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There are a couple paths to the 4-2-5. One is by removing a linebacker from the standard 4–3 to add the extra defensive back. The second is by converting the ends of a wide tackle six to safeties (the defensive ends of a wide tackle six already have pass defense responsibilities). A variation is the 2–4–5, which is primarily run by teams that run the 3–4 defense. They replace a defensive tackle with a corner.
The 3–3–5 removes a lineman to the nickelback.
The 33 stack uses an extra strong safety, and "stacks" linebackers and safeties directly behind the defensive linemen.
The 3–5–3 refers to a defense that has three down linemen (the "3" level), three linebackers and two corners (the "5" level), one free safety and 2 strong safeties (the "3" level). This is similar to a 33 stack, but with players more spread. Also called the "umbrella" defense or "3-deep". In this set, the third safety would be referred to as a "weak safety" (WS) and allows two position safeties at the mid-level with a third safety deep. It is because of this that the secondary safety in a football defense is called a free safety rather than a weak safety
Any defense consisting of six defensive backs. The sixth defensive back is known as the dimeback and this defense is also used in passing situations (particularly when the offense is using four wide receivers). As the extra defensive back in the nickel formation is called the nickel, two nickels gives you a dime, hence the name of the formation.
Defense consisting of seven (quarter) or eight (half dollar) defensive backs. The seventh defensive back is often an extra safety, and this defense is used in extreme passing situations (such as to defend against a Hail Mary pass). It is occasionally referred to as the prevent defense because of its use in preventing desperation plays. The cornerbacks and safeties in a prevent defense usually make a point of defending the goal line at the expense of receivers in the middle of the field.
The quarter formations are run from a 3–1–7 or a 4–0–7 in most instances; the New England Patriots have used an 0–4–7 in some instances with no down linemen. Half dollar defenses are almost always run from a 3–0–8 formation. The eighth defensive back in this case is usually a wide receiver from the offense. The wide receiver can capitalize on interception opportunities in the expected high-risk offensive play.
Unlike other formations, the extra safety is not referred to as a quarterback or halfback (except in Canadian football), to avoid confusion with the offensive positions of the same names, but rather simply as a defensive back or a safety.
Formations with many defensive backs positioned far from the line of scrimmage are susceptible to running plays and short passes. However, since the defense is typically used only in the last few seconds of a game when the defensive team need only keep the offense from scoring a touchdown, giving up a few yards in the middle of the field is inconsequential.
More extreme defensive formations have been used when a coach feels that his team is at a particular disadvantage due to the opponent's offensive tactics or poor personnel match-ups.
For example, in 2007, New York Jets head coach Eric Mangini employed a scheme against Tom Brady and the New England Patriots that utilized only 1 defensive lineman and 6 linebackers. Prior to the snap, only the lone lineman assumed a three-point stance near the offensive center while the 6 linebackers "roved" up and down the line of scrimmage, attempting to confuse the quarterback as to whether they would rush the passer, drop into coverage, or play the run. This defense (combined with poor weather conditions) did slow the Patriot's passing game, but proved ineffective against the run, and the Patriots won the game.
Punting formations use a five-man offensive line, three "upbacks" (sometimes also referred to as "personal protectors") approximately 3 yards behind the line to act as an additional line of defense, two wide receivers known as "gunners" either to stop the punt returner or to down the ball, and the punter, 15 yards behind the line of scrimmage to receive the long snap. (If the punting team is deep in its own territory, the 15-yard distance would have to be shortened by up to 5 yards to keep the punter in front of the end line.) The number of upbacks and gunners can vary, and either position can be replaced by a tight end in a "max protect" situation.
Most field goals feature nine offensive linemen (seven on the line, both ends in the tight end position, with two extra slightly off the line of scrimmage), a place holder who kneels 7 yards behind the line of scrimmage, and a kicker.
In 2018, the NFL further amended the rules on the kickoff formation. All players other than the kicker may now line up no more than 1 yard behind the restraining line. The rule also states that there must be five players on both sides of the ball. On each side, two players must line up outside the numbers and two players must be lined up between the numbers and the hashmarks. The NFL also made a rule regarding the receiving team's formation in 2018. Eight players on the receiving team must be lined up in the 15-yard "set up zone" measured from the receiving team's restraining line 10 yards from the ball.
