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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice notified Clay County of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail. In 1995, following the investigation, the DOJ notified the Chairman of the Clay County Commission of its findings and made recommendations regarding construction of a new jail; staffing and supervision; exercise; access to religious services, courts, and reading material; medical and mental healthcare; suicide prevention; general sanitation; fire safety; plumbing; bedding supplies; food services; and plumbing. Apparently after negotiation, the Attorney General filed an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. section 1997 et seq., against the jail. Six days later, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (Judge Hugh Lawson) issued a consent decree. The consent decree laid out steps the county must take to improve issues discussed in the DOJ's letter of findings and recommendations. According to the docket from PACER, the court adopted the consent decree as judgment in 1997 and dismissed the case in 2000.
<|assistant|>
In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice notified Clay County of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail. In 1995, following the investigation, the DOJ notified the Chairman of the Clay County Commission of its findings and made recommendations regarding changes needed. After the Attorney General filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. section 1997 et seq., against the jail, the parties agreed to a consent decree.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This class action lawsuit was filed on June 11, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs were the Anti-Police Terror Project, Community Ready Corps, and several individuals. Defendants were the City of Oakland, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) Police Chief, an OPD Sergeant, and two OPD officers. The suit followed police actions to quell protests that arose after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and counsel from the National Lawyers Guild, alleged that Oakland police used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets to disperse peaceful protests. Their suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they claimed that the actions of the OPD in quelling the protests were in violation of their:<ul> <li> First Amendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and free association;</li><li>Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force and unlawful seizure;</li><li>Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process.</li></ul>They also said that the city was liable for failure to select, train, and supervise the police department. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order which would prohibit the use of pepper spray, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, and non-lethal weapons. They also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to prohibit the alleged constitutional violations in the future. They also sought declaratory relief and money damages to be determined at a later date. On June 12, 2020 the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. Through the next week, plaintiffs submitted proposals for temporary restraining orders, and on June 18, 2020 Judge Spero granted the order. It prohibited use of tear gas and chemical irritants, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets except upon decision of an Operations Commander or Incident Commander in the OPD. After a series of hearings on the matter, on July 29 the court entered a preliminary injunction against the defendants to prohibit the OPD from using "less-lethal" weapons except in very limited settings, mandating that they wear body cameras, and requiring further training. 2020 WL 4346828. The provisions in the injunction were largely agreed upon by both parties during the hearings. However, the parties disagreed about the extent to which "mutual aid partners" would be bound by the preliminary injunction. During protests, the OPD had used mutual aid from other police departments and municipalities. The Court's subsequent opinion explained that because no mutual aid partners were defendants, the Court could not issue injunctive relief binding on mutual aid partners. 2020 WL 4584185. However, because under California law OPD officers were to remain in charge when using mutual aid, the Court included provisions in the preliminary injunction to ensure OPD officers remain in charge and that OPD would ensure that mutual aid partners do not use tactics inconsistent with the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce and modify the preliminary injunction and for sanctions on October 7, 2020. The plaintiffs alleged that the City violated the preliminary injunction by deploying chemical agents and projectiles in a prohibited way, kettling peaceful protestors, and failing to maintain social distance during protests that followed the shooting of Jacob Black by a Kenosha police officer on August 23 and the failure to indict any police officers for the death of Breonna Taylor on September 25. At the Court's order, the plaintiffs submitted a proposed order on October 21 explaining their requested changes to the preliminary injunction. In their proposed order, the plaintiffs sought $100,000 in sanctions and several modifications to the list of items prohibited from use by the OPD and corresponding changes in training. The City responded with a cross-motion to modify the preliminary injunction. The City disputed that it violated the injunction and sought changes to the mutual aid section of the injunction. The City said that after OPD informed its mutual aid partners of the preliminary injunction, many of its partners responded that they would no longer provide mutual aid. The City argued that it expected significant, extended protests with the upcoming presidential election and asked the Court to suspend the mutual aid section of the preliminary injunction and clarify that the injunction did not bind mutual aid partners. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the preliminary injunction and instead granted the defendants' motion to modify the injunction on October 28, 2020. 2020 WL 6381358. The Court acknowledged the concern of large-scale demonstrations with the presidential election and the potential challenges the OPD would face in policing such large-scale demonstrations without mutual aid. It found that the combination of the lack of mutual aid and the potential demonstrations was a significant change in the facts meriting a change in the injunction to properly balance the equities of the parties and the public interest. OPD officers still were required to ensure that mutual aid partners were briefed on OPD's prohibited weapons and force to the extent possible. The plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint on October 20. In the amended complaint, they added numerous individual plaintiffs. In addition, they added claims alleging assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, and violations of their rights under the California Constitution. The factual allegations and sought after relief remained largely the same. This case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.
<|assistant|>
This class-action lawsuit claims that Oakland, California police tactics used to quell protests following the killing of George Floyd were violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and also represented a Monell violation on the part the City of Oakland. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from the National Lawyers Guild. They brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On July 29 the court entered a preliminary injunction against the defendants, which limited the OPD's use of "less-lethal" weapons, mandated body cameras, and required further training. The parties both sought modifications to the injunction in October 2020. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the preliminary injunction and instead granted the defendants' motion to modify the injunction on October 28, 2020. The Court acknowledged the defendants' concern about demonstrations in relation to the upcoming presidential election and how OPD's mutual aid partners had largely withdrawn support after the preliminary injunction. It found that the combination of the lack of mutual aid and the potential demonstrations was a significant change in the facts meriting a change in the injunction to properly balance the equities of the parties and the public interest. OPD officers still were required to ensure that mutual aid partners were briefed on OPD's prohibited weapons and force to the extent possible. This case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 27, 1999, disabled plaintiffs who use wheelchairs for accessibility brought a class action lawsuit against Conoco, Inc., an owner/operator of gas stations and convenience stores, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs charged that Conoco had violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and Colorado law because its stores had many features that obstructed accessibility, in violation of Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S. § 24-34-601. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that when they attempted to use the businesses, they encountered several obstacles, including inaccessible parking, tables, sidewalks, entrances, restrooms, aisles, and "pay-at-the-pump" controls. Both plaintiffs experienced great delay during their stops at Conoco, as employees had to rearrange fixtures and assist the plaintiffs. They sought injunctive relief, and damages pursuant to the state law. On August 22, 2000, the court certified a class of "all persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, within four years of the filing of the Complaint in this case, have been denied, or are currently being denied, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any service station or convenience store owned by Conoco, Inc." On September 11, 2002, the court approved a five-year consent decree. The decree applied to Conoco's 124 existing corporate stores and newly acquired stores. Conoco's agreed to bring all stores into compliance with ADA regulations. The decree would begin with a pilot program for six stores, three chosen by each side. If the pilot program was successful, Conoco would begin renovating its other stores, one fourth of the total stores every nine months. An independent expert would evaluate the stores. Conoco agreed to pay the expert's fees of $1000 per store visit plus costs. Conoco also agreed to develop personnel training policies, do its own periodic checks for disabled access, to allow customers to submit comment cards, and to forward these cards to class counsel. Additionally, Conoco paid $8,000 each to the two named plaintiffs and $150,000 in attorney's fees. On November 14, 2008, the court approved a stipulated order of dismissal.
<|assistant|>
This was a case brought in 1999 by plaintiffs who used wheelchairs; they sued Conoco, an owner/operator of gas stations and convenience stores, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. They argued that Conoco systematically violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Colorado law by its inaccessible parking, tables, sidewalks, entrances, restrooms, aisles, and "pay-at-the-pump" controls. On September 11, 2002, the court approved a five-year consent decree. The decree applied to Conoco's 124 existing corporate stores and newly acquired stores. Conoco's agreed to bring all stores into compliance with ADA regulations. The decree would begin with a pilot program for six stores, three chosen by each side. If the pilot program was successful, Conoco would begin renovating its other stores, one-fourth of the total stores every nine months. An independent expert would evaluate the stores. Conoco agreed to pay the expert's fees of $1000 per store visit plus costs. Conoco also agreed to develop personnel training policies, do its own periodic checks for disabled access, to allow customers to submit comment cards, and to forward these cards to class counsel. Additionally, Conoco paid $8,000 each to the two named plaintiffs and $150,000 in attorney's fees.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
The plaintiffs in this case were a group of medical services and medical professionals associations in the state of California. On May 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and a class action complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, against the Director of the California Department of Health Services. The Department is charged with the administration of California's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal. The plaintiffs alleged that Assembly Bill X3 5 ("AB 5"), which reduced by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program, violated various state and federal laws, and therefore could not lawfully be implemented. They sought declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On May 21, 2008, the State removed the action to the Central District of California, because it raised a question under federal law. The plaintiffs asked the court to remand the case back to the Los Angeles Superior Court, and on June 23, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder agreed. Judge Snyder found that since a state law equivalent existed for all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, the case could not be said to be "arising under" federal law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. The case was then remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court as case number CV BC 390126. The Clearinghouse has acquired the State Court case summary, which shows ongoing activity on the case through to at least May 2013, but it is unclear from this document whether the case has lead to any substantial orders in favor of either party, or if it is approaching a settlement. The summary of this case on the <a href="http://www.cmanet.org/issues/detail/?issue=medical-litigation-provider-rate-cuts">California Medical Association's own website</a> provides little information, and focuses mostly on Douglas v. Independent Living Center (in the Clearinghouse as PB-CA-16), a related suit in federal court that reached the Supreme Court. This summary is up-to-date as of July 2013.
<|assistant|>
The plaintiffs in this case were a group of medical services and medical professionals associations in the state of California. On May 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ mandate and a class action complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles against the Director of the California Department of Health Services. The Department is charged with the administration of California's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal. The plaintiffs alleged that Assembly Bill X3 5 ("AB 5"), which reduced by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program, violated various state and federal laws, and therefore, could not be implemented. They sought a writ of mandate for violation of federal law and California's Medicaid plan, declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On May 21, 2008, the defendant removed the action to the Central District of California, asserting federal question jurisdictionOn June 23, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder issued an order remanding the case back to the Los Angeles Superior Court, finding that since a state law equivalent existed for all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, the case could not be said to be "arising under" federal law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. The case was then remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court as case number CV BC 390126. The Clearinghouse has no information about what happened to this case on remand at the State Court.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 26, 2020, three private individuals filed this class-action lawsuit against the City of New York, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Governor Andrew Cuomo, and fifty police officers of unknown identities. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The case arose out of the curfews that were imposed on New York City residents amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. The three plaintiffs were residents of New York City who were taken into custody for violating the curfew, although the complaint did not allege that they were arrested at any of the protests. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the curfews were violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and money damages, including punitive damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees. The case is ongoing as of August 5, 2020.
<|assistant|>
This class action lawsuit arose out of the curfews imposed in New York City amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. Plaintiffs were three individuals who had been taken into custody during the curfew, though not when they were at protests. They sued the City of New York, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Governor Andrew Cuomo, and fifty unnamed police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and monetary relief. The case is ongoing as of August 5, 2020.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: In response to the COVID-19 crisis, on March 27, 2020 the State Public Health Officer issued an emergency order restricting any medical or surgical procedure except those necessary to treat an “emergency medical condition,” including abortion. On March 30, the plaintiffs challenged the Order and requested an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to block enforcement. The court granted a limited TRO. On April 12, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. The parties agreed that the preliminary injunction had become moot as it was tied to the "medical restrictions" language, which had since been lifted. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18. <hr> On May 24, 2019, all abortion providers in Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on behalf of themselves and their patients. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General, the State Health Officer of the Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH), the District Attorneys of Madison, Jefferson, Mobile, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa counties, the Chairman of the AL Board of Medical Examiners, and the Chairman of the Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Alabama, and Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin enforcement of H.B. 314, a bill that banned nearly all abortions in the state, and to have the bill declared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed that H.B. 314 violated the rights of liberty and privacy secured to their patients by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that enforcement of the law would effectively prevent plaintiffs’ patients from obtaining legal abortion in Alabama, in violation <i>Roe v. Wade</i> and more than four decades of Supreme Court precedent affirming its central holding. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Myron H. Thompson. On June 21, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect in November. Judge Thompson granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on October 29, 2019 and ordered the injunction to remain in effect until the district court resolved the case in full. 415 F.Supp.3d 1053. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the State Public Health Officer began issuing a series of emergency orders restricting “elective” medical procedures on March 19, 2020. On March 27, the State Public Health Officer issued another order prohibiting any medical or surgical procedure except those necessary to treat an “emergency medical condition” or to “avoid serious harm from an underlying condition.” Each medical or surgical procedure performed in violation of the March 27 Order was considered a misdemeanor. The Attorney General issued guidance encouraging prosecution of violations and took the position that the order prohibits some unknown quantity of pre-viability abortions. To avoid risk of criminal and licensure penalties, the plaintiffs stopped performing pre-viability abortions. As a result, the actions of the Attorney General and ADPH effectively nullified the relief granted by the October 2019 preliminary injunction. On March 30, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to supplement their complaint to challenge the March 27 Order and also moved for an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) blocking enforcement of the March 27 order. Judge Thompson granted the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint the same day. Judge Thompson also granted the TRO, enjoining enforcement of the order, but promised to reconsider upon the submission of defendants’ written arguments. 2020 WL 1520243. On April 1, the defendants moved to dissolve the TRO and on April 2, they appealed the order granting the TRO to the Eleventh Circuit and moved to stay the TRO pending appeal. After a telephone conference, Judge Thompson limited the TRO in part on April 3, 2020. 2020 WL 1659700. The defendants clarified in the hearing that the order allowed providers to exercise their reasonable medical judgment to protect the right to terminate a pregnancy and the safety of their patients, while also “acknowledg[ing] that abortion providers and their patients must share the societal burden caused by COVID-19.” Specifically, providers should determine if the abortion can be delayed in a healthy way during the enforcement of the order. Consistent with these clarifications, Judge Thompson determined that the initial TRO was too sweeping and granted the stay to the extent that these clarifications are adopted. On April 5, Judge Thompson ordered each party to file and share with opposing counsel a list of witnesses (along with a brief summary of anticipated testimony), and a list of exhibits they intended to have admitted. The next day, Judge Thompson held a motion hearing regarding the TRO and the preliminary injunction. The defendants’ appeal was also dismissed that day pursuant to the parties’ joint motion for voluntary dismissal. Judge Thompson granted the preliminary injunction in part on April 12, after finding that it was substantially likely that the medical restrictions--when interpreted to allow only those abortions necessary to protect the life and health of the mother--were unconstitutional because they posed a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion for many women in Alabama. Rather than enjoin the medical restrictions in full, the court enjoined them only to prevent those applications of medical restrictions that are inconsistent with the Constitution. To the extent that the restriction is read to allow a provider to consider whether a patient’s abortion must proceed as scheduled, it would not constitute an unlawful prohibition. Essentially, the then-most recent representation made by the defendants were reduced to an order and the State Health Order was enjoined only to the extent that it is applied in a fashion inconsistent with those representations. 2020 WL 1847128. The same day, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On April 16th, the district court overruled the objections to the order granting the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. 2020 WL 1892578. The defendants moved for an emergency stay pending appeal in the Eleventh Circuit and on April 17th, moved to expedite the merits appeal. On April 23rd, Judge Jordan for the Eleventh Circuit (Circuit Judges Martin, Jordan, and Rosenbaum) denied the motion for a stay. 2020 WL 1952370. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. In a joint status report on May 15, the parties agreed that the preliminary injunction has become moot as it was tied to the "medical restrictions" language, which had since been lifted. The defendants represented that they had no intention to impose restrictions on dental, medical, or surgical procedures in future emergency orders. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18. The parties submitted a notice of stipulated partial dismissal relating to the "medical restrictions" language on May 21, and the court dismissed that portion of the complaint on May 22. The partial motion to dismiss was also denied as moot. On June 2, the parties submitted a joint motion to dismiss the State Health Officer, on the condition that he and his employees, agents, and successors in the office agree to be bound by the terms of any injunctive or declaratory and/or other relief issued against the other defendants in the case, but not for any monetary relief. The motion was granted on June 8. The plaintiffs were then directed by the court to identifying outstanding issues relating to their challenge on July 6. The plaintiffs responded on August 3 and argued that (1) the Act’s pre- and post-viability applications were not severable; (2) the Act’s post-viability application was constitutionally infirm and, (3) the plaintiffs had standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients. On August 11, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of order concerning costs and attorney's fees, after coming to an agreement that the State of Alabama would pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $451,351.60. The motion was granted the same day. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In May 2019, Alabama abortion providers filed a § 1983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that H.B. 314 violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by effectively preventing plaintiffs' patients from obtaining a legal abortion in Alabama. In October, the court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the law from going into effect. In March 2020 to respond to COVID-19, the State issued an emergency order restricting "elective" medical procedures, which they interpreted to include most abortions. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order, which was granted. The court then granted a preliminary injunction, limiting the enforcement of the emergency order to prevent unconstitutional application. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 14, 2017, Twitter received an administrative summons from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to provide records involving the specific identities of those operating under the @ALT_USCIS user account. In response, Twitter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on April 6, 2017, stating that the summons both exceeded CBP authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1509 and violated the First Amendment. Specifically, Twitter claimed that disclosing the requested information to CBP would likely unmask the person or persons using the @ALT_USCIS account, thereby violating the constitutional protections for anonymous and pseudonymous political speech. Twitter sought both injunctive relief and damages. In the wake of the inauguration, several “alternative” rogue government agency accounts were created on Twitter. Spurred on by the unauthorized Badlands National Park tweets and social media limitations set by the Trump administration, some of this wave of new users identified themselves as current and past employees of the agencies they exemplified, and others as fans or supporters. The @ALT_USCIS account was created in late January 2017 and portrays the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a unit within the Defendant DHS. @ALT_USCIS has tens of thousands of followers and frequently tweets critically against the Administration’s immigration policies and enforcement actions. On April 7, 2017, CBP <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/twitter-lawsuit-trump/522231/">withdrew its summons</a>. Twitter responded by voluntarily dismissing all claims against the Defendants. Shortly thereafter, the DHS Office of Inspector General <a href="https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=1CCC6A24-C0F2-4FC2-9C1D-3A40785155A9&download=1">opened an investigation</a> into: (1) whether the @ALT_USCIS investigation by the CBP’s Office of Professional Responsibility was in any way improper, (2) whether CBP abused its authority in issuing the March 14, 2017 summons to Twitter, and (3) if there is broader misuse of summons authority at the DHS and/or its components. DHS’s Office of Inspector General released the report on November 16, 2017. According to the report, "lack of clear guidance on the proper use of Section 1509 Summons has resulted in inconsistent—and in some cases, improper—use of such summonses." The report provided recommendations to ensure that CBP personnel are trained on the appropriate exercise of CBP’s examination and summons authority. This case is now closed, though Twitter since filed a related challenge pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking "records concerning demands from CBP and/or DHS that Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) provide them with information to identify the one or more persons using the Twitter account @ALT_uscis, an anonymous account critical of CBP." That case is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 18-cv-00155.
<|assistant|>
On March 14, 2017, Twitter received a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) summons to disclose identifying information of the user(s) operating a rogue “alternative” government agency account. Twitter did not comply and instead filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging a violation of First Amendment anonymity of political speech. On April 7, Twitter dismissed the suit when CBP withdrew its summons. The DHS Office of Inspector General is now investigating CBP on the matter.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 31, 2020, 52 black McDonald’s franchisees filed this lawsuit against McDonald’s in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s racially discriminated against them in its management policies and set the franchisees up to fail by placing them in economically depressed locations and high-crime areas. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S. § 1981 (part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteeing equal rights under the law), alleging that McDonald’s knowingly discriminated against Plaintiffs by denying equal advancement opportunities to them as compared to white counterparts. Additionally, the plaintiffs sued under state law, alleging that McDonald’s engaged in disproportionately harsh enforcement of the Franchise Agreement that amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent omission of requirements that were more stringent for them as well as of opportunities that were available to white franchisees. Represented by the Ferraro Law Firm based in Florida, the franchisees sought between $4 and $ 5 million per restaurant in compensatory damages, consequential damages, and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Judge Steve C. Seeger was assigned to the case. McDonald’s moved twice to dismiss the franchisees’ complaint for failure to state a valid claim. Following the first motion, the franchisees amended their complaint on November 16, 2020, to include 25 more plaintiffs, add details regarding McDonald’s Franchise Agreement, and remove an explicit cause of action for punitive damages, though Plaintiffs still seek punitive damages. McDonald’s filed the second motion to dismiss on December 21, 2020, after which franchisees responded. On February 2, 2021, McDonalds filed a reply both to the franchisees' amended complaint and in support of defendant's motion to dismiss. This reply alleged plaintiffs' claims failed because they were conclusory, failed to use facts particular enough to support their claims, and were time-barred under the statute of limitations of 42 U.S. § 1981. As of July 6, 2021, no further significant actions have occurred. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2020, former black McDonald's franchisees filed suit against the parent corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that McDonald's racially discriminated against them by denying opportunities to manage more viable franchises that were available to white franchisees and by more strictly enforcing standards for inspections and quality against them. McDonald's filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on December 21, 2020; it has not yet been adjudicated. The case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 23, 2016, a resident of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims on behalf of her child and all other children in Flint who suffered brain damage from drinking unsafe tap water during the Flint water crisis. The plaintiff sued numerous state officials, including the Governor and Flint emergency managers. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought class certification, declaratory relief, compensatory and exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were grossly negligent because they continued to “falsely reassure the public” that the water was safe despite evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, shortly after Flint officials began using water from the Flint River in 2013, the defendants began to receive complaints from residents about the color, taste, and odor of the water. By August 2014, Flint water tested positive for E. coli. and several “boil water” advisories were issued by the city of Flint through September 2014. But the water also contained lead, and boiling the water increased its lead concentration. The plaintiffs also emphasized the dangers of children consuming lead. According to the plaintiffs, children absorb forty to fifty percent of an oral dose of lead compared with three to ten percent absorption for adults. The defendants removed the case on May 31, 2016. They gave two reasons: first, that they acted under color of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and second, that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims required construction of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule; these federal questions, they said, justified removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On March 31, 2017, Judge Gordon J. Quist ruled that the defendants were not “acting under any federal officer or agency” when they took the actions that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims, so they were not entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. In addition, Judge Quist concluded that the court did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because their negligence claims did not “implicate an important federal interest.” Accordingly, the case was remanded to Michigan Court of Claims. On April 6, 2017, the defendants appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on April 16, 2018. Judge White described the relationship between the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and the EPA as “cooperative federalism, not an agency relationship” and concluded that the defendants were not eligible for federal-officer removal. The Court of Appeals also determined that federal question jurisdiction did not exist, relying on <i>Mays v. Flint</i>, a similar case also arising from the Flint water crisis. The defendants against appealed again, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on October 1, 2018. The case returned to the Michigan Court of Claims. (In fact, litigation in the Court of Claims had already resumed because the federal district court declined to stay its order remanding the case while the federal appeals proceeded.) The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of some, but not all defendants in a series of orders beginning in 2017. Three governmental employees appealed, claiming governmental immunity. On March 14, 2019, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that their liability depended on whether the defendants’ conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injury, which was not a suitable topic for summary disposition. 2019 WL 1211469. The defendants appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. On July 2, 2019 the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the appeal to be held in abeyance pending the decision in <i>Mays v. Flint</i>, as it could resolve issues raised in this case. 2019 WL 2872282. Subsequently, following the July 29, 2020 decision in <i>Mays v. Flint</i>, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for appeal. 2020 WL 6301869. The case returned once again to the Court of Claims, and on December 3, 2020, the case was stayed pending the finalization of a settlement. As of February 5, 2021, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On March 23, 2016, a resident of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims against state officials involved with the Flint water crisis. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were grossly negligent because they continued to “falsely reassure the public” that the water was safe despite evidence to the contrary. The defendants removed the case, but the district court and Sixth Circuit found that neither federal officer nor federal question jurisdiction existed. The case returned to state court, where litigation over the scope of an officer's governmental immunity continues.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 23, 2009, a openly gay former prisoner at Washtenaw County Jail filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Washtenaw County, corrections officers of Washtenaw County Jail, a jail physician, and SecureCare, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. The plaintiff, represented by the University of Michigan Clinical Law Program, asked the court for injunctive relief, a declaration that the plaintiff's rights were violated, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees, claiming that he was sexually assaulted and abused by guards and other prisoners, was not properly treated for his medical needs, and suffered inhumane conditions while in the jail. Specifically, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by another prisoner just days after entering the jail. Although he reported this abuse to a guard, nothing was done to remedy the situation. Approximately one week later, the plaintiff was sexually harassed and raped by a deputy in the jail. During his time at the jail, he was continually harassed by prisoners and guards. Some prisoners went so far as to contaminate his food with human feces and doused him with cups of urine. Although guards were aware of this abuse, they often encouraged and were complicit in this behavior and blamed the plaintiff's homosexuality for provoking these attacks. On December 9, 2009, the physician and SecureCare filed a Motion to Dismiss. On April 12, 2010, the Court (Judge Arthur J. Tarnow) denied the motion without prejudice. They sought summary judgment on Feb. 25, 2011, but on May 4, the court denied that motion "for the reasons stated on the record and in the briefs." Plaintiff then filed a new complaint, adding several defendants, on Jan. 19, 2012. The case was dismissed, on stipulation (presumably after some monetary settlement), on Nov. 28, 2012.
<|assistant|>
On June 23, 2009, an openly gay former prisoner of Washtenaw County jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, against Washtenaw County, corrections officers of Washtenaw County Jail, a jail physician, and SecureCare, claiming he was sexually harassed and raped by both guards and other prisoners, not properly treated for his medical needs, and forced to suffer other inhumane conditions while in the jail. On April 12, 2010, the Court denied the physician and SecureCare's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. The case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 5, 2010, two female former inmates who were imprisoned in the Century Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF"), a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD") facility, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by a civil rights law firm, the plaintiffs sued the LASD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as their equivalents under the California Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that CRDF female inmates were routinely subjected to degrading strip and body cavity searches at the CRDF without probable cause or individualized suspicion. On October 22, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. On February 28, 2011, the LASD moved to dismiss this suit, claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The complaint was amended on January 28, 2011, to add five additional former and current CRDF inmates as named plaintiffs. However, on December 27, 2011, District Judge Stephen V. Wilson moved this case to the inactive calendar, pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <i>Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington</i>, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012), another case involving strip searches, which Judge Wilson believed could affect the viability of relevant precedent (<a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11854">JC-NJ-0022</a> in this Clearinghouse) On April 2, 2012, the Supreme Court decided in <i>Florence</i> that if a prisoner was about to be housed in a jail's general population, no individualized suspicion was required, no matter how minor the arrest offense. Following this decision, on December 19, 2012, Judge Wilson issued an order moving this case back to the active calendar. In addition, Judge Wilson denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the LASD did not demonstrate sufficient grievance procedures as required by the PLRA. Judge Wilson also determined that the court would rule on the plaintiffs' motion to certify class after the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. 2012 WL 12878313, C.D. Cal. However, on January 9, 2013, after the plaintiffs requested the court reconsider its decision to defer ruling on the pending motion to certify class, Judge Wilson issued a new order allowing the plaintiffs to re-file their motion to certify class in light of evidence gathered during discovery. On June 10, 2013, the plaintiffs re-filed their motion to certify class. On March 12, 2014, Judge Wilson granted the plaintiff's request for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), but denied their request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) (299 F.R.D. 618). The court also allowed the plaintiffs to file a renewed motion to certify a damages class on the issue on liability pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). On May 19, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to certify class, requesting that the court certify a Rule 23(c)(4) liability class. In addition, the plaintiffs requested that the court reconsider its denial of the plaintiffs' request for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. As an alternative to this Rule 23(b)(3) reconsideration, the plaintiffs requested that the court certify subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4) on the basis of differing conditions of abuse, privacy, sanitation, and weather during the alleged illegal strip searches. On December 18, 2014, Judge Wilson issued an order granting a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class for the purpose of liability, as well as subclass certification. However, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification and all other subclass certifications. 2014 WL 10044904. On November 18, 2016 (2016 WL 8904537, C.D. Cal.), the court certified an additional two classes as (c)(4) issue classes, despite not certifying the (c)(4) classes in a July 26, 2016 order (2016 WL 6804910, C.D.Cal.). These new classes consisted of a class consisting of women who experienced simultaneous searches and a class consisting of women who experienced one-line-at-a-time searches. 2016 WL 8904537, C.D. Cal. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on December 2, 2016, and a fourth amended complaint on December 19. On June 7, 2017, the court issued an order regarding summary judgment motions from both parties. The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing claims of liability against individual defendants acting as individuals due to qualified immunity. The court also granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that because the defendants had not provided evidence to establish why they conducted searches in the manner that they did when alternatives existed, the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 2017 WL 9472901, C.D. Cal. The parties then engaged in mediation. The plaintiffs submitted a preliminary settlement agreement for $53 million on July 16, 2019, but Judge Wilson did not approve this settlement in a September 23, 2019 hearing. His objection to the settlement centered on the creation of a $3 million fund to finance contracts with Los Angeles-based nonprofit organizations and for-profit groups to “develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates.” He said that since there was a potential for many claimants to come forward demanding compensation in this case, such a fund should not be established unless there is money left over once all members of the class seeking compensation come forward. The plaintiffs submitted an amended settlement agreement for the same amount, but removing the fund, on October 31, 2019. Judge Wilson granted preliminary approval to this settlement on November 7, and set a fairness hearing for July 20, 2020, once class members could reasonably be notified. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2010, two former female inmates who were imprisoned in the Century Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF"), a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD") facility, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the LASD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that CRDF female inmates were routinely subjected to degrading strip and body cavity searches at the CRDF without probable cause or individualized suspicion. Settlement negotiations are ongoing in the District Court.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 11, 2016, six students with behavior-related disabilities residing in Pasadena brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, though their guardians, sued the Pasadena Unified School District for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 <i>et seq.</i>) and state disability statutes. The plaintiffs, represented by Mental Health Advocacy Services, the Judge L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fee. The plaintiffs claimed that the Pasadena Unified School District was systematically segregating students with behavioral issues in an alternative "therapeutic environment" in which students were subjected to arrests, forced isolations, suspension threats, and an inferior education overall. They sought a behavioral-service program within neighborhood schools to provide students with disabilities an equal education. For the several years, the parties engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations. On October 27, 2017, the case was transferred from Judge Beverly Reid O'Connell to Judge Virginia A. Phillips. On October 31, 2019, the court approved a settlement agreement and consent decree. The parties agreed to the appointment of neutral expert to evaluate the District's capacity, resources, and needs in several areas, including the transition of students with behavioral and mental disabilities out of segregated settings to general education campuses and the implementation of early response programs and academic support to identify and prevent behavioral problems. After the evaluation of the expert, the parties would agree on a Strategic Plan subject to a dispute resolution mechanism included within the settlement agreement. Once the parties agreed on the Strategic Plan, the neutral expert would oversee its implementation for five years, during which time the District Court would retain jurisdiction. Additionally, the District agreed to pay each plaintiff $8,500 in compensatory damages and plaintiff's counsel $425,000 in attorney's fees. The consent decree remains in force.
<|assistant|>
Class action lawsuit brought against the Pasadena Unified School District by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law and private counsel on behalf of middle school students described as having behavioral issues, who were forced to attend an alternative institution deemed a "therapeutic environment." In this secondary scholastic environment, students said they were subjected to an inferior level of education and arrested by law enforcement, threatened by school administration, and isolated from their peers. Plaintiffs claimed this segregational policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, in addition to state disability statutes. The parties agreed to appoint a subject matter expert to recommend reforms that the District would implement over a five-year window.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 18, 2004, three former employees brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, against the Canadian National Railroad Company and its subsidiaries. The plaintiffs, represented by several private attorneys, sought a declaration that defendants engaged in company-wide systemic racial discrimination when they continually failed to notify African-American employees of job announcements, and continually failed to post or make announcements readily accessible to African-American employees, for all positions that might lead to promotions and/or advancement to higher and better paying positions. Plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction and other equitable relief necessary to eliminate the effects of the defendants' past and present racial discrimination and to prevent such discrimination from continuing to adversely affect their lives and careers in the future. Finally, plaintiffs sought back-pay, other equitable remedies, and damages necessary to make them and the members of the class whole. On January 7, 2010, the District Court (Judge James B. Zagel) conditionally certified a class of "all African-American employees of the Railroad from February 18, 2000 to October 21, 2009" and approved a consent decree. Under the specific injunctive provisions of the consent decree, which remained in effect for three years, the defendants were required to implement policies, practices, and procedures to prevent discrimination in training and advancement. Such policies and practices included: a Training Catalog and electronically-available instructions on how employees may obtain the training needed to enhance their abilities and qualifications; on-line courses in the subjects of basic computer software skills, supervisory skills, and railroad-related topics; educational financial assistance, including, but not necessarily limited to, reimbursement for education relating to craft, technical, and vocational skills reasonably related to the railroad environment; EEO training for HR personnel, supervisors and managers, and employees; enhanced posting of available positions; nondiscriminatory selection procedures for available positions; a diversity counsel; semi-annual adverse impact analyses; and internal monitoring and compliance procedures. Additionally, the consent decree required the defendants to establish a settlement fund in the gross amount of $3,000,000 for the purpose of providing individual awards to the named plaintiffs, monetary awards to the eligible members of the settlement class, and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to class counsel.
