Datasets:
HHazard
/
continuous-learning

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
Community
1
text
stringlengths
13
991
Tom Osborne, head coach at Nebraska for a quarter century, further popularized the formation in the early 1970s as offensive coordinator (under head coach Bob Devaney) with consecutive national titles in 1970 and 1971. He incorporated the option into his I formation scheme beginning in 1980, forming the base of the Nebraska offense for over twenty years, and won three national championships in the 1990s. NFL teams followed the success of the I at the college level and adopted it as well.
The I formation is typically employed in running situations. In the I formation, the tailback starts six to eight yards behind the scrimmage from an upright position, where he can survey the defense. The formation gives the tailback more opportunities for finding weak points in the defense to run into.
The fullback typically fills a blocking, rather than rushing or receiving, role in the modern game. With the fullback in the backfield as a blocker, runs can be made to either side of the line with his additional blocking support. This is contrasted with the use of tight ends as blockers who, being set up at the end of the line, are able to support runs to one side of the line only. The fullback can also be used as a feint—since the defense can spot him more easily than the running back, they may be drawn in his direction while the running back takes the ball the opposite way.
Despite the emphasis on the running game, the I formation remains an effective base for a passing attack. The formation supports up to three wide receivers and many running backs serve as an additional receiving threat. While the fullback is rarely a pass receiver, he serves as a capable additional pass blocker protecting the quarterback before the pass. The running threat posed by the formation also lends itself to the play-action pass. The flexible nature of the formation also helps prevent defenses from focusing their attention on either the run or pass.
Many subtypes of the I formation exist, generally emphasizing the running or passing strengths of the base version.
The I formation, in any variant, can also be modified as Strong or Weak. This formation is commonly called an Offset I. In either case, the fullback lines up roughly a yard laterally to his usual position. "Strong" refers to a move towards the TE side of the formation (Primary TE, or flanker's side when in a "big" 2TE set), "weak" in the opposite direction. These modifications have little effect on expected play call. However, the Offset I allows a fullback to more easily avoid blockers and get out of the backfield to become a receiver.
In the NFL, the I formation is less frequently used than in college, as the use of the fullback as a blocker has given way to formations with additional tight ends and wide receivers, who may be called on to block during running plays. The increasingly common ace formation replaces the fullback with an additional receiver, who lines up along the line of scrimmage. The I will typically be used in short-yardage and goal line situations. College football now has a spread football system. Which in turn gets rid of the fullback. What spread formation can do is in a way "spread" the defense to cover the entire field.
A formation in football refers to the position players line up in before the start of a down. There are both offensive and defensive formations and there are many formations in both categories. Sometimes, formations are referred to as packages.
At the highest level of play in the NFL and NCAA, the one constant in all formations is the offensive line, consisting of the left and right tackle, left and right guard, and a center. These five positions are often referred to collectively as the "line", and have the primary role of blocking. By rule there must be two additional players on the line of scrimmage called ends. These players are eligible receivers and may play near the linemen (tight ends) or farther away (split end or wide receiver). Most teams play additional players near (but still off) the line of scrimmage to act as extra pass receivers.
Up to four players can be behind the offensive line, but one is always designated the quarterback (defined as the player who receives the ball from the center). Upon the snap of the ball, the quarterback becomes the "ball carrier". The ball carrier has five options:
The three other backs can be halfbacks (who primarily carry the ball), fullbacks (who primarily block), or they can play near (but not on) the line of scrimmage to act as extra tight ends or wide receivers. A tight end that fills the role as the 4th back is often called an "H-Back", and a wide receiver that fills that role is sometimes known as a "flanker" or a "slot" receiver (depending on where he lines up). Most formations have a "strong" side (the side with the tight end, or the side with more players) and a "weak side" (the side opposite the tight end, or the side with fewer players).
The ends, which may be either wide receivers or tight ends, may catch a passed ball or receive a handoff.
Descriptions and diagrams to display offensive formations typically use the following symbols:
The offense is required to set up a formation before a play, subject to several rules:
Two terms often heard in referring to
defensive formations are "box" and "secondary". The "box" is defined as an area on the defensive side of the ball, within 5 yards of the line of scrimmage and framed by the offensive tackles. This area is most commonly occupied by defensive linemen and linebackers. The "secondary" can refer to the defensive backs as a group, or to the area behind the linebackers usually occupied by defensive backs. The two standard NFL defenses, the 4-3 and the 3-4, have 7 players in the box. The phrase "8 in the box" is used to indicate that 1 of the 2 safeties has moved into the box to defend against the run.