Kick return formations vary; in most situations, an association football-like formation is used, with eleven players staggered throughout the field including two (rarely, one) kick returners back to field deep kicks, two more twenty yards ahead of them to field squib kicks, two more at about midfield mainly to assist in blocking, and five players located the minimum ten yards from the kicking line. In obvious onside kick formations, more players are moved to the front of the formation, usually top wide receivers and other players who are good at recovering and catching loose balls; this formation is known as the "hands team". A kick returner will usually remain back in the event of an unexpected deep kick in this situation.
To defend punts, the defensive line usually uses a man-on-man system with seven defensive linemen, two cornerbacks, a linebacker and a kick returner. They may choose to attempt to block the punt, or drop back to block for the receiver.
The wishbone formation, also known simply as the bone, is an offensive formation in American football. The style of attack to which it gives rise is known as the wishbone offense. Like the spread offense in the 2000s, the wishbone was considered to be the most productive and innovative offensive scheme in college football during the 1970s and 1980s.
While the record books commonly refer to Emory Bellard developing the wishbone formation in 1968 as offensive coordinator at Texas, the wishbone's roots can be traced back to the 1950s. According to Barry Switzer, it was Charles “Spud” Cason, football coach at William Monnig Junior High School of Fort Worth, Texas, who first modified the classic T formation in order “to get a slow fullback into the play quicker.” Cason called the formation “Monnig T”. Bellard learned about Cason's tactics while coaching at Breckenridge High School, a small community west of Fort Worth.
Earlier in his career Bellard saw a similar approach implemented by former Detroit Lions guard Ox Emerson, then head coach at Alice High School near Corpus Christi, Texas. Trying to avoid the frequent pounding of his offensive line, Emerson moved one of the starting guards into the backfield, enabling him to get a running start at the opposing defensive line. Bellard served as Emerson's assistant at that time. During his high school coaching career in the late '50s and early '60s, Bellard adopted the basic approaches of both Cason and Emerson, as he won two 3A Texas state championships Breckenridge in 1958 and 1959 and a 4A state title at San Angelo Central High School in 1966, using a wishbone-like option offense.
In 1967 Bellard was hired by Darrell Royal and became offensive coordinator a year later. The Texas Longhorns only scored 18.6 points per game in a 6–4 season in 1967. After watching Texas A&M—running offensive coordinator Bud Moore and Gene Stallings' option offense—beat Bear Bryant's Alabama team in the 1968 Cotton Bowl Classic, Royal instructed Bellard to design a new three-man back-field triple option offense. Bellard tried to merge his old high school tactics with Stallings' triple option out of the Slot-I formation and Homer Rice's variations of the Veer, an offensive formation created by Bill Yeoman.
Bellard later left Texas and – using the wishbone – guided Texas A&M and Mississippi State to bowl game appearances in the late 1970s. At Mississippi State Bellard “broke the bone” and introduced the “wing-bone”, moving one of the halfbacks up to a wing formation and frequently sending him in motion. Another variation of the wishbone formation is called the flexbone.
Ironically, the longest running wishbone offense was run not by Texas but by their arch-rivals, the University of Oklahoma, who ran variations of the wishbone well into the mid-1990s. Oklahoma coach Barry Switzer has been credited by some for having “perfected” the use of the wishbone offense and former OU quarterback Jack Mildren is often referred to as "the Godfather of the wishbone" by University of Oklahoma football fans. In 1971, the Oklahoma Sooners wishbone offense set the all-time NCAA single-season rushing record at 472.4 yards per game, a record which still stands to this day.
Phil Jack Dawson, then head coach of Westbrook High School in Westbrook, Maine, developed an effective defense against the wishbone offense then in use by Texas, called “backbone defense”. Dawson contacted Ara Parseghian, then head coach of the University of Notre Dame, and convinced him to use it against Texas in the 1971 Cotton Bowl Classic. Notre Dame beat Texas 24-11.
