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The A-11 was also not legal under Canadian football rules. There is no scrimmage kick exemption in the Canadian Football League (CFL). Persons who wish to change position from an eligible to an ineligible receiver (or vice versa) must physically change their uniform to a number that reflects their eligibility, and must seek permission from the official to do so.
Furthermore, until the end of the 2008 season the CFL rule book dictated that a designated quarterback must take all snaps, which made the two-quarterback system used by the A-11 (as well as offenses such as the Wildcat) illegal in the CFL. This rule was removed in CFL, mainly so that the Wildcat formation could be used. However, the A-11 is still unusable.
Single set back (also known as the "Lone Setback" or "Singleback" or "Ace" formation or "Oneback" or "Solo") is an offensive base formation in American Football which requires only one running back (usually a halfback) lined up about five yards behind the quarterback. There are many variations on single back formations including two tight ends and two wide receivers, one tight end/three wide receivers, etc. The running back can line up directly behind the quarterback or offset either the weak side (away from the tight end) or the strong side (towards the tight end).
This formation has gained popularity in the NFL as teams have started trading out a fullback, or blocking back, in favor of another wide receiver or tight end who is usually faster and better able to receive the ball, while still helping the run game with down-field blocks. The effectiveness of the formation is further increased if the team has athletic tight ends with good pass catching abilities, thereby increasing the versatility of the formation. It is, moreover, good for bootlegs and reverses.
The prevent defense is a defensive alignment in American football that seeks to prevent the offense from completing a long pass or scoring a touchdown in a single play and seeks to run out the clock. It is used by a defense that is winning by more than a touchdown, late in the fourth quarter, or in specific situations, such as third-and-very-long if it seems clear that the offense must pass the football to gain long yardage.
The alignment uses five or more defensive backs (or players in that role), preferring fast players over large players. They back up so far that they concede short-yardage plays but try to ensure that no receiver is uncovered downfield or can get behind them.
The prevent defense concedes short gains, such as four to eight yards per play, as long as the clock keeps running, but aims to prevent plays resulting in longer gains.
Safeties and cornerbacks pull back to a "safe zone" five to ten yards off the line of scrimmage, and the free safety often plays as far as twenty yards back. The defense does not jam receivers on the line. The prevent defense employs zone defense, in which each defensive back is responsible for an area of the field rather than a specific player. The backs watch the quarterback's eyes to determine where he intends to pass the ball.
When used late in the fourth quarter to run out the clock, the sidelines become an important area to defend, as a player who receives a pass near the sideline can run out of bounds and stop the clock. The defender's priority is less to prevent a reception than to keep the receiver in bounds following one. This keeps the clock running and reduces the amount of time the offense has to score.
The prevent defense uses five or more defensive backs.
The nickel defense has five backs, so named because the nickel is the five-cent coin.
The quarter defense has three down linemen, one linebacker, and seven defensive backs.
The half-dollar defense has eight defensive backs, no linebackers and three defensive linemen. The rare package is used when the offense needs to score a touchdown on the very next play, such as with a desperation Hail Mary pass. In theory, "dollar defense" (nine backs) and "twoonie defenses" (ten backs) are also possible but, for practical reasons, are almost never used; similar scenarios may involve linebackers replacing defensive linemen.
Professional teams may not have enough defensive backs on the roster to play the quarter or half-dollar defenses, so wide receivers sometimes fill the extra positions, particularly in late-game situations when the receivers' offensive skills can be put to defensive use.
When the defense concedes short plays, an offense that can practice clock management effectively can score without executing the long pass the defense seeks to prevent. Some coaches avoid using the prevent defense and choose instead to continue playing the same defensive schemes that seemed to be working well to that point. John Madden once said, "All a prevent defense does is prevent you from winning."
By conceding to the offense many easy gains for short yardage but no big play, the prevent defense can make the end of the game uninteresting for fans.
The attempt to prevent a long-yardage play can be a victim of individual effort, as happened to the Denver Broncos in the 2012 AFC Divisional Round playoff game. With less than 40 seconds to play, the Baltimore Ravens needed a touchdown to tie the game and faced a third down from their own 30-yard line. Broncos safety Rahim Moore allowed Baltimore receiver Jacoby Jones to get behind him and catch a 70-yard touchdown pass from Joe Flacco. The Ravens went on to win the game in double overtime.