This formation assumes the offense is lined up strong side right (from the offense's point of view). This diagram could be matched up to an offensive formation diagram to make a complete 22 player football field.
A trips formation is an offensive football formation, initially used by Joe Gibbs and the Washington Redskins, in which three receivers line up on the same side of the field. The side is usually specified by the quarterback calling "Trips right" or "Trips left" when he calls the play in the huddle.
There are multiple variables of the trips formation, and it may be combined with other types of formations. For example, the call "Shotgun, trips right, slot left" formation would indicate that the tight end and two wide receivers would line up on the right side of the field, while two receivers would line up on the left side of the field (one "wide", the other slightly off the line of scrimmage in the "slot"). The quarterback would line up at least five yards behind the center.
The objective of a trips formation is to flood the defense on one side of the field in order to create and exploit holes in zone pass coverage.
The Notre Dame Box is a variation of the single-wing formation used in American football, with great success by Notre Dame in college football and the Green Bay Packers of the 1920s and 1930s in the NFL. Green Bay's coach, Curly Lambeau, learned the Notre Dame Box while playing for Knute Rockne in the late 1910s. Rockne learned it from Jesse Harper, who learned it from coach Amos Alonzo Stagg. It contained two ends, and four backs. The formation often featured an "unbalanced line" where the center (that is, the player who snapped the ball) was not strictly in the "center" of the line, but close to the weakside.
Although modern use of this offensive formation is largely defunct and exterminated among college and professional teams, several high school football teams across the United States have revived the Notre Dame Box offense and have been highly efficient and successful. Three notable high schools that successfully implemented the Notre Dame Box offense extensively are Western Harnett High School in Lillington, North Carolina, Nauset Regional High School in Eastham, Massachusetts, and Isabella High School in Maplesville, Alabama.
The Chicago Bears's and Clark Shaughnessy's Stanford Indians success with a modernized version of the T-formation in the 1940s eventually led to the demise of the Notre Dame Box, as well as all single-wing variants. The Packers finally switched to the T-formation, after Don Hutson had retired, in 1947. No major NCAA or NFL team has used this formation since and much of the knowledge (i.e. playbooks and, if it ever existed, film) associated with this formation is no longer available.
Modern use of the Notre Dame Box.
Use of the Notre Dame Box in modern times has been limited in part due to changes in football rulebooks regarding motion. The frequent shifts in the backfield that are employed by the system are still legal, but teams must now set themselves in a formation for at least one second before snapping the ball or sending a player into "motion". This motion player must be moving backward or laterally. Canadian football never adopted these changes, and (even though it is not used in that variant of the sport) the original version of the system is still legal.
In the late 1990s, Western Harnett High School of Lillington, North Carolina was featured on ESPN after their program experienced a major turnaround credited to their employment of the Notre Dame Box. The head coach of that team, Travis Conner, later moved on to Jacksonville High School in nearby Jacksonville, North Carolina and installed the Notre Dame Box there, as well. He then moved onto Bunker Hill High School and completely transformed their football program, with the new system Bunker Hill produced 3 top 10 rushers with the leader being Reggie Davis who rushed for a single season near 2,000 yards.
The formation is very prevalent in the north of England, and is used by many teams in BUAFL due to the lack of talented passers as well at the unpredictable weather conditions.
In American football, a T formation (frequently called the full house formation in modern usage, sometimes the Robust T) is a formation used by the offensive team in which three running backs line up in a row about five yards behind the quarterback, forming the shape of a "T".
Numerous variations of the T formation have been developed, including the Power-T, where two tight ends are used, the Pro T, which uses one tight end and one wide receiver, or the Wing T, where one of the running backs (or wingback) lines up one step behind and to the side of the tight end.
Any of these can be run using the original spacing, which produced a front of about seven yards, or the Split-T spacing, where the linemen were farther apart and the total length of the line was from 10 to 16 yards.
The T formation is often said to be the oldest offensive formation in American football and is claimed to have been invented by Walter Camp in 1882. However, as the forward pass was legalized, the original T became obsolete in favor of formations such as the single wing. Innovations, such as a smaller, more throwing-friendly ball, along with the invention of the hand-to-hand snap in the 1930s, led to the T's revival.