In the National Football League, during the strike season of 1987, the San Francisco 49ers used the wishbone successfully against the New York Giants to win 41–21. Coach Bill Walsh used the wishbone because of his replacement quarterback's familiarity with a similar formation in college. The Cleveland Browns also utilized the wishbone at the pro level in a 2018 28–16 win over the Atlanta Falcons.
The Oklahoma playbook describes the quarterback, the architect behind the Wishbone, as, "a running back who can throw." They must also have an aptitude for the option and the decision making that lies within the play design as well as durability (cannot miss a practice).
The fullback is required to be able to handle a physical pounding because he is frequently hit without having the ball; he must also be quick with excellent stamina, and be a good blocker.
This makes the wishbone a "complete" offense. The offense expects to get a one-on-none in the running game and a one-on-one in open space with the passing game. The safety, who must support the run and also defend against the pass, is under tremendous pressure in this attack. The basic wishbone triple option play accounts for every defender on the field. Every defender is threatened before the basic play begins. There is an invitation to overplay or compensate on the basic play and overplaying or making a misstep on the basic play leaves the defense open for counters that leave no one to make up for the mistake.
The wishbone has the quarterback taking the snap from under center, with a fullback close behind him, and two halfbacks (sometimes called "tailbacks") further back, one slightly to the left, and the other slightly to the right. The alignment of the four backs makes an inverted Y, or “wishbone”, shape. There is typically one wide receiver and one tight end, but sometimes two wide receivers, or two tight ends.
The split-T is an offensive formation in American football that was popular in the 1940s and 1950s. Developed by Missouri Tigers head coach Don Faurot as a variation on the T formation, the split-T was first used in the 1941 season and allowed the Tigers to win all but their season-opening match against the Ohio State Buckeyes and the 1942 Sugar Bowl versus Fordham. Jim Tatum and Bud Wilkinson, who coached under Faurot with the Iowa Pre-Flight Seahawks during World War II, brought the split-T to the Oklahoma Sooners in 1946. After Tatum left for Maryland in 1947, Wilkinson became the head coach and went on to win a record-setting 47 straight games and two national titles between 1953 and 1957.
In the basic or tight-T formation, three running backs would line up about five yards behind the quarterback. The offensive linemen would form a fairly tight group in front of the backs. In the split-T, the offensive line was spread out over almost twice as much ground. This prompted the defensive front to widen as well, which created gaps for the offense to exploit.
The original split-T was a full house backfield. Later, Faurot would set up a flanker on one sideline. This was done after experience with nine man lines showed the flanker to create issues for the defense. The use of a split end to aid the passing game was optional, and was not an integral feature of either the split-T or the tight-T.
Faurot used the new formation to create what may have been the first option offense in football, which was a precursor of the wishbone, veer, and some modern run-first spread offenses. With the defense spread out, the offense would, in general, leave one defensive player on the play side unblocked. The blocking schemes were simple, with very little of the pulling or trapping of the more traditional power-running offenses.
The three base plays of the offense were the handoff (a dive play), the keep and the pitch play. The handoff was a fast play, with a halfback driving directly into the line, and the quarterback handing off within one yard of the line of scrimmage. Faurot judged this play to be the most dangerous in his offensive system, as the handoff occurred close to the line of scrimmage, close to potential interference by the defensive team.
If the dive play had not been called, then the quarterback kept the ball. The quarterback would run toward a spot just inside the unblocked defensive player. If that player closed on him, he would pitch the ball back to the outside trailing halfback, aiming for a spot outside that outside defensive player. When executed correctly, this resembled the two-on-one fast break of basketball, from which Faurot originally derived the concept (Faurot also lettered in basketball, as a student, and coached the Northeast Missouri State University basketball team to a conference championship prior to his tenure as the head football coach at Missouri).