<|assistant|>
Three former employees brought a class action lawsuit against the Canadian National Railroad Company and its subsidiaries in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that defendants have engaged in company-wide systemic racial discrimination and seeking a monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 4, 2013, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of Cook County and the Cook County Department of Corrections. The inmate sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that the jail had prevented him from receiving a newspaper based on a formal written policy prohibiting newspapers. The Cook County Department of Correction's General Order 9.7.1 lists all "newspapers" as a form of "institutional contraband." A friend had sent him the newspaper, and the jail returned it to the friend without notifying the inmate. The inmate alleged that the Cook County Department of Correction's policy of banning inmates from obtaining newspapers was overbroad, and violated his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that this policy unreasonably and irrationally censored and restricted his ability to read a large and important body of First-Amendment protected speech. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 3, 2013, Judge Kennelly denied the motion to dismiss. Then, both parties moved for summary judgment. In an opinion, the court partly granted and partly denied both motions. On July 6, 2015, the court ruled that the inmate's request for injunctive relief was moot. Although the inmate filed suit while he was still incarcerated at the jail, and he had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief at that time, because he was released shortly thereafter, there was no evidence that he would suffer from the jail's newpaper policy in the future. The court held that the jail's ban on newspapers violated the First Amendment. The court awarded the inmate $1.00 in nominal damages. Outside of court, the parties settled the amount of attorneys fees, and that amount is not disclosed. With the resolution of the attorneys fees, the case was closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2013, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The inmate sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of his First Amendment rights because the jail denied him possession of a newspaper. The court held that the jail's ban on newspapers was unconstitutional and awarded the inmate a declaratory judgment, and $1.00 in nominal damages. Outside of court, the parties settled the amount of attorneys fees, and that amount is not disclosed. With the resolution of the attorneys fees, the case was closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 12, 2005, plaintiff filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Corrections [DOC], challenging the DOC's refusal to transport plaintiff to an off-site medical clinic so that she could receive a nontherapeutic abortion. The complaint alleged that that the prison's policy that female prisoners would not be sent out of their institutions for abortions that were not medically necessary deprived plaintiff of her Fourteenth Amendment right to reproductive choice. The complaint further alleged that by forcing her to carry her an unwanted pregnancy to term, the prison was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. An emergency motion for a TRO was filed simultaneously with the complaint. On October 13, 2005, the District Court (Judge Dean Whipple) granted Plaintiff's motion for TRO and ordered Defendant to transport Plaintiff to Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis (RHS) in St. Louis, Missouri to receive medical services to terminate her pregnancy. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and moved for a stay of the TRO pending appeal. The Court denied the request on October 14, 2005 and entered an Order and Modified Judgment of Preliminary Injunction. Roe v. Crawford, 396 F.Supp.2d 1041 (W.D.Mo. 2005). On October 14, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered that the Modified Judgment of October 14, 2005 be stayed pending further order by Justice Thomas. On October 17, 2005, U.S. Supreme Court vacated the temporary stay entered on October 14, 2005 and denied the application for stay. Crawford v. Roe, 126 S.Ct. 477 (U.S. 2005). The District Court then entered another Modified Judgment of Preliminary Injunction, again ordering the DOC to transport Plaintiff to an outside facility for the purpose of receiving medical services to terminate her pregnancy. The DOC complied with the order and Plaintiff was so transported on October 20, 2005. Plaintiff amended her complaint on October 19, 2005 and moved to certify the action as a class action. On November 28, 2005, the District Court certified a class defined as "All pregnant women who are seeking or may in the future seek non-therapeutic abortions and who are in the custody of Defendants at the time Plaintiff Roe filed her Verified Complaint in this case or who will be placed in the custody of Defendants in the future and may while in the custody of Defendants seek a non-therapeutic abortion." The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 18, 20016, Judge Whipple granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' motion, finding that the DOC policy prohibiting transportation of female inmates for abortion procedures violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D.Mo. 2006). On November 29, the court awarded the Plaintiffs $87,908.00 for attorneys fees and $7,379.05 for costs to the Plaintiffs. On November 29, 2006, the Court granted Defendants' unopposed motion to amend the judgment and stay payment of fees and costs pending resolution of Defendants' appeal. On January 22, 2008, Judge William J. Riley, writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the judgment. Although he found that the District Court erred in its finding that the DOC policy was invalid under the Eighth Amendment, he determined that the DOC policy could not be maintained under the Fourteenth Amendment in light of <i>Turner v. Safley</i>, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The Eight Circuit denied the Defendant's motion to rehear the case en banc. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 17, 2008, ending the case.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections [DOC], challenging the DOC's refusal to transport plaintiff to an off-site medical clinic so that she could receive a nontherapeutic abortion. The District Court found that the DOC policy prohibiting transportation of female inmates for abortion procedures violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but found that the District Court erred in its finding that the DOC policy was invalid under the Eighth Amendment.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 7, 2011, indigent lawful permanent residents in Washington filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Northwest Health Law Advocates and the Public Interest Law Group, as well as private counsel, alleged that HCA had violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs, including five named members, sought class certification, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the state passed a bill that restricted immigrants' eligibility for the Washington Basic Health Program, which provided state-subsidized health insurance to indigent residents and, on the same day, sent plaintiffs letters notifying them that they would be de-enrolled from the program in ten days. Plaintiffs argued that the termination notices did not provide the adequate, meaningful, and timely notice required by the Due Process Clause. According to the amended complaint, HCA did not have enough information to determine immigration status prior to sending these notices. The notices failed to inform plaintiffs why they were ineligible for their benefits or to provide any individualized explanation for the HCA's determination that plaintiffs were not legal residents. Plaintiffs also assert that HCA violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against plaintiffs based on their immigration status. On September 28, 2011, the District Court (Judge James Robart) granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the Due Process class as defined by plaintiffs, with some minor revisions. Unthaksinkun v. Porter, C11-0588JLR, 2011 WL 4502050 (W.D. Wash. 2011). The Court also granted plaintiffs' motion to certify an Equal Protection class that includes individuals who were de-enrolled from Basic Health, but denied plaintiffs' request that the class also include future class members. On October 24, 2011, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which incorporated the parties' agreed proposal for a preliminary injunction. The order required the defendant to review class member lists and identify additional members of the Equal Protection class; send notice of reenrollment rights to known class members; reinstate coverage for class members who pay premiums; follow specific protocols before seeking to de-enroll any class member based on immigration status; provide individual termination notification including specific information to any re-enrolled class member; and post information on the Basic Health web site. On January 3, 2012, a mediator was appointed for the case. By March 15, 2013, the HCA had fully complied with the terms of the preliminary injunction and the members of the Due Process class had received their remedy according to the terms of the injunction. The parties agreed that the claim for the Equal Protection class members would become moot in 2014 when funding for Basic Health would be eliminated, and lawfully present immigrants, currently enrolled in Basic Health, would be eligible to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act. The parties therefore requested to continue the trial from August 2013 to August 2014, with the expectation that the claims of the Equal Protection class would become irrelevant. On February 13, 2014, the parties reached a final settlement, agreeing that since the protected class had already received appropriate relief through the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs’ due process claim need not be litigated further. The defendants also agreed to pay $264,000 in attorneys’ fees. The court approved the settlement on March 6, 2014. On July 8, 2014, the court dismissed the remaining equal protection claim with prejudice.
<|assistant|>
On April 7, 2011, indigent lawful permanent residents in Washington filed a lawsuit against the Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the HCA had violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by failing to provide adequate notice of their disenrollment from state-subsidized health insurance and by discriminating on the basis of immigration status. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification in part and issued a preliminary injunction. Defendant complied with the terms of the injunction and paid $264,000 in attorneys’ fees. On July 8, 2014, the court dismissed the remaining equal protection claims because they had become moot under the advent of the Affordable Care Act.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 28th, 2012, five former and current Jewish students filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Pine Bush School District. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declarative judgment, injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the school district had responded with deliberate indifference to the rampant anti-Semitic discrimination and harassment directed at the plaintiffs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the students had been harassed from elementary school to high school, and had been physically and psychologically injured. These included anti-Semitic slurs, anti-Semitic graffiti, Hitler salutes and celebrations, direct threats of harm, and physical attacks. The plaintiffs claimed that the school district has been made repeatedly aware of the various acts of discrimination and has consistently ignored, minimized or dismissed the harassment. <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/08/nyregion/swastikas-slurs-and-torment-in-towns-schools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0">The New York Times</a> reported on the case on November 8th, 2013. On December 6th, 2013, the school district moved for summary judgment. Judge Kenneth M. Karas heard oral arguments from both parties regarding summary judgment on July 14th. On November 3, 2014, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the individuals, holding they were redundant with the claims against the school district. The rest of the motion was denied. The defendants appealed the partial denial of summary judgment on November 24, 2014. On May 1, 2015, a Second Circuit panel dismissed the appeal, determining it lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been issued by the district court per 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On July 10, 2015, Judge Karas approved the parties' settlement agreement. Total damages amounted to $4.48 million: $3 million for compensatory damages and $1.48 million for attorney's fees. The injunctive part of the settlement required Pine Bush School District to revise and install policies to prevent or swiftly respond to incidents of anti-Semitism [see Exhibit 1 of the Settlement Agreement]. Additional measures included the continuance of a "No Place for Hate Committee," curriculum revisions to promote diversity and prevent bullying, professional development, and the appointment of an internal Title VI Coordinator.
<|assistant|>
On March 28th, 2012, five former and current Jewish students filed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their Southern New York school district. The plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered rampant anti-Semitic discrimination and harassment from elementary school to high school, and that the defendants had ignored, dismissed and minimized the harassment. After the plaintiffs' claims against the individual were dismissed in summary judgment for being redundant to the claims against the District, the parties reached a settlement in July 2015. It awarded the plaintiffs $4.48 million ($3 million for compensatory damages, the rest for attorney's fees). The District further agreed to implement policies to celebrate diversity and work against bullying.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 12, 2017, M.B., five minors in the Missouri foster care system (through their "Next Friends") filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri. The Plaintiffs sued the Interim Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Director of the Children’s Division (CD) of DSS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged substantive due process rights violations, procedural due process rights violations, and a violation of the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA). Represented by Children’s Rights, Inc., National Center for Youth Law, St. Louis University Legal Clinic, and private council, plaintiffs sued on behalf of a putative class of children under eighteen who are or will be placed in the custody of the state of Missouri due to abuse or neglect by their legal guardians. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the Defendants from subjecting class members to allegedly abusive policies and practices. <b>Background</b> The lawsuit brought three claims: first, violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; second, violation of the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and third, a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., 670 et seq. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Defendants’ failures to maintain a minimally adequate oversight system or to institute procedures to ensure the appropriate administration of medication violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Plaintiffs also ask that the Defendants’ failure to maintain and deliver the Plaintiffs’ complete and updated medical records to foster caretakers violated the Plaintiffs’ statutory rights under the CWA. The Plaintiffs also sought permanent injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to revise its practices related to medical records, promulgate an effective informed consent policy, and develop a secondary review system. Class action allegations were included in the first and amended complaints. Specifically, the complaint argued that, while the children were in the state’s custody and with foster parents, the state administered or instructed the foster parents to administer to the plaintiffs one or more psychotropic and/or anti-psychotic drugs and failed to ensure that medications were appropriate, safe, and adequately monitored. Because of this, the class had suffered or would suffer substantial and often irreversible harm to their physical, emotional, and/or mental health. <b>Specific example of abused alleged</b> The named plaintiff M.B., who had been in the foster care custody of CD for more than three years, was placed on more than six psychotropic drugs at one time under the supervision of CD. While in CD’s custody, his medications fluctuated wildly while he was moved between eight different placements, including two psychiatric institutions. When M.B. was placed with a licensed therapeutic foster parent, CD did not discuss M.B.’s medications with him, the proper methods to administer the medication, nor its adverse effects. His foster parent was not given an opportunity to ask questions about M.B.’s medication plan nor given information from his medical records or history. Instead, she had to rely on pill bottle label’s and M.B.’s instructions. She began noticing severe adverse effects; M.B. was afraid to go to sleep, would twitch, and was observed with his eyes rolling back in his head. After three weeks in the placement, M.B. threatened his foster parent’s life and was hospitalized. Despite his foster parent’s wish to care for M.B. as his foster parent and her continued involvement in ensuring M.B. receives the care he needs, he was not returned to her home. After leaving his foster parent’s home, M.B.’s medications steadily increased, and by January 2017, he was taking seven psychotropic medications, including three antipsychotics at the same time. In early 2017, M.B. was moved hundreds of miles away from his foster parent, the only constant adult presence in his life, because the prior facility reportedly couldn’t accommodate his needs. His foster parent visited in April 2017 and observed a completely changed child – once hyperactive, he was now lethargic, slurring, and falling asleep in broad daylight. These are all documented adverse effects of high dosage of different psychotropic drugs. As of filing, M.B. had been moved to a psychiatric hospital. The other named plaintiffs had similar stories of experiencing adverse effects, likely resulting from poorly administered medication. <b>Procedural timeline</b> On July 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On August 21, 2017, the state filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing the court did not have jurisdiction because the case should be heard in Missouri’s juvenile courts, that the due process claims were insufficient, and that plaintiffs had no private right of action under the Child Welfare Act based on Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. On January 8, 2018, Judge Nanette K. Laughrey denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim and procedural due process claim. Judge Laughrey granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice regarding Plaintiffs’ CWA violation claim and without prejudice the Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims relating to informed consent. 2018 WL 327767. For several months, the parties engaged in discovery and depositions. On March 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. On July 19, 2018, Judge Laughrey certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of "all children in Children's Division foster care custody who presently are, or in the future will be, prescribed or administered one or more psychotropic medications while in state care." 327 F.R.D. 271. The defendants appealed the order granting class certification to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 22, 2018 (case number 18-2798). Since the original defendant retired in July 2018, the appellant replaced him with Ms. Lester. On October 29, 2018, the defendant’s motion to stay the lawsuit pending appeal was denied by Judge Laughrey under seal. 2018 WL 5504178. Several months of mediation and negotiations followed. On May 30, 2019, the parties reported having reached a settlement. On July 8, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. Parties also separately notified the Eighth Circuit of the potential settlement, and the Eighth Circuit issued an order on July 9 staying the August 2018 appeal of class certification until the settlement was resolved. On July 15, Judge Laughrey granted preliminary approval of settlement. On November 6, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for final approval of class action settlement, with relevant documents regarding discovery and plaintiffs' private information kept under seal. A fairness hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Lajuana M. Counts on November 20, 2019 and the judge issued a Report and Recommendation on December 4 indicating that the settlement should be approved and the case be dismissed with prejudice. The settlement agreement included policy and procedural commitments relating to the defendant’s (a) training of case management staff and resource provider, (b) providing medication monitoring, mental health assessment, medical examinations, and concurrent non-pharmacological treatment, (c) maintaining medical records, including efforts to build system and reporting capabilities and to comply with CD policy on record collection and distribution, (d) secondary review of designated prescription of psychotropic medications by a child and adolescent psychiatrist, (e) obtaining informed consent to the administration of psychotropic medications, (f) appointing a Psychotropic Mediation Advisory Committee to provide professional and technical consultation and policy advice on issues related to psychotropic medication, and (g) developing excessive dosage guidelines based on advice from and consultation with medical and clinical experts. On December 5, Judge Laughrey adopted the Report and Recommendations and granted the parties’ motion for final approval of the class action settlement. The Court retained jurisdiction for purpose of enforcement. The settlement agreement defined specific exit criteria, and the state is entitled to exit the agreement once exit criteria have been met for three consecutive six-month reporting periods. The parties agreed to jointly seek an order terminating court jurisdiction over the agreement when appropriate, though the state can also do so on its own motion. Plaintiffs filed a motion for $4,027,882.78 in attorneys' fees and costs. The parties disputed as to the hourly rate used to calculate attorneys' fees. On April 3, 2020, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the original request, adjusting some of the attorneys' billing rates and hours tracked to arrive at a final award of $3,386,558.81. 2020 WL 1666159. <b>Current status</b> There is nothing in the district court docket showing any disputes over enforcement. After the settlement was approved, the Eighth Circuit signed off on the state's voluntary dismissal of the (previously stayed) appeal. On April 28, 2020, Defendants filed a new appeal of the attorneys' fees award. It is pending.
<|assistant|>
On June 12, 2017, five children filed this class action lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against Missouri's Department of Social Services and the Children's Division (CD) for substantive due process rights violations, procedural due process rights violations, and violations of the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. Plaintiffs argued that the class has suffered or will suffer substantial and often irreversible harm to their physical, emotional, and/or mental health because of defendant's improper administration of medication to the plaintiffs. On March 16, 2018, plaintiffs moved for class certification. On July 19, 2018, Judge Nanette K. Laughrey certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of "all children in Children's Division foster care custody who presently are, or in the future will be, prescribed or administered one or more psychotropic medications while in state care." The defendants appealed the order granting class certification to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 22, 2018 (case number 18-2798). In May 2019, the parties reached a settlement and the court approved the settlement agreement in December. The court retained jurisdiction. Attorneys' fees and costs were awarded in April 2020. Defendants appealed the class certification ruling to the Eighth Circuit in April 2020.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 13, 2011, David House, a U.S. citizen, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. House, represented by counsel from the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that federal agents' search of his electronic devices at the border and prolonged seizure of the devices without reasonable suspicion violated the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, House claimed that the government seized his electronic devices, including his laptop computer, at the border when he was coming home from vacation. The plaintiff claimed that the government targeted the plaintiff solely on the basis of his lawful association with the Bradley Manning Support Network, an organization created to raise funds and support for the legal defense of Pfc. Bradley Manning (now Chelsea Manning, after a name change), a soldier charged with leaking a video and documents relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the WikiLeaks website. The government then kept the devices for forty-nine days, retained the information from them indefinitely, and disseminated the information to other government agencies and possibly foreign governments. In addition, the materials seized by the government contained confidential information identifying members and supporters of the Bradley Manning Support Network, and that the defendants' review, retention, and disclosure of that information intruded on the right of associational privacy protected by the First Amendment. According to an <a href="https://www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-sues-homeland-security-over-seizure-activists-computer">ACLU press release</a>, the search and seizure of the plaintiff's laptop had a chilling effect on the activities of the Bradley Manning Support Network, by "silencing once-outspoken supports and causing donors to retreat." On July 28, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The defendants argued that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that searches of electronic devices at the border should be subjected to a different standard than that for other closed containers. The defendants also argued that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated by the routine search and detention of his devices at the border. Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's "associational privacy" claims should be dismissed, because the government is not prohibited from examining any items at the border simply because they may be related to the work of an organization; nor, the government argued, were there any factual allegations showing how Plaintiff's organization has been targeted by the government, or that the routine search of Plaintiff's electronic devices disclosure may impede the future activities of the organization. On March 28, 2012, Judge Denise J. Casper denied the U.S.'s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that even if the government does not need suspicion or a warrant to search a laptop at the border, that power is not unlimited and First Amendment rights remain intact. House v. Napolitano, 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012). On May 23, 2013, the matter settled. All of the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice with each party bearing his or her own costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. The government agreed to destroy all copies of the plaintiff's devices and to turn over documents related to its investigation of him and his devices. The government also admitted that the plaintiff was on the Department of Homeland Security's "Lookout" list used by agents at border checkpoints, which is why he was stopped and searched in the first place. The government further agreed to release reports on DHS agents' questioning of House, which included inquiries about whether he knew anything about Manning giving classified information to WikiLeaks.
<|assistant|>
In 2011, a private individual filed a lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts under the First and Fourth Amendments against the U.S. government for unlawfully searching and seizing his electronic devices at the border solely based on his connection with the Bradley Manning Support Network. The government settled with the plaintiff in 2013 and agreed to destroy all copies of the plaintiff's devices and to turn over documents related to its investigation of him and his devices.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
<b>NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see <a href="https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/"> their tracker</a>.</b> COVID-19 Summary: On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The court granted a preliminary injunction on May 19, which was stayed by the Sixth Circuit on May 26. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the stay on June 25. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the existing requirements for remote signature gathering for ballot initiatives violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the COVID pandemic and resulting state of emergency restrictions on public gatherings made it impossible for proponents of ballot measures to comply with Ohio’s ballot-access signature requirements. They said that applying the ballot requirements to the 2020 election without adjustment in light of the pandemic violated their equal protection and due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the defendants to immediately place the plaintiff’s marijuana decriminalization initiatives on the November 3 election ballot directly without the need for supporting signatures from voters or, alternatively, suspend prohibitions against remote signature collection, extend filing deadlines for signature submission, develop timely, efficient and realistic procedures and practices for gathering and submitting signatures from voters, and reduce the number of voters' signatures required to ten percent of the number currently prescribed for the November 3, 2020 election. This lawsuit was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Competitive Democracy and private attorneys. Concurrently, on April 27, 2020, the plaintiffs also submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order. The Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections and Ohioans for Raising the Wage each sought to intervene on April 30 and May 1, respectively. Both motions were granted on May 4. On May 19, 2020, the district court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ink signature and witness requirements and the current deadline as applied to the plaintiffs and the intervening plaintiffs for the November 3 general election, and directing them to update the court by May 26 regarding adjustments to the enjoined requirements “so as to reduce the burden on ballot access.” They further ordered the defendants to accept electronically-signed and witnessed petitions from the intervening plaintiffs collected through the on-line signature collection plans and to meet and confer regarding any technical or security issues regarding those plans by May 26. 2020 WL 2557064. The court noted that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic “the state’s strict enforcement of the signature requirements for local initiatives and constitutional amendments severely burden plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights as applied here.” The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit the next day asked the district court to stay its own order, pending appeal. The district court refused. 2020 WL 2614447. On May 26, the Sixth Circuit granted the stay pending appeal, finding that the defendants were likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal and that they would suffer serious and irreparable harm if the court enjoined them from conducting the election in accordance with lawfully enacted ballot-access regulations. 959 F.3d 804. The court explained: “[w]hether this intermediate burden on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights passes constitutional muster depends on whether the state has legitimate interests to impose the burden that outweigh it. Here they offer two. Defendants claim the witness and ink requirements help prevent fraud by ensuring that the signatures are authentic. And the deadlines allow them time to verify signatures in an orderly and fair fashion, while also providing initiative proponents time to challenge any adverse decision in court. These interests are not only legitimate, they are compelling.” The plaintiffs submitted an initial hearing en banc, petition for rehearing en banc, motion for reconsideration, and motion to vacate the stay pending appeal, all of which were denied on June 16, 2020. The same day, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the stay and the Supreme Court denied the application on June 25. 2020 WL 3456705. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as a temporary restraining order. The court granted preliminary injunction on May 19, which was stayed by the Sixth Circuit on May 26. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the stay on June 25. The case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 7, 2011, a natural-born United States citizen of Latino ethnicity filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, under various state laws against the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff"). The plaintiff, initially represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (the "Metro Government") had violated the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County (the "Metro Charter"); that his due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution were violated; that he was maliciously harassed due to his race and ethnicity; and that he was falsely imprisoned. Plaintiff's principal claim was that the Metro Government had violated the Metro Charter by allowing the Sheriff to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. government, which permitted the Sheriff to perform federal immigration law enforcement functions, even though the Metro Charter conferred all law enforcement duties upon the Nashville Police Department, and even though a prior Tennessee Supreme Court decision, Metro Government v. Poe, held that the Metro Charter took from the Sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace and vested that duty in the Nashville Police Department. Plaintiff also brought several other claims, including a due process claim and a false imprisonment claim, which would subsequently be dismissed. On February 28, 2011, the Chancery Court ordered that the United States was an indispensible party to the lawsuit, and granted plaintiff thirty days to amend his complaint. An amended complaint was filed, which added a second plaintiff, added the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") as a defendant, and dropped all claims except for the violation of the Metro Charter. The case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On June 21, 2011, the District Court (Judge Kevin H. Sharp) granted plaintiffs permission to again amend their complaint. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 796 F. Supp. 2d 900 (M.D. Tenn. 2011). The court denied as moot the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add another defendant and ICE subsequently moved to dismiss this latest iteration of the complaint. On September 12, 2011, the District Court (Judge Sharp) granted in part and denied in part ICE's motion to dismiss, dismissing plaintiff's due process claim against it. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:11-00218, 2011 WL 4048523 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2011). The District Court refused to dismiss plaintiff's claim that the 287(g) agreement violated the Metro Charter, and instead chose to certify that question to the Tennessee Supreme Court for determination. The case was stayed pending the resolution of that question of law. Over a year later, on October 19, 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the 287(g) agreement did not violate the Metro Charter or any other state law cited by the Plaintiffs. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 382 S.W.3d 318 (Tenn. 2012). The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, "[w]hile the Charter makes the Police Chief the 'principal conservator of the peace,' it does not expressly prohibit the Sheriff from engaging in all activities that could conceivably be considered 'law enforcement.'" Following the resolution of this question, in December of 2012, two of the three plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims against all defendants. The remaining plaintiff dismissed his claims against ICE, but proceeded against Metro Government with constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and with a claim of false imprisonment. In April of 2013, plaintiff's counsel filed a sealed motion asking the Court for leave to withdraw from representation of plaintiff. The District Court granted the motion for the reasons stated in the sealed motion. The Court allowed plaintiff thirty days to either find new counsel or notify the court that he intended to proceed pro se. Plaintiff did neither. The Court deemed the case abandoned, and dismissed it with prejudice.
<|assistant|>
On January 7, 2011, plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, arguing they had violated the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County by allowing the Davidson County Sheriff's Office to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. government. The agreement permitted the Sheriff to perform federal immigration law enforcement functions, even though the Charter conferred all law enforcement duties upon the Nashville Police Department, and even though a prior Tennessee Supreme Court decision, Metro Government v. Poe, held that the Charter took from the Sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace and vested that duty in the Nashville Police Department. The Tennessee Supreme Court, answering a certified question from the U.S. District Court, held that the 287(g) agreement did not violate the Metro Charter or any other state law cited by the Plaintiffs. This effectively ended the case.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: Five particularly vulnerable immigration detainees and organizations comprised of immigration attorneys filed this complaint on March 30, 2020, challenging EOIR and ICE's failure to implement a uniform policy suspending in-person immigration court appearances and providing for remote communication alternatives. Their emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking the suspension of in-person hearings and the implementation of procedures for remote communications, was denied in late April. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. <hr> On March 30, 2020, individuals detained in ICE facilities and several organizations whose members include attorneys representing current and prospective clients detained in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), ICE, and the directors of those agencies in their official capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that in failing to "put in place a uniform policy suspending in-person appearances and enacting protective measures for detained noncitizens who wish to proceed with their immigration hearings," the defendants violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought injunctive relief ordering the defendants "to suspend in-person immigration hearings for detained individuals and to provide robust remote access alternatives for detained individuals who wish to proceed with their hearings" during the COVID-19 pandemic and to "guarantee secure and reliable remote communication between noncitizens in detention and their legal representatives." The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and costs, personal protective equipment should it be necessary, and, in the alternative, "injunctive relief ordering temporary release for detained immigrants who have inadequate access to alternative means of remote communication with legal representatives or the immigration court." The case was assigned to Judge Carl J. Nichols. This case was filed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the potential for in-person court appearances as a risk factor for further outbreak of the disease. States and countries around the world had taken unprecedented measures to control the spread of the disease (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) including shutting down nonessential businesses, restricting public gatherings, and imposing “shelter-in-place” orders. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned that courthouses, because of the level of interaction with people and objects that in-person court appearances require, are especially susceptible to the spread of the virus. The CDC recommended social distancing measures and specifically urged “alternatives to in-person court appearances, such as virtual court, as a social distancing measure to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission.” As such, federal courts and the Bureau of Prisons have taken measures to implement uniform policies to minimize the health risk. Yet, the plaintiffs asserted that EOIR has not taken the same uniform protective measures and most immigration courts remain open for business, putting the health and safety of attorneys and clients at risk. Moreover, plaintiffs contended that the defendants were still holding in-person immigration hearings, despite the availability of telephonic and video teleconferencing capabilities, and continued to require paper filings to made at physical court locations. Lastly, the plaintiffs' contended that the lack of a uniform policy and unavailability of remote access have made "effective representation by counsel extremely challenging." The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to issue and implement uniform, reasonable policies were arbitrary and capricious and interfered with the detained plaintiffs' right to counsel, in violation of the APA and INA. Furthermore, the detained plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' policies deprived noncitizens of their ability to retain counsel and to receive their counsel's legal advice, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendment. The organizational plaintiffs claimed that defendants' policies restricted their ability to communicate with and advise their clients and risked the safety and health of their members, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. Lastly, the detained plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' practice of continuing to hold in-person proceedings subjected them to "an unreasonable risk of serious harm and punitive conditions, in violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause." On April 8, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Request for Hearing, seeking an order that defendants "suspend in-person hearings during the health emergency and require EOIR and ICE to adopt policies and procedures to enable the conduct of remote hearings consistent with Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights." The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their statutory and constitutional claims, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO, and that the public interest weighs heavily in favor of a TRO. Defendants asserted that the court does not have jurisdiction to grant this motion. Moreover, defendants argued that plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits of their APA claim or their right-to-counsel and procedural-due-process claims. Finally, defendants contended that plaintiffs' "speculative claims of future injury do not outweigh the public interest in retaining EOIR's and ICE's flexibility to respond to changing circumstances." After a hearing on the emergency motion for TRO, Judge Nichols issued a minute order on April 15 requiring that "in the event that Defendants issue any further guidance or otherwise make policy changes relevant to this case, then Defendants shall provide the Court with immediate notice." The order also required that, "in the event that any of the individual Plaintiffs' upcoming hearings are continued, rescheduled, or otherwise changed, then the Party who learns of the change first shall provide the Court with immediate notice." On April 28, following supplemental briefing and an amicus brief from the National Association of Immigration Judges, Judge Nichols issued a memorandum and order denying the plaintiffs' emergency motion for TRO. First, Judge Nichols concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish that the court has jurisdiction over their claims. Judge Nichols further stated that even if the court had jurisdiction, "Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiffs have not pointed to EOIR and ICE actions that are reviewable under the APA, and, perhaps most important, they also have not demonstrated that EOIR’s and ICE’s actions are arbitrary and capricious given the rapidly changing situation relating to the COVID-19 pandemic." Judge Nichols also found that "Plaintiffs have not established that they are 'certain' to suffer an 'imminent' injury, especially when weighed against their chances of prevailing on the merits." Finally, Judge Nichols held that the balance of equities and public interest did not tip in favor of preliminary injunctive relief, as the court was"not certainly not well-positioned to second-guess those health and safety determinations" made by defendants. 2020 WL 2026971. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.
<|assistant|>
In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, immigrant detainees and organizations comprised of immigration attorneys filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued EOIR, ICE, and their directors for violations of statutory and constitutional rights. The plaintiffs challenged defendants' failure to implement a uniform policy suspending in-person court appearances and provide for remote communications. In April, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, seeking the suspension of in-person court appearances and access to remote communications. The court denied this motion in late April. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 13, 2008, a prisoner at the Monroe County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Monroe County. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the living areas in the jail were grossly overcrowded, leading to unsanitary and dangerous living conditions. The plaintiff claimed the existence of overcrowding that harmed prisoners. The prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor of a gymnasium. The facilities had only two showers and limited toilets for over 200 prisoners. The overcrowding led to increased tensions, frequently erupting into violence. Cell blocks and showers were unsanitary and food was served cold. Finally, there was so much crowding that there was no space to engage in walking or exercising during the day, and the prisoners were not taken for outdoor recreation. On August 4, 2008, the District Court (Judge Richard Young) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff's motion to certify the case as a class action, defining the class as “any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail.” 2008 WL 3084766. The Court (Judge Young) found that although the plaintiff's individual claims for relief were moot, he had standing to represent the class. On August 14, 2009, the parties entered a stipulation to a private settlement agreement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to make reasonable efforts to continue to meet with the judges of the Monroe Circuit Court to discuss ways of keeping the jail population under its capacity. The defendants also agreed that if the population exceeded the number of available beds for a specified period of time, the jail would take reasonable steps, including informing the board of commissioners, transferring prisoners, and requesting orders to release prisoners to reduce the population. Additionally, the defendants agreed not to accept prisoners from other counties on a per diem basis and to only accept Monroe County prisoners that the jail was legally required to accept. Under the settlement, the prisoners were granted at least two hours each week of vigorous physical exercise and were guaranteed reasonable sleeping arrangements, requiring the jail to have stacking bunks when they run out of permanent beds. The parties also agreed to reporting requirements. Finally, defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs for $20,000. The parties agreed that absent a court order or written agreement, the settlement would remain in effect until October 1, 2011. On September 30, 2011, the District Court (Judge Young) granted the plaintiff's motion to modify the parties' agreement and extend the private settlement agreement. The District Court (Judge Young) granted similar motions to modify the parties’ agreement and extend the private settlement agreement on October 1, 2012, September 18, 2014, and September 14, 2016, thereby extending the agreement to October 1, 2018. The October 1, 2018 extended the previous settlement agreement and additionally required a study as to whether a new jail facility was necessary. On January 15, 2019, the Court acknowledged that the parties had once again extended their settlement agreement to January 14, 2021, and the court modified its past orders to provide that the parties move for dismissal of the case on January 14, 2021. As an additional condition on the settlement agreement, a study of the Monroe County criminal justice system and alternatives to incarceration was required. As of February 13, 2020, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2008, an inmate at the Monroe County Jail filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Monroe County Sheriff and Commissioners, in their official capacities. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claimed that overcrowding and general living conditions in the jail violated Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2009, the parties agreed to a private settlement agreement, under which the defendant had to make reasonable efforts to control the population and improve living conditions, as well as paying the plaintiff's legal costs. The settlement agreement was modified and extended in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and again in 2019. The agreement is ordered to apply through January 2021.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 14, 2013, a disabled adult beneficiary of a state-run Medicaid waiver program who was also on a waitlist for another Medicaid waiver program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration and two heads of divisions of that agency in their official capacities under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs, and class action certification. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the "integration mandate" of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by changing its eligibility requirements for Medicaid waiver programs and by not allowing an appeal from the policy change as required by the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3). Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant [1] removed the waitlist for the Indiana's Community Integration and Habilitation Medicaid Waiver Program and established new "priority criteria" that limited access to the program that many and [2] instituted a new policy for Indiana's Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program and its Traumatic Brain Injury Medicaid Waiver Program require recipients to require "a nursing facility level of care." The plaintiff claimed both of these actions violated the "integration mandate" because they deprived disabled persons of the assistance they need to be integrated into the community. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendant failed to inform plaintiff that she could appeal her removal from the waitlist under the Medicaid Act and that the defendant provided no means for securing such an appeal. On June 14, 2013, the plaintiff moved to have the case certified as a class action. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that defendant be enjoined from removing plaintiff from the Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program pending further order of the court. The preliminary injunction was withdrawn without prejudice on September 23, 2013. On March 24, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2014 WL 1213390 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2014). On June 26, 2014, the court dismissed the original named plaintiff's individual claims because they had become moot--she received a waiver--but she still retained the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The individual claims of intervening plaintiffs still remained. Later in 2014, the defendants and the plaintiffs both moved for summary judgment. On Mar 27, 2015, the US filed a statement of interest in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In May 2015, the court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment. On May 28, 2015, the court dismissed another one of the individual plaintiff's claims because they had become moot--he received a waiver. He also reserved the right to appeal the denial of class certification. On June 9, 2015, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ integration mandate claims were not ripe for review. The integration mandate focuses on the setting in which services are administered, not the amount of services received. The plaintiffs did not contend that the setting in which they received services had changed as a result of Indiana's policy change. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification, the dismissal of the individual plaintiffs, and the grant of summary judgment to the Seventh Circuit. On May 10, 2016, the Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgement and affirmed denial of class certification. The court found that the State's narrow reading of integration mandate was unwarranted and that there was no reason to interpret it as only applying to "claims by people who literally have been institutionalized." The court held that "setting" does not necessarily refer merely to physical structures, finding that the text of the statute does not compel such a restrictive interpretation and that the integration mandate's protection would be undermined "if plaintiffs were required to segregate themselves by entering an institution before they could challenge an allegedly discriminatory law or policy that threatens to force them into segregated isolation." Indeed, the court pointed out that Indiana's institutions do not have capacity for most people who could be institutionalized. The court also pointed to the purpose of the ADA, which was to prevent outright discrimination. Ultimately, the court held that "the integration mandate is implicated where the state’s policies have either (1) segregated persons with disabilities within their homes, or (2) put them at serious risk of institutionalization." 823 F.3d 902. The case then returned to the district court for further proceedings. On December 19, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal after having reached a settlement, and the court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice the next day. The settlement agreement is not currently available. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
Physically disabled adult Medicaid beneficiaries filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Medicaid Act after the state changed the policy for two Medicaid waiver programs. The court denied class certification and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment. The parties shortly thereafter stipulated dismissal, and the case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 21, 2011, current and former students represented by private counsel, and two non-profit public interest firms, the Southern Poverty Law Center and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota (Judge Joan N. Ericksen, Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau) against their school district. The plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and damages, claiming denial of equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they experienced physical and emotional harms due to unlawful discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex-based stereotypes that the defendant perpetuated and enforced through its policies and practices. The defendant's allegedly discriminatory policies were first instated in the mid-1990s, with a health curriculum policy prohibiting teachers from teaching that homosexuality was "normal" or valid. In 2009, the defendant created the "Sexual Orientation Curriculum Policy," which disallowed the teaching of sexual orientation as part of the school district's curriculum, and suggested that these matters were better addressed outside of the school. The plaintiffs claimed that this policy prevented school officials from responding adequately to anti-LGBT bullying and led to differential treatment of LGBT students. Between August 23, 2011 and March 1, 2012, the parties engaged in several settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau. On March 1, 2012, the Court (Judge Ericksen) granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate this case with another case concerning similar questions of law and fact (E.R. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 11-CV-2282) for pretrial proceedings. On March 6, 2012, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office filed an intervenor complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs. On March 6, 2012, the Court (Judge Ericksen) entered a consent decree negotiated by the plaintiffs, the defendant, and the United States. The five-year decree required the school district to revise its policies and appropriately respond to student harassment in accordance with Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and the United States' Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance. As per the decree, the school must provide, among other things: annual harassment and diversity training for students and employees, a mental health professional meeting certain requirements at all times, an anti-bullying survey, more active monitoring of potential harassment "hot spots," and a better platform for student input. The school district's insurance carrier also paid $270,000 to the plaintiffs as settlement. On May 6, 2013, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to seal certain pleadings. Doe v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64126, at *1 (D. Minn.). The decree term ran its course in March 2017 and no further litigation has ensued. The case appears closed.
<|assistant|>
Five students sued their school district under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant perpetuated and enforced sexual orientation and sex-based stereotypes through its policies and practices, and that said policies prevented school officials from responding adequately to anti-LGBT bullying. The parties negotiated a five-year consent decree requiring the school district to revise its policies and appropriately respond to student harassment, and the defendant's insurer paid $270,000 to the plaintiffs.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In September 2006, the EEOC's Seattle Field Office filed this suit in U.S. District Court, District of Montana, against Les Schwab Tire Centers of Montana, Inc. and Les Schwab Tire Warehouse, Inc. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; it alleged that the defendant had harassed a Native American employee because of his race, and then retaliated against him when he complained. Judge Donald W. Molloy was assigned to the case. The employee who was allegedly discriminated against intervened in the EEOC's suit. On February 19, 2008, the defendant filed two separate motions for partial summary judgment. On April 21, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement conference. The following day, the court granted the motion and the parties began negotiations. Those negotiations led quickly to a settlement. On June 27, 2008, the defendant filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the intervenor’s claims and the EEOC filed a proposed consent decree. Judge Molloy granted both that same day. In exchange for resolving all issues and claims arising out of the EEOC’s complaint, the defendant agreed to monetary and injunctive relief that would last two years, without admitting guilt. The complainant received $185,000 in damages and the defendant agreed to various injunctive provisions including training, reporting, and promising that its managers and employees would not engage in practices which constitute harassment based on an employee’s race or retaliation. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction for two years. There is no further activity in the docket, so presumably the case closed without incident in 2010.