The T-formation was viewed as a complicated "gadget" offense by early football coaches. But NFL owner-coach George Halas and Ralph Jones of the Chicago Bears along with University of Chicago coach Clark Shaughnessy, University of Texas coach Dana X. Bible, and Notre Dame coach Frank Leahy were advocates. Shaughnessy was an advisor to Halas in the 1930s while the head coach at the University of Chicago.
The T is referenced in the Chicago Bears fight song, "Bear Down, Chicago Bears", written after the 1940 championship over Washington. "We'll never forget the way you thrilled the nation, with your T formation..."
The T formation is still used in a few instances at the high school level. In Utah, the Duchesne High School team set the state record of 48 consecutive wins using the Wing T. Some smaller colleges and high schools, particularly in the Midwest, still use the T. It is also still used on some levels as a goal line formation (often called a "full house" backfield today). Its simplicity, and emphasis on running, makes it particularly popular as a youth football formation.
In American football, a nickel defense (also known as a 4–2–5 or 3–3–5) is any defensive alignment that uses five defensive backs, of whom the fifth is known as a nickelback. The original and most common form of the nickel defense features four down linemen and two linebackers. Because the traditional 4–2 form preserves the defense's ability to stop an opponent's running game, it has remained more popular than its variants, to the extent that even when another formation technically falls within the "nickel" definition, coaches and analysts will refer to it by a more specific designation (e.g., "3–3–5" for a lineup of three down linemen and three linebackers) that conveys more information with equal or greater conciseness.
In college football, TCU is known to use a nickel defense as its base set, typically playing three safeties and two linebackers. Current Horned Frogs coach Gary Patterson installed the nickel partly out of necessity upon finding that larger and more prominent programs, most notably those of the large public universities in Texas, were able to "recruit away" most of the large athletes who would otherwise be available to the TCU program. As it turned out, the nickel proved to be a very good set against the spread offenses proliferating throughout college football in the early 21st century.
A common defensive front adjustment for 3–4 teams to accommodate the nickel backfield involves putting the two outside linebackers into a three-point stance shading the offensive tackles (i.e., a 5 technique). To complete the adjustment, the 3–4 defensive ends are moved to face or shade the offensive guards. The nose tackle is removed for a defensive back. The purpose of this is to leave the four best pass rushers on the field in a long yardage situation. This is not the only adjustment that can be made. Bill Arnsparger would often remove linebackers from a 3–4 to create nickel and dime sets, replacing them with defensive backs.
Zone coverage (also referred to as a zone defense) is a defense scheme in gridiron football used to protect against the pass.
Zone coverage schemes require the linebackers and defensive backs to work together to cover certain areas of the field, making it difficult for the opposing quarterback to complete passes. Zone defenses will generally require linebackers to cover the short and midrange area in the middle of the field, in front of the safeties. In the case where one or two linebackers blitz, the remaining linebacker(s) expands his zone to cover the zone responsibilities of the vacating linebacker(s). Often, blitzing will leave larger holes in the pass defense, but it is a gamble the defensive coordinator wants to make to pressure the quarterback into a poor decision and hopefully an interception or at least an incompletion.
In the following, "cover" refers to the "shell" that the defense rolls into after the snap of the ball, more specifically the number of defenders guarding the deep portion of the field.
In passing situations, the defense will assign players to guard portions of the field, forming a defensive "shell" that the defense hopes will either prevent the offense from completing a pass or ensure a defensive player is able to tackle the receiver after a completed pass. The general terminology used to describe this alignment is "Cover #," with "#" being the number of defensive players forming the coverage shell.
Cover One is a man-to-man coverage for all the defensive backs except for one player (usually a safety) who is not assigned a man to cover but rather plays deep and reacts to the development of the play. Often the safety will remain in a pass coverage position and play a zone defense by guarding the middle of the secondary, reacting to runs or completed passes and double-teaming a receiver if needed.
In a traditional Cover 1, the free safety plays deep and all of the other defenders lock in man coverage to an assigned player for the duration of the play. Essentially, during the pre-snap read, each defender identifies the coverage responsibilities and does not change the assignment. Some teams play a variant of the Cover 1 called Cover 7. In Cover 7, the free safety still plays deep, but the underneath coverage is much more flexible and the defenders switch assignments as the play develops in an attempt to improve defensive positions to make a play on the ball. Examples of these switches include double covering a certain receiver and using defensive help to undercut a route to block a throwing lane.
