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Brown's formulations became widely known and were retrospectively attributed to Whorf and Sapir although the second formulation, verging on linguistic determinism, was never advanced by either of them.
Since Brown and Lenneberg believed that the objective reality denoted by language was the same for speakers of all languages, they decided to test how different languages codified the same message differently and whether differences in codification could be proven to affect behavior.
Universalist scholars ushered in a period of dissent from ideas about linguistic relativity. Lenneberg was one of the first cognitive scientists to begin development of the Universalist theory of language that was formulated by Chomsky as Universal Grammar, effectively arguing that all languages share the same underlying structure. The Chomskyan school also holds the belief that linguistic structures are largely innate and that what are perceived as differences between specific languages are surface phenomena that do not affect the brain's universal cognitive processes. This theory became the dominant paradigm in American linguistics from the 1960s through the 1980s, while linguistic relativity became the object of ridicule.
Today many followers of the universalist school of thought still oppose linguistic relativity. For example, Pinker argues in "The Language Instinct" that thought is independent of language, that language is itself meaningless in any fundamental way to human thought, and that human beings do not even think in "natural" language, i.e. any language that we actually communicate in; rather, we think in a meta-language, preceding any natural language, called "mentalese." Pinker attacks what he calls "Whorf's radical position," declaring, "the more you examine Whorf's arguments, the less sense they make."
Pinker and other universalists have been accused by relativists of misrepresenting Whorf's views and arguing against strawmen.
Joshua Fishman's "Whorfianism of the third kind".
Joshua Fishman argued that Whorf's true position was largely overlooked. In 1978, he suggested that Whorf was a "neo-Herderian champion" and in 1982, he proposed "Whorfianism of the third kind" in an attempt to refocus linguists' attention on what he claimed was Whorf's real interest, namely the intrinsic value of "little peoples" and "little languages". Whorf had criticized Ogden's Basic English thus:
Where Brown's weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis proposes that language "influences" thought and the strong version that language "determines" thought, Fishman's "Whorfianism of the third kind" proposes that language "is a key to culture".
In his book "Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind", Lakoff reappraised linguistic relativity and especially Whorf's views about how linguistic categorization reflects and/or influences mental categories. He concluded that the debate had been confused. He described four parameters on which researchers differed in their opinions about what constitutes linguistic relativity:
Lakoff concluded that many of Whorf's critics had criticized him using novel definitions of linguistic relativity, rendering their criticisms moot.
The publication of the 1996 anthology "Rethinking Linguistic Relativity" edited by Gumperz and Levinson began a new period of linguistic relativity studies that focused on cognitive and social aspects. The book included studies on the linguistic relativity and universalist traditions. Levinson documented significant linguistic relativity effects in the linguistic conceptualization of spatial categories between languages. For example, men speaking the Guugu Yimithirr language in Queensland gave accurate navigation instructions using a compass-like system of north, south, east and west, along with a hand gesture pointing to the starting direction.
Lucy defines this approach as “domain-centered,” because researchers select a semantic domain and compare it across linguistic and cultural groups. Space is another semantic domain that has proven fruitful for linguistic relativity studies. Spatial categories vary greatly across languages. Speakers rely on the linguistic conceptualization of space in performing many ordinary tasks. Levinson and others reported three basic spatial categorizations. While many languages use combinations of them, some languages exhibit only one type and related behaviors. For example, Yimithirr only uses absolute directions when describing spatial relations— the position of everything is described by using the cardinal directions. Speakers define a location as "north of the house", while an English speaker may use relative positions, saying "in front of the house" or "to the left of the house".
Separate studies by Bowerman and Slobin treated the role of language in cognitive processes. Bowerman showed that certain cognitive processes did not use language to any significant extent and therefore could not be subject to linguistic relativity. Slobin described another kind of cognitive process that he named "thinking for speaking" – the kind of process in which perceptional data and other kinds of prelinguistic cognition are translated into linguistic terms for communication. These, Slobin argues, are the kinds of cognitive process that are at the root of linguistic relativity.
