this Report and Recommendation with an order denying MDOC’s motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2016. 2016 WL 1156740. On June 30, 2017, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation to certify the plaintiffs’ class. The court adopted this recommendation on July 20, 2017, certifying the class as “all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the custody of MDOC (whether now or in the future), who require hearing-related accommodations, including but not limited to interpreters, hearing devices, or other auxiliary aids or services, to communicate effectively and/or to access or participate in programs, services, or activities available to individuals in the custody of MDOC.” 2017 WL 3085785. On March 9, 2018, the court partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and denied MDOC’s motion for summary judgment. 294 F. Supp. 3d 695. The court found that the devices that MDOC provided to the plaintiffs failed to meet the standard of reasonable accommodation. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, and agreed that a training program would be appropriate as well. It ordered MDOC to make videophones available to all deaf and hard of hearing inmates and to provide necessary auxiliary aids to enable equal participation in prison programs and services, including access to ASL interpreters, mandatory training for officers and staff on how to interact with deaf and hard of hearing inmates, and appropriate compliance monitoring. The plaintiffs had additionally sought summary judgment on a claim that MDOC’s policies for classification and housing placement were insufficient; the court denied summary judgment on this claim. By September 2018 the parties had reached a settlement agreement, and they filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class-action settlement on September 26, 2018. The settlement agreement required MDOC to provide specified accommodations for the plaintiffs and all other current and future class members, appointed a monitor to oversee enforcement of the settlement, and mandated that MDOC pay $1.3 million for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. In particular, MDOC agreed to provide hearing assessments, adequately accommodating facilities, communications technology, and auxiliary aids and services necessary to allow the class members to access MDOC services, programs, and activities. The agreement also required MDOC to install non-auditory notification systems and develop and implement new procedures regarding the accommodations for MDOC guards and staff. On January 15, 2019, the court granted the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement and set a fairness hearing for March 28, 2019. The day after the hearing, the court issued an order granting the parties’ joint motion for final approval of the settlement. The settlement was set for enforcement until 2021. On August 12, 2019, a hard of hearing MDOC prisoner (“Class Member 1”) filed, as a class member and as an interested party, a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Another prisoner (“Class Member 2”), filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement on October 10, 2019. On October 22, 2019, Class Member 2 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a protective order, claiming that MDOC subjected him to adverse treatment, such as discrimination and harassment, for filing a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On December 2, 2019, Class Member 1 filed another motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The post-judgment complaints were referred to the Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. On February 20, 2020, the court issued an order recommending the process by which such complaints would be adjudicated, including a mediation process. On the same day, the court recommended that Class Member 1’s motions be denied, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the claims in his initial motion. The court held, among other things, that the “most efficient and effective means of addressing the issues [Class Member 1] raised in his motions is for him to first pursue them through the mediation process with the Settlement Monitor pursuant to the procedures outlined” in the magistrate judge’s order issued on the same day. On March 3, 2020, the magistrate judge issued a recommendation on settlement compliance, setting out deadlines for implementation of certain terms of the settlement agreement. The court adopted the recommendations on March 25, 2020. Class Member 1 appealed this decision. The magistrate judge issued orders on Class Member 2’s motion for enforcement, temporary restraining order, and preliminary injunction on May 26, 2020. As to enforcement, the magistrate judge recommended denial, because the issues raised were not “exceptional or extraordinary.” Because Class Member 2 “has provided ample notice to Defendants as to his request for injunctive relief, the Court will treat his motion [for temporary restraining order] as one for preliminary injunction.” The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied, holding, among other things, that Class Member 2 had failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits. The court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations on July 6, 2020. As of July 20, 2020, Class Member 1’s appeal is pending before the Sixth Circuit.
<|assistant|>
This class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan was filed March 31, 2015 by three prisoner-plaintiffs alleging that the Michigan Department of Corrections was discriminating against them and other deaf and hard of hearing prisoners. MDOC’s summary judgment motion was denied by the court in 2016. The court certified the plaintiffs’ class on July 20, 2017. On March 9, 2018, the court ordered MDOC to provide necessary aids to inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing. The court approved a settlement agreement on March 29, 2019. Two class members later filed motions to enforce the settlement agreement, both of which were denied; as of July 20, 2020, one of the class members has an appeal pending before the Sixth Circuit.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In August 2006 the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants terminated the complaining party and a class of employees who were forty-years-old or older and made comments concerning the age of the complaining party. In 2007, the parties entered settlement talks as they continued to engage in discovery. On December 17, 2007, TIN moved for summary judgment. On June 2, 2008, District Judge Neil Wake granted the defendant's motion on the grounds that "the EEOC has not provided direct evidence that the termination of [claimants] were motivated by age-based animus...TIN has articulated legitimate, nondiscrimination reasons for the terminations...[t]he EEOc has not established that TIN's articulated reasons are mere pretext." Therefore, "a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that age discrimination was the real reason for the terminations of [claimants]." 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43193. The EEOC appealed this decision on July 31, 2008. The 9th Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for trial, finding that a jury could potentially find age discrimination. 349 Fed. Appx. 190. On June 11, 2010, the parties entered a consent decree. The settlement enjoined the defendant from engaging in an employment practice that constituted age discrimination, including retaliation. Further, the defendant agreed to pay $250,000 to resolve the claims, provide training about the ADEA to employees, expunge references to the complaints from personnel files, provide neutral letters of references to claimants, modify its policies to ensure equal opportunity for employees of all ages, and file reports with the EEOC Phoenix District Office for the Duration of the decree (two years). Since there is no subsequent enforcement activity, presumably the matter closed finally in June 2012.
<|assistant|>
In August 2006 the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of age. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants terminated the complaining party and a class of employees who were forty-years-old or older and made comments concerning the age of the complaining party. The matter was settled through a consent decree on June 11, 2010.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 2, 1990, prisoners at the Shasta County jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Shasta and the County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their conditions of confinement violated the Eight Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged problems with overcrowding, inadequate staffing, and inadequate medical, dental and mental health care. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on December 26, 1990, and on April 12, 1991, the District Court (Judge Edward J. Garcia) certified a class of all present and future prisoners at the Shasta County jail, as well as subclasses for male and female prisoners. On November 8, 1991, defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of medical, dental and mental health care. After holding a hearing on May 13, 1992, on September 4, 1992, Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski recommended that the defendants' motion be granted and the case be dismissed. On October 28, 1992, the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted Magistrate Judge Nowinski's recommendations in full, over the plaintiffs' objections. The plaintiffs appealed, and during the appeals process litigation continued in the District Court over attorneys' fees and discovery. On April 6, 1994, the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted further recommendations by Magistrate Judge Nowinski to deny plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs appealed this decision as well. On October 21, 1994, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Poole, Judge Canby and Judge Rymer) affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. <i>Wooden v. Cnty. of Shasta</i>, 39 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994). The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the issues raised in the defendants' motion, but found the District Court's grant of summary judgment sua sponte on the issues of overcrowding and inadequate staffing to be improper and remanded to have those issues properly briefed and argued. On January 6, 1995, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims. Magistrate Judge Nowinski issued a report on March 31, 1995, recommending that the motion be granted, and the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted this report on June 9 and dismissed the case. A further motion for attorneys' fees by plaintiffs was later denied. As of the date of this summary, we have no further information on this case.
<|assistant|>
On August 2, 1990, prisoners at the Shasta County jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Shasta and the County Sheriff, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiffs attorneys' fees, and the case was definitively dismissed in 1995.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 4, 2011, visually impaired and blind inmates at Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facilities filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by Legal Aid and private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sued the State of New York for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, alleging discriminatory denial of access to services, activities and programs on the basis of their disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the State of New York denied them access to adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations with regard to both mobility and reading materials, among other things. On March 14, 2014, the court (Judge James L. Cott) released an order certifying settlement class. Attached to this order was a copy of the private settlement agreement negotiated by both parties. The agreement provided that the Department of Corrections shall provide visually impaired prisoners with any reasonable accommodation recommended by a medical professional. It also provided that visually impaired prisoners will have their glasses replaced at no cost as long as the glasses were not negligently lost or broken; that the law library will have two PCs with assistive programs; that law clerks will be on hand to assist visually impaired prisoners with their legal research; that the correctional facilities will have games, books, and legal forms appropriate for use by the visually impaired; and many other things. It also included that the Department of Corrections would pay attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. This private settlement agreement was intended to last two years, with a possibility of adding two more years if the Department of Corrections was deemed to not be following it adequately. Moreover, many of the provisions in the settlement agreement were to be added to the official facility policies of the Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facility. On July 22, 2014, Judge Cott released a final judgment, creating the effective date of the private settlement agreement and dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Judge Cott ordered to keep the docket open for letters from plaintiffs about whether the correctional facilities have been following the provisions of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was set to expire on July 22, 2016, with the possibility of extension dependent on the defendants' compliance. Although the court received letter in 2016 alleging that the defendant failed to comply, the docket indicates no extension of the agreement, and the case is presumed closed.
<|assistant|>
In January 2011, visually impaired inmates at Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facilities filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York for violations of their rights to adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations. In 2014, plaintiffs and defendants negotiated a private settlement agreement that came into effect on July 22, 2014. The settlement provided for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and reasonable medical care and accommodations. The lawsuit is currently closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). The Plaintiffs alleged that when PennDOT had resurfaced highways in the cities of Meadville and Erie, it failed to install mandatory curb cuts and otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701. On September 7, 2006, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint joining the cities of Meadville and Erie as defendants in the case. Voices for Independence had previously filed a suit against Meadville (see related cases) but joined the City in this case because PennDOT denied legal responsibility to retrofit non-compliant curb cuts at intersections of state and local roads. On December 22, 2006, PennDOT, Meadville, and the Plaintiffs entered a court-approved settlement wherein Meadville and PennDOT agreed to share responsibility for the remediation of non-compliant intersections where future resurfacing work was to be performed. The Defendants agreed to retrofit existing non-compliant intersections which, under the ADA, should have been remediated as part of earlier resurfacing work performed within the two years prior to the lawsuit. A similar settlement was made between Erie, PennDOT, and the Plaintiffs on April 4, 2007, wherein PennDOT assumed responsibility for constructing ADA-compliant curb cuts in all its future road projects in Erie and to remediate non-compliant curb cuts which were constructed or should have been corrected in conjunction with prior road projects going back to March 28, 2004. The parties could not agree as to whether a statute of limitations relieved the Defendants of responsibility to retrofit non-compliant intersections modified after January 26, 1992, when the ADA first came into effect, but more than two years prior to the date the lawsuit was filed. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue, asking the Court to declare that they were not responsible for these retrofitting these intersections. On September 28, 2007, the Court (Judge Sean J. McLaughlin) issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in which it denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Voices for Independence v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, 2007 WL 2905887 (W.D. Penn, 2007). On March 4, 2009, the plaintiffs and PennDOT agreed to a third settlement, in which PennDOT agreed to retrofit intersections where necessary on all roads it resurfaced in Erie and Meadville from January 24, 1992, to March 28, 2004, and to issue an Annual Report of Compliance on or before January 31 of each year during the life of the settlement, listing each curb cuts installed, repaired, or retrofitted, with relevant measurements. If these reports showed that PennDOT was unlikely to complete the retrofitting project by January 1, 2014, then the Plaintiffs were to follow dispute resolution measures outlined in the earlier settlements. On March 11, 2009, the Plaintiffs, the City of Meadville, and PennDOT entered a Consent Decree, wherein Meadville and PennDOT divided responsibility for certain resurfaced roads, sidewalks, and intersections in Meadville that were still in need of retrofitting in order to be ADA-compliant. On January 30, 2012, the Plaintiffs and PennDOT entered into a fourth settlement, clarifying the requirements of the earlier settlements and ensuring that within the cities of Erie and Meadville all newly constructed or altered State roads and highways would have curb cuts at all intersections containing curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway. In cases where PennDOT felt that this was inappropriate, it was required to provide written notice to the Plaintiffs. PennDOT also agreed to install the curb cuts that it had omitted in work performed since 2007. The settlement also addressed problems with undulating sidewalks and other obstructions. In the settlement, PennDOT agreed to pay an unspecified amount in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. On May 23, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement, alleging that PennDOT had failed to install approximately one thousand curb cuts required by the earlier settlements, and that it failed to file with the Court the detailed annual report listing the exact number and location of each omitted curb cut. This was granted on January 29, 2013. On April 18, 2013, the Plaintiffs and PennDOT entered into a fifth settlement, which included a list of curb cuts remaining to be installed. PennDOT agreed to install all these curb cuts by December 31, 2013, excepting certain intersections where ongoing construction would prevent them from being completed by the deadline. The fifth settlement recognized that discussions about other ADA compliance issues were still ongoing between the parties. PennDOT agreed to pay an unspecified amount in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. As in the previous four settlements, the court approved the terms of the agreement and retained jurisdiction concerning interpretation of and compliance with the terms of the settlement. Since entry of the fifth settlement agreement, defendants have continued to submit status reports. On November 23, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion to dismiss the City of Meadville. They agreed that Meadville had fulfilled its obligations under the settlement and consent decrees by, among other things, installing about 860 curb ramps. The court granted the motion to dismiss on November 28, 2016. This case was reassigned to Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on February 5, 2019. As of May 21, 2020, the remaining defendants are still subject to the settlement agreements. The court continues to monitor their compliance and the parties file periodic status reports.
<|assistant|>
On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in federal court against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). The Plaintiffs alleged that when PennDOT had resurfaced highways in the cities of Meadville and Erie, it failed to install mandatory curb cuts, and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiffs later added the cities of Meadville and Erie as defendants in the case, because PennDOT denied legal responsibility to retrofit non-compliant curb cuts at the intersections of state and local roads. The parties have entered a series of five court-approved settlement agreements, the first on December 22, 2006 and the most recent on April 18, 2013; the settlements require future compliance with the ADA on all state road and highway resurfacing projects in Meadville and Erie, and the retrofitting of all non-compliant intersections resurfaced after January 26, 1992 (the date the ADA became effective) with ADA-compliant curb cuts.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 4, 2017, two inmates of Pierce County Jail (PCJ) with mental health issues brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued Pierce County and the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Washington, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Ronald B. Leighton, and referred to Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The complaint alleged that the defendants did not adequately screen for mental illness during the booking process or during incarceration, ignored clear signs of mental illness and requests for care and, and, as a result, routinely failed to document serious mental health symptoms, psychiatric medications, and treatment history. As such, the plaintiffs’ mental illnesses were allowed to progress unchecked, leading to hallucinations, delusions, and an increased risk of self-harm. The complaint also alleged that the defendants "routinely warehouse these individuals in solitary confinement for 21 to 24 hours a day," and that they have a formal written policy of placing people with “poor behavioral control due to a mental disorder” in “crisis cells” for 23 hours a day. On December 21, 2017, after filing and withdrawing two motions to certify class, the plaintiffs filed a third motion to certify class, defining the class as: “All qualified individuals who have mental illnesses that are disabilities as defined in 42 U.S.C. §12102 and 29 U.S.C. §705(9)(B), and who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated at the Pierce County Jail.” On February 2, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, among other claims, the plaintiffs' §1983 claim of inadequate mental health treatment. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their administration of psychiatric medication upon release claim because they fail to show the existence of an imminent injury. On March 28, 2018, Judge Leighton granted in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against the named agents of the county but retaining the claims against Pierce County and Pierce County Sheriff’s Department. On May 7, 2018, adopting a report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Christel, Judge Leighton dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of standing. On May 11, 2018, however, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment, arguing that the court mistakenly dismissed the entirety of the complaint instead of the limited dismissal (one claim for lack of standing) sought by the defendants. On May 15, 2018, Judge Leighton granted the motion for reconsideration, saying that the dismissal was an inadvertent administrative error. The defendants filed their answer to the complaint with the court on May 12, 2018, and discovery continued. On June 7, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The motion alleged that plaintiffs' failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 23(i)(3) in their unilateral decision to re-note the motion to certify, resulting in a delay tactic that was prejudicial to the defendants. In an order issued on August 3, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion and additionally ruled against the plaintiffs on a pending discovery motion. The order specified that although the motion to certify was stricken, the class allegations would remain in the complaint and permitted the plaintiffs to file a motion requesting enlargement of time to file a renewed motion to certify. As such, the plaintiffs amended and renewed their motion for class certification on August 29, 2018. After a period of discovery, Magistrate Judge David W. Christel issued his report and recommendations on the motion for class certification on October 15, 2018. He recommended that the certification be denied because plaintiffs had failed to meet the numerosity and commonality requirements. Additionally, he found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the defendant acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Here, there were too many disparate and individualized issues regarding mental health such that the class lacked cohesiveness. On October 25, 2018, the parties jointly stipulated for dismissal with prejudice, with all parties bearing their own costs. The case officially closed on October 29, 2018.
<|assistant|>
This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by two former inmates of Pierce County Jail in the U.S. District for the Western District of Washington. They alleged that the defendant had violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to adequately screen for mental illness. On March 28, 2018, Judge Leighton dismissed part of the claim.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 8, 2015, six U.S. citizens who had their email, text message, and telephone call metadata collected by the government during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah, filed suit against the National Security Agency ("NSA") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the domestic surveillance program and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as statutory, actual, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the district of Utah under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications, and the Privacy Act. They alleged violations of these acts and of the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and of Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. In October of 2001, then President George W. Bush authorized the NSA, in conjunction with the FBI, to intercept the international phone calls and international emails of people within the United States without a warrant. The operation, known as "the President's Surveillance Program," collected email, text message, and telephone call metadata, which was stored in a "security compartment" code-named "STELLARWIND." Before and during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, this surveillance was expanded in and around Salt Lake City and other Olympic venues. This expansion covered the metadata on every phone call made to and from individuals within the Salt Lake City area, as well as the content of every text message and email to and from those individuals. The plaintiffs were all living and working within the Salt Lack City area during this period, and frequently used the targeted communications methods. The plaintiffs claimed this program of warrant-less surveillance was a violation of their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, and several other Federal laws that govern government surveillance of individuals within the United States. The government moved to dismiss the suit on December 18, 2015, claiming a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiffs, (1) failed to plausibly allege their standing, (2) had not otherwise alleged the existence of a live case or controversy to support their claim for equitable relief, (3) failed to plausibly allege their standing in regard to similar surveillance they alleged was continuing, (4) did not plausibly allege standing to seek monetary relief, and (5) made claims for monetary relief that were barred by sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on February 18, 2016. The court denied the motion on January 10, 2017, finding the plaintiffs had established a plausible claim that they had suffered a redressable injury. The court held that it was not its role at this stage of the litigation to analyze the likelihood of the allegations being true. 228 F.Supp.3d 1271. On September 27, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss (that is, withdraw) the case. In their motion, they reiterated their position that their rights were violated, but stated that because of the defendants' extensive use of the "state secrets doctrine," discovery had been fruitless. The plaintiffs decided that further litigation of the case would not be beneficial. The same day, the court dismissed the action.
<|assistant|>
During the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the NSA and FBI collected the content of every email and text message, as well the metadata of every telephone call, moving to and from individuals in Salt Lake City, UT. in 2015, a group of Salt Lake City area residents filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for Utah, challenging the legality of this surveillance program. The court has yet to rule on a motion to dismiss by the defendants.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In July 2012, Plaintiffs, representing the estates of their respective children, filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and Department of Defense officials in their personal capacities. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiffs alleged that the United States directed and authorized missile strikes resulting in citizens' deaths abroad, in violation of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in December 2012 under several theories precluding judicial review, including lack of standing, separation of powers concerns, the presence of non-justiciable political questions, and qualified immunity of the federal officials. The district court scheduled oral arguments for July 2013. Meanwhile, the district court took judicial notice of a New York Times article by Charlie Savage, U.S. Admits for First Time Drones Killed 4 Americans, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2013, and requested briefing on how the statements of the Attorney General of the United States affected the legal issues in the case. On April 4, 2014, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, due heavily to special factors that precluded a cause of action under Bivens. The Court found no Fourth Amendment claim because there was no actual seizure of the decedents. The Court found no Fifth Amendment claim for two of the Plaintiffs because their deaths were unanticipated, which amounted only to negligence and not a violation of Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. The Court stated the claim against the third decedent appeared plausible as the death was not unintended. The Court then found that applying Bivens in this case would be inappropriate, as it would be an unprecedented application of Bivens which would "draw the Court into 'the heart of executive and military planning and deliberation'" because the Court would have to examine national security policy, military chain of command, and operational combat decisions. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 77 (D.D.C 2014), quoting Lebron v. Rumseld, 670 F.3d 540, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Court finally found that Bill of Attainder claim was unfounded as Plaintiffs could point to no legislative action. 35 F. Supp. 3d 56. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In July 2012, plaintiffs, representing the estates of their respective children, filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and Department of Defense officials in their personal capacities. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiffs allege that the United States directed and authorized missile strikes resulting in citizens' deaths abroad, in violation of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. On April 4, 2014, the case was dismissed. The Court found the application of Bivens would be inappropriate as it was unprecedented and would require the Court to review military planning and operations.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 21, 2007, private attorneys filed a national class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the refusal by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (a component of the Department of Homeland Security) to accept concurrent adjustment of status applications for special immigrant religious workers. It was the general USCIS policy to accept concurrent filing of underlying visa petitions (I-360) with family-based and other employment-based permanent resident applications (I-485). By regulation, however, this approach was not available for those seeking religious worker visas. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B). Plaintiffs contended that the policy violated their constitutional rights to freedom of religion, equal protection, and due process, as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Separate motions for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction to stop the accrual of unlawful presence time was filed with the Complaint and granted December 27, 2007 and Aug. 21, 2008. 2007 WL 4593876; 2008 WL 3928016. In June 2008, Judge Lasnik granted class action status; the plaintiff class was defined as "all individuals currently in the United States who are beneficiaries of a Petition for Special Immigrant (Religious Worker) (Form I-360) that has been filed or will be filed, and who were or would be eligible to file an Application for Adjustment of Status (Form I-485) but for CIS's policy codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (2)(i)(B) that the Form I-360 petition must be approved before the Form I-485 application can be filed." 2008 WL 2645495. In November 2008, Judge Lasnik rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the court could not at that point of the litigation, find that the plaintiffs' various claims were incorrect. 2008 WL 4962685. In March 2009, Judge Lasnik held that the regulation did not appropriately implement the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and was therefore unlawful. 2009 WL 799683. On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed, finding the regulation permissible under the INA, and remanded to the district court to consider plaintiffs' remaining contentions. Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 618 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2010). On remand, the District Court, Robert S. Lasnik, held for the government in all respects. In particular: a) the visa provisions of the U.S. immigration code serve a compelling government interest and do not substantially burden Plaintiffs exercise of their religion (satisfying RFRA) by imposing limitations on the grant of visas; b) fraud in the religious worker visa program is endemic, and "the bar on concurrent filings is a rational regulatory attempt to reduce fraud in the religious worker program. Given the government's legitimate interest in reducing fraud and the broad deference courts show the determinations of the political branches in the context of immigration, the bar on concurrent filings," which singles out religious workers for extra scrutiny, "withstands scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,"; c) Plaintiffs have "no legitimate entitlement to apply for adjustment of status before obtaining CIS approval of the I-360 visa petition." No process for visa applications is constitutionally mandated, or even statutorily required. Therefore, Plaintiffs' due process claims fail as a matter of law; and d) the threshold for a First Amendment violation is higher than for a RFRA violation, and that claim fails for same reasons as the RFRA violation claim. For those reasons, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants'. 819 F.Supp.2d 1154 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal in July of 2011. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Mary M. Schroeder, affirmed for the same reasons. 697 F.3d 1119 (amended 703 F.3d 483). The Court's mandate was issued November 28, 2011, and the district court docket ends there.
<|assistant|>
On November 21, 2007, private attorneys filed a national class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's refusal to accept concurrent adjustment of status applications for special immigrant religious workers. Other, non-religious classes of immigrants are able to file for concurrent adjustment of their underlying visa provisions. Plaintiffs contended violations of their rights under RFRA, Equal Protection, Due Process and the First Amendment. The district court found that the visa restrictions found in U.S. Immigration policy serve a compelling interest without burdening Plaintiffs' exercise of religion, satisfying RFRA; the special restrictions on religious applicants serve a rational relation to the goal of preventing fraud, satisfying Equal Protection; that there is no statutorily or Constitutionally mandated right to such proceeding, defeating a Due Process claim as a matter of law; and that the First Amendment arguments fail for the same reason as the RFRA arguments. Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who affirmed on the same grounds.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 16, 2014, the estate of an inmate who died in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Monterey County, the Monterey County Sheriff, the Monterey County Jail, and the California Forensic Medical Group under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief, claiming a failure to provide medical care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and a deprivation of substantive due process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also claimed negligence and wrongful death under California state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants left the inmate lying unconscious, helpless, and untreated in his bed to die from viral influenza syndrome complicated by pneumonia—a treatable condition. At the time of the inmate's death, the jail was already the subject of a class action lawsuit regarding systemic failures to provide adequate medical care. <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13198"><i>Hernandez v. County of Monterey</i></a>. On June 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Labson Freeman. On April 21, 2015, the parties agreed to enter into settlement negotiations; a settlement conference was scheduled for October 30, 2015. The parties could not come to a settlement agreement at that conference. Further settlement discussions continued through April and June 2017, but the parties did not settle. In October 2017, the plaintiff filed a stipulation and proposed order with the court for the dismissal of defendant California Forensic Medical Group. The court approved it. That same day, the defendant Sheriff filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the claims against him. He claimed that he could not be liable because the plaintiffs could not show that on January 15, 2014, the defendant Sheriff knew the plaintiff had faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Moreover, the defendant Sheriff argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded him from liability for civil damages because his conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. On April 6, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part this defendant Sheriff’s motion. Judge Freeman granted the motion as to the plaintiff's first cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for loss of the parent/child relationship in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These claims were dismissed. The court denied the motion, however, as to the plaintiffs’ alleged violations of California state tort law. The parties continued to engage in discovery and motion in limine briefing through the rest of 2018. At the same time, they continued to engage in settlement conferences and reached a settlement for monetary damages in early 2019. On January 23, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for settlement approval. The court approved the settlement agreement on March 18, 2019. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the case on April 29, 2019. This case is closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2014, the estate of an inmate who died in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Monterey County and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs claimed a failure to provide medical care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and a deprivation of substantive due process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties settled on March 18, 2019 and case was dismissed on April 29, 2019.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by several campgrounds and individuals wishing to travel to Maine against the State of Maine's enforcement of stay-at-home orders and quarantine requirements for those traveling into Maine. The plaintiffs alleged that Maine's orders violated their rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection. The court denied their motion for preliminary injunction and found that the orders were narrowly tailored to the goal of protecting public health. The plaintiffs appealed on June 1 and moved for reconsideration. The court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and the case was stayed on June 8. No outcome on appeal as of November 2020. <hr> The stay-at-home executive orders issued by Maine Governor Janet Mills in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 required people entering Maine to self-quarantine for 14 days. Several campgrounds in rural Maine and individual plaintiffs wishing to travel interstate to Maine alleged that the executive orders violated their rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs sued Governor Mills, in her official capacity, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 15, 2020. Plaintiffs, who simultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction (PI) and expedited relief, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' costs and fees. The case was assigned to Judge Lance E. Walker. Plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions on interstate travel in the executive orders burdened their right to interstate travel and were not the least restrictive means for advancing a compelling government interest. Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that the restrictions on interstate travel "deprived Plaintiffs and their customers of their constitutional rights . . . without any pre- or post-deprivation process." Finally, plaintiffs claimed that "The Rural Reopening plan creates 'winners' and 'losers' of the same, similarly situated businesses, based solely upon their location within the State of Maine," in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. Plaintiffs requested an order declaring "that the challenged orders unconstitutionally infringe upon Plaintiffs’ rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection" and enjoining enforcement of the challenged aspects of the executive orders. 2020 WL 2519973. On May 25, Governor Mills filed an opposition for plaintiffs' motion for PI, asserting that states "have broad latitude when confronting a public health emergency" and that "elimination of the self-quarantine requirement, at least at this time, would threaten the public health, and the plaintiffs’ desire to recreate and visit friends in other states without self-quarantining does not outweigh Maine’s interest in protecting its population." On May 29, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest, stating that "the Court should hold that Maine’s discrimination against out-of-state residents likely violates Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause." The DOJ asserted that the quarantine requirement discriminates between Maine residents and out-of-state residents and that the discrimination appears to be insufficiently tailored to further public safety. Later that day, Judge Walker issued an order denying plaintiffs' motion for PI. Judge Walker concluded that while the executive orders burden plaintiffs' right to travel, plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success sufficient to justify PI because "it is not at all clear that there are any less restrictive means for the state to still meet their goal of curbing COVID-19." Moreover, Judge Walker found that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their due process claim; "Because the COVID-19 scenario is the kind of scenario for which emergency action would be expected, and because Plaintiffs have not persuasively shown that they are denied access to quick and meaningful post-deprivation review of administrative action." Finally, Judge Walker held that the "irreparable harm that plaintiffs would suffer as result of orders did not outweigh state's concern for public health posed by COVID-19 pandemic." However, Judge Walker stated that "Plaintiffs have raised a very serious matter for judicial resolution and I am persuaded that they might be able to demonstrate a violation of the Constitution sometime during the travel of this case." 2020 WL 2791797. On June 1, plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion for PI to the First Circuit (No. 20-1559). Plaintiffs also filed a motion for expedited injunction pending appeal and a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Judge Walker incorrectly placed the burden on plaintiffs to show that the Governor's order was not narrowly tailored. On June 5, Judge Walker issued an order denying plaintiffs' motions for expedited injunction and reconsideration. Judge Walker agreed that the burden of proof rested with the Governor to prove that the orders were narrowly tailored, but stated that he had not indicated that "Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving the Governor’s restrictions were not narrowly tailored, or that they had failed to do so." Judge Walker explained that, in his May 29 order, he found that Governor Mills "carried her burden of proof sufficiently to defeat Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction." On June 8, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay pending appeal, which was granted the next day. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On May 25, 2020, several rural campgrounds and individuals wishing to travel to Maine filed this suit against Governor Mills in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. Plaintiffs challenged Maine's executive orders, which required individuals traveling into Maine to self-quarantine for 14 days, alleging that the orders violated their right to interstate travel, as well as their due process and equal protection rights. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated plaintiffs' right to interstate travel. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and the plaintiffs appealed on June 1 and moved for reconsideration. The court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and the case was stayed on June 8. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 19, 2011, several couples who reside in the state of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Probate Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant's policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. In Alabama, no person may marry without a marriage license. One of a probate judge's ministerial jobs is to issue marriage licenses to those couples that meet the requirements. Alabama law does not explicitly say that proof of citizenship is a requirement to obtaining a marriage license. In fact, in 2008, the Alabama Attorney General, issued a statement saying citizenship was not a requirement to obtaining a marriage license. However, the Montgomery County Probate Office had on its website a requirement of showing "legal presence" in the U.S. for persons 18 years or older trying to obtain a marriage license. On October 21, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On December 2, 2011, the clerk for the Middle District Court of Alabama accepted the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the case.