The spread offense is an offensive scheme in gridiron football that typically places the quarterback in the shotgun formation, and "spreads" the defense horizontally using three-, four-, and even five-receiver sets. Used at every level of the game including professional (NFL, CFL), college (NCAA, NAIA, CIS), and high school programs across the US and Canada, spread offenses often employ a no-huddle approach. Some implementations of the spread also feature wide splits between the offensive linemen.
Spread offenses can emphasize the pass or the run, with the common attribute that they force the defense to cover the entire field from sideline to sideline. Many spread teams use the read option running play to put pressure on both sides of the defense. Similar to the run and shoot offense, passing-oriented spread offenses often leverage vertical (down field) passing routes to spread the defense vertically, which opens up multiple vertical seams for both the running and passing game.
The grandfather of the spread offense is Rusty Russell, a graduate of Howard Payne University, in Brownwood, Texas, and coach of Fort Worth's Masonic Home and School for orphaned boys. Russell began coaching Masonic Home in 1927, and due to the fact that his teams were often over-matched physically by other schools, they were called the "Mighty Mites". While there, he deployed the earliest form of a spread offense to great success. Russell's team is the subject of a book by author Jim Dent entitled, "Twelve Mighty Orphans: The Inspiring True Story of the Mighty Mites Who Ruled Texas Football".
But, as Bart Wright notes in his 2013 book "Football Revolution: The Rise of the Spread Offense and How It Transformed College Football", Meyer's spread the defensive rush to the ball….” While some later football historians and coaches have confused the Meyer Spread, which relied on great quarterbacks like Baugh and O’Brien to pass around 17 times a game on average, with more contemporary spread offenses, Wright concludes that it is “preposterous that Meyer’s offense was any sort of antecedent” to the modern spread offense invented by Jack Neumeier around 1970 (see below).
The spread's first evolution came about in 1956 when former NIU Huskies head coach Howard Fletcher adapted Meyer's spread with the shotgun formation to create what he termed the "Shotgun Spread" a more pass-oriented version. Under Fletcher's newly created offense, quarterback George Bork led the nation in total offense and passing in 1962 and 1963. Bork became the first man in college football history to pass for 3,000 yards in a season in 1963 while guiding the Huskies to a victory in the Mineral Water Bowl and the NCAA College Division National Championship.
The modern spread: Jack Neumeier and "basketball on grass".
While there is no evidence to suggest Neumeier had heard of Rusty Russell or Howard Fletcher in 1970, Jack Neumeier evidently built his offensive theories upon a foundation established by other coaches, including Glenn “Tiger” Ellison, a high school coach from Ohio and a college teammate and friend of legendary Ohio State coach Woody Hayes. published a book, "Run and Shoot Football: Offense of the Future", in 1965 that found its way into Neumeier's library. In his book, Ellison describes his desperate experiments with the "departure into insanity" "Lonesome Polecat" sandlot-style formation in a successful attempt to avoid a losing season in 1958.
Neumeier then took Ellison’s ideas and synthesized something even more innovative than the “Run and Shoot.” Combining motion, four wide receivers, an occasional no-huddle series and a power running game, along with blocking innovations designed for an undersized line added to the mix by his offensive line coach Jack Mathias, Neumeier's great experiment in 1970 and his tinkering during subsequent seasons took football offenses in a new direction.
Another piece of the puzzle Neumeier assembled preparing for the 1970 season came from Red Hickey during Hickey's stint coaching the San Francisco 49ers. Hickey first utilized the shotgun formation in a 1960 NFL game against the Baltimore Colts. The shotgun, based on an old short punt formation that dated back to the World War I era, which Pop Warner then updated as a double wing formation in the 1930s at Stanford, featured the quarterback setting up for a long snap seven yards behind the center. Hickey thought it might help to slow the Colt pass rush and give the 49ers quarterback another second or two to spot his receivers.