Cover 1 schemes are usually very aggressive, preferring to proactively disrupt the offense by giving the quarterback little time to make a decision while collapsing the pocket quickly. This is the main advantage of Cover 1 schemes—the ability to blitz from various pre-snap formations while engaging in complex man-to-man coverage schemes post-snap. For example, a safety may blitz while a cornerback is locked in man coverage with a receiver. Or the cornerback may blitz with the safety rotating into man coverage on the receiver post-snap.
The main weakness of the Cover 1 scheme is that there is only one deep defender that must cover a large amount of field and provide help on any deep threats. Offenses can attack Cover 1 schemes by sending two receivers on deep routes, provided that the quarterback has enough time for his receivers to get open. The deep defender must decide which receiver to help out on, leaving the other in man coverage which may be a mismatch.
A secondary weakness is inherent in its design: the use of man coverage opens up yards after catch lanes. Man coverage is attacked by offenses in various ways that try to isolate their best athletes on defenders by passing them the ball quickly before the defender can react or designing plays that clear defenders from certain areas thus opening yards after catch lanes.
Teams that play Cover 2 shells usually subscribe to the "bend-but-don't-break" philosophy, preferring to keep offensive players in front of them for short gains while limiting long passes. This is in stark contrast to a more aggressive Cover 1 type scheme which leaves the offensive team's wide receivers in single man-to-man coverage with only one deep helper. By splitting the deep field between two defenders, the defense can drastically reduce the number of long gains.
In Cover 2 the cornerbacks are considered to be "hard" corners, meaning that they have increased run stopping responsibilities and generally defend against shorter passes, although if two receivers run a deep route on a certain side of the field, that side's corner has deep coverage responsibility as well. The "hard" corners also generally bear the responsibility of "pressing" or "jamming" the offensive receivers- disrupting the receivers intended path downfield. It also relies heavily on the "Mike" (Middle) linebacker's ability to quickly drop deep downfield into pass coverage when he reads a pass.
A variant of cover two is the Inverted Cover 2, in which either right before or after the snap the corners "bail" out while the safeties come up—in effect switching responsibilities. This strategy may be employed to trick a quarterback who has not correctly interpreted the shift. The main drawback here is that the middle of the field is left open.
The advantage of cover 2 is that it provides great versatility to the defense as the corners can play run, short pass, and deep pass with the confidence that they have support from two deep safeties.
Another disadvantage of Cover 2 is that it leaves only seven men in the "box" (the area near the ball at the snap) to defend against the run. In contrast Cover 1 and Cover 3 usually have eight men in the box.
A potential problem with the Cover 2 is that defensive pressure on the Quarterback must be provided nearly exclusively by the front linemen as all other defenders are involved in pass coverage. If the defensive linemen do not provide adequate pressure on the Quarterback, the offense is afforded plenty of time to create and exploit passing opportunities. Blitzing in the Cover 2 often creates greater areas of weakness in the defense than other coverages. Thus, unsuccessful blitzes can prove to be more productive for the offense than in other schemes.
In Cover 3, the two corners and free safety each have responsibility for a deep third of the field, while the strong safety plays like a linebacker. This coverage is generally considered to be a run stopping defense as it focuses on preventing big pass plays and stopping the run while giving up short passes.
On the snap, the CBs work for depth, backpedaling into their assigned zone. One safety moves toward the center of the field. The other safety is free to rotate into the flat area (about 2–4 yards beyond the line of scrimmage), provide pass coverage help, or blitz.
One of the biggest benefits of the Cover 3 coverage scheme is the ability to walk the strong safety up into the box with minimal to no changes in the coverage due to the pre-snap center field position of the free safety. This enables the defense to play strong against the run, but still prevent explosion plays such as a long pass or break away run. This advantage is most pronounced versus two tight end sets which naturally creates 8 holes for running backs, whereas in cover 2 schemes there are only 7 defenders in the box leaving 1 hole uncovered, or requiring a defender to cover 2 holes.
Cover 3 schemes are susceptible to short, timed passes to the outside due to the hard drop of both cornerbacks. This puts pressure on the outside linebackers to react to pass plays and get into their drop quickly if they need to cover a receiver.
Another disadvantage of Cover 3 schemes is they are relatively easy to diagnose by opposing quarterbacks. Because of this, teams will often employ slight wrinkles in their coverage to confuse offenses. An example of this includes employing man coverage on one side and zone on another or swapping coverage zones between defenders. Also leaves the seams open and makes the safety choose on four verticals which leaves one open.