<|assistant|>
This 2006 lawsuit was brought by the EEOC in the District of Montana. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, they alleged that the defendant racially discriminated against a Native American employee. On July 27, 2008, the parties settled. The defendant paid $185,000 in damages and was required to provide equal employment opportunity training to its employees. There is no further activity in the docket, so presumably the case closed without incident in 2010.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 21, 2007, juvenile detainees filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs alleged that the Youth Study Center (YSC), run by the City, did not provide adequate nutrition, discriminated against disabled youth, excessively confined youth, failed to provide medical care, failed to provide educational services, and unlawfully restricted access to courts and to family visitation. Plaintiffs argue that in doing so, the City violated the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. After litigation began, the City further restricted access by plaintiffs' counsel to youth in the YSC, where children were being detained. However, on March 4, 2008, the Court (Ivan L.R. Lemelle) granted plaintiffs' motion to access other potential members of the class. Months later, the Court granted plaintiffs' motions to join additional plaintiffs, and on February 6, 2009, plaintiffs' motion to certify class was granted. 255 F.R.D. 406. In June and August of 2008, the Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. 2008 WL 2522127. The defendants also moved the Court to sanction plaintiffs' counsel, alleging that they violated a Court order by asking the youth questions during a visit to the YSC after the Court issued an order prohibiting expert inspections, but the Court denied the motion, holding that the violation was not "willful" disobedience of "specific and definite" instructions. 2009 WL 363456. The parties eventually settled, and on February 12, 2010, the Court signed two consent decrees - one for the education claims, and one for the confinement conditions claims. The decrees required the parties to each retain consultants with expertise in juvenile detention educational services to monitor the YSC, and that the YSC improve building safety, food service, provide more health care for physical and mental conditions, reduce hours of continuous confinement, train staff, implement new grievance policies for detained youth, and to improve educational services and equipment for detained youth. The decree set February 11, 2012 as the target date for compliance. However, after numerous monitoring reports indicated that much progress was needed to reach full compliance, the Court granted multiple motions modifying both decrees to allow extensions of the Court's jurisdiction. On January 17, 2013, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the Conditions of Confinement Consent Decree on the condition that a new YSC facility be finished by April 1, 2014. (The case was subject to reinstatement on motion by a party if that condition was not accomplished.) On December 3, 2013, the Court granted joint motion to dismiss the Conditions of Education Consent Decree upon the implementation of the recommendations listed in the November 26, 2013 status report. On May 28, 2014, the Court granted a motion to dissolve the Conditions of Education Consent Decree. Since no motion was filed prior to April 1, 2014, on the conditions claims, the case is therefore concluded.
<|assistant|>
On December 21, 2007, juvenile detainees filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Court (Ivan L.R. Lemelle) signed two consent decrees to improve the Youth Study Center detention facilities; after years of progress, the Court granted two conditional motions to dismiss the decrees. On May 28, 2014, the case concluded.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 24, 2013, a group of non-profit Catholic-based organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, who all provide healthcare to their employees through the Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust, were represented by the public interest firm Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction to keep the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate. On October 24, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants opposed this motion on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On November 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, or, alternatively for summary judgment. On December 27, 2013, Judge William J. Martinez denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On December 27, 2013, the plaintiff appealed the court's decision to deny preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit (No. 13-1540). On December 31, 2013, the appellate court denied the plaintiff's motion for an emergency injunction. That same day, however, Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor granted plaintiff's requested injunction pending receipt of a response by the government. On January 24, 2014, the Supreme Court issued an injunction pending appeal, stating: "If the employer applicants inform the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that they are non-profit organizations that hold themselves out as religious and have religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services, the respondents are enjoined from enforcing against the applicants the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations pending final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. To meet the condition for injunction pending appeal, applicants need not use the form prescribed by the Government and need not send copies to third-party administrators. The Court issues this order based on all of the circumstances of the case, and this order should not be construed as an expression of the Court's views on the merits." On March 6, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to consolidate this appeal with two similar cases: <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13267">Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius</a> and <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13059">Reaching Souls International v. Sebelius</a>. On March 31, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied the defendant's motion to consolidate. However, on July 14, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in an opinion that joined this case and Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius. (794 F.3d 1151). The same day, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs objected to using the expanded accommodation designed by the court, in which they would not have to notify their insurers directly about their religious opposition to contraception, but would have to communicate that opposition and the name of their insurer to the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs requested a rehearing en banc, but the Tenth Circuit denied the request in an order on September 3, 2015. 799 F.3d 1315. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in order to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13465>Zubik v. Burwell [II]</a>. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. While the case was back in the District Court, President Trump issued an Executive Order in May 2017 directing the Department of Health and Human Services to address conscience-based objections to the preventive care mandate. The Department of Health and Human Services followed the Executive Order, issuing an exemption to religious organizations like the Little Sisters of the Poor. The case was dismissed voluntarily on June 26, 2018 and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On September 24, 2013, a group of non-profit Catholic-based organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. After many appeals, this case was consolidated with six others in the Supreme Court, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, and ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. But following an Executive Order from President Trump, the HHS issued an exemption for religious organization like Little Sisters of the Poor, and the case was voluntarily dismissed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 5, 2013, the Catholic owner of a corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("ACA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring the organization to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech and association contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On March 22, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings. On March 25, 2013, defendants gave notice of non-opposition to plaintiffs' motion. On April 2, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge John R. Tunheim granted the preliminary injunction and stayed the case pending resolution of the appeal in either of the cases (1) <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.phpid=12706&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Co%27brien%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012)</a> or (2) <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12665&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cannex%20medical%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013)</a>, or until the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a substantially similar case, whichever occurred first. Both of the aforementioned cases involved similar legal issues and the same defendant. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)</a>, a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 24, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Injunction in Favor of Plaintiffs and Stipulation for Fee Motion Briefing Schedule, which was also signed by the defendants, and which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On November 26, 2014, Judge Tunheim issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. The plaintiff moved for and received several extensions of time to file a motion for attorneys' fees, but the docket shows no record of the plaintiffs moving for attorneys' fees, and the case now appears closed.
<|assistant|>
On February 5, 2013, the Catholic owner of a corporation and the corporation itself filed a lawsuit seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, and upon the joint stipulation of the parties, the court ordered that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 24, 2009, an inmate at the Susquehanna County Jail filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the County of Susquehanna under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the Susquehanna Prison policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching all inmates, regardless of the nature of their charged crime or the likelihood that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. Although the case was initially assigned to Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, it was later reassigned to Chief Judge Yvette Kane and then to Judge A. Richard Caputo. The parties sought class-action status for a statewide class of those who were strip-searched after being charged with minor violations or misdemeanors in the judicial district. Meanwhile, as litigation in this case continued, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that blanket strip search policies were constitutional. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). In light of the new holding, the plaintiff sought class certifications for two new classes pertaining solely to the delousing portion of the strip search procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that the delousing policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that it violated the detainees' rights to refuse unwanted medical treatments under the Fourteenth Amendment. On October 5, 2011, Judge Caputo certified the Fourteenth Amendment Class but denied the Fourth Amendment Class, on the grounds that the court in <i>Florence</i> held that the strip search procedures, including the delousing portion, were reasonable. 621 F.3d 296. The liability class consisted of all people who had been placed into the custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into Susquehanna County Jail. The defendants appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition to appeal the order. Extensive discovery followed between 2012-2013. On September 13, 2013, Judge Caputo granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy. The Court reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a sanitary facility, that the policy was reasonable, and accommodating inmates’ right to refuse the treatment would substantially burden the defendant. 2013 WL 5201571. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On July 24, 2009, an inmate at the Susquehanna County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. Middle District Court of Pennsylvania against the Country of Susquehanna. The plaintiff alleged that the written blanket policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching of Susquehanna County Prison, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without inquiry into or the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband violated the Fourth Amendment. On September 13, 2013, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a sanitary facility, the policy was reasonable, and accommodating inmates’ right to refuse the treatment would substantially burden the defendant.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 15, 2020, the plaintiffs, inmates at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pro se in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming that their indefinite solitary detention in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) violated their rights. They sued the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), which runs the facility, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201. They sought declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, a temporary restraining order, damages, and costs. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants placed them in the SHU for over five years without committing an identifiable infraction, and stayed in the facility for indefinite periods. As a result, they claimed that they were denied access to the facility's exercise yard and law library, had their mail searched, and were denied in-person visitation with their families. In addition, they alleged that the guards at the facility hindered their ability to make this claim by forcing them into a burdensome grievance process that they claimed they worked within. They alleged that this led to intense emotional distress. They claimed that this treatment violated the Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and substantive and procedural due process clause. In addition, the defendants invoked the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), saying that their treatment violated the basic rights laid out in these treaties. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 5. They added a First Amendment violation due to the guards' refusal to let the plaintiffs discuss their case or make their claims in court and a Sixth Amendment violation blocking access to legal counsel and the courts. After receipt of this amended complaint, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson issued an order dismissing parts of the complaint without prejudice on September 10, 2012 (2012 WL 3966363, S.D.Ind.). She dismissed the claims relating to the grievance process, saying that the inmates' access to the process fulfilled the requirements for due process, and the international law claims, since treaty law alone does not create a cause of action in the United States. She also removed the extra plaintiffs from the suit. She allowed the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process claims related to indefinite detention to continue. The plaintiff submitted a statement of revised complaints reflecting the Judge's statement on September 24; this was treated as the complaint going forward. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's due process claims on September 23, 2014. After discovery, the plaintiff's disciplinary history showed a pattern of violent behavior and non-cooperation with prison staff, which Judge Magnus-Stinson showed to be sufficient to justify his stay in SHU in an entry granting summary judgment on the issue on June 24, 2014 (2014 WL 2866197, S.D.Ind.). Discovery also demonstrated that the facility regularly conducted administrative reviews every 30 days and reviews where the plaintiff could state his case every 90 days. Judge Magnus-Stinson said that this was more than the due process clause requires of inmates. The defendants did not seek summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim, and asked the plaintiff to show cause that the claim had not been abandoned, which he did on August 11, 2014. The defendants never filed another summary judgment motion, and a bench trial on the Eighth Amendment issue occurred in July 2015. The plaintiff was now represented by counsel. On September 25, 2015 (2015 WL 5672702, S.D.Ind.), Judge Magnus-Stinson ruled in the defendants' favor, saying that, while she was concerned about the length of time the plaintiff was in solitary confinement, which now totaled over eight years, he has regularly been given avenues to get out of solitary confinement and chose not to take them. In addition, she ruled that the lighting, access to food and clothing, and communication with outside counsel did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff moved to appeal on October 15, 2015. On February 6, 2017, the defendants in the original trial moved to dismiss the appeal, noting that one of the plaintiff's separate appeals surrounding a refusal to provide him with Kosher meals was dismissed on February 3 and the facts in that case were nearly identical to this one. For the appeal, the plaintiff retained private counsel. In an opinion dated May 10, 2017 (856 F.3d 508, 7th Cir.), an appeals panel composed of Judges Diane Wood, Joel Flaum, and William Conley upheld the District Court's decision on the Eighth Amendment claim, reiterating Judge Magnus-Stinson's reasoning. However, the panel reversed and remanded Judge Magnus-Stinson's grant of summary judgment on the due process claim, noting that for a stay this long in the SHU, more process may be needed than brief statements on the outcomes of 30-day reviews. Upon remand, a bench hearing with Judge Magnus-Stinson was set for September 24, 2018. On December 19, 2018, Judge Magnus-Stinson released an opinion ruling that the defendants violated the plaintiff's due process rights because the periodic reviews of his continued detention in SHU were "perfunctory" and continued to punish him for acts years ago instead of providing new offenses each time. She also noted a discrepancy in previous statements from the defendants; initially, during summary judgment motions, she was told that 30-day reviews are sufficient due process, but, during this hearing, the defendants claimed that the real reviews were the 90-day ones, which, theoretically, would allow the 30-day reviews to be surface-level. Judge Magnus-Stinson granted $314,000 in compensatory damages and a total of $22,500 in punitive damages spread across multiple defendant-employees in the IDOC. In addition, she granted the plaintiff's claim of injunctive relief and directed the defendants to draw up a plan for the plaintiff's release from SHU; when created, the plaintiff would have 14 days to contest it. On January 4, 2019, the defendants provided the plan, which would move the plaintiff to a general population cell immediately but mandated that the plaintiff participate in a SHU release program for permanent integration into general population. The plaintiff filed a motion contesting this plan two weeks later, saying that the program could extend indefinitely based on assessments of his behavior, and he hoped a more expeditious SHU release plan could be found. On March 4, 2019, Judge Magnus-Stinson approved the defendant's plan, since it immediately moved him out of SHU, the point of the initial injunction. This closed the case in District Court. However, the defendants appealed the final decision to circuit court on April 2, 2019. All proceedings in the case were stayed on March 20, 2020, with the circuit court asking for an update on the status of mediation by May 20, 2020. No update has been filed, likely due to COVID concerns; the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2012, the plaintiff, an inmate held in solitary confinement in an Indiana prison for over five years, filed a complaint pro se in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging that this treatment violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The District Court granted summary judgment on the due process claim and rejected the Eighth Amendment claim, but the Seventh Circuit remanded the grant of summary judgment on appeal. On remand, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, dispensing compensatory and punitive damages and approving a release plan. The defendants appealed this ruling; the case remains with the Seventh Circuit.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 12, 2007, four black homeowners <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-MA-0003-0001.pdf">filed</a> this lawsuit, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries (Countrywide), alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (ECOA), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (FHA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement, and restitution of monies disparately obtained from black borrowers, claiming that Countrywide's home financing policies and practices were discriminatory. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide's policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loan applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than similarly situated white applicants. On September 10, 2007, Countrywide filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not allege a sufficiently specific discriminatory policy to support a disparate impact claim under ECOA or FHA. The District Court (Judge Nancy Gertner) <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FH-MA-0003-0002.pdf">denied</a> this motion on July 30, 2008, allowing the case to proceed. <i>Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A.</i>, 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008). In June 4, 2008, the plaintiffs moved for consolidated or coordinated pre-trial proceedings with two other actions against Countrywide (Garcia v. Countrywide Financial Corp., C.A. No. 5:07-1161 (C.D. Cal.); Jenkins v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., C.A. No. 1:08-2935 (N.D. Ill.)). On August 4, 2008, The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a transfer order to U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (Judge John G. Heyburn II). Information about this case after its transfer may be viewed here: <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12445">FH-KY-0002</a>.
<|assistant|>
In July 2007, four black homeowners filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank, alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement, and restitution, claiming that Countrywide's home financing policies and practices had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loan applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than white applicants. In August 2008, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. So for more information see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12445">FH-KY-0002</a>.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 10, 2019, two female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail and the Georgia Advocacy Office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office and the South Fulton Municipal Jail under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the Georgia Advocacy Office, sought class certification, declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act through their use of prolonged solitary confinement on individuals with mental disabilities; through conditions of confinement that deprived the plaintiffs of basic human needs; excluded plaintiffs and other women from the competency restoration program on the basis of sex; and by denying plaintiffs’ access to important services and programs solely by reason of their disabilities. Over 200 female detainees within South Fulton Municipal Jail with psychiatric disabilities were detained in 23-hour solitary confinement. The conditions within the mental health pods deprived women of basic human needs. During visits to the South Fulton Jail, plaintiffs’ counsel described seeing women unresponsive on the floor, covered in their own food and feces, feces smeared on the walls, pods that had mold growing on the walls, urine puddles on the floor, and women sleeping on metal cots without any bedding. Plaintiffs described that they spent on average less than one hour per day outside of their cells to the pod common area often alone and unable to have any social interactions with others. The plaintiffs argued that the solitary confinement and the totality of the conditions increased their risk of psychological harm. No programs or therapy were provided to the female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Jail. In contrast, male detainees in the Fulton County Jail system with mental disabilities were provided with therapeutic restorative programs. On April 12, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to certify a principal class that consisted of women who experienced mental disabilities and were or would be in the future confined in the Fulton County Jail system, and a subclass for women who experienced mental disabilities who were or would be deemed incompetent to stand trial while confined in the Fulton County Jail system. Defendants moved to dismiss the class action on May 3, 2019. They argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a proper claim upon which relief could be granted against the defendants. Further, the defendants argued that: (1) they had Eleventh Amendment immunity from all claims in their official capacities; (2) even under the assumption that the plaintiffs’ claims were true, the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit the plaintiffs from having limited out of cell time; and (3) the plaintiffs did not fully exhaust their administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On May 7, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to remedy unconstitutional conditions in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail. The plaintiffs requested that the court order for defendants to offer at least four hours of daily out of cell time to all female detainees in the mental health pods, including one hour per day of outdoor time; and within a month, establish and present the Court for approval a plan to be implemented within another month for providing a medically sound environment for women with mental disabilities. The defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss. The amended motion brief provided the same arguments as the original, with the addition of several affidavits from the defendants. On July 23, 2019, Judge William M. Ray granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion because: plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the mental health needs of the plaintiffs; the defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs; and that the potential for harm to the plaintiffs outweighed potential harm to the defendants. Defendants were ordered to: (1) within 7 days to develop a system to monitor plaintiffs' out of cell time and permit each woman to at least three hours of free time; (2) within 30 days offer at least four hours of out of cell time; and (3) establish and file a plan with the court outlining how to provide sanitary conditions and out of cell therapeutic programs. On July 30, 2019, Judge Ray denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the dismissal was not warranted based on immunity, failure to state a claim, or lack of exhaustion. On August 20, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction order. On September 10, 2019, Judge Ray granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was defined as "a psychiatric disability class consisting of all women who experience psychiatric disabilities who are now or will in the future be confined in the mental health pods for female detainees in the Fulton County Jail system." But the court declined to certify the requested subclass. On October 18, 2019, the defendants appealed the court's order for preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit (Docket No. 19-14227). But in the district court, the parties continued with discovery and the plaintiffs sent requests for interrogatories and discovery to the defendants. On December 6, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to modify the preliminary injunction to reflect changes made by the defendants regarding housing for women with psychiatric disabilities. The plaintiff's discovered that the South Fulton Jail began housing these women in the "G-Pod"—a disciplinary segregation unit where women were given one hour per day or less out-of-cell time. The plaintiffs requested that the preliminary injunction also cover these women so that they would also be provided adequate mental health care. The court has yet to rule on the motion to modify, the appeal is pending, and the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In April 2019, two female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail and the Georgia Advocacy Office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act by placing detainees with mental disabilities in prolonged solitary confinement, maintaining conditions of confinement that deprived the plaintiffs of basic human needs, excluding plaintiffs and other women from the competency restoration program on the basis of sex, and denying plaintiffs’ access to important services and programs solely by reason of their disabilities. The court granted a preliminary injunction in July 2019, which the defendants appeals. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 7, 2017, eighteen death row prisoners in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) alleged they had been kept in solitary confinement at the Broad River Correctional Institution (BRCI) for between nine and twenty years. Plaintiffs sued SCDC, its Director, and its Warden under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. The prisoners alleged that they were placed in solitary confinement regardless of behavioral history or individual status. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas E Rogers, III. On December 22, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction asserting that they were transferred from Lieber Correctional Institution to the Maximum Security Unit at Kirkland Reception and Evaluation Center, which provided even harsher conditions than those previously experienced in their solitary confinement at Lieber. On June 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Rogers issued a Report and Recommendation that the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction be denied. 2018 WL 3802100. Judge Rogers found that the plaintiffs failed to make a showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. The court adopted this recommendation and subsequently denied the motion on August 9, 2018. 2018 WL 3773933. One of the plaintiffs then filed a motion for protective order on August 21, 2018 which was granted on August 23, 2018. On April 16, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second motion for preliminary injunction on May 21, 2019, along with a motion for temporary restraining order. On June 5, 2019 however, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew both motions. They explain in the supporting documentation that defendants had worked with plaintiffs counsel to voluntarily make some changes to the facility that made the preliminary relief no longer necessary. They maintained that the ultimate question regarding conditions at BRCI remain valid and that they intended to continue pursuing the lawsuit. The court issued a scheduling order on December 2, 2019 regarding discovery and hearing preparation. As of April 10, 2020, there have been no other entries in the docket. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On December 7, 2017, eighteen death row prisoners in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) alleged they have been kept in solitary confinement for between nine and twenty years. Plaintiffs sued SCDC, its Director, and Wardens of prisons within the SCDC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by being denied any meaningful opportunity to challenge their conditions of confinement. The prisoners alleged that they were placed in solitary confinement regardless of behavioral history or individual status. On December 22, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, but on June 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Rogers issued a Report and Recommendation that the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction be denied. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This class action lawsuit was filed on June 18, 2020 in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of California. The suit came after police in Sacramento, California allegedly used illegal tactics in an effort to disrupt protests that occurred after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were several Sacramento residents who were injured during the protests; the defendants were the City of Sacramento, the Sacramento Police Department (SPD), one named officer, and 125 Does (public employees and agents). The lawsuit had eleven different claims, including violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under § 1983, violations of the California state constitution, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bane Act. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the defendants from engaging in the behavior allegedly in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution, as well as compensatory, punitive, and special damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On August 14, the plaintiffs amended the complaint. They added numerous plaintiffs and also added a section explaining how each plaintiff exhausted their administrative remedies by submitting government claims to the City of Sacramento and Sacramento Police Departments. The plaintiffs also added tort claims under state law, alleging assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The factual allegations and sought after relief largely stayed the same. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.
<|assistant|>
This class action lawsuit was brought on June 18, 2020 in response to the Sacramento Police Department using allegedly illegal tactics to quash the protests that arose after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution, the California state constitution, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bane Act. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on August 14, adding additional plaintiffs and state tort claims. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 14, 2007, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) began an investigation into the conditions at four Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) facilities: Lansing Residential Center, Louis Gossett, Jr. Residential Center, Tryon Residential Center, and Tryon Girls Residential Center. The investigations were conducted pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. On August 14, 2009, the DOJ published in its findings letter that the facilities had violated the due process rights of the confined youths. It also concluded that 1) staff resorted to use force disproportionate to the level of juveniles' infractions and used excessive restraints to discipline them; and 2) investigations into uses of force and restraints were inadequate and that, in many instances, OCFS failed to hold staff accountable for gross violations of policy. On July 14, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York to enforce a settlement agreement with the State of New York and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The United States sought declaratory relief and an order enjoining the defendants from continuing practices of excessive force and restraints as detailed in the findings letter and to ensure lawful conditions of confinement. The United States claimed that the harms outlined in their findings letter, specifically that the defendants failed to take reasonable measures to prevent staff from inflicting serious harm on the youths and did not provide adequate mental health care and services, violated the the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case was assigned to Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. and referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Homer. On the same day, the parties also filed the settlement agreement. 2010 WL 10900167. The agreement put forth a remedial plan addressing each of the issues identified in the DOJ's original investigation. It outlined limits on use of restraints—including a prohibition on chemical restraints and psychotropic medications—and use of force in only the least amount necessary. The institutions also agreed to institute new incident reporting procedures and provide improved mental health care and treatment. A monitoring team would produce status reports approximately every six months regarding the facilities' compliance with implementing the settlement provisions. The settlement would last until the facilities achieved substantial compliance with the settlement terms for twelve consecutive months. On July 19, 2010, Judge Scullin, Jr. approved this settlement agreement. In January 2011, the State closed Tryon Residential Center. Tryon boys were transferred to Finger Lakes Residential Center (formerly Louis Gossett, Jr. Residential Center). In August 2011, the State closed Tryon Girls Residential Center. Tryon girls were transferred to Taberg Residential Center for Girls (Taberg) and Columbia Girls Secure Center. Both parties agreed that Taberg and Columbia would be monitored under the Settlement Agreement. In August 2013, the State closed Lansing Residential Center. The girls held at Lansing were released on community supervision. After years of monitoring and biannual status reports, the court began to dismiss the institution defendants one by one. On September 8, 2014, the court dismissed Columbia Girls Secure Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. On December 21, 2015, the court dismissed Finger Lakes Residential Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. And on October 20, 2017, the court dismissed Taberg Residential Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. Dismissing Taberg Residential Center concluded the State’s obligations under the settlement agreement. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In December 2007, the DOJ Civil Rights Division began an investigation into the conditions at four New York juvenile facilities. After an investigation, the DOJ published a findings letter detailing improper and unconstitutional use of excessive force and restraints within the facilities. On July 14, 2010, the United States filed suit to enforce a settlement agreement against the State of New York and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services. The agreement set forth remedial terms and required monitors to produce status reports. By October 20, 2017, all of the facilities had either closed or achieved substantial compliance with the settlement agreement. This case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Mantech MSM Security Services, Inc., on behalf of a black employee who was offered a settlement that purported to waive his rights to file charges with the EEOC and to participate in its investigations. It is also unclear whether the agreement was specific to the employee or a standard agreement offered to all Mantech employees. It is likewise unclear whether the employee had or knew of any discrimination claims against Mantech at the time he was offered the settlement and release agreement. The EEOC alleged that the agreement constituted per se retaliation and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). The EEOC sought monetary relief and injuctive relief barring Mantech from using such waiver agreements. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge Alexander Williams Jr.) approved and entered on September 21, 2006. The one-year agreement required Mantech to modify all releases of employment discrimination claims to inform signers that the agreement neither prevents them from filing charges with the EEOC, participating in investigations, or benefiting from injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC nor requires them to inform the company of communication with the EEOC. The decree also empowered the EEOC to monitor Mantech's practices by requiring Mantech to provide copies of claim releases it would have employees sign. Under the terms of the decree Mantech also had to pay the employee the amount of money offered in the original release agreement with interest ($7557 total). The case is now closed. The decree was entered in 2006 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.
<|assistant|>
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Mantech MSM Security Services, Inc., on behalf of a black employee who was offered a settlement agreement that appeared to waive his right to file charges with the EEOC and participate in its investigations. It is unclear whether the agreement was specific to the employee or a standard agreement offered to all Mantech employees. The EEOC alleged that the agreement constituted per se retaliation and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). The EEOC sought monetary relief and injunctive relief barring Mantech from using such waiver agreements. The Court entered the parties' one-year settlement as a consent decree. The decree required Mantech to modify its releases, report each claim release it obtained in connection to an employee's settlement of employment, and to pay the employee the amount of money offered during the original release agreement plus interest ($7,557 total). The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This suit was filed on November 23, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California by the California Hospital Association (CHA), against the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services in his official capacity. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief preventing the state from implementing reductions to the reimbursement rates paid for hospital services under Medi-Cal, the state's Medicaid program. In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed several acts modifying the state's Medicaid plan. Under the Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (the Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. As the result of litigation in related suits, at the time this suit was filed, preliminary injunctions were already in place preventing the defendant from implementing several of these rate reductions. See related cases. The plaintiff in the instant case sought new injunctions preventing the reductions established by California Assembly Bill X4 5 (AB 5), passed on July 28, 2009. Unlike the state's earlier efforts to reduce its reimbursement rates, AB 5 was not a flat percentage reduction. In contrast to the plan submitted to and approved by CMS, which provided for annual updates, AB 5 limited the reimbursement of certain classes of hospital services and locked the reimbursement rates for hospital services to the rates paid in the 2008-09 year. The plaintiff argued this was a violation of the Medicaid Act. The plaintiff brought the suit under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the state's failure to submit a plan to amend its Medicaid program to CMS for approval prior to implementing the reductions made them unlawful and therefore preempted by the federally approved plan. The plaintiff also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of its members' civil rights. The plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the AB 5 rate reductions and a declaratory judgment holding the reductions unlawful. On January 11, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the contested effects of AB 5, which the Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted on February 24, 2010. The defendant appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 26, 2010; shortly thereafter it requested a stay of appellate proceedings because of a pending request for certiorari review by the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, a related case (Clearinghouse code PB-CA-0016). The Supreme Court accepted that case for review on the question of whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a cause of action in this class of cases, and so on June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this case from the District Court's active case list pending the outcome of Douglas. She ordered that the parties file quarterly joint status reports until the case was either reactivated or voluntarily dismissed. The case was also stayed at the Appellate Court pending the decision of the Supreme Court in Douglas. CMS approved most of the California Medicaid plan amendments while Douglas was still awaiting adjudication. In light of this, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce the Medicaid Act against a state. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in Douglas and remanded that case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2012). After the Supreme Court decision, the instant case as well as Douglas and several other cases entered joint settlement mediation in the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on May 28, 2014, pursuant to the parties' joint request for dismissal. The parties reached a settlement agreement on August 19, 2014, and their agreement was approved by the district court on September 22, 2014. The Settlement Agreement provided that the plaintiffs would release state and federal entities from all liability relating to the payment reductions. In return, the defendants agreed to release plaintiffs from liability relating to "DHCS’s Claimed Excess Payments." The court dismissed the case with prejudice on April 23, 2015, and determined that each party was required to bear its own costs in accordance with the dismissal. The district court retained jurisdiction until January 1, 2016 to entertain any applications for attorneys' fees, and to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
This suit was filed on November 23, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California by the California Hospital Association against the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services in his official capacity. The Plaintiff sought an injunction preventing State Medicaid reimbursement reductions established by California Assembly Bill X4 5 (AB 5), which locked the reimbursement rates for hospital services to the rates paid in the 2008-09 year, contrary to the plan that the State submitted to and approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services. The Plaintiff brought the suit under the Supremacy Clause, arguing that the rate reductions were preempted due to their being non-compliant with federal Medicaid law. The Court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the enforcement of the contested effects of AB 5 and the State appealed. The case was stayed at the Appellate Court pending the Supreme Court's decision in a related case. After that decision was issued, this case and several other cases entered joint settlement mediation. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2014, and the case was dismissed with prejudice in 2015.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 9, 2007 organizations and individuals present at a May 1st immigration rally in MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, CA filed suit against the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, included the Multi-ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network, the Korean Immigrant Workers Alliance, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles, IDESPCA, Pilipino Workers Center, Garment Workers Center, and numerous individuals. The plaintiffs alleged that the LAPD used excessive force in trying to disperse the rally, therefore violating the U.S. Constitution's 1st, 4th, and 14th amendments, the California Constitution, and California Civil Code § 52.1. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with damages. On January 8, 2008, District Court Judge Howard Matz certified a class for both structural relief and monetary relief. The certification for structural relief included anyone who engaged or may engage in peaceful demonstrations in LA, and who at the time of the demonstration were or are: (1) one of the plaintiff organizations; (2) officers and representatives of the plaintiffs' organizations, including people who participate in the Plaintiffs' organizations' events; (3) other organizations who advocate and/or organize on behalf of individuals' right to free speech and assembly; and (4) people who participate in events put on by the organizations described in (3). The certification for monetary relief included any persons present at the May 1, 2007 rally between 5-7pm who did not engage in conduct justifying the LAPD's use of force, and who were subject to the force or other unlawful police activity. The parties worked with Magistrate Judge Carla Woehile to negotiate a settlement agreement. On March 19, 2009, the court granted preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. The settlement created a class fund of $250,000 for unrepresented class members, and a represented individuals fund of $12,550,000 for the individual plaintiffs named in the suit. The agreement also stipulated an award of the class attorney's fees of $3,753,000. Judge Matz granted final approval of the settlement agreement on June 23, 2009 and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The structural relief order, issued by Judge Mantz on June 24, 2009, restricted the LAPD from interfering with individuals' right to free speech for any reasons other than protecting public safety or public health, and required LAPD officers to issue a Declaration of Unlawful Assembly before taking any action. The relief order also placed restrictions on the methods of disbursement the LAPD may use, including limiting the use of less lethal weapons, batons, motorcycles and low-flying helicopters that would interfere with the demonstrators' right to free speech. Aside from these restrictions on use of force, the order stipulated that LAPD officers undergo annual training on proper crowd control policies and techniques.
<|assistant|>
This class action was brought by protesters at a 2007 immigration rally in Los Angeles who were victims of excessive force by police officers trying to disperse the rally. The 2009 settlement awarded the plaintiffs damages of over $12 million and attorneys' fees of $3.7 million, as well as both structural reform of the LAPD. The structural reform placed limitations on the LAPD's ability to interfere with nonviolent demonstrations, including issuing a declaration of unlawful assembly before any using force to break up the demonstration. The order also restricted the methods of disbursement the LAPD can use, including limitations on the use of less lethal weapons, batons, motorcycles and low-flying helicopters that would interfere with the demonstration. Additionally, the order stipulated that all LAPD officers receive annual training on the proper crowd control and disbursement techniques.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 19, 2015, former inmates at the all-female jail on Rikers Island filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued New York City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by Legal Aid and private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York violated their rights of due process and free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that at the Rose M. Singer Center, the all-female jail on Rikers Island, the City of New York permitted corrections officers to sexually assault inmates and that inmates were allowed to be retaliated against when they reported the sexual assault to higher authorities. On January 5, 2016, District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein released a summary order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. He found that the class was not sufficiently ascertainable as proposed and that the plaintiffs lacked typicality and commonality in their claims. Judge Hellerstein was also concerned that granting class certification would make it more difficult for currently unknown victims to file a damages suit in the future. However, he ruled that the claims of the individual plaintiffs survived for both monetary and equitable relief. On March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After engaging in discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which was approved by Judge Hellerstein on May 26, 2017. Due to the stipulation of dismissal, the appeal to the Second Circuit was withdrawn. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On May 19, 2015, former inmates at the all-female jail on Rikers Island sued the city of New York for an alleged culture of sexual assault. The plaintiffs sought class action certification but were denied in an order released on January 5, 2016. On March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After engaging in discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which was approved by Judge Hellerstein on May 26, 2017. Due to the stipulation of dismissal, the appeal to the Second Circuit was withdrawn. The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 5, 2012, the plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of all Connecticut residents who, since March 5, 2009 have applied or will apply for food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the Connecticut Department of Social Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers from the Greater Hartford Legal Aid and the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, asked the court for injunctive relief for the processing of food stamp applications. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was noncompliant with the Food Stamps Act 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) for application for food stamps. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was failing to process food stamp applications in a timely manner as well as refusing to properly use the expedited process for eligible food stamp applications. For example, from January 2010 to February 2012, almost 30% of the Department's pending food stamp applications were over 30 days old. This prevented the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons from meeting their nutritional needs. On December 4, 2012, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to properly process food stamp applications for plaintiff and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, docket 14-01328. This appeal was denied without an opinion. On May 13, 2013, the court signed the preliminary injunction order as well as the order granting class certification. The class was defined as: "All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2" On March 24, 2014 the court denied defendant's motion to amend the preliminary injunction. On July 6, 2015 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction order. 792 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2015). On September 8, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 2016, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert A. Richardson for settlement conference. Throughout the remainder of 2016, the parties continued to engage in settlement discussions. The parties reached an agreement on December 16, 2016. The Court dismissed the case as settled and directed the clerk to terminate this file without prejudice to reopening on or before February 20, 2017. The parties submitted their settlement agreement to the Court for approval on January 5, 2017. The settlement agreement provided that the defendant would comply with the timely requirements for processing food stamps applications. Fully complying with the timely processing required the defendant to meet a 96% timely processing standard, starting no later than the month following the date that the settlement was approved by the Court. The defendant would also enact policies and train staff to meet this timely requirement. The defendant was to provide plaintiff with monthly SNAP Application Timeliness Reports, for the duration of the Order. The Court was to retain jurisdiction over this matter indefinitely until the defendant achieved full compliance of the settlement agreement for 26 months of any 30 month period or for 22 consecutive months, whichever came first. Class notice was to take the form of posting a notice in both English and Spanish in various DSS offices' waiting rooms, on DSS's website, and in the waiting room of Greater Hartford Legal Aid. The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on January 6, 2017 and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 8, 2017. After the fairness hearing, Judge Bryant granted approval of the settlement on March 9, 2017. On September 11, 2017, the parties entered a stipulation and order of settlement regarding defendant payment of attorney's fees, costs and expenses of $922,000. As of January 2019, this case was open pending the demonstration of full compliance with the settlement agreement.