A brief sensation for the 49ers, Hickey's shotgun formation only lasted for the final few games of the 1960 season and a few games into 1961. Opponents soon neutralized the formation when they realized that their defenses could take advantage of the need for the center to focus on the long snap before making his block. Linebackers blitzing up the middle collapsed the pocket protecting 49er quarterbacks. By the end of the 1961 NFL season, football coaches universally agreed that the shotgun formation was dead and buried, until Jack Neumeier resurrected it as part of the new spread passing offense he synthesized.
Sid Gillman, after a long career, coached the San Diego Chargers throughout the 1960s. Before his lengthy stint with the Chargers, he coached the Los Angeles Rams. An innovator with the use of motion and passing in football offenses, Gillman also revolutionized the use of game films to study opposing teams. As a trademark of his offenses, Gillman utilized the forward passing of his talented quarterback John Hadl to Hall of Fame split end Lance Alworth and flanker Gary Garrison to open up defenses for the Chargers’ rushing game and to move the ball down the field.
Gillman continued coaching off and on into the 1980s. During a stint working with the Los Angeles Express of the short-lived United States Football League during the early ‘80s, Gillman became a leading advocate for what some sportswriters referred to as the “ace” formation, a variation of the one-back spread offense that evolved after Jack Neumeier's retirement from coaching.
In an article written by Bob Oates of the Los Angeles Times in 1984, Gillman talked about evolving trends and the future of football. “’The thing that makes the ace formation so effective’ Gillman said, ‘is that it enables you to do so many more things. Its offensive potential – with four guys up there in receiving positions – is mathematically almost limitless. It causes the defense more trouble than any two-back formation.’”
Sports historians have called Gillman the “father of the passing game,” and his focus on studying game films certainly influenced most football coaches by the early 1960s, including Jack Neumeier. While Gillman's innovations with the passing game inspired many followers, neither Gillman nor his protégés had utilized the ace formation or developed any other offense resembling the spread as the 1960s came to a close.
The head coach of the San Diego State Aztecs during the mid-‘60s, Don Coryell, found inspiration in Sid Gillman’s passing game. Coryell had developed a national reputation as one of the most prominent innovators of the I formation during the 1950s. Coryell brought the I formation with him when he joined John McKay’s coaching staff at USC for a short stay in 1961, and it became the signature power running formation at what came to be known as Tailback U under McKay and his successor John Robinson.
Football aficionados can trace Coryell’s focus on spacing and downfield movement and separation between receivers back to Dutch Meyer’s 1952 book, "Spread Formation Football." Coryell's emphasis on precisely timed and executed pass routes now seems like the norm at all levels of football. But Don Coryell had just begun experimenting with all of these elements in 1970.
Nobody dreamed in 1970 that Coach Neumeier's new and innovative one-back spread offense would gradually percolate throughout the football world and eventually become football's dominant offense.
In a 2013 article, sports commentator Matt Offer wrote that Neumeier's “offense could be considered ground zero for all that we have come to think of as modern in the game of Football. Spreading the defense horizontally with formations, and vertically with passing concepts. Isolating defenders in match ups where your guy has the best chance to win. It all seems so simple now, but in 1970 when everyone and their mother was running the Veer it truly was revolutionary.” Nationally respected sportswriter Bart Wright's 2013 book on the history of the modern spread offense, "Football Revolution," gives clear credit to Coach Neumeier and his 1970 Granada Hills Highlanders team for originating what football coaches across the nation have come to know as “basketball on grass.”
In a chapter in Tim Layden's "Blood, Sweat and Chalk" entitled “The One-Back Spread: An L.A. high school coach took a chance and launched an offense – and John Elway and Drew Brees with it,” Layden talks about the “radical change” introduced by Neumeier with his 1970 Highlanders and his “wide-open spread game.” But it took some amazing luck for Coach Neumeier's football ideas to achieve national attention and ultimately dominance.
As they frequently do, following the remarkable success of his 1970 team, other coaches talked about Neumeier's offense and began to incorporate elements of it into their own offensive schemes. Other local high school coaches – mostly competitors – saw it, liked it, copied it and began to utilize it. Today, there are books written about Neumeier's offense. Coaching workshops introduce coaches to the one-back spread and teach them how to implement it. They also teach coaches how to defend against it.