Researchers such as Boroditsky, Majid, Lucy and Levinson believe that language influences thought in more limited ways than the broadest early claims. Researchers examine the interface between thought (or cognition), language and culture and describe the relevant influences. They use experimental data to back up their conclusions. Kay ultimately concluded that "[the] Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right visual field but not the left". His findings show that accounting for brain lateralization offers another perspective.
Recent studies have also taken the "behavior centered" approach, which starts by comparing behavior across linguistic groups and then searches for causes for that behavior in the linguistic system. In an early example of this approach, Whorf attributed the occurrence of fires at a chemical plant to the workers' use of the word 'empty' to describe the barrels containing only explosive vapors.
More recently, Bloom noticed that speakers of Chinese had unexpected difficulties answering counter-factual questions posed to them in a questionnaire. He concluded that this was related to the way in which counter-factuality is marked grammatically in Chinese. Other researchers attributed this result to Bloom's flawed translations. Strømnes examined why Finnish factories had a higher occurrence of work related accidents than similar Swedish ones. He concluded that cognitive differences between the grammatical usage of Swedish prepositions and Finnish cases could have caused Swedish factories to pay more attention to the work process while Finnish factory organizers paid more attention to the individual worker.
Everett's work on the Pirahã language of the Brazilian Amazon found several peculiarities that he interpreted as corresponding to linguistically rare features, such as a lack of numbers and color terms in the way those are otherwise defined and the absence of certain types of clauses. Everett's conclusions were met with skepticism from universalists who claimed that the linguistic deficit is explained by the lack of need for such concepts.
Recent research with non-linguistic experiments in languages with different grammatical properties (e.g., languages with and without numeral classifiers or with different gender grammar systems) showed that language differences in human categorization are due to such differences. Experimental research suggests that this linguistic influence on thought diminishes over time, as when speakers of one language are exposed to another.
Kashima & Kashima showed that people living in countries where spoken languages often drop pronouns (such as Japanese) tend to have more collectivistic values than those who use non–pronoun drop languages such as English. They argued that the explicit reference to “you” and “I” reminds speakers the distinction between the self and other.
Psycholinguistic studies explored motion perception, emotion perception, object representation and memory. The gold standard of psycholinguistic studies on linguistic relativity is now finding non-linguistic cognitive differences in speakers of different languages (thus rendering inapplicable Pinker's criticism that linguistic relativity is "circular").
Recent work with bilingual speakers attempts to distinguish the effects of language from those of culture on bilingual cognition including perceptions of time, space, motion, colors and emotion. Researchers described differences between bilinguals and monolinguals in perception of color, representations of time and other elements of cognition.
Linguistic relativity inspired others to consider whether thought could be influenced by manipulating language.
The question bears on philosophical, psychological, linguistic and anthropological questions.
A major question is whether human psychological faculties are mostly innate or whether they are mostly a result of learning, and hence subject to cultural and social processes such as language. The innate view holds that humans share the same set of basic faculties, and that variability due to cultural differences is less important and that the human mind is a mostly biological construction, so that all humans sharing the same neurological configuration can be expected to have similar cognitive patterns.
Multiple alternatives have advocates. The contrary constructivist position holds that human faculties and concepts are largely influenced by socially constructed and learned categories, without many biological restrictions. Another variant is idealist, which holds that human mental capacities are generally unrestricted by biological-material strictures. Another is essentialist, which holds that essential differences may influence the ways individuals or groups experience and conceptualize the world. Yet another is relativist (Cultural relativism), which sees different cultural groups as employing different conceptual schemes that are not necessarily compatible or commensurable, nor more or less in accord with external reality.
Another debate considers whether thought is a form of internal speech or is independent of and prior to language.
In the philosophy of language the question addresses the relations between language, knowledge and the external world, and the concept of truth. Philosophers such as Putnam, Fodor, Davidson, and Dennett see language as representing directly entities from the objective world and that categorization reflect that world. Other philosophers (e.g. Quine, Searle, Foucault) argue that categorization and conceptualization is subjective and arbitrary.