<|assistant|>
In 2012, plaintiff looked to seek injunctive relief in order to ensure the proper application processing for food stamp applicants. The plaintiff alleged severe noncompliance with federal law in processing food stamp applications. In 2013, the District Court for the District of Connecticut filed an order for preliminary injunction granting plaintiff's claim. The case settled in December 2016, with defendant agreeing to comply with the legal timeliness requirements of processing food stamp applications. The case is closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 29, 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of thirteen women employed by Sing Sing Correctional Facility. Ten additional women were later identified as complainants. The plaintiff sued New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant violated federal law by providing inferior benefits to female employees on maternity leave. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctive relief, reinstatement for several employees, backpay, and attorney’s fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant gave male employees with work-related injuries up to six months of paid workers’ compensation leave, and though women were allowed the same leave, pregnant employees on paid workers’ compensation leave were involuntary switched to maternity leave at or around the time they gave birth. The company’s maternity leave policy required that women first use their accrued paid time off before switching to sick leave with half pay and then unpaid sick leave. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, by failing to make a case-by-case judgement concerning each female employee’s eligibility for workers’ compensation, engaged in employment discrimination through its categorical determination that female employees who had recently given birth should be transferred from workers’ compensation leave and benefits to the lesser-paid maternity leave policy. On October 23, 2007, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin referred the case to Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman for settlement. On May 21, 2008, the parties reached a settlement that provided $972,000 in compensatory damages, liquidated damages, back pay, and interest to the complainants. The order also contained a provision through which the court could order monetary relief to additional victims identified after the settlement. The order was subject to monitoring by the EEOC and the court for up to five years. Although it was not made clear on the docket, the consent decree indicates that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) got involved in this matter and filed a separate case in 2008 (08-4419). The two plaintiff parties shared a consent decree with similar stipulations. Enforcement of the DOJ’s consent decree lasted three years. The settlement also enjoined DOCS from engaging in any act or practice that discriminated against any employee on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth, including the removal of any female employee from workers’ compensation solely because of childbirth. The DOCS was required to provide each employee who requested to use maternity or child-rearing leave with written notification of the company’s policy. Additionally, the court ordered DOCS to provide for its administrative staff anti-discrimination training, including a discussion of pregnancy discrimination and discrimination in pay and benefits. DOCS was to forward a copy of attendance sheets for such trainings to EEOC and to the court. The settlement also allowed for the later identification and inclusion of employees who were affected by discriminatory practices of DOCS but not listed in the initial complaint. A total of twenty-three complainants were in the initial consent decree. Since the order was signed in 2008, it has been modified to include 5 more women. The defendant paid a total of almost $147,000 to these women. The consent decree is now complete and the case closed.
<|assistant|>
On May 12, 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of approximately 23 women employed by Sing Sing Correctional Facility. The plaintiff sued New York State Department of Correctional Services under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant violated federal law by providing inferior benefits to female employees on maternity leave. On May 20, 2008, the parties reached a settlement of $972,000, providing compensatory damages, liquidated damages, back pay, and interest to the plaintiff. The order was subject to monitoring for up to five years.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 30th, 2010, four Medicaid-eligible children of Mississippi with behavioral or emotional disorders filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the Mississippi Department of Mental Health (the Department) and the Mississippi Division of Medicaid. The Complaint alleged that the State of Mississippi failed to meet the needs of and discriminated against children with mental illnesses. Plaintiffs claimed that they were unlawfully separated from their families and forced to cycle through institutions that failed to provide adequate services. They further alleged that the state failed to provide federally mandated and medically necessary home and community-based mental health services. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and private counsel, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary and permanent injunction. Children's Rights Inc., counsel for plaintiffs in the child welfare case, Olivia Y. v. Barbour (in the Clearinghouse as <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11054">CW-MS-0001</a>) filed a motion for those plaintiffs to intervene in this case. Olivia Y., which pertains to foster care, was already settled and in the implementation phase. On September 30th, 2011, the court denied intervention. Judge Henry Wingate held that the interests of Olivia Y.'s plaintiffs were not substantially impacted by the outcome of the instant case. 2011 WL 4590790 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2011). On April 8, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) entered an appearance as an amicus curiae. On December 22, 2011, the DOJ wrote a letter to the court reporting its investigative findings related to the suit. The letter supported plaintiff's claims that the mental health services being offered by the state were grossly inadequate. It concluded the state was in violation of the ADA, the EPSDT (Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment) provisions of the Medicaid Act, and other federal statutes by not providing services to individuals with mental illness and/or developmental disabilities in the most integrated setting. The letter concluded that if Mississippi declined to enter into voluntary compliance negotiations, or if negotiations were unsuccessful, the United States might take action, including initiating a lawsuit. Plaintiffs submitted notice of these findings to the Court on February 27, 2012. On August 23, 2013, Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker issued a document entitled Report and Recommendations, in which he recommended that the Court grant defendant’s motion to dismiss the allegation that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) by failing to affirmatively provide EPSDT services to Plaintiffs, and grant the plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay on discovery so that the Court can schedule a case management conference. Magistrate Judge Parker concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in the first instance because 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) required only that defendants provide notice of the availability of EPSDT services, provide for or arrange screening services where requested, and then arrange for treatment either directly through Medicaid or a third party. As a result, Judge Parker found that the statute did not require defendants to seek out parties who were eligible as the plaintiffs had alleged, but only required that defendants provided services after they were requested. 2013 WL 12303126. Plaintiffs objected to the magistrate judge's recommendations on September 6, 2013. The parties continued to respond to each other regarding this objection. Following the letter from the DOJ, the parties entered into negotiations. On August 29, 2014, the DOJ and the State reached an agreement addressing remedial measures the State would implement in response to the DOJ’s and the plaintiffs’ claims. As part of the agreement, Mississippi retained the Technical Assistance Collaborative (“TAC”) to provide assessments of permanent supportive housing for the mentally handicapped and assessments of Mississippi’s existing mental health services. TAC recorded its findings in the March 2015 TAC Report. On April 24, 2015, defendants filed a motion for a protective order in response to a complaint to compel public access to records by Gannett River States Publishing Corporation d/b/a The Clarion-Ledger. The complaint alleged that the TAC Report should be made public because it was paid for with taxpayer money, it was the understanding of the organizations and families who participated in the assessment for the TAC Report that the TAC Report would be public, and the “exemptions” and/or “privileges” asserted by the Department of Mental Health to keep the report private were inapplicable. Magistrate Judge Parker approved the agreed protective order on May 6, 2015 based on the confidential nature of the settlement negotiations, of which the TAC report was a part. The order stated that statements made and documents generated or exchanged by one of the parties to the negotiations or the TAC in the course of the settlement negotiations should not be disclosed by any of the parties to the negotiations to anyone who is not a party, counsel, or expert participating in the negotiations. Additionally, the order provided that counsel for defendants should provide plaintiffs' counsel with a copy of the March 2015 TAC Mississippi Children’s Behavioral Health Needs Assessment. On June 24, 2015, in response to the agreed protective order, Gannett River States Publishing Corporation d/b/a The Clarion-Ledger filed a motion to intervene and to vacate the protective order. The Clarion-Ledger claimed that it was well-established that they may intervene for the limited purpose of challenging the protective order and that the protective order should be vacated because the Department failed to show good cause as to why the TAC Report must be protected from public disclosure. On August 28, 2015, Judge Parker issued an order granting in part and denying in part The Clarion-Ledger’s motions. 2015 WL 5097209. Judge Parker granted the motion to intervene because the motion was timely, The Clarion-Ledger had an interest in the matter, the disposition of this action could impair The Clarion Ledger’s ability to protect its interest, and the existing parties to the suit inadequately represented its interest. Judge Parker denied the motion to vacate because the TAC Report was part of a mediation or settlement conference, making it confidential and not subject to disclosure. The parties continued negotiating, but reached an impasse. Accordingly, on December 17, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Termination of Settlement Negotiations between the plaintiffs and the DOJ and the defendants and requested a scheduling conference. The Notice asked for decisions to be rendered on outstanding motions, which included defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for class certification, and plaintiff's motion to lift the stay of discovery (Docket Nos. 15, 29, and 56). It also requested a case management conference with respect to Count II, plaintiffs’ ADA claim. The same day, Judge Parker stated that an order was forthcoming on those motions and that the Court would hold in abeyance the motion for class certification. There was little movement in the case in the subsequent months. On May 25, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for resolution of the pending motions. On July 12, they moved the court to transfer the case to Judge Tom Lee, who was adjudicating a similar case, <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11054">Olivia Y. v. Barbour</a>. On August 3, the Clarion Ledger, a local newspaper, filed a motion to vacate the protective order preventing it from accessing the TAC Report, arguing that since settlement negotiations had ceased, the public interest in accessing the report now outweighed the parties' interest in resolving the matter. On October 9, Judge Wingate granted plaintiffs' motion for resolution of the pending motions. On October 19, Judge Parker denied the Clarion Ledger's motion to vacate the protective order on the TAC Report. 2016 WL 6106479. On October 24, 2016, District Judge Henry T. Wingate denied plaintiffs' motion to transfer the case, finding that the Olivia Y. case was not active and ongoing, so transfer was inappropriate. On November 7, 2016, more than three years after Magistrate Judge Parker filed his Report and Recommendations regarding defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Complaint - which alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) by failing to affirmatively provide EPSDT services to Plaintiffs - Judge Wingate adopted the findings in the Report and granted the Motion to Dismiss Count One. Judge Wingate agreed with Judge Parker that plaintiffs had an affirmative duty to request EPSDT services. Judge Wingate also lifted the stay on discovery on that day, allowing the discovery process to move forward. On December 6, 2016, the court consolidated this case with <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15449">United States v. Mississippi</a>. 2016 WL 7650605. In that case, the U.S. alleged that Mississippi discriminated against adults with mental illness in a way that resulted in unnecessary institutionalization. On December 7, 2016, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification, which had never been decided by the court. On January 13, 2017, three of the four plaintiffs in the case, J.B., L.P., AND L.M., moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims since they had all turned 21 and aged out of the State's mental health system for children. The court granted this motion on March 19, 2017, leaving only one plaintiff in the case. Also on January 13, 2017, the remaining plaintiff, L.S., moved to amend the complaint due to the decision to no longer seek class certification and other changes that had occurred over the six years since litigation commenced. On April 14, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. However, since the EPSDT claim from the original Complaint had been dismissed, the court precluded the plaintiff from resurrecting this claim. On April 24, 2017, L.S. filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleged that the State had failed to provide L.S., who had both developmental disabilities and mental illness, with services in the most integrated setting appropriate and had unnecessarily institutionalized him. Plaintiff confined his claims to the ADA and Section 504. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs. Over the next two months, the parties conferred and were able to reach a settlement agreement. On June 29, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint and filed the Settlement Agreement with the court. The Agreement provided as follows: 1) Within 21 days of the execution of the agreement, the State would remove L.S. from East Mississippi State Hospital to an intermediate care home, where he would receive a variety of services. He would also be enrolled in the ID/DD Waiver Program, and would receive person-centered planning to determine and coordinate his services according to his needs. Defendants agreed to pay $7,500 in attorney's fees to L.S.'s attorney. Finally, the Agreement gave the court jurisdiction to enforce its terms until L.S.'s enrollment in the Waiver Program or nine months until he transitioned into the intermediate care facility, whichever came earlier. On June 30, 2017, the court issued a Final Judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and incorporating into the Judgment the terms of the Settlement Agreement. As of June 2018, there has been no further activity, and the case now appears closed.
<|assistant|>
On March 30th, 2010, the class of Medicaid-eligible children of Mississippi with behavioral or emotional disorders filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged that the state of Missouri failed to meet the needs of children and discriminated against children with mental illnesses resulting in unnecessary institutionalization. They further accused the state of failing to provide federally mandated and medically necessary home and community-based mental health services. The plaintiffs claimed violations of state obligations under the Medicaid Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties attempted to negotiate, but in December 2015, Plaintiffs notified the Court that the parties had reached an impasse in their negotiations and requested decisions on outstanding motions. In November of 2016, the court dismissed Plaintiff's EPSDT (Medicaid) claim. After three of the four plaintiffs reached adulthood, the remaining plaintiff amended his complaint to include only individual ADA and Section 504 claims. The parties were able to reach a Settlement Agreement in the summer of 2017, and the remaining plaintiff was moved out of the Mississippi State Hospital and into a more integrated setting. The case was dismissed on June 30, 2017.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 27, 2016, former California state prisoners filed this class action lawsuit against Securus Technologies (a prison phone service provider) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Court of California. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought class action certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The complaint asserted that Securus had recorded prisoners’ phone calls in violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, which allowed for statutory damages of up to $5,000 for every unlawfully recorded call, and also alleged negligence. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Securus recorded confidential attorney-client phone calls without permission of all parties and that Securus shared recordings with law enforcement personnel. Based on <a href="https://theintercept.com/2015/11/11/securus-hack-prison-phone-company-exposes-thousands-of-calls-lawyers-and-clients/">the <i>Intercept</i>'s article</a> that 70 million phone call recordings were made by Securus, the plaintiffs estimated that half a million calls between public defenders and clients were unlawfully recorded each year. The putative class was specified as all persons in California whose conversations were eavesdropped on or recorded by Securus from June 1, 2008 to May 27, 2016, without permission and while in the custody of law enforcement officers or agencies and their attorneys. This case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey T. Miller. On July 5, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that plaintiffs lacked standing because their phone calls were not recorded and they were no longer in prison. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 26, 2016, which included additional causes of action, such as fraudulent concealment/intentional omission of material facts, fraud and intentional misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on August 26, 2016. On October 24, 2016, Judge Miller granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ conversion claim without leave to amend and dismissed the fraudulent misrepresentation claim with leave to amend. The court denied the remainder of the defendant’s motion. 2016 WL 6157953. The plaintiffs timely amended the fourth cause of action in their second amended complaint on November 7, 2016. The defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on November 25, 2016. On January 26, 2017, Judge Miller granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirements and California law in alleging misrepresentations. 2017 WL 385743. On February 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint to satisfy the fraud claim under Rule 9(b). The defendant again moved to dismiss, and on March 29, 2017, Judge Miller granted the motion without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead fraud. 2017 WL 1166365. On October 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class comprised of other prison detainees whose calls had allegedly been recorded by the defendant, which the plaintiffs asserted comprised over 120 individuals. On the same day, the plaintiffs requested that documents in this case be sealed. Judge Miller granted the motion to seal on November 7. On April 12, 2018, Judge Miller denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify class without prejudice because the plaintiffs had failed to identify an ascertainable and manageable class. 2018 WL 1782926. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 22, and filed a renewed motion to certify a class on July 11, 2018, and Judge Miller ordered the parties to meet and confer to create a joint discovery plan on August 7, 2018. On August 17, 2018, the court granted the parties’ motion to stay its ruling on the renewed motion to certify class pending the result of the parties’ attempt to secure private mediation. On November 21, 2018, Judge Miller denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying a class consisting of every person in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer in California (and their attorneys) who had been eavesdropped on or recorded by the defendant. 331 F.R.D. 391. The plaintiffs petitioned for leave to appeal the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit. This petition was denied. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728. However, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal the district court’s class certification decision. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6334. On April 17, 2019, Judge Miller granted the defendant's motion to stay the case pending resolution of the defendant's appeal before the Ninth Circuit. 383 F. Supp. 3d 1069. Following the Ninth Circuit's grant of review of Securus' petition, the Ninth Circuit appointed a mediator. After multiple status conferences with the mediator, a settlement agreement was reached between the parties. On March 12, 2020, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal without prejudice pending approval of the settlement by the district court. In its June 16, 2020 order preliminarily approving the parties' settlement agreement, the court approved the following class definition: "Every person who was a party to any portion of a conversation between a person who was in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer or other public officer in California, and that person's attorney, on a telephone number designated or requested not to be recorded, any portion of which was eavesdropped on or recorded by Defendant Securus Technologies, Inc. by means of an electronic device during the period July 10, 2008 through June 16, 2020." 2020 WL 6799401. Under the settlement agreement, Securus agreed to make available to its customers a no-cost “private call” option for approved numbers, implement message prompts advising callers whether the call will be recorded, and post on its website information about designating numbers as approved. The defendant also agreed to provide plaintiff's counsel with bi-annual compliance declarations and to pay attorneys' fees and costs. The court awarded $870,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, as well as $10,000 to each of the three named plaintiffs as a service award. Final judgment in the suit was entered on November 19, 2020. The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement.
<|assistant|>
Former prisoners filed a class action lawsuit against Securus Technologies, Inc. (a prison phone service provider) in the U.S. District for the Southern District Court of California in May 2016. The plaintiffs alleged that Securus unlawfully recorded privileged calls between prisoners and their attorneys and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The plaintiffs obtained certification of a class of affected individuals, and the defendants appealed the class certification to the Ninth Circuit. The parties reached a settlement agreement in late-2020 in which Securus agreed to provide private call options for approved numbers, to notify its customers when a call would be recorded, and to publicize information about how to get a number designated as approved for private calls. The plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 10, 2004, two death-sentenced inmates at the Mansfield Correctional Institution in Mansfield, Ohio, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They asked the Court to stay their executions and issue an injunction against the defendants' use of their current lethal injection protocol, which they alleged would violate their Constitutional rights by torturing them to death. Specifically, they feared that the short-acting anesthetic used by the defendants would wear off too soon, allowing them to feel the excruciatingly painful effects of the potassium chloride that was used during the lethal injection process. In addition, they argued that the defendants' use of pancuronium bromide would paralyze them, making them unable to cry out or alert their executioners that the anesthetic had worn off too soon. On September 3, 2004, Plaintiff Dennis asked the Court to stay his execution while the claim was pending. On September 16, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Judge Gregory L. Frost) denied Dennis's motion, arguing that he should have brought his claim to the court at an earlier time, which would have allowed the Court to consider the merits of the claim without requiring entry of a stay. Plaintiff Dennis appealed. On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Richard Fred Surhheinrich, Eugene Edward Siler, and Martha Craig Daughtrey) affirmed the District Court's decision and dismissed the appeal without a written opinion. Dennis was executed by lethal injection on October 13, 2004. As to Plaintiff Cooey, the defendants asked the District Court to dismiss the complaint, claiming that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. On September 24, 2004, the District Court (Judge Frost) granted their motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Cooey returned to the District Court and re-filed his complaint on December 8, 2004. The defendants asked the district court to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitation and res judicata, in addition to arguing that the complaint should be construed as a successive habeas petition. On March 28, 2005, the District Court denied the defendants' motion but granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Before the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal, the plaintiff requested that they stay their decision until after the U.S. Supreme Court made a decision in the case of Hill v. McDonough. The Sixth Circuit granted the stay, and the Supreme Court decided the case on June 12, 2006, unanimously holding that a challenge to the method of execution as violating the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution properly raised a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for civil rights violations, rather than under habeas corpus. This meant that the Court had effectively ruled that a prisoner who had previously sought habeas relief was not barred from bringing a later challenge under §1983. Following the decision by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit heard arguments regarding the appeal. On March 2, 2007, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Suhrheinrich) remanded the case back to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, and on April 19, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay of execution. The plaintiff then asked the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on June 1, 2007, the Sixth Circuit refused to rehear the petition. Cooey v. Strickland, 2007 WL 1574663 (6th Cir. Jun.1, 2007). Cooey was executed by lethal injection on October 14, 2008.
<|assistant|>
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio by two inmates who were sentenced to death at the Mansfield Correctional Institution. They claimed that the Defendants method of lethal injection violated their Constitutional rights by torturing them to death. One Plaintiff was dismissed on September 16, 2004 because his complaint was not timely. He was executed by lethal injection on October 13, 2004. The other Plaintiff was then dismissed without prejudice because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the second Plaintiff re-filed his complaint on December 8, 2004, however because he waited for a Supreme Court decision in Hill v. McDonough, his case became barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals thus directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint on March 2, 2007. The Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay of execution, and the second Plaintiff was executed by lethal injection on October 14, 2008.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 6, 2016, the Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative, a nonprofit organization devoted to furthering prisoners' rights, and three juveniles sentenced to life in prison, filed this class-action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Governor Larry Hogan and three other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs moved for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Maryland’s parole system for exacting disproportionate punishment. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested a declaration that Maryland's statutory scheme requiring judges to impose life sentences without taking a defendant's youth into account to be unconstitutional, remedy the state's failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for release for juveniles in prison for life, and provide individual relief for the three plaintiffs based on violations of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The plaintiffs also argued that the Governor's clemency was unconstitutional because it was exclusive for prisoners confined for life and devoid of any standards. On May 26, 2016, the families of the victims of the three plaintiffs, as well as the Maryland Crime Victim Resource Center, filed a motion to intervene in the suit as defendants based on Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. The intervenors argued that they should be allowed to intervene in order to assert their rights to be notified of and participate in any proceedings related to defendants who had injured them. They also argued that amici status was insufficient. On June 13, the defendants filed a motion taking no position on the victims' requests but noting that it did not need their assistance to put up a sufficient defense. On July 8, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was barred by the U.S. Supreme Court's rule in <i>Heck v. Humphrey</i> because a ruling in their favor would necessarily conclude that their life sentences were invalid. Further, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to make a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted under the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendments and that their complaint in fact showed that they were receiving meaningful opportunities for release. Third, in the alternative, the defendants argued that summary judgment was proper because the plaintiffs had the opportunity to participate in the parole process and in fact did receive parole. Finally, they argued that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the prisoners did not exhaust their rights under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On August 30, 2016, Judge Hollander denied the victim families' motion to intervene, concluding the families had no right under Maryland law to intervene in the suit. The families had no protectable interest to gain or lose as a result of the proceedings and no rights at stake. Additionally, the families did not show that the State could not protect their interests nor that their objectives were substantially different from the State's. Judge Hollander also refused to grant permissive intervention, concluding that it would cause significant burdens to the litigation. Instead, she granted the families amicus status. 316 F.R.D. 106. On December 7, 2016, Judge Hollander sent a memorandum to the parties, asking them to submit briefs on the impact of a recently decided 4th Circuit case on the defendants' motion to dismiss. <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15365">LeBlanc v. Mathena, 2016 WL 6652438 (4th Cir. 2016)</a> held that Virginia's geriatric release program provided "no meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" because it had few governing standards. Under Virginia's system, the State Parole Board could deny geriatric release for any reason "without considering a juvenile's maturity and rehabilitation." The parties subsequently provided updated memoranda. On December 20, 2016, the three named plaintiffs moved for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that they be present at oral argument on January 4, 2017, given that they faced life imprisonment if the court were to dismiss the case against them. The defendants did not oppose the motion and Judge Hollander granted the writs. On February 3, 2017, Judge Hollander issued her decision, denying plaintiffs' motion to strike and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs had moved to strike the amici's filings for improperly asserting defenses not raised by the defendants. Judge Hollander denied the motion to strike but refused to consider any of the novel arguments raised by the amici. On the motion for summary judgment, Judge Hollander held that summary judgment was inappropriate before discovery and that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery on their claims prior to such point. 2017 WL 467731. Under the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Judge Hollander held that plaintiffs' challenge to Maryland's parole system was cognizable under § 1983 because it did not challenge their sentences or convictions themselves. However, she also concluded that the plaintiffs' did not make a plausible claim that Maryland's parole system violated Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. On the statute of limitations defense and administrative exhaustion claims, Judge Hollander held that the plaintiffs' complaint was not time-barred nor exhausted. Finally, on the motion to dismiss, Judge Hollander concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions in <i>Miller</i>, <i>Graham</i>, and <i>Montgomery</i> applied to juvenile prisoners sentenced to life without parole. Since the governor's clemency authority lacked any clear standards and since parole was almost never granted to juvenile lifers, the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim that they had no meaningful opportunity for release, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As such, the plaintiffs "sufficiently alleged that Maryland’s parole system operates as a system of executive clemency, in which opportunities for release are 'remote,' rather than a true parole scheme in which opportunities for release are 'meaningful' and 'realistic,' as required in Graham." Judge Hollander then directed the defendants to answer the complaint, which they did on February 28, 2017. On March 30, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite for settlement. On August 1, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge. J. Mark Coulson for discovery and related scheduling. From March 30 to October 6, the parties engaged in discovery and litigation surrounding the terms of discovery. On September 27, 2017, Judge Coulson issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Plaintiffs' were seeking "risk assessment" documents of inmates in efforts to better understand the parole process. Defendants opposed this due to confidentiality concerns for inmates not related to this matter. Judge Coulson allowed for six "risk assessment" reports be given to the plaintiffs in order to protect confidentiality while also allowing the plaintiffs some degree of information to better understand the process. 2017 WL 4280779. The parties were engaged in settlement negotiations until negotiations fell apart in June of 2018. On June 28, 2018, plaintiffs moved for a partial judgment on the pleadings and a permanent injunction. The motion alleged that the role of the Governor in Maryland's parole system was unconstitutional in that sole authority to parole was given to the Governor. Furthermore, the parole system failed to make a distinction for juveniles, which the Supreme Court had held are entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. The permanent injunction would stipulate to parole boards that they consider juvenile lifers for parole in their normal course, without the approval or review of the Governor. On October 17, 2018, Judge Coulson issued a memorandum opinion concerning a discovery dispute. The defendants had sought a protective order regarding confidential information, namely inmate records, the tests administered in the parole process, and personnel records of psychologists who conduct those tests. Judge Coulson approved the protective order for the inmates records and denied it for the tests and personnel records as long as the personnel records had redacted identifying information. 2018 WL 5026369. Judge Coulson issued another order on October 25, 2018, limiting plaintiffs' access to only records concerning the actions of the Governor when Governor Hogan was in office. 2018 WL 5026369. Judge Coulson again issued a memorandum order concerning a discovery dispute on July 15, 2019. Plaintiffs had moved for reconsideration of the limit on risk assessment records of juveniles. Judge Coulson denied the motion, asserting that the plaintiffs were simply trying to relitigate a ruling. 2019 WL 3081196. As of January 31, 2020, the parties were still engaged in discovery. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
The Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative, a non-profit organization dedicated to fighting for prisoners' rights, and three inmates who, as juveniles, were sentenced to life in prison, filed a § 1983 suit against Governor Hogan and officials from the Department of Corrections, alleging that Maryland's parole system violated the Eighth Amendment by providing no meaningful opportunity for parole for juvenile lifers.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
NOTE: There are two separate cases, in two separate district courts, with the caption Hadix. The first one, in the Eastern District of Michigan, was filed in 1980, under docket number 2:80-cv-73581-JF. (It is in the Clearinghouse as PC-MI-0003.) This summary and documents are for the Western District of Michigan case, 4:92-CV-110, which was initiated in 1992 when the Eastern District Judge, John Feikens, split the earlier Hadix case in two, and sent part of it (the part relating to medical and mental health care) to the Western District. The first case case started on September 18, 1980, when inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for a catalog of unconstitutional conditions at the prison. On February 13, 1985, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge John Feikens) approved a consent decree in that case, settling the issues of sanitation, safety, medical and mental health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. For other proceedings in the Eastern District case, see the relevant case summary (PC-MI-3). On April 21, 1992, the defendants asked the district court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the consent decree; the plaintiffs asked the court to adopt the mental health orders entered in USA v. Michigan (No. 1:84-CV-63) (PC-MI-0007) by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Judge Richard A. Enslen). On May 15, 1992, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied both requests. On further consideration, however, on June 5, 1992, the district court relinquished control and supervision of the provisions governing mental health care and medical care, transferring them to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as he deemed appropriate. 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1992). At this point, the case was consolidated with Knop v. Johnson (PC-MI-0006), another class action lawsuit against the Michigan DOC. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed both cases with regard to the findings regarding access to courts. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992). The court (Judge David A. Nelson) held that the DOC's duty to provide assistance in gaining access to the courts included assisting with prisoners' challenges to their convictions and conditions of confinement. On March 8, 1993, The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Knop v. McGinnis, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). On June 4, 1993, Judge Enslen ordered defendants to submit a plan for providing access to the courts consistent with this opinion. On December 22, 1994, Judge Enslen rejected defendants' plan. Litigation continued regarding discovery and attorneys fees. On October 1, 1996, the district court adopted the defendants' proposals in both of the consolidated cases for legal writer programs that would provide access to the courts. On July 3, 1996, the Court (Judge Enslen) denied the defendants' request for termination of the consent decree. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1362 (W.D.Mich. 1996). The plaintiffs asked the district court to grant them attorneys fees for their counsels' unpaid work up to this point in the litigation, and the defendants argued that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees should apply to any fee award that the judge made. On May 23, 1997, the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) awarded the requested fees, holding that the PLRA's fee cap could not apply to litigation filed before the PLRA's effective date. Hadix v. Johnson, 965 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Mich. 1997). (Back in the Eastern District, Judge Feikens did the same.) The defendants appealed. On April 17, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Justice Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy) held that the fee cap imposed by the PLRA did not apply to fee petitions, regardless of whether the work was performed before of after the PLRA's enactment date. The court then partially upheld and partially reversed the fee award, remanding the appeals back to the district courts for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendants sought and obtained review by the Supreme Court. On June 21, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) held that the PLRA limits attorney fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999). Sometime in 1994, a class of inmates at five different correctional institutions in Michigan asked the both district courts for injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The cases were consolidated with the Western District Hadix, and the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants not to cut off funding for prison legal services programs. On April 1, 1999, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Daughtrey) held that the inmates had not shown widespread actual injury necessary for them to have standing to bring the class action lawsuit, and remanded the case back to the Western District Court. Hadix v. Johnson, 173 F.3d 958 (6th Cir. 1999).The defendants asked the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on April 1, 1999, the Sixth Circuit denied that request. Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1999). On March 18, 1999, the Eastern District transferred several additional components of the original consent decree (regarding water temperatures, housing temperatures and ventilation in the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, and some issues relating to housing in the Egeler Correctional Facility) to the Western District. The Eastern District explained that the rationale for transfer was that health care was implicated in these provisions. On December 2-3, 1999, the court (Judge Enslen) conducted hearings on the medical health care provisions of the consent decree and other issues transferred by the Eastern District. The court found some remaining constitutional violations, relating to medical and mental health care, and to temperature, ventilation and fire safety conditions at several facilities, but agreed with the defendants to terminate some of the Consent Decree provisions as no longer necessary. On November 15, 2000, the Eastern District transferred to this court some additional fire safety issues. On January 8, 2001, the district court granted defendants' request to terminate enforcement of the mental health provisions of the Consent Decree; the termination became effective in early February 2001. (On June 27, 2001, the Eastern District issued its Order of Termination, terminating its jurisdiction over all sections of the Consent Decree remaining in the Eastern District.) In June 2002, the Western District held yet another hearing, and found continuing constitutional violations with respect to medical care and fire safety. The defendants were required to submit a remedial plan, which in February 2003 the court ordered as an injunction. The defendants appealed. The 6th Circuit Hadix v. Johnson, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 367 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2004), remanding the fire safety provisions of the injunction for further factual development. After an additional hearing, and in a very extensive opinion, the District Court (Judge Enslen) again found the existence of constitutional violations with respect to fire safety, and ordered a revised version of the prior remedial plan implemented. 2005 WL 2243091 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 14, 2005). Although the mental health care provisions of the consent decree had been terminated in 2001, plaintiffs moved on September 8, 2006 to reopen the terminated provisions and for a preliminary injunction pertaining to mental health care. The cause for the motion was the death of a restrained Michigan prisoner, T.S., and other fatal cases in which, plaintiffs alleged, inmates' deaths were attributable to delays or malfeasance in the provision of mental health care. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted a preliminary injunction. Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 2006 WL 3275865 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2006). The Court lifted the prior termination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), explaining that jurisdiction has been retained because enforcement of the medical health and fire safety provisions of the consent decree was ongoing. In granting relief, the Court found numerous constitutional violations. It held that the punitive use of in-cell restraints "constitutes torture and violates the Eighth Amendment," and enjoined the practice. It also held that psychiatric and psychological staffing levels were constitutionally inadequate, and ordered defendants to file a staffing plan. The Court also required daily psychologist rounds in the segregation unit and required protocols for medical/mental health staff and interdisciplinary meetings after finding that patients with medical and mental health problems fall into "the black hole between the disciplines." On December 5, 2006, the defendants appealed the court's decision to grant the injunction. Two days later, the court issued a permanent injunction holding the defendants in contempt for their failure to comply with the consent decree's hiring requirements. The court ordered the defendants to provide additional staffing throughout the Hadix facilities - particularly nursing staff. On April 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the defendants' request to overturn the injunction. On February 22, 2007, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from transferring prisoners from Hadix facilities other than routine transfers not intended to reduce prison population. On May 14, 2007, the district court granted the defendants' motion to terminate the court's jurisdiction over the 8-Block of the Parnall Correctional Facility. Ultimately the case went to trial, and on August 8, 2008, the parties made their closing arguments before district judge Robert J. Jonker. On March 31, 2009, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants failed to comply with the November 2006 preliminary injunction, or that the defendants failed to comply with the mental health provisions of the consent decree. They also noted that it seemed as though the Hadix class had all but disappeared with the closing of multiple correctional facilities. Hadix v. Caruso, 2009 WL 891709 (W.D. Mich. 2009). The plaintiffs then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the District Court's opinion was affirmed. Hadix v. Caruso, 420 Fed.Appx. 480 (6th Cir. 2011). (In the meantime, on August 14, 2008, the parties filed a stipulated order to terminate Section III of the 1985 Hadix consent decree concerning fire safety.) On January 17, 2012, the plaintiffs' motion to add new parties to the Hadix class was granted, enabling them to continue with the litigation. Most recently, on June 22, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulation of dismissal of the heat abatement portion of the consent decree. On September 29, 2015, district judge Robert J. Jonker wrote an opinion on this case. He ordered the consent decrees sections II.A.3.b; II.A.4.a; II.A.5.a; II.A.7; and II.A.11 as closed, denied the plaintiff’s request for ongoing prospective injunctive relief, and terminated federal supervision over the Hadix facilities and the Hadix class. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