Don Faurot, the head coach of the Missouri Tigers, developed the split-T and unleashed it onto the college football world in 1941. He combined this new formation with the athletes he had at running back and quarterback and created an offensive juggernaut. The Tigers finished the season 8-1, with the sole loss in the season opening out of conference game at #10 Ohio State. They were the Big Six Conference champions, ranked #7 in the AP poll, and accepted the invitation to play #6 Fordham in the 1942 Sugar Bowl.
In 1946, Jim Tatum became the Oklahoma head coach. He installed the split-T offense that he had learned as an assistant coach under Don Faurot at the U.S. Navy's Iowa Pre-Flight school football team during World War II. In his first year, he turned around Oklahoma's losing record and delivered a Big Six Conference championship. In 1947, Tatum left Oklahoma for Maryland, where he saw even more success with the split-T, including a consensus national championship in 1953.
Bud Wilkinson, also a Faurot assistant at Iowa Pre-Flight, was the next Sooners head coach. In 1953, after losing to Notre Dame and tying Pittsburgh, Oklahoma beat arch-rivals Texas, 19–14, and went on to win their next 46 games in a row, setting an NCAA record that stands to this day. Notre Dame book-ended the streak when they again beat Oklahoma in Norman, 7–0 on November 16, 1957.
Tatum and Wilkinson would later face off in the 1954 Orange Bowl, when #1/#1 Maryland and #4/#5 Oklahoma met on the field for the first time. Both teams used the split-T as their base offense. Other top football programs used the split-T during this period as well, including Alabama, Houston, Notre Dame, Texas, Michigan, Penn State, and Ohio State.
Bible, Dana X., "Championship Football", Prentice-Hall, 1947.
Brown, Paul, and Clary, Jack, "PB: The Paul Brown Story", Atheneum, 1979.
Faurot, Don "Secrets of the "Split-T" Formation", Prentice-Hall, 1950.
Keith, Harold, "Forty-Seven Straight: The Wilkinson Years at Oklahoma", University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.
The shotgun formation is a formation used by the offensive team in gridiron football mainly for passing plays, although some teams use it as their base formation. Instead of the quarterback receiving the snap from center at the line of scrimmage, in the shotgun he stands farther back, often five to seven yards off the line. Sometimes the quarterback will have a back on one or both sides before the snap, while other times he will be the lone player in the backfield with everyone spread out as receivers.
The shotgun formation can offer certain advantages. The offensive linemen have more room to maneuver behind the scrimmage line and form a tighter, more cohesive oval “pocket” in which the quarterback is protected from “blitzing” by the defense. If the quarterback has speed, mobility or both, he can use this formation to scramble before his pass; or, to run to an open field position in the defensive secondary or to the sideline, usually gaining first-down yardage.
Although some running plays can be run effectively from the shotgun, the formation also has weaknesses. The defense knows a pass is more than likely coming, particularly from an empty set lacking any running backs, and there is a higher risk of a botched snap than in a simple center/quarterback exchange. If the defense is planning a pass rush, this formation gives fast defensive players more open and exposed targets in the offensive backfield, with less cluttered “blitzing” routes to the quarterback and any other halfback in the offensive backfield.
Shotgun combines elements of the short punt and spread formations — "spread" in that it has receivers spread widely instead of close to or behind the interior line players. The origins of the term are thought to be that it is like a "shotgun" in spraying receivers around the field. (The alignment of the players also suggests the shape of an actual shotgun.) Formations similar or identical to the shotgun used decades previously would be called names such as "spread double wing". Short punt formations (so called because the distance between the snapper and the ostensible punter is shorter than in long punt formation) do not usually have as much emphasis on wide receivers.
The shotgun evolved from the single wing and the similar double-wing spread; famed triple threat man Sammy Baugh has claimed that the shotgun was effectively the same as the version of the double-wing he ran at Texas Christian University in the 1930s.
In the latter part of the 1940s, the Philadelphia Eagles, under Hall of Fame Coach Earl "Greasy" Neale, implemented the shotgun formation in their offensive attack with quarterback Tommy Thompson.
The formation was named by the man who actually devised it, San Francisco 49ers coach Red Hickey, in 1960. John Brodie was the first National Football League shotgun quarterback, beating out former starter Y. A. Tittle largely because he was mobile enough to effectively run the formation.