Another question is whether language is a tool for representing and referring to objects in the world, or whether it is a system used to construct mental representations that can be communicated.
Sapir/Whorf contemporary Alfred Korzybski was independently developing his theory of general semantics, which was aimed at using language's influence on thinking to maximize human cognitive abilities. Korzybski's thinking was influenced by logical philosophy such as Russell and Whitehead's "Principia Mathematica" and Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". Although Korzybski was not aware of Sapir and Whorf's writings, the movement was followed by Whorf-admirer Stuart Chase, who fused Whorf's interest in cultural-linguistic variation with Korzybski's programme in his popular work "The Tyranny of Words". S. I. Hayakawa was a follower and popularizer of Korzybski's work, writing "Language in Thought and Action". The general semantics movement influenced the development of neuro-linguistic programming (NLP), another therapeutic technique that seeks to use awareness of language use to influence cognitive patterns.
Korzybski independently described a "strong" version of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity.
In their fiction, authors such as Ayn Rand and George Orwell explored how linguistic relativity might be exploited for political purposes. In Rand's "Anthem", a fictive communist society removed the possibility of individualism by removing the word "I" from the language. In Orwell's "1984" the authoritarian state created the language Newspeak to make it impossible for people to think critically about the government, or even to contemplate that they might be impoverished or oppressed, by reducing the number of words to reduce the thought of the locutor.
APL programming language originator Kenneth E. Iverson believed that the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis applied to computer languages (without actually mentioning it by name). His Turing Award lecture, "Notation as a Tool of Thought", was devoted to this theme, arguing that more powerful notations aided thinking about computer algorithms.
The essays of Paul Graham explore similar themes, such as a conceptual hierarchy of computer languages, with more expressive and succinct languages at the top. Thus, the so-called "blub" paradox (after a hypothetical programming language of average complexity called "Blub") says that anyone preferentially using some particular programming language will "know" that it is more powerful than some, but not that it is less powerful than others. The reason is that "writing" in some language means "thinking" in that language. Hence the paradox, because typically programmers are "satisfied with whatever language they happen to use, because it dictates the way they think about programs".
In a 2003 presentation at an open source convention, Yukihiro Matsumoto, creator of the programming language Ruby, said that one of his inspirations for developing the language was the science fiction novel "Babel-17", based on the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis.
Ted Chiang's short story "Story of Your Life" developed the concept of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis as applied to an alien species which visits Earth. The aliens' biology contributes to their spoken and written languages, which are distinct. In the 2016 American film "Arrival", based on Chiang's short story, the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis is the premise. The protagonist explains that "the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis is the theory that the language you speak determines how you think".
In his science fiction novel "The Languages of Pao" the author Jack Vance describes how specialized languages are a major part of a strategy to create specific classes in a society, to enable the population to withstand occupation and develop itself.
In the Samuel R. Delany science fiction novel, "Babel-17," the author describes a highly advanced, information-dense language that can be used as a weapon. Learning it turns one into an unwilling traitor as it alters perception and thought.
The Totalitarian regime depicted in George Orwell's "Nineteen Eighty Four" in effect acts on the basis of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, seeking to replace English with "Newspeak", a language constructed specifically with the intention that thoughts subversive of the regime cannot be expressed in it, and therefore people educated to speak and think in it would not have such thoughts.
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs. Intentionality is primarily ascribed to mental states, like perceptions, beliefs or desires, which is why it has been regarded as the characteristic "mark of the mental" by many philosophers. A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of "intentional inexistence": to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states.
The earliest theory of intentionality is associated with Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument for the existence of God, and with his tenets distinguishing between objects that exist in the understanding and objects that exist in reality. The idea fell out of discussion with the end of the medieval scholastic period, but in recent times was resurrected by empirical psychologist Franz Brentano and later adopted by contemporary phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl. Today, intentionality is a live concern among philosophers of mind and language. A common dispute is between naturalism about intentionality, the view that intentional properties are reducible to natural properties as studied by the natural sciences, and the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that intentionality is grounded in consciousness.