Portions of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, first started in 1980, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan in 1992. The Plaintiffs, prisoners in correctional institutions in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), claimed that certain conditions of the facilities were unconstitutional, and that they did not have proper access to courts. The earlier case had resulted in a Consent Decree in 1985. After the Court denied the Defendant's 1992 motion to terminate the Consent Decree, the Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees despite the Defendant's objections under the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on April 17, 1998, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court on June 21, 1999. The District Court then granted injunctive relief to the Plaintiffs on the issue of access to the courts, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiffs did not suffer widespread actual injury necessary for them to have standing to bring a class action lawsuit. Litigation continued over the mental health care provisions of the Consent Decree, which eventually ended in termination of that portion of the Consent Decree in February of 2001. In June of 2002, however, the court found that the Defendants were in violation of the medical care and fire safety portions of the Consent Decree and ordered the Defendants to correct the outstanding problems. This was sent back to the District Court by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the District Court made slight alterations to its order with largely the same outcome. The mental health care provisions were brought back to the forefront of the litigation in September of 2006 due to the death of a prisoner which was allegedly attributable to delays in the provision of mental health care. The Court entered a preliminary injunction, finding numerous constitutional violations. The Defendants appealed, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied their request to overturn the District Court. In early 2009 the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had failed to comply with the November 2006 preliminary injunction, and with the mental health provisions of the Consent Decree. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove these allegations and also noted that it seemed as though the Hadix class had all but disappeared with the closing of multiple correctional facilities. On January 17, 2012, the Plaintiffs motion to add new parties to the Hadix class was granted, enabling them to continue with the litigation. On June 22, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulation of dismissal of the heat abatement portion of the Consent Decree. On September 29, 2015, District Judge Robert J. Jonker ordered the consent decrees at issue as closed, denied the plaintiff’s request for ongoing prospective injunctive relief, and terminated federal supervision over the Hadix facilities and the Hadix class. This case is now closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 28, 2016, the Alabama chapter of the NAACP, Greater Birmingham Ministries, and two African-American plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Alabama in their official capacities under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prohibit the defendants from enforcing a state law that nullified a city minimum wage law. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint described the efforts of the Alabama legislature to undermine the City of Birmingham’s ordinance raising its minimum wage to $8.50 per hour (later adjusted to $10.10) as an effort to prevent the City from helping its African-American residents. At the time, Birmingham was the only city in Alabama that had raised its minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. At the beginning of the Alabama Legislature’s 2016 legislative session, the House of Representatives, with only white representatives voting in favor, approved a bill preventing cities from raising the minimum wage. The state Senate fast-tracked the bill through committees within 36 hours and passed it via a roll call vote on February 25, 2016, with only white state senators voting in favor. The Governor signed the bill 90 minutes after its passage. On June 2, 2016 the case was reassigned from a Magistrate Judge to Judge R. David Proctor. On June 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added ten plaintiffs and three defendants. The additional plaintiffs included the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and its members, including several members of the Alabama House of Representatives and state Senate, as well as registered voters in the City of Birmingham. The additional defendants included the State of Alabama, the City of Birmingham, and the Mayor of Birmingham in his official capacity for the purpose of providing complete relief. The complaint additionally alleged violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; a de jure policy of maintaining white control over black majorities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Thirteenth Amendment; de jure segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and intentional racial discrimination in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Judge Proctor denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice on July 1, 2016 and the case proceeded over the course of the summer of 2016. On February 1, 2017, Judge Proctor dismissed the case for, among several reasons, failure to sue the correct defendants, failing to state a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and failing to plausibly plead an equal protection claim. Judge Proctor determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Attorney General and Mayor and City of Birmingham; that the complaint did not implicate the Voting Rights Act; and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege an equal protection violation because the amended complaint made conclusory allegations unsupported by specific factual allegations. Judge Proctor also determined the complaint did not implicate the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and that the plaintiffs previously conceded their privileges and immunities claim. On March 2, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed Judge Proctor’s dismissal. On July 25, 2018, the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal on all but one count. The court found that the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim that nullification by Governor Bentley of the $10.10 minimum wage requirement had the purpose and effect of discriminating against black citizens of Birmingham. While the court found that plaintiffs had standing to sue the attorney general and the State of Alabama for injuries under the Minimum Wage Act, the court found the City of Birmingham to be an improper defendant. To analyze the validity of the plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim, the court looked to the Minimum Wage Act’s impact. Given that the Act affected 10% more black wage workers than white wage workers and the hourly pay disparity between black and white workers, the court found it plausible that the act bore more heavily on black workers. The court cited the fact that the Act denied a significant increase in pay to around 40,000 Birmingham residents, most of whom are black. The plaintiffs had to show on the face of the complaint that the enactment of the Act had a discriminatory purpose. The court found that plaintiff’s allegations that the Act was introduced by a white representative and was objected to by all black members of the state legislature and that the Act was accelerated without opportunity for public comment or debate were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Additionally, the court affirmed the importance of considering Alabama’s historic effort to disenfranchise black citizens. When looking to the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals strongly criticized the lower court’s standard of allowing “only the clearest proof” to suffice. The court of appeals asserted that this extraordinary standard has no place in equal protection law given the implicit nature of modern discrimination. The 11th Circuit granted an en banc rehearing and the case is ongoing as of November 2019.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiffs sued agents of the State of Alabama for the passage of a bill restricting cities from increasing their minimum wages. Plaintiffs alleged the bill discriminated against African-American residents of the City of Birmingham. Their case was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal on all but one claim, finding that plaintiffs had stated a valid complaint alleging intentional discrimination. The case was remanded and is ongoing as of November 2019.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 14, 2005, a group of anti-war demonstrators including the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER), the Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation, the National Council of Arab Americans, a pastor at a congregational church, and a civilian whose son died in the Iraq War (collectively, “the demonstrators”) sued the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service (NPS), and the Director of the Secret Service (collectively, “the government”) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3)–(4) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The protesters contended that NPS had issued the Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) permits before accepting applications from the general public, and also contended that setting aside area that couldn’t be used by the public during the Inaugural Parade was unconstitutional. Represented by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, the demonstrators alleged that the government violated their Equal Protection rights as well as their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for redress of. The demonstrators asked the court to declare the government’s actions unconstitutional and to enjoin the NPS from setting aside its regulations for the PIC in the future. This case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. The government urged the court to deny the demonstrators’ request for injunctive relief. The government emphasized that the demonstrators already had access via permit to nine sites along the Parade route, including John Marshall Park, one of the largest parks along Pennsylvania Avenue. The government also argued that the PIC’s application for a permit to use Freedom Plaza was submitted before ANSWER’s application, and that the NPS followed proper procedures in issuing the PIC permit. On January 18, 2005, the court denied the demonstrators’ motion for preliminary injunction. On July 28, 2005, ANSWER filed an amended complaint that dropped the other plaintiffs. The Amended complaint challenged three governmental actions as constitutional violations: (1) NPS exempting itself from the permitting regulations, (2) a prohibition on signs that was issued by the Secret Service, and (3) a policy granting the Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) exclusive access along the parade route. Again, declaratory and injunctive relief for future parades was sought for these claims. Almost two years later, on June 13, 2007, the court granted in part the government’s motion to dismiss. 493 F.Supp.2d 34. The Court found that no relief could be granted for ANSWER’s claims pertaining to the 2005 Inauguration parade that sought declaratory judgment, and therefore the court dismissed them. The other three claims, however, were allowed to continue. The court ruled in ANSWER’s favor on March 20, 2008, granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the first claim involving the NPS exempting itself from the permitting regulations. 537 F.Supp.2d 183. The court found that the NPS permitting regulations were not applied in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner and therefore declared the actions unconstitutional and enjoined the NPS from exempting themselves from the permitting process in the future. ANSWER filed a supplemental pleading alleging that the NPS’ regulatory set-aside for the PIC violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause by favoring individuals affiliated with the administration and disfavoring others. The government moved to dismiss the supplemental pleading, but the court denied the motion on January 14, 2013 and affirmed that ANSWER has standing to pursue its full claim. 915 F.Supp.2d 93. On January 28, 2016, the court granted the defendants’ summary judgement motions on the second and third claims. 153 F.Suppp.3d 395. The court found that the sign ban was content-neutral. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court determined that the sign ban was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s substantial interest in ensuring safety and managing the flow of pedestrian traffic during an inaugural parade. Regarding the exclusive access claims, the government also upheld the constitutionality of setting aside space only usable by the Presidential Inauguration Committee. Here, the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in planning and executing the Inaugural Parade. On February 29, 2016, ANSWER appealed the court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the exclusive access claim. On October 14, 2016, while awaiting the appeals court decision, ANSWER and the Secretary of the Interior settled ANSWER’s claim for attorneys’ fees for litigating NPS’ permitting violations; the defendants agreed to pay $90,000. Then, on January 17, 2017, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on the exclusive access claim, finding that the set-aside was subject to intermediate scrutiny, that it was narrowly tailored to a significant government interest, and that it left open ample channels for communication for demonstrators and the public. 845 F.3d 1199. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On January 14, 2005, a group of anti-war demonstrators including the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER), the Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation, the National Council of Arab Americans, a pastor at a congregational church, and a civilian whose son died in the Iraq War sued the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service, and the Director of the Secret Service under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3)–(4) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, the plaintiffs alleged that the government violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, and their right to equal protection under the law by violating National Park Service (“NPS”) regulations by exempting the Presidential Inauguration Committee (“PIC”) from the regular permit process for reserving space along the Inauguration Day Parade route and by banning sign supports from the Parade. The plaintiffs alleged that these actions together prevented the public from accessing the Parade route and from exercising their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the government’s actions unconstitutional and to enjoin the NPS from setting aside its regulations for the PIC in the future. The district court found that the NPS’ regulatory set aside violated NPS regulations but was not unconstitutional. The court also upheld the government’s sign support ban. The D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision on appeal.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 18, 2017, the Georgia State Conference of the Georgia NAACP, the Troup County Chapter of the NAACP, Project South, and a small number of named and unnamed plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City of LaGrange, Georgia in the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the city on one federal claim – violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3604(b) – and two state claims: tortious interference with utility service and unconscionability. They sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ costs. The plaintiffs objected to two policies regarding the provision of municipal utilities in the City of LaGrange. The first policy required an individual to pay any outstanding court debt prior to receiving utility service from the City. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans, was the only policy of its kind nationwide, and was not justified by any legitimate purpose. The second policy required an individual to provide a valid social security number and government-issued photo identification in order to receive utilities. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on Latinos and was not justified by any legitimate purpose. On July 21, the City of LaGrange moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City argued that disparate impact theory did not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §3604(b). It further argued that the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Fair Housing Act as not applying to post-acquisition conduct; that is, it did not apply to conduct that occurred after a housing sale or rental transaction, and that the conduct at issue fell into that category. Finally, the City claimed their policies were reasonable, and not arbitrary, artificial, or unnecessary. Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. granted the City of LaGrange’s motion to dismiss on December 7, 2017, ruling that the defendants were correct in their interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow reading of the FHA. Judge Batten found that the plaintiffs did not present cognizable claims under the Fair Housing Act because all but one plaintiff alleged violations that occurred post-acquisition of housing, and that the plaintiff’s injury was not sufficiently concrete to have standing. Having dismissed the federal claim, Judge Batten did not address the two state claims. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on January 4, 2018. The Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Wilson and Branch, and District Judge Vinson, sitting by designation) issued an opinion on October 10, 2019, vacating the District Court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Appellate Court ruled that §3604(b) encompasses some post-acquisition conduct and the basic utility services in question fell within the scope of services covered by §3604(b). It directed the District Court to determine anew whether the plaintiffs’ disparate impact allegations stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. This opinion was made a judgment of the District Court on November 25. On December 23, 2019, the parties filed an amended joint preliminary report and discovery plan and Judge Batten ordered that discovery end on August 18, 2020. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
The Georgia NAACP and other plaintiffs challenged policies in place in the City of LaGrange, GA, limiting provision of utility service to individuals with outstanding court debt and to individuals who lack photo identification and valid social security numbers. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On October 10, 2019, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s decision and remand the case for further proceedings. The case is pending discovery.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 18, 2015, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, along with the Attorneys General from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska, filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The case, brought against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), asked the court to strike down the DOL final rule defining "spouse" for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611. The FMLA defines "spouse" as "a husband or wife, as the case may be." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(13). In 1993, the Department's Interim Final Rule defined "spouse" as "a husband or wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in states where it is recognized." 58 Fed. Reg. 31817, 31835 (June 4, 1993). The 1995 Final Rule clarified that the law of the State where the employee resides would control for the purpose of determining eligibility for FMLA spousal leave. 80 Fed. Reg. 9990 (Feb. 25, 2015). Under the new rule, 29 C.F.R. Part 825, the FMLA moved from a "state of residence" to a "place of celebration" rule for the definition of spouse. That means that it would cover same-sex spouses if their marriage took place in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage, even if they lived in (or moved to) a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage. The rule, described <a href="http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/spouse/index.htm">here</a>, was scheduled to become effective on March 27, 2015. On March 26, 2015, the day before the rule's effective date, the District Court (Judge Reed O'Connor) entered a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement. It's unclear whether that order applies to application of the rule outside of Texas, or outside of the states that are parties. The court granted defendants’ request for a hearing, and scheduled it for April 10, 2015. 95 F. Supp. 3d 965, 2015 WL 1378752, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38264. On April 24, 2015, the states of Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, Nebraska and Arkansas filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiff states alleged that: (1) the Windsor decision affirmed states’ authority to define and regulate marriage, a principle embodied in the full faith and credit statute; (2) the DOL’s Final Rule ignores that that the federal full faith and credit statute expressly reserves the right to the States to refuse to recognize as marriages same-sex unions performed under the laws of other States; (3) by requiring plaintiff states to recognise out-of-state same-sex marriage for the purposes of the FMLA, the DOL is interfering with plaintiff states’ enforcement of their duly enacted law by forcing plaintiff states to violate either state law or a federal regulation; (4) the Final Rule conflicts with the federal full faith and credit statute and the Windsor decision; (5) Congress did not pre-empt state law defining marriage in the FMLA; and (6) the new rule harms the states as well as employers within the states. The plaintiff states sought a declaratory judgment that the Final Rule is unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and that it unlawfully attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and requested temporary relief in enjoining the Final Rule from taking effect on March 27, 2015. On April 27, 2015, the district court stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (<a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787">PB-OH-0003</a> in this Clearinghouse). The defendant filed a motion to dissolve preliminary injunction on the same day. On June 26, 2015, in light of the Obergefell decision, the district court lifted the stay of this case, and granted the defendant’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction that was issued on March 26, 2015 as it found that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required by the four-factor preliminary injunction test. 2015 WL 13424776, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190764. On July 17, 2015, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action, and the case was subsequently closed. However, on August 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for the court to vacate its March 26, 2015 order granting the preliminary injunction. On February 2, 2016, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to vacate as (1) the defendants are not suffering from the “vagaries of circumstance” because the preliminary injunction has lost its effectiveness, and that (2) the court is not obligated to vacate on the grounds that matters of “broad issues of law” discussed within the order may “recur in future litigation”. 2016 WL 3636072, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92575. As of November 2018, there has been no further action in this case since the February 2, 2016 order.
<|assistant|>
On March 18, 2015, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, along with the Attorneys General from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska, filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The case, brought against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), asked the court to strike down the DOL final rule defining "spouse" for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611. On March 26, 2015, the day before the rule's effective date, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement. In April 2015, the district court stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The defendant filed a motion to dissolve preliminary injunction on the same day. On June 26, 2015, in light of the Obergefell decision, the district court lifted the stay of this case, and granted the defendant’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. In July 2015, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action, and the case was subsequently closed. However, in August 2015, the defendants filed a motion for the court to vacate its March 26, 2015 order granting the preliminary injunction. In February 2016, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to vacate, and as of November 2018, there has been no action since.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 9, 2012, a Catholic media network filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On May 4, 2012, the defendant departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff had not alleged any facts showing that it did not qualify for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the U.S. was in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the offensive contraception coverage requirement. On March 25, 2013, Chief District Court Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn granted the U.S. motion to dismiss. Chief Judge Blackburn found that, while the plaintiff had alleged sufficient imminent harm to establish standing to bring the case, the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the anticipated amendments rendered the plaintiff's claim not yet ripe for review. On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff's revived their complaint in the Southern District of Alabama. <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13619">Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. et al v. Sebelius</a>.
<|assistant|>
In 2012, a Catholic media network filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. In March 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 9, 2011, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the sheriff of Orleans Parish. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP). The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the policy against the delivery of such publications also failed to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard to review decisions censoring and excluding books and magazines distributed by the plaintiffs to OPP prisoners. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner in contravention of over thirty years of well-settled case law. On December 2, 2011, Judge Jay C. Zainey approved a consent judgment for injunctive relief only. The defendants agreed to the distribution of the plaintiffs' monthly publication and to adopt and implement a new written policy regarding "Incoming Publications" for prisoners at the jail. On September 17, 2012, Judge Zainey ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for a total of $15,000, not including attorney fees and costs. On March 11, 2014, Judge Zainey approved the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of attorney fees and costs of $72,754.61.
<|assistant|>
On September 9, 2011, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the sheriff of Orleans Parish. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP). Judge Jay C. Zainey approved a consent judgment for injunctive relief only ordering the defendants to distribute the plaintiffs' monthly publication and to adopt and implement a new written policy regarding "Incoming Publications" for prisoners at the jail. Judge Zainey also ordered $87,754.61 in damages and attorney fees and costs.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 13, 2017, several organizations (National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG), Mijente Support Committee, and Detention Watch Network) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by counsel from NIPNLG itself and Public Citizen Litigation Group, plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations promoting immigrants' rights. According to their complaint, they sought information on "Operation Mega," which news sources had reported as an ICE immigration enforcement operation to apprehend non-citizens nationwide in mid-September 2017. On the same date that news sources had reported "Operation Mega," ICE had released a press release stating that no nationwide operation was planned due to recent weather disasters in Florida and Texas. The complaint alleged that on September 12-14, 2017, plaintiffs and other requesters nationwide had submitted FOIA requests to each of defendant's field offices, seeking records concerning "Operation Mega" or related operations, including another named "Operation Safe City." The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendant. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On November 14, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. On January 8, 2018, the parties filed a joint status report. The defendant expected to produce the first batch of 500 responsive documents in February. The latest status report, of Mar. 6, confirmed the defendant's production and specified defendant would produce another 500 pages in March, followed by 1000 pages in April and each subsequent month. ICE substantially completed document production on March 19, 2019, and the parties narrowed their disputes from there. On January 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asking the Judge to protect the “Homeland Security Investigations Criminal Street Gangs Investigations Handbook” because it was an internal agency memorandum and that it would disclose investigatory procedures. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2020 alleging that the plaintiff did not meet the standards for withholding under FOIA. Judge Mehta has not ruled on the motions as of June 10, 2020, and the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On November 13, 2017, several immigrant rights' organizations sued ICE under FOIA, seeking records on a mass immigration enforcement operation called "Operation Mega," planned for September 2017, or related operations. ICE finished document production in 2019, and the parties filed motions for summary judgment related to one Handbook in early 2020. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In December of 1990, the United States Department of Justice, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et al, investigated the Arlington Developmental Center (ADC) in Tennessee. The investigation revealed that conditions in the facility seriously threatened the health and safety of its developmentally delayed residents. The Department of Justice found that residents were subject to abuse and neglect, inadequate medical care, an unsafe physical environment, and lack of educational services. On January 21, 1992, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of Tennessee pursuant to CRIPA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that the state had failed to provide humane conditions and adequate treatment at Arlington Developmental Center. The case was styled United States v. Tennessee, Civ. No. 92-2062. (W.D.Tenn.1992)(''the United States case"). The case followed a similar action that was filed against the ADC by private plaintiffs, styled People First of Tennessee v. Arlington Developmental Ctr., No. 92-2213 (W.D.Tenn.1992)(''People First case'') (See ID-TN-1 of this collection). On August 7, 1992, the District Court (Judge Jon Phipps McCalla) denied the state's motion for summary judgment in the United States case. U.S. v. Tennessee, 798 F.Supp.483 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). A lengthy trial in the United States case began on August 30, 1993 and continued through October 1993. On November 22, 1993, the Court (Judge McCalla) made issued an oral ruling against the defendants, finding that the conditions at ADC violated the due process rights of the residents. Written findings of fact were issued by the Court on February 18, 1994. On September 2, 1994 entered a detailed remedial order to correct the violations the Court found. The order called for the appointment of a monitor. Linda R. O'Neall, Ph.D. was subsequently appointed to that position. On June 30, 1995, Judge McCalla issued an emergency order after the monitor reported that a state of medical emergency existed at the facility. After the state failed to comply with the emergency order, the court entered a preliminary injunction on July 21, 1995 required the center to hire a Developmental Medicine Physician, additional physicians for overnight coverage, additional nurses, and a full-time psychiatrist. On August 9, 1995, Judge McCalla found the state in contempt for failure to comply. In a reported opinion dated November 6, 1995, the court described the state's history of noncompliance in this matter and approved appropriate sanctions. United States v. Tennessee, 925 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Tenn. 1995). On September 27, 1995, the Plaintiffs and the Intervenor in the People First case (ID-TN-1) were named as Intervenors in the United States case. Defendants remained in contempt and on June 26, 1996 the court entered a stipulation and order whereby, in lieu of sanctions for contempt, the defendants agreed to develop three comprehensive plans addressing compliance with previous orders, downsizing the facility, and community placement of residents. The court approved the State's proposed community placement plan on August 21, 1997. On June 28, 1999, the court ordered the creation of workgroups to facilitate implementation of the plan but later suspended the workgroups. The parties appealed the order suspending the workgroups and submitted a mediation settlement agreement. The District Court (Judge Bernice Bouie Donald) denied a motion to approve the settlement agreement on February 24, 2003. U.S. v. Tennessee, 256 F.Supp. 2d 768 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judge Boyce F. Martin Jr.) vacated and remanded the decision of the district court on June 23, 2005. United States v. Tennessee, 143 Fed. Appx. 656 (6th Cir. 2005). On May 16, 2006, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement to resolve various pending matters. The goal of the settlement, reached pursuant to the state's decision to close ADC, was to "ensure an orderly and careful closure of the ADC, the safe transition of Class Members presently living at ADC to community residences, and the accelerated development of a comprehensive network of services and supports for Class Members as they enter and live in the community." The court approved the settlement on Feb. 15, 2007. The settlement set out provisions relating to the transition of class members in light of ADC's closure, including the need for a specific closure plan and transition plan, support resources for families and class members, the development and improvement of community-based services and supports for class members, and improvement of individualized services provided to ADC residents. The settlement also provided for monitoring. Over the next several years, litigation continued over the scope and enforcement of the settlement. On January 17, 2013, the court approved a joint exit plan. If the state completed the plan's requirements by the end of 2013, the court would dismiss the case with prejudice. The court dismissed the case and vacated all injunctive relief on December 3, 2013, finding that the state had complied with the exit plan. Over the course of the litigation, People First were granted attorney's fees periodically. In total, the court awarded them over $4.4 million. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In 1990, the DOJ conducted an investigation into the the Arlington Development Center, which revealed that residence were subject to abuse and neglect. The DOJ filed a lawsuit. After several years, the parties entered into a settlement. The case ended in 2013, when the court found that the state had complied with the settlement.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case involved a challenge to the Trump Administration's immigration policies concerning asylum and family separation. On June 26, 2018, a coalition of states filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the Trump Administration and its top immigration officials, challenging the Administration’s practice of refusing entry to asylum applicants at the southern border as well as its family separation policy. The states, represented by their attorneys general, were Washington, California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The states alleged that they suffered immediate and irreparable injuries to their sovereign, proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests, and sought relief for substantive and procedural due process violations, equal protection violations, and violations under the Administrative Procedure Act and asylum laws. The case was assigned to District Judge Marsha Pechman. Specifically, the states argued that the Administration’s policies harmed their sovereign and proprietary interests by 1) interfering with their licensing authority and rendering them unable to enforce their own legal mandates and public policy, and 2) burdening their state-funded legal, healthcare, education, and other programs. They also argued that their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health and well-being of their residents were harmed by the policy. On July 11, 2018, the federal government moved to dismiss, transfer, or stay the proceedings pending the resolution of a related class-action lawsuit, <u>Ms. L. v. ICE</u>, which was active in the Southern District of California. It's <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16620">here</a> in the Clearinghouse). According to the federal government, the states wished to engage in “sweeping and burdensome” discovery, duplicative of what was already being conducted in <u>Ms. L</u> In that case, a class of parents who had been separated from their children had already been certified. Since the class members in <u>Ms. L</u> included individuals the plaintiff states purported to represent, the defendants claimed that ongoing litigation in the present court would interfere with the orderly administration of that case. The defendants argued that the court should dismiss the case out of comity and, in the alternative, that the case should be transferred to the Southern District of California or stayed until the <u>Ms. L</u> case had progressed further. On August 8, 2018, Judge Pechman heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, transfer, or stay the proceedings. She ordered the case transferred to the Southern District of California, finding that there was substantial overlap between the states’ claim in this case and the class claim in <u>Ms. L</u> Judge Pechman noted that the government had much to do in the way of reuniting separated families and that requiring the government to respond to multiple orders from multiple district courts would only stand in the way of those efforts. 2018 WL 3752220. The case was transferred to the Southern District of California and given a new docket number, 3:18-cv-1979. It was assigned to Judge Dana M. Sabraw. On March 18, 2019, the defendants requested that the proceedings in the present case either be bifurcated or held in abeyance. On May 20, Judge Sabraw granted defendants' request to hold this case in abeyance pending the outcome of the proceedings in <u>Ms. L</u>. (As of June 23, 2021, in <u>Ms. L. v. ICE</u>, the parties continued to work on implementing their court-approved settlement agreement. Additionally, a steering committee was continuing efforts to contact all parties and attorneys relevant to the certified class. The above was reported in a joint status report published on May 19, 2021. This case is ongoing, though in abeyance.
<|assistant|>
On June 26, 2018, a coalition of states filed this lawsuit challenging the Trump Administration's practice of refusing entry to asylum applicants at the southern border, as well as its family separation policy. The case was transferred to the Southern District of California and is currently being held in abeyance until litigation in a similar case, <u>Ms. L v. ICE</u>, concludes.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 12, 2018, a group of U.S. citizen children, their non-citizen parents, and other non-citizen adults filed this class action lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs challenged DHS’ new rule for determining whether or not to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for immigrants from countries facing various crises warranting their nationals to stay in the U.S. rather than be returned home. The plaintiffs argued that the new DHS rule violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment as well as requirements set out by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by the ACLU, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and assigned to Judge Edward M. Chen. As the complaint explained, TPS is a formal mechanism by which individuals from designated countries can legally stay and work in the U.S. when their countries are facing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances making it untenable for them to return. Breaking from previous administrations’ practices, the Trump administration adopted a new rule in assessing whether to continue TPS status that allowed it to ignore consideration of any new crises that emerged since TPS status was granted. The complaint argued that the new DHS rule threatened more than 200,000 individuals with the risk of losing their right to legally work and live in the U.S. Thus, the complaint argued that over 200,000 U.S. citizen children faced the choice of being separated from their families or leaving the only home they had ever known. Moreover, the complaint highlighted President Trump’s various past statements to argue that issuance of the new rule was motivated by racial animus. The plaintiffs were a combination of children who were U.S. citizens, their non-citizen parents with TPS status, and other adults with TPS status. The plaintiffs also sought to represent the following class: “The U.S. citizen children, from ages five to eighteen, of all TPS holders from El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan.” On May 3, 2018, the parties filed a joint letter brief concerning a discovery dispute they were having. The plaintiffs were seeking early discovery to support a motion for a preliminary injunction, but the defendants opposed the request. On May 17, Judge Chen directed DHS to begin assembling the administrative record to avoid delay if production is later required. DHS moved to dismiss the case on May 21. On June 15, the parties filed another joint letter brief regarding their discovery dispute. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that discovery should not be limited to the administrative record given that they had pled separate constitutional claims. The defendants claimed that the court should first order production of the administrative record before considering questions of possible discovery. Judge Chen issued a summary order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss on June 25, 2018. 2018 WL 3109604. The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case because, although the courts were limited in reviewing TPS designation determinations, this case did not challenge a particular determination but rather a broader policy. The court also held that the APA claim stood because DHS had not provided any reasoned explanation for the new rule as required under the APA. The court maintained the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim based on the plaintiffs' racial animus argument, holding that the Fifth Amendment barred racial discrimination in the immigration setting regardless of how much deference the executive branch normally receives on immigration matters. Finally, the court maintained the due process claim because the APA and equal protection claims were sufficiently pleaded. Judge Chen also ordered the defendants to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests and to produce the administrative records for the TPS termination of Sudan and Nicaragua within 10 days, and for El Salvador and Haiti one week later. On June 26, Judge Chen directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the court should reconsider its holding with respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <i><a href=“https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15626”>Trump v. Hawaii</a></i>. On July 20, Judge Chen referred the parties to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim to address their ongoing discovery dispute. On August 6, 2018, Judge Chen issued another order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, this time elaborating on his prior order and addressing intervening case law. 321 F.Supp.3d 1083. In addition to affirming his previous conclusions regarding the plaintiffs' APA and due process claims, Judge Chen found that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that racial and national-origin animus held by President Trump was a motivating factor in DHS's decision to terminate TPS designations, violating equal protection. On August 10, Magistrate Judge Kim granted the plaintiffs' request to require the defendants to produce documents they had withheld on the basis of the deliberative process privilege. That same day, the defendants sought an emergency stay of the Magistrate's order pending review by the district court. On August 13, Judge Chen denied the defendants' emergency motion, finding that the production of documents could not be delayed. Judge Chen then denied the defendants' request for relief from the discovery order on August 15. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on August 23, which Judge Chen granted on Oct. 3, 2018. 2018 WL 4778285. The court held that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, including family separation and being forced to move back to countries where neither the children nor adults had any remaining ties. Moreover, the court held that the U.S. economy itself would be hurt if thousands of TPS status holders were suddenly removed. The court found that DHS had not provided any justification for its new rule, and that if anything, the rule was implemented out of racial animus and to affect the administration's pre-determined outcome to terminate TPS status. Subsequently, DHS appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which assigned the appeal case number 18-16981. The district court approved the parties’ joint motion to stay proceedings pending the appeal on October 26, 2018. In the district court on Feb. 26, 2019, Judge Chen found <i>Bhattarai v. Nielsen</i> (located <a href=“https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17194”>here</a> in this Clearinghouse) to be related and reassigned the case to his docket. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on Aug. 14, 2019. On Aug. 21, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether (1) the government had waived any argument concerning the scope of the administrative record; if not, (2) whether the district court made sufficient findings to warrant additional discovery to supplement the record; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering additional discovery. The parties filed their supplemental briefs. On September 14, 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. 975 F.3d 872. In an opinion by Judge Callahan, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs APA because the TPS statute itself states that the Secretary of Homeland Security possesses full and unreviewable discretion in designating foreign states under the statute. The Ninth Circuit also found that there was not sufficient likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their claims, as they did not provide adequate evidence linking President Trump's statements about other countries to the DHS Secretaries' TPS decision-making. As such, after vacating the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
<|assistant|>
On March 12, 2018, children who are citizens of the U.S., their non-citizen parents, and other non-citizen adults filed this class action against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs challenged DHS’ new rule for determining whether or not to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for those countries facing various crises warranting their nationals to stay in the U.S. rather than be returned home. The plaintiffs argued that the new DHS rule violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court granted a preliminary injunction on Oct. 3, 2018. DHS appealed, and the Ninth Circuit issued a decision on September 14, 2020, vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding the case back to the district court.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 26, 2014, three individual plaintiffs and their wholly-owned family company filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiffs alleged that the provision of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") that mandated group health plans include coverage for "all [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity," posed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 30, 2014, District Court Judge Patrick J. Schiltz granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction against enforcement of the contraception mandate until thirty days after the Eighth Circuit issued a decision in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.phpid=12706&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Co%27brien%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012)</a> or <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12665&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cannex%20medical%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013)</a>, or until thirty days after the Supreme Court issued a ruling in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B ">Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013)</a> or <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12705&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (Third Cir. 2013).</a> On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12661&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Chobby%20lobby%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B">Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)</a>, a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 14, 2014, the parties jointly submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Injunction in Favor of Plaintiffs and Stipulation for Fee Motion Briefing Schedule, which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On November 18, 2014, Judge Schiltz issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. On December 30, 2014, the parties stipulated for an extension of time for the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. On December 31, 2014, Judge Schiltz granted this stipulation in an order extending the deadline to March 3, 2015. The docket shows no record of the plaintiffs moving for attorneys' fees, and the case now appears closed.
<|assistant|>
On March 26, 2014, three individual plaintiffs and their wholly-owned family company filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19: This is a habeas action filed by nine immigration detainees confined in the Caroline and Farmville Detention Centers, seeking either writs of habeas corpus for each petitioner, or in the alternative, injunctive relief. The petitioners alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus, either due to medical conditions or their age. The plaintiffs' TRO was denied on April 29. The decision was appealed, but the plaintiffs later dismissed the appeal and the underlying district court litigation. <hr> On April 9, 2020, nine immigration detainees filed this lawsuit against ICE, the warden of the Farmville Detention Center, the Superintendent of the Caroline Detention Center, and the Field Office Director of the ICE Washington Field Office. Represented by the Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the Legal Aid Justice Center, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under, or in the alternative injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to Judge Liam O'Grady and Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction on April 13. On April 29, Judge O'Grady denied the motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden. The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit on May 8 (Docket No. 20-6695). On October 6, the plaintiffs filed a motino to dismiss the appeal, and back in the district court, on October 8, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Judge O'Grady dismissed the case without prejudice on October 14.
<|assistant|>
Nine immigration detainees petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in light of their vulnerability to COVID-19, requesting release from the Farmville and Caroline Detention Centers. The plaintiffs' motion for TRO was denied on April 29. The plaintiffs initially appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of female employees, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment and/or constructively discharged some female employees in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. On July 31, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's prima facie case. On August 12, 2009, the District Court (Judge Wanger) granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment regarding satisfying the conditions precedent for a Title VII sexual harassment claim and also granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the conditions precedent for a Title VII constructive discharge claim. On October 21, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the female employees $145,000.
<|assistant|>
On September 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of female employees, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment and/or constructively discharged some female employees in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. On October 21, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the female employees $145,000.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 17, 2009 juveniles detained in the Pierce County jails and their parents filed a lawsuit alleging violations of their civil rights in the Superior Court for the State of Washington, County of Pierce. The Plaintiffs, represented by a team of public interest attorneys from the Columbia Legal Service's Institutions project, sought declaratory and equitable relief and damages, claiming that the Defendant's failure to provide educational services to the juveniles detained in the adult jail violated their rights under the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that by failing to provide educational services in the adult jail, the Defendants had violated the State Constitution's requirement that a free public education be provided to all children in the state. Furthermore, the plaintiff's claimed that the Defendants' actions had violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. On July 15, 2009 the defendants moved for removal from the Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma Division. The District Court granted the removal and the case proceeded there. On March 29, 2010 the parties filled a settlement agreement. Defendants agreed to implement an educational program at the Jail that satisfies the state of Washington's legal requirements for educational programs. The defendants agreed to provide a written learning plan, individually crafted for the needs of each juvenile detained in the adult jail detailing the learning goals for the juvenile and a plan describing how to achieve such goals. The defendant school district agreed to provide certified instructional staff to conduct the program within the jail. While group instruction is not required under the agreement, each juvenile detained in the adult jail will be provided with individual instruction. Under the settlement agreement, the juveniles detained in the adult jail will be provided with the instruction in the subjects necessary under the law to earn credits towards graduation from the Tacoma public schools. In addition, the defendants agreed to provide special education offerings to juvenile's detained in the adult jail. Furthermore, under the agreement, the parents of the juvenile's detained must be given access to the written records regarding their child's education within the jail. All juvenile participants are expected under the agreement to comply with the rules of the Tacoma School District. However, the agreement holds that the juveniles detained in the adult jail cannot be disciplined by having their access to the program taken away. The one exception contemplated by the agreement is if the discipline is a result of an incident that took place during the juvenile's participation in the program. If this is the case, the agreement contemplates the jail being able to discipline the juvenile by taking away their access to the educational program. The parties agreed to appoint a settlement monitor, whose mandate is to monitor the implementation of the settlement for the first four semesters of the program's existence. Furthermore, the parties agreed that the court should retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. If after a good faith negotiation the parties cannot agree to continue the enforcement of the agreement, the court is to exercise its jurisdiction. The duration of the Consent decree is "six full semesters", which we read to be the equivalent of three years, during which compliance will be monitored.
<|assistant|>
Juveniles detained in Pierce County, Washington adult jail, and their parents, filed this case in 2009 to challenge the lack of educational and other services. The case was resolved by a Consent Decree entered in 2010 which required that individually designed educational programs would be provided which would allow the children to earn credits toward graduation from Tacoma schools.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 1, 2015, inmates of the Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) suffering from hepatitis-C filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Corrections and Centene Corporation, a provider of healthcare for inmates, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article I § 8 of the Minnesota Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive and equitable relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Article I §§ 2, 5, and 7 of the Minnesota Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Specifically, they claimed that defendants refused to provide them with hepatitis-C drugs that met accepted medical standards. They claimed that defendants subjected them to less effective and more dangerous 48-week Interferon treatments for non-medical reasons that constituted “deliberate interference” to their serious medical needs. Prior to late 2013, hepatitis-C treatment consisted of 48-week Interferon injections. Interferon was not highly effective and caused serious side effects. In January, 2014, the American Association for the Study of Liver Disease and Association for the Study of Infectious Disease recognized the potential of a new 12-week treatment regimen consisting of a daily pill with a 95% cure rate. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and other federal agencies recognized the new drug as the standard of care by June 2014, and the FDA approved sales under multiple labels by the end of 2014. On June 3rd, 2015, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adjusting the language of some of their claims and correcting the name of Centene Corporation to Centurion of Minnesota, LLC. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on October 29, 2015, which removed plaintiffs’ claims based on the Fifth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution. The second amended complaint also included voluminous medical reports on hepatitis-C. On February 23, 2016, Judge Patrick J. Schiltz dismissed all claims against one of plaintiffs’ treating physicians based on a joint stipulation by the parties. In addition, the plaintiffs reached a confidential settlement with Centurion and another of plaintiffs’ physicians, the existence of which was entered in the record on October 5, 2016. Litigation involving the remaining defendants dragged on for the next year; defendants moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs moved for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and partial summary judgment. On October 4, 2017, Judge Schiltz rejected these and other pending motions. Judge Schiltz did, however, grant plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint and “encourage[d]” plaintiffs to drop all claims except for those under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs responded on December 1, 2017, with a drastic revision of their complaint. The third amended complaint added new named plaintiffs, removed unknown agents of the Minnesota Department of Corrections as defendants, and alleged violations of only the Eighth Amendment and the ADA. After unfruitful court-initiated settlement negotiations, plaintiffs moved to certify a class, and defendants moved for summary judgment. These motions were taken under advisement, and a trial was scheduled for February 2019. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify class on January 3, 2019. The opinion was filed under seal because of its discussion of the plaintiffs’ medical conditions and is not available. Of the plaintiffs' claims that were dismissed, all but one were dismissed without prejudice. Judge Schlitz certified the class as “all current and future inmates of Minnesota correctional facilities who have been diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C and have not received treatment with a direct‐acting antiviral medication.” On March 3, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to approve a class action settlement of the remaining claims. Judge Schiltz approved this settlement on June 24, 2019 and entered judgment that same day. The settlement had two main requirements: 1) the defendant must amend their 2018 Guidelines on the testing and treatment of HCV to comply with factors outlined in the settlement and; 2) the defendant must update policy to include education of prisoners with HCV who are released from MDOC facilities. The settlement was set to last for 24 months and required the MDOC to submit quarterly reports on their compliance. The court retained jurisdiction until the later of July 25, 2021 or two years after any appeals from the approval of the settlement were resolved. The defendants agreed to pay $325,000 in attorneys’ fees and $41,144 in costs. Because the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement, this case is ongoing for monitoring purposes.