<|assistant|>
On October 19, 2011, several couples who reside in the state of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Probate Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. On December 2, 2011, the clerk for the Middle District Court of Alabama accepted the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the case.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 1 2018, Sigma Beta Xi (a non-profit organization) and three children filed this class action in the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, National Center for Youth Law, and private counsel, sued the County of Riverside under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. They claimed that Riverside's Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program, which was an alleged probation supervision program, violated their constitutional and state rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not give children adequate notice of charges against them, and used coercion and other misleading tactics to induce them to enter the YAT program without their informed consent. As part of this program, the defendants allegedly searched the homes, belongings, and persons of the children in the YAT program and prohibited children in the YAT program from associating with anyone the program did not approve of. Notably, the complaint contended that the YAT program had a significant adverse impact on Black and Latinx children. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from engaging in the YAT program practices that violated the plaintiffs' rights. On September 5, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint, denying generally and specifically the plaintiff's allegations. They stated that the purpose of the YAT program was to "divert certain youth from the juvenile justice system and instead handle them in an informal, treatment-oriented manner, including, without limitation, the provision of school attendance and behavior monitoring, mentoring, and involvement in pro-social activities" and not, as plaintiffs claimed, to "target, ensnare, and discriminate against children in...schools in Riverside County, by stripping them of their constitutional rights and treating them like criminals." The individual plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to be certified as a class on September 13, 2018. On September 17, 2018, the court granted their motion after determining that the children satisfied the necessary elements of a class (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy). The class was certified as: "All children in Riverside County who have been referred to the Riverside County Youth Accountability Team ("YAT") program pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 601, and who had either been placed on a YAT probation contract or had been referred but not yet placed on a YAT probation contract." The case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution in December of 2018. On January 2, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to a protective order for the youth plaintiffs during the course of this case. After out of court negotiations, the parties moved for class action settlement on July 24, 2019. The proposed settlement agreement mandated the following: 1) Narrowing the category of youth who fall under the jurisdiction of Welfare & Institutions § 602 and will be enrolled in a Welfare & Institutions Code § 654 program or referred for prosecution under Welfare & Institutions Code § 60 2) Defendants agree not to seek or accept referrals from any source regarding any youth under the age of 18 into the YAT program 3) Creation of a presumption for the protection of youth charged with school disruption, possession of alcohol, cigarettes, or marijuana, and possession of a laser pointer or graffiti tools. The Probation Department will counsel and close these matters or refer the youth to a community-based organization 4) Addition of defense counsel to the YAT team to legally advocate for the youth 5) Improvements in the risk-assessment tool used by the YAT program 6) Improvements in communication with youth and their parents/guardians about the responsibilities and expectations involved in the program, including an updated contract 7) Updates in records keeping, data tracking, and personnel policies and training 8) The addition of community representatives to the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Committee The agreement appointed Scott MacDonald and Naomi Goldstein as third-party monitors to report annually on the settlement progress. The agreement is set to expire after 5 years, and the court will retain jurisdiction during that time. The hearing for final approval of the agreement is set for June 20, 2020, although it may be subject to further postponement due to the COVID-19 public health emergency. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
A non-profit and children enrolled in the Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program filed this class action on July 1, 2018 against County of Riverside for implementing practices in the YAT program that violated participants' constitutional rights. The court granted class certification in September 2018 and the case remains ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as class action status for the case, claiming that the defendants' failure to administer medical treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. The defendants refused to provide needed treatment for their medical conditions, Hepatitis C, because the plaintiffs had not completed a DOCS-sponsored substance abuse program. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on September 2, 2005. The state had recently lost similar lawsuits in federal and state courts (see, for example, case PC-NY-52 in the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse database) and, in October 2005, revised its policies so that completion of DOCS substance abuse programs was not required prior to provision of Hepatitis C treatment to prisoners. The defendants thus argued that, as the plaintiffs were now receiving treatment under the revised policy, the plaintiffs' equitable claims were now moot and that class action status should not be accorded the case. District Judge David N. Hurd rejected the defense arguments in a memorandum and order filed on February 27, 2006. He found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot, because the defendants had failed to show (1) there was no reasonable expectation of re-institution of the substance abuse treatment policy and (2) complete eradication of the prior policy's effects. The court noted that the revised policy expressly changed due to litigation losses, not due to the defendants' medical judgment, making it difficult for the court to accept that the defendants might not again revise the policy, at some point, to the plaintiffs' detriment. Additionally, Judge Hurd found class certification appropriate, as some 500 of the approximately 9,000 Hepatitis C-positive prisoners in defendants' custody had been deprived of treatment due to the prior policy making treatment contingent upon meeting the substance abuse program requirement. Plaintiffs' counsel were appointed to serve as class counsel. Hilton v. Wright, 235 F.R.D. 40 (N.D. N.Y. 2006). In the following months, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, including conferences with the court. On July 25, 2007, the parties filed with the court their interim settlement agreement. It made explicit the parties' joint agreement that participation in DOCS' substance abuse programs was not a precondition to provision by DOCS of treatment for Hepatitis C and required notification to DOCS medical personnel and known Hepatitis C-positive prisoners of this policy. Prisoners previously denied treatment under the old policy would now be re-evaluated and would receive treatment, if doing so was medically appropriate. Also under the agreement, DOCS had to report its compliance with the agreement's terms to class counsel, and had to pay class counsel's fees stemming from the case, including those incurred over the two year compliance monitoring period established by the agreement. The period could be extended by agreement of the parties or by order of the court. On January 2, 2008, Judge Hurd approved the settlement, but denied the plaintiff's class application for permission to amend their complaint to assert a claim for damages. On December 14, 2009, Judge Hurd dismissed the first amended complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appealed this decision and the order was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On May 25, 2010, Judge Hurd awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees of $23,152. Judge Hurd had also denied attorney's fees beyond the sum of $23,152, but the plaintiffs appealed this order and it was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On April 20, 2012, the Second Circuit vacated in part the judgment and remanded the case on the basis that the district court did not adequately explain why it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for damages. In addition, because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the Court of Appeals vacated the part of the order denying the plaintiffs' application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court for it to determine in its discretion whether to grant, full or partially, the plaintiffs' application for such costs. Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2012). On May 11, 2013, Judge Hurd issued an opinion vacating the previous orders that the first amended complaint be dismissed and the portion of the order denying attorneys' fees beyond the sum of $23,152. Judge Hurd also granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. All claims relating to the 2003 denial of Hepatitis C treatment based on the length of incarceration requirement was waived. Judge Hurd dismissed all of the claims against the chief medical officer. Judge Hurd awarded additional attorneys' fees of $17,385.45, for a total fee award of $40,537.45. Hilton v. Wright, 928 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). On August 28, 2013 Judge Hurd ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiff $120,000 in full settlement of any and all claims, inclusive of any and all damages, fees, and costs of any kind. Judge Hurd also ordered that all claims or counterclaims were discontinued.
<|assistant|>
On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to administer treatment for Hepatitis C based on completion of a substance abuse program constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. Parties reached a settlement that required treatment regardless of completion of the substance abuse program and defendants were required to pay $120,000 in damages, fees, and costs.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 26, 2011, individuals with disabilities and several related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against New York City and its mayor under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 <i>et seq.</i>, and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), New York City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 <i>et seq.</i> Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Advocates, claimed that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against disabled individuals by inadequately planning for the evacuation of people with disabilities, failing to provide an accessible shelter system; ignoring the unique needs of people with disabilities in the event of a power outage; failing to communicate adequately with people with special needs during an emergency; and failing to account for the needs of people with disabilities in recovery operations following a disaster. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the City's discrimination in emergency planning was demonstrated by the City's response to Hurricane Irene and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which failed in various ways to appropriately accommodate those with disabilities. On June 29, 2012, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a plaintiff and clarify their factual claims. On November 7, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jesse M. Furman) issued an opinion ruling that both the organized and individual plaintiffs had standing to sue and certifying the class defined as "all people with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, who are within the City and the jurisdiction served by the City's emergency preparedness programs and services." 290 F.R.D. 409. On May 10, 2013, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed a statement of interest urging the court to find that the defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and noting among other things that the defendants nowhere contended that making reasonable accommodations was impractical. On November 7, 2013, after a six-day bench trial on the question of liability the District Court (Judge Furman) ruled that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYCHRL. Specifically the court found that: "(1) The City's evacuation plans do not accommodate the needs of people with disabilities with respect to high-rise evacuation and accessible transportation; (2) its shelter plans do not require that the shelter system be sufficiently accessible, either architecturally or programmatically, to accommodate people with disabilities in an emergency; (3) the City has no plan for canvassing or for otherwise ensuring that people with disabilities -- who may, because of their disability, be unable to leave their building after a disaster -- are able to access the services provided by the City after an emergency; (4) the City's plans to distribute resources in the aftermath of a disaster do not provide for accessible communications at the facilities where resources are distributed; (5) the City's outreach and education program fails in several respects to provide people with disabilities the same opportunity as others to develop a personal emergency plan; and (6) the City lacks sufficient plans to provide people with disabilities information about the existence and location of accessible services in an emergency." 980 F. Supp. 2d 588. On December 4, 2013, the District Court ordered the parties to engage in settlement negotiations with a mediator to be paid for by the defendants. Settlement negotiations progressed throughout 2014. On September 30, 2014, the parties indicated they reached a settlement. The court held a fairness hearing on February 13, 2015. On March 6, the court granted final approval of the settlement. The final settlement provided a remedial plan that included increasing shelter accessibility, surveying facilities for use as hurricane shelters, standardized procedures and amenities in emergency evacuation centers and shelters, operational plan for post-emergency rapid survey of population to determine critical needs, development of adequate accessible transportation and communication, increased accessibility to power outage services, hiring of a Disability and Access and Functional Needs Coordinator and the creation of a Disability Community Panel, and development of a high rise evacuation plan. The settlement also provided monitoring and reporting procedures. On August 24, 2015, the parties stipulated to an agreement that the plaintiffs would be awarded $3,700,000 in attorney's fees. Further, the court would retain jurisdiction over the settlement until May 2019, when the agreement's obligations were set to terminate. On three different occasions between 2018 and 2019, the parties jointly agreed to extend the deadline by which the defendant needed to comply with particular terms of the settlement. The defendant has continued submitting status reports with the court. Monitoring appears to be ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2011, individuals with disabilities and related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and its mayor alleging that they failed to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities in their emergency response plan. After a bench trial in November 2013, the District Court ruled for the plaintiffs and later approved a settlement which included policy changes, ongoing monitoring, and attorney's fees. As of April 10, 2020, monitoring appears to be ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 17, 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities under the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs, represented by North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, brought the suit against the state of North Carolina. They asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants discriminated against them. Specifically, they alleged that by reason of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs. Prisoners within the DOC can earn credits that shorten their terms of incarceration if they work or participate in certain programs. Pursuant to the medical gain time policy, the DOC grants disabled inmates sentence reduction credits only if it determines that they are medically unfit to participate in the traditional sentence reduction credit programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOC's definition of "medically unfit" misclassified numerous prisoners with disabilities and excluded them from participation in the medical gain time program even when they were physically unable to participate in traditional sentence reduction credit programs. Furthermore, even when prisoners with disabilities were given the opportunity to earn sentence reduction credits through the medical gain time policy, the DOC discriminated against them by providing the opportunity to earn credits at two-thirds the rate available to prisoners without disabilities. On September 19, 2011, Judge Terrence Boyle granted class certification. The class was defined as all present and future prisoners of the DOC with disabilities "who have been, and may in the future be, discriminated against, excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs by reason of their disabilities." 276 F.R.D. 452. On August 15, 2013, Judge Boyle approved the parties' stipulated consent decree. The agreement mandated that the DOC establish, implement, and modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities. The plaintiffs' attorneys must have an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed policy changes. Additionally, the DOC must create various new full-time positions, including a position dedicated to monitoring the implementation of the new policies and the consent decree. The DOC was required to pay $56,199.02 to Prisoners Legal Services for expenses associated with the implementation of the consent decree. The requirements of the agreement were set to terminate two years following the date of entry, and the agreement allowed for judicial enforcement. On November 1, 2013, Judge Boyle denied hearing any further action in the case from individuals other than through counsel in the suit. Judge Boyle’s decision did not prohibit individuals from filing separate and distinct suits. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In September 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities within the custody of the North Carolina DOC filed a class action lawsuit against the DOC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that, on account of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In August 2013, the Court approved the parties' stipulated consent decree, in which the DOC agreed to modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities and allow a monitor to oversee the implementation of such policies.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 20, 2004, Cintas Corporation employees filed a lawsuit against Cintas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Unfair Business Practices Act, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented initially by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, equitable, and compensatory relief, claiming that Cintas engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that Cintas engaged in, among other practices, discriminatory hiring, recruitment, promotion, assignment, transfer, and compensation. On October 29, 2004, the Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) issued a stipulation and order that defined the scope of the class claims, allowed Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint, and outlined limited discovery and the schedule for Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. On March 22, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel three plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims and stayed the action as to those plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss those plaintiffs from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 658984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2005). The Court granted the EEOC's motion to intervene on April 26, 2005. Finding that the subject matter was of public importance, that the litigation was still in its early stages, that neither party would be prejudiced, and that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant objected to the EEOC's intervention, the Court ordered the EEOC to file a complaint in intervention within seven days. The EEOC filed its complaint in intervention on April 27, 2005. The complaint asked the Court for equitable relief, back-pay, and punitive damages. On September 20, 2005, after the parties filed a stipulation, the Court issued an order relating Ramirez v. Cintas with Houston v. Cintas (Northern District of California, Docket No. C-05-03145-CRB). The Houston case was also transferred to Judge White. On November 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel another plaintiff to arbitrate his claims and stayed that action as to that Plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss the Plaintiff from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 2894628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2005). On December 8, 2005, based on the parties' joint stipulation, the Court dismissed the class action representatives individual claims with prejudice and removed her as the class representative. The order specified, however, that the former class representative could participate as a member of the certified class if she qualified under the class definition. On January 12, 2006, the Court dismissed another putative class representative's claim claims and individuals claims based on the parties' joint stipulation. The Court found that the individual Plaintiff could not serve as class representative and was not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The Court issued a similar order regarding another individual plaintiff on March 9, 2006. On May 11, 2006, the Court ordered that class claims of discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, and women in hiring for certain positions at Cintas' Rental Division, made pursuant to Title VII and § 1981, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. All other claims had been dismissed or stayed pending arbitration. The arbitrator filed an opinion on September 15, 2006. The arbitrator found that the Cintas Employment Agreements permit class-wide arbitration and that there was no limitation to where the class action may be heard. The Court denied Defendant's motion to vacate the arbitration decision on November 22, 2006. The Court found that the arbitrator had not "manifestly disregarded the law" and that the decision was not irrational. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2006 WL 3388628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2006). The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the putative class action claims without prejudice so that they were able to proceed with their individual claims through arbitration on April 3, 2009. Defendant did not oppose the motion and the case was closed on January 28, 2010.
<|assistant|>
This case was brought by African American and Hispanic employees of Cintas Corporation against Cintas, alleging employment discrimination in hiring, promotion, and pay. The case went into arbitration, and the District Court dismissed all claims on January 28, 2010.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the countries granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On August 21, 2019, the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, along with the city of New York, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiff States sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as well as the acting secretaries of both departments in their official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Plaintiff States sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s final public charge rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The Plaintiff States also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defined personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, under the proposed Rule, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. The Plaintiff States asserted that this Rule would force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain permanent resident status. The Plaintiff States further argued that the Rule causes damage to the health and livelihood of immigrant families by deterring them from using these benefits, thereby undermining the sovereign interests of the Plaintiff States and interfering in the policies designed to support the well-being and civil rights of residents. The Plaintiff States contended that the Rule exceeds the Defendant's jurisdiction and authority under the APA; is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion; and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On September 9, 2019, the Plaintiff States filed a motion for preliminary injunction and stay pending judicial review, arguing they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims made in the complaint, and that preliminary relief is in the public interest. The Rule, unless prohibited, was set to go into effect on October 15, 2019. The Plaintiff States asserted that the Rule should not take effect while the legal action was still pending. On September 27, 2019, the Defendants filed an opposition to the motion. The Defendants contended that the Rule is a "well-reasoned definition of public charge providing practical guidance to Executive Branch officials making public charge inadmissibility determinations" based on foundational principles of United States immigration law. The Defendants also argued that the Plaintiff States and City did not meet their burden of establishing standing, that they did not show an actual or imminent threat of harm as the result of the Rule. Although the Plaintiff States claimed that enforcement of the Rule would cause irreparable harm, the Defendants argued that those claims are not enough to establish standing. The Defendants further argued that the Motion should be dismissed because the Plaintiff States' substantive claims lack merit and because the Plaintiff States are outside the zone of interests regulated by the APA. On October 11, 2019, Judge George Daniels granted the motion for preliminary injunction. First, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States had standing, that their claims were ripe for judicial review, and that they were within the zone of interests regulated by the APA. Then, after analyzing the long-standing definition of the term public charge and whether Congress intended to redefine public charge, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States sufficiently alleged that the Rule exceeds statutory authority and is contrary to law. Judge Daniels also ruled that the Plaintiff States sufficiently demonstrated that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States and "law-abiding citizens who have come to this country to seek a better life" will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Finally, Judge Daniels ordered that the injunction be applied nationwide, in order to unify national immigration policy and in consideration of nearly two dozen other jurisdictions that have had suits brought challenging the Rule. 408 F.Supp.3d 334. On October 30, 2019, the Defendants filed an appeal of the order granting preliminary injunction; the Defendants also sought to stay the preliminary injunction. On December 2, 2019, Judge Daniels denied the Defendants' motion to stay. Judge Daniels reasoned that "to stay the injunction would be inconsistent with this Court's underlying findings of Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, and of the irreparable injury that Plaintiffs, noncitizens, and the general public would suffer in the absence of an effective injunction." 2019 WL 6498250. On January 8, 2020, while the Defendants' appeal was pending, the Second Circuit denied the Defendants' motion for stay pending appeal of the nationwide preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 95815. On January 13, 2020, the Defendants submitted to Justice Ginsburg of the Supreme Court an application for stay of the preliminary injunction while the appeal is pending in the Second Circuit. Justice Ginsburg referred the application to the Supreme Court on January 27, 2020. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Defendants' application for stay and thus stayed the District Court’s October 11, 2019 orders granting a nationwide preliminary injunction. In granting the Defendants' application, Justice Gorsuch, writing the opinion for the court, addressed the many suits, injunctions, and stays regarding the Rule occurring across the country and concluded that the "routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions." These nationwide injunctions, Justice Gorsuch reasoned, shared a similar flaw in that "they direct how the defendant must act toward persons who are not parties to the case." Justice Gorsuch also found that these nationwide injunctions encouraged gamesmanship and forum shopping, that if a single district court issued a nationwide injunction, "the government’s hope of implementing any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep, parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0 victory in the courts of appeal." Thus, in granting the Defendants' application for stay and staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court found the occasion to address its concerns with the proliferation of nationwide injunctions. 140 S.Ct. 599. After the Supreme Court ruling, the Defendants stated that the rule would take effect on February 24, 2020. Following the Supreme Court's stay of the preliminary injunction and a Ninth Circuit opinion "concluding that the Rule falls well within the Executive Branch’s discretion to interpret and implement the public charge inadmissibility provision in the INA," the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on February 14, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants were taking "a third bite at the apple" and that because Defendants offered "no new substantive arguments, and this Court has already evaluated and rejected Defendants’ contentions under the more stringent standards governing entry of a preliminary injunction," the motion to dismiss should be denied. On the same day, the Plaintiffs, along with the Plaintiffs in <i>Make the Road New York, et al. v. Kenneth Cuccinelli, et al.,</i> filed a motion to consolidate the two actions for pre-trial purposes. The parties argued that the cases meet the standard for consolidation as they share many common questions of fact and law and also assert the same constitutional violation and cause of action. On March 6, 2020, the Plaintiff States sent a letter to the Defendants urging them "to immediately stop implementation of [the Rule] ... in the wake of the COVID-19 coronavirus." The Plaintiff states asserted that, in the context of a nationwide outbreak of COVID-19, "DHS’s policy of deterring immigrants from using the medical benefits to which they are legally entitled directly undermines and frustrates our public health professionals’ efforts, putting our communities and residents at unnecessary risk." On April 13, 2020, the Plaintiff States filed a motion in the Supreme Court to temporarily lift or modify the Court's stay of the district court's October 11, 2019 and December 6, 2019 orders. The Plaintiffs' asserted that, while state and local authorities had taken "extraordinary efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and protect the health and well-being of ... residents," the Rule undermined those efforts by "deterring immigrants from accessing healthcare and public benefits that are essential tools for protecting the public at large . . . ." The Supreme Court denied the motion to temporarily lift or modify the stay on April 24, 2020, but ruled that “[t]his order does not preclude a filing in the District Court as counsel considers appropriate.” Back in the district court, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction and stay or a temporary restraining order on April 28, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that immigrants would be deterred from seeking public health benefits out of fear of violating the public charge rule, which would exacerbate the national health crisis. These changed facts, the plaintiffs believed, provided the district court the authority to issue an injunction despite the Supreme Court's previous stay. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. 2020 WL 4347264. The Defendants appealed the court’s preliminary injunction order to the Second Circuit on August 3, 2020. On August 12, 2020, the Second Circuit stayed the injunction with respect to all states but the Plaintiff States (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) until the Second Circuit ruled on the motion to stay. The Second Circuit then stayed the second preliminary injunction altogether on September 11, 2020 while the Second Circuit considered the Defendants’ appeal of the district court’s first preliminary injunction order. 974 F.3d 210. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. As a result, the Plaintiffs argued, DHS’s and USCIS’s implementation of the Rule exceeded the departments’ statutory authority under FVRA and was not in accordance with the law under the APA. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s initial preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that the Rule is contrary to the INA and arbitrary and capricious. 969 F.3d 42. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Following their Second Circuit win, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. In response, on November 17, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims that the Rule was invalid because it was issued by an unlawfully serving Acting DHS Secretary, insisting that the Rule was promulgated pursuant to the APA and ratified by lawful agency officials, including the Acting DHS Secretary. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In August of 2019, three states and the City of New York filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Department of Homeland Security's Public Charge Rule, enacted in August of 2019, expanded the number of programs that the federal government would consider when making public charge determinations to include health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Public Charge Rule would result in harm to the Plaintiff States and its residents by deterring legal residents from enrolling in basic benefit programs out of fear of being determined a "public charge" and rendered inadmissible for citizenship. District Court Judge George Daniels granted the Plaintiff States' Motion to Stay Pending Judicial Review and Preliminary Injunction, resulting in the Rule not being implemented as planned. In January 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, and Defendants accordingly implemented the Rule in February 2020. In April 2020, the Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay of the January 2020 order in light of the ongoing COVID-19 national emergency. The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the district court, asserting that the Rule is hindering efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and causing irreparable harm to citizens and non-citizens. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction. The court then enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. The Defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which stayed the second preliminary injunction order until it ruled on the first. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, where the matter was pending as of December 19, 2020. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. The Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs' motion and moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims that the rule was promulgated improperly. The court has yet to rule on these motions as of December 19, 2020. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 17, 2000 the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance that required all police officers and firefighters over the age of 63 to be involuntarily retired at the end of the year. Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). This act makes it unlawful to discharge a person because of his or her age but contains a public safety exception for police officers and firefighters so long as the forced retirement is not a subterfuge. Plaintiff also alleged due process violations under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The case was consolidated with Minch v. City of Chicago, a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On April 9, 2001 Chicago filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Elaine E. Bucklo) granted defendant's motion to dismiss in regards to the due process claims of the police plaintiffs but denied it in regards to all other claims on March 25, 2002. Chicago then filed a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit which was granted on May 5, 2002. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner, Judge Manion, and Judge Rovener) ruled on April 9, 2004 that it was possible for a plaintiff to prevail in a case of this sort but that in this particular case it was not. The Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the ADEA claims. On May 13, 2004 the district court (Judge Samuel Der−Yeghiayan) did so. The cases were completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 after the firefights elected not to continue with their due process claims.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and his due process rights. The case was consolidated with a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On March 25, 2002 the due process claims of the police plaintiffs were dismissed. Defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit which directed on April 9, 2004 that the ADEA complaints be dismissed. The case was completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 when the firefighters elected not to continue with their due process claims.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 4, 2020, three Michigan residents whose vehicles were seized and impounded by police filed this putative class action lawsuit against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the public interest organization Institute for Justice and private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983; they contended that Wayne County's vehicle seizure policies and practices are unconstitutional. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief for violations of the 4th Amendment, the excessive fines clause of the 8th Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The complaint alleged that Wayne County's policies create incentives for "the seizure of property without probable cause" and are designed to "maximize revenue" rather than fight crime. Wayne County allegedly seized and impounded cars "based simply on their proximity to crimes" committed by someone other than the driver. Once confiscated, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay "arbitrary fees" or go through a lengthy nuisance-abatement proceeding without the opportunity to assert an "innocent owners" defense. For the named plaintiff, her car was allegedly impounded because her boyfriend was suspected of engaging in prostitution-related activities. She alleged that her car was impounded twice merely because it was in proximity to prostitution and drug-related activities, and that she was ultimately forced to pay a flat redemption fee to reclaim her vehicle, without an opportunity to assert that she was not present or involved in the alleged activity that prompted the seizure. This process ultimately forced her to file for bankruptcy and lose her car. The plaintiffs seek to certify a class of "persons who own a vehicle (or other property within a vehicle) that has been or will be seized by Defendant Wayne County on or after February 5, 2018 and before the date of class certification, whether pursuant to Michigan’s Controlled Substances Act (MCL 333.7521, et seq.), the Public Nuisances chapter of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 (MCL 600.3801, et seq.), or the so-called Omnibus Forfeiture Act (MCL 600.4701, et seq.)," as well as a subclass of individuals who had their vehicles so seized when they were not present or present but not suspected of any wrongdoing. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on March 12, 2020. They argued that the named plaintiff lacked standing and suffered no constitutional violation because she waived any challenge to the seizure of her property. Further, they contended that there was probable cause - the car was suspected of being connected to prostitution-related activities - to seize her vehicle, and that therefore she had no legal claim. On May 1, 2020, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to specify that the police did not have probable cause to suspect any prostitution-related activities. Additionally, the amended complaint added an new plaintiff to the lawsuit and greater detail about Wayne County's alleged unconstitutional processes and their impact on the defendants. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur J. Tarnow presiding.
<|assistant|>
In 2020, Michigan residents whose cars were seized and impounded filed this putative class action against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that Wayne County's policy of seizing and impounding vehicles and asset forfeiture process violated their 4th, 8th, and 14th amendment rights. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur Tanow presiding.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed this class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. The alleged violations stemmed from Monsanto's conversion on January 1, 1997, of its pension plan from a conventional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. As the case proceeded other cases were consolidated and various additional plaintiffs who had similar complaints and defendants with the same pension plan were joined. On September 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed their final amended consolidated class action complaint. It contained ten counts that constituted three general allegations: that the pension plans violated ERISA by ceasing or reducing the rate an employee's benefits accrued on account of age, that the plans violated ERISA by back-loading the rate at which benefits accrued for older workers, and that the payment of interest on late benefit payments was below the rate specified in one of the plans. On August 29, 2007, the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007, the court dismissed three counts of the complaint relating to the reduction of the rate at which benefits accrued with prejudice on the basis of a recently decided case in the Seventh Circuit. Class action status was certified on May 22, 2008. The district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) issued two opinions on June 11, 2009, concerning the competing motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on the claim that one plan failed to pay adequate interest on delayed pension payments. But the court granted defendants summary judgment on the counts relating to the back-loading of the rate at which benefits accrued. On October 27, 2009, plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on September 22, 2010, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. On September 30, 2014, the district court ordered the exhibits to be destroyed or disposed of, and the case closed.
<|assistant|>
On June 23, 2004 plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. On August 29, 2007 the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007 the court dismissed part of the complaint. On June 11, 2009 the district court summary judgment to the plaintiffs on one remaining claim and to defendants on all others. On October 27, 2009 plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on July 30, 2010 the decision of the district court was affirmed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 17, 2015, death row prisoners at California's San Quentin prison, who had been kept in prolonged solitary confinement, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were confined under inhumane and degrading conditions for excessively long periods, from three to twenty-six years, without meaningful review of their placement or hope of release. The plaintiffs claimed that they were deprived of basic human needs, suffered serious psychological and physical injury, had been coerced into providing information, and were subject to disproportionate punishment. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that they were placed in solitary confinement on the basis of allegations of gang affiliation without reliable evidence, even though they were not involved in any current gang activity. On August 17, 2015, this case was reassigned to Judge Claudia Wilkens, who had also been assigned to a similar case, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12103">Ashker v. Brown.</a> On September 8, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas for settlement and a settlement conference was set for October 28, 2015. As of May, 14, 2016, settlement negotiations were ongoing, and both parties continued to submit status reports. On October 10, 2016, there was a settlement conference before Judge Vadas but the matter was not settled. Another settlement conference was scheduled for January 3, 2017, and it was rescheduled for February 15, 2017. On January 17, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. On February 15, 2017, the defendants and five of the six plaintiffs entered into a full settlement of the case. Under the settlement, the parties agreed to stay the litigation and suspend all activity until July 18, 2017. The litigation was to remain stayed for an additional ninety days, during which time the plaintiffs could move to have the stay lifted by showing current, ongoing, and systemic constitutional violations continued to exist as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. If the plaintiffs did not file such a motion by October 17, 2017, the parties agreed that the case would be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. One plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement, and because of this, the plaintiffs argued that the settlement agreement was invalid. The parties continued to negotiate and the plaintiffs presented the defendants with a proposed settlement agreement that was signed by all six plaintiffs. The defendants requested further time to negotiate. On July 24, 2017, the parties requested to stay the litigation once again. On August 21, 2017, Judge Wilken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the parties' ongoing efforts to settle the case. On October 3, 2017, the parties were still negotiating and declared that they would update the court on their progress towards settlement on October 10, 2017. On October 10, 2017, the parties were still negotiating. On November 9, 2017, the parties requested that the matter be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and Judge Wilken granted this order. On January 10, 2018, there was a motion to intervene filed and on January 26, 2018, there was a motion for relief from judgment. Both motions were filed by the same individual, and both motions were denied by Judge Wilken on September 5, 2018.