Since no other NFL teams used the formation during this time, some believed it had been invented by Tom Landry. Instead, Landry simply dusted off the old innovation to address a pressing problem: keeping Staubach protected while an unusually young and inexperienced squad (12 rookies made the 1975 Cowboys roster) jelled. The Cowboys ended up in the Super Bowl that season, in no small part due to its new use of the old formation. The shotgun became a "signature" formation for the Cowboys, especially during third down situations.
The shotgun was adopted by more teams throughout the pass-happy late 1980s, and was part of almost every team's offense in the 1990s, eventually becoming a base formation for some teams in the late 2000s.
In recent years, the shotgun has become vastly prevalent. Many college quarterbacks—such as Tim Tebow, who almost exclusively used the shotgun at Florida—have difficulty adapting to NFL offenses where about a third of snaps are taken under center. However, with the spread offense increasingly used in the NFL, the shotgun is more popular, since the spread allows for more effective running.
Though the shotgun is a pass-dominated formation, a cleverly designed halfback draw play can put defenses off guard and a fast halfback can get good yardage before the defense recovers from their mistake. A further development of the play is a halfback option pass, with the quarterback being one of the eligible receivers. Roger Staubach's backup and successor, Danny White, twice caught such a pass for a touchdown. It was noted at the time that he was only eligible because of the shotgun formation (an NFL quarterback who takes a snap from underneath the center was and still is an ineligible receiver, a rule not found in any amateur level of American football).
The shotgun is also used in college, but running is used more often than in the NFL. Most offenses in college who run in the shotgun have a fast quarterback. They often use a play where the quarterback has an option of handing the ball off to the running back who runs to the side opposite the side he was lined up on. The quarterback can also run the opposite way depending on how the defense reacts. Urban Meyer and the Florida Gators used this effectively from 2006 to 2009 with Tim Tebow.
The Nevada Wolf Pack currently employs a formation called the "pistol", in which the running back, instead of lining up next to the quarterback, lines up behind the quarterback, who in turn has lined up two to three yards behind the center.
Coach Urban Meyer has added elements of the option offense to the shotgun offense he employed as coach at Bowling Green State University, the University of Utah, and University of Florida. This "spread option" offense is also used by the Missouri Tigers, Ohio State Buckeyes and other college teams with quarterbacks who can run as well as throw effectively.
At times the formation has been more common in Canadian football, which allows only three downs to move ten yards downfield instead of the American game's four. Canadian teams are therefore more likely to find themselves with long yardage to make on the penultimate down, and therefore more likely to line up in the shotgun to increase their opportunities for a large gain. Canadian teams also have the advantage that backs positioned behind the line of scrimmage can run forward and cross the line running as the ball is snapped.
The 46 defense is an American football defensive formation, an eight men in the box defense, with six players along the line of scrimmage. There are two players at linebacker depth playing linebacker technique, and then three defensive backs. The 46 defense was originally developed and popularized with the Chicago Bears by their defensive coordinator Buddy Ryan, who later became head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles and Arizona Cardinals.
Unlike most defensive formations that take their names from the number of defensive linemen and linebackers on the field (i.e. the 4–3 defense has 4 linemen and 3 linebackers), the name "46" originally came from the jersey number of Doug Plank, who was a starting strong safety for the Bears when Ryan developed the defense, a role typically played in the formation as a surrogate linebacker.
The formation was very effective in the 1980s NFL because it often negated a team's running game and forced them to throw the ball. This was difficult for many teams at the time because most offensive passing games centered on the play-action pass, a situation that often favored the defense even further with the quarterback lined up to receive the snap from directly behind the center.
Currently, the 46 is rarely used in professional and college football. This is largely because of multiple receiver and spread formations. The eight man line that the 46 presented was most effective against the two back, two wide receiver sets common in the 1980s.
A weakness of the 46 defense is that with eight defensive players lining up near the line of scrimmage and only three in the secondary, it leaves areas open for receivers to catch passes. Also, timed passes can be thrown before the players blitzing have a chance to reach the quarterback. When the Miami Dolphins gave the Bears their only loss of the 1985 season, Miami exploited these weaknesses with quarterback Dan Marino's quick release of the ball, and their receivers' ability to beat the one-on-one coverage of Chicago's cornerbacks.