The concept of intentionality was reintroduced in 19th-century contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano (a German philosopher and psychologist who is generally regarded as the founder of act psychology, also called intentionalism) in his work "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint" (1874). Brentano described intentionality as a characteristic of all acts of consciousness that are thus "psychical" or "mental" phenomena, by which they may be set apart from "physical" or "natural" phenomena.
Brentano coined the expression "intentional inexistence" to indicate the peculiar ontological status of the contents of mental phenomena. According to some interpreters the "in-" of "in-existence" is to be read as locative, i.e. as indicating that "an intended object ... exists in or has "in-existence", existing not externally but in the psychological state" (Jacquette 2004, p. 102), while others are more cautious, stating: "It is not clear whether in 1874 this ... was intended to carry any ontological commitment" (Chrudzimski and Smith 2004, p. 205).
A major problem within discourse on intentionality is that participants often fail to make explicit whether or not they use the term to imply concepts such as agency or desire, i.e. whether it involves teleology. Dennett (see below) explicitly invokes teleological concepts in the "intentional stance". However, most philosophers use "intentionality" to mean something with no teleological import. Thus, a thought of a chair can be about a chair without any implication of an intention or even a belief relating to the chair. For philosophers of language, what is meant by intentionality is largely an issue of how symbols can have meaning. This lack of clarity may underpin some of the differences of view indicated below.
To bear out further the diversity of sentiment evoked from the notion of intentionality, Husserl followed on Brentano, and gave the concept of intentionality more widespread attention, both in continental and analytic philosophy. In contrast to Brentano's view, French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre ("Being and Nothingness") identified intentionality with consciousness, stating that the two were indistinguishable. German philosopher Martin Heidegger ("Being and Time"), defined intentionality as "care" ("Sorge"), a sentient condition where an individual's existence, facticity, and being in the world identifies their ontological significance, in contrast to that which is merely ontic ("thinghood").
Other 20th-century philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle and A.J. Ayer were critical of Husserl's concept of intentionality and his many layers of consciousness. Ryle insisted that perceiving is not a process, and Ayer that describing one's knowledge is not to describe mental processes. The effect of these positions is that consciousness is so fully intentional that the mental act has been emptied of all content, and that the idea of pure consciousness is that it is nothing. (Sartre also referred to "consciousness" as "nothing").
Platonist Roderick Chisholm has revived the Brentano thesis through linguistic analysis, distinguishing two parts to Brentano's concept, the ontological aspect and the psychological aspect. Chisholm's writings have attempted to summarize the suitable and unsuitable criteria of the concept since the Scholastics, arriving at a criterion of intentionality identified by the two aspects of Brentano's thesis and defined by the logical properties that distinguish language describing psychological phenomena from language describing non-psychological phenomena. Chisholm's criteria for the intentional use of sentences are: existence independence, truth-value indifference, and referential opacity.
In current artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind, intentionality is sometimes linked with questions of semantic inference, with both skeptical and supportive adherents. John Searle argued for this position with the Chinese room thought experiment, according to which no syntactic operations that occurred in a computer would provide it with semantic content. Others are more skeptical of the human ability to make such an assertion, arguing that the kind of intentionality that emerges from self-organizing networks of automata will always be undecidable because it will never be possible to make our subjective introspective experience of intentionality and decision making coincide with our objective observation of the behavior of a self-organizing machine.
A central issue for theories of intentionality has been the problem of intentional inexistence: to determine the ontological status of the entities which are the objects of intentional states. This is particularly relevant for cases involving objects that have no existence outside the mind, as in the case of mere fantasies or hallucinations.