<|assistant|>
In 2015 death row prisoners at San Quentin prison, who have been kept in solitary confinement for years without meaningful review, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was voluntarily dismissed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. They faced imminent removal to Iraq. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, the ACLU National Immigrant Rights Project, and other counsel, they alleged that their removal into dangerous circumstances would violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and that removing them without giving them a chance to assert their defenses under the INA and CAT would violate the Due Process Clause. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and was assigned to Judge Mark Goldsmith. The same day as they initiated the action, petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The government filed its opposition, and the motion was heard on June 21, 2017. The next day, the District Court granted a 14-day emergency stay of removal pending fuller consideration and decision on the court's authority over the matter. The stay was set for 14 days preliminarily. On June 24, 2017, the petitioners filed a complaint and amended habeas petition, along with a motion to expand the June 22nd 14-day Order Staying Removal to cover a nationwide class of Iraqi nationals facing imminent removal to Iraq. On June 26, the Court granted that the motion, staying removal of "all Iraqi nationals in the United States with final orders of removal, who have been, or will be, arrested and detained by ICE as a result of Iraq’s recent decision to issue travel documents to facilitate U.S. removal." 2017 WL 2806144 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The stay was effective for 14 days, until July 10. On June 29, 2017, the petitioners/plaintiffs (the petitioners became plaintiffs when they filed the complaint in addition to the habeas petition) filed a motion to extend the 14-day stay of removal until resolution of the preliminary injunction they said they'd file on July 14; they also sought discovery of basic information about the putative class. The government opposed both motions. On July 6, Judge Goldsmith extended the 14 day stay until July 24; on July 22, he ruled that he had jurisdiction, and confirmed that the stay would remain in effect. He wrote: <blockquote>"This Court concludes that to enforce the Congressional mandate that district courts lack jurisdiction — despite the compelling context of this case — would expose Petitioners to the substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution before their legal claims can be tested in a court. That would effectively suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which the Constitution prohibits."</blockquote> At a subsequent status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule; the petitioners' preliminary relief brief was due July 17, the government's response July 20, and any reply by July 21 in the morning. The court undertook to rule on that motion by July 24. On July 24, 2017, the District Court granted the petitioners' requested preliminary relief, staying the enforcement of final orders of removal directed to any and all Iraqi nationals in the United States who had final orders of removal on June 24, 2017, and who have been, or will be, detained for removal by ICE. 261 F.Supp.3d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The court explained that the stay of removal would last for each particular class member until he or she completed adjudication of a motion to reopen through the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and (if he or she lost in the immigration courts) until the U.S. Court of Appeals denied an individual stay of removal. The motions to reopen are due, the court said, within 90 days of when the government provides each class member with his or her immigration file. (If a class member fails to file a motion to reopen, or fails to appeal, the stay of removal will expire, as well.) On September 22, 2017, the government appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal on the July preliminary injunction was proceeding, various administrative matters moved forward: immigration files were delivered, etc. More substantively, the plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 13, 2017, raising claims that the class's prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 1, the government moved to dismiss. On November 7, plaintiffs sought a second preliminary injunction on the new detention claims (and also filed an amended motion for class certification). After a hearing on December 22, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on January 2, 2018; he held that any detainee who had spent more than 6 months in detention -- nearly all of them -- was entitled to release 30 days later unless an Immigration Judge found by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing that that detainee poses a flight risk or public safety risk. 285 F.Supp.3d 997 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit consolidated that second appeal with the prior one, which had not yet been argued. Consolidated argument was held April 25, 2018. The matter continued in the district court, with many small issues contested and decided. Among those decisions: The court decided that the regulatory process for governmental immigration bond appeals was unlawful, because it allowed the government to unilaterally extend prolonged detention, and because the process by which the government could obtain a stay of bond release was standardless and deprived the detainee of the opportunity to be heard timely. On June 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion, seeking to remedy alleged coercion by the government, which was trying to obtain detainees "voluntary" agreement to be deported. On June 20, 2018, the court issued an order requiring, among other things, seven day notice to class counsel of any consular interviews, that the government permit and facilitate communication between the class and class counsel, and that the government cease any threatening or coercive communications with class members. However, class counsel argued that the government was failing to comply, in part by failing to provide detainees with notice of their right to communicate with class counsel at a specific staging facility. The petitioners also argued that class members were suffering mistreatment at the Calhoun County Jail as a result of their involvement in this case. On August 22, 2018, Judge Goldsmith agreed that the government was not obligated to provide this notice at temporary staging facilities under his previous order, but found the petitioners claims of mistreatment substantiated. He ordered the government to provide class counsel with the names of detainees at the Calhoun County Jail who had faced administrative or disciplinary sanction. Judge Goldsmith denied the government’s motion to dismiss on September 24, 2018, at the same time granting the petitioners’ motion to certify the primary class. 342 F.Supp.3d 751 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The petitioners moved for a third preliminary injunction on November 1, 2018, arguing that the subclass of detainees who had been held longer than six months were entitled to immediate release from detention because there was not a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioners argued that under <i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i>, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in the absence of such a likelihood, prolonged detention was unlawful. On November 20, 2018, Judge Goldsmith granted that injunction, ruling to release all detainees who had been held longer than six months under orders of supervision. 349 F.Supp.3d 665 (E.D. Mich 2018). The releases were to take place no later than December 20, 2018. All but a handful of the detainees were released by that date. On January 18, 2019, the government appealed. Also on December 20, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in the consolidated appeals from the first two preliminary injunctions. 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). Writing for the court, Judge Alice Batchelder vacated the District Court’s preliminary injunctions halting removal and ordering bond hearings. The case was ordered remanded with instructions to dismiss the removal-based claims for lack of jurisdiction. On February 4, 2019, the petitioners filed for en banc rehearing of the decision, arguing that the INA did not strip the court of jurisdiction, and that such a broad reading would create a circuit split as well as intra-circuit conflict. The petition for rehearing delayed the effective date of the Court of Appeals order until it was denied; the order then became effective on April 9, 2019. That meant that as of April 9, 2019, the stay of removal was lifted. However, the vacatur of the bond order did not mean that anyone got redetained, because those released on bond were protected by the third preliminary injunction, the release order. The third appeal was still pending, and back in District Court, Judge Goldsmith issued an order on March 12, 2019, staying the case pending resolution of that third appeal. Although Judge Goldsmith stayed future substantive proceedings at the district level, he ruled that the court would continue to supervise compliance with non-reversed court orders. So the release order remained in effect. However, Judge Goldsmith set up a process by which the government could seek to redetain individuals whom ICE believed were close to removal; for several of these individuals, the Court granted redetention. It seemed that Iraq had begun to allow a few removals of class members. In fact, one such class member <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/us/jimmy-aldaoud-iraq-deport.html"> died</a> in Iraq shortly after his repatriation there. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs/petitioners sought certiorari review of the Sixth Circuit's stay ruling. On January 3, 2020, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision with regard to the third preliminary injunction, which required the government to release all primary subclass members once the government has detained them for six months. Judge Jeffery Sutton delivered the opinion, in which the court vacated the injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The appeals court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this class-wide injunction and that it was inappropriate to extend Zadvyas to this setting. Similar to the reasoning in the appeals court's last opinion, the district court lacked jurisdiction because the INA stripped all courts, save for the Supreme Court, of "jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232." The appeals court reasoned that <i>Zadvyas</i> should not be extended because in that case aliens were detained under one provision while in this case, the government has detained class members under four provisions. Because the provisions in each case differed, the appeals court reasoned that the district court should not have extended the <i>Zadvyas</i> standard onto the different provisions. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on February 16, 2020. On February 16, 2020, Judge Goldsmith issued an order administratively closing the case pending resolution of appellate matters. Judge Goldsmith concluded that administratively closing the case was appropriate because the Sixth Circuit had yet to issue an operative ruling and that such a ruling would eventually impact further proceedings. While the case was administratively closed for the time being, the district court would continue to supervise and maintain the status quo of the third preliminary injunction until the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate. As of March 16, 2020, the first preliminary injunction (the stay of removal) was vacated, but the matter remained pending on a petition for Supreme Court review. Both the second and third preliminary injunctions were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On July 2, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the the petition for writ of certiorari. On November 25, 2020, one of the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied on December 23. The plaintiff filed a letter on December 24, 2020, which the court treated this letter as a motion for reconsideration of the denial. On January 25, 2021, the court denied to reconsider it because they did not find that there was a palpable defect in the original denial. On March 3, the parties filed a joint memorandum requesting an adjournment of a status conference in light of the Department of Homeland Security's plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021. On March 4, the court granted the request. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The district court stayed petitioners' removal, but that injunction was vacated by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioners petitioned for Supreme Court review, which was denied on July 2, 2020. The case is ongoing and the Department of Homeland Security plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 23, 2015, a group of inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act (the "FCA"), 47 U.S.C. §§201,206,207 and 276, and Pennsylvania law. They alleged that GTL participated in unjust, unreasonable, unfair and deceptive conduct from January 1, 2000 through the present (the "Class Period") by charging exorbitant rates and fees - up to 100 times normal market rates for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities throughout the United States. GTL and its subsidiaries serve over 2,200 correctional facilities and 1.1 million inmates in forty-eight states. The plaintiffs sought certification of this action as a class action and declaratory and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that GTL created a monopoly through exclusive contracts with thousands of correctional facilities, and therefore faces little or no market competition to challenge its intrastate telephone rates. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that in return for this monopoly power, GTL provided kickbacks to the contracting facilities. Reports have estimated that the kickbacks paid to correctional facilities exceed $124 million per year. During rule-making proceedings, the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") looked at whether intrastate charges were unreasonably high, unfair, and far in excess of the cost of providing service. The FCC concluded that they were, and that GTL had exploited their economic position by charging rates for intrastate calls greatly exceeding the cost of providing service, in direct violation of Sections 201 and 276 of the FCA that those rates be just, reasonable, and fair. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiffs' filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Western District of Arkansas to join a related pending cases against GTL. That motion was granted on May 31, 2016. Once transferred, the case was consolidated with <i>Chruby et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corporation</i> by Judge Timothy L. Brooks. Once consolidated, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was considered and denied by Judge Brooks, citing aspects of the cases brought that required overwhelmingly claimant-specific factual analysis. Plaintiffs' filed an appeal on this question to the US Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 12, 2017, and the petition was denied and October 27, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 27, 2018.
<|assistant|>
In 2015, inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act. They alleged that GTL charged exorbitant rates and fees for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities. Following consolidation with related cases in the Western District of Arkansas, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied, as was their petition to appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case was dismissed with prejudice in 2018.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
On March 18, 1997, a federal inmate in state custody in Texas filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that the defendants had exhibited a deliberative indifference to his medical condition and as such had violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that when he entered the custody of the Defendants his initial medical screening health questionnaire was incorrectly completed in violation of policy. The Plaintiff asserted that as a result of the indifferent administration of the initial medical screening health questionnaire, he was incorrectly classified as not disabled which prevented him from receiving the accommodations he required. Plaintiff in fact has epilepsy, major depression, and a number of other disabling disorders. The Plaintiff was subsequently housed in the administrative segregation section, rather than in the hospital ward as he claimed was required by his medical condition. The Plaintiff contends that this initial misclassification upon entry into custody lead to 17 months of being housed in an incorrect unit without access to the proper accommodations he was entitled to as a disabled person. The Plaintiff claimed that the lack of proper accommodations led to excessive seizures and mental anguish. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition and failed to adequately treat the Plaintiff's chronic kidney disorder for 17 months, which had serious implications for his health in violation of the equal protection clause and the due process clause. Additionally, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had breached their duty owed to the Plaintiff as a disabled person by compelling him to wear leg irons, despite their use having been restricted because of his orthopedic disability. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care to control his diabetes, which led to a partial loss of his vision. The Plaintiff further contended that as a result of his inadequate medical care and incorrect classification, he stood trial for a federal crime in a diminished mental and debilitative state in violation of his 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights. On motion for summary judgment, the District Court first found that Congress did not intend for the Americans with Disabilities Act to apply to the treatment of prisoners within state prisons. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff's ADA claim. Pursuant to the 11th Amendment, the District Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities. On the Plaintiff's deprivation of medical care claims, the court held that o amount a constitutional deprivation of medical care, the acts or omissions must be "sufficiently serious to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Negligent failure to supply medical care does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Consequently, as to the Plaintiff's §1983 claims, the District Court held that Hall was not denied medical care and consistently received medical care throughout his incarceration, therefore even taken as true, the Defendant's acts and omissions did not amount to a constitutional deprivation of medical care. Therefore, the Plaintiff's §1983 claims were dismissed by the District Court. In the end, the District Court granted all of the summary judgment motions before it, and dismissed a number of claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff argued that the District Court incorrectly granted the motions for summary judgment and the dismissals for failure to state a claim. On October 26, 1999, the 5th Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders but also held that the District Court had erred in holding that the ADA does not apply to prisoners incarcerated in state prisons. Nevertheless, though it held that the ADA applies to the Plaintiff while incarcerated in the County Jail, the 5th Circuit upheld the District Court's decision on grounds of qualified immunity because the Plaintiff failed to show that the Defendants had shown a deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
<|assistant|>
In this prison conditions case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to prisons. The Court upheld the District Court's denial of plaintiff's claim on qualified immunity grounds.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
On November 15, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner and former prisoner observation aid (POA) at the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility (Huron Valley), filed a claim against the warden of Huron Valley, as well as a corrections officer and another staff member at Huron Valley in the U.S. District Court of Eastern Michigan. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The case was presided over by Judge Sean F. Cox. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, monetary damages, and for the plaintiff to be reinstated as a POA at Huron Valley. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants fired her from her position as a POA in retaliation for reporting misconduct against two mentally ill prisoners to external professional advocates and organizations when her internal reports went unanswered and unresolved. Specifically, the plaintiff witnessed and reported the following: a mentally ill prisoner being “hog-tied” naked and left for an extended period of time screaming in pain, as well as another mentally ill prisoner whose water was intentionally cut off from her cell for multiple days and who later went into cardiac arrest after foaming at the mouth and vomiting from severe dehydration. In both instances, the plaintiff made repeated reports to appropriate officers and staff at Huron Valley, but these reports were ignored. On June 1, 2018, the defendant's motioned for summary judgement. The motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 27, 2019. The court granted the summary judgement in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claims, as well as her First Amendment retaliation claim as it pertained to monetary damages. The summary judgement was also denied in part in favor of the plaintiff with regard to the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against the defendants in their official capacity. The case was dismissed on July 26, 2019 after a settlement agreement was reached between the two parties. Through the settlement agreement, the plaintiff was awarded $6,000 in damages, the option to resume her position as a POA at Huron Valley, and the removal of any records of notations regarding the plaintiff’s initial termination. In addition to the relief awarded directly to the plaintiff, the defendants agreed to instate a new policy allowing POA’s to report misconduct to outside organizations if internal reports are ignored, a training for POA’s on this new policy, and a mandatory annual training given to prison officers and staff regarding prisoners with mental illness. Lastly, defendants agreed to pay $60,000 in attorney's fees.
<|assistant|>
A former prison observation aid witnessed and reported two instances of gross misconduct by prison staff against mentally ill inmates to appropriate supervisors but plaintiff's reports went unanswered. After reporting the misconduct to external organizations and advocates, the plaintiff was fired in retaliation. The case was dismissed after a settlement agreement between the parties; plaintiff was awarded relief and reform was made to the prison's policies.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: In this preexisting class action addressing medical care in Arizona's prisons, the district court denied COVID-19 emergency relief on March 23, 2020. Notwithstanding the grave threats posed by congregate imprisonment during the pandemic, the court held that the emergency measures sought by the plaintiffs were outside of its authority under the settlement agreement in this case. However, the Court did (subsequently) order Arizona to disclose to class counsel who had been tested and the results. <hr> This case is a direct descendant of <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11975"><i>Gamez v. Ryan</i></a>, docket number CV-10-2070-PHX-JWS (MEA). That case was dismissed with prejudice on March 21, 2012 after the district court judge determined that the third amended complaint added additional claims and the plaintiffs that were not within the contemplation of the court at the time that it dismissed the second amended complaint. On March 22, 2012, fourteen Arizona prisoners brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), under § 1983. Represented by the ACLU, the Prison Law Office, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the ADOC deprived them of access to adequate health care and that even when prisoners were allowed access to treatment, they did not receive adequate care. They also alleged the defendants subjected prisoners in isolation to unconstitutional conditions. The case was assigned to Judge Neil Wake. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently exhaust administrative remedies, and that their claims were moot. The District Court denied the motion as to all three claims. On March 6, 2013, Judge Wake granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification, finding that all the prerequisites for class certification had been met. The class included all prisoners who were subjected to any of the following practices: failure to provide timely access to health care; failure to provide timely emergency treatment; failure to provide necessary medication and medical devices; insufficient health care staffing; failure to provide care for chronic diseases and protection from infectious disease; failure to provide timely access to medically necessary specialty care; failure to provide timely access to basic dental treatment; practice of extracting teeth that could be saved by less intrusive means; failure to provide mentally ill prisoners medically necessary mental health treatment (i.e. psychotropic medication, therapy, and inpatient treatment); and/or failure to provide suicidal and self-harming prisoners basic mental health care. The class certification also included subclasses of prisoners who were held in isolation and suffered from any of the following practices: inadequate psychiatric monitoring because of chronic understaffing; use of chemical agents against inmates on psychotropic medications; lack of recreation; extreme social isolation; constant cell illumination; limited property; and/or insufficient nutrition. 289 F.R.D. 513. On July 10, 2013, the defendants appealed the grant of class certification to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals because the class included all 33,000 prisoners in the ADOC. The following day, the defendants filed an Emergency Motion to Stay in the District Court, pending adjudication of the appeal. Judge Wake denied the defendants' emergency motion on August 9, 2013, weighing heavily the nature of the allegations and the potential risk to the plaintiffs. To mitigate the burden on the defendants and to conserve judicial resources, Judge Wake set firm parameters for the completion of discovery. A three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of class certification on June 5, 2014. 754 F.3d 657. The defendants petitioned for a rehearing en banc on July 3, 2014. The petition was denied on April 21, 2015. On May 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on August 7, 2014. 2014 WL 3887867. The defendants' primary argument was that the named plaintiffs received constitutionally adequate medical and dental care and therefore lacked standing. Judge Wake denied summary judgment on this point because the plaintiffs were not challenging care on any particular occasion, but exposure to the risk of harm stemming from inadequate policies and practices. The District Court also denied summary judgment on the conditions of solitary confinement claim. While the defendants argued that each particular practice or condition challenged was constitutional, the District Court stressed that the relevant issue was whether the totality of the conditions in the isolation units exposed the prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm (a lack of social interaction and environmental stimulation). On October 14, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation. The defendants agreed to remedy the ADOC health care system by meeting more than 100 performance measures, including particular screenings and procedures, staffing requirements, and the provision of interpreters for health services. The agreement also required the defendants to reform policies relating to prisoners with serious mental illnesses in isolation units. Modifications included increasing access to mental health treatment, increasing time spent outside of the cell, and restricting the use of pepper spray to a last resort in preventing serious injury or escape. Finally, the settlement provided for ongoing monitoring and oversight by the plaintiffs' lawyers. The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court over disputes arising out of the stipulation, and agreed not to move to terminate the stipulation for at least four years. The defendants agreed to pay $4.9 million in attorneys' fees and costs and up to $250,000 a year in reasonable fees for enforcement in the future. On February 18, 2015, the stipulation was approved by Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan, who was assigned to oversee enforcement of the stipulation. Between the confirmation of the stipulation in February 2015 and April 2016, there were many court-mediated discussions regarding the defendants’ fulfillment of the stipulation. On May 20, 2016, the court ordered the defendants to submit a plan detailing how they were going to comply with certain stipulation measures they had failed to address. On May 27, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for criminal investigation, arguing that the failure to provide adequate medical care and the reckless tolerance of those conditions is a felony that should be investigated by the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice. This motion was denied, but was followed by another motion to enforce the stipulation on July 12, 2016. Over the next two years, the plaintiffs filed several motions to enforce the stipulation and the defendants were ordered to submit several plans for correcting their non-compliance. Per court orders, the parties also met and conferred about once a month regarding the defendants’ compliance with the stipulation. On July 25, 2017, the court ordered defendants to stop harassing and intimidating witnesses who provided information to the court. The plaintiffs’ counsel had previously been asked to notify the court about any allegations of retaliation that occurred in the prisons. There were several evidentiary hearings concerning these allegations. On September 30, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part several of the plaintiffs’ motions to enforce the stipulation. The court found the defendants to be in compliance with some of the performance measures but not with others. On October 10, 2017, however, the court ordered that the defendants had been so substantially non-compliant that it considered imposing civil contempt. The court listed the performance measures the defendants had not properly complied with. Per the court’s instructions, by January 5, 2018 the defendants were required to file a list of instances of non-compliance during December 2017 and on January 9, 2018, the defendants had to show why the court should not impose sanctions of $1,000 per incident of non-compliance. After receiving several extensions to file this list, the defendants provided a partial list. The parties could not agree on what would qualify as “substantial noncompliance” to trigger the enforcement process. In February 2018, Judge Duncan ruled that the defendants will be “substantially non-compliant” with the stipulation whenever a performance measure falls below 85% for more than six months within any 24-month period, or if a performance measure falls below 85% for three consecutive months. On June 22, 2018, the court issued several orders in an attempt to resolve the issues faced since the stipulation came into effect. First, the court found the defendants in civil contempt, determining 1,445 instances of violations of performance measures. The defendants were ordered to pay $1,445,000 in contempt fines. 2018 WL 3239691. Next, because there had been little progress made by the defendants’ multiple revised remediation plans, the court used its authority under the stipulation to require the defendants to hire outside experts to evaluate the continuing violations. The six categories to be evaluated were: pharmacy, intersystem transfers, access to care, diagnostic services, specialty care, chronic care, and infirmary care. The defendants were required to submit a list of two experts in each category to the court for evaluation and selection. 2018 WL 3238938. Additionally, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to terminate monitoring of certain performance measures. The court ordered the defendants to retain an expert to evaluate the monitoring process, ensuring the defendants would not overstate their compliance. 2018 WL 3238944. Further, the court ordered the defendants to reinstall the health needs request form boxes that had been removed from housing units in the prisons and to resume the previous process for collecting and logging prisoners’ health requests. 2018 WL 3083847. The court also ordered the defendants to file a plan to implement the recommendations made by BJ Millar of Advisory Board Consulting. Finally, the court awarded the plaintiffs additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,259,991.98 for the work performed since the stipulation began. 2018 WL 3238944. The case was also reassigned a few days later to Senior Judge Roslyn O Silver after Judge Duncan retired. On September 28, 2018, the court again granted a motion filed by the plaintiffs to enforce parts of the stipulation and ordered the defendants to file a plan to address the non-compliance. On December 11, 2018, the court appointed outside expert Dr. Mark Stern to evaluate the defendants’ non-compliance and analyze the cause of it, following its order on June 22, 2018. While the parties had a disagreement on the scope of the expert engagement, including the scope of the information the expert could access, the court solved this dispute by ordering the defendants to allow the expert quite broad access to the documents and the personnel he needed to fulfill his obligation. 2019 WL 396930. On December 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the federal judge “may, in the future, consider ordering Defendants to develop and implement a plan to increase [health care] staffing in general as a remedy for Defendants’ non-compliance.” <i>See Parsons v. Ryan</i>, 912 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 2018). On January 11, 2019, the defendants filed the motion to terminate the monitoring and reporting of Maximum Custody Performance Measure which required the defendant to provide the isolated inmates out-of-cell time, including time for exercise and group-programming, claiming that they achieved the condition for termination by achieving most of the requirements. The plaintiffs objected to the motion, claiming that the defendant’s monitoring and reporting system was so unreliable that their self-reported findings could not support termination. In January 2019, ADOC announced that they would change the healthcare provider from Corizon to another private company as of July 1, 2019. After this announcement, some of the plaintiffs received medical bills and collection notices that should have been paid by Corizon. Also, the plaintiffs were concerned that the upcoming transition of health care provider would not be properly made because a jail in the other jurisdiction had reported that Corizon’s operation for the transition of health care provider was flawed and caused a serious problem in meeting the medical and mental care need in the facility. To ensure the appropriate transition of the healthcare provider, the plaintiffs filed a motion to require the production of a Health Care Transition Plan on March 4, 2019. On October 11, 2019, after the court expert filed a report that “confirm[ed] the Court’s long held belief that pervasive issues have precluded accurate monitoring of certain performance measures and that even the low compliance levels reported in some instances may be worse,” Judge Silver issued an order that gave the parties three options to proceed in this case. The parties had the options to proceed by: (1) robust efforts to coerce compliance with the stipulation, (2) a new settlement based in part on Dr. Stern’s recommendations, or (3) concluding the stipulation to be irretrievably breached by the defendants and proceeding to trial. The parties agreed to engage in settlement negotiations, and the court granted the parties 60 days to attempt to reach a new agreement. Settlement did not occur. The defendants appealed the District Court's eleven orders issued on June 22, 2018, imposing contempt sanctions, awarding attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs, appointing expert witnesses, and otherwise enforcing obligations under the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs cross-appealed from the attorneys’ fees order. On January 29, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order holding the defendants in contempt; affirmed the order partially granting and partially denying the defendants’ motion to terminate the monitoring of certain performance measures; affirmed the order requiring the defendants to reinstall Health Needs Request boxes for prisoners to submit forms requesting medical assistance; dismissed the remainder of the medical needs appeal for lack of jurisdiction; and affirmed in part and reversed in part the order awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for work performed post-stipulation. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit vacated the attorneys' fees order and remanded with instructions to (a) recalculate the fee award by determining the correct hourly rates for each year, (b) exclude from any fee award the 11 hours erroneously included; (c) modify the costs award down by $1,285.79 in light of the district court’s failure to reflect the downward adjustments in its prior order; and (d) reweigh whether a fee enhancement was appropriate. <i>See Parsons v. Ryan</i>, No. 18-16358, 949 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2020). The defendants' petition for rehearing en banc was denied on April 17, 2020. On January 31, 2020, Judge Silver issued an order finding that the defendants remain substantially noncompliant with a significant number of Performance Measures at multiple locations. In light of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the district court may impose contempt sanctions to coerce performance, the court found further sanctions appropriate and required defendants to pay a $100,000 monthly fine for each instance of future noncompliance beginning on March 1, 2020. The court ordered that the defendants shall come into compliance regarding every Performance Measure and location identified in the January 31, 2020, order by March 1, 2020. The court ordered that if further monetary sanctions did not result in the defendants’ compliance with their contractual obligations as of the compliance numbers for July 2020, the court would set the case for trial. On February 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the stipulation, claiming that the parties had completed the multi-step process regarding eleven performance measures and asking the court to order the defendants to produce a remediation plan regarding those performance measures. The court granted the motion on April 23, 2020 and ordered the defendants to submit a remediation plan for non-compliant performance measures within 14 days. On April 27, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Appellate Commissioner ordered $152,069.40 in attorneys' fees to be paid by defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On May 6, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the stipulation as to the performance measure requiring urgent specialty consultations and diagnostic services to be scheduled and completed within 30 calendar days of any requests. The plaintiffs claimed that the state had missed the deadlines to cure their noncompliance imposed in May 2019 and therefore should be fined a total of $400,000. Additionally, the plaintiffs asked the court to order the defendants to consult with a court-appointed health care expert to discuss their failures and implement his recommendations. On May 8, the Ninth Circuit addressed four consolidated appeals regarding various orders in 2018, including the defendant's contempt order, plaintiff's appeal of the attorneys' fee calculation, and several orders relating to specific medical needs. The court affirmed the district court’s contempt order but remanded the calculation of the attorneys’ fees due to errors in the calculation of hourly wage. For the medical needs appeals, the court affirmed the district court’s termination order denying the defendant’s request to terminate certain Performance Measures and the HNR-Box order, in which it ordered defendants to reinstall HNR boxes, but dismissed the rest for lack of jurisdiction. On May 20, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to enforce the stipulation for certain performance measures relating to the minimum time required for the prisoners to spend outside their cells. The plaintiffs asked the court to find the defendants noncompliant for the period of November 2016 to August 2019 for all maximum custody units. They also sought an order requiring the defendants to implement the terms of the Stipulation. On May 27, the defendants responded to the May 6 motion and argued that the court’s May 2019 order was valid only for June 2019, and not for the period after July 2019. <hr> COVID-19 Litigation: On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion requesting the court to order the defendants to collaborate with Dr. Marc Stern, the court’s expert, to immediately develop and implement a plan for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in Arizona prisons. Specifically, plaintiffs' suggested plan included the following components: 1. Patient education; 2. Screening, testing, treatment, and housing of class members; 3. Provision of hygiene and cleaning supplies; 4. Health care and custody staffing plans; 5. Coordination with community hospitals and among the ten prisons; and 6. Reduction in the density of the population for class members who are high risk according to the standards set forth by the CDC. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested that the court order defendants to suspend all department orders, policies, and/or regulations that: 1. Charge class members for hygiene supplies including soap; 2. Charge class members $4.00 for submitting a Health Needs Request seeking medical care; 3. Designate ethyl-alcohol based hand sanitizer as contraband. The District Court granted expedited briefing, and the defendants responded on March 18, 2020. They argued that the ADOC is following a prevention and response plan guided by CDC recommendations and outlined the policy changes in effect in light of COVID-19. Because the defendants maintained that ADOC already has a robust and detailed plan in place, they recommended that the plaintiffs' emergency motion be denied in full. The plaintiffs' replied on March 20, 2020, urging the court to order the defendants to work with Dr. Stern, the expert, because in the past the defendants repeatedly failed to meaningfully implement proposed plans and failed to provide basic healthcare. On March 23, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion. Although the court acknowledged that defendants have failed to comply with the performance measures, it found that "that does not empower the Court to exercise general control over matters such as prisoner education or the distribution of hygiene and cleaning supplies." Additionally, the court found that plaintiffs’ motion did not point to clear provisions of the stipulation that would authorize the type of order they seek. On March 23, 2020, the defendants issued a press release stating that six prisoners had been tested for COVID-19. The next day, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote defendants’ counsel, requesting the class members’ identities, and asking to be notified if and when additional class members are tested in the future so that plaintiffs’ counsel could monitor the delivery of health care to these persons. The defendants refused to provide the requested information on the basis that the stipulation does not cover COVID-19 or require defendants to provide this information to plaintiffs. On April 2, 2020, the court ordered defendants to produce this information, finding that COVID-19 is covered by the parties' stipulation. Therefore, to comply with the stipulation and the specified performance measures, the court ordered the defendants to provide plaintiffs the names and identification numbers of prisoners tested for COVID-19 and the results, on a weekly basis. On April 27, two individuals filed a motion for injunction and house arrest, seeking preventative measures to combat COVID-19 or for release from custody. The motions were denied on June 9 as they are class members and cannot file motions on their own behalf. On June 12, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce paragraph 14 of the stipulation, which required an interpretation of healthcare encounters for non-English speakers. The defendants responded on July 28, arguing that the motion is based largely on information that predates Centurion’s assumption of inmate healthcare in July 2019, and that translation services are currently available. A mediation was held on August 24, 2020, to address the parties' compliance with the Stipulation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendants continue to provide monthly status reports regarding their compliance with court orders. $147,265.20 in attorneys' fees was awarded to plaintiffs on December 28, 2020. The case is currently in discovery and ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On March 22, 2012, fourteen Arizona prisoners brought this suit alleging that the ADOC deprived plaintiffs of adequate health and dental care and claiming that defendants subjected prisoners in isolation to unconstitutional conditions. Class certification was granted in March 2013 and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in June 2014. The parties filed a stipulation on October 14, 2014 in which defendants agreed to reform both the health care system and policies relating to prisoners in isolation. After filing the stipulation, the parties worked with the court to enforce the stipulation. The court ordered the defendants to pay civil contempt sanctions for their non-compliance. On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion requesting the court to order the defendants to collaborate with Dr. Marc Stern, the court’s expert, to immediately develop and implement a plan for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in Arizona prisons. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This action, filed on January 28, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States. The case was filed on behalf of an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa, as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from detention and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint argued that detaining a lawful U.S. visa holder solely pursuant to the executive order violates Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The ACLU of Southern California represented the plaintiff. The plaintiff was an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa issued pursuant to a petition filed by his son, who was a U.S. citizen. When he landed at Los Angeles International Airport on the evening the executive order was issued, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained him and threatened to deport him back to Iran as soon as the next day. Had he been granted admission to the U.S., he was to receive a green card seven weeks later. While detained at the airport, the plaintiff was denied access to counsel. At the same time as the complaint was filed, the plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stay his removal (deportation). However, before the court could review the application, the plaintiff was placed on a flight to Dubai. The plaintiff filed an amended application on January 29, 2017, and Judge Dolly Gee granted the temporary restraining order that same day. The order requires the federal government to transport the plaintiff back to the U.S. and permit him to enter the country. The assignment to Judge Gee was on an emergency basis over the weekend; on Monday, Jan. 30, 2017, following ordinary procedures, the case was reassigned to Judge S. James Otero. In February, a series of procedural updates took place: a status conference was set to discuss compliance with the temporary restraining order, the case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish for Discovery. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a status report on Feb. 9, though it is not currently available publicly, and a status conference was held the following day. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/03/09/2017-04837/protecting-the-nation-from-foreign-terrorist-entry-into-the-united-states">Executive Order 13780</a>. On Mar. 17, defendants filed a status report. Then on Apr. 25, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On May 4, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to vacate the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court ordered the hearing vacated on May 8, as well as stayed the briefing schedule until further notice. The plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal on June 26, and the court ordered the case closed on June 27. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
This action, filed on January 28, 2017 with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenges President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen from entering the United States. The action was filed on behalf of an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from detention and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint argued that detaining a lawful U.S. visa holder solely pursuant to the executive order violates Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Counsel for the plaintiff are the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California. The plaintiff is an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa issued pursuant to a petition filed by his son, who is a U.S. citizen. When he landed at Los Angeles International Airport on the evening the executive order was issued, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained him and threatened to deport him back to Iran as soon as the next day. Had he been granted admission to the U.S., he was to receive a green card seven weeks later. While detained at the airport, the plaintiff was denied access to counsel. The same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stay his removal (deportation). However, before the court could review the application, the plaintiff was placed on a flight to Dubai to be sent back to Iran. The plaintiff filed an amended application on January 29, 2017, and Judge Dolly Gee granted the temporary restraining order that same day. Per the order, the plaintiff is to be transported back to the U.S. and permitted to enter the country. The case was assigned to Judge S. James Otero on January 30, 2017. The case ended in a settlement. The plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on June 26. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement. This case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 17, 2006, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued Benni's LLC (d/b/a Bennigan's) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC, representing a female employee at Benni's and an intervening female employee, asked the court for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in employment practices that discriminated on the basis of sex, and for monetary relief for the two employees. The EEOC claimed that Benni's subjected the complaining parties to a sexually hostile work environment, leading to one employee's constructive discharge. On March 28, 2008, Judge Warren W. Eginton granted a motion for default judgment. This judgment adopted a recommended ruling for default judgment because Benni's had not obtained counsel. On September 18, 2008 Judge Warren ordered default judgment damages and attorneys fees. This ruling included injunctive relief in the form of postings, anti-discriminatory policies, trainings, and monitoring. It also required the defendant to pay a total of $190,000 to the two employees and to pay their attorney fees. The injunction was scheduled to last for five years; there is nothing more on the docket since, so presumably the matter ended finally in 2013.
<|assistant|>
On August 17, 2006 the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued Benni's LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant subjected the complaining parties to a sexually hostile work environment, leading to one employee's constructive discharge. On March 28, 2008, Judge Warren W. Eginton granted a motion for default judgment. The default judgment damages included injunctive relief in the form of postings, anti-discriminatory policies, trainings, and monitoring. It also required the defendant to pay a total of $190,000 to the two employees and to pay their attorney fees.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 23, 2014, two Scott County, Mississippi residents who had been arrested and detained filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by the ACLU and the MacArthur Justice Center, the plaintiffs sued Scott County, an Eighth Circuit Judge, and Scott County Justice Court judges. The plaintiffs filed on behalf of themselves and sought to certify a class of those similarly situated. They brought this class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were indefinitely detained without individualized bail hearings in Scott County and were indefinitely denied counsel throughout the Eighth Circuit Court District, which violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, attorneys fees, and a declaratory judgment. After the plaintiffs were arrested in Scott County, the judges set their bail without any individualized hearing or consideration of the bail factors required under state or federal law, including the ability to afford bail and the appropriateness of non-monetary bail options. The bail was set such that the plaintiffs were financially unable to pay the bond or the set percentage of the bond that would be required to secure the bond through a bond company or agent. Additionally, the plaintiffs had to wait more than one month before the court appointed a public defender to represent them, even though they had both completed Affidavits of Indigence and Application of Felony Indigent Counsel. Under Mississippi law, they should have had immediate representation by a public defender after submitting their affidavits and applications. Scott County also enforced a custom and policy of not providing counsel to indigent felony arrestees until they had been indicted, which could take months. As a result of these practices, felony arrestees in Scott County were routinely detained prior to indictment simply because they were too poor to afford bail. The scarcity of grand jury panels further exacerbated the risk of indefinite pre-indictment detention in Scott County. A felony arrestee could have waited three to five months to learn if he had been indicted and, consequently, to be appointed representation. This meant that felony arrestees did not have attorneys to represent them at their initial appearance where they had to argue for release or reasonable bail. The plaintiffs alleged that these practices violated the plaintiffs' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel, their Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial, their Fourteenth Amendment rights against excessive and punitive pre-indictment detention, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to an individualized bail hearing and determination. On September 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class. Following the plaintiffs' filing of an amended complaint, all of the defendants in this case filed motions to dismiss. On September 30, 2015, Judge Wingate issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, and dismissing the plaintiffs' motions to certify a class as moot. The court granted the motions to dismiss of both the Eighth Circuit judge and the Scott County Judge Court judges. Additionally, the court granted Scott County's request to dismiss the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. However, the court retained the plaintiffs' demand for monetary damages against Scott County. The court stayed that portion of the lawsuit pending the conclusion of state court criminal proceedings. Finally, because the only remaining claims were the plaintiffs' individual damages against the county, the court dismissed the motions to certify classes as moot. On April 17, 2017 the parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, on June 27, 2017, Judge Henry T. Wingate issued a final judgment--a stipulated declaratory judgment and a settlement agreement. Scott County agreed to provide counsel to all indigent defendants and to provide "applications" for indigent representation within 48 hours of arrest. The plaintiffs agreed that on Scott County's implementation of these orders, no further injunctive relief would be necessary, and therefore agreed to dismiss all claims once that happened. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, and the settlement provided for periodic meetings to discuss compliance issues as they arose. The settlement stated that these periodic check-ins were to occur for 24 months after the agreement went into effect, with the potential for future court action if it was not implemented. The case closed in 2019 with no further enforcement action filed.