Another problem with the 46 defense is that most teams do not have enough impact players to run the 46 as effectively as the Bears and Ryan's other two major successes, the late 1980s Philadelphia Eagles for which he was head coach and the 1993 Houston Oilers for whom he was defensive coordinator, did. Those teams fielded some of the best front-seven defenses ever, and included such players as Jerome Brown, Mike Singletary, Steve McMichael, Richard Dent, Dan Hampton, Clyde Simmons, Reggie White, Otis Wilson, Seth Joyner, William Fuller, and Wilber Marshall.
In today's game, the 46 defense is often simplified to its main component of walking the strong safety up to the line of scrimmage as an eighth man in the box to help contain the run. Defenses today may also run safety blitzes and corner blitzes at crucial moments without committing wholly to the "46" defense. Up front, teams still use the concept of the "T-N-T" alignment, where two defensive ends are covering (lined up directly across from) the guards, and a nose tackle is covering the center. In the case of a zone-blocking scheme, this makes it difficult for the offensive linemen to reach any of the linebackers on the second level.
This is where defensive players would line up against a normal Pro Set offense.
When three or more receivers are used by the offense, the defense makes what is called a jayhawk adjustment. The charlie linebacker will step back to where the middle linebacker was in the normal alignment, the middle linebacker will move to where the strong safety was aligned and the strong safety will move out to cover the third receiver. If the offense uses a fourth receiver, the middle linebacker lines up in front of the center and the charlie linebacker would cover the fourth receiver.
To note, there is nothing particularly innovative about this particular set of assignments. For example, the strong safety could assume either the charley or the jack linebacker role. The linebacker displaced would line up over the weak side offensive tackle, where the strong safety is normally found.
Arguably, the two most difficult positions on offense to develop quickly are wide receivers and quarterbacks. A style of play was needed for teams that could not field strong throwing quarterbacks. In the flexbone formation, intelligent and athletic personnel can adapt to playing a quarterback's position without having to throw the ball very well.
Flexbone teams are often playing against more talented teams so they must use time management and trickery of the flexbone to even the playing field. By running the ball almost exclusively, a flexbone offense also runs the game clock and limits the opposing teams possibly faster and stronger offense from scoring against their own defense.
Another key consideration is that the flexbone formation gives the offense four potential vertical receiving threats at the snap: the two wide receivers and the two slotbacks. This is something that alternative formations such as the I-formation or the traditional wishbone cannot achieve without pre-snap motion that tips the offense's hand. This advantage allows the four-verticals play, a deadly weapon against Cover 3, a common defensive coverage used by the eight-man fronts that a strong running team is likely to face.
Since this offense is primarily used by service academies (Air Force, Army, Navy and The Citadel), it helps alleviate the inherent unbalance related to recruiting and being unable to recruit the type of talent that a larger school like Oklahoma or Alabama might be able to. The Flexbone allows for QBs who may be shorter or smaller than ideal (5'10 - 6'2 and weighing around 185-205 pounds) to be able to start because they often have a speed advantage despite not being able to throw the ball as well.
As a result of the misdirection and the size of the outside WRs (usually 6'2 or taller and over 200 pounds) to help block, the slotbacks can be similarly sized to the QB. This allows for the Flexbone to have 3 players who can run fast (with SBs also helping serve as receivers or lead blockers) while the FB can be a more traditional HB size of 220-235 pounds.
Schools at the FCS (formerly I-AA) level that currently run the Flexbone include Wofford, The Citadel, and more recently the upstart program of the Kennesaw State Owls coached by Brian Bohannon who in 2017 lead the Owls to a 12–2 record and appearance in FCS playoffs in only the 3rd year of the program's existence.
The flexbone offense is also popular at the high school football level.