Cover 4 refers to 4 deep defenders each guarding one-fourth of the deep zone. Cover 4 schemes are almost always used to defend against deep passes. (see also Prevent defense).
The most basic Cover 4 scheme involves 3 CBs and 2 safeties. Upon snap, the CBs work for depth, backpedaling into their assigned zone. Both safeties backpedal towards their assigned zone.
As with other coverage shells, Cover 4 is paired with underneath man or zone coverage in its most basic form.
The main advantage of a Cover 4 defense is that it is extremely difficult for even the best quarterbacks to complete long passes against it. Therefore, this coverage is generally used as a prevent defense to be used near the end of a game or half, meaning that the defense sacrifices the run and short pass to avoid giving up the big play with the confidence that the clock will soon expire.
Cover 4 also has the advantage of using safeties in run support as opposed to cornerbacks as would be the case in a Cover 2 scheme. This gives the defense nine in the box and the ability to stop the run with an extra defender on either side. The play-side safety would come up in support on a running play while the back-side safety would be responsible for the middle third of the field and the cornerbacks would have the deep outside thirds.
The main weakness of Cover 4 shells is the large amount of space left open by the retreating defensive backs. Since the defensive backs are working for depth, short pass routes underneath can enable the quarterback to make short- and medium- length passes, as well as isolate a defensive back on a wide receiver near the sideline with little help.
Cover 6 call defensive strength to the Field instead of to the offensive formation or front, and organize personnel by Field-side player and Boundary-side player. The position of the ball on the field therefore dictates strength of the offense. In Cover 6 the field safety and field corner cover fourths of the field, and depend on a field outside linebacker to support underneath them. The free safety covers the boundary-side deep half and the boundary corner plays the flat. Thus the field side of the coverage is quarters, and the boundary side is cover 2.
The Cover 6 gets its name from the fact that it combines elements of the Cover 2 (the strong safety covering half the field) and the Cover 4 on the opposite side. The Pittsburgh Steelers are a Cover 6 team. The quarters play of the strong side safety, like the Steelers' Troy Polamalu, allows him to support on runs quickly. The Tennessee Titans have also been known to use it.
On the strong side, the corner and safety play "Cover 4 rules", which as above the corner and safety each have a quarter of the field working for depth in their zones. The "Sam" linebacker will be dropping outside to cover the flats. If in 3-4 the Middle Backer will cover that sides hook to curl if not blitzing.
On the weak side, the corner and safety play "Cover 2 rules", which as above the corner stays home in the flats, and the safety covers the deep half. The "Will" backer will play hook to curl or blitz depending on the call. If in 3-4 usually the "Will" or the Middle Backer will blitz from that side.
The Cover 6 is also good for calling a corner blitz from the weak side, and having the backer cover flats instead.
Cover 6 has the disadvantages of both Cover 2 and Cover 4. The field side is generally soft on flat coverage. The field side corner can be left in single coverage deep as well. On runs, the field side may be spread by a tight end and 2 receiver formation, offering an advantage on the edge. The Boundary side is hard behind the corner to the sideline, as well as in the seam between corner and linebacker.
Cover 0 refers to pure man coverage with no deep defender. Similar to Cover 1, Cover 0 has the same strengths and weaknesses but employs an extra rusher at the expense of deep coverage help leaving each pass defender man-to-man. Cover 0 is an aggressive scheme that allows for numerous blitz packages, as it's easier for players to drop off their coverage and rush the quarterback. However, there is no "help over the top"—if a wide receiver "beats" (achieves separation from) his defender, there is no one left in the secondary who can make up the coverage on the receiver, which could result in an easy pass completion and possible touchdown.
In American football, an eight-in-the-box defense is a defensive alignment in which 8 of the 11 defensive players are close to the line of scrimmage.
The area occupied by defensive linemen and linebackers is often referred to as "the box". The box is usually about 3-5 yards in depth and spans the offensive line in width. Normally five to seven defensive players occupy this area but frequently another player is brought into the box for run support against smashmouth-oriented offensive teams or short yardage situations.
Obvious advantages come off the eight in the box strategy including more defenders to stop the run game of the opponent which is the main reason for this strategy. The eight in the box scheme is also often used by teams throughout the NFL as a disguise to which players will be coming after the quarterback. This creates a level of difficulty for the offensive linemen because they will not know pre-snap who they will need to block. Quick decisions will need to be made after the snap of the ball.