<|assistant|>
Two Scott County, Mississippi residents who had been arrested and detained filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued Scott County, an Eighth Circuit Judge, and Scott County Justice Court judges. The plaintiffs alleged that they were indefinitely detained without individualized bail hearings in Scott County and were indefinitely denied counsel throughout the Eighth Circuit Court District, which violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The parties settled the case in July 2017, requiring the county to provide arrestees with applications for legal representation before their first court appearance. The settlement agreement lapsed in 2019 with no enforcement action filed in the District Court.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 8, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Shree Lalaji LLC (trading as Best Western Salisbury Plaza) on behalf of a black employee, who it alleged was subjected to racial epithets and remarks and retaliation, and a class of black employees who were subjected to the racially hostile work environment that accompanied the situation. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the general manager made racially hostile statements, treated black employees less favorably, refused service to and overcharged black guests of the hotel, and reduced the individual employee's hours in retaliation for his complaints about the general manager's racially motivated actions. The EEOC also alleged that the employee had been constructively fired. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the black employees, including backpay, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge William M. Nickerson) entered as a consent decree on December 6, 2006. The decree provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee who allegedly had been constructively fired received $7,000 in back pay and $8,000 in compensatory damages, while the class of black employees received a total of $5,000. Under the decree, the Best Western was restrained from racial discrimination and creating a hostile work environment. The Best Western agreed not to retaliate against employees who oppose practices believed the employees to violate Title VII, and was required to post an equal employment notice and provide its employees with at least four hours of training on keeping the work environment free of racial harassment. The parties bore their own costs and attorneys' fees. The decree did not have a specific overall duration, and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII suit against Shree Lalaji LLC (trading as Best Western Salisbury Plaza) on behalf of a black employee who it alleged was subject to racial epithets and remarks and retaliation and a class of black employees who were subjected to the racially hostile work environment that accompanied the situation. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for retaliation and racially hostile work environment. The Court entered the parties' settlement agreement as a consent decree. The decree provided a total of $20,000 in monetary relief and required the Best Western not to retaliate or discriminate on the basis of race, to post an equal employment notice, and train its employees in keeping the work environment free of racial harassment. The decree did not have a specific overall duration, and the case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 12, 2017, three private American citizens filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages against the Trump Campaign alleging its participation in the Russian Email Hacking and in the decision to disseminate the information discovered. The complaint stated that part of the information released involved included the plaintiffs' private emails, social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, and phone numbers. They argued that the defendant's alleged actions violated D.C. privacy law and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (conspiracy to intimidate lawful voters from giving support or advocacy to electors for president and to injure citizens in person or property on account of such support or advocacy). They further made tort claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiffs include a former foreign service officer, a former staffer for the finance team of the Democratic National Party (DNC), and a lottery winner who gave away most of his winnings. All three plaintiffs donated to the DNC during the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle and allegedly had their emails stolen by Russians who hacked the DNC’s electronic database. They were represented by the Protect Democracy Project, United to Protect Democracy, and a law professor at the University of Michigan Law School. On September 26, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional factual allegations. On October 25, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. On July 3, 2018, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint without prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the court had the jurisdiction and was the appropriate venue for their claim. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On July 12, 2017, three individuals sued Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. and a senior adviser to the Trump campaign team alleging damages stemming from having their private information stolen by Russians who hacked the Democratic National Committee’s electronic database during the 2016 Presidential election cycle. On September 26, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional factual allegations, and on October 25, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. On July 3, 2018, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint without prejudice, holding that it was the wrong forum for the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 19, 2003, a plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Abercrombie & Fitch Co. in United States District Court in the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief including punitive damages, alleging that the defendant engaged in systemic discrimination against African-Americans. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant routinely refused to hire African-Americans because they did not fit the Abercrombie "look." Hawk v. Abercrombie, 23145625 WL 3-9 (D.C.N.J. 2003). While the plaintiff took the time to file with EEOC, and also file in Court (Judge Rodriguez) the case never went anywhere beyond these initial filings and the complaint. On December 5, 2003, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. The Court (Judge Rodriguez) granted the motion without prejudice and the case was closed that same day.
<|assistant|>
On November 19, 2003, a plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Abercrombie & Fitch Co. in United States District Court in the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff contended that the defendant routinely refused to hire African-Americans because they did not fit the Abercrombie "look." On December 5, 2003, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. The Court (Judge Rodriguez) granted the motion without prejudice and the case was closed that same day.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In September 2006, the EEOC's Philadelphia District Office filed suit against the restaurant chain Denny's. The complaint was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and alleged that Denny's violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by refusing to allow a disabled employee to continue working there, and by refusing to grant reasonable accommodations by making exceptions to its policy placing a cap on medical leave time. Between 2008 and 2010, the parties held multiple failed settlement negotiation conferences and engaged in discovery. On January 15, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that one of the named plaintiffs was not a person with a qualified disability and that there were other settled facts barring her claim. On July 16, 2010, the court denied this motion finding that there was sufficient evidence to support that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. Beginning in December 2010, the parties again engaged in settlement negotiations. On June 24, 2011, the court entered a consent decree for a two year duration. The consent decree requires the defendant to not discriminate or retaliate against persons with disabilities in its hiring practices, to change its policies on accommodation and leave, to provide training to its employees, submit to reporting requirements, to pay $1,300,000 in to the claimants, and provide offers of reinstatements to the claimants. The decree laid out various timeframes to complete trainings and had a bi-annual reporting requirement for two years. There has been no further docket activity and so the case is presumably closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued the restaurant chain Denny's in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The EEOC alleged Denny's violated Title I of the Americans with Disability Act by refusing to accommodate an employee with a disability who requested additional medical leave. In 2011, the parties agreed to a two year consent decree which required the defendant to pay $1,300,000 in damages, changes its policies, provide training to employees, among other requirements.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 8, 2011 the Southern Poverty Law Center ("SPLC") filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Jackson Public Schools Board of Trustees and several officials of the school district. The Plaintiff class (all students who currently attend and/or will attend the Capital City Alternative School in the future), represented by attorneys from the SPLC and by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Defendants' punishment methods were unconstitutional. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants would routinely shackle or handcuff students to railings and leave them unsupervised for up to six hours at a time as punishment for noncriminal violations of school policies. During these punishments, students were forced to eat their lunches while restrained, and had to beg school officials to let them use the restroom. On April 12, 2012, the Parties presented a Settlement Agreement to the Court that was focused on overhauling the Defendants' disciplinary policies. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement banned the use of fixed restraints on all students, banned the use of handcuffs for punishment of noncriminal behavior and completely banned the use of handcuffs on any student under the age of 13. Additionally, the agreement required the Defendants to consult with experts to rework their disciplinary system, and to implement a system of record keeping and reporting of all instances in which restraints of any kind were used on students. Finally, the court appointed a monitor to follow the case for 24 months to ensure that the Defendants were in compliance with the agreement. This Settlement Agreement was approved by the Court on May 25, 2012, and did not preclude any class member from bringing an individual damages claim against the Defendants. On July 17, 2015, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the case, indicating they had achieved compliance with the Settlement Agreement. On July 27, 2015, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit was filed on June 8, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of all students who currently attend and/or will attend the Capital City Alternative School in the future. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendant school district's practice of shackling students to railings for up to six hours at a time was an unconstitutional form of punishment for noncriminal violations of school policies. On May 25, 2012, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement that banned the use of handcuffs on any student under the age of 13, and on all students in cases of noncriminal violations of school policies. It further required the Defendants to overhaul their disciplinary system, and called for extensive monitoring of the Defendants' progress over the next 24 months. This Settlement Agreement addressed declaratory and injunctive relief only, and left class members the opportunity to bring individual damages claims against the Defendants.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLU of Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request at issue in this case in particular concerned implementation at CBP’s Miami Field Office (including Miami International Airport and various ports of entry) and CBP’s Tampa Field Office (including Orlando International Airport and various ports of entry). In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding" of how defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through the Miami and Tampa Field Offices, and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." Plaintiffs noted that the Miami and Orlando airports are especially busy hubs for international passengers, and that a direct flight route runs from Dubai to Orlando. On Apr. 12, the case was assigned to Judge Darrin P. Gayles. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion and subsequent procedure see <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719">this case</a>. Pending a transfer decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Judge Gayles administratively closed the case on June 29, effectively staying it until the Panel made a decision. On Aug. 2, the Panel denied defendants' transfer motion. The parties jointly moved to reopen the case on Aug. 8, and Judge Gayles granted this motion on Aug. 22. On Nov. 16, the parties submitted a joint scheduling report, agreeing that setting a trial date would be premature. Judge Gayles ordered the parties instead to submit a joint status report by Dec. 15. In the Dec. 15 status report, the parties explained that defendants were working to identify whether records they released in the other ACLU cases were also responsive to this this. The report also explained that defendants' processing capacity had recently improved. Plaintiff continued to monitor production. On Jan. 8, 2018, the parties reported that, in all the nationwide cases combined, defendants had to process thousands more pages than they had previously estimated they could. The parties thus agreed that, in this case, defendants would process 300 pages of potentially responsive records and produce responsive non-exempt records to plaintiff by Feb. 28, 2018. In the latest status report, of Mar. 7, the parties stated that defendants had agreed on a production schedule. Subsequently, on Mar. 9, Judge Gayles ordered defendants to process 400 emails by Apr. 30, 800 emails by June 30, and 95% of all emails by Sept. 30, ending with completed production by Dec. 31. Status reports filed May through October indicated that DHS had processed over 19,000 pages of potentially responsive emails and produced over 14,000 pages of responsive emails. From 2018 to 2019, the defendants continued to file status reports updating the court as to the production. Aside from a brief stay that occurred when the federal government shut down at the end of 2018, document production was relatively uneventful. On July 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation for dismissal prejudice, which was granted the next day. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719">this case page</a>. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Florida sued DHS and CBP under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at Miami and Tampa airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation, and this case is proceeding here.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 8, 2018, a prisoner in Galveston County Jail filed this class action in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The case was assigned to Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. Represented by the ACLU of Texas and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Galveston County and various Galveston County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that Galveston County’s bail policies—especially the practice of setting a high minimum bail and failing to appoint defense counsel for arrestees’ bail hearings—favored wealthy arrestees over poorer arrestees and violated poor arrestees’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the same day the initial complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed for class certification. The putative class would encompass all people who are or will be detained in Galveston County Jail because they are unable to pay secured bail set at magistration. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 4, 2018, to join a second prisoner as a named plaintiff. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed an amended motion for class certification to reflect the added plaintiff. On June 8, 2018, the defendant parties filed separate motions to dismiss. First, Galveston County moved the court to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the County did not make policy to detain individuals without inquiring into their ability to pay and that the County did not set a bail schedule. Second, the District Court Judges also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims against them in their individual capacities should be dismissed due to their inability to administer relief. Third, the Magistrate Judges filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that they did not create the policy; that § 1983 was not the proper vehicle for challenging state court detention release procedures under Fifth Circuit precedent; and that the plaintiffs had no viable Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment claims. Fourth, the District Attorney filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under immunity grounds. He alleged that he did not set bail or make bail recommendations in misdemeanor cases, and that one of the named plaintiffs lacked standing because he received bond. On September 9, the District Judges filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They alleged that one of the named plaintiff’s claims were moot because his criminal case concluded. Further, they argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff’s claims and that he could not file under <i>Ex Parte Young</i>. Regarding relief, the District Judges reasoned that they did not possess jurisdiction to alter or control bail determinations until after the indictment stage. In September, the parties began discovery. On December 10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison entered recommendations regarding the motions to dismiss. On January 10, 2019, Judge George Hanks approved and adopted the Magistrate’s recommendations. The court denied the County’s motion to dismiss for subject-matter jurisdiction, the District Attorneys’ motion to dismiss, and the District Judges’ motion to dismiss for subject-matter jurisdiction. It granted the District Judges’ motion to dismiss regarding the claims against them in their individual capacities. It denied in part and granted in part the defendant magistrates’ motion to dismiss, allowing the magistrates to remain in the case in their personal capacities and only for purposes of declaratory relief. In this order, the court held that the plaintiff’s release from jail did not moot the claim. Second, the County alleged that its changes in policies mooted the case, but Galveston County did not offer evidence to show that new processes were followed uniformly or consistently applied. The court also held that <i>Younger</i> abstention did not apply in light of Fifth Circuit precedent, <i>O’Donnell v. Harris County</i> (available at <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15377">CJ-TX-0010</a> in this Clearinghouse). It rejected the argument that a writ of habeaus corpus offered the sole federal remedy. While the District Attorney contended that sovereign, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity protected him from the claims, the court applied <i>Ex Parte Young</i>, rejecting this argument because the claims were for prospective relief, not damages. Finally, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the § 1983 claim establishing the District Court Judges’ liability and the District Attorney’s policymaker role in setting the bail practices. 352 F. Supp. 3d 718. On January 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed requests for a preliminary injunction. The first request included propositions that the County must amend its bail setting procedures. The second required the County to provide defense counsel for any person arrested for a felony unable to retain counsel, who would represent arrestee at any hearing concerning pretrial release. On August 7, the Magistrate recommended that the court deny the first and grant the second motion, which Judge Hanks adopted and approved on September 11, 2019. 2019 WL 4305457. The court denied the first because the County had begun reforms to its bail system to bring it into compliance with <i>O’Donnell</i>. The County modeled its new bail policy on the suggested preliminary injunction in that case. With the changes, the magistrate would possess financial information about the individual. Also, for those unable to afford bail review, the court would schedule an individualized bail review hearing within 48 hours after the initial appearance. The second motion for preliminary injunction sought an order requiring the County to provide counsel at initial bail hearings for indigent arrestees charged with felonies. The court held that this initial bail hearing constituted a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings, thus affording the arrestees a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The injunction required that Galveston County provide any indigent felony arrestee with counsel to represent the arrestee at the initial hearing concerning conditions of pretrial release. 2019 WL 3714455. Subsequent to the preliminary injunction order, the District Court Judges, the District Attorney and the County appealed to the Fifth Circuit (USCA No. 19−40785). On February 15, 2019, the plaintiffs and the District Court Judges filed motions for respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 12, 2019, the Magistrate recommended that the court grant class certification. Two weeks later, Judge Hanks adopted the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendations granting the motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief. The class included “all people who are or will be detained in Galveston County Jail on felony and state-jail felony charges because they are unable to pay secured bail set at magistration.” 2019 WL 1129492. As a result, the District Court Judges, the District Attorney, the County, and the Magistrates each filed a notice of appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (USCA No. 19−40395) at the end of April and the beginning of May. Further, on April 12 and April 23, 2019, the parties filed second proposed findings of fact and conclusions on the preliminary injunction. On July 6, the court granted a motion to suspend deadlines until the Fifth Circuit addressed the appeals. On September 13, the case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey Brown. The case is ongoing pending appeal as of October 31, 2019.
<|assistant|>
In April 2018, a prisoner in Galveston County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Galveston County, alleging that Galveston County’s bail policies favored wealthy arrestees over poorer arrestees and violated poor arrestees’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 30, 2006, on behalf of a female and a male plaintiff, the Chicago civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint challenged the Cook County Sheriff's blanket policy of requiring a strip and body cavity search of every detainee who entered the Cook County Jail for booking/intake, irrespective of the nature of the charge against the detainee and of whether there was any reasonable suspicion that the detainee was concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiffs contended that suspicionless strip and body cavity searches of detainees accused of misdemeanors and other minor offenses violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also alleged that the searches of male detainees were conducted in a degrading manner that was significantly different than the manner in which females were searched. All female detainees, however, were also allegedly given, without their consent, sexual transmitted disease (STD) testing by a vaginal swabbing procedure. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification on the various claims. Approximately a month later, an amended complaint added a third named plaintiff. A month after that, a second amended complaint was filed adding three additional persons, including officers of a health care contractor, to the multiple jail, public health, and governmental officials named as defendants along with Cook County. Defendants responding by moving to dismiss the case on numerous grounds which included: (1) no personal involvement was alleged as to the individual defendants; (2) testing for STDs by vaginal swabbing was not unconstitutional; (3) the County had no control over the Sheriff; (4) one of the three named plaintiffs (Johnson) was arrested for a felony drug crime, so the strip search of him was lawful; (5) each pretrial detainee arrived at the jail after a judicial determination of probable cause; (6) the issue of living conditions and treatment of pretrial detainees at the jail was decided by the district court in Duran v. Sheahan, Case No.74 C 2949 and the case is therefore barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion; and (7) the Sheriff had no control of the health care company that performed the vaginal swabbing. With the exception of dismissing the official capacity claims against the individual defendants, the District Court (District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly) denied the motion to dismiss by order dated August 25, 2006. On April 25, 2007, Judge Kennelly certified the case as a class action, with the classes defined as follows: (1) all males who were subjected to a strip search and/or a visual body cavity search as new detainees at the Cook County Jail on or after January 30, 2004; and (2) all persons charged only with misdemeanor or lesser offenses not involving drugs or weapons who were subjected to a strip search and/or a visual body cavity search as new detainees at the Cook County Jail on or after January 30, 2004. Defendants sought leave to appeal the certification order to the Seventh Circuit, but leave was denied. Plaintiffs decided not to seek class certification on the vaginal swabbing claims. On October 3, 2008, the individual defendants filed two motions for summary judgment, the first based on the constitutionality of the search policy in question, and they second based on principles of qualified immunity. On November 10, 2008, Cook County filed a motion for summary judgment, and on the same day, the plaintiffs also filed a partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability. On February 23, 2009, the district court (Judge Michael Kennelly issued an opinion in which it granted the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity but denied the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the constitutionality of the search policy. The court also granted Cook County's motion for summary judgment with respect to the respondeat superior claims, but otherwise denied the motion. The court granted the plaintiff motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of the Class II members and with respect to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of the Class I members for searches that occurred prior to the installation of privacy screens, but otherwise denied that motion. On March 5, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on April 2, 2009. 616 F.Supp.2d 834, N.D. Ill 2009. On August 13, 2009, the case went to trial, and the following day, the jury reached a verdict. They found in favor of the plaintiffs, and held that county jail employees violated the law in the manner in which they conducted strip searches of detainees. The defendant subsequently made two motions in response to the judgment and the district court denied them both. First, on September 15, 2009, the district court denied the sheriff's motion to stay the proceedings pending his interlocutory appeal of a purported 11th Amendment issue, specifically, the Court's ruling denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law at the recent jury trial. The court held that the interlocutory appeal was frivolous. 2009 WL 2986109 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2009). Second, on November 17, 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law of for a new trial. The issue of damages still remained, so from March 29, 2010, to April 7, 2010, the court held a jury trial on damages. Immediately after the jury trial and before the verdict was issued, the parties entered into settlement talks. On April 28, 2010, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) denied the defendants' interlocutory appeal of the District Court's denial of "11th Amendment" immunity (Judge Easterbrook admonished the parties for confusing 11th Amendment sovereign immunity with qualified immunity). Judge Easterbrook held that the denial was not from a “final decision” and that the appeal was frivolous. The defendants had waited three years before they asserted immunity, so the District Court had held that the immunity was waived. 604 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2010) But on August 11, 2010, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, but did not decided the amount of damages or attorney's fees. Instead, the parties reached a settlement agreement deciding those amounts. On November 24, 2010, the Court preliminarily approved the class-action settlement, and on March 4, 2011, the Court granted final approval of the class action settlement. The defendants agreed to pay roughly $18 million in attorney's fees and costs and $365,000 in incentive awards to the class representatives. The defendants also established a $55,000,000 cash fund to pay the claims of individual class members as they were submitted to the court. After the settlement agreement, the court retained jurisdiction and has been handling the claims of individual class members from 2011-2016. As of April 7, 2016, there have been no new motions from late claimants. Note: There was another strip search case against the Cook County Sheriff in the same District Court. That case, Bullock v. Sheahan, No. 04 C 1051, alleged an unconstitutional practice and policy of strip searching male inmates prior to their release from the Cook County Jail. See <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=10517">JC-IL-0039</a>.
<|assistant|>
In 2006, a Chicago civil rights law firm filed this class action civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint challenged the Cook County Sheriff's blanket policy of requiring a strip and body cavity search of every detainee that entered the Cook County Jail for booking/intake, irrespective of the nature of the charge against the detainee and of whether there was any reasonable suspicion that the detainee was concealing weapons or contraband. After two jury trials, the court found for the plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement agreement regarding monetary relief in 2011.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: Two immigrants detained pending removal proceedings obtained a temporary restraining order that required their immediate release to protect them from the risk of infection. <hr> On March 26, 2020, two detained immigrants filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by Public Counsel, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. They alleged that their detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment right to safe conditions of confinement. Specifically, they alleged that detention during the COVID-19 outbreak (1) constituted a state-created danger; (2) violated the government’s Fifth Amendment duty to care for those in its custody; and (3) functioned as punitive detention. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of habeas corpus. The Department of Homeland Security originally detained the plaintiffs in early March pending removal proceedings. They were held in Adelanto, a for-profit detention facility run by Geo Group, Inc. with a history of health and safety violations. Around the same time, COVID-19 was spreading throughout the world. California declared a state of emergency on March 4, 2020, and the United States declared a national emergency on March 13. Coronavirus spreads easily between people in close contact, posing risks to detainees. To reduce the risk of COVID-19 infection, the plaintiffs immediately moved for a temporary restraining order providing for their release. Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. granted the motion on March 27, the day after the suit was filed. Judge Hatter declared that “[t]he law is clear—the Government cannot put a civil detainee into a dangerous situation.” As a result, a detainee’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated if “a condition of his confinement places him at substantial risk of suffering serious harm, such as the harm caused by a pandemic.” He also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiffs must first exhaust their administrative remedies and lacked standing. As part of the March 27 order, Judge Hatter directed the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted. 2020 WL 1502864. On April 6, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition adding another individual plaintiff. On the same day, Judge Hatter ordered the amended petition to be stricken and declared that relief for additional petitioners would only be available in separate proceedings absent class certification. Judge Hatter extended the temporary restraining order by 14 days on April 10 to allow more time for the court to consider whether to issue a preliminary injunction. On April 13, the court severed one of the two individual plaintiffs' claims so they could be resolved in a new case. This case was stayed on April 24, 2020 due to developments in <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17522><i>Roman v. Wolf</i></a>, another COVID-19 case seeking the release of immigrants in detention. The <i>Roman</i> plaintiffs had obtained provisional class certification and a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs in this case fell within the <i>Roman</i> class and the scope of its preliminary injunction. As a result, Judge Hatter stayed this case pending <i>Roman</i>'s conclusion. The court released a scheduling order on June 1, 2020. The court found that the petitioners were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their habeas corpus petition and decided to combine the evidentiary hearing with a court trial regarding the petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The hearing and trial were scheduled for October 6, 2020 but this date was subject to change due to the pandemic. The court found that it had the authority to entertain a class-wide motion for bail and, if granted, would then individually consider each member for bail. As of February 26, 2021, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Two immigrants detained pending removal proceedings sued the Department of Homeland Security. They alleged that detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights and sought immediate release. The next day, the court issued a temporary restraining order providing for the plaintiff's release. The case was stayed after the plaintiffs in a related case obtained class-wide relief that protected the individual plaintiffs in this case.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In 1977 (and thereafter amended a number of times), the foster children of Jackson Missouri, represented by Children's Rights Inc., and Legal Aid of Western Missouri, filed a class action aimed at reforming the state's child welfare system. The federal complaint charges the Missouri Division of Family Services (DFS) with endangering the lives of children in state custody by failing to properly investigate and monitor foster homes that were found to be unsafe, unsanitary and unsupervised. Plaintiffs alleged that children were exposed to contagious diseases, deprived of medical and psychiatric care, subjected to physical and emotional abuse, and transferred between foster homes inappropriately and without adequate preparation. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §601 et. seq, and 42 U.S.C §1302. We don't have the early parts of the docket sheet in this case, so do not know the ins and outs of the subsequent litigation. But in 1983, a settlement agreement was reached mandating top-to-bottom reform of the foster care system. In 1985, DFS sought a modification of the consent decree, which was countered by a contempt motion from the plaintiffs for state failure to implement court-ordered reforms. In 1992, a full trial was held in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Judge Dean Whipple) resulting in a finding of contempt due to a "lack of commitment to make a good faith effort." The court order called for defendants to increase budgets through state lobbying and directed defendants to transfer caseworkers to Jackson County to ease caseloads. G.L. v. Stangler, 873 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1994) In response, a new settlement agreement was reached in 1994, following the assessments of an expert panel. The settlement mandated such improvements as training for foster parents and mandatory criminal history and child abuse checks for prospective foster families. In 1995, a monitoring plan was developed in addition to semi-annual compliance reports thereafter. Based on defendants' substantial compliance with components of the consent decree, in 2000, the parties renegotiated the decree, allowing the state to exit from some provisions. On January 30, 2001, the court approved an Amended Decree and Operational Guide. The amended decree created a permanent community quality assurance committee, which was to take over system monitoring once DFS reached substantial compliance and exited from the decree. Over the next ten years, with court oversight, DFS successfully implemented all of the reforms required by prior court order. On February 1, 2006, the court conditionally dismissed the case, court oversight officially ended, and the state agreed to keep in place until 2009 the policies, practices and staff positions created as a result of the lawsuit.
<|assistant|>
In 1977, the foster children of Jackson County, Mississippi filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §601 et. seq, and 42 U.S.C §1302. The plaintiff, represented by Children's Rights Inc., and Legal Aid of Western Missouri asked the court to reform the foster care system, claiming poor monitoring of foster care homes leading to unsafe conditions for children. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that children were exposed to contagious diseases, deprived of medical and psychiatric care, subjected to physical and emotional abuse, and transferred between foster homes inappropriately and without adequate preparation. In 1994, the Court found the Missouri Division of Family Services to be in contempt of the consent decree reached between the parties and ordered the defendant to increase its budget and increase its staff to adequately handle high caseloads. Afterwards a monitoring plan was developed and successfully implemented the court conditionally dismissed the case in 2006.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Erie and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 22, 2013, Judge Sean McLaughlin granted the U.S motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims as unripe.
<|assistant|>
On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Erie and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On January 22, 2013, Judge Sean McLaughlin granted the U.S. motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims as unripe.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case, Flick v. City and County of San Francisco, is a companion case to Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), a class action case challenging the strip search policy of the City and County of San Francisco. [See JC-CA-0007]. Flick filed her case on September 3, 2003, represented by attorneys C. Schwartz and Mark E. Merin, who were also class counsel in the Bull case. Flick alleged that she was subjected to false arrest by several San Francisco police officers, purportedly for the charge of public intoxication. Plaintiff alleged that she was transported to the County Jail, where she was forcibly striped naked and thrown into a "cold room." She remained naked in the cold room, until she was released the next morning. No citation or any criminal charges were ever filed against her. Plaintiff alleged violations of her rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. She sought general, special, exemplary, and statutory damages, as well as attorneys' fees. On November 6, 2003, the Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) issued an order relating the case with Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), a class action case challenging San Francisco's strip search. [See JC-CA-0007]. Bull was filed by the same attorneys who represent Plaintiff. On November 21, 2003, Plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, negligence, violations of her rights under California law, as well as false arrest, detention, and imprisonment. On March 18, 2011, the Court stayed this matter pending the resolution of the Bull case after establishing Plaintiff's membership in Bull's plaintiff class. Two years later, the parties in the Bull case settled and the case was dismissed. On September 30, 2013, after the Bull case was dismissed, the parties in this case reached a settlement and the Court dismissed this case, though the details of the settlement were not provided.
<|assistant|>
In September 2003, a woman who had been arrested and detained in the San Francisco County Jail filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §1988 against the City and County of San Francisco in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiff sought general, special, and exemplary damages, claiming that her arrest and subsequent detention violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Establishing that Plaintiff belonged to the plaintiff class in a related case, Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), the Court stayed this case pending Bull's resolution. [See JC-CA-0007]. The parties settled and this case was dismissed on September 30, 2013.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 4th, 2012, a professional video journalist filed a lawsuit in the United States Eastern District of New York against Suffolk County and one of its police officers, alleging violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privacy Protection Act, and state law. The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys, asked the court for a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive, and attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that while filming a police proceeding, the defendant police officer ordered him to "go away." The plaintiff then moved to another public area farther away and continued filming, at which point the defendant police officer drove his car towards plaintiff, allegedly causing plaintiff to fear for his safety. The defendant police officer then arrested the plaintiff and confiscated his camera and other belongings. The plaintiff was detained for approximately two hours at the police station. The complaint also argued the defendant police officer's actions were the result of a department policy to engage in such unconstitutional behavior. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2012 and 2013, and a trial was scheduled for June 9, 2014. Before trial could take place, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The parties presented the proposed settlement agreement to the Suffolk County Legislature, as required for municipal settlements by local rules, and the Legislature authorized the settlement and payment on May 8, 2014. The parties executed a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice on May 15, 2014. In consideration for the plaintiff’s release of all claims against the defendants, Suffolk County paid $200,000, including attorney’s fees and costs. The agreement also outlined Department General Orders issued by the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), including one relating to interacting with and releasing information to the media, one relating to bystanders at police incidents, one relating to recorded media in the possession of bystanders and media personnel, and one relating to dispute resolution between SCPD and members of the media arising out of or in connection with news media coverage at scenes of police activity. The SCPD also instituted a video training module addressing the rules and procedures of the SCPD and the constitutional right of the public and press to observe, photograph, and record police activity in locations open to the public. Suffolk County, through SCPD, was also to form a Police-Media Relations Committee to enhance communications between the SCPD and the media. Magistrate Judge William D. Wall entered the stipulation and order of settlement on July 22, 2014. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On April 4th, 2012, a professional video journalist filed a lawsuit in the United States Eastern District of New York against Suffolk County and one of its police officers, alleging violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privacy Protection Act, and state law. After engaging in discovery, the parties settled in 2014, with Suffolk County paying monetary damages to the plaintiff and implementing policies, procedures, and training regarding police and media relations.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On Mar. 23, 2018, three Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador, as well as the immigrants' rights organization Casa de Maryland which has many Salvadorian members, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and the private law firm Akin Gump Strauss, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Under the INA, the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for six to eighteen months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Salvadorians following a devastating earthquake in that country in 2001 respectively. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that the nationals could not yet return safely to El Salvador (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent natural disasters), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS's Jan. 2018 announcement that it would soon terminate TPS for Salvadorians, effective Sept. 2019. The plaintiffs argued that DHS's decision to end the program was based not on a change in conditions in El Salvador, but rather on invidious discrimination toward Latino immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin. This racial animus allegedly appeared in President Trump's public remarks disparaging Latin American immigrants. The plaintiffs also argued that DHS's action was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. This case was assigned to Judge George Jarrod Hazel. On Nov. 28, 2018, the court (Judge Hazel) largely denied DHS' motion to dismiss. 355 F.Supp.3d 307. The court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the TPS statute did not bar the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the statute's language and scheme did not unambiguously preclude judicial review, and that the alternative methods of review of the plaintiffs' claims that DHS offered were meaningless. The court upheld the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, finding that the court owed the government less deference in this case and that President Trump's clearly racist statements regarding Latino immigrants provided sufficient evidence to make the claim plausible. For similar reasons, the court also upheld the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. The court upheld the APA claim in so far as it alleged the government's actions were arbitrary and capricious because they were motivated by racial discrimination and because the government failed to conduct an objective assessment of El Salvador's conditions. But the court dismissed the APA claim in so far as it alleged the government's actions were arbitrary and capricious because the government did not consider the reliance interests of those implicated. The court concluded that the TPS statute did not require the government to make such considerations. Finally, the court kept President Trump as a defendant, concluding that although "ultimately, relief against the President himself is extraordinarily unlikely in this case, none of the authority cited by Defendants requires that the President be dismissed at this early stage." DHS then filed its answer to the complaint on December 12, 2018. In light of the TPS termination date of September 9, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a scheduling order to resolve the dispute before then. They argued the protection of the <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16815">Ramos v. Nielsen</a> preliminary injunction issued in the Northern District of California was insufficient, as the government had appealed that order to the Ninth Circuit. DHS opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion to stay the litigation until the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on the Ramos preliminary injunction. Both parties filed a series of responses. With the government shutdown, DHS moved to stay proceedings because of a lapse in appropriations. The court granted the DHS’ second motion on January 8, 2019, and stayed proceedings until after the government reopened. By the end of the month, DHS had received funding, and the plaintiffs sought to amend their proposed scheduling order. Following a conference, the court ordered its schedule and the parties proceeded to discovery. Since then, the parties have pursued discovery. Following the Supreme Court's decision in <i><a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16132"> Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</a></i> in which the Court held that the APA required the government to consider reliance interests before rescinding DACA, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's dismissal of their APA claim. The plaintiffs argued that the court previously dismissed the APA claim because it declined to consider the plaintiff's theory that the defendants failed to consider reliance interests when deciding whether to extend or terminate TPS and that this ruling now conflicted with <i>Regents</i>. As of December 23, 2020, the case is ongoing and the motion for reconsideration remains pending. The case is still ongoing as of July 24, 2020.