<|assistant|>
In May 2015, inmates with Hepatits C filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Corrections under 42 USC § 1983, claiming violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief alleging that the defendant, by denying them treatment of "breakthrough drugs" for the hepatitis-C virus, showed deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The case ended in a settlement requiring that 1) the defendant must amend their 2018 Guidelines on the testing and treatment of HCV to comply with factors outlined in the settlement and; 2) the defendant must update policy to include education of prisoners with HCV who are released from MDOC facilities. The court retained jurisdiction until the later of July 25, 2021 or two years after any appeals from the approval of the settlement were resolved. This case is ongoing for settlement compliance.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This lawsuit was filed June 2, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The case arose out of the spring and summer protests in 2020 in response to the police killing of George Floyd. The case alleges that Minneapolis police targeted journalists covering the protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The original complaint had one class representative and sought class certification to cover all journalists covering the protests more generally. Defendants were various city and state officials and the City of Minneapolis. The complaint alleged that police actions against plaintiffs constituted retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, unlawful seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrests were violations of procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, class certification, declaratory relief, money damages with interest, and attorney's fees and costs of the suit. They also submitted separate motions for class certification and an expedited motion for a temporary restraining order. The next day the case was assigned to Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright and referred to Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz. On June 5, 2020, defendants opposed plaintiff's motions for class certification and the TRO. Three days later plaintiffs amended their complaint to add an individual plaintiff and to add the Communications Workers of America as a plaintiff. The next day, Judge Wright issued an order denying class certification and denying the TRO. Regarding class certification she said that plaintiffs would need to wait for more discovery to happen. On the TRO she said that there was no evidence, nor did plaintiffs allege, that the behavior plaintiffs sought to enjoin was persistent beyond May 31, 2020. To grant the TRO, the behavior plaintiffs sought to enjoin must have been "imminent." 2020 WL 3056705. On June 22, 2020, one defendant asked for more time to respond to the complaint. One of those defendants was given until August 3 to respond. Before defendants could respond, however, plaintiffs then asked to file a second amended complaint. They filed the second amended complaint on July 30. The new complaint added charges of civil conspiracy to deprive rights, failure to intervene in defense of rights, violations of Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and another count of violating the First Amendment, this time via a theory on retaliation. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.
<|assistant|>
This case, filed on June 2nd, 2020, dealt with the tactics of Minneapolis police amidst the spring and summer protests that erupted nationwide after the police killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff was a freelance journalist who argued that police actions in response to these protests constituted violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought class certification that would cover other journalists covering the protests. An amended complaint filed soon after the original added another individual and the Communications Workers of America as plaintiffs, seeking class representative status for them as well. A second amended complaint added violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to intervene in defense of plaintiffs' rights. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 24, 2009, Medicaid-eligible children with psychiatric and behavioral disorders living in Washington filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by Disability Rights Washington, the National Health Law Program, the National Center for Youth Law, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services under the Medicaid Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to address the lack of community-based mental health services for Medicaid-eligible children in Washington State. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's system for providing Medicaid-funded services to children with mental health needs violated the Medicaid Act’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which required coverage of "medically necessary" healthcare services. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the state's very limited mental health services, children with psychiatric disorders were often untreated or under-treated, which lead to consequences such as involvement in the child welfare system, juvenile detention, or academic failure. Because available services in the community were so limited, children often had to go to institutions to receive care. The plaintiffs alleged that such frequent institutionalization violated the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act under <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11643"><i>Olmstead</i></a>. On July 23, 2010, the court (Judge Thomas S. Zilly) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. After a period of mediation, the parties entered an interim settlement agreement on March 7, 2010. The interim agreement was scheduled to last through June 2013, but on June 28, 2013, the court agreed to a stipulation submitted by both parties to extend the interim agreement until the final Settlement Agreement was approved. The stipulation noted that both parties were cooperating and making good progress toward the final agreement. Under the interim agreement, the state began to restructure and expand mental health care programs for Medicaid-eligible children. The plaintiffs submitted a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement on August 29, 2013. On December 19, 2013, the court granted the joint motion for final approval of the proposed settlement but retained jurisdiction to monitor compliance. Under the settlement, Washington agreed to create a new care coordination program known as Wraparound with Intensive Services (WISe) to connect children with home and community-based direct services, crisis intervention services, and intensive care coordination that puts the child and their caregiver at the center of decision-making. The state also agreed to increase the number of children who can access services over the next five years and submit a plan for fulfilling the rest of their obligations to the court. The state further agreed to give yearly status reports to the court and pay $3.1 million to the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. The agreement was set to last until June 2018. On November 16, 2015, the defendants submitted a status report on their progress towards accomplishing the goals of their settlement. The report claimed that some children were already having some success in WISe or "WISe-like" programs but that the program has not yet reached the scope required under the settlement agreement. As of November 16, 2015, 19 Washington counties offered the program. The goal was to equip all 39 of the counties with WISe programs before the agreement would be terminated in June of 2018. On November 15, 2018, the defendants submitted another status report on their progress towards accomplishing the goals of their settlement, focusing on progress between 2017-18. The report noted that as of November 15, 2018, the state of Washington anticipated achieving substantial compliance by June 30, 2019, a delay from the original anticipated completion date of June 2018. As of June 2018, all of Washington’s 39 counties had started implementing WISe programs, and the state was meeting 88% of the monthly substantial compliance caseload target. But the state was still working to build sufficient provider capacity and to meet monthly caseload target numbers. In 2019, the parties agreed to a one-year extension to June 30, 2020, because Washington was struggling to meet the existing deadline. On September 12, 2019, the defendants agreed to pay an additional $310,000 in attorneys’ fees for costs incurred over the prior year. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Children with psychiatric and behavioral disorders filed a class action complaint alleging that Washington's system of mental health services for Medicaid-eligible children was inadequate. Parties reached a settlement agreement for expanded intensive home- and community-based services for all Medicaid-eligible children statewide. Implementation was expected to be complete by June 2018, but has been delayed to June 2020.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 28, 2005, nine individuals with developmental disabilities filed this lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the Illinois Department of Human Services, and the Illinois Department of Public Health in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that they were eligible for long term care through state administered Medicaid Services but were forced to reside in large congregate care institutions rather than community based facilities as a condition of receiving care in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A group of developmentally disabled individuals who could receive community-based care but did not wish to do so sought to intervene. On December 22, 2005, the district court (Judge James F. Holderman) denied this petition on the grounds that their rights were not at issue in the case. This group appealed, but on February 15, 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Easterbrook, Kanne, and Williams) affirmed the district court. On March 7, 2006, the district court (Judge Holderman) certified a class consisting of all persons in Illinois with developmental disabilities who qualified for long term care and were capable of being cared for in a community based facility but were either institutionalized in large congregate care facilities or at risk of being so institutionalized. The parties reached agreement on a consent decree and submitted it to the court on November 13, 2008. Numerous objections were filed by those who feared they would be forced into community based care or that institutionalized care would suffer because of the consent decree. On July 7, 2009, the court (Judge Holderman) refused to approve the consent decree and decertified the class on the grounds that the named plaintiffs did not represent class members who either were not eligible for community based treatment or did not wish to have such treatment. On August 31, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint narrowing the proposed class to only those individuals who had requested community based placements. On January 25, 2010, the parties filed a revised consent decree and motion for class certification. On January 26, 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of the revised consent decree. A number of previous objectors sought to intervene and on April 7, 2010, the court (Judge Holderman) granted their motion for limited intervention. The parties and the intervenors proceeded to negotiate and on January 11, 2011, the parties and intervenors filed a motion for class certification and preliminary approval of a new consent decree. The court (Judge Holderman) granted these motions on January 13, 2011. The consent decree provided for increased placement of developmentally disabled individuals into community based treatment programs should they desire it, a statewide database and waitlist, and the development of transition service plans. It also contained measures protecting institutionalized care, and called for various benchmarks and the appointment of a monitor. Judge Holderman approved the consent decree on June 15, 2011. Since monitoring began in 2011, the monitor, Tony Records, had filed three yearly reports, reporting one major instance of noncompliance in 2012 when an intermediate care facility serving 205 individuals closed quickly and residents were transitioned to new placements without the protected processes required by the consent decree. The 2013 report noted concerns about reimbursement to intermediate care facilities and other issues that would require additional efforts by the defendants. On June 17, 2015, the court Executive Committee reassigned the case to Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman because Judge Holderman retired. In June of 2015, the Illinois state legislature faced a budget crisis, so the court (Judge Coleman), approved the parties' Agreed Order on June 30, 2015, that even in the absence of an FY2016 budget, the state of Illinois would continue to pay all service providers covered under the consent decree. However, in an order issued August 18, 2015, Judge Coleman noted that in absence of a state budget, the State Comptroller had issued letters describing the state's intent to only pay for services provided to members of the class covered by the consent decree. Since many services providers work with both class members and non-class members across the population with developmental disabilities, this practice put the entire population at risk, and Judge Coleman ordered that the state continue timely payments for all service providers. In response to an emergency motion filed by plaintiffs and intervenors, Judge Coleman issued another order on September 1, 2015, again ordering the state to make timely payments for services to individuals with developmental disabilities in the interim until the state passed an FY 2016 budget. On June 22, 2016, Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted a proposed Agreed Order which would order the State to continue to pay for all services and personnel required by the consent decree during FY 2017. Judge Johnson Coleman granted the order on June 28, 2016, requiring the State to provide funding in the absence of a FY 2017 budget. The Monitor's Fourth Annual Report, submitted in January 2016, indicated several concerns over the State's financial status and its impact on resources available to implement the decree, particularly with respect to shortages staff members able to provide adequate services to class members in the community. This was true despite defendants' efforts to implement the terms of the decree. The Fifth Annual Report, filed in January of 2017, indicated that there had been no improvement with respect to direct service provider shortages over the past year. It also noted that, because of staffing shortages, the availability of small community assisted living homes was actually decreasing. Another concern noted was the availability of adequate day activity and employment programs. Citing the Monitor's findings, on April 7, 2017, plaintiffs and intervenors filed a joint motion to enforce the consent decree. They indicated that a major reason behind defendants' failure to properly implement the decree was the State's inadequate reimbursement rates. On August 11, 2017, Judge Coleman granted the motion, finding that defendants had failed to provide class members by failing to provide them with resources of sufficient quality, scope, and variety. On August 18, 2017, she ordered defendants to devise a plan to address the issues causing the reduction in services and to bring the State into substantial compliance. Defendants attempted to formulate a compliance plan that would meet the consent decree's standards and be practical given the State's budgetary constraints. On March 30, 2018, and April 11, 2018, defendants submitted status reports in which they described actions taken to bring the State into compliance. Judge Coleman found that the State's efforts did not bring it into compliance in a June 6, 2018, order. The order did recognize a "good faith effort" on the part of the defendants consisting of: <ul> <li> A pilot program to expand access to direct support professionals (DSPs). </li> <li> Funding increases for DSPs. </li> <li> Enhanced monitoring of service delivery. </li> <li> Additional programmatic improvements. </li> </ul> Judge Coleman directed defendants to "develop adequate solutions" to the continuing problems. A status hearing was held on July 10, 2018, where the parties reported on the progress addressing four primary areas to bring the State in compliance with the consent decree. On September 12, 2018, the monitor reported on the progress of the parties. A Rates Methodology Oversight Committee has been established and a meeting schedule has been set. A draft tool for a quality monitoring program has also been developed. As of November 15, the State of Illinois has not approved the implementation of the draft tool On May 10, 2019, the monitor reported that the parties have made progress on most issues, including implementing the monitoring compliance tool. However, concerns remain regarding the timeline for hiring the third-party vendor. On November 14, 2019, the monitor reported that federal CMS has approved the 3.5% increase for community-based providers, which will implement a rate increase to $13.00/hour, and that it expects the process for approval of the 3.5% rate increase for ICF-DD providers will continue into January 2020. The next status hearing is set for January 17, 2020 and the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On July 28, 2005 plaintiffs, nine individuals with developmental disabilities, filed suit against the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the Illinois Department of Human Services, and the Illinois Department of Public Health in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that they were eligible for long term care through state administered Medicaid Services but were forced to reside in large congregate care institutions rather than community based facilities as a condition of receiving that care. After several years of litigation, on June 15, 2011, the court granted approval of a consent decree submitted by the parties and intervenors and granted class certification to the new class. The monitor found minimal noncompliance over the next three years, until the budget crisis in 2015 led to the state missing payments to providers. The court issued three orders between June and September 2015 compelling the state to pay providers in a timely manner. The State was also found to be in noncompliance in 2016 and 2017, and in August of 2017, the court issued an Order to enforce the decree. As of November 14, 2019, the monitor reported that federal CMS has approved the 3.5% increase for community-based providers, which will implement a rate increase to $13.00/hour, and that it expects the process for approval of the 3.5% rate increase for ICF-DD providers will continue into January 2020.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is another response to efforts by the Trump Administration to strip law enforcement funding from states and certain local jurisdictions unless their governments agree to participate in federal immigration enforcement. On August 23, 2018, the State of California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by its attorney general, sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Attorney General under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the Mandamus Statute. The plaintiff claimed that by unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the State, the government violated the spending clause and the APA. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the JAG certification requirements were unconstitutional, injunctive relief barring their use, and mandamus compelling the defendants to issue and disperse FY2018 funds, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. California had been receiving federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, a criminal justice grant administered by the DOJ and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The plaintiff alleged that in 2017 the DOJ imposed unprecedented immigration enforcement conditions on recipients of JAG funding and that courts across the country had since struck those conditions as unconstitutional. The plaintiff also alleged that rather than change these conditions, the DOJ maintained a requirement for FY2018 grants that the chief law officer of the jurisdiction applying for the grant certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits local government entities from imposing restrictions on the exchange of information regarding an individual’s immigration or citizenship status, among other statutes. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore, but was later reassigned to Judge William Orrick after it was related to another case challenging the FY2018 funding conditions; that case can be found <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16739">here</a>. On November 1, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On December 3, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for partial summary judgment. They made the same arguments as the appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit regarding FY2017 conditions: basically, that the conditions were lawfully authorized by statute. The plaintiffs cross-filed for summary judgment in their response three weeks later. On March 4, 2019, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Judge Orrick found that the challenged conditions were ultra vires and violated the separation of powers; that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was unconstitutional; that the Attorney General exceeded the Spending Clause by imposing ambiguous conditions on Byrne JAG grants in FY2018; that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA; that California was entitled to mandamus relief; and that a nationwide injunction was warranted but stayed. On March 26, Judge Orrick issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants from using the FY2018 Byrne JAG funding conditions for any California state entity, San Francisco, any California political subdivision, or any jurisdiction in the United States. The judge then stayed the nationwide aspect of the permanent injunction until further rulings from the Ninth Circuit (which had expressed concerns over the nationwide nature of the relief during the 2017 litigation over Byrne JAG funding conditions). On May 3, 2019, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 19-15950). The parties subsequently entered mediation conferences. In November 2019, the Ninth Circuit stayed the appeals. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2018, the State of California filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the Department of Justice was again unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the State in violation of the spending clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff in March 2019 and entered a permanent injunction. The defendants appealed and the case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 29, 2015, a nineteen-year-old man from Decatur, Georgia, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against DeKalb County and Judicial Correction Services, Inc. ("JCS"). The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and private practice, asked the court for damages, claiming that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they incarcerated him for five days in the county jail because he was unable to pay $838 in fines and fees stemming from a traffic ticket within thirty days of sentencing. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by revoking his probation and incarcerating him for failing to pay court-imposed fines without conducting a hearing to determine his ability to pay, the adequacy of his efforts to obtain the resources needed to pay, and any alternatives to incarceration. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants failed during the probation revocation proceedings to inform him of his right to request court-appointed legal assistance and that they failed to provide such assistance when it became apparent that the plaintiff was indigent. The plaintiff's traffic violation constituted the underlying offense in this case. On October 9, 2014, the plaintiff pled guilty to driving with a suspended license before the DeKalb County Recorder's Court. He was sentenced to an $810 fine. After the plaintiff said that he was unable to pay on that day, the judge ordered him to pay the fine and other court fees within thirty days and to serve twelve months of probation with JCS. The company eventually charged the plaintiff with violating his probation for failure to pay, and the plaintiff's probation was revoked and he was incarcerated after a brief hearing before the Recorder's Court. The plaintiff claimed that his jailing was a direct result of the county's "pay-only probation" policy. Under this policy, the plaintiff argued, the county imposed probation solely to earn revenue from indigent people who often cannot afford to pay the sentencing fines and fees stemming from their traffic offenses or county ordinance violations. The parties announced that they reached a private settlement agreement on March 18, 2015. Under the settlement, the defendants would pay a lump sum of $70,000 for damages and attorneys' fees. The chief judge of the DeKalb County Recorder's Court also agreed to take measures to ensure that the court's judges and personnel respect the rights of people who cannot afford the probation fines and fees. For example, the court adopted "bench cards" listing general policies to assist judges in avoiding incarcerating indigent people unable to pay the fines. The cards specify the legal alternatives to jail and provide that judges must conduct an "economic ability-to-pay hearing" before sending a probationer to jail for failing to pay fines and fees. The cards also inform judges about the specific procedures for protecting people's right to counsel during probation revocation proceedings. In addition to providing bench cards for each judge, the Recorder's Court also agreed to conduct training sessions for court personnel to explain probationers' right to counsel and their right to an indigency hearing. Finally, the court revised its petition revocation forms in order to better inform probationers of their right to court-appointed counsel in revocation proceedings and their right to request a waiver of the $50 fee for such counsel if they cannot afford it. On April 3, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, presumably due to the settlement. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On January 29, 2015, a nineteen-year-old man from Decatur, Georgia, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DeKalb County and Judicial Correction Services, Inc. He asked the court for damages, claiming that the defendants violated his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when they incarcerated him for five days in the county jail because he was unable to pay $838 in fines and fees stemming from a traffic ticket. The parties reached a settlement agreement on March 18, 2015. Under the proposed settlement, the defendants will pay a lump sum of $70,000 for damages and attorneys' fees. The chief judge of the DeKalb County Recorder's Court also agreed to take measures to ensure that the court's judges and personnel respect the rights of people who cannot afford the probation fines and fees. Such measures include adopting "bench cards" to inform judges of probationers' rights and conducting trainings for court personnel. The case is now closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 9, 2005, a group of individuals whose applications for employment with the City and County of Honolulu had been rejected brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court District of Hawaii to challenge constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory pre-employment residency requirement for public employment. The law in question, Hawaii Revised Statute Section 78-1(c), provided: <blockquote>All persons seeking employment with the government of the State or in the service of any county shall be citizens, nationals, or permanent resident aliens of the United States, or eligible under federal law for unrestricted employment in the United States, and residents of the State at the time of their application for employment and as a condition of eligibility for continued employment. "Resident" means a person who is physically present in the State at the time the person claims to have established the person's domicile in the State and shows the person's intent is to make Hawaii the person's permanent residence. In determining this intent, the following factors shall be considered: (1) Maintenance of a domicile or permanent place of residence in the State; (2) Absence of residency in another state; and (3) Former residency in the State. </blockquote> Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Hawaii, argued that to be unconstitutional because it had the impermissible purpose of deterring migration into the State. They sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the law. The District Court (Judge David Alan Ezra) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 423 F.Supp.2d 1094 (D.Hawaii 2006). Plaintiffs then filed motions for summary judgment and for permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the law. Judge Ezra found the law to be unconstitutional and granted plaintiffs' motions. Defendants' counter motion for summary judgment was denied. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 460 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Hawai'i 2006). Defendants appealed. While the appeal was pending, the challenged provisions of the law were repealed by 2007 Hawaii Laws Act 52 (H.B. 1750). The state then filed an unopposed motion to vacate the district court judgment, due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. The case was remanded to the District Court for closing. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs.
<|assistant|>
On June 9, 2005, a group of individuals whose applications for employment with the City and County of Honolulu had been rejected brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court District of Hawaii to challenge constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory pre-employment residency requirement for public employment. The law in question provided that any state employment seeker be a citizen, national, or LPR. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction. Both were granted. While on appeal, the unlawful provisions were repealed, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to vacate the judgment due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 12, 2018, three mothers seeking asylum in the United States filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all those similarly situated nationwide. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), along with their respective agency heads, for allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Each of the three named plaintiffs had been separated from their minor children upon being detained in the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by the Immigrant Advocacy and Litigation Center, the University of Southern California, and public counsel, sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government’s immigrant family separation policy. See <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html">“How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families.”</a> The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge John A. Kronstadt. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following: Plaintiff Ms. P, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing a physically and sexually abusive relationship in her native Guatemala. Ms. P and her daughter were detained near the border and placed in a windowless room that lacked basic amenities alongside 150 other detainees. Here, Ms. P witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, whose distress was mocked by the detention officers. On May 20, after several days in these conditions, Ms. P’s daughter was taken away, with no indication given as to when, or if, Ms. P would see her again. About two weeks later, Ms. P received notice of her daughter’s location. They were not permitted contact with one another until June 22, when they were able to speak via telephone. According to licensed clinical social workers familiar with Ms. P and her daughter, they are both showing signs of trauma, anxiety, and depression as a result of the ongoing separation. Ms. P has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address these concerns. Plaintiff Ms. O, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing gang violence in her native Honduras. Upon crossing the border, Ms. O and her daughter flagged down a patrol car. They were then processed and detained separately at a nearby facility. Ms. O was placed in a holding cell that resembled a chain-link dog kennel with 50 other women and no basic amenities. Here, Ms. O witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, who were taunted by the detention officers. On May 21, Ms. O, along with 50 other detainees, was taken to court where she plead guilty to criminal illegal entry though she did not understand the consequences. After the proceeding, Ms. O was transferred to another facility without her daughter. Ms. O did not learn of her daughter’s whereabouts until May 30. She and her daughter have spoken over the phone only three times for less than five minutes since being separated. Ms. O has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address her trauma. Plaintiff Ms. M, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 18, 2018 after fleeing domestic and gang violence in her native El Salvador. Upon crossing the border, Ms. M and her daughter flagged down a patrol car and were immediately taken to facility and separated for questioning. Ms. M was mocked by detention officers during this questioning. Ms. M was kept in a “cage” that lacked basic amenities with 40-50 other women. Food was scarce, and the guards would sometimes throw crackers on the floor of the cell and laugh as the hungry women scrambled to pick them up. From her cage, Ms. M could see her daughter crying in a separate cell. On May 21, Ms. M was taken to criminal proceedings with 50 other detainees where she believed she had to, and did, plead guilty though she did not understand the consequences. After these proceedings, Ms. M was transferred to another facility. She did not learn of her daughter’s location or condition until her mother, who is a permanent legal resident of the United States, provided her with this information on May 25. On June 22, Ms. M was able to speak with her daughter, who was crying uncontrollably, on the phone for about one minute. Ms. M was released on bond on July 12. On July 12, the plaintiffs sought to have their lawsuit declared “related” to the <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9493">1985 Flores</a> case, which had resulted in an important and long-lasting immigration settlement agreement. Judge Dolly M. Gee declined to transfer the case to Flores because this action sought affirmative relief separate and apart from the Flores Settlement Agreement and did not call for a determination of the same questions of law or fact. On July 18, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide meaningful access to mental health care screening and treatment to the plaintiffs and other proposed class members. On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, proposing to define the class as all adult parents nationwide who (1) were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child. On September 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In January 2019 the parties entered settlement discussions and the court selected Senior District Judge James S. Otero to preside over settlement proceedings between the parties. Several settlement conferences were held but the case was eventually sent back to Judge Kronstadt in October 2019 after the parties failed to come to an agreement. On November 5, 2019, Judge Kronstadt granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. He certified the following class: <blockquote>"All adult parents nationwide who entered the U.S. at or between designated ports of entry, who (1) on or after July 1, 2017, were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or ORR custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child."</blockquote> He also certified the following subclasses: <blockquote>"(i) the Custody Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who are currently or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (ii) the Released Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who were previously detained in immigration custody by DHS, but who have since been release."</blockquote> Next, Judge Kronstadt found that the plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim with respect to both subclasses. 2019 WL 6723686. The court ordered that the defendants make available, to all members of the subclasses who elect to have them, medically appropriate initial mental health screenings, diagnoses, and treatment (if requested) by qualified professionals. On November 27, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 19-56400). They also requested that the district court stay the case pending resolution of the appeal. On February 21, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal. On March 24, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay the case, including pending discovery, through January 10, 2021. The parties reported that on March 11, 2020, defendant DHHS had finalized a contract with a non-profit organization to implement the preliminary injunction as to the Released Subclass. As to the Custody Subclass, defendant DHS would provide notice to class members of available services and the ICE Health Service Corps Behavioral Health Unit would provide screenings and any necessary treatment. Consequently, the parties requested a stay while this relief is provided. The district court granted the stay the same day, ordering the defendants to file status reports every sixty days, with the first report due on May 22, 2020. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On July 12, 2018, three mothers who came to the United States seeking asylum and who, upon being detained, were separated from their minor children, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the government to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government’s immigrant family separation policy. On November 5, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court ordered the defendants to begin providing class members with mental health screenings and any necessary treatment. The defendants initially appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal. The parties negotiated plans to implement the relief ordered by the district court and on March 24, they filed a joint stipulation to stay the case through January 10, 2021, while the relief is provided. The court granted the stay and ordered the defendants to file status reports every sixty days.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 9, 2009, the Native American Council of Tribes and current and former Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary were forbidden from using tobacco in their Native American rituals and ceremonies. Therefore, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of due process and their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs alleged that there were other, less restrictive means that the South Dakota State Penitentiary could accomplish their goals. The United States filed a Statement of the Interest with the Court on July 16, 2012, stating that the defendant’s arguments were a request for the court to determine the importance and centrality of tobacco to Plaintiff’s religious practices. This was a problem because under common law and the RLUIPA, courts are forbidden from inquiring into the centrality of beliefs to religions. In response to a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants on February 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) decided that Plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Furthermore, the court stated that Plaintiffs did not have claims under international law, as they did not create an independent cause of action for Plaintiffs. This left the First, Fourteenth, and RLUIPA claims for the jury to decide at trial. The trial began on March 27, 2012. The Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs’ Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs’ beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco was part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an “essential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.” The Court also held that there was not a compelling government interest in the ban of tobacco and, even if there was, a total ban was not the least restrictive means as required by RLUIPA. 897 F. Supp. 2d 828. On January 25, 2013, the District Court ordered a remedial order that limited the amount of tobacco to be 1% of the total mixture used for religious ceremonies. This was in accordance with the statements of one of the plaintiffs who argued that it did not matter how much tobacco was in the mixture, but rather that tobacco was present in the mixture. 2013 WL 310633. The Plaintiffs were then granted attorneys’ fees in the amount of $75,350.87. The Defendants appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 25, 2013. On April 24, 2014 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision for the same reasons asserted by the District Court. 750 F.3d 742. On January 7, 2016 the Eight Circuit denied the defendants’ petition for rehearing en banc. On July 5, 2016, the Court determined that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the remedial order was an attempt to add claims to the case rather than amend. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motions were denied. On August 9, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to modify the remedial order because there was not a significant change in the facts or law. The Court also denied Plaintiff's motion for TRO to prohibit defendants from banning tobacco in religious ceremonies, finding that the claim is moot because that relief was already included in the Court's original order. Finally, the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend their complaint because the case was already decided on its merits. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On December 9, 2009, Native American inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of due process and their first amendment right to free exercise of religion. On March 27, 2012, the Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs’ Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs’ beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco is part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an “essential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.”
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 6,000 incarcerated individuals to challenge the inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons, alleging that the Mississippi Department of Corrections' response to the pandemic violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act and the Constitution. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order requiring defendants to implement remedial measures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. The parties jointly stayed all proceedings on September 15 and entered settlement talks on October 22. <hr> On May 14, 2020, nine named plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit to challenge the Mississippi Department of Corrections's ("MDOC") inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons: Central Mississippi Correctional Facility ("CMCF") and South Mississippi Correctional Institute ("SMCI"). The plaintiffs, represented by the Mississippi Center for Justice, the ACLU of Mississippi, and private counsel, sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that MDOC's failure to adequately implement baseline protection measures in response to COVID-19 at CMCF and SMCI violated the Eighth Amendment, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, they alleged that overcrowding at CMCF and SMCI made social distancing infeasible; that inmates were not provided access to adequate disinfecting supplies; and that systemwide, MDOC had tested less than 0.5% of its prison population for COVID-19. The case was assigned to Judge Tom S. Lee. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of inmates who were currently incarcerated, or would be in the future, in CMCF or SMCI during the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought to certify a "disability subclass" of people who suffered from a disability that substantially limited one or more of their major life activities and who were at increased risk of contracting, becoming severely ill and/or dying from COVID-19 due to their disability or any medical treatment necessary to treat their disability. The § 1983 allegations were brought on behalf of the whole class, while the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations were brought only on behalf of members of the disability subclass. The plaintiffs in the disability class alleged that the defendants had intentionally discriminated against members of the disability subclass in violation of the ADA Act and the Rehabilitation Act by denying them reasonable accommodations, including accommodations recommended by the CDC. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction requiring defendants to take steps to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19, including the following: (1) implementing facility-wide protocols for reporting, obtaining soap, etc.; (2) conducting immediate testing for anyone displaying symptoms; (3) implementing remedial measures like intensified cleaning procedures and social distancing; (4) informing inmates of reporting procedures for non-compliant staff members; and (5) providing incarcerated individuals with disinfecting supplies and personal hand soap. Plaintiffs also sought appointment of an independent monitor and attorneys' fees and costs. On May 25, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, requesting the court to require the defendants to implement efforts to mitigate and manage infection and the spread of COVID-19 at CMCF and SMCI. On August 3, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Robert P. Myers, Jr. On September 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw the previous motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and filed a joint motion with defendants to stay all proceedings. Judge Myers granted the motion on October 1. On October 22, the parties attended a status conference to initiate settlement negotiations and the case remains ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On May 14, 2020, plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit to challenge the Mississippi Department of Corrections's ("MDOC") inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons: Central Mississippi Correctional Facility ("CMCF") and South Mississippi Correctional Institute ("SMCI"). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that MDOC's failure to adequately implement baseline protection measures at CMCF and SMCI violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the implementation of mitigation measures to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 on May 25, but later withdrew the motion and moved to stay the proceedings on September 15. The parties then entered settlement negotiations and the next status conference was set for February 22, 2021.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 25, 2013, a Native Hawaiian resident of Hawaii filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii against the state. The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asked the court to enjoin a recently enacted state law that allows same-sex couples to marry, claiming that that the beliefs and culture of Native Hawaiians were violated by the Hawaiian Marriage Equality Act of 2013. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Native Hawaiians had a special relationship with the state of Hawaii and the United States Federal Government. He alleged that this relationship was supported by the Hawaii Admission Act of 1959, the Native Hawaiian Education Act of 1994, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, and many others. He believes that Native Hawaiians have an express right to preserve their culture, value, languages, and religious customs, and that the practice of same-sex marriage was against the moral values of the majority of Native Hawaiians. He claimed that the state had breached its duty to the Hawaiian people, and that a court-ordered injunction of the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013 was a necessary step towards repairing the breach. The district court (Judge Susan Oki Mollway) did not grant an injunction, and instead issued an order on February 19, 2014 denying as moot all pending orders. The court stated that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this claim as he was not able to present a particularized injury that he would suffer or any clear constitutional claims that were violated. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the decision on August 4, 2016. The Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc on October 24. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On November 25, 2013, a Native Hawaiian resident of Hawaii filed a lawsuit in the District of Hawaii U.S. District Court against the state. The plaintiff, who represented himself, asked the court to enjoin a recently enacted state law that allows same-sex couples to marry, claiming that that the beliefs and culture of Native Hawaiians were violated by the Hawaiian Marriage Equality Act of 2013. The district court did not grant an injunction, and stated that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The case is now closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is one of the many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from the ACA regulation's mandatory insurance coverage for contraception. The current regulatory accommodation allows religious organizations who object for religious reasons to providing contraceptive coverage for their employees to notify their insurer, or notify the government directly, of that objection. Then, the government will work with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure the employees have access to contraception. The religious employers claimed that this approach violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because they see their action of notifying the government as starting a chain of events that results in their employees receiving contraception. This particular lawsuit was filed by Union University, a Baptist college, on Apr. 4, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and claimed that the ACA's contraception mandate violated its sincerely held religious beliefs, the First Amendment's establishment clause and freedom of speech, and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. The university moved for a preliminary injunction blocking HHS from implementing the mandate. HHS did not oppose the motion. Though the agency did not believe the university would win on the merits, it agreed that the case should be stayed in light of two similar cases currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13451&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseType%7CFA%3BcaseState%7CMI%3BcaseNum%7C0014%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B ">Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6838707 (W.D. Mich.)</a> and <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13434 ">Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D. Tenn.)</a>. On Apr. 29, 2014, District Judge Daniel Breen granted the preliminary injunction and stayed the case until thirty days after the issuance of a mandate by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pending resolution of either of the two aforementioned pending cases. The Court of Appeals consolidated <i>Michigan Catholic Conference</i> and <i>Catholic Diocese of Nashville</i>, and on June 11, 2014, affirmed the District Judges' denials of preliminary injunctions for all plaintiffs. The court found that organizations exempt from the contraception mandate experienced no burden on the exercise of their religion, and therefore were unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an "accommodation" under the law needed only to provide a "self-certification" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's free speech, free exercise, or establishment clauses. On Mar. 24, 2017, the present case was reassigned to Chief Judge Thomas S. Anderson. On Oct. 31, 2017, the Sixth Circuit dismissed both<i>Michigan Catholic Conference</i> and <i>Catholic Diocese of Nashville</i>, which the defendants informed the court in a Nov. 3, 2017 status report. On Nov. 6, 2017, Judge Anderson granted the defendants' request to extend the injunction and stay, which had been scheduled to lift Nov. 30, 2017, until Dec. 4, 2017. On October 6, 2017, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/us/politics/trump-contraception-birth-control.html">President Trump changed federal government's policy</a> on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. On Nov. 16, 2017, the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the case, and on the same day, the Judge Anderson dismissed the case.