Buck-lateral is an American football play or a series of plays used in the Single-wing formation. Since the Single-Wing formation lost prominence by 1950, the football play referred to as the Buck-lateral is almost gone from football's vocabulary. However, prior to this time, the buck-lateral play gave fullbacks the option to run, lateral, or hand-off the ball to another player. Running the buck-lateral required an offensive scheme that needed the fullback to possess many specialized skills, as opposed to today's fullback who mainly blocks and carries the ball infrequently.
Before the invention of the Single-Wing offense by Pop Warner, offenses used simple plays designed for runners to attack the defensive front behind massed line blocking. This battering ram approach usually involved the biggest runner, the fullback, as his main role was to "buck" or smash the middle of the defensive front.
The term lateral describes a short toss from one back to another that does not advance the ball. (see lateral pass) A ball that goes forward to another player is called a forward pass. The pass and the lateral are both allowed to advance the ball when the offense is operating behind their line of scrimmage. Once beyond the line of scrimmage the lateral is the only means of transferring the ball to another player.
The Buck-lateral was a play designed for single wing fullbacks to receive the toss from the center, and start toward the central part of the line to make the play look like a typical smash or buck. However, at some point the fullback might pause to do one of several deceptive options, usually handing-off to passing backs or even keeping the ball and plowing ahead. If the fullback delivers the ball to another back, the new carrier might have several additional options including handing or lateralling the ball to still another back.
Warner's Carlisle formation, or Single-Wing, added additional misdirection and trickery to allow for runners to gain yards by deceiving the defense. The Single-wing also allowed the offense to put more blockers at the point of attack than the defense could muster.
The buck-lateral play was actually a series of plays that started out the same way with the fullback taking the direct snap from center, then directing his forward movement toward the middle of the line of scrimmage. The play had several scripted or "read" options to confuse the defense. The player who was given permission to read the play could determine for himself whether to keep the ball or deliver it to another player. The fullback could basically either keep the ball to pound the middle of the line, or he could give the ball to one of the three other single-wing backs, usually the quarterback. Once in possession, the quarterback then continued the possibilities for initiating other permutations to the play.
To understand the mechanics of the play, one has to understand basic terminology of the single-wing formation.
The tailback was stationed four and one-half yards behind the short-side guard. In a typical formation, the fullback would line up three and one-half yards behind the long-side guard. One and one-half yards behind the tackle or guard, would be the quarterback or blocking back. Finally, the wingback aligns himself to the outside of the opposing defensive tackle. He is only one yard off the line.
In most offenses the tailback was the main ball handler and generator of offense; however, the fullback could also take the direct snap due to his proximity to the tailback. In fact whenever the ball was snapped, one of the two backs would take the snap while the other feigned taking the snap to confuse the defense.
A popular scenario for the buck-lateral saw the fullback with the option to hand-off to the quarterback. The quarterback, on taking the ball, could try to sweep the end or toss the ball to the tailback, who had been paralleling the play more deeply in the backfield. If the tailback takes the lateral from the quarterback, he is in position to sweep the end, or even throw the ball to a receiver down field.
Coaches created different versions of the buck-lateral depending on the versatility of the backfield. In one version the fullback might fake a hand-off to the quarterback, who is standing with his back to the defense to hide the lack of exchange. In another version, the fullback could give the ball to the quarterback, who then might initiate a reverse by giving the ball to the wingback coming back against the flow of the play. In another twist, the quarterback could take the fullback hand-off and complete a jump-pass.
The buck-lateral was especially deceptive and effective, but hard to execute. The single-wing fullback had to have the skills of a modern-day quarterback in handling the ball. Plus, he had to be able to take the punishment associated with bucking the middle of the defense where the bigger, stronger defensive players were stationed.
When the fullback took the snap, defensive players expected the play to hit the center of the line because the traditional role of the fullback was to grind out yardage between the tackles. Defensive players who rushed to stop the fullback at the guard-center gap might be totally surprised if the fullback slipped the ball to the nearby quarterback who was heading in another direction.
Consequently, single-wing teams that could master the buck-lateral series of plays could be successful by always making the defense guess to where the ball was going. Of course, if the defense loses sight of the ball during the fakes or laterals, then the defense is at an extreme disadvantage.