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On Mar. 23, 2018, three Salvadorian TPS recipients and an immigrants' rights organization sued DHS for revoking TPS for Salvadorians living in the U.S. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Having survived a motion to dismiss, the case proceeded to discovery.
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You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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On October 8, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff believes the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates the business owner's religious freedom. The plaintiff, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them. On November 15, 2013, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and the defendant filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings until the resolution of one of either of two cases implicating the same issues, to which the Supreme Court had recently granted writs of certiorari: (1) <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B ">Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013)</a> or (2) <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12705&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (Third Cir. 2013).</a> On December 3, 2013, U.S. District Court (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) granted the plaintiff's motion. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)</a>, a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on July 15, 2014, Judge Smith lifted the stay. On September 23, 2014, Judge Smith issued an order continuing the preliminary injunction and directing the parties to file a proposed injunction and judgment. The parties filed their respective proposed injunctions and judgments, and then their replies. On November 12, 2014, Judge Smith permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. The case was then dismissed.
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On October 8, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.
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You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
On July 5, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to Vermont's governor, advising him of the results of the late summer 2004, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Vermont State Hospital ("VSH"), a facility housing mentally ill persons. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended VSH staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for patient well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found deficiencies in patient care at VSH, in that conditions and services at VSH substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of patients at VSH were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies in conditions of patient care and treatment at VSH existed as to three topic areas, including VSH's: (1) failure to protect patients from harm and undue restraints (e.g., inadequate suicide prevention measures; use of seclusion and restraints for staff convenience and initial punishment, rather than in patients' best interests; excessive duration and failure to document use of seclusion and restraints); (2) failure to provide adequate psychiatric and psychological services (inadequate and dated treatment planning, psychiatric and psychological assessments and diagnoses; poor medication management and monitoring; rudimentary or non-existent behavior plans) and (3) failure to ensure adequate discharge planning and placement in the most integrated setting appropriate to each patient's individualized needs (e.g., failure to initiate, maintain, monitor, or adjust adequate discharge criteria or to maintain an adequate utilization review process necessary to ensure appropriate lengths of stay). The letter provided details of deficiencies for all three of these categories. Moreover, the findings letter stated that these shortcomings were at times historical problems, rather than sporadic recent failures. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation and by providing notice that, absent a resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at VSH. On July 21, 2006, DOJ simultaneously filed both a CRIPA complaint against Vermont and a consent judgment between the parties, the latter setting out an agreed-upon settlement including obligations by the state to implement the remedial measures set out in the findings letter. The lawsuit set out that the state's practices at VSH violated its' patients' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure (depending on the component of the plan, within six, eighteen, twenty-four, or thirty months) improvements that would bring the facility up to generally accepted professional standards of care, including integrated treatment planning, adequate and complete mental health assessments, and improved discharge planning and community integration. The settlement also set out time frames for psychiatric, psychological, and pharmacy services improvements, documentation improvements, and implementation of modern practices in the use at VSH of restraints, seclusion and emergency use of psychotropic medications, as well as reporting and supervision measures to provide protection from harm and adoption of an integrated incident management system. Improvement in quality assurance and environmental conditions were also mandated by the agreement. The parties' settlement appointed Mohamed El-Saabawi and Jeffrey Geller as jointly-selected experts to monitor the implementation of the agreement, with the federal and state governments, respectively, paying each monitor's reasonable costs and expenses. Every six months, the monitors would produce to the parties a joint report on compliance. The agreement would terminate in four years, unless earlier compliance could be established. District Judge William K. Sessions III approved the settlement and issued a conditional dismissal of the case on July 31, 2006. Shortly before the settlement agreement was set to expire, the parties agreed to extend the term of the agreement from July to October 2010 in order to continue working together to address conditions at the hospital. Following the parties' Joint Motion for Final Dismissal, on October 28th, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.
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This 2005 case in the U.S. District Court of Vermont is the result of the DOJ's investigation of conditions and practices at the Vermont State Hospital, a facility housing mentally ill persons. The DOJ simultaneously filed both a CRIPA complaint and a settlement agreement setting out remedial measures to improve the level of care provided at the hospital. In 2010, the court dismissed the case per the terms of the settlement agreement.
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You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
On January 13, 2012, three non-profit organizations that advocate for independent living for individuals with disabilities filed this civil rights lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles, the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles ("CRA"), and 34 owners of CRA-funded apartment complexes under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and California Government Code §1135 for failure to ensure that housing was accessible to people with disabilities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for the injuries incurred as a result of the defendant's allegedly discriminatory practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's actions have frustrated the plaintiffs' missions and undermined the effectiveness of the programs and services they provided, including encouraging community integration of people with disabilities, providing assistance to individuals and families searching for housing or affected by discriminatory housing practices, and eliminating discriminatory housing practices. After being served, the CRA was dissolved and ceased to exist as of February 1, 2012. Its authority, rights, powers, duties, and obligations were transferred to successor agencies and entities. One of those agencies was the DRA, which was also a named defendant and subsequently sued in a cross-claim by the City of Los Angeles. Another was the CRA/LA, which was operating under the supervision and direction of a newly constituted Oversight Board. On June 1, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint naming the CRA/LA and the Oversight Board as defendants, and adding additional nominal defendants. In an August 13, 2012 status report, the parties stated that they had conducted preliminary settlement conversations, and that the plaintiffs' lead counsel had attempted to engage the defendants in further discussions for a possible mediation. On August 20, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint correcting the name of a defendant. Over the next few months, the defendants individually filed answers to the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, which the Court deemed to be responses to the second amended complaint. On September 20, 2011, the City, CRA/LA, and the Oversight Board filed motions to dismiss. In a November 29, 2012 meeting in chambers, U.S. District Judge S. James Otero dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the FHA as to DLA and the City, and all of the plaintiffs' claims as to the Board. On December 17, 2012, the Court referred the case to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Later that month, the Court entered a scheduling order, giving the parties until September 2013 to complete discovery. The case was transferred to Judge Fernando M. Olguin for all subsequent proceedings. When the parties failed to meet the September 2013 deadline, Judge Olguin became involved in the process by attempting to work with counsel to forge a plan to proceed with discovery. After that, Judge Olguin held more than thirteen hearings to work through the various discovery issues. The primary area of contention was electronically stored information, the production of which would have resulted in both sides spending tremendous amounts of time and money going through those documents. Meanwhile, the defendants were involved in a battle of cross-claims. The City of Los Angeles filed a Crossclaim for Contribution, Indemnity, and Declaratory Relief against the owner defendants and the CRA/LA. The CRA/LA subsequently filed a nearly identical crossclaim against the owner defendants. The owner defendants filed a motion to dismiss the City and the CRA/LA’s crossclaims, which was granted on September 19, 2013. 973 F.Supp.2d 1139. Judge Olguin found that: (1) the owner defendants could not be liable to the government defendants based on plaintiffs’ claims; (2) no express or implied right of contribution or indemnity existed under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act; (3) the comprehensive remedial scheme of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act preempted state-law rights to contribution and indemnity; and (4) the government defendants could not rely on contractual indemnity provisions as an "end run around the unavailability of indemnification or contribution under these civil rights statutes." On December 17, 2013, CRA/LA filed a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Amended Cross-Claim for Indemnity and Contribution by the City of Los Angeles, which was granted the following September. The parties' discovery dispute continued well into 2016. On February 25, 2016, the CRA/LA moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. This motion was denied in an August 31, 2016 order, in which Judge Olguin held that the CRA/LA could be found liable as a successor to the CRA based on the extensive factual allegations in the second amended complaint. 205 F.Supp.3d 1105. On July 29, 2016, the plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement. The agreement provided that over the following 10 years, the City would ensure that at least 4,000 of its affordable housing units met the highly accessible standards required by federal law, and would enforce policies to ensure that those units were inhabited by people who needed the specific accessibility features provided. The city would spend at least $200 million during the life of the agreement. Over the 10 years of the agreement, the plaintiffs were to assist people with disabilities to transition into the newly-accessible units. In September of 2017, the plaintiffs and CRA/LA reached a separate settlement agreement. 2017 WL 3976623. In it, CRA/LA agreed to take all actions necessary to provide 250 accessible units by no later than January 2021. It also agreed to establish a Housing Accessibility Fund. It committed $8,750,000 to the retrofits necessary to upgrade the 250 accessible units, and committed $160,000 to a court-appointed monitor. The monitor, to be appointed in early 2018, would evaluate CRA/LA’s compliance with the agreement. A corrected settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles was filed on December 13, 2017. It finalized the determination of attorneys fees. The owner defendants, who were explicitly unaffected by the settlement agreements between the other defendants and the plaintiffs, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on October 5, 2017. In it, they argued that the plaintiffs had no remaining stated claims against the defendants in light of the two settlement agreements, and that the plaintiffs had achieved complete relief absent the owner defendants’ participation. On January 31, 2018, the court was notified of a related case, 2:11-cv-00974-PSG. This is an action brought by the United States for damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act. The FCA claim does not appear to have affected the outcome of this case. On September 28, 2018, Judge Olguin denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that it was an inappropriate device for challenging the consent judgments. 2018 WL 6118574. On October 23, 2018, Judge Olguin appointed a settlement monitor. On February 15, 2019, the monitor submitted their first report and concluded that the defendant was not on track in complying with the settlement agreement, finding that the defendant missed every deadline related to the settlement. After several semi-annual monitoring reports finding compliance issues, the plaintiffs invoked the dispute resolution process set forth in the settlement agreement. They argued that the defendant violated numerous settlement provisions. After unsuccessfully mediating the dispute, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On December 19, 2019, Judge Olguin granted the motion. Monitoring will continue until Judge Olguin finds substantial compliance with the settlement agreement or 2026, whichever is later.
<|assistant|>
On January 13, 2012, three non-profit organizations that advocate for independent living for individuals with disabilities filed this civil rights lawsuit in the District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles, the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles ("CRA"), and 34 owners of CRA-funded apartment complexes for failure to ensure that housing is accessible to people with disabilities. The plaintiffs settled with the City of Los Angeles in 2016, and separately settled with the CRA/LA in 2017. The plaintiffs and the owner-defendants are still in litigation.
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You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
This case was transferred from the Northern District of Alabama and is a later development of the case <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11465>EE-AL-0119</a>. On October 18, 2006, several current and former employees of the defendant's Albertville, Alabama facility filed a lawsuit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this class action seeking damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant Wayne Farms violated the FLSA. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the company failed to account for all compensable time of its employees, including time spent clearing security and time walking to and from security to donning and doffing areas. On June 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge R. David Proctor) ordered the case stayed because the court had received Defendant's Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate for Pretrial Proceedings to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. On October 9, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 17, 2008, holding that seven plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. On October 15, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 17, 2008, on the ground that two plaintiffs failed to list the FLSA claim as an asset in their bankruptcy petitions and thus were estopped from asserting the claim. On November 17, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 18, 2008, on the ground that one plaintiff never worked more than 40 hours in any contestable work week and thus, did not have an FLSA overtime claim. On November 24, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 19, 2008, on the ground that 3 plaintiffs worked only as Quality Assurance employees and had been paid already for all the activities cited in the Complaint. On April 9, 2009, the parties reached a settlement. On August 17, 2009, the District Court (Judge Keith Starrett) granted preliminary approval to the terms of the settlement agreement, which provided that defendant pay $1,375,000 (which included attorneys' fees). On March 31, 2010, the District Court (Judge Starrett) issued the Judgment of Dismissal. However, on June 10, 2010, the Court reopened the case for the limited purpose of filing the distribution plan. The court ultimately closed the case on September 1, 2010.
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This case was brought against Wayne Farms, LLC by current and former employees seeking monetary damages under the FLSA. The case settled for $1,375,000 and was dismissed by the court on September 1, 2010.
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You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
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Summarize the following text:
This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule. <u>Casa de Maryland and two of its Members Sue Over the Public Charge Rule</u> On September 16, 2019, Casa de Maryland, a nonprofit immigrant rights organization serving over 100,000 members, and two of its members filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs, represented by Georgetown Law’s Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection (ICAP), sued Donald J. Trump, in his capacity as President of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaration that the Department of Homeland Security’s <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/2019-17142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge- grounds">Final Rule</a> (the Rule) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and an order setting it aside. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Charles B. Day and then immediately reassigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/us/immigration-public-charge-injunction.html">article</a>, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. In their complaint, the plaintiffs asserted four claims for relief. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the Rule was not in accordance with the plain meaning of public charge in the INA and that defendants acted beyond their statutory authority. The plaintiffs further contended that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it "departs from over a century of prior practice without adequate explanation for this change in policy" and defendants' proffered rationales are "not supported by the evidence in the record, and a pretext to conceal the true motivation for the policy change." The plaintiffs also proclaimed that the Rule violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing that it is so vague that affected persons will "struggle to know how to accord their conduct to avoid adverse immigration consequences." Lastly, the plaintiffs contend that because "defendants’ promulgation of the Public Charge Rule was motivated at least in part by the Trump Administration’s intent to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin," the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule will cause them and their members harm by producing a chilling effect that discourages eligible members from utilizing public benefits and requiring Casa de Maryland to allocate significant resources to combat this chilling effect. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing or enforcing the rule or, at the least, delaying its implementation date. The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to win on the merits of their APA and Constitutional claims, that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of an injunction. In support of their request for a nationwide injunction, the plaintiffs contended that a nationwide scope is appropriate in order to ensure uniformity in immigration enforcement and to provide plaintiffs with complete redress. On September 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint and a corrected motion for preliminary injunction, making minor formatting and substantive changes to both documents. In their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction filed on October 1, 2019, the defendants argued that the "plaintiffs provide no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a sweeping overhaul of core immigration law principles." The defendants asserted that the individual plaintiffs and Casa de Maryland did not establish standing and that the "plaintiffs’ claims are even more sweeping and aggressive than those of other litigants challenging the Rule." <u>The District Court Grants a Nationwide Preliminary Injunction</u> Following a hearing on October 10, 2019, Judge Grimm issued an opinion and order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on October 14, 2019. The order enjoined the defendants from enforcing the Rule nationwide and postponed the implementation of the Rule pending the resolution of this case. Judge Grimm concluded that a nationwide injunction was appropriate given the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, the irreparable harm they would face absent a nationwide injunction, and the need to have a uniform immigration law. 414 F.Supp.3d 760. The defendants filed a motion for stay of injunction pending appeal to the Fourth Circuit on October 25, 2019. Defendants argued that they are likely to succeed on appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing, did not fall within the zone of interests of the relevant statute, and the Rule is fully consistent with the INA and the APA. Defendants also contended that, because they would be "forced to grant lawful permanent residence (“LPR”) status to aliens likely to become public charges at any time under the Rule," they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay as their interest in "ensuring that 'aliens be self-reliant'" would be affected. On October 30, 2019, the defendants filed an appeal of the order for preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. The appeal was docketed on November 4, 2019 (Docket No. 19-2222). On November 14, 2019, Judge Grimm issued an order denying the defendants' motion for stay pending appeal. Judge Grimm concluded that the defendants did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on their appeal, that they did not establish irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, and that the defendants offered no arguments addressing why a stay would be in the public's best interest. 2019 WL 7565389. <u>The Fourth Circuit Stays the Injunction Pending Appeal</u> The next day, the defendants filed a motion for stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal, rehashing the main arguments from their motion to stay in the district court. On December 9, 2019, a Fourth Circuit panel issued an order granting the motion to stay the injunction pending appeal without issuing an opinion explaining their reasoning. Circuit Judges J. Harvie Wilkinson III and Paul Niemeyer voted to grant the motion and Circuit Judge Pamela Harris voted to deny the motion. On December 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Fourth Circuit's order granting stay of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that it was inappropriate for the panel to grant the motion, and threaten to upend the status quo, with limited briefing and without oral argument. The plaintiffs further contended that should the Fourth Circuit grant the stay, "DHS’s new rule would go into effect in all or most of the country before any appellate court rules on the merits of the preliminary injunctions—causing irreparable harm to Appellees and to noncitizens around the country." The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 3, 2020, maintaining the claims and arguments as the first amended complaint and adding the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs asserted that the immigrant communities of Baltimore will be harmed by the chilling effects caused by the Rule. On January 14, 2020, after the defendants filed a response in opposition, the Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, again without issuing an opinion explaining its rationale. <u>The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule</u> On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court issued orders staying a nationwide injunction in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287"><i>State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security</i></a> and an injunction for the State of Illinois in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17408"><i>Cook County, Illinois v. Wolf</i></a>. Following these decisions, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. <u>Defendants Move to Dismiss</u> On May 27, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants asserted that the complaint should be dismissed in full "[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s repeated stays of injunction, the Ninth Circuit’s detailed opinion on the Rule’s legality," and because the Rule does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses. <u>The Fourth Circuit Reverses the Preliminary Injunction</u> On August 5, a split Fourth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Harvie Wilkinson III, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert King) issued an order and opinion denying the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction. 971 F.3d 220. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson held that Casa lacked standing; that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits of their claims because the Rule was a permissible interpretation of "public charge;" and that a nationwide injunction was an overly broad remedy. Judge King dissented. Citing a decision of the Seventh Circuit two months prior (962 F.3d 208), he disagreed on all points. He held that plaintiffs <i>did</i> have standing; that the plaintiffs <i>were</i> likely to win on the merits because the Rule is not a permissible interpretation of "public charge" given the statute and history; and that a nationwide injunction was an appropriate remedy given the circumstances. In light of this decision, back in the district court, Judge Grimm back issued an order on August 7, directing the parties to supplement their briefings on the pending motion to dismiss. <u>The Reversal is Stayed Pending a Rehearing en banc</u> On September 15, the Fourth Circuit's order was stayed pending ruling on a petition to rehear the case en banc. That petition was granted on December 3, 2020, and oral arguments are scheduled to begin in March 2021. <u>President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule</u> On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. The parties began conferring to determine how this would impact the litigation. On March 1, 2021, the District Court denied the government's motion to dismiss without prejudice, noting that the motion would be subject to reinstatement once the administration reviewed the rule. <u>The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated</u> On March 9, 2021, <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2021/03/09/dhs-secretary-statement-2019-public-charge-rule">DHS formally abandoned the rule</a>. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision that vacates the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide (<a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17408"><i>Cook County v. Wolf</i></a>). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for <i>Cook County</i>, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (<a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17409"><i>City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS</i></a>) and Second (<a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17287"><i>New York v. DHS</i></a>) Circuits. On March 11, the Fourth Circuit issued an order granting the government's voluntary dismissal of its appeal. That same day, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants. They also moved to reconsider the dismissal. They filed similar intervention motions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as an <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20A150/172422/20210319132528733_20A__%20Application.pdf">emergency application</a> to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from <i>Cook County</i>. The Fourth Circuit denied the motion to intervene, as well as the motion to reconsider, on March 18. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On September 16, 2019, a non-profit immigrant rights organization in Maryland and two of its members filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. In October 2019 the district court ordered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule nationwide. A Fourth Circuit panel stayed the injunction in December 2019, reversed it in August 2020, but in December 2020 agreed to rehear it en banc. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 21, 2013, director and editors of Antiwar.com filed this suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sought disclosure of records maintained by the FBI regarding a 2004 threat assessment conducted by the FBI regarding this website. Represented by private counsels and ACLU of Northern California, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs separately filed requests with the FBI seeking expungement of all FBI records that describe each plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment rights. In August 2013, the FBI responded that maintenance of records regarding the plaintiffs was proper under Section 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act. The plaintiffs appealed this decision and the FBI responded that because the matter was subject to judicial review, the appeal had been administratively closed. The plaintiffs also appealed the denial of the expungement request and sought amendment of any records that pertain to individual plaintiffs that were inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete. The FBI denied the appeal because the matter was currently subject to judicial review. On May 1, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint alleging four claims for relief, including two new claims under the Privacy Act. On November 12, 2015, FBI filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion on December 17, 2015. On May 10, 2016, the Magistrate Judge Jacqueline S. Corley entered an order regarding the cross-motions for summary judgments. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ third and fourth claims for relief under Sections (e)(7) and (d)(2) of the Privacy Act that the FBI must expunge or correct the memos. The court denied without prejudice both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ first and second claims for relief regarding disclosure under FOIA and Privacy Act claims. 2016 WL 2642038. On January 23, 2017, after four years of extensive litigation, the parties stipulated a proposed settlement agreement. On the same day, Magistrate Judge Corley granted the agreement. The settlement required the defendant to produce relevant information to the plaintiffs to satisfy its obligation under the FOIA. The parties stipulated to dismiss all FOIA claims, with the exception of attorney’s fees. On February 10, 2017, the parties entered into a further stipulation of settlement agreement to propose that they will (1) either file a stipulation of settlement and dismissal as to the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to FOIA or (2) propose a briefing schedule with respect to the attorney’s fees to the court by April 14, 2017. The court granted further stipulation on February 13, 2017. On July 18, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration regarding their Privacy Act claims and allowed the plaintiffs to bring claims under the Privacy Act based on newly produced documents. 2017 WL 3035157. On October 5, 2017, the defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment. On October 26, the plaintiffs also filed a second cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 12, 2018, having considered the parties’ briefs and oral argument, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion. 2018 WL 398236. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (USCA Case Number 18-15416). In the Court of Appeals, the parties exchanged briefs and multiple institutions filed amici briefs. Oral argument took place on June 12, 2019 before a three-judge panel consisting of Judge A. Wallace Tashima, Judge William A. Fletcher, and Judge Marsha S. Berzon. On September 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment. 937 F.3d 1284. The Ninth Circuit held that unless a record is pertinent to an ongoing authorized law enforcement activity, an agency may not maintain it under Section (e)(7) of the Privacy Act. The Ninth Circuit held that the FBI had not met its burden of demonstrating that the one memo, the 2004 Memo, was pertinent to an ongoing law enforcement activity, it must be expunged. However, another memo, the Halliburton Memo, need not be expunged because the FBI had met its burden to prove that it was pertinent to ongoing law enforcement activities. On November 20, 2019, Judge Corley of the Northern District of California issued an amended final judgment ordering the FBI to expunge from its records the 2004 threat assessment memo. With this final order, the case closed.
<|assistant|>
In May 2013, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the FBI in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking disclosure of documents pursuant to FOIA and the Privacy Act. Represented by ACLU of Northern California, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties settled on the FOIA claims and the court ruled in favor of the FBI on the Privacy Act claims in 2017. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that one memo was no longer pertinent to an ongoing law enforcement activity and must therefore be expunged, but another memo was pertinent and did not need to be expunged.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 14, 2007, a group of female current and former employees of Sanofi-Aventis US (a pharmaceutical company) filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and New York Executive Law § 296. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, including back pay, front pay, and compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against female employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Sanofi-Aventis discriminated with respect to its policies, practices and selection procedures for promotion, a disparate pay scale, and differential terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant subjected female employees to a continuing systemic discrimination that resulted in both a disparate impact and disparate treatment in the areas of promotion, training, and performance evaluation, which relied on subjective judgments, and further that the defendant's refusal to establish clear guidelines could not be justified as a business necessity. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant:<blockquote>- pre-selects and "grooms" male employees for promotions, favorable assignments and training - fails to provide all employees with a consistent and timely notice of job openings and promotional opportunities - requires managers to give permission to an employee to apply for any promotion - fails to prevent sexual harassment targeted at female employees by male managers; and - selectively and disproportionally disciplines and punishes women for minor infractions - retaliates against females who seek relief through human resources</blockquote>On February 29, 2008, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but the Court rejected this motion. Between February 2008 and November 2009, the parties engaged in discovery. On November 16, 2009, the parties submitted a stipulation informing the court that the action was settled and the parties were in the process of preparing class action settlement agreement. On August 5, 2010, the Court approved the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs received over $15 million in damages and their counsel was awarded over $4.5 million for the settlement. The settlement also included injunctive terms for the defendant to develop non-discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation policies that ensure its female employees enjoy equal terms and conditions of employment comparable to their male counterparts. These policies were to include:<blockquote>- prohibiting discrimination based on gender or marital status; - prohibiting harassment and retaliation that result from employees' reporting of gender discrimination; and - improving policies on pay and promotions</blockquote>The settlement was to last three years, or until 2013. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In March 2007, a group of female current and former employees of a pharmaceutical company filed this class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against female employees, and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and New York Executive Law § 296. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement that awarded the plaintiffs over $15 million in damages and injunctive relief. The case is closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 21, 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 ("Local 117") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of the union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued the Washington State Department of Corrections ("DOC") for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e, et seq. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed charges of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that defendant violated Title VII. Local 117 is the exclusive certified bargaining representative of approximately 6,000 State employees employed by the DOC. In July 2007, prior to the filing of this case, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of females inmates against DOC, alleging that certain staff had engaged in sexual misconduct ("the Jane Doe lawsuit"). The DOC responded to the Jane Doe lawsuit by conducting an investigation and hiring consultants to look at the issue. As a result of this investigation, the consultants hired by the DOC recommended increasing the number of female correctional officers in the women's correctional facilities. The consultants did not recommend decreasing the number of male correctional officers. The plaintiffs' experts in the Jane Doe case suggested that increasing the number of female correctional officers would limit the potential for sexual misconduct. Both the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, the Department of Justice, and the National Institute of Corrections Information Center recommended increasing overall staffing levels at women's correctional facilities in order to improve safety. In May 2008, the DOC submitted a request to the Washington State Human Rights Commission ("WSHRC") to designate numerous existing correctional officer positions at several women's correctional facilities as female-only, asserting that gender is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") for those positions. In February 2009, the WSHRC approved DOC's request to designate the requested positions as female-only, and upon receipt of those approvals, the DOC indicated to Locall 117 its intent to designate the positions as female-only and began recruiting and reassigning employees accordingly. In this lawsuit, Local 117 alleged that DOC failed to undertake any individualized analysis of each position before designating approximately 110 positions as female-only, and they further alleged that many of these positions were improperly designated as female-only. Local 117 alleged that, as a result, male correctional officers were discriminated against, such as being forced to transfer to less desirable positions and being skipped-over on overtime opportunities. In addition, the female staff were required to work more overtime hours. Further, following the designation of additional female-only positions, DOC employees reported that violence against staff by inmates had increased, as had violence between inmates. DOC employees believed that a lack of male staff presence in the female living units has emboldened violent offenders to act out. Both sides moved for summary judgment. On April 8, 2013, Judge Settle granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and found the plaintiff's motion moot. 2013 WL 1412335 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2013). On April 19, 2013, plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On June 12, 2015, the Ninth Circuit filed an opinion affirming the trial court's decision. 789 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff filed petitions for rehearing en banc and panel rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied these petitions on August 5, 2015.
<|assistant|>
In 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 ("Local 117") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of its union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued DOC for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by designating certain existing correctional officer positions at women's correctional facilities as female-only. In 2013, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and in 2015 the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 1, 2012, the family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado ("ADX") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendants' failure to treat the prisoner's serious mental illness violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant "exhibited persistent and deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's mental illness, which lead to the death of the prisoner in an incident determined to be a suicide. A related class action case was filed on June 18, 2012. See <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12177">PC-CO-0019</a>. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 31, 2012, adding a second cause of action for deprivation of the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death. On April 23, 2013, the district court (Judge Richard P. Matsch) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the First Amendment claim and denied the motion to dismiss on all other claims. On June 21, 2012, the defendant filed an appeal of the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. On July 22, 2014, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding a lack of factual support for the allegation that the named defendant could be held personally liable for any shortcomings in the treatment of the prisoner. The court (Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe) remanded the case with direction to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. 572 Fed. App'x 611 (10th Cir. 2014). On remand, the district court (Judge Matsch) entered an order dismissing the case on November 13, 2014. No. 12-cv-1144-RPM, 2015 WL 9583378 (Col. 2015). On December 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Seek Relief from Judgment and Leave to Amend the Complaint. The plaintiff claimed that he could prove that Warden Davis knew Vega and knew of his mental condition through new evidence obtained in discovery in Cunningham, et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (<a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12177">PC-CO-0019</a>). Judge Matsch granted the motion on April 23, 2015. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on July 15, 2015, alleging that, had Warden Davis performed his job duties and read Vega’s records, he would have been aware of the suicide risk. Instead, he failed to take any preventative action. The amended complaint included a count of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and a count of deprivation of right of familial association. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim of deprivation of the right of familial association on the grounds that the claim was already adjudicated by the 10th Circuit, and also filed a motion to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim on the basis that the complaint still failed to state an individual-capacity claim against the defendant. On December 31, 2015, the judge granted the motion to dismiss, determining that the defendant was not accountable for the death under the doctrine of qualified immunity without direct knowledge or notice. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals on January 21, 2016. The appellate court determined that, although the deliberate indifference claim was nudged closer to the line of plausibility than in his initial complaint, the plaintiff still failed the facial plausibility standard. As such, the 10th Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. 673 Fed App'x 885 (10th Cir. 2016). The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
The family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado ("ADX") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death, in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case twice failed on qualified immunity grounds. The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 18, 2016, thirteen lawful permanent residents (LPRs) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by a private immigration law firm, claimed that USCIS had unlawfully delayed adjudicating their naturalization applications by classifying them under its CARRP (Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program) policy. The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling USCIS to dismantle CARRP policies and to adjudicate the plaintiffs' applications, and a declaratory judgment that CARRP violated the INA, APA, the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution, and the Due Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment. Subsequently, on June 21, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to twenty. The plaintiffs were all from countries with significant Muslim populations — Albania, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Nigeria, Bosnia, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, and Sudan. USCIS's CARRP policy directed adjudicating officers to identify any immigration benefits application by any applicant that might implicate a "national security concern." When so classified, the officers were required to delay or deny the application. Although the total number of people subject to CARRP is not known, USCIS data revealed that between 2008 and 2012, more than 19,000 people from twenty-one Muslim-majority countries or regions were subjected to CARRP. CAARP's definition of a "national security concern" was broader than the INA's, drawing on the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database, which the plaintiffs alleged was based on vague, overbroad, and uncorroborated information. All the plaintiffs in this case submitted naturalization applications that were subject to CAARP. Some of the plaintiffs had already also had naturalization interviews and examinations, part of the statutorily defined naturalization process under the INA. That statute specified that USCIS must process a naturalization application within 180 days from the filing date and within 120 days of the interview and examination date. All the plaintiffs had been waiting for a decision for longer than the 180-day period -- in one case, for more than two years. Further, USCIS did not notify plaintiffs that they had been classified under CARRP, nor did the plaintiffs have an opportunity to respond to this action. In addition to the INA claim, the plaintiffs challenged CARRP as a violation of the APA due to USCIS's arbitrary and capricious action and action contrary to law. CARRP never passed through the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking process, nor did Congress approve it. The plaintiffs alleged that the INA, rather than USCIS's additional non-statutory criteria, must govern naturalization entitlements because the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to set naturalization law through statutes. After the plaintiffs filed their complaints, during the rest of 2016, the individual plaintiffs filed three voluntary dismissal motions, after either USCIS had adjudicated their applications or the particular plaintiffs themselves had withdrawn them. By the end of 2016, only one plaintiff remained. On December 19, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that USCIS had already denied this plaintiff's application in October 2016, and so the Court lacked jurisdiction. In response, on January 3, 2017, the remaining plaintiff opposed the defendants' motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court retained jurisdiction because the litigation had started before the USCIS adjudication. The defendants replied on January 10. On June 1, the defendants notified the Court that a federal grand jury had indicted the plaintiff for selling contraband cigarettes. On August 24, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. The Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court stated that the plaintiff had failed to challenge USCIS's adjudication jurisdiction while the amended complaint was pending; that USCIS had already adjudicated and denied her naturalization application, thereby making the case moot; and that an appeal to the denial was pending in the agency, preventing ripeness. Further, the plaintiff lacked standing to procure a declaratory judgment as to CAARP's validity, due to unlikelihood of future injury. The Court thus dismissed the case without prejudice. 2017 WL 3658916. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
LPRs sued USCIS alleging unlawful delays in adjudicating their naturalization applications due to USCIS' classification of their applications as posing "national security concerns." Most plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew during 2016. One plaintiff remained, and the Court dismissed the case in Aug. 2017 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 23, 2012, the United States on behalf of black firefighters filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and against the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary compensation, alleging that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion had a disparate impact on black firefighters. On April 30, 2013, the NAACP and Jacksonville Brotherhood of Firefighters filed a complaint in intervention, echoing the claims and allegations of the United States while adding to the action several named plaintiffs and a class of Black Firefighters who tested for and were denied promotion while the testing practice was in place. The District Court (Judge Timothy J. Corrigan) denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on December 27, 2013. In their motion, the U.S. asked that the Jacksonville Fire Department be required to set aside five slots from the next round of promotions following the November 2013 test for those fire suppression captain candidates allegedly discriminated against on the 2004 and 2008 test administrations. The court denied the motion because the remedy offered did not correlate to the severity of the alleged injury, it would be difficult for the city to administer, and the plaintiffs had not established that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case. On June 9, 2015, the court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff finding the plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case of disparate impact, which enabled the parties to engage in additional phases of discovery. 2015 WL 3618367. Over the next eighteen months, the parties participated in discovery. The plaintiff amended the complaint three times, the latest of which was filed on November 28, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. After months of completing prerequisites for a settlement agreement, a fairness hearing took place on December 19, 2018. Judge Corrigan approved the agreement in a consent decree on February 5, 2019. The settlement included total payments of $4.9M in individual relief to classmembers and creation of new promotion examinations. The agreement also awarded attorneys' fees to counsel for the NAACP in the event it took over monitoring and enforcement of the decree from the U.S. The decree was set to remain in effect for the duration of settlement payments; fulfillment of the defendant's obligation to create the promotion positions; and completion of the second regular test administration of the new promotion procedure. The consent decree included details on this procedure and the promotion positions. The court held a second fairness hearing in May 23, 2019 and in June the court directed the parties to proceed with administration of individual relief. The case is ongoing as the consent decree is under enforcement.