But the story of how the one-back spread offense “went viral,” to use today's internet-driven jargon, isn’t quite that simple. In the 1970s, there were no coaching clinics, YouTube videos or internet blogs to make the case for the one-back spread offense to high school coaches, much less college or NFL coaches. Most coaches in 1970 looked at innovative passing offenses with disdain. New football concepts spread slowly through the instinctively conservative ranks of football coaches. Today, it's not even clear who coined the phrase “one-back spread offense.”
Jack Elway began to utilize the one-back spread in his offense at Northridge during the 1978 season. He took it with him when he became head coach at San Jose State a year later. During his tenure at San Jose State and later at Stanford, Jack Elway became an even more successful proselytizer for the one-back spread offense. Elway worked with Jack Neumeier to teach the offense to a number of prominent members of the coaching profession, most significantly Dennis Erickson. Erickson served as Jack Elway’s offensive coordinator at San Jose State.
Dennis Erickson initially heard about the spread offense while serving as the offensive coordinator at Fresno State in the late 1970s. Moving on to San Jose State in 1979, he combined his ideas about the offense with Jack Elway’s. As a result of the Elway connection, Erickson spent time that year learning about the offense with Jack Neumeier. In fact, in Matt Opper’s 2013 article, by the late-1970s, Granada Hills had become “a must stop destination for college coaches across the nation.”
Tiller went on to become an outstanding college head coach at Purdue. At Purdue, Tiller utilized the one-back spread offense again with tremendous success. His quarterbacks at Purdue playing out of the one-back spread included Kyle Orton and Drew Brees, among others. In 2000, Brees led the Boilermakers to the Rose Bowl with Neumeier’s offense. Tiller’s teams forced the Big Ten to adapt to the challenges posed by the wide-open one-back spread.
Brown confirms this lineage for Urban Meyer's offensive theories and success, also connecting the Ohio State coach to Joe Tiller and Rich Rodriguez, among other coaches who have built successful careers coaching variations on the one-back spread offense. So at least some of Urban Meyer's theories about football offenses, leading to Ohio State's most recent national championship, trace directly back to Jack Neumeier.
Today, virtually every NFL, college, high school and youth league football offense shows clear signs of Coach Neumeier's influence. Fans can watch elements of Neumeier's offense at every level of play, from peewee league scrimmages to NFL Super Bowls. In the 2016 College Football Playoff National Championship bowl game and the 2016 Super Bowl, all of the offenses were direct descendants of the turbocharged “basketball on grass” offense that Jack Neumeier created out of desperation for his undersized 1970 Granada Hills High School football team. His offense continues to live on and thrive years after Jack Neumeier's death in 2004.
Reflecting on the enduring impact of Neumeier's spread offense, sportswriter Mary Crouse wrote that “It amuses Neumeier's first guinea pig, [Dana] Potter, to see a college or pro team throw the ball out of the shotgun on first down or attempt 40 passes a game. The same things stirred critics when Neumeier introduced them to the [Los Angeles] City football scene. ‘I had a lot of coaches tell me Coach Neumeier's offense would never work in college or the pros,' Potter said. `So it's hilarious for me to see how many teams are using it now. It's neat to see how his offense has evolved.’"
While it took decades for Cactus Jack's Aerial attack – the up-tempo one-back spread offense – to percolate throughout the football world, there is no doubt that Coach Neumeier's theories and the success of his 1970 team changed that world forever.
The spread offense is specifically designed to open up seams and holes for the offense, and does not specifically focus on the passing or running game, however, like all types of offenses, there can be sub types which can specifically focus on the passing or running game, or even option, fakes or trick plays.
The basic pre-snap appearance of the spread offense is constant—multiple receivers on the field. Most contemporary versions of the spread utilize a shotgun snap, although many teams also run the spread with the quarterback under center. Jack Neumeier's 1970 iteration of the spread offense utilized both formations. In addition, the actual execution from those formations varies, depending on the preferences of the coaching staff. While most of these are balanced offenses, such as the one utilized by Larry Fedora's North Carolina Tar Heels, several sub-forms also exist.