<|assistant|>
On April 4, 2014, Union University, a Baptist college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment against the Department of Health and Human Services. The school claimed the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act violated its religious beliefs. The plaintiff sought and was granted a preliminary injunction against the mandate, and a stay of the case, until the resolution of similar, pending appeals before the Sixth Circuit.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of prisoners subjected to unconstitutional conditions in San Francisco county jails, more specifically, those having been confined in their cells for up to 23.5 hours per day with total denial of access to direct sunlight or outdoor recreation. Plaintiffs sued the San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department, the City and County of San Francisco, and four members of the Sheriff’s Department for being directly involved in designing and implementing the policies that led to deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants for acting under the color of law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The violative conduct, plaintiffs alleged, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and contravened the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged two violations of the California Constitution and brought two tort claims against the Sheriff’s Office, for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs, represented by a local civil rights lawyer, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the physical and emotional ailments incurred due to deprivation of sunlight. On June 27, 2019 plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and on August 30, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court ruled on both motions on January 31, 2020, granting each in part and denying each in part. The preliminary injunction had challenged the sufficiency of the type of sunlight that prisoners received in their cells and the amount of time that inmates confined to their cells for 23.5 hours a day were allotted for outdoor exercise. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove specific harm from degree or quality of sunlight and that the defendants’ denial of outdoor exercise did not warrant a preliminary injunction for convicted prisoners, with a partial exception for prisoners in administrative segregation units. These prisoners were held in cells too small for meaningful exercise for 23.5 hours a day. The court ordered that these prisoners be allowed exercise in the gym for at least one hour a day for five days a week. The court did not order the defendant to provide outdoor exercise for these persons. However, the court found that for pretrial detainees, denial of direct sunlight for four years constituted unconstitutional punishment. Pretrial detainees, as innocent persons, have the right to be free from punishment generally under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not just cruel and unusual punishment vis a vis the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered that the defendant provide at least one hour of exposure to direct sunlight each week for pretrial detainees, absent disciplinary issues. The motion to dismiss was also granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all Eighth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees, deeming them redundant with respect to these plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claims. The motion to dismiss the federal claims against individual defendants was also granted because the court found that the defendants could not have reasonably known that they were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights at the time of their acts and were therefore entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. However, qualified immunity does not extend to state law claims, like those leveled under the California Constitution and the common law. Therefore, most of these claims were sustained, although the court required plaintiffs to amend certain elements of their complaint and removed certain defendants for jurisdictional reasons. Both parties appealed the ruling and the court granted a stay on the preliminary injunction while the two parties engage in settlement discussions. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On May 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of prisoners subjected to unconstitutional conditions in San Francisco county jails, more specifically those having been confined in their cells for up to 23.5 hours per day with total denial of access to direct sunlight or outdoor recreation. Plaintiffs sued the San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department, the City and County of San Francisco, and four members of the Sheriff’s Department for being directly involved in designing and implementing the policies that led to deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants for acting under the color of law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The violative conduct, plaintiffs alleged, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and contravened the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged two violations of the California Constitution and brought two tort claims, for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs, represented by a local civil rights lawyer, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the physical and emotional ailments incurred due to deprivation of sunlight.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: Female dispatchers are seeking a temporary restraining order banning their employer's (the City of Warren) policy that requires female dispatcher to conduct pat downs, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. The plaintiffs alleged that they are being exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19 solely because of their sex. No outcome yet. <hr> On March 27, 2020, the six female dispatchers filed this lawsuit against their employer, the City of Warren, in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Warren Police Department requires them, but not their male counterparts, to pat-down, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. By requiring the plaintiffs to conduct these activities without adequate protective gear, the plaintiffs claimed that they were being exposed to to the risk of the COVID-19 virus at a considerable risk to their health. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued under § 1983 for violations of their 14th Amendment Equal Protection rights and under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. They alleged that the unlawfully adverse conditions of employment have now placed them in dire and immediate danger. The plaintiffs also filed a claim with the EEOC alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII and anticipate amending the complaint once the EEOC has conducted its responsibility. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order that would require the defendants to end their policy of directing female dispatchers to perform custodial searches of female prisoners. They also sought protection from retaliation, and a detailed report showing Defendant's steps to ensure that no female dispatchers are required to conduct these searches again. On April 1, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental notice of facts, informing the court that a City of Warren police officer had tested positive for COVID-19 and that nine other employees were in quarantine for possible exposure. They also documented their attempts to contact the defendants to secure protective measures themselves, which the defendants failed to respond to. The plaintiffs argued that this change of facts further demonstrated their need for the court to enter an order granting their emergency temporary restraining order and to provide injunctive relief. The plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on April 10, adding additional plaintiffs. On April 15, two of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaints. On May 1, the defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint On August 14th, 2020 the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on November 12, 2020 and the court denied both plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on their finding that plaintiffs stated causes of action for which relief can be granted and that there are issues of fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment. On November 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, adding claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex. The case remains ongoing in the discovery phase.
<|assistant|>
6 female dispatchers are seeking a temporary restraining order banning their employer's (the City of Warren) policy that requires female dispatcher to conduct pat downs, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. The plaintiffs alleged that they are being exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19 solely because of their sex. No outcome yet.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 23, 2007, a Latino borrower filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Chase Bank USA and JP Morgan Chase & Co, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiff alleged racially discriminatory lending practices in connection with home mortgage loan he took out from Chase. Specifically, he alleged that Chase was engaged in both intentional and disparate impact discrimination through its development and implementation of mortgage pricing policies and procedures that resulted in less favorable loan conditions to non-white borrowers as compared to similarly situated white borrowers. The case then went into mediation. In August 14, 2008, the parties entered a joint stipulation to dismiss JP Morgan as a defendant. On August 15, 2008, the Court (Judge Andrew Guilford) ordered that JP Morgan was to be dismissed without prejudice, but the plaintiff reserved a right to conduct discovery with respect to it. On January 16, 2009, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The complaint was a class action allegation, adding another two named plaintiffs, against Chase Bank USA. The amended complaint alleged that Chase engaged in practices that had a disparate impact on minorities (defined as any non-Caucasian minority). It was alleged that Chase developed mortgage pricing policies that provided financial incentives to its authorized loan officers, mortgage brokers and corresponding lenders to make subjective decisions to increase interest rate and charge additional fees to minority borrowers. That allegedly led to minorities receiving higher interest rates and costs than non-minority borrowers in a similar situation. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory and equitable relief, and damages. The parties eventually settled on March 10, 2010. Under the agreement, the parties sought to certify following class: "All African-American and Hispanic borrowers who, since August 23,2005, obtained a mortgage loan originated through Chase's wholesale channel." The minority borrowers that paid off their loans could claim either a $300 credit towards the closing costs of his or her next loan with Chase, or a check for $70. Existing non-delinquent borrowers could receive either a $300 credit, or a $90 check. Above borrowers, and delinquent borrowers, were entitled to "red carpet access" for loan modification services with dedicated 800 numbers, and dedicated personnel with fair housing and lending training. The "red carpet access" was to be in effect for 2 years from the date of the agreement. The defendant had to submit quarterly reports during that period to class counsel, as well as maintain a settlement website. The defendant agreed to pay $1,95 million in attorney's fees. Each class representative received $5,000. On May 17, 2010, the Court ordered a preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, pending a fairness hearing. On November 9, 2010, the Court issued a final judgment, approving the settlement agreement. The court certified the class above as a settlement class. The Court retained jurisdiction over the agreement for its duration.
<|assistant|>
On August 23, 2007, a Latino borrower filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Chase Bank USA and JP Morgan Chase & Co, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On January 16, 2009, the plaintiff filed a first amended class action complaint, alleging hat Chase engaged in lending practices that had a disparate impact on minorities. On November 9, 2010, the Court approved a settlement agreement in which the defendant agreed to issue credit or a payment to its paid off or existing borrowers, and "red carpet access" to delinquent borrowers with trained personnel. The defendant also paid $1.95 million in attorney's fees.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 4, 2013, a death row inmate at the Connecticut Northern Correctional Institution (NCI) filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Corrections and six other state officials in their official and individual capacities under 42 USC § 1983 and the ADA. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a release from 23 hour-per-day solitary confinement, an end to universal use of restraints while outside of his cell, access to group religious services, visitation rights, a return of private property, and mental health care. The plaintiff also sought compensation and damages. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Article I Section 10 Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses, and the 1949 Geneva Convention prohibition on collective punishment (this last charge and Fifth Amendment claims were dropped after he received legal representation). The plaintiff had originally been sentenced to death and served 21 years on death row. After the state abolished capital punishment in 2015, he was re-sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole in 2017 (during this litigation). Throughout the 23 years of his sentence prior to the time of filing, the plaintiff lived in a 12x7 foot concrete cell with only a three-inch wide window. He spent between 22 and 23 hours every day in this cell. He had extremely limited contact with other prisoners and was handcuffed or shackled whenever he left his cell. He sought injunctive relief to order the state to release him from solitary confinement and place him in the general prison population, to pay back wages, to allow group 7th Day Adventist religious services, to return all personal property, to stop the elevated uses of restraints, to improve mental health care, to provide better access to recreation and dining facilities, to restore his security levels and accompanying privileges to his pre-2017 status, to end collective punishments, and to end discrimination against life-term inmates. The case was assigned to Judge Stefan R. Underhill. In 2014, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel for settlement conferences. On March 3, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants first claimed that they were immune in their official capacities from money damages under the Eleventh Amendment, and second that they were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. They also argued that the conditions on death row were constitutional and satisfied the Eighth Amendment. But before the court ruled on the motion or the plaintiff even replied, a clinical professor at Columbia University School of Law was appointed as pro bono counsel for the plaintiff. The motion was denied as moot and the plaintiff was given opportunity to amend with new counsel. After multiple extensions were granted, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2017. The plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that state statutes that transferred former death row prisoners to solitary confinement unconstitutionally amounted to a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. The complaint also dropped claims of fifth amendment and Geneva Convention violations. The plaintiff still sought a permanent injunction, requesting that the defendants submit a plan to the court to release him from solitary confinement, provide mental health care, and end his physical and social isolation, end his sensory deprivation. After over a year of discovery, the parties filed cross-motion for summary judgment in November 2018. On August 27, 2019, Judge Stefan Underhill granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied the defendants’ motion. Judge Underhill found that the conditions of confinement violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because they were deliberately indifferent to the serious risks of the plaintiff's confinement. The court also found that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Furthermore, Judge Underhill found that the state's statute on death row was an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation of Article I Section 10 of the constitution. Judge Underhill granted permanent injunctive relief to the plaintiff. In a separate injunctive and declaratory relief order, the court ordered the state to end plaintiff’s placement in the high security confinement, to allow the plaintiff to leave his cell for more than four hours per day, and to stop his segregation from other prisoners. The court also ordered that the state provide a “meaningful individualized classification determination“ for plaintiff's security level every six months. The Judge also ordered that the state stop enforcement of the death row "special circumstances" policy against any current or future prisoner. Finally, the court ordered the state to submit a status report to him within 30 days detailing how these orders would be effectuated. On September 4, 2019, Judge Underhill granted in part the defendants’ motion to stay his order. But the order denied a request to stay the requirement of a 30-day status report. On September 9, 2019, the defendants appealed Judge Underhill’s order granting summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Docket No. 19-2858). On September 20, the defendants submitted a motion for stay to the District Court pending their appeal to the Circuit Court. On September 25, another prisoner held under the state "special circumstances" statute on death row filed a motion to intervene. The intervenor sought to oppose the stay of the injunction. The defendants also filed the status report that same day. On October 16, the court granted the stay as to determining damages but denied the stay as to enforcing injunctive relief. The case is pending appeal in the Second Circuit.
<|assistant|>
On October 4, 2013, a prisoner held in solitary confinement filed this complaint in the U.S. District court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff alleged that the extreme conditions of his confinement violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that state statute placing him in solitary was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, ordering an end to his and other Connecticut prisoners' solitary isolation. The case is currently pending appeal to the Circuit Court.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 22, 2015, non-citizen applicants for employment authorization documents (EADs) and two legal service organizations who assist immigrants and asylum seekers with these applications, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) and Advocates for Human Rights, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), its accompanying regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the American Immigration Council, and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agency U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for their policies and practices of unlawfully delaying adjudication of EAD applications and refusing to issue required interim EADs. The individual plaintiffs were all eligible for EADs and would be eligible to work with appropriate documentation, were it not for the government’s unlawful delay in adjudicating their applications. As a result, they had lost drivers’ licenses and experienced financial hardship, including inability to pay for utilities and medically necessary care. The organizational plaintiffs claimed that they had to divert limited resources to try to remedy these delays by contacting USCIS and Congresspeople, as well as employers, to try to keep clients’ jobs open while they waited for EAD adjudication. The individual plaintiffs sought to represent a nationwide class of non-citizens who had filed or would file an EAD application that was not or would not be adjudicated within the required regulatory time frame. The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart. The government filed a series of sealed motions, including an August 10, 2015 motion to dismiss. On February 10, 2016, the court issued a sealed order granting in part and denying in part the government’s motion to dismiss. It ruled that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over several of the plaintiffs, and that the claim would have to be heard in state court if at all. The plaintiffs filed a sealed amended complaint on February 22, 2016 which included the five original plaintiffs and eight additional plaintiffs. They included: <ul><li>immigrants who sought EADs on the basis of their “U Nonimmigrant” status as crime victims who cooperated with law enforcement; <li>F-1 student visa holders seeking temporary work after the completion of their university programs; <li>asylum applicants seeking initial and renewal applications while their asylum matters remained pending; and <li>recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program (DACA) seeking renewal. </ul>The plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification on March 22, 2016; the government filed a sealed motion to dismiss on April 18, 2016. Oral arguments on these motions were heard on September 7, 2016. On October 5 the court issued an order dismissing some plaintiffs for lack of standing or for failure to state a claim, but allowing others to proceed, and denying without prejudice the individual plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, with leave to amend. 325 F.R.D. 671. The plaintiffs filed a third motion for class certification on November 4, 2016, proposing nationwide classes of individuals whose EAD applications had been delayed 30 days (for asylum applicants) or 90 days (for others). The government moved to dismiss in part on March 2, 2017, and oral arguments took place on July 13. On July 18, 2017, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the 30-day plaintiff class’s motion for class certification, but also granting the government’s motion to dismiss as to 90-day plaintiff class and subclass’s claims (because revised regulations now required the government to take action). The certified 30-day class was defined as “[n]oncitizens who have filed or will file applications for employment authorization that were not or will not be adjudicated within…30 days…and who have not or will not be granted interim employment authorization.” The order also dismissed the organizational plaintiffs. 2017 WL 3034447. On October 17, 2017, the court set a briefing and discovery schedule. Discovery was scheduled to be completed by April 2, 2018. On July 26, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and denied the government’s cross motion for summary judgment. While the court’s written decision is not publicly available, the docket indicates that it ordered the government to submit status reports on their compliance with its order every 30 days. On August 27, 2018, the parties filed a sealed, joint implementation plan of the court’s order. On September 27, 2018, the government appealed the summary judgment order to the Ninth Circuit. In the district court on October 10, 2018, the parties submitted briefing regarding whether the court should specify specific rates for EAD adjudication compliance as part of an implementation order of the court’s July 26, 2018 decision. They also made proposals regarding the appropriate venue for filing any federal district court action where an EAD application was not adjudicated in compliance with the court’s order. On March 20, 2019, the district court issued an order declining to require the government to comply with the injunction by a specific date. It also declined to require individuals to file EAD applications with the court before compelling the government to adjudicate the applications. 2019 WL 1275097 The government dismissed its Ninth Circuit appeal on May 5, 2020; on July 28, it asked the district court to vacate the injunction, due to a “material change in the law.” That motion is pending as of August 7, 2020.
<|assistant|>
Noncitizens entitled to employment authorization filed a class action lawsuit alleging that USCIS's policies and practices unlawfully delayed adjudication of their application for employment authorization and that USCIS unlawfully refused to issue interim employment authorization. On July 26, 2018, the district court certified a nationwide class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but later dismissed its appeal on May 5, 2020. As of August 2020, the government continues to submit monthly status reports to the district court.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 5, 2011, several homeless individuals filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the City violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights when it seized and destroyed their personal possessions. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction, declaratory judgment that plaintiffs' rights were violated by the defendant, monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees. On April 22, 2011, the court filed an order granting a temporary restraining order against the City. 2011 WL 1533070. This was followed by a preliminary injunction, granted by the court on June 23, 2011. 797 F.Supp.2d 1005. The City responded with several appeals over the next few years. On July 25, 2011, the City appealed the order for preliminary injunction. After first ordering the parties to explore the possibility of mediation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the City’s appeal. 693 F.3d 1022. On April 29, 2013, the City filed an ex parte application for an order modifying the preliminary injunction to conform with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Essentially, the City had a problem with the language in the preliminary injunction. While the injunction issued by the trial court prohibited the City from seizing property, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used language in their denial that prohibited the City from performing the combined act of seizing and destroying property. The City wanted this narrower language construed in the injunction. On June 17, 2013, the trial court denied the application, saying that the City failed to identify any change in law or circumstances that would support a modification. On July 17, 2013, the City again appealed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this time about the trial court’s denial of modification of preliminary injunction. The City later decided they would not pursue this appeal and filed a motion to dismiss it, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 1, 2014. Back in trial court, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on April 20, 2014, which the court denied on July 24, 2017. 2014 WL 12693524. On December 15, 2015, after several settlement conferences, the parties filed a joint notice of tentative settlement. The City agreed to pay $822,000 plus attorneys’ fees to settle the case. Though this settlement is not found in the pleadings, please see <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-attorney-fees-homeless-case-20160613-snap-story.html">this LA Times article </a> regarding the settlement. On July 25, 2016, the court issued an order dismissing the action with prejudice against the City. This case established precedent that the Los Angeles Police Department cannot “summarily [destroy] the property of homeless individuals without notice.” 693 F.3d 1022.
<|assistant|>
Eight homeless individuals sued the City of Los Angeles for seizing and destroying their property. After plaintiffs won a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that survived several appeals, the City agreed to pay an $822,000.00 settlement.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigration detainees in Arizona, seeking release due to their high risk of illness or death from COVID-19. The court partially granted an injunction on May 11, 2020, requiring the defendants to list measures they could take to comply with CDC and ICE guidelines.<hr> Thirteen immigration detainees at La Palma Correctional Center or Eloy Detention Center (both private immigration detention facilities) filed this petition for habeas corpus on April 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The petitioners were represented by private counsel and lawyers from several public interest groups, including the ACLU National Prison Project, the ACLU Foundation of Arizona, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the Florence Immigration and Refugee Project. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus against the wardens of the two detention centers, the centers' field directors, and the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The complaint alleged that the spread of COVID-19 put the detainees at high risk of illness or death and that the steps the centers had taken to mitigate its spread were inadequate. In fact, petitioners argued that given the seriousness and contagiousness of the illness, particularly for detainees with co-morbidities, the only adequate remedy was release. The complaint set forth two theories under which continued detention violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Under the first theory, the respondents owed petitioners a certain degree of medical care and reasonable safety, since confinement established a special relationship between them. Under the second theory, the respondents violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against punitive detention for civil offenders. Petitioners argued that, given the spread of the disease and the centers' lack of precautions, they were treated worse as civil offenders than convicted criminal offenders were. Petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, an injunction ordering their release. They also sought declaratory relief and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Steven P. Logan and referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf. The court partially granted the petitioner's request on May 11, 2020. It found that there was a substantial risk to the detainees, that the respondents had made intentional decisions by failing to take measures to protect high-risk detainees from infection, that this failure was objectively unreasonable given the measures available to them, and that this failure could cause serious illness or death among the detainees. However, the court did not find that the only available remedy was release. Instead, Judge Logan asked each party to submit lists of measures that could be taken to make conditions consistent with CDC and ICE guidelines. The parties were given two days to submit these lists. 2020 WL 2319980. Also, the court on May 15 ordered that an individual petitioner be placed in a single-occupancy cell without a roommate and with adequate access to hand sanitizer and personal protective equipment. It is unclear from the opinions why this petitioner secured relief. In the following weeks the parties submitted status reports regarding the effort to bring the centers into compliance with ICE and CDC guidelines. And on June 12, 2020, the court granted the petitioners' motion to transfer <i>Espinoza v. Howard</i> (No. 2:20-cv-01134), another case by detainees at the same facilities seeking similar relief, to Judge Logan. Since the transfer, the petitioners in <i>Espinoza</i> moved for a preliminary injunction, but the parties have become bogged down in ongoing efforts to thoroughly brief the motion. On July 15, 2020, the <i>Urdaneta</i> respondents appealed the court's May 11 ruling. The appellate docket does not show why they appealed, and the respondents voluntarily dismissed the appeal on September 14 before the Ninth Circuit acted on it. On November 25, 2020, the petitioners moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. The motion was granted on November 11, 2020. On February 25, 2021, the parties stipulated to allow the petitioners to apply for fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Thirteen civil immigration detainees held in two private Arizona detention centers filed this petition for habeas corpus on April 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that the centers' failures to take measures that would mitigate the spread of COVID-19 violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. They sought habeas corpus or, in the alternative, injunctive relief to secure relief along with attorneys' fees and costs. The court on May 11 directed the parties to list measures to bring the centers into compliance with CDC guidelines and continues to monitor implementation.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 5, 2014, a same-sex couple, represented by private counsel, in Michigan challenged the state's refusal to recognize their marriage, filing a claim against the state pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in <i>United States v. Windsor</i>, plaintiffs had traveled to the State of New York and gotten married under state law. Upon returning, Michigan did not recognize this marriage. Specifically, Michigan Public Act 324 had invalidated by statute all same-sex marriages in Michigan, and Michigan Public Act 334 prohibited the recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (both statutes were passed in 1996). Additionally, the 2004 Michigan Marriage Amendment essentially codified these restrictions into the state's constitution. One of the plaintiffs here was a legal parent to an adopted child, but the couple was prevented from joint adoption in Michigan because of their unrecognized marriage. The plaintiffs alleged that this deprives their child of many benefits associated with recognition of a legal family unit and deprives the couple of equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the out-of-state marital nonrecognition provisions of the Michigan Marriage Amendment and the 1996 statutes violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; an injunction preventing the defendants, in their official capacities, from attempting to block state and local governmental recognition of existing, valid marriages between same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions; and an award of attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On February 10, 2015, the court (Judge Arthur J. Tarnow) granted a stay in this case, pending the U.S. Supreme Court resolution of <a href=http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12811><i>DeBoer v. Snyder</i></a>. The latter case, while not featuring a couple with a marriage recognized in a different jurisdiction, challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan Public Acts at issue here as well as the Michigan Marriage amendment. <i>DeBoer v. Snyder</i> invalidated Michigan's same-sex marriage restrictions at the district court level, was reversed by the 6th Circuit, and was heard in a consolidated action as <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12787&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BcaseName%7Cobergefell%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B"><i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i></a> before the United States Supreme Court in April of 2015. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision in <i>Obergefell</i> that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). On July 16, 2015, the stay was lifted and this case was reopened. On July 30, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs' claims were moot in light of the <i>Obergefell</i> decision, after the plaintiffs' counsel denied a request for concurrence in the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' response was that while the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Obergefell</i> granted a substantial part of the relief they requested, the invalidation of the Michigan Marriage Amendment, it did not grant another part of their requested relief: the invalidation of the 1996 statutory provisions. On October 22, 2015, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that regardless of whether the 1996 provisions had technically been declared invalid, there was no reasonable chance that that the defendants would again deny recognition to the plaintiffs' marriage. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as moot and found that the plaintiffs would not be "prevailing parties" entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On June 5, 2014 a same-sex Michigan couple challenged the state's refusal to recognize their valid out of state marriage performed in New York, filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 on their own behalf and on behalf of their adopted child, as Michigan's refusal to recognize the marriage prevents a joint adoption (one parent is legal guardian). On February 10, 2015 the court granted a stay in this case, pending the United States Supreme Court's resolution of <i>DeBoer v. Snyder</i>, which also raises constitutional questions regarding Michigan's refusal to recognize valid same-sex marriages performed out of state. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were rendered moot by the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in <i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i> which required all states to recognize same-sex marriages in other states.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 9, 2009, six inmates of the Canyon County Jail filed a class action lawsuit against the jail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming their confinement was indecent, cruel and, inhumane due to overcrowding, inadequate ventilation, inadequate plumbing, inadequate recreation, inadequate medical care and overall lack of cleanliness. On August 21, 2009, the court (Judge B. Lynn Winmill) entered an order preliminarily approved the parties' consent decree, conditionally certified the plaintiffs' class, directed notice to the plaintiff's class, and scheduled a final fairness hearing. On November 12, 2009, the court (Judge Winmill) approved the Consent Decree, which requires the jail to adhere to its functional capacity except in rare circumstances, and even then, for periods of no more than 48 hours. The Consent Decree also contains detailed provisions concerning sanitation, temperature control, water temperature, staffing levels, special meals and a prohibition against sex discrimination in the work release programs for female prisoners. On April 15, 2010, the parties moved to amend the Consent Decree. The amendments included new provisions relating to security checks in the prisons. Specifically, the jail agreed to train its staff to perform security checks, simplify and revamp the procedure for logging security checks, and generate reports for jail administrators showing the number of security checks each day. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the amendment on May 3, 2010. The parties moved for a second amendment to the Consent Decree on December 28, 2010. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the amendment on January 3, 2011. Under the amendment, work release prisoners are to be released to a specific unit with a designated functional capacity. The parties moved for a third amendment to the Consent Decree on November 19, 2012. With the exception of attorneys fees, which the parties resolved by separate agreement, the parties agreed that the third amendment resolved all issues in the complaint. The amendment states that the defendant substantially complied with the 2009 Consent Decree, and that the only sections still remaining would be those in the third amendment. The third amendment set forth detailed provisions regarding ventilation, sanitation, plumbing, outdoor recreation, staffing and rule enforcement, and implementation and verification. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the order on January 8, 2013. The Consent Decree was to remain in place for a minimum of one year, after which it was susceptible to termination under the PLRA. No further action has been taken in this case.
<|assistant|>
In January 2009, inmates at Canyon County Jail filed a class action lawsuit against the jail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging overcrowding and inadequate sanitation, recreation, and medical care. The parties entered into a Consent Decree in 2009. The Decree was subsequently amended three times, most recently in 2012.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 29, 2005, the Memphis District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The EEOC sued Tri-State Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc. ("Tri-State"); United Association Of Plumbers, Pipefitters and Sprinklerfitters Plumbers, Local Union No. 17 (Local No. 17); and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO ("United Association"). The case was assigned to Judge J. Daniel Breen. The complaint alleged racial and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violations of equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, it alleged that the employer Tri-State, a construction firm, subjected a group of African-American employees--seven male, one female--to multiple forms of racial discrimination, culminating in their dismissal once they complained; it also alleged that the female employee was additionally discriminated against due to her gender. The complaint also said that the local plumber's union failed to represent the workers because of their race and denied them work referrals because they complained of discrimination. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employees. The employees all worked on the FedEx Forum arena construction site in Memphis, Tennessee from 2003 to 2004, where they said their co-workers made racially derogatory comments towards them and drew racist graffiti. Their employer allegedly assigned them the most dangerous tasks due to their race, and denied them the opportunity to work overtime while allowing the same to their white colleagues. They complained to their local union in May 2004, but they said that the union rather than advocating for them, alerted Tri-State, who subsequently fired them that June in retaliation. In the months that followed, the union's business manager allegedly told them there was no work, yet other union members who had not complained were being referred to jobs. They filed a formal charge against both Tri-State and the local union with the EEOC (the exact date is unclear based on the available documents from the case). After an investigation, the EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that they had been unlawfully discriminated against. Negotiations between the EEOC and Tri-State to reach a conciliation agreement were ultimately unsuccessful, leading the EEOC to file this lawsuit. The eight employees moved to intervene as plaintiffs on December 2, 2005. Although the precise reasons for their motion could not be confirmed from the available documents in the case, their motion was granted by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on January 6, 2006. They filed their own complaint on March 8, 2006, largely reiterating the same allegations from that filed by the EEOC. United Association filed a motion to dismiss on March 13, 2006; it argued that the intervening plaintiffs allegations, if true, failed to establish either that Local No. 17 was acting as its agent or that the plaintiffs exhausted all their administrative remedies before filing suit. United also filed an answer to the intervening plaintiffs' complaint that same day denying their pertinent allegations in full. On May 12, 2006 the intervening plaintiffs filed their response rebutting each of United's principal arguments. They also indicated their intention to file an amended complaint that would clarify their specific complaints against United, and did just that on July 12; the amended complaint added more detail about Local No. 17's agency relationship with United and about their actions before contacting the EEOC. Tri-State filed its own motion to dismiss on Sept. 14, 2006, this one responding to both the intervening plaintiff's and the EEOC's complaints. Tri-State alleged that the EEOC and the intervening plaintiffs' attorney conspired to ensure the failure of conciliation efforts, and that such bad faith activity was fatal to the lawsuit. District Judge J. Daniel Breen denied United Association's motion to dismiss on February 27, 2007 and Tri-State's on August 21. Judge Breen noted that none of the cases relied on by United Association in its motion were directly applicable to the precise issue raised in this case. 2007 WL 649088. As for Tri-State, he found that its assertions that the EEOC negotiated in bad faith was largely contradicted by correspondence between the two parties in the run-up to the EEOC's filing of the lawsuit. 502 F. Supp. 2d 767. For the next few months, the parties undertook discovery. On May 21, 2008 the case was reassigned to Judge S. Thomas Anderson, a newly appointed district court judge. On November 5, 2008, the court approved a consent decree between the defendants, the EEOC, and all but one of the intervening plaintiffs. Among its provisions, the decree required Tri-State and the Local Union to update their anti-discrimination policies and provide anti-discrimination trainings to their members. Tri-State and the Local Union also agreed to pay a total of $360,000 to be distributed among the intervening plaintiffs as directed by their counsel and the EEOC. The consent decree was to last for three years, during which the court would retain jurisdiction for enforcement. Two weeks after the consent decree was entered, the EEOC and seven of the eight intervening plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims. Discovery then continued with all defendants and the one remaining plaintiff representing himself pro se. On September 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to compel discovery and sanction Hunt for failing to attend his deposition. The plaintiff filed no response to the motion, and the court granted the defendants’ motion on October 12. The defendants rescheduled the deposition, but Hunt again failed to show up without notice. After Hunt did not respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss on October 29, the court finally dismissed the case on December 3. The consent decree expired in 2011, and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In September 2005, the EEOC brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violations of equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Eight complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit in January 2006. The case settled as to most of the plaintiffs in November 2005, with the defendants agreeing to enter a consent decree providing for anti-discrimination policies and damages payments to seven of the employees. The one remaining plaintiff's case was dismissed for failure to prosecute in 2011.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This lawsuit was filed on June 18, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The suit was filed in response to police tactics used to quell protests in Indianapolis that ensued following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs were Indy 10 Black Lives Matter (a Black Lives Matter chapter out of Indianapolis) and three individual plaintiffs. They were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Indiana. The only defendant was the City of Indianapolis. The complaint alleged that Indianapolis police used stun grenades, tear gas, and pepper-balls against peaceful protesters, in addition to rubber bullets and police dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and free assembly and their Fourth Amendment rights from excessive force. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from interfering with peaceful protests, especially with excessive force. They also sought money damages and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson and Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor. At the end of June, the court ordered a hearing for the preliminary injunction. Briefing on the motion for a preliminary injunction continued throughout July and August. In early September, the parties indicated that they were working with Magistrate Judge Pryor to try and reach a settlement. On October 5, the parties reached a settlement, and shortly after, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the settlement, the Indianapolis Metro Police Department ("IMPD") may only use force that is objectively reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances. No riot control agents that under City and IMPD policies require approval abuse would be used to deter protestors from going to another location, against protestors because elsewhere in the City there were unlawful activities taking place, and against protesters engaged in passive resistance. In addition, the settlement required IMPD to take reasonable measures to ensure announcements to disperse were heard by all and to announce the use of riot control agents. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on December 11, 2020, and the Court dismissed the case on December 14, 2020. This case is closed.
<|assistant|>
This lawsuit was filed in response to police tactics used in Indianapolis to quell the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleges that Indianapolis police used chemical weapons and rubber bullets, among other weapons, to unlawfully put down the protests. The plaintiffs were Indy 10 Black Lives Matter and three private individuals, while the defendant was the City of Indianapolis. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's actions violated their First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In October 2020, the parties reached a settlement limiting the use of chemical agents against protestors by the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice in December 2020, and the Court dismissed the case. This case is closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 6, 2019, a legal services provider and seven individuals detained at the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The individual plaintiffs, along with the Refugee & Immigrant Center for Education & Legal Services (RAICES), challenged new directives that the government issued at two detention centers in Texas, which effectively gave asylum seekers just twenty-four hours to prepare for their credible fear interviews (“the Directives”). Represented by Democracy Forward Foundation, RAICES, and Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), the plaintiffs alleged that the Directives violated the First Amendment, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and the Appointments Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and the case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the combination of three new USCIS directives resulted in an unlawful infringement on the right to seek asylum in the U.S. Specifically, the Directives reduced the time given to asylum seekers to consult with third parties prior to their credible fear interviews, mandated that requests for extensions be denied absent the most extraordinary circumstances, and eliminated a legal orientation program for asylum seekers at the Dilley facility. The plaintiffs made the following legal claims in their complaint:<blockquote>(1) that by impeding asylum seekers’ ability to consult with persons of their choosing and preventing them from fully and effectively participating in the credible fear interview process, the Directives violate IIRIRA; (2) the Directives are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion under the APA as they were motivated by racial animus and the defendants failed to provide an adequate justification for changing policy; (3) the Directives violate the APA because they were issued absent notice and comment; (4) the Directives violate the Rehabilitation Act, because they unlawfully discriminate against the individual plaintiffs (who have disabilities under the Act) by failing to provide them with a reasonable accommodation and/or excluding them from the asylum process altogether; (5) the Directives violate the First Amendment because they unduly impede communication and association between the individual plaintiffs and their counsel, as well as between RAICES and its clients; and (6) the Directives were issued in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Appointments Clause, because Mr. Cuccinelli’s service as Acting Director of USCIS is not in accordance with the Act, nor was he nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.</blockquote>On September 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed the administrative record on October 21, and on January 9 the parties agreed to treat the plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On March 1, 2020, the district court granted in part and denied in part the summary judgment motions of both the plaintiffs and defendants. 2020 WL 985376. First, Judge Moss concluded that the court only had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenges to the directives reducing consultation time and prohibiting extensions. Next, he found that Mr. Cuccinelli was not lawfully appointed to serve as Acting Director of USCIS, thereby requiring that those two directives be set aside. He also set aside the individual plaintiffs’ negative credible-fear determinations and removal orders and remanded to USCIS for further proceedings. Judge Moss did not reach the plaintiffs’ other legal challenges. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
A legal services provider and seven detained asylum seekers filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court on September 6, 2019, challenging the Trump Administration's new asylum directives, which gave asylum seekers only 24 hours to prepare for their credible fear interviews. The plaintiffs alleged that the directives violated IIRIRA, the APA, the First Amendment, the Appointments Clause, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. In March 2020, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that Acting USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli was unlawfully appointed and setting aside two of the challenged directives. The case is ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is one of a pair of lawsuits filed against the Arizona Attorney General to challenge his practice of seizing money wire transferred to Mexico through Western Union. In an attempt to curtail the smuggling of undocumented immigrants by trafficking organizations (known as "coyotes") from Mexico to Arizona, the Arizona Attorney General had obtained warrants and seized millions of dollars of money that was wire transferred to Mexico. The Attorney General focused on amounts over $500 which were believed to have been sent as payments to Mexican smugglers who have transported people or drugs into Arizona. Western Union filed this lawsuit on September 19, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the Arizona Attorney General of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico, even if such transfers were not sent from or received in Arizona. The seizures were to occur pursuant to a seizure warrant sought by the Arizona Attorney General in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County. Western Union alleged that the seizures violated violate the Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt the seizures. The District Court (Judge Stephen M. McNamee) ordered that the Western Union case be consolidated with the related class action case, Torres v. Goddard [IM-AZ-6]. On September 20, 2006, the Court (Judge McNamee) denied the motion for temporary injunctive relief, in part, due to parallel proceedings in Arizona state court raising the same or similar issues. On September 25, 2007, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. For several years, the court granted extensions of time. On March 10, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice per the parties' agreement to settle and stipulation to dismiss the case. The settlement was approved on February 24, 2010 in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. [CV2010-005807.] In that case, the parties agreed to a $94 million settlement where as much as $50 million will go to support law enforcement agencies working to crack down on drug and human smuggling. Under the agreement, the state will receive $21 million and Western Union will devote $19 million to improve its own efforts to stop money laundering and $4 million to an independent monitor. Western Union also agreed to provide border state prosecutors access to wire transfer records.
<|assistant|>
On September 19, 2006, Western Union filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Attorney General in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the state of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico. The Arizona Attorney General believed that millions of dollars were being sent as payment to Mexican smugglers who had transported people or drugs into Arizona. The parties ultimately stipulated to dismiss the case in 2010 after entering into a settlement agreement in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services [CV2010-005807].