<|assistant|>
On April 23, 2012, the United States, on behalf of black firefighters, filed a complaint against the City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion has a disparate impact on black firefighters, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case involved claims arising from a juvenile detention center being used for a television show. Two children previously detained in the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) filed this class action lawsuit on August 24, 2016. Defendants included numerous Fox entertainment companies (collectively “Fox”); Cook County, Illinois; the Chief Judge of the District Court of Cook County; and various officials connected to JTDC. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (in Chicago). Allegedly, plaintiffs’ rights were violated due to the filming of the hit Fox television show, Empire, at JTDC. They sought disgorgement and monetary damages. Judge Amy St. Eve. was assigned. The complaint was brought following the summer of 2015. Plaintiffs claimed JTDC locked down for approximately two weeks to be used as a set to shoot scenes for Empire. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew the children housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods at the facility to make room for the shooting. Throughout the two weeks, numerous areas, including JTDC's school, its facilities for family visits, and the outdoor recreation yard, were placed off-limits to the children living there. The lockdown allegedly harmed the children of JTDC. It had “interrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems that brought the children to the JTDC,” including the children’s access to education. Psychological damage was also alleged as children were forced to sit still in their pods, unable to get up from their chairs without permission, for days at a time. The following claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:<ol type="I"><li>Due process violations</li><li>Unlawful seizure</li><li>Monell liability (JTDC/Cook County official’s liability as final decision-makers)</li><li>Joint action liability</li><li>Respondeat superior (Fox defendants)</li><li>Conspiracy</li></ol>Additional claims were brought under Illinois state law:<ol type="I" start="7"><li>Breach of fiduciary duty (Cook County/JDTC defendants)</li><li>Inducement of breach of fiduciary duty (Fox defendants)</li><li>Intentional infliction of emotional distress</li><li>Civil conspiracy</li><li>Respondeat Superior</li><li>Indemnification (Cook County defendants)</li></ol>Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2016. They clarified the allegations against Cook County’s Chief Judge. They particularly focused on the Chief Judge’s role as the final decisionmaker regarding the JTDC lockdowns. Numerous defendants filed motions to dismiss on December 5, 2016. The court granted these motions in part on April 20, 2017. First, the court denied all defendants’ claims for qualified or Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, the court dismissed counts II, V, and X. Third, the court dismissed counts IV, V, VIII, and IX, but also allowed plaintiffs to re-plead. 2017 WL 1425596. On May 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. They added an unjust enrichment claim (Count XIII) against Fox defendants and fixed the deficiencies in their earlier pleadings. Fox filed a motion to dismiss several of the claims in this complaint on June 19, 2017. The court granted the motion in part on October 16, 2017. Counts IV, VI, and X were dismissed with prejudice. However, counts VIII and XIII proceeded. 2017 WL 4620841. In March 2018, this case was reassigned to Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Plaintiffs filed for partial summary judgment on December 9, 2019. They argued that Cook County’s Chief Judge was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. Shortly after, in early 2020, the parties began settlement negotiations. The court denied class certification on January 16, 2020. They cited plaintiffs’ failure to meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(a) and (b). However, the court stated plaintiffs could be in compliance with modifications to their motion. The court also encouraged parties to seek a settlement rather than continue litigation. 334 F.R.D. 518. Defendant Chief Judge moved for summary judgment on January 17, 2020. He sought to dismiss all claims against himself. Stated reasons included his not being a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment's bar against lawsuits for damages against the states. Plaintiffs renewed their motion to certify a class on June 15, 2020. Three days later, the motion's text was sealed at plaintiffs’ request. However, according to the court’s eventual order on June 10, 2021, three classes were requested. In order to narrow their focus plaintiffs required all class members detained at JDTC for at least 24 consecutive hours. Class 1 included all those confined to their pods longer than they otherwise would have been because of filming. This class had numerous subclasses involving the denial of various services during the filming period. Class 1(a) included those who did not receive at least one hour of “Large Muscle Exercise.” Class 1(b) included those who did not receive scheduled outdoor recreation. Class 1(c) included those who did not receive off-pod recreation or programming. Class 1(d) included those who did not travel to a nearby school for classes. Class 1(e) included those who did not receive various off-pod activities including “game room.” Class 1(f) included those who did not leave their pods for 24 consecutive hours. Class 2 included all those who had family visits during the June and July filming periods. Class 3 included all those confined in pods with populations that exceeded a safe capacity. The court granted summary judgment for defendant Chief Judge on November 23, 2020. The court determined that Chief Judge acted as "an arm of the State of Illinois when he operat[ed] and administer[ed] the JTDC." As such, the Chief Judge was protected by the Eleventh Amendment's bar against lawsuits for damages against the states. Any § 1983 claims against this defendant were rendered moot. 502 F.Supp.3d 1285. On December 16, 2020, defendants from Fox and Cook County filed an updated motion for summary judgment and a new motion for summary judgment, respectively. On June 10, 2021, the court issued an order addressing plaintiffs’ claims and the renewed motion for class certification. 2021 WL 2376017. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those regarding conditions of confinement. The court also granted in part plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification. The four classes certified were class 1(c) concerning off-pod recreation, class 1(d) concerning attending classes, class 1(e) concerning various off-pod activities, and class 3 concerning pods that exceeded a safe capacity. The remaining classes were denied. Classes 1(a) and 1(f) both failed the FRCP 23(b)(3) requirement that common questions must predominate over individual ones among class members. Classes 1, 1(b), and 2 all failed the FRCP 23(a)(3) requirement that claims of the parties representing the class be typical among class members. In the same order, the Court addressed the plaintiff's state law claims. First, the court dismissed claims against Fox regarding unjust enrichment and inducement of Chief Judge’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The court determined that plaintiffs failed to show that Fox had actual knowledge of the alleged breach. Second, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court stated that plaintiffs made "no effort to explain how [their] harm was sufficiently severe to support an IIED claim.” Third, the court did not dismiss claims regarding Cook County’s indemnification of defendant Chief Judge. Because Cook County funds the JTDC, it thus remains liable to indemnify claims arising within JTDC and the Chief Judge’s official capacity. Fourth, the court did not dismiss claims regarding defendant Chief Judge’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find the Chief Judge had a guardian-ward relationship with the plaintiffs’ juvenile detainees. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2016, two children previously housed the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) filed this class action lawsuit against both Fox Broadcasting and Cook County officials connected to the JTDC. They alleged degraded conditions of confinement caused by JTDC being used as a filming location for the Fox television show, Empire. Plaintiffs secured class certification and now continue to pursue various claims including indeminfication and JTDC official's breach of their fiduciary duty during the filming period. This case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 13, 2016, seven school children, represented by a California public interest law firm, filed this class action suit against Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and state education officials in the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the state denied students their constitutional right to literacy. <b>Background</b> The plaintiffs were students at five of Detroit’s lowest performing schools: Hamilton Academy, Experiencia Preparatory Academy, Medicine and Community Health Academy at Cody, Osborn Academy of Mathematics, and Osborn Evergreen Academy of Design and Alternative Energy. The student proficiency rates in these schools hovered near zero in core subject areas. At Hamilton, for example, 100% of the 6th graders scored below proficiency in both reading and math. The complaint documented what it alleged to be pervasive conditions that denied children the opportunity to attain literacy, including lack of books, classrooms without teachers, insufficient desks, buildings plagued by vermin, unsafe facilities, and extreme temperatures. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the fundamental right to literacy, as compared to other students in Michigan, and by functionally excluding plaintiffs from Michigan’s statewide system of public education. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated the state-created danger doctrine by affirmatively creating and increasing the risk that plaintiffs would be exposed to dangerous conditions, from which the plaintiffs were harmed as a result. Third, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by intentionally discriminating against the plaintiffs, or responding with deliberate indifference, on the basis of the plaintiffs’ race. Fourth, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the defendants utilized criteria or methods of administration that had the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin. The defendants sought a judicial declaration that the defendants had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, they asked the court to order the State to provide appropriate, evidence-based literacy instruction at all grade levels and to address physical school conditions that impaired access to literacy. <b>Procedural History</b> On November 17, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the claims brought by the plaintiffs were non-justiciable because the plaintiffs lacked standing under U.S. Constitution, Article III, §2; the relief requested was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; and the claims themselves were barred by the Rooker/Feldman Doctrine. As to the last point, the defendants argued that a case with similar claims that sought to include all children of the Detroit Public Schools had been brought and dismissed in state court (Moore v. Snyder), and that by bringing this case, the plaintiffs were asking the Federal District Court to review state judicial proceedings, which the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to do. Furthermore, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because they failed on the merits: there was no fundamental right to literacy, the claim failed under the state-created danger doctrine, there was no constitutional violation on the basis of race, and there was no discrimination under Title VI. Several amicus briefs were filed for both parties. On May 16, 2017 District Court Judge Stephen J. Murphy III held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. On July 27, 2018, Judge Murphy granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 329 F.Supp.3d 344. He found that there was no constitutional right to access literacy and that Michigan's implementation of various educational laws was not irrational and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judges Eric Clay, Jane Stranch, and Eric Murphy heard oral arguments on October 24, 2019. On April 23, 2020, Judges Clay and Stranch delivered an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the District Court. They agreed with the lower court that the plaintiffs had not proven their Equal Protection or compulsory attendance-Due Process claims. They held, however, that a basic minimum right to education is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and that a basic minimum right to education includes a foundational level of literacy, which plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated they did not receive in their schools. 957 F.3d 616. Judge Murphy dissented, disagreeing that the court had the authority to establish a new fundamental right to education. On May 14, 2020, Governor Gretchen Whitmer and plaintiffs' counsel announced that they had reached a settlement agreement. The settlement included individual awards to the seven student plaintiffs to further their education, funding to support literacy programs in Detroit schools, and the creation of two task forces to monitor the quality of education in Detroit and advise the Michigan Governor on education reform in the city. The Governor also agreed to propose legislation that would provide Detroit schools with even more funding for literacy programs, and to remove a prohibition on Detroit's use of bonds to raise capital for its schools. There is no official end date on the settlement and no official monitor, though the parties agreed that they could seek judicial enforcement if necessary. On May 19, 2020, after the settlement was announced, the Sixth Circuit took the unusual step of voting <i>sua sponte</i> to rehear the case en banc. 958 F.3d 1216. This vacated the Sixth Circuit opinion that found a basic minimum right to education. The plaintiffs subsequently moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that it was moot because a settlement had been reached. The Sixth Circuit granted the dismissal on June 11, 2020. <b>Current Status</b> Because the Sixth Circuit vacated the April 2020 opinion, it does not have precedential value, though the language of the opinion still exists for plaintiffs to potentially draw on in the future. The settlement still stands and its terms are ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On September 13, 2016, seven students at five of Detroit’s lowest performing schools, filed a federal class action suit against Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and state education officials for denying their constitutional right to literacy. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Constitution and federal civil rights laws by functionally excluding plaintiffs from Michigan’s statewide system of public education, exposing plaintiffs to dangerous conditions at schools and in fact harming them, and intentionally discriminating the plaintiffs based on their race. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged defendant's violation of Title VI when the defendants utilized criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of the plaintiffs' race. Plaintiffs are seeking an order from the federal court that would make the State of Michigan provide the plaintiffs' class appropriate, evidence-based literacy instruction at all grade levels and repair of physical school conditions. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016. The court granted the defendants' motion on July 27, 2018. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court on April 23, 2020 and found a fundamental right to a basic minimum education under the Constitution. Subsequently, the state and the plaintiffs reached a settlement on May 14, which provided for funding for literacy-related programs in Detroit and across the state as well as the creation of two committees to advise the Governor on education reform in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc on May 19, vacating the April 23 opinion. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss given the successful settlement, and the case was dismissed on June 11. The Sixth Circuit opinion remains vacated, but the settlement is in force.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing case to secure sanitary water in a psychiatric hospital in which the plaintiffs filed additional motions for temporary restraining orders in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, requesting release and mitigation measures including: adequate mental health care, social distancing, and hygiene products. The court granted a temporary restraining order on April 25 and a preliminary injunction on May 24, ordering the defendants to isolate patients exposed to the virus and to conduct testing throughout the facility to determine the spread of COVID-19 among staff and patients. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction on June 22 and filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. The case is ongoing. <hr> On October 23, 2019, four individuals at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in D.C., filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. on behalf of themselves and all other patients at the hospital. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of the D.C., Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia and Saint Elizabeths Hospital. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Saint Elizabeths had not had safe, running water since at least September 26, 2019, the date the water supply was completely turned off. This prohibited patients and staff from routinely flushing toilets, washing their hands, showering, drinking water from water fountains, and washing their clothing. The case was initially assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper, but randomly reassigned to Judge. Randolph D. Moss on October 30, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on December 16, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a Due Process or ADA claim and that the hospital officials were entitled to qualified immunity. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, seeking to represent "all current and future Saint Elizabeths Hospital patients." On April 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in light of COVID-19, adding a petition for writ of habeas corpus. They alleged that although the defendants had turned the water back on in October 2019, they continued to foster conditions that exacerbated the dangers to their patients by failing to take adequate steps to protect their patients from COVID-19. Plaintiffs also asserted that, as of April 15, four patients had died of COVID-19 and that "32 patients and 47 staff at the Hospital have tested positive for COVID-19." The motion was granted on April 22. 2020 WL 1935524. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on April 18, requesting the court order the defendants to reduce the population, both by halting admission to the hospital and releasing current patients, and to develop COVID-19 mitigation measures including testing, hygiene products, social distancing, educational programming, and daily reporting. The defendants filed a motion in opposition on April 21. On April 25, Judge Moss granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to isolate individuals exposed to COVID-19, conduct clinical evaluations prior to releasing individuals from isolation, and produce bi-weekly reports of compliance with the order. 456 F.Supp.3d 126 (Apr. 25, 2020). Following a status conference, this order was extended until May 11. On May 11, Judge Moss again extended and expanded the temporary restraining order, additionally requiring defendants to complete and report the results of two baseline point prevalence surveys to determine the spread of COVID-19 among staff and residents at the facility, and to assign staff to only one unit per day. 2020 WL 2410502. On May 14, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting the incorporation of the current restraining order into an injunction, a reduction of the number of patients in the facility, appropriate mental health care, the appointment of an independent monitor, and reporting. The defendants filed a motion in opposition on May 19. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part on May 24, converting the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction which required the defendants to file a status report by June 8 detailing plans for further mitigation measures in the facility. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion in all other respects. 464 F.Supp.3d 132 (May 24, 2020). On June 22, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. They also filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. Discovery is ongoing, and defendants continue to submit bi-monthly notices of compliance to the court. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Four patients in a psychiatric hospital sued due to alleged unconstitutional conditions within the facility, specifically a lack of running water that prohibited them from showering, washing their hands, flushing toilets, and drinking water. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in light of COVID-19, alleging that the hospital was not taking adequate measures to protect patients from the virus. The court granted a preliminary injunction, requiring isolation and testing on May 24. On June 22, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. They also filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. The case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 25, 2016, prisoners at the Tennessee Department of Corrections filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner and the Medical Director of the Tennessee Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide medically acceptable care to prisoners with the Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), despite having knowledge of the proper standard of care and medical advances in HCV treatment. Such a policy, alleged the plaintiffs, constituted deliberate indifference to the suffering of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU, Disability Rights Tennessee, and private counsel. They sought a declaration that the policies and practices of the defendants were unconstitutional and an injunction to require defendants to implement a plan to eliminate the risk of serious harm resulting from inadequate diagnosis, assessment, and treatment of HCV infections, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs further sought monetary relief in the form of the costs of the suit and attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. On September 16, 2016 the plaintiffs moved to certify their class, and on May 4, 2017, Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw granted the motion. The class consisted of "All persons currently incarcerated in any facility under the supervision or control of the Tennessee Department of Corrections or persons incarcerated in a public or privately owned facility for whom the Tennessee Department of Corrections has ultimate responsibility for their medical care and who have at least 12 weeks or more remaining to serve on their sentences and are either currently diagnosed with Hepatitis C infection or are determined to have Hepatitis C after an appropriate screening test has been administered by the Department of Corrections." 2017 WL 1737871. The defendants tried to appeal this class certification decision, but were denied leave to appeal on August 10, 2017. A lengthy and heavily contested discovery process followed. On June 29, 2018 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied on June 6, 2019. The case went to trial on July 16, 2019, and finished July 19, 2019. On September 30, 2019 Judge Crenshaw issued a judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on October 30, 2019, and on August 24, 2020 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Raymond M. Kethledge and Eric E. Murphy) affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court’s reasoning was significantly influenced by the parties' agreement to focus on the 2019 policy for HCV rather than the original 2016 policy at the trial. Quoting the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the 2016 policy was “erratic, uneven, and poor” and “border[ed] on deliberate indifference” as it “prioritized” the best treatment, direct-acting antivirals, for only those with severe liver scaring giving no consideration to other factors, despite the knowledge that antivirals often halt the progress of HCV or cause it disappear completely. However, the court found that the 2019 policy represented a significant improvement. It expanded testing for HCV and established more forgiving criteria for which cases received the direct-acting antivirals (not all cases could receive the treatment due to budget restrictions). Moreover, the 2019 policy established “continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their course of treatment.” The court thus held that the defendant “sought to employ the finite resources at his disposal to maximize their benefit for the inmates in his care.” And it observed that, while the plaintiff’s claim that every inmate should have received the antiviral is certainly desirable, such a demand would have required the defendant to “spend money he did not have.” Judge Ronald Lee Gilman dissented, and argued that the court failed to consider the serious harm caused by the delay in proper treatment as a result of the defendant's 2016 policy and the continuing rationing of care in the 2019 policy. Moreover, he argued that lack of funding (which he suggested the defendant could have tried harder to address) was not an excuse for the violation of the Eight Amendment. 972 F.3d 734. The case is likely over, but the plaintiffs could still appeal or seek reconsideration of the Sixth Circuit's ruling.
<|assistant|>
On July 25, 2016, prisoners at the Tennessee Department of Corrections filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs sued the Tennessee Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants failed to provide medically acceptable care to prisoners with Hepatitis C and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to oppose class certification, but on May 4, 2017, Chief Judge Crenshaw granted the plaintiffs class certification. A lengthy and contested discovery discovery followed. On June 28, 2018 defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied on June 6, 2019. After a trial, Judge Crenshaw issued a judgement for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on October 30, 2019. On August 24, 2020 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that in contrast to the 2016 policy, the 2019 policy reflected satisfactory medical practice given the limited resources at the disposal of the defendant.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 22, 2011, a Christian liberal arts college filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the ACA rules requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiff considered an abortifacient. The plaintiff did not object to other forms of contraception. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene its Christian faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 27, 2012, the defendant Departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the U.S. was in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 22, 2012. The amendments expanded on the plaintiff's objections to providing emergency contraception and claimed that the plaintiff would be subject to federal enforcement action no later than July 1, 2014, even given the "safe harbor" period and anticipated amendments. That same day, the plaintiff also filed an opposition to the U.S. motion to dismiss, arguing that it faced imminent harm despite the safe harbor period and anticipated amendments. On April 9, 2012, the U.S. moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing as before that the safe harbor period and anticipated amendments prevented the plaintiff from alleging any imminent harm. The plaintiff opposed this motion on the same grounds as the first motion to dismiss. On January 7, 2013, the District Court (Judge Christine M. Arguello) granted the U.S. motion to dismiss. Judge Arguello found that, in light of the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review. Judge Arguello declined to reach the question of the plaintiff's standing. Colorado Christian University v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 93188 (D. Colo. January 07, 2013). The next day, the District Court issued a final judgment dismissing the case in its entirety.
<|assistant|>
In 2011, a Christian liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their group health insurance plan. In January 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated imminent harm, and issued a final judgment declaring the case dismissed in its entirety.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 19, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) notified the Nassau County Correctional Center (NCCC) in New York of its intent to investigate conditions at the jail to determine whether they were unconstitutional. The DOJ conducted this investigation under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1997, also known as the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). On September 11, 2000, the DOJ issued a findings letter containing evidence that NCCC unconstitutionally physically abused inmates and behaved with deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs. In April 2002, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and the parties' settlement agreement was attached to the complaint. The case was assigned to Arlene Lindsay. The complaint alleged that NCCC violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting inmates to improper use of force and failing to provide medical care. Under the settlement, the NCCC agreed to develop and implement appropriate policies regarding inmate medical care and mental health services. Specifically, the policies were to address issues in the areas of inmate prescreening, staffing levels, sick call, medication distribution, emergency care, dental care, mental health care, substance abuse treatment, disease control, records, training, mortality reviews, inmate education, sanitation, immunization, and medical grievance procedures. The NCCC also agreed to develop and implement new procedures concerning the use of force against inmates. Specifically, the policies were to address issues in the areas of staff training, reporting and documenting use of force, use of chemical agents, use of restraints, physical contact between staff and inmates. On May 7, 2002, the court conditionally dismissed the complaint, provided that the defendant had substantially complied with the agreement over the course of three years. In August 2002, the court reassigned the case to Judge Leonard Wexler. On July 15, 2005, the parties jointly stipulated that NCCC was in substantial compliance with the portion of the settlement agreement about improper use of force and the court accordingly dismissed that portion of the case. However, the parties agreed that NCCC was not in substantial compliance with the portion of the settlement agreement relating to the provision of medical care and the court thus retained jurisdiction until NCCC was in substantial compliance. On March 14, 2008, the parties stipulated that NCCC was then substantially compliant with settlement agreement related to provision of medical care. Accordingly, Judge Wexler dismissed the case in full. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In April 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that the Nassau County Correctional Center alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint alleged that inmates were subject to excessive force and denied access to medical care. The parties entered into a settlement agreement and the court retained jurisdiction to ensure substantial compliance. In March 2008, the parties agreed that NCCC was in substantial compliance with the entirety of the settlement agreement and the case was closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 29, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Gib Lewis Unit in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiff, bringing the case pro se, sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). He sought a declaratory judgment that TDCJ's enforcement of grooming standards violated his First and Fourteenth amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin TDCJ from enforcing these standards. Specifically, he asked the court to require TDCJ to permit him to grow his beard a full fist length and wear Islamic head gear (Kufi), in line with his religious beliefs. On June 4, 2009, District Judge Thad Heartfield put the case on hold pending a decision in Garner v. Morales, 2009 WL 577755 (5th Cir. 2009), which addressed the same issue in a different prison, and had recently been remanded by the Fifth Circuit back to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Judge Heartfield denied all pending motions, including the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 2009 WL 1586691. On June 12, 2009, the plaintiff appealed Judge Heartfield's opinion to the Fifth Circuit. On appeal, the plaintiff also filed a motion asking the Fifth Circuit to compel the District Court to issue the preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to compel on December 29, 2009, but ultimately vacated the lower court's opinion. On May 28, 2010, the appeals court held that the lower court had erred in pausing the case without findings of fact or conclusions of law. It remanded the motion for preliminary injunction to the District Court. (J. E. Grady Jolly)607 F.3d 1046. Meanwhile, in District Court, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on July 7th, 2009. Judge Heartfiled denied the motion. In response to the Fifth Circuit's May 28th ruling, the District Court reopened the case. The plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel, but Magistrate Judge Judith Guthrie denied the motion on July 7, 2010. Following an evidentiary hearing in District Court, Judge Heartfield dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Judge Heartfield noted that the Fifth Circuit had recently found in Gooden v. Crain, 353 Fed.Appx. 885 (5th Cir. 2009), that a District Court could credit prison officials' testimony that changing grooming codes could present a significant security concern. Judge Heartfield further held that the claim was moot because a temporary medical exemption had permitted the plaintiff to grow a beard. 2010 WL 3790823. The plaintiff appealed the judgment on October 8, 2010. The Fifth Circuit issued a per curiam decision on July 18, 2011 partially vacating and remanding the lower court's ruling. (J. Fortunato Benavides, J. Carl E. Stewart, J. Edith Brown Clement). The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim challenging the head-covering policy, and its dismissal of the equal protection and first amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim challenging the grooming policy. It held that the issue was not moot because the medical exemption had been temporary and had most likely expired in January 2011. 434 Fed.Appx. 322 (5th Cir. Tex.). Meanwhile, in District Court, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to permit him to grow a beard. Judge Ron Clark denied the motion on April 4, 2011, finding that the plaintiff was asking the Court to grant him relief on an issue on which he had already failed to prevail. That summer, on August 23, 2011, the case was officially reassigned to Judge Ron Clark. On October 24, 2011, the plaintiff filed another motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing that in a prior order, the Court had recognized that if Garner was successful in his case in the Southern District, the Plaintiff here could prevail as well. The plaintiff pointed to the Southern District's recent opinion granting declaratory relief to Garner, 2011 WL 2038581. Judge Clark denied the motion for a temporary restraining order on January 9, 2012 because the Garner case was stayed while on appeal. The next day, the plaintiff again moved for a preliminary injunction. On January 31, 2012, the plaintiff appealed Judge Clark's opinion on the temporary restraining order. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and denied the motion on January 4, 2013. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on a temporary restraining order. The Court did remand the case, urging the lower court to reexamine the motion for a preliminary injunction. (per curiam decision, J. Judge Jerry E. Smith, J. Edward C. Prado, J. Stephen A. Higginson) 505 Fed.Appx. 369 (5th Cir. 2013). Meanwhile, in District Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff again moved to appoint counsel. On March 29 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice appeared as Amicus Curiae stating that the United States believed TDCJ's "blanket prohibition on religious beards is not narrowly tailored to the generalized budgetary and security interests it asserts" and asking the court to deny TDCJ's motion for summary judgment. Without deciding on either motion, Magistrate Judge Guthrie stayed the proceedings pending the appeal on the temporary restraining order opinion on April 11, 2012. After the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, on June 3, 2013, the plaintiff brought an objection to the District Court's handling of the case. In particular, he complained that the Magistrate Judge had made so many of the rulings. He asked that the District Judge perform his duty. A month later, on July 2, 2013, he asked the Fifth Circuit to order the District Court to do its job. He alleged that the District Court had failed to decide on injunctive relief, even after the Fifth Circuit had urged it to reexamine the motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 12, 2013, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff's request, but with the caveat that the plaintiff could reinstate it if the District Court had not ruled in 180 days. On December 19, 2013, two pro bono lawyers were appointed as counsel for the plaintiff, and on January 17, 2014, Judge Clark assigned the case to Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. On February 4, 2014, Judge Hawthorn granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining TDCJ from enforcing a policy prohibiting the plaintiff from maintaining a quarter-inch beard. 2014 WL 495162. A bench trial was held in July 2014 before Magistrate Judge Hawthorn. On September 26, he granted declaratory and injunctive relief requiring TDCJ to allow the plaintiff to wear a fist-length beard and a Kufi. 69 F.Supp.3d 633. The state appealed the decision on October 16, 2014. The case was stayed for several months pending resolution in Holt v. Hobbs [135 S.Ct. 853], but after the Supreme Court found for the prisoner plaintiff in that case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment and permanent injunction on May 2, 2016. 822 F.3d 776. Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn denied the defendant's motion to stay the judgment pending the appeal in the Fifth Circuit. On April 29, 2015, he order the defendant to pay the plaintiff $16,312.72 in costs and $214,160.44 in attorney's fees and expenses. The defendant appealed the ruling on May 18, 2015, but withdrew the appeal on May 16, 2016. There has been no significant activity since 2016, and the case appears closed.
<|assistant|>
On March 29, 2009, a Muslim inmate at the Gib Lewis Unit in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. He sought relief from a TDCJ policy prohibiting him from wearing his beard at a fist-length and from wearing a Kufi. The case went back and forth between the District Court and the Fifth Circuit for more than seven years, but the Plaintiff ultimately won a permanent injunction enjoining TDCJ from enforcing these grooming policies.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 1, 2017, former detainees at a private detention facility in Leavenworth, Kansas filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc. (the facility's operator) and Securus Technologies, Inc. (its phone and video services provider) for violations of the Kansas, Missouri and federal (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, <i>et seq.</i>) wiretapping statutes. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and sought monetary relief and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that throughout the time they were detained, defendants improperly and without authorization recorded confidential phone calls and meetings between them and their attorneys. Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara was assigned to the case. On November 13, 2017 an individual tried to join the case as a member of the class, but this motion was denied because class certification had not been granted. CoreCivic and Securus moved to dismiss Count I (the violation of the Missouri wiretapping statute), and this motion was granted because none of the allegedly unlawful interceptions took place Missouri. Securus also moved to dismiss Counts II and III (the violations of the Kansas and federal wiretapping statutes). The court granted in part and denied in part this motion. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that any of their intercepted communications had been disclosed but had adequately alleged that their communications had been unlawfully intercepted and a statutory business use exception did not apply because intercepting conversations between detainees and their lawyers was not part of the defendants' ordinary course of business. 2018 WL 1175042 (Mar. 5, 2018). The parties began settlement negotiations in August, 2018. These negotiations continued until August 23, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved to certify the class and for preliminary approval of class action settlement. The court granted this motion on September 26, 2019. Five members of the class filed objections to the settlement, but the court overruled these objections and approved the settlement on January 28, 2020. The certified class included:<blockquote>All detainees at Leavenworth Detention Center who, during the period of June 1, 2014 through June 19, 2017, had their attorney-client telephone calls recorded by Defendants: (a) after the detainee requested privatization of his or her attorney’s phone number (subclass A); (b) after his or her attorney requested privatization of the attorney’s phone number (subclass B); (c) after Judge Robinson’s cease and desist order on August 10, 2016, in the case styled U.S. v. Black, Case No. 2:16-CR-20032 (subclass C); or (d) after the detainee or his or her attorney otherwise notified one or more Defendants in writing of their attorney-client relationship and provided written notification of the attorney’s phone number at issue (subclass D).</blockquote>The settlement agreement created a Settlement Fund of $1,450,000.00, of which CoreCivic agreed to fund $1,100,000.00 and Securua agreed to fund $350,000.00. The plaintiffs' attorneys received about $500,000 of the settlement funds. The settlement did not provide for relief besides damages. As of April 5, 2020, the court has retained jurisdiction for the administration of ongoing settlement payments.