For example, assume that Mary is thinking about Superman. On the one hand, it seems that this thought is intentional: Mary is "thinking about something". On the other hand, Superman "doesn't exist". This suggests that Mary is either "not thinking about something" or that Mary is "thinking about something that doesn't exist". Various theories have been proposed in order to reconcile these conflicting intuitions. These theories can roughly be divided into "eliminativism", "relationalism", and "adverbialism". Eliminativists deny that this kind of problematic mental state is possible. Relationalist try to solve the problem by interpreting intentional states as relations while adverbialists interpret them as properties.
Eliminativists deny that the example above is possible. It might seem to us and to Mary that she is thinking about something but she is not really thinking at all. Such a position could be motivated by a form of semantic externalism, the view that the meaning of a term, or in this example the content of a thought, is determined by factors external to the subject. If meaning depends on successful reference then failing to refer would result in a lack of meaning. The difficulty for such a position is to explain why it seems to Mary that she is thinking about something and how seeming to think is different from actual thinking.
Relationalists hold that having an intentional state involves standing in a relation to the intentional object. This is the most natural position for non-problematic cases. So if Mary perceives a tree, we might say that a perceptual relation holds between Mary, the subject of this relation, and the tree, the object of this relation. Relations are usually assumed to be existence-entailing: the instance of a relation entails the existence of its relata. This principle rules out that we can bear relations to non-existing entities. One way to solve the problem is to deny this principle and argue for a kind of "intentionality exceptionalism": that intentionality is different from all other relations in the sense that this principle doesn't apply to it.
Dennett's taxonomy of current theories about intentionality.
Daniel Dennett offers a taxonomy of the current theories about intentionality in Chapter 10 of his book "The Intentional Stance". Most, if not all, current theories on intentionality accept Brentano's thesis of the irreducibility of intentional idiom. From this thesis the following positions emerge:
Roderick Chisholm (1956), G.E.M. Anscombe (1957), Peter Geach (1957), and Charles Taylor (1964) all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences. Members of this category also maintain realism in regard to intentional objects, which may imply some kind of dualism (though this is debatable).
The latter position, which maintains the unity of intentionality with the natural sciences, is further divided into three standpoints:
Proponents of the "eliminative materialism", understand intentional idiom, such as "belief", "desire", and the like, to be replaceable either with behavioristic language (e.g. Quine) or with the language of neuroscience (e.g. Churchland).
Holders of "realism" argue that there is a deeper fact of the matter to both translation and belief attribution. In other words, manuals for translating one language into another cannot be set up in different yet behaviorally identical ways and ontologically there are intentional objects. Famously, Fodor has attempted to ground such realist claims about intentionality in a language of thought. Dennett comments on this issue, Fodor "attempt[s] to make these irreducible realities acceptable to the physical sciences by grounding them (somehow) in the 'syntax' of a system of physically realized mental representations" (Dennett 1987, 345).
They are further divided into two theses:
Advocates of the former, the Normative Principle, argue that attributions of intentional idioms to physical systems should be the propositional attitudes that the physical system ought to have in those circumstances (Dennett 1987, 342). However, exponents of this view are still further divided into those who make an "Assumption of Rationality" and those who adhere to the "Principle of Charity". Dennett (1969, 1971, 1975), Cherniak (1981, 1986), and the more recent work of Putnam (1983) recommend the Assumption of Rationality, which unsurprisingly assumes that the physical system in question is rational. Donald Davidson (1967, 1973, 1974, 1985) and Lewis (1974) defend the Principle of Charity.
The latter is advocated by Grandy (1973) and Stich (1980, 1981, 1983, 1984), who maintain that attributions of intentional idioms to any physical system (e.g. humans, artifacts, non-human animals, etc.) should be the propositional attitude (e.g. "belief", "desire", etc.) that one would suppose one would have in the same circumstances (Dennett 1987, 343).
Basic intentionality types according to Le Morvan.
Intentionalism is the thesis that all mental states are intentional, i.e. that they are about something: about their intentional object. This thesis has also been referred to as "representationalism". Intentionalism is entailed by Brentano's claim that intentionality is "the mark of the mental": if all and only mental states are intentional then it is surely the case that all mental states are intentional.