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids in the Atlanta area. The complaint stated that, in response to a 2015 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directive titled "Operation Border Resolve," U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeted families from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala living in nine major U.S. cities, including Atlanta. As part of the directive, the complaint alleged, ICE agents were to be trained on the Fourth Amendment: "[I]f they claim to be a member of local law enforcement during a ruse, the agents must notify the local law enforcement agency beforehand." The complaint argued that, in Jan. 2016, ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of noncitizens, then arrested and detained them without probable cause or search warrants. The plaintiffs argued that ICE violated the Fourth Amendment and committed false imprisonment, trespass, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, under Georgia state law and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). They sought damages and declaratory relief. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. After Judge Clarence Cooper was recused, the case was reassigned to Judge Steve C. Jones on Dec. 13. The plaintiffs, first represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and later by private counsel, were three families with members who were citizens of various Central American countries. In one instance, ICE officers pulled over one named plaintiff while he was driving, without citing any traffic violation. The officers indicated that the plaintiff had to let them search his home, as they believed a criminal suspect was located there, or else the plaintiff risked obstructing a criminal investigation. The officers claimed to have a warrant but did not show it, and repeatedly threatened the plaintiff. Fearing arrest, but denying any such criminal suspect was in his home, the plaintiff went back to his home with them but agreed they would wait outside while he obtained identification cards of the people residing inside. The ICE officers then forcefully entered the home and eventually arrested the plaintiff's wife for missing an immigration court date, which the family claimed had not happened. ICE detained her and some of her children for a month. In the case of another family, ICE officers once again attempted to enter into the home by claiming there was a criminal suspect there. The agents did not have a warrant, nor did they make clear they were ICE officers. Upon entering the house, they arrested and detained members of the family. Additionally, in the case of the third family, ICE officers once again gained entry into the home with no search warrant by claiming there was a criminal suspect. In each case, the plaintiffs suffered significant emotional distress after they were released from custody. On Feb. 16, the defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) because the alleged conduct arose from removal proceedings and lay within the Immigration Courts' jurisdiction. The defendants also disputed that the FTCA applied because the removal orders, arrests, and detentions were lawful. On Aug. 6, 2018, the court (Judge Steve C. Jones) granted the motion to dismiss as to the alien plaintiffs and denied it without prejudice as to the citizen plaintiffs (three minor children). The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and the INA barred it from adjudicating the merits of alien removal orders, but not from adjudicating citizen removal orders. The court found that the alien plaintiffs' claims that they were detained through misrepresentations and disregard for policy ultimately challenged detention methods in the execution of removal orders, and so § 1252(g)'s jurisdictional limits applied. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 4, 2018. On Sept. 18, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief and that punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and declaratory relief are not available under the FTCA. On Aug. 28, 2019, Judge Steve Jones granted the motion to dismiss with regard to plaintiffs' claims for trespass, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress along with the claims for punitive damages, attorney's fees, and declaratory relief. Unable to conclude that removal orders are essentially equivalent to arrest warrants, however, Judge Jones denied the motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment. In March 2020, the parties had a dispute about an offer of judgment. Defendants claimed that they made an offer for judgment of $15,000 total while plaintiffs believed they had accepted an offer of judgment for $15,000 for each of nine plaintiffs. On March 23, Judge Jones directed the clerk to strike plaintiffs' acceptance and the case is now in discovery. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids on Central American families in the Atlanta area. The complaint argued that ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of immigrant families, then arresting and detaining them without probable cause or search warrants. Only the minor plaintiffs' claims for false imprisonment survived the motion to dismiss. The case is now in discovery.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 14, 2006, Western Watersheds Project, an Idaho environmental non-profit organization, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sought reversal of a January 2005 agency determination that a bird species known as the Greater Sage Grouse did not warrant inclusion as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The plaintiff also brought the claim under the Administrative Procedure and Declaratory Judgment Acts, arguing that the organization's continued interest in studying the bird in its wild habitat was threatened by the bird’s substantially declining population and the defendant’s decision to deny the species protection was arbitrary and politically motivated. The plaintiff sought an order to remand the matter to the defendant agency for reconsideration. The case was assigned to Chief District U.S. Judge B. Lynn Winmill. According to the complaint, the plaintiff petitioned the defendant in 2003 to list the Sage Grouse as a threatened or endangered species, citing “over one hundred peer-review scientific publications” detailing the destruction of the Sage Grouse’s habitat due to livestock grazing and oil and gas development. In 2005, the defendant responded to the petition with a finding that Sage Grouse would be listed as an endangered species. The complaint alleged that this finding violated the ESA's requirement that such determinations be based on the best available scientific information. The plaintiff asked the court to order that the defendant conduct a new review of Sage Grouse’s status. Beginning on September 19, 2006, fourteen corporate and government entities began efforts to intervene in the suit on the defendant’s behalf, including the State of Wyoming, the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and the Petroleum Association of Wyoming. The intervenors argued that new federal regulations protecting the Sage Grouse would burden them with costs of compliance. On March 9, 2007, Judge Winmill denied the motions to intervene in part, ruling that the would-be intervenors could not claim any interest in the litigation given that the plaintiff sought only an administrative re-assessment of the Greater Sage Grouse’s status. However, Judge Winmill granted the motion in part in the event that the plaintiff might pursue a remedy beyond a remand of the administrative decision. Because that could adversely effect the intervenors, they were granted the right to intervene to the extent of challenging a possible proposed remedy. This decision was unsuccessfully appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the intervenors. On April 9, 2007 and May 21, 2007, the plaintiff and defendant respectively filed cross motions for summary judgment. On December 4, 2007, following a hearing on motions, the court granted summary judgement for the plaintiff, reversing the defendant’s decision to not list the Sage Grouse, and directing defendant agency to further consider whether to list the Sage Grouse pursuant the ESA. In his opinion, Judge Winmill found that the defendant's review of the Sage Grouse's status had failed to consider the findings of its own scientific experts. Furthermore, a Deputy Assistant Director at the defendant agency had used “intimidation tactics” to influence the results of the agency's scientific inquiries. Judge Winmill therefore found that the agency’s decision had not been based on sound scientific analysis as required by the ESA. 535 F.Supp.2d 1173. The opinion also noted that the same Director had already been found in a separate case to have improperly interfered in an ESA listing determination in <i>Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS</i>, 2005 WL 2000928 (N.D.Cal. 2005). The court declared the defendant's prior determination invalid and remanded the issue to the agency for further consideration in compliance with the ESA. On January 30, 2008, the parties stipulated to a 90-day deadline (from the date of the court's order) for the defendant's completion of the new review of the Sage Grouse's status. However, the defendant subsequently asked the court for additional time to comply with the court's order, and ultimately obtained several extensions from court. On December 12, 2008, the parties agreed to a settlement covering plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs, amounting to $135,000, which the court approved. On March 8, 2010, after receiving several extensions, the defendant reported to the court that it had determined that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, despite this finding, the defendant placed the Sage Grouse on its list of "precluded" species, meaning that a bureaucratic backlog and a lack of resources prevented the agency from protecting the species regardless of the threats it faced. Thus the defendant avoided needing to protect the Sage Grouse while conceding the plaintiff’s scientific arguments. The plaintiff asked for leave to file a supplemental complaint to explain that the defendant’s new determination had been arbitrary and politicized, saying that it placed the Sage Grouse in a “black hole from which few species ever emerge, and under which they receive no ESA protection.” The plaintiff asked the court to order the defendant to review the Sage Grouse's status yet again and requested leave to file an amended supplemental complaint. But on April 27, 2010, Judge Winmill denied the motion. The plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant violated the earlier order or that their second determination was not in compliance with the ESA. The plaintiff would be required to file a new action if they wanted to bring this new claim and the case closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2006, an environmental non-profit filed this action seeking reversal of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's determination not to list the Greater Sage Grouse under the Endangered Species Act. The court found that the defendant's decision not to list the species had been tainted by political considerations and inattention to scientific analysis. The defendant was ordered to conduct a new review of the Sage Grouse's status, the result of which was a new determination in 2010 that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, the defendant claimed it could not actually add the species to the endangered species list, due to a bureaucratic backlog and lack of resources. The plaintiff's request to file a supplemental brief was denied by the court, and the case closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. Attorneys with Legal Momentum, Farmworkers Legal Services of New York (FLSNY), and other social justice organizations and private firms represented the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss, and/or for summary judgment on various grounds, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and argued that Title VII did not protect workers recruited outside of the U.S. In June 2004, the District Court (Chief Judge Norman A. Mordue) denied defendants' motions. Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). On June 15, 2005, following the dismissal of the New York defendants, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The Court reconsidered the transfer order but reaffirmed its decision. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:02-CV-1589, 2006 WL 931752, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17923 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2006). Plaintiff moved for class certification on February 15, 2007, proposing a class consisting of "[a]ll female H-2B workers recruited, procured or referred for employment by the Defendants or their agents, or whose H-2B employment opportunity was procured by Defendants or their agents, from 1999 to the present." On November 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.) granted class certification. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 250 (M.D.N.C. 2007). On December 18, 2007, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Defendants International Labor Management Corporation (ILMC) and Del-Al Associates summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Title VII claims. However, the Court denied summary judgment to the North Carolina Grower's Association (NCGA) on the Title VII claims. The Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs asserted under New York Human Rights Law, dismissing them without prejudice. The Court issued its memorandum opinion on January 1, 2008. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 53293 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2008). Both Plaintiffs and Defendant NGCA moved for reconsideration. On February 20, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the Title VII claim against ILMC. The Court stated that it had dismissed ILMC as an "employment agency," when ILMC had only contested that it was not an "employer." The Court thus held that, as the issue of whether ILMC was not an "employment agency" was not before the Court at the summary judgment stage, it had erred in dismissing the claim. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 506090 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2008). On April 4, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) also granted Defendant NGCA's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the Title VII claim against it. The Court held that, since Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of her initial EEOC complaint, the "identity of interest" exception--which the Court had applied to Plaintiff--should actually not apply to her on summary judgment. Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 939180 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2008). On April 16, 2008, less than a week before trial was scheduled to begin, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds. On August 4, 2009, the Court granted the parties' motion for final approval of the class settlement.
<|assistant|>
On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. The case eventually settled just prior to trial. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In 1955, the Supreme Court ordered school districts to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” 349 U.S. 294. But the city of Columbus, MS did not allow black students to attend schools previously reserved for whites until 1965, a decade later. Even by 1970, no white students attended a historically black school, and less than 5% of black students attended historically white schools. The United States brought this action on July 13, 1970 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. It sued both of the public school systems in Lowndes County: the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the Lowndes County School District. The Department of Justice brought the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 and sought immediate desegregation of both districts. District Judge Orma R. Smith entered a consent decree on August 10, followed by a permanent injunction on September 5. The injunction ordered the districts to operate unitary, non-racial school systems that did not discriminate on the basis of race. It also established a biracial advisory committee and governed how the districts assigned students to schools, hired faculty and staff, transported students, built new facilities, and decided which extracurricular activities to offer. The Columbus Municipal Separate School District’s original remedial measures focused on its middle and high schools. In July 1975, the United States sought additional relief to desegregate the District’s elementary schools. Originally, the District claimed that its existing policies were constitutional despite the fact that half its elementary schools were either over 90% black or 90% white. It later proposed minor attendance zone changes based on a neighborhood schools concept. In contrast, the United States proposed an ambitious pairing system. When two schools were paired, their attendance zones would be merged. Then, all students would attend one school for certain grades (e.g., 1st to 3rd grade) and the other school for the others (e.g., 4th to 6th grade). By pairing historically black schools with historically white schools, the United States’ plan promised quick desegregation. The district court adopted the United States’ pairing plan. The District appealed, arguing that its more limited plan should have been adopted instead. In an August 9, 1977 opinion, Fifth Circuit Judge Irving L. Goldberg upheld the district court’s determination. Judge Goldberg observed that the District’s plan would leave several schools entirely segregated and that the pairing plan would produce “much greater desegregation.” Therefore, Judge Goldberg held that the pairing plan was appropriate despite a small increase in the District’s transportation costs. 558 F.2d 228. Over the next decades, the districts filed reports with the court. The court also implemented adjustments to the student assignment plan, authorized the construction and sale of schools, and supervised the appointment of new members to the biracial advisory committee. In 2007, the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the United States filed a joint motion for a declaration of unitary status. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case as to Columbus on August 9. In contrast, Lowndes County parents’ groups concluded that the Lowndes County School District was not adhering to its obligations under the consent decree. They filed cases in 2002 and 2003 to enforce the districts’ desegregation obligations. The Court merged these two lawsuits with this case in 2004. The parents’ groups, Lowndes County, and the United States agreed to a new consent decree in 2006, which declared the District unitary with respect to student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, and transportation only. It also provided a pathway towards a declaration of full unitary status. On August 21, 2008, the District moved for unitary status. The United States opposed the motion because of inadequate facilities and a lack of advanced courses in one of the District’s high schools together with complaints of harassment of and discrimination against black students in majority white schools. The parties then agreed to a modified consent order under which the District would remedy these problems. The District again moved for unitary status on May 15, 2012. This time, the United States did not oppose the motion, but the parents’ groups did. At a fairness hearing, few residents opposed the plan. The court found that the District had made the required facilities improvements and implemented an AP program. It also found that the District had formulated and implemented an anti-discrimination policy. District Judge Michael P. Mills wrote that the court had “seriously considered” denying unitary status because Caledonia High School continued to use “Confederates” as its nickname and play “Dixie” at sporting events. But the court ultimately concluded that the lack of complaints from the community suggested that these “troubling” activities were “not vestiges of segregation” of sufficient magnitude to justify a denial of unitary status. The Lowndes County School District was declared unitary on October 24, 2012. 900 F. Supp. 2d 703. The case is now closed. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 558 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1977). 900 F. Supp. 2d 703 (N.D. Miss. 2012).
<|assistant|>
In the 1970s, the United States sued two Mississippi school districts to dismantle de jure racial segregation. Both districts operated under permanent injunctions for about forty years and obtained declarations of unitary status early in the 21st Century. The case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 9, 2017, thirteen protesters and two reporters who were arrested during a protest in Baton Rouge filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge, as well as numerous agents of the Sheriff’s Department and of the state, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 306 of the State of Louisiana Children's code. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well and monetary relief and attorneys’ fees. After a Baton Rouge police officer shot and killed Alton Sterling, people gathered in Baton Rouge to speak out against the pattern of police misconduct in the area and, more generally, in the United States. In July 2016, a peaceful, youth-led protest gathered at the State Capitol building where participants spoke, sang, and prayed. Participants then marched around the area in the same fashion. Eventually, law enforcement officers gathered. The officers ordered the protesters out of the streets. Most complied with the dispersal order. The officers ordered the protesters to disperse – an impossible order to comply with, since the police blocked off most of the surrounding streets, had already ordered the protesters to stay off the sidewalks, and were arresting people who stepped into the streets to leave. Shortly thereafter, the officers swept through the crowd, violently grabbing people and binding their wrists with plastic zipties. The officers arrested a mix of protesters, reporters, and legal observers. One of the plaintiffs was a 17-year-old girl put in an adult prison with male inmates in violation of the Children’s Code. Another plaintiff was separated from her children, including a five-year-old who was taken from her and put into child protective services. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants’ First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The plaintiffs also claimed excessive force, unreasonable search and seizure, and civil conspiracy. The original complaint and some of the exhibits contained many photographic images depicting the actions of both protesters and law enforcement officers. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to end their practices and policies as described above. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction to require the defendants to expunge the plaintiffs’ arrests at the defendants’ cost and bar the defendants from reporting the plaintiffs’ arrests to any law enforcement agency, database, employer, or credit agency. They further asked that a permanent injunction be granted for the above. On July 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of related cases. The plaintiffs listed six cases that all involved damages lawsuits on behalf of people who were wrongfully arrested during the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. One of these cases was <i>McKesson v. City of Baton Rouge</i>, one with common questions of law and fact with the present case. The case was originally assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. On July 12, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge James J. Brady. Then, in light of the plaintiff’s notice of related cases, the court reassigned the case to Judge John W. deGravelles and Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes, the judges who presided over the <i>McKesson</i> case mentioned above. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding an exhibit to the complaint listing the names and charges of all persons arrested during the protest. On September 11, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint and first amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in their use of illustrative pictures in a petition and a “Photographic Timeline” as one of the exhibits. The defendants considered these to be unconventional and unprofessional. Then, on September 28, 2017, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the first amended complaint. The defendants made similar arguments to the motion above. On October 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal of some of the defendants, namely, the defendants associated with the Louisiana Sheriff’s Association. Judge deGravelles approved this the next day. On January 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, removing some of the unconventional exhibits complained about in prior motions to dismiss. The amended complaint retained, however, much of the photographic imagery in the complaint itself. On January 11, 2018, the defendants, in response to the plaintiffs’ filing a second amended complaint, withdrew their September 11, 2017 and September 28, 2017 motions to dismiss. In the following weeks, the defendants filed two motions to strike and four motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. In support of the motions to strike, the defendants argued again that the second amended complaint violated FRCP Rule 8. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the complaint contained redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous allegations. In support of the motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over some of the defendants because Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to them. Lastly, the defendants argued that this case was ripe for dismissal on the grounds that the outcome of the case might influence the claims that had already been or had yet been filed. On February 20, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. Then, on February 26, 2018, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed and/or stricken because the 82d page, 333 paragraph complaint, with its attached 64 pages of exhibits, violated the provision of FRCP Rule 8 that requires that a properly pled complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” On May, 14, 2018, Judge deGravelles granted in part the defendants’ motion to stay discovery. With the exception of written discovery, discovery was stayed pending resolution of the issues raised in the motions to dismiss. On September 7, 2018, pending motions to dismiss and motions to strike were decided. All motions were granted in part and denied in part; after the motions, the claims against an officer in question in his personal capacity, failure to intervene, and state law claims remained, while claims against the officer in his official capacity and certain claims against other officers were dismissed. In response to these rulings and further discovery, on November 6, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss so that the plaintiffs could file a new complaint that includes only the officers against whom the plaintiffs had valid claims. The new complaint was filed a week later; it changed the list of defendants, removing the ones already mentioned and adding new defendants identified during discovery. Different sets of defendants filed for summary judgment and motions to dismiss in early 2020, though no ruling on either has been made as of June 2020. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
This 2017 lawsuit was brought by thirteen protesters ad two reporters who were arrested for their participation in the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Children's Code Article 306, and state law. They alleged that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants’ First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) changed its longstanding policy for determining unlawful presence of students and exchange visitors. Under the old policy, students and exchange visitors were deemed unlawfully present only after an official determination. However, the new policy deemed students as unlawfully present immediately after any unauthorized activity. The unauthorized activity could be as minor as a failure to report a change of address. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against USCIS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel including Mayer Brown. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide notice and comment and comply with other requirements of the APA. Further, the new policy allegedly imposed three- and ten-year bars on individuals without notice or opportunity to cure and thus violated the protections guaranteed by the due process clause. Finally, plaintiffs alleged the new policy violated provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). On December 14, 2018, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The plaintiffs also filed motions for a preliminary injunction and partial summary judgement on some of their claims involving the APA and the INA. On January 10, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On May 3, 2019, the court agreed with plaintiffs and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the new policy, noting the APA directed courts to "set aside agency action" found unlawful. However, it denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice because the parties failed to file the relevant administrative record. The plaintiffs again filed a motion for partial summary judgment in late May, 2019. At the same time, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the new policy was exempt from notice and comment requirements of the APA. On July 3, 2019, the judge denied both motions for summary judgement without prejudice, again stating that the parties failed to provide a sufficient administrative record. The parties subsequently renewed their summary judgment motions. On February 6, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on two grounds. First, Judge Biggs found that the new rule was subject to notice and comment rulemaking under the APA that had not taken place. Second, Judge Biggs found that the rule conflicted with the INA's plain text because the INA defined "unlawful presence" to mean more than mere participation in unauthorized activity. The Court remedied this violation by entering a nationwide injunction against the policy. 389 F. Supp. 3d 377. The government appealed the decision and injunction to the Fourth Circuit on April 3, 2020. However, on August 3, 2020, the government voluntarily dismissed that appeal, leaving the underlying injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal.
<|assistant|>
On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a new policy that made it easier to declare the presence of students and visitors to the United States unlawful. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities challenged that policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. They alleged that the new policy violated statutory and due process rights. The District Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the policy but denied summary judgment because the parties had not submitted a complete administrative record. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals but then the government dropped that appeal, leaving the injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 30, 2016, asylum seekers in this case, represented by the American Immigration Council and partners, filed this lawsuit against the Attorney General of the United States as well as the directors of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The plaintiffs argued that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed members the opportunity to timely submit these applications. The plaintiffs argued that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, governing regulations, and their due process rights. They sought class certification, injunctive and declaratory relief, mandamus, and attorneys' fees. On July 21, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to certify their class. However, the court granted a stipulated motion to stay the case until after the 2016 presidential election. The case was restored to active docket on November 7, 2016. In January 2017, the court issued an order certifying the class. 2017 WL 1397749. The court certified the following classes and subclasses: • CLASS A (“Credible Fear Class”): All individuals who have been released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). • A.I.: All individuals in Class A who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • A.II.: All individuals in Class A who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • CLASS B (“Other Entrants Class”): All individuals who have been or will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). • B.I.: All individuals in Class B who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • B.II.: All individuals in Class B who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. The day after class certification, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion in March 2017. 2017 WL 1153856. On October 30, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and that neither Congress nor the Constitution required the notice that the plaintiffs were seeking. The court disagreed, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. On March 29, 2018, the court found that Congress, in adopting the one-year application deadline, expressed concern about foreclosing legitimate claims and intended to monitor administration of the deadline to make sure it was implemented fairly. Failure to provide notice to class members, then, violated Congressional intent. The court also found that the defendants had not taken steps that were “reasonably calculated” to provide notice to class members and that consequently, it had not met its procedural due process obligations. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit on May 25, 2018. According to the American Immigration Council, the parties agreed to a joint interim stay agreement that requires the Executive Office for Immigration Review and USCIS to treat as timely all pending and newly filed asylum applications adjudicated during the stay that are filed by class members without final orders of removal. <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/challenging-obstacles-meeting-one-year-filing-deadline-filing-asylum-application">See the Council's website for additional information.</a> Since the defendants filed the appeal, the parties have been participating the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. As of this writing, this process is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2016, asylum seekers filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed them the opportunity to timely submit asylum applications. In March 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit in May 2018, and the parties have since been participating in the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. This process is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 4, 2004, a practicing lawyer and his family members filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under Bivens and 50 U.S.C §§ 1804 and 1823 (electronic surveillance and physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendants conducted unlawful arrest, imprisonment, searches and seizures. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a by illegally leaking information and that portions of the Patriot Act are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought return of improperly seized property. This case is based on the following background. On March 11, 2004, terrorists' bombs exploded on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain. The FBI obtained photographs of fingerprints from the bombing incident. The FBI made a wrongful match of a fingerprint taken from near the Madrid bombing site to that of the plaintiff, supposedly in part because the plaintiff was a Muslim. Despite numerous signs that the match was erroneous, the FBI arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff from May 6, 2004, through May 20, 2004. After news reports revealed that the Madrid fingerprint matched an Algerian citizen, the plaintiff was released from prison. On November 29, 2006, the District Court (Judge Aiken) signed a stipulated settlement agreement reached by the parties. The agreement limited plaintiffs' remaining claims to a facial challenge to FISA, in which the relief available was a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of these statues. On December 6, 2006, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment and sought removal of all illegally seized materials under government possession. Defendants argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief. On September 26, 2007, the District Court (Judge Aiken) found that the plaintiffs' claims alleging an on-going 'case' or 'controversy' provided the Court jurisdiction. The Court concluded that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1824 of FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional as they violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for declaratory relief was granted. On October 9, 2007, defendants filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. On March 24, 2010, the Appeals Court vacated the District Court's summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the only relief that would address the alleged Fourth Amendment violation would be injunctive relief. However, the plaintiffs were only entitled to declaratory judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. On November 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
<|assistant|>
On October 4, 2004, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government alleging that portions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended by the Patriot Act was unconstitutional. On September 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon (Judge Aiken) concluded so and ordered summary judgment. On March 24, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit vacated the order based on that the plaintiffs lacked standing due in part to the settlement agreement.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 19, 2017, death-row inmates in Florida filed this lawsuit alleging that the practice of placing death-row inmates in solitary confinement indefinitely violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they claimed that the permanent solitary confinement posed a serious risk of harm to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by themselves, sought injunctive and monetary relief. Lastly, they sought to represent a class of all Florida inmates on death row and in FDOC custody at one of two state correctional facilities. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia Morales Howard. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on October 6, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for lack of jurisdiction. On October 25, 2017, the case was referred to mediation. On November 17, 2017, the Florida DOC filed initial discovery disclosures. On September 10, 2018, parties stipulated to both a protective order and a confidentiality order. On March 28, 2018, the complaint was amended. On April 23, 2018, the motion to certify the class was denied as moot. On December 5, 2018, a memorandum denying the presence of a third-party observer at mental health examinations was filed stating that the presence of a third party is not necessary or proper. On May 28, 2019, both parties filed a joint status report to schedule mediation before Senior United States District Judge Harvey Schlesinger and stipulating to a non-jury trial. On June 12, 2019, Judge Howard issued an order setting the terms of the settlement proceedings in front of Judge Schlesinger. The court directed the clerk to administratively close the case, to be reopened when the settlement efforts have concluded. Judge Howard directed the clerk to open a new case, <i>In re: Davis v. Inch Settlement Conference</i>, Case No. 3:19-mc-17, and assign it to Judge Schlesinger. On October 30, 2019, the parties notified the court that discussions are continuing and the parties request more time for mediation. A mediation session was held in January 2020 and is ongoing as of May 11, 2020.
<|assistant|>
In 2017, death row inmates from Florida filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy of placing death row inmates in indefinite solitary confinement violates their eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. In 2019 the parties entered into settlement discussions. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This action, filed on May 26, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, was brought by three adopted children placed in an abusive and neglectful home by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and Children's Rights, Inc.; they sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the state violated their federal and state civil rights by placing them in a foster-turned-adoptive home (approved and monitored by the DYFS) that systematically starved and otherwise neglected them. Not long after the case was filed, a guardian ad litem from Children's Rights was named for the plaintiffs. In 2003, B.J. (the plaintiffs' oldest brother) was found looking for food in his neighbor's trash. B.J. was 19 years old but weighed only 45 pounds. Shortly thereafter, the police entered his home and discovered 3 other adopted boys, the plaintiffs in this case, all of whom were extremely underdeveloped (K.J., age 14, weighed 40 pounds; T.J., age 10, weighed 28 pounds; M.J., age 9, weighed 23 pounds). Upon the police's discovery, DYFS removed the plaintiffs from the home that day. (note: the DYFS had visited the home over 38 times within the past 4 years and were aware of the plaintiffs' living conditions) The complaint alleged that the defendants, having placed the plaintiffs in their foster care custody, had a special relationship with the plaintiffs that imposed upon the state an affirmative duty to care for and protect the plaintiffs from harm; that the defendants failed to adequately screen, approve, and monitor the foster home in order to ensure the plaintiffs' safety and welfare, despite the repeated signs and observations indicating that the plaintiffs were not receiving adequate care; that the acts and omissions of the defendants were a substantial departure from the exercise of reasonable professional standard and amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' welfare; that the defendants did not adequately train or supervise employees handling such cases; that the defendants' conduct placed the plaintiffs in state-created dangers; that the defendants failed to regularly visit the plaintiffs; that the defendants failed to conduct a pre-adoptive and post-adoptive home study; that the defendants failed to investigate suspected child abuse reports regarding the plaintiffs; and that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their perceived handicaps. All this, the plaintiffs said, violated federal Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, state Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, the state's Violation of Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, the state's Tort Claims Act, the state's Law Against Discrimination, and various state adoption and regulation laws. The requested relief included compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. On April 6, 2005, the court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to counts under Section 1983, the New Jersey Child Placement Bill of Rights, and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, plaintiffs' counts under the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey statutes and regulations, and the Law Against Discrimination were dismissed for failure to state a claim. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 30, 2005, awarding a sum of $7,500,000 to the plaintiffs, without any admission of liability by any party. The settlement amount was inclusive of attorneys' fees. The settlement also ensured that the guardian ad litem (GAL) would attempt to obtain educational services from the children's local school districts for the plaintiffs (including 10 hours per month of cognitive remediation therapy, 1 hour per week of vocational therapy, 1 hour per week of occupational therapy, and 4 hours per week of one-on-one academic tutoring), and that until the plaintiffs exited the custody of DYFS, the state would provide the GAL, on a bi-monthly basis, with updated records regarding each plaintiff. The defendants also agreed to provide each plaintiff with a Medicaid card entitling them to benefits under Medicaid "Family Care Plan A," from the date of the settlement agreement to the date each plaintiff reaches age 21, and to waive any and all Medicare liens. The court approved this settlement in its entirety on November 30, 2005. While the settlement agreement was pending in early November, B.J., the oldest brother who was not a party to the case, filed a Motion to Intervene. The Motion was granted in mid-November. On November 29, 2005, the court approved the settlement B.J. and the state reached in mid-November, which awarded B.J. a sum of $5,000,000, continued his medical care via Medicaid, and in which the state waived any and all Medicaid liens. The plaintiff's attorney fees were also waived, though the costs were not.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiffs, three minor children, sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that defendants placed them in a foster-turned-adoptive home that systematically starved them. This case was filed in 2004, and the parties agreed to settle in September 2005. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in November 2005, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $7,500,000.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the county and the county sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The prisoners, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Eight Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that the county jails were overcrowded and, among other things, provided inadequate access to law libraries and to medical, dental and mental health care. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 12, 1990, the plaintiffs moved the District Court for a preliminary injunction, and on February 27, 1991, following discovery, the Court (Chief Judge Robert E. Coyle) adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds and granted a limited injunction, prohibiting prisoners from being bedded on the floor, prohibiting the addition of more beds to the prison during the case, and authorizing the Sheriff to release prisoners when the jail was 90% full. The Court also certified the case as a class action. The parties began negotiations to settle the case in 1991, and in March 1992 they came to an agreement. Like the preliminary injunction, the settlement enjoined the County from bedding prisoners on the floor and allowed the Sheriff to deny new prisoners and release current prisoners when the jail came within ten percent of its maximum capacity; in addition, it settlement also addressed issued with law library access and medical, dental and mental health care. It applied to the Men's Jail, the Public Safety Center, the Men's Honor Farm, and the Female Facility (closed in 1993). The Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) approved the settlement and terminated the case on May 4, 1992. Three days later, the Court (Magistrate Judge Moulds) ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. In 2008, a class member filed a motion seeking enforcement of the settlement, but the Court referred the movant to class counsel. The settlement was still in effect in 2012, and played a part in the County's application for state funds to finance an expansion of its jail facilities.
<|assistant|>
On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County and the County Sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction in 1990, and the parties settled in 1992.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 25, 2014, a former pre-trial detainee of the Montgomery County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Montgomery County, its sheriff, and its jail administrator under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged that the jail did not provide adequate food and nutrition, which caused him and other inmates to experience dramatic weight loss, hair loss, skin conditions, and other medical conditions, including scurvy. The plaintiff sought to represent a class of inmates who, like himself, had been denied proper nutrition at the Montgomery County Jail. On September 29, 2017, District Judge Brenda K. Sannes denied the motion for class certification, without prejudice, ruling that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). On May 29, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those claims were moot because he had filed his complaint four months after he was released from the jail. He filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2018. A second former inmate of the jail joined as plaintiff in this amended complaint. The new plaintiff had been detained at the jail for several months both before and after conviction. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought again to represent a class. The court granted class certification on August 20, 2018, defining the class as all detainees, from July 24, 2011 onward, who had been detained at the jail for at least two consecutive weeks. The class was divided into two sub-classes: pre-trial detainees and post-trial detainees. On November 7, 2019, the court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment. However, the court did strike the demand for declaratory and injunctive relief, as those claims had been dismissed on May 29, 2018, before the plaintiffs re-asserted them in the amended complaint. 2019 WL 5842822. The parties set three different trial dates before agreeing to a settlement in late February. On July 8, 2020, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were ready to finalize the settlement agreement, except for one detail: the county was insisting that the plaintiffs’ attorneys agree not to publicly share information about the settlement, though the settlement would be a matter of public record. On July 15, 2020, the county informed the court that the parties had resolved the issue, and the settlement is pending.
<|assistant|>
In 2014, a former pre-trial detainee at the Montgomery County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged the facility failed to provide adequate food and nutrition, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2018, the class was certified. The class was divided into two subclasses of pre-trial and post-trial detainees and was generally defined as all detainees who have been or will be placed into the custody of the jail and were detained for at least two consecutive weeks since July 24, 2011. As of July 13, 2020, a settlement agreement is pending.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants subjected the female complaining party to a sexually hostile work environment and terminated her in retaliation to her opposing these practices. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief against the defendants. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge William Wall. The defendants successfully had the lawsuit dismissed in July 2007, as the EEOC failed to demonstrate that Grace Church and Diocese were an integrated enterprise or an employer of the complaining party. At the same time the EEOC's partial motion for summary judgment was denied. The court granted the EEOC leave to amend their complaint. 2007 WL 4914663. On December 18, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint against the defendants. On January 25, 2008, Diocese moved to dismiss the EEOC’s amended complaint. Diocese argued that the EEOC did not sufficiently plead that Diocese was an employer under Title VII, and therefore the amended complaint should be dismissed. The court did not agree. On July 15, 2008, the court denied Diocese’s motion to dismiss EEOC’s amended complaint. For nearly three years, the parties underwent discovery proceedings. On November 30, 2012, settlement discussions began. The complainant intervened as a plaintiff, on May 20, 2013. The next day, the parties’ reached an agreement, and the court approved their consent decree. This consent decree allowed the court to retain jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. The decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The defendants next agreed to adopt non-discriminatory policies and procedures. In addition, the defendants agreed to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all employees, post notices of this lawsuit’s resolution in prominent places where employee notices were posted, report regularly to the EEOC, and keep records up to date that were relevant to employment discrimination. There are no indication of non-compliance by the parties, and the duration of the consent decree has lapsed. The case is presumably closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, female, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant intervened in this lawsuit. In 2013, the court approved the parties' consent decree. This decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The case is presumably closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division as well as the Governor of Missouri, the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, the Director of the Family Support Division, the Director of the Department of Revenue and the Director of the Motor Vehicle and Driver Licensing Division. Under Missouri law, the Family Support Division (“FSD”) has the authority to issue an order suspending the driver’s license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months’ worth of child support payments or at least $2,500, whichever is less. The complaint challenged the statute, alleging that it perpetuates a cycle of poverty by unconstitutionally suspending the driver’s licenses of parents who are unable to pay child support. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleged that the statute makes no inquiry into the reason for the nonpayment before ordering a license suspension and provides no notice about the procedure for contesting suspension. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute drives parents further into poverty because these individuals often lose their jobs because of lack of reliable transportation to travel to work. Further, parents who have had their licenses suspended are often unable to visit or help care for their children. Furthermore, the complaint raised the issue that noncustodial parents who cannot afford to make their child support payments are already criminalized under a different Missouri law that is punishable with fines and jail time. The complaint alleged that once the licenses are suspended, it is extremely difficult to obtain reinstatement, even if the parent manages to start making regular payments because the reinstatement process is entirely without clear process, guidelines or communication. The plaintiffs argued that even attorneys making in-person visits to the child support offices, filing petitions with FSD, requesting hearings, and communicating directly with FSD could not navigate the process successfully. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that FSD’s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents’ driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the suspensions violate substantive due process because they discriminate on the basis of wealth and are not narrowly tailored to the collection of child support, the best interests of children, or any compelling government interest. The complaint further alleged that the suspensions infringe on plaintiffs’ substantive due process because it violates their fundamental right to travel and violates their procedural due process because FSD does not guarantee a hearing or provide notice of a hearing. The complaint also alleged that the suspensions deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection because the defendants use their unique position as government actors to use debt collection methods that are not available to private creditors. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver’s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver’s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs’ and class members’ driver’s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the factual allegations of the original complaint. After filing their amended complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify a class on November 1, 2019. The case was first assigned to District Judge Ronnie L. White and later reassigned to District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on February 5, 2020. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case proceeded to discovery. On July 28, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class without prejudice and instructed the plaintiffs to refile it after the court issues an amended case management order. On September 24, 2020, the court held the plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed on June 1, 2020, in abeyance until the court receives notification from the defendants that they plan to resume issuing new license suspensions for failure to pay child support. The case remains ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division and a number of other Missouri public officials challenging a Missouri law that allows the Family Support Division ("FSD") to suspend the driver's license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months' worth of child support payments or at least $2,500 in child support payments, whichever is less. The plaintiffs claimed that FSD’s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents’ driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver’s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver’s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs’ and class members’ driver’s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the allegations of the original complaint. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case remains ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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