The short punt formation is an older formation on both offense and defense in American football, popular when scoring was harder and a good punt was itself an offensive weapon. In times when punting on third down was fairly common, teams would line up in the short punt formation and offer the triple threat of punt, run or pass. "Harper's Weekly" in 1915 called it "the most valuable formation known to football."
The formation is similar to the single wing and modern shotgun by including the possibility of a long snap from center. However, it is generally a balanced formation, and there are backs on both sides of the tailback, offering better pass protection. As a result, it was considered a much better passing formation than running, as the premiere running formation was the single wing. That said, it was regarded as a good formation for trap plays.
The formation was invented by Amos Alonzo Stagg in 1896. Andy Smith, coach of California's "Wonder Teams" summed up the short-punt philosophy with his motto of "Kick and wait for the breaks." In the early days of the sport the ball was often moved up the field, not through offensive plays, but rather through punting. Once the opposing team got the ball, the defense was relied upon to make the other team's offense lose yards or fumble. To confuse the opponent and attain longer punts, the punting was often done on first or second downs and it was not uncommon for a team to kick more than 40 times in a game.
The formation was used extensively by Fielding Yost's "point-a-minute", hurry up Michigan Wolverines in their early history, as well as his disciple Dan McGugin's Vanderbilt Commodores. Bill Roper used the short punt at Princeton.
The short punt was the base formation for the Benny Friedman-led New York Giants in 1931. In the 1956 NFL Championship, the Chicago Bears shifted into a short punt formation in the third quarter, after falling way behind.
In American football, the A formation was a variation of the single-wing formation used with great success by the New York Giants of the 1930s and early 1940s. This formation was masterminded by Giants coach Steve Owen and relied heavily upon Hall of Fame center Mel Hein for its success.
The A formation differed from the traditional single-wing in that the quarterback played further back from the line and closer to the center. It also place the backfield opposite the "strong" side of the unbalanced line, providing more flexibility in the running game (though less power). The wingback is on the opposite side compared to the single-wing and the quarterback is the primary passer, rather than the tailback. The name of the formation was arbitrary, not from its slight resemblance to the letter "A", unlike formations named "I", "T", "V", and "Y" for the shapes formed by the backs' positioning; Owen labeled the standard single wing his team's "B" formation.
One major advantage of the A is the center could snap the ball to any of three players; typically to the fullback or blocking back for runs and the quarterback for passes. The fourth back, the wingback, became a crucial part of the system when Owen introduced a half-spin sweep series in 1938 which featured a wide sweep play to the motioning wingback, a dive inside by the deep fullback, and a bootleg threat away from sweep action by the quarterback. This triple-threat, highly deceptive series anticipated the Wing-T Buck Sweep series by well over a decade.
A great center like Hein was a major asset, albeit not essential, in running the A formation — however only the Giants used this set-up with any frequency. This gave the Giants an advantage in that teams had to prepare specifically to defend the A whenever they played New York.
The Veer is an option running play often associated with option offenses in American football, made famous at the collegiate level by Bill Yeoman's Houston Cougars. It is currently run primarily on the high school level, with some usage at the collegiate and the professional level where the Veer's blocking scheme has been modified as part of the zone blocking system. The Veer is an effective ball control offense that can help minimize mismatches in a game for a team. However, it can lead to turnovers with pitches and handoff option reads.
The Veer can be run out of any variety of formations, although it was primarily designed to be run out of the split-backed, aptly named veer formation. It has been used out of the I-formation (and its variants, including the Power-I and Maryland I) and the wishbone formation. Some variants of the triple option have now made the jump to the shotgun formation, which has become a popular option formation since Eric Crouch and the University of Nebraska Cornhuskers used the shotgun option during his 2001 Heisman campaign.
He attempts to maintain proper pitch relation to the quarterback, technically a few yards outside the quarterback and moving laterally so that the quarterback may pitch the ball as he goes down the field. This entire action takes no longer than a few seconds.
The fourth player in the split-veer would be a wide receiver or tight end. His job, depending on the formation, would be to block the force player who is responsible for the flat on the side being attacked. The offense relies on the quarterback making the proper reads, turning up the field (if he decides to keep the ball) and gaining yardage. The dive back must remember to not take the football from the quarterback, rather the quarterback must give it to him. The pitch man must maintain proper spacing from the quarterback to ensure that the quarterback can make an effective pitch that can ensure more yardage.