Discussions of intentionalism often focus on the intentionality of conscious states. One can distinguish in such states their phenomenal features, or what it is like for a subject to have such a state, from their intentional features, or what they are about. These two features seem to be closely related to each other, which is why intentionalists have proposed various theories in order to capture the exact form of this relatedness.
Critics of intentionalism, so-called anti-intentionalists, have proposed various apparent counterexamples to intentionalism: states that are considered mental but lack intentionality.
Some anti-intentionalist theories, such as that of Ned Block, are based on the argument that phenomenal conscious experience or qualia is also a vital component of consciousness, and that it is not intentional. (The latter claim is itself disputed by Michael Tye.)
Another form of anti-intentionalism associated with John Searle regards phenomenality itself as the "mark of the mental" and sidelines intentionality.
A further form argues that some unusual states of consciousness are non-intentional, although an individual might live a lifetime without experiencing them. Robert K.C. Forman argues that some of the unusual states of consciousness typical of mystical experience are "pure consciousness events" in which awareness exists, but has no object, is not awareness "of" anything.
Several authors have attempted to construct philosophical models describing how intentionality relates to the human capacity to be self-conscious. Cedric Evans contributed greatly to the discussion with his "The Subject of Self-Consciousness" in 1970. He centered his model on the idea that executive attention need not be propositional in form.
The auditory moving-window is a psycholinguistic paradigm developed at Michigan State University by Fernanda Ferreira and colleagues. Ferreira and colleagues built the paradigm in order to address the scarcity of (fluent) spoken-language comprehension literature versus the robustness of that for visual-word processing. Auditory moving-window can be used to assess indirectly the processing load of a sentence: this processing load is assessed by an analogue of reaction time within the paradigm (discussed below). Reaction times within the paradigm are sensitive to at least word frequency and garden path effects.
The paradigm has been used in the study of syntactic processing in the study of aphasic patients. One such study suggests that many aphasic patients retain their abilities to process syntactic structures on-line. Further, evidence suggests that Expressive aphasics have a degraded ability to process complex syntax on-line, whereas Receptive aphasics are impaired only after on-line comprehension concludes
The auditory moving-window paradigm, because of its similarity to the eye tracking paradigm, has a broad range of applications. It is at least sensitive enough to detect frequency effects on comprehension: low frequency words had a greater IRT and DT than high frequency words, suggesting a relative difficulty of lexical access. Further, it is sensitive to garden path effects
Because one of the aims of the auditory moving-window is to investigate fluent speech, the paradigm is several steps more complex than simple auditory word-by-word presentation:
The presentation of a prepared sample depends on what software is being used. What follows is an abstraction of the general strategy.
The auditory moving-window is roughly analogous to an eye tracking task presented in the auditory modality. The eye tracking variable of interest that is thought to be closest to the DT is that of fixation duration. They are held to be directly related: a greater DT is correspondent to a greater fixation duration. Several eye-tracking studies use fixation duration as an indirect measure of processing load: a greater fixation duration is correspondent to a greater processing load . The same applies to DTs.
Kenneth Goodman (December 23, 1927 - March 12, 2020) was Professor Emeritus, Language Reading and Culture, at the University of Arizona. He is best known for developing the theory underlying the literacy philosophy of whole language.
Goodman began teaching at Wayne State University in 1962. His research focused on reading in public schools. While at Wayne State University, Goodman developed miscue analysis, a process of assessing students' reading comprehension based on samples of oral reading. One of his research assistants in miscue analysis was Rudine Sims Bishop. Goodman taught at Wayne State University for 15 years before moving to the University of Arizona.
After publishing an influential book on the subject of whole language, Goodman began to create a psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic model of reading inspired by the work of Noam Chomsky. Goodman decided that the process of reading was similar to the process of learning a language as conceptualized by Chomsky, and that literacy developed naturally as a consequence of experiences with print, just as language ability developed naturally as a consequence of experiences with language. Goodman concluded that attempts to teach rules ("phonics") to children for decoding words were inappropriate and not likely to succeed.