<|assistant|>
Former detainees at a private detention facility filed this class action lawsuit alleging that the company that operated the detention facility and the company that provided phone and video conference services had violated Kansas, Missouri, and Federal wiretapping statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had recorded confidential phone calls and meetings between detainees and their attorneys. The defendant companies agreed to pay a total of $1.45 million to the class members and their attorneys in a settlement.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Plaintiffs--young undocumented immigrants residing in Arizona--filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on Nov. 29, 2012. Represented by the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, plaintiffs claimed that the state was invalidly denying them drivers' licenses, despite their eligibility under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona Executive Order that denied them drivers' licenses violated both the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause; they sought a declaration that the state action was invalid, and an injunction providing them drivers' licenses. Plaintiffs also petitioned for certification of a class in their complaint, including all young immigrants residing in Arizona who had been granted deferred action, or would be, pursuant to the DACA program and had (or would have) employment authorization documents (EADs) and Social Security Numbers, who were being denied drivers' licenses by the Arizona Motor Vehicles Division. On Dec. 14, 2012, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On Jan. 9, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court (Judge David Campbell) heard oral arguments for both motions on Mar. 22, 2013, and issued an order on May 16, 2013. Judge Campbell denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Supremacy Clause claim, and that, although plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim, they did not show the likelihood of irreparable injury for the claim. Judge Campbell accordingly granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part as to the Supremacy Clause claim and denied in part as to the Equal Protection claim. 945 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013). Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 17, 2013. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 17, 2013, adding two individual plaintiffs and removing the class action claims. In all other respects, the amended complaint essentially reiterated the original complaint, alleging violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On Mar. 26, 2013, Judge Campbell issued an order dismissing one of the individual plaintiffs without prejudice. The case then spent a long time in discovery. On Apr. 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim and for a permanent injunction. On July 7, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Harry Pregerson) issued an opinion as to the interlocutory appeal, granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from enforcing any policy by which the Arizona Department of Transportation refused to accept plaintiffs' EADs, issued under DACA, as proof that plaintiffs were authorized under federal law to be present in the United States. 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). On Nov. 24, 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied the state's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and on Dec. 9, 2014 denied a stay pending the state's petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari review. On Dec. 11, 2014, the state sought a stay from the Supreme Court, pending its cert. petition; the Court rejected that stay on Dec. 17, in an order issued without opinion. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito noted that they would grant the stay. Following this, District Judge Campbell issued a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014. He then held a Jan. 7, 2015 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and summary judgment and on defendants' motion for summary judgment. On Jan. 22, 2015, Judge Campbell granted plaintiffs' motion and denied defendants'. The final judgment permanently enjoined defendants from refusing to issue drivers' licenses to DACA recipients by rejecting their EADs as proof of their authorization under federal law to be present in the United States. In his order, Judge Campbell held that for purposes of Equal Protection, defendants had classified DACA recipients differently from other holders of EADs who could obtain drivers' licenses and that such differential treatment of similarly situated persons did not survive rational-basis review. Plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm by losing job opportunities because they lacked drivers' licenses. 81 F.Supp.3d 795 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2015). Defendants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. After oral argument on July 16, 2015, the panel (Circuit Judges Pregerson, Berzon, and Christen) asked the parties for further briefing on issues of preemption, the separation of powers doctrine, and the Take Care Clause. The United States, at the Court's invitation, submitted an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs on Aug. 28, 2015. The Ninth Circuit then issued an opinion on Apr. 5, 2016, affirming the District Court's order. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's Equal Protection holding. But the Ninth Circuit chose to use the constitutional avoidance principle to reach the same result without finding a constitutional violation. The court thus held that defendants' classification policy for issuing drivers' licenses violated the INA by using an independent definition of "authorized presence," and it was thus preempted by exclusive federal authority to classify noncitizens. 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016). Defendants requested an en banc rehearing, but the Court denied this request in a Feb. 2, 2017 order (Circuit Judges Kozinski and others dissenting). 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017). Defendants then requested a stay while they petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for cert. The Ninth Circuit granted a stay on Feb. 13, 2017, and defendants filed the petition on Mar. 29, 2017. In the interim, on Sept. 5, 2017, the Trump administration <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca">announced plans to rescind DACA</a>. But a district court in <i>Regents of the University of California</i> <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16132">enjoined this move</a> on Jan. 9, 2018, and the government sought cert from the U.S. Supreme Court. On Jan. 22, 2018, in this case, defendants notified the U.S. Supreme Court of the relation between the two cert. petitions. On Feb. 14, 2018, in the Supreme Court, the U.S. filed an amicus brief. On Mar. 19, the Supreme Court denied cert. in this case. On Apr. 6, the Ninth Circuit issued an order lifting the stay and causing its April 2016 judgment to take effect. The case is closed.
<|assistant|>
On Nov. 29, 2012, DACA-eligible plaintiffs sued Arizona for denying them drivers' licenses. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014 and a permanent injunction on Jan. 22, 2015. The 9th Cir. upheld the injunction on Apr. 5, 2016, and denied an en banc rehearing. SCOTUS has denied cert.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 13, 2006, a group of former and current female employees filed their fourth amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., against the Novartis Corporation in the United States District Court in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief, back pay and front pay, and compensatory and punitive damages, alleging sex discrimination, including pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant discriminated in compensation, promotion, personnel evaluations and treatment of women taking pregnancy leave. 244 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). This action began on November 19th 2004, when a smaller group of plaintiffs filed their original complaint. The parties engaged in extensive discovery, specifically on the relationship between the parent company and its subordinate. There was also an early question about whether the Chairman of Novartis was being properly served notice on the case (see Order confirming proper service). On August 16, 2007, the Court (Judge Lynch) granted class certification and defendant's motion for summary judgment. This order granted a class of all women who are currently holding, or have held, a sales-related job position with [NPC] during the time period July 15, 2002 through the present, including those who have held positions as Sales Representatives, Sales Consultants, Senior Sales Consultants, Executive Sales Consultants, Sales Associates, Sales Specialists, Senior Sales Specialists, and District Managers I. 244 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Furthermore, included in this class were any women discriminated against on the basis if pregnancy with respect to the issue of incentive-based compensation. 244 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). While the Court (Judge Lynch) certified the class, he also granted a motion of summary judgment for the defense, holding that the corporation could not be liable for any Title VII violation by NPC. This judgment was based on lack of evidence from the plaintiff that the Corporation and NPC functioned as a single enterprise. 244 F.R.D. 254-255 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A jury trial commenced on April 7, 2010. The jury delivered a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The trial concluded on May 19, 2010, with equitable relief to be order by the Court at a later date. In light of this, the parties engaged in vigorous negotiations and entered into a Settlement Agreement in July 2010, according to which the defendant Novartis would pay $175 million in total and adopt other measures to reduce or eliminate discrimination against female workers. On July 14, 2010, the court (Judge Castel) preliminarily approved the settlement agreement. On November 30th, 2010, the court (Judge Colleen McMahon) finalized the judgment, certifying the class, approving the settlement agreement, and dismissing the case with prejudice. The defendant was required to pay $152,500,000 in backpay, damages to the class, and other charges related to the litigation. On April 8th, 2011, the court (Judge McMahon) approved of modifications to the list of class members and the claims administration process as laid out in the settlement agreement, in order to ensure that all class members receive accurate settlement awards. On September 23rd, 2013, the court (Judge McMahon) addressed a letter to all counsel to encourage continued compliance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed to a 3-year compliance period, however the appointed overseer to the compliance was unable to reach either party to ensure continued cooperation. On April 29, 2014, the court (Judge McMahon) ordered the monitoring period concluded and declared the settlement to have been carried out, thereby terminating Defendant's obligations to the class and concluding the case.
<|assistant|>
This case was brought by several female employees against defendant Novartis seeking monetary and equitable relief. On July 14, 2010, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement agreement, according to which defendant would pay $175 million and adopt other measures to reduce discrimination against female employees. The court found for the Plaintiff class and awarded about $150 million in damages.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition and a complaint for injunctive relief brought on behalf of three immigration detainees confined in detention centers in Texas. The petitioners alleged that as people who were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their age and serious medical conditions, they were exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19. Plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal on December 24, 2020. We presume the case to be closed. <hr> On April 15, 2020, three immigration detainees filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and various detention center officers. Represented by private counsel, the Texas Civil Rights Project, Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants were subjecting them to punishment in a way that violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights and violating the Rehabilitation Act by not taking into account their vulnerability to severe illness or death, denying them soap, hand sanitizer, and other hygiene products, failing to clean common items and surfaces, detaining them in crowded conditions that precluded social distancing, and failing to screen incoming detainees and officers for COVID-19 before entering the detention centers. The case was assigned to Judge Marina Garcia Marmolejo and Magistrate Judge John A. Kazen. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 24, arguing that the plaintiffs could not bring conditions of confinement claims in a habeas action, and that the alleged violations they had plead were not unconstitutional. Later, the Court granted the defendants motion to sever one of the plaintiffs from the case, as he was detained at a separate facility and therefore lacked any connection to the facility in question. On July 31, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, and on August 13, 2020, the defendants filed a response. On December 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal. However on February 3, 2021, the defendants filed a notice of binding authority. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents at this time, and presumes the case to be closed.
<|assistant|>
Detained immigrants in Texas sought writs of habeas corpus, requesting release from their detention centers because they were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to their age and medical conditions.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 17, 2014, two street musicians filed <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-MI-0016-0001.pdf">this lawsuit</a> in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Saugatuck, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages, claiming that the City's application of the Saugatuck Public Entertainment Ordinance (Ordinance) to the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that criminalizing the act of playing music on a public sidewalk without a permit is a prior restraint on expression that violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it does not provide them with fair notice that the Ordinance, which prohibits performances on the streets of Saugatuck without a permit, applies to individual street musicians. On March 27, 2015, upon stipulation and consent of the parties, the Court (Judge Robert J. Jonker) <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-MI-0016-0002.pdf">entered an order</a>: <ul><li>Permanently enjoining the City from enforcing the Public Entertainment Ordinance against the plaintiffs and other individual street performers who wish to perform on the public sidewalks in Saugatuck, including against individual street performers who accept tips from passersby;<li>Permanently enjoining the City from requiring the plaintiffs or other individual street performers to obtain a permit if they wish to perform on the public sidewalks in Saugatuck;<li>Awarding each plaintiff $7,500; and<li>Reserving for resolution between the parties the issue of attorneys' fees to be paid to the plaintiffs.</ul>On May 26, 2015, the Court entered an order granting the plaintiffs an extension until June 2, 2015 to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. On June 17, 2015, Judge Jonker ordered the defendants to pay attorneys’ fees and costs of $30,000 to the ACLU. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In December 2014, two street musicians brought this suit seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages against the City of Saugatuck, Michigan, alleging that the City's prohibition against street musicians performing without a permit is unconstitutional. In March 2015, the District Court entered a Consent Judgment permanently enjoining the City from applying this prohibition and awarding each plaintiff $7,500.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an 18-year-old black man, was fatally shot by Darren Wilson, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, a small city in St. Louis County. The shooting sparked nationwide protests and attention to police use of force and police/African-American relations. The Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri, brought the case in front of a grand jury to determine whether there was probable cause to indict Wilson for his actions. But on November 24, it was announced that the jury had declined to indict Wilson. A federal criminal investigation of Wilson also proceeded. As the criminal investigations were moving forward, on September 4, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened an investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD). The investigation was initiated under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d ("Safe Streets Act"), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"). On March 4, 2014, the DOJ announced that there would be no federal criminal civil rights prosecution. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence to disprove Wilson's claim that he (reasonably or not) feared for his safety. Accordingly, it reported, "Wilson's actions do not constitute prosecutable violations" of federal civil rights law. That same day, the DOJ announced the opposite results in its civil investigation. The DOJ Report concludes: <blockquote>"Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes. Ferguson's own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans. The evidence shows that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities."</blockquote> The report explained that Ferguson's municipal court "operates as part of the police department. The court is supervised by the Ferguson Chief of Police, is considered part of the police department for City organizational purposes, and is physically located within the police station. Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police. Thus, if the City Manager or other City officials issue a court-related directive, it is typically sent to the Police Chief's attention." While the court Judge does not report to the police chief, the court clerk does, and the report explains that "the Court Clerk and assistant clerks routinely perform duties that are, for all practical purposes, judicial. For example, documents indicate that court clerks have disposed of charges without the Municipal Judge's involvement." The report devotes 80 pages to its investigative findings, which allege systemic constitutional violations of numerous types: <ul><li>unlawful stops without reasonable suspicion, and arrests without probable cause</li><li>excessive force, particularly with the use of Tasers and canines, and against people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities</li><li>retaliation for First-Amendment protected speech and advocacy</li><li>illegal prevention of citizen recording of police encounters</li><li>violations of due process by punishing and even jailing people based on their opposition to the charges against them (for example, if they assert constitutional defenses) or on simple inability to pay fines</li></ul>The report connects all of these policing failings to what it labels "FPD's weak systems of supervision, review, and accountability," which "have sent a potent message to officers that their violations of law and policy will be tolerated." With respect to the municipal court, the report highlighted "barriers to resolving a case that court practices impose, including: (1) a lack of transparency regarding rights and responsibilities; (2) requiring in-person appearance to resolve most municipal charges; (3) policies that exacerbate the harms of Missouri's law requiring license suspension where a person fails to appear on a moving violation charge; (4) basic access deficiencies that frustrate a person's ability to resolve even those charges that do not require in-court appearance; and (5) legally inadequate fine assessment methods that do not appropriately consider a person's ability to pay and do not provide alternatives to fines for those living in or near poverty. Together, these barriers impose considerable hardship." Moreover, it alleged, "Current bond practices are unclear and inconsistent. Information provided by the City reveals a haphazard bond system that results in people being erroneously arrested, and some people paying bond but not getting credit for having done so." The report attributed all of these policing/court problems to two overarching sources. First, the report argued, Ferguson used its police and municipal court process as revenue raisers: tickets and warrants are treated as sources of funding, not promoters of public safety or order. Second, the burdens imposed by this approach disproportionately harmed African Americans, and, the report argues, this stemmed in part from intentional discrimination in violation of the Constitution. The report devotes considerable attention to the disparate effects of police and court practices. E.g.: "African Americans experience disparate impact in nearly every aspect of Ferguson's law enforcement system. Despite making up 67% of the population, African Americans accounted for 85% of FPD's traffic stops, 90% of FPD's citations, and 93% of FPD's arrests from 2012 to 2014." And: <ul><li>African Americans are 2.07 times more likely to be searched during a vehicular stop but are 26% less likely to have contraband found on them during a search. They are 2.00 times more likely to receive a citation and 2.37 times more likely to be arrested following a vehicular stop.</li><li>African Americans have force used against them at disproportionately high rates, accounting for 88% of all cases from 2010 to August 2014 in which an FPD officer reported using force. In all 14 uses of force involving a canine bite for which we have information about the race of the person bitten, the person was African American.</li><li>African Americans are 68% less likely than others to have their cases dismissed by the Municipal Judge, and in 2013 African Americans accounted for 92% of cases in which an arrest warrant was issued.</li></ul>The report concludes that the racial skew remains even after various other factors are controlled for. This unnecessary disparate impact itself violates Title VI and the Safe Streets Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Moreover, the report states: <blockquote>Racial bias and stereotyping is evident from the facts, taken together. This evidence includes: the consistency and magnitude of the racial disparities throughout Ferguson's police and court enforcement actions; the selection and execution of police and court practices that disproportionately harm African Americans and do little to promote public safety; the persistent exercise of discretion to the detriment of African Americans; the apparent consideration of race in assessing threat; and the historical opposition to having African Americans live in Ferguson, which lingers among some today. We have also found explicit racial bias in the communications of police and court supervisors and that some officials apply racial stereotypes, rather than facts, to explain the harm African Americans experience due to Ferguson's approach to law enforcement. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Based on this evidence as a whole, we have found that Ferguson's law enforcement activities stem in part from a discriminatory purpose and thus deny African Americans equal protection of the laws in violation of the Constitution."</blockquote> The DOJ concluded its report with 12 single space pages of recommendations for reform, covering essentially all the activities of the Ferguson police and municipal court. DOJ commented, as well, that "These recommendations should be closely evaluated and, as appropriate, implemented by other municipalities. We also recommend that the City and other municipalities work collaboratively with the state of Missouri on issues requiring statewide action, and further recommend: a. Reform of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.341.1, which requires the suspension of individuals' driving licenses in certain cases where they do not appear or timely pay traffic charges involving moving violations; b. Increased oversight of municipal courts in St. Louis County and throughout the state of Missouri to ensure that courts operate in a manner consistent with due process, equal protection, and other requirements of the Constitution and other laws." Negotiations towards a consent decree ensued, and the negotiating teams reached an agreement, which was made public on January 27, 2016. However, after several public hearings, the Ferguson City Council voted to accept the agreement only if it were changed in seven specified ways--(i) eliminate any requirement of salary increases for police officers; (ii) eliminate any requirements for staffing in the Ferguson Jail; (iii) extending agreement deadlines; (iv) eliminating the requirement that the terms of the agreement apply to any other governmental agency who, in the future, might take over Ferguson policing; (v) adding local preference for contracting with consultants, contractors and third parties providing services under the agreement; (vi) adding project goals for minority and women participation in consulting, oversight and third party services; and (vii) capping monitoring fees at $1 million over the first five years with no more than $250,000 in any single year. The DOJ rejected these attempts to reopen the negotiations, and promptly sued, filing this case on February 10, 2016. Acting AAG Vanita Gupta then wrote a letter to Ferguson, suggesting that the city’s projected costs of the agreement were overstated. On that assurance, Ferguson's City Council approved the settlement March 15, 2016; it was filed with the Court the next day. Judge Perry approved and entered the parties' jointly-filed the consent decree on April 19, 2016, after a public hearing to consider the community's input on the proposed consent decree. The consent decree created guidelines for training police officers and reorienting Ferguson's use-of-force policies toward de-escalation and avoiding force. It provided for community policing and engagement measures, reform of the Ferguson municipal code and municipal court system, bias-free police and court practices, and accountability measures, among other provisions. The agreement was set to remain in effect until Ferguson was in full and effective compliance for two years. On July 22, 2016, the court appointed the Squire Patton Boggs team, led by Clark Ervin, as the monitor of the consent decree, and the court has held quarterly status hearings since September 2016. After agreement by the parties and in consultation with the Court, Natashia Tidwell was appointed as the new Lead Monitor on December 12, 2017. The monitor submitted a status report on March 30, 2018. The status report noted that the defendants had made the most progress on the municipal court reform sections of the consent decree, while most other subject areas were still in the early phases of implementation. The report expressed the monitoring team's concerns about the defendants' ability to implement the provisions of the consent decree under the status quo: <blockquote>Significant work remains to be done before the City will be able to claim full implementation of the Consent Decree. In particular, the Monitor is concerned that implementation may stall unless the City hires additional personnel to assist with compliance. Specifically, the Monitor recommends that the City hire the following individuals: (1) an outreach coordinator tasked with community engagement and implementation of the numerous Consent Decree provisions that require public education and collaboration with the Ferguson community; (2) an individual within the Municipal Court to assist with policy development and training; and (3) an FPD employee to support policy development, facilitate the conversion of policies into structured and organized trainings, and evaluate whether state and other external training programs comply with FPD’s implemented policies. These roles are critical to achieving compliance with the Consent Decree, and during the remaining quarter of Year Two, the City should prioritize identifying talented individuals to serve in these positions.</blockquote> On June 18, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to modify four provisions of the consent decree, claiming the proposed modifications were consistent with the intent and purpose of the original provisions and would allow for more effective and practical application of the provisions, particularly in providing greater clarity to FPD officers in the course of their duties. The court approved the minor modifications on June 21, 2018. The plaintiffs made minor amendments to the consent decree on November 15, 2018 in an uncontested motion. Monitoring and regular status conferences have continued, and are ongoing as of June 9th, 2020. Status conferences are made open to the public and have established procedures for public comment on compliance. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On August 9, 2014, 18-year-old black male, Michael Brown was shot by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened up an investigation into the Ferguson Police Department. The Justice Department did not find enough evidence to prosecute the officer in question but did find that the police department was violating the Constitution through various practices that invidiously discriminated against African Americans. The Justice Department and the City of Ferguson worked toward a consent decree that was eventually passed by the Ferguson City Council on March 15, 2016. The agreement will last until the Justice Department finds the city compliant for two years.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 16, 2015, the Florida Justice Institute filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of 2,000 inmates in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), and their medical services contractor Corizon LLC, had denied hernia surgeries to prisoners to save money, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the defendants to immediately provide hernia surgery to all FDOC prisoners recommended for surgery. For prisoners who have not seen a surgeon, the plaintiffs requested that they be seen by a surgeon. The plaintiffs also requested monetary damages and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. On December 24, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class defined as "all current and future prisoners in the custody of FDOC who have presented, or will present, with a symptomatic hernia to prison staff." The plaintiffs also moved for certification of two subclasses. These were a surgery recommendation subclass, defined as "all class members who have received, or will in the future receive, a recommendation from a surgeon that they receive surgery" and a no consult subclass, consisting of "all class members who have not seen a surgeon, or will be denied a visit to a surgeon in the future, for a surgical consultation." On January 6, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the defendants to perform those hernia surgeries for those prisoners who have already received a recommendation. The plaintiffs also sought an order requiring the defendants to send class members to an independent surgeon for a surgical consultation, and then to abide by the surgeon's recommendation. On May 2, 2016, the plaintiffs and the defendants participated in settlement mediation and reached a settlement. On September 19, 2016, the plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion asking the court to conditionally certify two classes and to preliminarily approve the class settlement. On September 23, 2016, Judge Hinkle preliminarily approved the consent order and certified two classes. The injunctive class was defined as "[a]ll current and future prisoners in FDOC custody who, after September 16, 2011, have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with a hernia by a qualified medical provider." The damages class was defined as "[a]ll past and current prisoners in FDOC custody who were diagnosed with and/or treated for a hernia between September 8, 2013, and May 31, 2016, at an FDOC facility while Corizon was the medical provider for that FDOC facility." As part of the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay about $2.1 million to settle this lawsuit: FDOC would pay $150,000 and Corizon would pay $1,950,000. The consent order also required FDOC to amend its health care policy on hernias to ensure that prisoners are referred to doctors for consultations and receive the recommended care. The FDOC would adopt a new Health Service Bulletin dealing with hernias, provide notice to medical staff and comply with the new policy. On March 27, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for final approval of the class action settlement. In response, the court required that certain state and federal governmental officials be given notice and 100 days to file any objection prior to final approval in compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act. After all objections had been fully considered, Judge Hinkle ruled that none provided the basis to disapprove or alter the agreement. The court granted final approval of the class action settlement on September 11, 2017. 2017 WL 8780863. On November 16, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss with prejudice the defendant Corizon. The court granted it and removed Corizon from the action. On December 19, 2017, a class member filed a notice of a breach of the agreement, claiming that the defendants were not providing inmates hernia exams. Judge Hinkle treated this notice as a motion for relief and denied it without prejudice on December 31, 2017. On January 2, 2018, another class member filed a notice of their appeal of the order granting final approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Later, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his appeal. On April 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the consent order (from September 23, 2016), and the defendants answered on May 16, 2019. Oral argument on the motion was held on June 13, 2019. On August 15, 2019, the parties reached a joint agreement, and the court issued an order for the parties to comply. FDOC agreed to provide more complete and frequent reports. The parties also agreed that a delay of more than four months between diagnosis and surgical consult or between surgical consult and surgery would be considered an "undue delay." The motion to enforce was dismissed without prejudice as moot. There have been repeated efforts to reopen the case by prisoners who were not included within the class definition, but the court has denied these. As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.
<|assistant|>
In 2015, prisoners filed this class action in the U.S. District for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that they were denied medical treatment for hernia and sought an injunction requiring a new health policy to provide surgery for hernia. In 2016, parties reached a settlement that required such policy as well as monetary damages to the plaintiffs. In 2019, the parties reached an agreement that in addition to the settlement, more complete and frequent reports would be provided and a delay of more than four months would be considered an "undue delay." As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is part of the series of <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=33">Signal International cases</a>. It was consolidated with <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380"><i>Achari v. Signal International</i></a> and continues on that page. On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-LA-0010-0016.pdf">denied class certification</a> on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14377"><i>David v. Signal International</i></a>. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company based in Pascagoula, Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters approximately $15,000 for recruitment fees, as well as additional fees for skills and medical tests. The plaintiffs also named Malvern C. Burnett and Sachin Dewan, a New Orleans lawyer and India-based recruiter, respectively, as co-defendants for their involvement in the scheme. Upon arrival in the United States, plaintiffs discovered that they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, they were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps under constant supervision of private security guards, and were subject to threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and (d)), Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidential relationship. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) transferred this case and <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380"><i>Achari</i></a>, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14381"><i>Chakkiyattil v. Signal International</i></a>, and <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14385"><i>Devassy v. Signal International</i></a> to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380"><i>Achari</i></a> case. This case continues at the case page for <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14380"><i>Achari</i></a>.
<|assistant|>
On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In September 2000, the New Orleans District Office and Houston Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commision (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, doing business as Rite Aid Corp., in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. Following four amendments of the complaint by the EEOC, one motion for summary judgment that was granted in part and another that was denied, and a $1,820 fine against the EEOC for excessive discovery that was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case was heard before the judge in July 2002. The judge held that the EEOC prevailed against the defendant for engaging in an unlawful employment practice but ordered that no relief be awarded since the EEOC failed to prove cognizable danger existed that Rite Aid would in the future take sex into account in making an employment decision. Both parties appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in September 2002, which affirmed the District Court's decision in October 2002.
<|assistant|>
The EEOC filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, (doing business as Rite Aid Corp.), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. The Court found that the EEOC had proven Defendant had engaged in an unlawful employment practice but provided no relief, finding no cognizable danger that future wrongdoing would occur.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 25, 2013, three same-sex couples residing in Utah, one of which was legally married in Iowa, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Utah. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that Amendment 3 to the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(5) violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause by denying same-sex couples the opportunity to marry or have Utah recognize marriages entered into in other states. The plaintiffs asked for a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing both the amendment and the law and compelling the defendants to recognize the Iowa marriage as legal in Utah. The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. Section 31-1-2 of the Utah Code was amended in 1977, to state that marriages "between persons of the same sex" were "prohibited and declared void." In 2004, the legislature passed section 30-1-4.1 of the Utah Code, which provides: (a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter. (b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any legal status, rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially equivalent to those provided under Utah law to a man and woman because they are married. In addition, the Utah Constitution was amended by referendum on Nov. 2, 2004 (with 66% of the voters approving the amendment) to include the following text: (1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect. In this case, District Judge Robert Shelby, held on December 20, 2013, decided the case for the plaintiffs, declaring the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing the relevant sections of the Utah Code and Constitution. Given the Supreme Court's opinion in Windsor v. United States, the court held, "the important federalism concerns at issue here are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under the law." The plaintiffs had, Judge Shelby found, a fundamental right to marry, and an inability to "develop the type of intimate bond necessary to sustain a marriage with a person of the opposite sex." Moreover, neither Utah's law nor the constitutional amendment served a rational basis: two of the asserted justifications (promoting responsible procreation within marriage; promoting the ideal arrangement that children be raised by both a father and a mother in a stable family unit) were not served by the ban on same-sex marriage, and the justification of preserving the traditional definition of marriage was insufficiently weighty. The court observed that "The State's position appears to be based on an assumption that the availability of same-sex marriage will somehow cause opposite-sex couples to forego marriage," but found that view unsupported by evidence, whereas the harm experienced by same-sex couples was "undisputed." The court compared Utah's arguments to those made by Virginia in 1966, before the Supreme Court, defending the ban on interracial marriage. The state sought a stay and filed an appeal, but Judge Shelby denied the application, as did the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. While the stay applications (there were several, on different grounds) were pending, about 1300 Utah couples got married. The state applied to the Supreme Court for a stay, and on January 6, 2014, that was granted, "pending final disposition of the appeal" before the 10th Circuit. This raised the issue of the status of the 1300 marriages celebrated in the prior two weeks. On January 8, the Utah Attorney General, Sean Reyes, declined to state whether the marriages remained effective, but Governor Gary Herbert's child of staff that same day directed all state agencies that recognition of the marriages was "ON HOLD until further notice." That is, "For example, if a same-sex married couple previously changed their names on new drivers licenses, those licenses should not be revoked. If a same-sex couple seeks to change their names on drivers licenses now, the law does not allow the state agency to recognize the marriage therefore the new drivers licenses cannot be issued." U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder took a different position, however: he announced on January 10 that "for purposes of federal law, these marriages will be recognized as lawful and considered eligible for all relevant federal benefits on the same terms as other same-sex marriages." Several states have followed the same approach. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Utah's ban on same-sex marriage, the court held in an opinion by Judge Lucero, violated the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state's marital laws, protected by the 14th Amendment under the doctrine of substantive due process. Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Circuit 2014). Judge Kelly dissented. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah clerks county began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
<|assistant|>
On December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found for the plaintiffs in this challenge (filed March 25, 2013) to Utah's same-sex marriage ban, and enjoined enforcement of that ban. Over a thousand marriages occurred in the next two weeks, at which time the Supreme Court stayed operation of the district court injunction pending disposition of the appeal in the 10th Circuit. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that Utah's ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah county clerks began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a "Certificate of Eligibility" pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1. Plaintiff alleged the practice and law violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Plaintiff requested that their claims be heard by a three-judge panel and be declared unconstitutional. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed.
<|assistant|>
his case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a "Certificate of Eligibility" pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 12, 2008, two convicted felons filed a civil rights action under federal and state laws in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division. Plaintiffs named the Secretary of the State of Mississippi, and various county election officials as Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that §241 of the Mississippi Constitution explicitly allows for individuals who have been convicted of a crime to vote for the U.S. President and Vice President. Plaintiffs assert that they meet all the requirements for an elector in the State of Mississippi and, despite their felony convictions, retain the right to vote for President and Vice President. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' disfranchisement of Plaintiffs violates § 241 of the Mississippi Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the National Voter Registration Act. Represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union, Plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) denied the motion for a preliminary injunction from the bench, stating that their interpretation of § 241 was not "fair or reasonable." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently denied Plaintiffs' motion for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal. On October 02, 2008, the state officials filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). On March 9, 2009, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) granted Defendants' motion as to 12(b)(6), concluding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' complaint was "without merit and should be dismissed with prejudice" because their interpretation of § 241 was "legally incorrect." The Court also concluded that "defendants have correctly construed this provision." Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On February 25, 2010, in a published opinion by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Young v. Hoseman, 598 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2010)
<|assistant|>
This 2008 voting rights case was brought by convicted felons who claimed that Massachessetts Constitution permitted them to vote in presidential elections. The District Court disagreed, and the 5th Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 17, 2006, American citizens who use the telephone and internet filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States of America, the National Security Agency and the Attorney General under the Declaratory Judgment Act and <i>bivens</i>. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the government had engaged in a massive, indiscriminate, illegal dragnet of the phone calls and email of tens of millions of ordinary Americans since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Allegedly, the core component of the defendant's surveillance program was a nationwide network of sophisticated communication surveillance devices attached to the key facilities of various telecommunication companies carrying Americans' Internet and telephone communications. On February 2, 2007, this case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel then consolidated the case as part of a multi-district litigation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13881">NS-CA-11</a>, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12825">NS-CA-0004</a>. After dismissals of almost all of the cases in the MDL, this case was one of only two cases remaining. The other case was Jewel v. NSA, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12772">NS-CA-0002</a>, in this Clearinghouse. On January 21, 2010, Judge Walker dismissed this case and Jewel v. NSA, holding the plaintiffs lacked standing. Jewel v. National Sec Agency, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21 2010). The plaintiffs appealed. On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated that judgment. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that the plaintiffs did have standing and remanded the case back to district court "with instructions to consider, among other claims and defenses, whether the government's assertion that the state secrets privilege bars this litigation." Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011). Upon remand, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary adjudication, requesting that the district court dismiss the defendants' state secret defense. The defendants cross-moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity for the statutory claims and for summary judgment on the assertion of the state secrets privilege. On May 8, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint and demand for a jury trial against government defendants. Earlier in 2012, Judge Walker had retired, so the matter was reassigned to District Judge Jeffrey S. White on September 17, 2012. On July 23, 2013, Judge White granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary adjudication, rejecting the defendants' state secrets defense. However, the Judge White also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages under FISA and all statutory claims for injunctive relief on the basis of sovereign immunity. Judge White reserved ruling on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on remaining non-statutory claims (counts 1—4 of the Jewel Complaint and the fourth cause of action in the Shubert Complaint). Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013). On March 10, 2014, Judge White entered a temporary restraining order requiring the preservation of relevant evidence pending the parties' further briefing and the Court's final determination of the preservation issues. In its restraining order, the Court required that the government refrain from "destroying any potential evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this action, including but not limited to prohibiting the destruction of any telephone metadata or 'call detail' records, pending further order of the Court." This order applied to this case, as well as Jewel v. NSA and First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12784">NS-CA-0003</a>, in this Clearinghouse. This temporary restraining order directly conflicted with an order to destroy all metadata within five years of collection issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13621">NS-DC-0051</a>, in this Clearinghouse. As a result, the FISC granted temporary relief from the five-year destruction requirement but required that telephony metadata being preserved beyond the five-year limitation not be used by the NSA for any purpose. On February 10, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' claim that interception of their internet communications was a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient factual basis to sue under the Fourth Amendment, and even if plaintiffs did establish sufficient facts, the claim would be dismissed because any defense would impermissibly disclose state secret information. 2015 WL 545925. On May 20, 2015, the Court ordered final judgment in favor on the defendants based on the February 10, 2015 order. The docket was last updated on March 5, 2018. The Court granted a Stipulated Protective Order with regard to Plaintiffs' personal information. Within 60 days of the final disposition of the action, the Defendants were required to return or destroy all protected material.