The College Football Hall of Fame credits Bill Yeoman with the invention of the veer formation. Yeoman ran that offense with the Houston Cougars beginning in the mid-1960s and continuing through his career at Houston, which concluded in 1986.
When an offensive system is devised for a team, the coach must take into account his players, so the veer can be applied to several situations. It can be used for undersized players so that double teams and angles can be used to block defenders. It can be used to isolate defenders and create predictable responses to the offenses actions. If a team is very disciplined it can take advantage of an undisciplined defense that can not execute their responsibilities precisely on each snap of the game.
The veer offense was adopted by Jack Lengyel, the new head coach of the Marshall University Thundering Herd prior to the start of the 1971 season after the 1970 team was killed in a plane crash. Lengyel believed that the veer option offense would be a better offense than the Power I offense he had used at the College of Wooster. Bobby Bowden, then the head coach of West Virginia, offered to tutor Lengyel and his coaches on the intricacies and nuances of the veer option offense. Lengyel installed Reggie Oliver at quarterback. The Young Thundering Herd of Marshall would win two games in 1971: a last-second win against Xavier in their first home game after the crash and the homecoming game against ranked Bowling Green.
In the Florida State-Houston game in the Gator Bowl in 1968, the 'Noles brought the safeties up and they ignored the QB, running right past him at times, and crashed into the trailing back, usually Paul Gipson. This took the pitch option away. The Veer wasn't stopped but it was slowed. Florida State won the game 40–20.
Highly athletic defensive lines can also "bring the house" and penetrate the backfield of a veer option offense, disrupting the option read progression and forcing the quarterback to scramble and throw downfield, something which the offense is ill-equipped to do. Persistent backfield penetration can result in a preponderance of Fullback dive plays, which typically result in low gains, putting the offense in a cycle of low-yardage FB dives and incomplete passes under pressure, effectively neutering the "option" portion of the offense.
Other successful teams known to use the veer are the Kemmerer Rangers (Wyoming), which has won two state titles in the last three years; and the Baker County Wildcats (Florida) who went 10–2 and were 30th in the country.
Mount Carmel High School in Chicago, IL has used the veer option under head coach Frank Lenti since 1984. In that time Mount Carmel has won 9 state championships, and was crowned team of the decade in Illinois after winning 5 state titles in the 90's. Notable players that have gone on to the NFL include Donovan McNabb and Simeon Rice.
Pistol-Flex or Pistol Double-Slot is a hybrid of two well-known American football formations: the pistol and flexbone formations. It was pioneered in 2009 by Paul Markowski, who is currently an offensive consultant for Chestnut Hill College. By combining the strengths of each offensive set, the end result is a formation that is very effective for both passing and running. The triple option can be used from this set very effectively. Markowski has developed a true quadruple option play run out of the Pistol-Flex formation.
The base formation of the Pistol-Flex has the QB in a shotgun set four yards behind the center. The B-back is in a three-point stance with his down hand two yards behind the QB's feet. The two slotbacks are set one yard directly behind the offensive tackles to their side. The offensive line splits are all three feet. There are multiple formations that the Pistol-Flex can be run from (Open, Tight, Bone, Box, Twins).
At any given time, there are at least four eligible receivers within one yard of the line of scrimmage, which bodes well for the passing attack.
The I formation is one of the most common offensive formations in American football. The I formation draws its name from the vertical (as viewed from the opposing endzone) alignment of quarterback, fullback, and running back, particularly when contrasted with the same players' alignments in the "T formation".
The formation begins with the usual 5 offensive linemen (2 offensive tackles, 2 guards, and a center), the quarterback under center, and two backs in-line behind the quarterback. The base variant adds a tight end to one side of the line and two wide receivers, one at each end of the line.
The exact origin of the I formation is unclear. Charles M. Hollister of Northwestern in 1900 is one source, as is Bob Zuppke in 1914.