The spread option is a shotgun-based variant of the classic triple option attack that was prevalent in football well into the 1990s. Notable users of this offense include Ryan Day's Ohio State Buckeyes, Mario Cristobal's Oregon Ducks, Chip Kelly’s UCLA Bruins, Scott Frost’s Nebraska Cornhuskers, Gus Malzahn’s Auburn Tigers, Jim Harbaugh’s Michigan Wolverines and Dan Mullen's Florida Gators.
The spread option is a run-first scheme that requires a quarterback that is comfortable carrying the ball, a mobile offensive line that can effectively pull and trap, and receivers that can hold their blocks. Its essence is misdirection. Because it operates from the shotgun, its triple option usually consists of a slot receiver, a tailback, and a dual-threat quarterback.
One of the primary plays in the spread option is the zone read, invented and made popular by Rich Rodriguez. The quarterback must be able to read the defensive end and determine whether he is collapsing down the line or playing up-field containment in order to determine the proper play to make with the ball.
A key component of the spread option is that the running threat posed by the quarterback forces a defensive lineman or linebacker to "freeze" in order to plug the running lane; this has the effect of blocking the target player without needing to put a body on him.
Recently, use of the spread has led to new defenses, most noticeably the 3-3-5. Traditional defenses use 4 or 5 down linemen sets to stop an offense, but with the growing number of spread offenses, teams are looking to smaller, faster defensive players to cover more of the field. The strategy and philosophy behind this thinking has been widely debated and many coaches have found success using a 30 front, or using a 40 front against the spread.
The 2008 Miami Dolphins also implemented some form of the spread offense in their offensive schemes. Lining up in the "wildcat" formation, the Miami Dolphins, borrowing from Gus Malzahn's college spread offense, “direct snap” the ball to their running back, Ronnie Brown, who was then able to read the defense, and either pass or keep the ball himself.
In recent years, the spread offense has become a very popular term used in context of the high school game with the offense's innovative ways to make the game faster and higher scoring. While it has changed the game, and teams that successfully run it are scoring more points, there is debate whether the offensive system is as effective as it seems.
Some coaches have taken to packaging their offensive system and marketing them to programs around the country, such as Tony Franklin, who served as an assistant coach at the University of Kentucky under Hal Mumme where he developed his offense based on Mumme's "Air Raid" system. Manny Matsakis being another example as he is the inventor of the Triple Shoot Offense, which is a spread set with forms in the Shotgun, Pistol and under center. Matsakis was an assistant coach under both Mike Leach at Texas Tech and Bill Snyder at Kansas State. He is currently the head coach of Enka High School in Asheville, North Carolina.
As a reaction to the success of the spread offense in high-profile colleges, such as The University of Florida, innovative high school coaches began retooling the system to work on high school teams. Now the system has been widely adopted, with numerous schools achieving success. Defenses are left with the challenge of defending more of the field than ever before, and the offense was given the advantage of having numerous running and passing lanes created by the defense being so spread out.
In American and Canadian football, a single-wing formation was a precursor to the modern spread or shotgun formation. The term usually connotes formations in which the snap is tossed rather than handed—formations with one wingback and a handed snap are commonly called "wing T" or "winged T".
Created by Glenn "Pop" Warner, the single wing was superior to the T formation in its ability to get an extra eligible receiver down field.
Among coaches, single-wing football denotes a formation using a long snap from center as well as a deceptive scheme that evolved from Glenn "Pop" Warner's offensive style. Traditionally, the single-wing was an offensive formation that featured a core of four backs including a tailback, a fullback, a quarterback (blocking back), and a wingback. Linemen were set "unbalanced", with two on one side of the center and four on the other. This was done by moving the off-side guard or tackle to the strong side. The single-wing was one of the first formations attempting to trick the defense instead of over-powering it.
For much of the history of the single-wing formation, players were expected to play on both sides of the ball. Consequently, offensive players often turned around to play a corresponding location on defense. The offensive backs played defensive backs, just as the offensive linemen played defensive linemen. Unlike teams of today, single-wing teams had few specialists who only played on certain downs.