<|assistant|>
On May 17, 2006, plaintiffs sued the United States government in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. The court dismissed each of plaintiffs' claims except the claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment and later dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of factual basis and alternatively because any defense would disclose state secret information.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. EPIC is a nonprofit organization that aims to expose new issues related to privacy and civil liberties. The complaint stated that ICE had a contract with Palantir Technologies, a data mining firm, to create and maintain information systems "designed to make determinations about specific, identifiable individuals." FALCON and ICM are two such information systems that ICE used. EPIC argued that Palantir's products provide "the basis for deportation determinations" by collecting "massive amounts of data on individuals and applying, secretive, proprietary techniques [to make] determinations about their fitness for employment, travel, and whether they should be targeted for further investigations." FALCON and ICM specifically enabled ICE to secretly collect personal data from numerous federal databases with information on individuals not suspected of any crimes. The complaint further asserted that ICE sought to make FALCON exempt from several Privacy Act safeguards, while ICM is already exempt from those safeguards. At an initial scheduling conference held on March 14, 2018, Judge Randal D. Moss directed the parties to file a joint status report every 60 days. Status reports filed in May through September 2018 indicated that the government was in the process of producing responsive records on a rolling basis. A November 2018 status report indicated the production was complete and that EPIC was reviewing the produced records. The August 2019 joint status update stated that EPIC had reviewed the document production and identified several issues in dispute, including the agency's withholdings under FOIA exemptions. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to these specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents the same day. EPIC reviewed the released documents and, on September 19, 2019, stated that there are no further issues concerning document production. The only issue left to be determined was attorneys' fees. On January 30, 2020, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. On January 31, the court ordered the dismissal. There have been no subsequent docket entries and the case has closed.
<|assistant|>
This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. ICE finished document production by November 2018. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents. On January 31, 2020, the parties settled, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. This case has finished.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In April 2019, the plaintiff applied to work for Whole Foods' Manhattan-area delivery service. As part of their hiring procedure, Whole Foods, which is owned by Amazon, conducted a background check. Upon learning about plaintiff's criminal history, Whole Foods denied plaintiff a job, despite there being no other issues with plaintiff's application. On June 6, 2020, the plaintiff brought a class action suit against Whole Foods and Amazon. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff brought suit under three state human rights laws that restrict employers' ability to deny employment on the basis of applicants' criminal histories. The plaintiff sought statutory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, injunctive and/or declaratory relief, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. In response to defendant Whole Food's September 4 motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
The plaintiff was denied employment by Whole Foods due to prior criminal history, despite three New York/New York City statues that protect applicants with criminal histories. The plaintiff brought a class action suit and has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint in response to Whole Food's motion to dismiss.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 14, 2006, the San Francisco District Office and Seattle Field Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Providence Health System, doing business as Providence Alaska Medical Center, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendant failed to rehire the complaining parties after a layoff based upon their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with the ADEA (a zero-tolerance policy), and to pay the Plaintiffs a lump sum of $220,000 to be divided as the Plaintiffs see fit. The Consent Decree also required the Defendants to implement a non-discrimination policy, which would specifically say that age-based discrimination may result in disciplinary action, and would define age-based discrimination clearly. The goal of this policy was to make it easier for workers to come forward with complaints of age-based discrimination, and to offer quicker solutions to these complaints. The Defendants also agreed to educate their employees on the requirements of ADEA, and to report their progress to the Plaintiffs. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012.
<|assistant|>
On June 14, 2006, the EEOC filed this ADEA case against Providence Health System in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska on behalf of employees who claimed to have been denied re-hire after lay-off due to their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with ADEA, to implement a non-discrimination policy, and to pay the Plaintiffs $220,000. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 30, 2016 a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness (“GLAD”), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Ana under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ACA”) Title II, the California Disabled Persons Act, and Cal. Govt. Code § 11135, which at relevant parts provides that no person shall be unlawfully denied full and equal access to benefits on the basis of disability. Plaintiffs also sued the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) under Section 504, alleging discrimination based on disability in the Santa Ana City Jail against immigration detainees housed by ICE in the jail. Represented by private counsel, Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing a total lack of communication services for inmates who are deaf and hard of hearing, such as ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids, Plaintiffs alleged that detainees with hearing disabilities were effectively denied access to the programming and services made available by the jail to the general public. Plaintiff resident alleged that, while ICE officials and the Santa Ana Jail knew she was not fluent in English and was deaf, they never provided her with auxiliary aids or language assistance during her five months of immigration detention at the jail. Because of this failure, she was unable to understand the jail’s procedures, had no means to communicate with people outside of the jail, received improper medical care, and was denied all access to the jail’s educational programming. Furthermore, because officials failed to communicate to her that she was eligible for bond in June 2015, she stayed an extra five months at the jail. Later, on December 5, 2016 Defendant City of Santa Ana submitted a request for stay of proceedings and early mediation through the court’s alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) program. Judge Manuel Real referred the case to the ADR program, and the Parties went before a Mediator on February 17, 2017. The case settled fully on the same date. While the terms of the settlement were not made public, an attorney for Plaintiffs <a href="http://www.ocweekly.com/news/santa-ana-settling-with-deaf-immigrant-detained-by-ice-7967327">made a statement</a> shortly after mediation that Plaintiffs would receive damages in the amount of $140,000. He also referenced injunctive relief that would “prevent what happened to the plaintiffs in this case from happening to another deaf, hard-of-hearing person housed in the Santa Ana city jail.” After the terms of the settlement were carried out, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the action with prejudice on May 19, 2017, with each Party to pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs.
<|assistant|>
In June 2016, a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Santa Ana's failure to provide ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids to deaf and hard of hearing immigration detainees at the city's jail violated Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. In February 2017, the parties reached a settlement requiring Defendants to pay $140,000 in damages to Plaintiffs and to develop measures to ensure that deaf and hard of hearing jail detainees would receive appropriate accommodations and services. The case closed in May 2017.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In 1992 and 1993, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("RA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) ("RCW"). In the first suit filed on October 26, 1992, styled Duffy v. Riveland (92-01596), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at a July 30, 1992, prison disciplinary hearing. By order dated January 28, 1994, the District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Duffy appealed. In the second suit, styled Duffy v. Yost (93-637), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at two separate classification hearings. The District Court (Judge Coughenour) granted summary judgment to the defendants on April 19, 1994. Duffy appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases on appeal and reversed the summary judgments in part (dismissal of ADA, RA, state law claims and § 1983 claims stemming from disciplinary hearing) and affirmed in part (dismissal of § 1983 claims stemming from classification hearings) and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Duffy v. Riveland. 98 F.3d 447 (1996). On remand, both cases were assigned to District Judge Rothstein. Duffy amended his complaint and then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his state law claim. On January 14, 1998, the District Court (Judge Barbara Rothstein) granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that state law (RCW 2.42.120) required the defendants to provide hearing-impaired inmates with a qualified interpreter at quasi-judicial proceedings. The Court ordered that injunctive relief should be extended to all future disciplinary hearings. On February 10, 1998, a consolidated class action complaint was filed in the Duffy cases and the case Atkins v. Lehman, also pending in the District. A settlement of all claims followed. The settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters and TTY access to hearing impaired inmates. In addition to the new policy, the DOC agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys fees of $150,000. The District Court approved the class action settlement by order dated September 3, 1998. The settlement class included "All inmates incarcerated in Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities now or in the future who are deaf or whose hearing impairment substantially limits a major life activity." We have no further information on this matter.
<|assistant|>
In 1992 and 1993, Sean Duffy a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("RA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) ("RCW"). The parties eventually settled, and the settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters to hearing impaired inmates.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 13, 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to apply the relevant sections of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they apply the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendant to recognize both of them as legal parents of their child and to issue a birth certificate for the child that identifies them both as legal parents. On July 22, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from enforcing the sections of its Uniform Parentage Act at issue in a way that differentiates between male spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction with donor sperm and similarly situated female spouses of women. Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *1 (D. Utah. July 22, 2015). The defendants complied with the injunction, including issuing a birth certificate for the plaintiffs' child listing them both as parents. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs and defendants submitted a joint stipulated proposed order granting a permanent injunction. On October 20, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) converted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction and awarded $24,302 in attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiffs.
<|assistant|>
In 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs challenged Utah's application of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. Utah did not treat female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they treated the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. The Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Utah to apply the Act uniformly. Then, the parties settled and the preliminary injunction was made permanent.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 25, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three New York City residents who use wheelchairs filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The plaintiffs sought class-action certification; an order and judgment enjoining defendants from violating Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the NYCHRL; declaratory relief; an order requiring defendants to institute system-wide policies and practices necessary to ensure the subway system elevators regularly operate in a useable and sanitary condition and provision of adequate notice and alternative accommodations when outages occur; and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City’s subway system in violation of state and federal law. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the subway elevators caused riders with mobility disabilities to routinely face frequent elevator outages occurring without notice and lasting as long as several months; that the defendants gave no warning of outages and did not provide alternate accommodations when they occur; and that as a result of defendants’ failure to provide proper maintenance, they have denied New Yorkers with mobile disabilities access to public transportation. The plaintiffs argued that the transit agency’s failure to provide an adequate number of elevators in the subway system violates the city’s human rights law, whose aim is to “eliminate and prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public accommodations and housing and other real estate, and to take other actions against prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination and bias-related violence or harassment.” The plaintiffs' federal claims alleged that the transit agency’s failure to maintain operable elevators violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discriminating against people with disabilities in public facilities. On September 6, 2017, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice as against the City of New York on the ground that the lease between the City and the Transit Authority gives the Transit Authority full jurisdiction, control, possession, and supervision of New York transit facilities and limits the City’s right of reentry to the leased facilities to repair service facilities that are not used for transit purposes. On November 3, 2017, Judge Katherine B. Forrest issued an order certifying the action to proceed as a class action on behalf of all persons who use or seek to use the New York City subway system and have a disability that requires them to use an elevator to access the subway system. The parties proceeded to discovery and deposition in 2018 and the case was reassigned to Judge Robert W. Sweet on September 20, 2018. Discovery continued under Judge Sweet, until he passed away on March 24, 2019. The case was reassigned to Judge George B. Daniels on April 8, 2019. On May 28, 2019, Judge Daniels terminated a motion for extension of time to complete discovery, a motion to compel, and a motion for discovery pursuant to the May 2, 2019, status conference. Two more motions were resolved on June 4, 2019. On August 9, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. They moved the court to find that the defendant discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities by systemically failing to implement adequate, programmatic subway system elevator maintenance in violation of Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Plaintiffs' experts also filed supporting statements. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They moved the court to find in favor of the defendant on all claims in the complaint and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. An oral argument was held on October 24, 2019. At the conclusion of oral argument, the court reserved decision on the motions and declined to set a trial date. On November 14, 2019, the plaintiffs filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 18, the defendants briefly responded in a letter to the judge and asked that the plaintiffs’ filing be stricken from the docket because the filing was not solicited by the court. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On April 25th, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three individual disabled New York City residents who use wheelchairs and have frequently encountered subway outages filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City’s subway system in violation of state and federal law. After extensive discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on August 9, 2019. An oral argument was held on October 24 but Judge George B. Daniels reserved a decision on the motions. The case is still ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 29, 2008, two men married in the state of California, filed suit against the United States, the State of California, and 'Does 1 through 1,000' alleging violations by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA", 1 U.S.C. §7) of the Full Faith and Credit, Equal Protection, and Due Process clauses to the Constitution, as well as the rights to Privacy, Speech, Travel, and the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. The case was originally filed in Superior Court of California for the County of Orange and removed to the US District Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that DOMA discriminated along lines of gender and sexual orientation by prohibiting any requirement that any state recognize same sex marriages conducted in another state, and in turn permitting the limitation of federal benefits tied to marital status that are due those couples on such grounds. Plaintiffs also complained that the California state constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage ("Proposition 8") violated the same set of rights as DOMA. These allegations had been brought twice before by the couple, but were dismissed or withdrawn for jurisdictional and technical reasons. The portion of the case pursuing California law was dismissed as moot on July 25, 2009, since plaintiffs were already and continued to be legally married in the state of California. The Court, Judge David O. Carter, ultimately dismissed the portion of the case concerning DOMA on technical grounds on August 24, 2009, citing improper initial filing in state court (despite removal to proper federal court). The case is notable for the two different stances taken by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") during briefing. The DOJ initially defended the law substantively in briefing filed June 11, 2009, citing public policy considerations to validate DOMA's diminishment of the legal status of same-sex marriages in states where they are prohibited by law, and consequent limitation on the federal benefit rights afforded such couples whose marriages are not legal in all states. In later briefing filed on August 17, 2009, the DOJ withdrew support for the law, stating that it should be "repealed as a matter of policy" due to its "discriminatory" nature, but continued to defend it on the presumption of constitutionality afforded acts of Congress and its practice of defending federal statutes as long as reasonable arguments can be made in support of their constitutionality. This was an intermediate step towards the DOJ's later position that DOMA is unconstitutional.
<|assistant|>
Two married men in California brought suit alleging that DOMA and Proposition 8 violated their Equal Protection and Due Process Rights. The case, dismissed for jurisdictional reasons and withdrawn previously, was dismissed again because of improper filing. Smelt is significant because the DOJ began briefing by defending DOMA on substantive grounds, but changed its argument during defense of its dispositive summary judgment motion, stating that the law was "discriminatory" in nature and should be "repealed as a matter of policy."
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated nonprofit charities revived their dismissed claim (<a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12050">Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius</a>), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. Th plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the religious employer exemption and the accommodations put forth in the government's final rule as amended on June 28, 2013, arguing that the definition of religious employer was too narrow and the rule continued to burden their free exercise. They argued that the accommodations required nonexempt plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn triggered an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs found objectionable. The plaintiffs argued that they were thus the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage and asked the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On May 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. On June 30, 2014, Judge John Ross granted the preliminary injunction. 28 F.Supp.3d 944. The government appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 28, 2014. On November 12, 2015, the Eighth Circuit decided that it would hold the appeal in abeyance in light of the pending Supreme Court decision in <i>Zubik v. Burwell</i> (See <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465">FA-PA-0016</a> in this Clearinghouse). In <i>Zubik</i>, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of the case and instead held that the parties "should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates [plaintiffs'] religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by [plaintiffs'] health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage." The government requested that the Eighth Circuit issue an order like the one issued by the Supreme Court in <i>Zubik</i>, acknowledging that the plaintiffs believed they should be exempt from the government's final rule and staying the appeal to provide the government with an opportunity to resolve the plaintiffs' request for an exemption. On September 19, 2016, the Eighth Circuit issued this order. Afterwards, the parties continued to provide status updates regarding a resolution to the plaintiffs' challenge to the Eighth Circuit. In light of the continuing stay in the appeal of this matter, the district court dismissed without prejudice the government’s motion to dismiss on August 5, 2016. Since September 19, 2016, the parties have submitted multiple status reports to the Eight Circuit. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report asking the court not to take any action on the case as the parties continued discussions pursuant to the Supreme Court's Directive in <i>Zubik</i>. The report noted that the Trump administration had not yet determined its position on the issue. On July 14, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report stating discussions between parties were still ongoing. The report again noted the Trump administration had not determined its position, and as a result, the plaintiffs requested the case remain in abeyance. On September 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed another status report containing the same information. On October 6, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case with the plaintiffs' consent. The court granted the dismissal of the appeal on October 10, 2017. Also on October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued an order that would no longer require employers to provide contraception if they had religious objections. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html">See New York Time article for more information</a> On October 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. The court granted the motion the same day. This case is closed.
<|assistant|>
On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated non-profit charities revived their dismissed claim in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government challenging provisions of the Affordable Care Act, as amended on June 28, 2013, extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On June 30, 2014, plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction that prevents the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. The government appealed the injunction and as of March 2017. In October of 2017 when the Trump Administration removed the contraception required for employers with a religious objection, the parties moved to have the case dismissed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition brought on behalf of medically vulnerable immigration detainees confined in two detention centers in California. The plaintiffs were granted a temporary restraining order and released from detention on April 30, 2020. The motion for preliminary injunctions for both subclasses were denied on May 26 and July 22. The case remains ongoing. <hr> This is a class action lawsuit regarding the immediate release of medically vulnerable immigration detainees from two immigration detention centers during the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 21, 2020, numerous immigration detainees filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Acting Secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the senior warden and an officer at Otay Mesa Detention Center (OMDC), Field Office Director at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Calexico Assistant Field Office Director, Deputy Director of ICE, and Facility Administrator at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (IRDF) for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241. Specifically, they alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment right to due process by subjecting them to heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. Represented by private counsel and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, the plaintiff sought writs of habeas corpus for immediate release of medically vulnerable detainees, or alternatively injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order ordering the immediate release, as well as declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Dana M. Sabraw. The plaintiffs alleged that in the Spring of 2020, outbreaks of COVID-19 at the detention facilities escalated and that ODMC had the highest number of confirmed cases out of any ICE facility in the country. They argued that the staff failed to take appropriate preventative measures, such as by failing to allow for social distancing in the barracks, dining, bathing, or recreation areas. On the same day the petition was filed, the plaintiffs also filed motions for a temporary restraining order and for class certification. The plaintiffs requested a class-wide temporary restraining order directing the defendants to immediately release the Otay Mesa Medically Vulnerable subclass from custody , which included "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center who are age 45 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." The plaintiffs also proposed an Imperial Class of "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility" and an Imperial Medically Vulnerable Subclass of "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility who are age 45 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." On April 30, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, declaring that the conditions of confinement at OMDC were unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The court provisionally granted the OMDC Subclass and ordered the defendants to identify subclass members and immediately release them in a manner that comported with public health guidelines. On May 1, the court issued an order granting in part the class certification, modifying and provisionally certifying the Otay Mesa Medically Vulnerable subclass as "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center who are age 60 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 as determined by CDC guidelines." The court also confirmed its issuance of the temporary restraining order set forth in the April 30 order. On May 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to amend or correct the order granting the temporary restraining order, contending that the court addressed the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits after it declared that the conditions of confinement were unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and erred in provisionally granting the Subclass. They requested that the court correct the April 30 order to clarify that it did not issue a ruling on the merits but rather found a likelihood of success on the merits. The court granted the defendants' motion in part, specifically correcting the language of the April 30 order to state that it found a likelihood of success on the merits. In a May 11 supplemental briefing, the plaintiffs argued that, because they could continue to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, the temporary restraining order should be converted to a preliminary injunction. However, on May 26, the court denied this request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the defendants instituted a number of new policies and practices to address the spread of COVID-19 at OMDC (such as suspending new admissions, screening all persons entering the facility, posting educational resources, increasing sanitation, providing masks to detainees, and requiring employees to wear personal protective equipment), had identified subclass members, and that most subclass members were being housed in units with no positive cases. The court thus found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the due process claim. On June 12, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and writs of habeas corpus and to provisionally certify the IRDF class and subclass. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the court order the defendants to release all members of the IRDF subclass, reduce the population at the facility to allow for social distancing, and create a plan to protect those remaining (including implementing testing, social distancing, and cleaning protocols and providing personal hygiene and protective materials). On July 22, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and motion for class certification. The court held that IRDF had no active COVID-19 cases and thus, unlike OMDC, the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. On August 10, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a joint motion to decertify the OMDC subclass, both of which the court denied on October 19. On August 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from the May 26 order or, in the alternative, for preliminary injunction to establish a dispute resolution process regarding the OMDC subclass. The court denied this motion on November 12, stating that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court stated that even though OMDC had resumed accepting new individuals, including individuals who had tested positive for COVID-19, that was not sufficient to warrant relief in light of the precautions being taken at OMDC. Furthermore, the court decided that although the plaintiffs' assertion that these new admissions were being housed with members of the OMDC subclass was potentially concerning, it was unclear whether it was actually happening. The parties are currently engaged in discovery. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In April 2020, a group of medically vulnerable immigration detainees filed this lawsuit seeking writs of habeas corpus and their immediate release in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that their heightened risk of COVID-19 at the centers violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order later that month, declaring that the conditions of confinement at one of the facilities was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs requested that the temporary restraining order be converted to a preliminary injunction, which the court denied on the grounds that the defendants had instituted a number of new policies and practices to address the spread of COVID-19 at the facility and therefore that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success of their due process claim. In June, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and writs of habeas corpus for detainees located in a second detention center. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions in July because the detention center had no active cases of COVID-19 cases. In August, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the court later denied, and later that month, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from the May 26 order or, in the alternative, for preliminary injunction to establish a dispute resolution process, which the court denied in November. The court continued to hold that, in light of the precautions being taken at the first detention center, a preliminary injunction was not justified. The parties are currently engaged in discovery. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
For over 60 years, each Christmas, John Satawa and his family had displayed a nativity scene in the median strip of a county road in Warren, Michigan. In December 2008, the County Road Commission received a written complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation. The Road Commission acquiesced to the complaint and denied Mr. Satawa a permit for 2009, prompting the filing of this federal lawsuit. The case was filed on October 23, 2009, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Macomb County Road Commission. The plaintiff, represented by an attorney from the American Freedom law center and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. He alleged that the defendant's denial of his permit application to place a crèche on a median strip of a county road during the Christmas holiday season violated his rights under the Constitution's Free Speech clause, Establishment clause, and the Equal Protection clause. On December 28, 2009, the District Court (Judge Gerald E. Rosen) denied Mr. Satawa's motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 19, 2011, Judge Rosen granted the Road Commission's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. On August 1, 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Danny J. Boggs) agreed with the District Court's Establishment Clause holding against the plaintiff. However, the Court reversed the District Court's rulings on the plaintiff's Free Speech and Equal Protection claims. The Court of Appeals found that the median area constituted a traditional public forum, and therefore any restrictions on speech there would have to be narrowly tailored; the denial of the permit was NOT narrowly tailored, the Court of Appeals held, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The parties settled the matter on November 29, 2012, and stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit. According to his lawyers' press release, Mr. Satawa installed his nativity scene that season. The voluntary dismissal was agreed to by the district court; the case was dismissed as of January 3, 2013.
<|assistant|>
On October 23, 2009, a Catholic resident of Warren, Michigan filed this federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Macomb County Road Commission. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's denial of his permit application to place a nativity scene on a median strip of a county road during the Christmas holiday season was unconstitutional. District Judge Gerald Rosen first denied a preliminary injunction and then ruled for the defendant on all issues, in April 2011. But in August 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the issues of Free Speech and Equal Protection, finding for the plaintiff. In 2012, the parties settled, and he reinstalled his nativity scene.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 5, 2014, a fourteen-year-old transgender boy filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against South Middle School and its administrators, Summit Academy Charter Public School and its administrators, Wilson Middle School and its administrators, and OW Best Middle School and its administrators. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, proceeded under Title IX, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought monetary damages claiming that defendants had discriminated against him because he was transgender. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was consistently misgendered by school staff, forced to use the girls' restroom, harassed by school staff and other students, and that he was repeatedly outed by school staff. He also claimed that his mother made repeated attempts to meet with his teachers and school administrators to discuss the plaintiff's situation, but that they avoided her, and when they did meet with her, they were dismissive. On September 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which contained no substantive changes but stated his reliance on their demand for a jury trial. On February 24, 2015, the United States submitted a statement of interest in the case. The United States stated its position that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, discrimination against transgender individuals is discrimination on the basis of sex and his prohibited by Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and that the case should be allowed to proceed to discovery to resolve questions of fact. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on November 5, 2015. It included additional factual allegations pertaining to the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff. On February 23, 2016, all defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Before District Judge Avern Cohn could rule on the motion to dismiss, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement and obtained court approval on March 8, 2017. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $53,150.44 in damages and $44,349.56 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2014, a fourteen-year-old transgender boy filed a lawsuit against the four middle schools he had attended between 2011 and 2014. In February 2015, the United States submitted a statement of interest in the case, arguing that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit discrimination against transgender individuals. Although the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss in February 2016, the parties were able to reach a settlement agreement in March 2017. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $53,150.44 in damages and $44,349.56 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Three children charged as adults who were being or had been held in solitary confinement in Palm Beach County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on June 21, 2018. They sued the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office and School Board under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 <i>et seq.</i>), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 794 <i>et seq.</i>) , Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12132), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the Human Rights Defense Center, the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County Education Advocacy Project, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the ADA, IDEA, and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged Palm Beach County's use of solitary confinement against minors, the conditions of the solitary confinement, and the lack of educational opportunities available to children in solitary confinement. The plaintiffs alleged that many of the children placed in solitary confinement had mental health issues or other disabilities, did not have access to any educational programs and services while in solitary confinement, and did not receive accommodations for their documented disabilities. The complaint also alleged poor treatment in general, including lack of access to clean drinking water, medical care, and recreational facilities. Many of the named plaintiffs alleged long-lasting repercussions from the conditions they experienced while in solitary confinement. In addition, the complaint alleged that some children were placed in solitary confinement without an explanation and did not have the ability to challenge their placement. This case was assigned to Judge William P. Dimitrouleas. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs moved for class certification and for a preliminary injunction. Also on June 21, Judge Dimitrouleas denied the class certification motion as premature. The defendants moved to dismiss on July 20, which Judge Dimitrouleas denied as moot on August 3 after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that dropped one named plaintiff. The defendants moved to dismiss again. The United States filed a statement of interest on October 1, 2018 that explained its view on the scope of IDEA’s protections, although the government did not take a position on whether the defendants had violated the IDEA in this case. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on November 1. Meanwhile, the parties began to work toward a settlement. On November 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge Matthewman granted both the preliminary approval of a Settlement Agreement that the parties submitted and conditional certification of a class defined as “all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office." Additionally, there were 2 proposed settlement subclasses:<blockquote>a) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office and are in need of special education evaluation, instruction, accommodations, and related services (“IDEA subclass”); and b) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office (“ADA and 504 Subclass”).</blockquote>The proposed settlement required, among other things: <blockquote>- Recreation and showers seven days a week, and no unreasonable withholding of phone or visitation privileges; - any juvenile classified into segregated housing for any reason, other than protective custody, shall be allowed out of their cells throughout the regular school day with other juveniles in general population so long as there are no co-defendants or keep-separates in the same housing pod; - On weekends and holidays the Sheriff’s Office shall utilize an expanded rotation schedule for co-defendants that allows for greater time in facility accommodations to minimize the duration of time spent in segregated housing; - the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board shall confer to determine how best to allow equal access, including any accommodations, to juvenile educational services and programming outside of the segregation cell; maintain notes and documentation of these conferences; and refer the juvenile to a mental health professional for an evaluation and to determine a need for any accommodations; - juveniles who refused educational services and programming shall be given another opportunity to participate prior to each period.</blockquote>The agreement was set to last at least five years. The agreement also provided that experts would monitor compliance, and the defendants would provide documents and access to facilitate monitoring. For reasons that are unclear to the Clearinghouse, the monitoring was set to last for only two years despite the agreement's five-year term. On February 28, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement and certification of the class. Judge Matthewman approved the settlement after holding a Fairness Hearing and dismissed the case on March 6, 2019, but the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. 2019 WL 1051146. On April 19, 2019, the plaintiff moved for $606,526.00 in attorney’s fees and $39,296.78 in costs. The defendants responded that only $260,690.50 in fees and $131.33 in costs were appropriate. On October 10, 2019, Judge Matthewman issued an order granting $390,959.00 in fees and $29,724.53 in costs, for a total award of $420,683.53. 426 F. Supp. 3d. 1266. Judge Matthewman rejected the plaintiff’s use of a blended rate of $525 per hour for all attorneys on the case, and instead arrived at the $390,959.00 figure based on individualized calculations for each attorney and paralegal involved using rates ranging from $150 per hour to $400 per hour. On December 3, 2019 the court entered a satisfaction of judgment as to the attorneys' fees. Although monitoring concluded in December 2020, the settlement agreement remains in force as of April 15, 2021.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiffs, incarcerated children who are experiencing or have experienced solitary confinement in Palm Beach County Jail filed this putative class action lawsuit against the County School District, School Board, and Sheriff's Office, as well as related officials in their individual capacities, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on June 21, 2018. The claim was filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiffs alleged violations of the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged Palm Beach County's use of solitary confinement against minors, the conditions of the solitary confinement, and the lack of educational opportunities available to children in solitary confinement. The case has settled and the settlement agreement continues to be enforced.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 6, 2010, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") against the State of Arkansas. The Department of Justice asked the court to issue an injunction, claiming that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are the most appropriate for their needs. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that in administering developmental disability services, the State of Arkansas unnecessarily segregates and isolates persons with disabilities from the community. Previously, the DOJ had filed suit against the State of Arkansas (ID-AR-002) and the Conway Human Development Center ("CHDC") alleging that the manner in which the State provides services to persons with disabilities residing in the CHDC violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, and the Disabilities Education Act. The DOJ moved to dismiss Count II of the CHDC complaint in order to pursue the statewide action. The State moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements to bring suit under Title II of the ADA, as stated in the Code of Federal Regulations. The regulations set forth an administrative process, that prior to filing a lawsuit, that requires a complaint by an individual of discrimination to an agency with jurisdiction over the subject matter, an attempt at an informal resolution, issuance of a formal letter of compliance or noncompliance, and a referral by the federal agency to the Attorney General for enforcement. On January 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge J. Leon Holmes) dismissed the case without prejudice because the court found that the DOJ had not followed the administrative process set forth in the regulations.
<|assistant|>
The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a claim against the State of Arkansas alleging that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are appropriate for their needs and segregates persons with disabilities from the community. The court found that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements necessary to bring a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and dismissed the case without prejudice.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump's March 6, 2017 Executive Order." Attorney from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP worked with the ACLU on the case. The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's San Diego Field Office, including San Diego International Airport and the San Diego port of entry. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the Executive Orders. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public's understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders here in the San Francisco Field Office" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public's ability to hold the government accountable." On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multi-district litigation," effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719">this case</a>. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion (notice of the denial was filed on Aug. 15). On Aug. 3, Judge M. James Lorenz denied defendants' May 10 motion to stay. The parties met for a series of case management conferences in the fall of 2017. The case did not settle, so the parties continued with discovery. On October 15, 2018, the parties filed notice of settlement and subsequently jointly moved to dismiss the case. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15719">this case page</a>. Litigation about attorneys' fees dragged on for several years. The parties ultimately agreed on a fee award and notified the court the case was closed on July 11, 2019. The Clearinghouse does not know the amount of the fee award.
<|assistant|>
On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties sued DHS under FOIA for information on the implementation of President Trump's travel ban at San Diego airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation and ultimately agreed to release documents to the ACLU.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
The plaintiff in this case is a trans woman who was housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts for a nonviolent drug possession charge. Because of her gender presentation and identity, she faced degrading sexual harassment from both staff and other prisoners. She was forced to use communal showers and bathrooms without locks, and was subject to strip searches conducted by male staff in front of other prisoners. The living conditions and repeated sexual harassment during her time there prompted her to file suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts on November 15, 2017. She alleged that the conditions she faced in the prison amount to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as several state constitution claims. The named defendants are the Massachusetts Department of Correction, Commissioner of the DOC, superintendent of the prison, ADA coordinator responsible for the facility, and Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Clinical Services responsible for the provision of health services to all DOC prisoners. GLAD is representing the plaintiff and the case has been assigned to Judge Richard G. Stearns. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief. Specifically, she asked that the DOC be required to transfer her to a women's facility, require and train all staff to use the correct name and pronouns for her, treat her as they would any cisgender woman in custody, make accommodations to assure she will not be harassed by male staff or other prisoners, and provide her access to gender-appropriate medical care. She also requested attorneys fees. On March 5, 2018, Judge Stearns issued a partial preliminary injunction instructing the defendants to do the following: require that female rather than male staff conduct strip searches of the plaintiff whenever feasible, continue to house the plaintiff in a single cell and allow her separate time to shower, and to the extent that it is reasonable, provide a staff member to ensure that other inmates do not enter the shower area while the plaintiff is showering. In September 2018, the DOC voluntarily transferred the plaintiff to a women's facility and in April 2019 she was released. Soon after, Judge Stearns dismissed the case as moot. Finally, on July 8, 2019, the court awarded the plaintiff $46,297.50 in attorneys fees and $11,740.94 in litigation expenses.
<|assistant|>
The plaintiff, a trans woman housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts, sued the Department of Correction (DOC) and several administrators in the department for mistreatment while in custody on account of her gender identity and presentation. She was represented by GLAD and brought the suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint requested injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The judge granted a preliminary injunction regarding how prison staff were required to treat and accommodate the plaintiff while housed in the men's facility. After the plaintiff's transfer to a women's facility in 2018 and release in 2019, the judge dismissed the case as moot and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.
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