After developing and researching the Whole Language model, Goodman presented his work to the American Educational Research Association (AERA) conference and published an article in the "Journal of the Reading Specialist," in which he famously wrote that reading is a "psycholinguistic guessing game." He retired from the University of Arizona in August 1998.
Goodman's concept of written language development views it as parallel to oral language development. Goodman's theory was a basis for the whole language movement, which was further developed by Yetta Goodman, Regie Routman, Frank Smith and others. His concept of reading as an analogue to language development has been studied by brain researchers such as Sally Shaywitz, who rejected the theory on the grounds that reading does not develop naturally in the absence of instruction. Despite this, the theory continues to receive support from some scholars. Goodman's theory and strong convictions made him an icon of the whole language movement and a lightning rod for criticism from those who disagree with it. His book "What's Whole in Whole Language" sold over 250,000 copies in six languages.
Goodman served in several important capacities, including as President of the International Reading Association, President of the National Conference on Research in Language and Literacy, and President of the Center for Expansion of Language and Thinking. He also worked extensively with the National Council of Teachers of English. He received a number of awards, including the James Squire award from NCTE for contributions to the profession and NCTE (2007). Goodman has published over 150 articles and book chapters as well as a number of books. In addition to "What's Whole in Whole Language", he also wrote "Ken Goodman on Reading" and "Phonics Phacts"; all were published by Heinemann. His book "Scientific Realism in Studies of Education", was published by Taylor and Francis in 2007.
His last book was "Reading- The Grand Illusion: How and Why People Make Sense of Print" with contributions from linguist, Peter H. Fries and neurologist, Steven L. Strauss and was published by Routledge in 2016.
Goodman was inducted into the Reading Hall of Fame in 1989.
1. "A Communicative Theory of the Reading Curriculum," Elementary English, Vol. 40:3, March 1963, pp. 290–298.
2. and Yetta M. Goodman, "Spelling Ability of a Self-Taught Reader," The Elementary School Journal, Vol. 64:3, December 1963, pp. 149–154.
3. "The Linguistics of Reading," The Elementary School Journal, Vol. 64:8, April 1964, pp. 355–361.
Also in Durr, (ed.), Readings on Reading, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1968.
Also in Frost, (ed.), Issues and Innovations in the Teaching of Reading, Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1967.
4. "A Linguistic Study of Cues and Miscues in Reading," Elementary English, Vol. 42:6, October 1965, pp. 639–643.
Also in Wilson and Geyer, (eds.), Reading for Diagnostic and Remedial Reading, Merrill, 1972, pp. 103– 110.
Also in Gentile, Kamil, and Blanchard, (eds.), Reading Research Revisited, Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1983, pp. 129–134.
Also in Singer and Ruddell, (eds.), Theoretical Models and Processes of Reading, 3rd Edition, Newark: IRA, 1985.
5. "Dialect barriers to reading comprehension," Elementary English, Vol. 42:8, pp. 852–60, December 1965. Also in Linguistics and Reading, NCTE, 1966.
Also in Dimensions of Dialect, NCTE, 1967.
Also in Kosinski, (ed.), Readings on Creativity and Imagination in Literature and Language, NCTE, 1969.
Also in Teaching Black Children to Read, Center for Applied Linguistics, Washington, 1969.
Also in Kise, Binter, and Dalabalto, (eds.), Readings on Reading, Int. Book Co., pp. 241–51.
Also in Caper, Green, Baker, Listening and Speaking in the English Classroom, Macmillan, 1971. Also in Shores, Contemporary English: Change and Variation, Lippincott, 1972.
Also in Ruddell, (ed.), Resources in Reading Language Instruction, Prentiss Hall, 1972.
Also in DeStefano, Editor, Language, Society and Education, Jones Co., Worthington, Ohio, 1973.
6. and Yetta Goodman, "References on Linguistics and the Teaching of Reading," Reading Teacher, Vol. 21:1, October, 1967, pp. 22–23.

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