College football playbooks prior to the 1950s were dominated with permutations of the traditional single-wing envisioned by Warner. Two-time All-American Jack Crain's handwritten playbook clearly denotes how the University of Texas ran their version of the single-wing circa 1939–1940. University of Texas Coach Dana X. Bible ran a balanced line, which means that there were the same numbers of linemen on each side of the center. Also, the ends were slightly split.
The advent of the T formation in the 1940s led to a decline in the use of single-wing formations. For example, the single-wing coach Dana X. Bible, upon his retirement in 1946, saw his replacement, Blair Cherry, quickly install the T formation like many other college coaches of the day. Wallace Wade said he was "not convinced that the single wing is not a more potent formation than the T. The single wing we used caused the defense to spread. It called for more intensive coaching on individual assignments."
However, from 1949 to 1957 Henry "Red" Sanders elevated a seldom distinguished UCLA football program to an elite level with his precision single-wing system, winning a National Championship at UCLA in 1954.
The Sutherland single-wing was a variation of the single-wing used with great success by Coach Jock Sutherland of the 1930s and 1940s. Note that coach Sutherland mastered many forms of the single-wing, but the formation described here is the one he invented and was named for him.
The Sutherland single-wing differs from the traditional single-wing in that the wingback is brought into the backfield as a halfback, flanking the fullback on the other side from the tailback. This allows a more flexible running attack to the weak-side. Both the tailback and halfback are triple threats in this offense. The weakness of this formation is less power than the traditional single-wing and it requires very talented backs to play tailback and halfback effectively.
The double-wing is an offensive formation which should not be confused with the Double Wing offense. The double-wing formation is used in many offenses from the youth level through college. The formation was first introduced by Glenn "Pop" Warner around 1912. Just a few offenses that use the formation are the double wing, flexbone and wing T offenses. It was the primary formation used by Ara Parseghian when he ran the wing T at Notre Dame, winning National Championships in 1966 and 1973.
The formation is not necessarily the same in all offenses and is often a broad term to describe any offense with two wingbacks. In the wing T, the double-wing formation is used to refer to Red, Blue and Loose Red formations.
The double-wing formation in American football usually includes one wide receiver, two wingbacks, one fullback, and one tight end.
The direct snap or toss from the center usually went to the tailback or fullback; however, the quarterback could also take the ball. The tailback was very important to the success of the offense because he had to run, pass, block, and even punt. Unlike today, the quarterback usually blocked at the point of attack. As with his modern day counterpart, a single-wing quarterback might also act as a field general by calling plays. The fullback was chosen for his larger size so that he could "buck" the line. This meant that the fullback would block or carry the ball between the defensive tackles. The wingback could double-team block with an offensive lineman at scrimmage or even run a pass route.
The single-wing formation was designed to place double-team blocks at the point of attack. Gaining this extra blocker was achieved in several ways. First, the unbalanced line placed an extra guard or tackle on one side of the center. Second, a wingback stationed outside end could quickly move to a crucial blocking position. Third, the fullback and especially the quarterback could lead the ball carrier producing interference. Finally, linemen, usually guards, would pull at the snap and block at the specified hole. Line splits were always close except for ends who might move out from the tackle.
The single-wing formation depended on a center who was skilled both at blocking and at tossing the ball from between his legs to the receiving back. The center had to direct the ball to any of several moving backs, with extreme accuracy, as the play started. Single-wing plays would not work efficiently if the back had to wait on the snap because quick defensive penetration would overrun the play. The center was taught to direct the ball to give the tailback or fullback receiver a running start in the direction that the play was designed to go.
The single-wing formation was a deceptive formation with spectators, referees, and defensive players often losing sight of the ball. A backfield player, called a "spinner", might turn 360 degrees while faking the ball to the other backs, or even keeping the ball or passing it. Defensive players were often fooled as to which back was carrying the ball.