Today's coaches would call the buck-lateral a gadget play, because it was designed to thoroughly confuse the defense by making its members lose sight of the ball with fakes, counter action, and laterals. Trick plays are harder to execute and demand considerably more practice time than less complicated plays.
The Kansas City Chiefs used the fullback inside run variant of the Buck Lateral series on a fourth-and-short situation to set up their first touchdown.
The A-11 offense is an offensive scheme that has been used in some levels of amateur American football. In this offense, a loophole in the rules governing kicking formations is used to disguise which offensive players would be eligible to receive a pass for any given play. It was designed by Kurt Bryan and Steve Humphries of Piedmont High School in California.
The scheme was used at the high school level for two seasons before the national governing body of high school football, the National Federation of State High School Associations, closed the scrimmage kick loophole in February 2009, effectively banning important facets of the offense. Due to rules regarding player numbering and eligible receivers, the scheme as originally designed is not usable at most levels of football, including the National Football League and college football.
The A-11 offense was to be the basis of the A-11 Football League (A11FL), a professional football league which was scheduled to play its first season in 2015. However, after announcing franchises names and scheduling "showcase games" in early 2014, the A11FL folded before taking the field.
The A-11 offense was developed in 2007 by head coach Kurt Bryan and offensive coordinator Steve Humphries at Piedmont High School in Piedmont, California. Coming off a 5–6 record in 2006, the coaches were looking for an edge to compete against other teams that fielded more top athletes. Bryan and Humphries found a loophole in the rules concerning allowable punt formations which they used it to design an every-down offense in which all 11 (hence the name "A-11") players were potentially eligible to receive a forward pass. Using the A-11, Piedmont's record improved to 7–4 in 2007 and 8–3 in 2008, with the offense often confusing defenses and scoring more points.
While some high school coaches noticed Piedmont's success with the A-11 and began incorporating aspects of the offense into their own playbooks, others called the system "an unsporting act" and "outside of the spirit of the rule code". Bryan and Humphries began heavily promoting coaching clinics, instructional DVDs, and other materials soon after completing their first season running the offense, which also drew criticism from other coaches.
High school athletic associations in North Carolina, West Virginia, Louisiana, and the District of Columbia banned the use of the A-11 for the 2008 season. In February 2009, the National Federation of State High School Associations rules committee voted 46–2 to close the loophole allowing the linemen-free formations featured in the A-11. The system's creators petitioned the California Interscholastic Federation to allow use of the offense over the next three seasons on an experimental basis, but the appeal was denied.
The scheme's creators modified the system to comply with the rule changes in 2009. Though the offensive personnel is spread out more than in conventional formations, this version of the A-11 abides by the numbering requirements, making it easier for the defense to determine which players could legally go out for a pass. As such, it is similar to spread schemes from the early days of football such as the Emory & Henry formation. As such, unlike the original A-11, the modified version is legal in most levels of football.
The most striking characteristic of the A-11 is its use of a formation in which most offensive players except the center are spread out across the line of scrimmage standing upright. In conventional football formations, five or more offensive players are offensive linemen, who set up before each play in a three-point stance and who serve exclusively as blockers. Offensive linemen almost never carry the football and are almost always ineligible to catch a forward pass or even advance beyond the line of scrimmage before a pass is thrown. At most levels of football, (including the National Football League (NFL), college football, and American high school football), offensive linemen must wear jersey numbers from 50 to 79, marking them as ineligible receivers in all but very limited situations.
To use the scrimmage kick formation exemption, the player who receives the snap (presumably the kicker or placeholder) must stand at least seven yards behind the line of scrimmage. The A-11 places the quarterback in that position, which becomes a deep shotgun formation. This has the effect of reducing the need for offensive line protection since defensive players have more ground to cover before reaching the passer. The offense also places an additional passing back (similar to the wildcat offense) in the backfield next to the quarterback, creating the potential for either back to receive the snap, pitch to the other back, run or pass the ball, block, or go out for a pass.
As mentioned, a loophole in the rules regarding punt formations allowed the A-11 to be used at the high school level until 2009, when the National Federation of State High School Associations rules committee closed the loophole. A modified version that complies with uniform numbering regulations can still be used.
The scrimmage kick formation is allowed on fourth downs under NCAA rules and on conversion attempts, and a few situations which define a scrimmage kick formation with an additional requirement that "it is obvious that a kick may be attempted." It is otherwise not allowed for most normal plays, making the original A-11 impossible to use on an every-down basis.