Single-wing teams used both a standard punting formation and a quick punt, often kicking on second or third downs. The quick punt, or quick kick, saw the tailback-punter quickly backing up 5 yards as the ball was in the air from the center to distance him from rushers. The strategy was to keep defensive halfbacks, expecting a possession play, from dropping back to return the ball. The standard punt formation was often used for either punting as well as running or passing the ball. Most teams had a litany of plays that they might run from a punt formation.
Prior to 1930 the shape of the football was a prominent oval shape called a prolate spheroid. Due to the shape of the ball, single-wing backs handled the ball more like a basketball, with short tosses and underhand lobs. Gradually, balls were allowed to be elongated enough to produce streamlined passes with a spiral. The spiraled ball could be thrown farther with more accuracy, thus increasing the potential for offenses to use the forward pass more frequently.
The single-wing quarterback played a different role than modern-day quarterbacks. While the quarterback may have called the snap count due to his position close to the center of the formation, he may not have called the actual play in the huddle. For much of the history of football, coaches were not allowed to call plays from the sideline. This responsibility may have gone to the team captain. The quarterback was expected to be an excellent blocker at the point of attack. Some playbooks referred to this player as the blocking back. The quarterback also had to handle the ball by faking, handing off, or optioning to other backs.
Although the single-wing has lost much of its popularity since World War II, its characteristic features are still prevalent in all levels of modern football. They include pulling guards, double teams, play action passes, laterals, wedge blocking, trap blocking, the sweep, the reverse and the quick kick. Many current offenses, such as the spread option, use single-wing tendencies for running plays, while using wide receivers instead of wingbacks.
The current incarnation of the Wildcat offense, which has been adopted by many college, NFL, and high school teams uses many elements of the single-wing formation.
Colton California has been a consistently successful single-wing team by reaching the state playoffs on six consecutive seasons.
In 1998 The Menominee Maroons won the Michigan high school class BB football championship, and in 2006 and 2007 won the Michigan High School Class B football championship, winning 28 consecutive games over the last 2 years, and reaching the state playoffs for the last 11 years.
In 1971 the Corning High School Cardinals of Corning, California had a 9–0 undefeated season utilizing a balanced single-wing offense under coach Tag McFadden. They were the number one rated school Division 4 in the state and Mcfadden was garnered coach of year by Cal-Hi Sports.
In 1974 and 1975, St. Mark's School (MA) compiled a 13–1 record running the Princeton Single Wing.
In 1980 Coach Ted Hern brought the single-wing to Moriarty High School, the "Fighting" Pintos made three state championship appearances winning 2 state titles, one undefeated season and suffering only 3 losses in four seasons. Coach Frank Ortiz was an assistant coach in the later seasons.
Since 1985, Santa Rosa High School has used the single-wing formation under Coach Frank Ortiz. The Lions have made the playoffs every year except three, won their district title 17 times, won the New Mexico AA State Championships in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012 and made a total of 13 State Finals appearances.
In 2005 St. Mary's of Lynn in Massachusetts won the D4A Eastern Mass Title following two consecutive division titles with Ed Melanson running the Single Wing. Prior to Coach Melanson installing the Single Wing there in 2002, St. Mary's had not had a winning season since 1977.
In Kansas, Mark Bliss installed the Single Wing offense at Conway Springs High School in 1997, coaching the team to Kansas Class 3A state championships in 1998, 2001, 2002, and 2003. During his seven seasons at Conway Springs, his teams compiled a record of 81–4, including a 62-game winning streak. Conway Springs continues to run the Single Wing offense and added state titles in 2004, 2008, and again in 2011 and are perennial playoffs contenders under Coach Matt Biehler.
In Kansas, Ed Buller created a football dynasty centered around the Single Wing offense. In his 40 years of coaching, which ended in 1984, Buller's only losing season was his first. Buller compiled a record of 335–78–7 and coached the Clyde Bluejays to 10 undefeated seasons along with 39 consecutive winning seasons.
In Nebraska Dave Cisar's Screaming Eagle youth football teams have been running the Single Wing offense for 8 seasons. During that time period those teams have gone 78-5 and averaged over 35 points per contest and won two State Titles. He did this with 6 totally different teams in 4 different leagues in various age groups. His teams even used the famous "fullback full spinner series" along with the other traditional Single Wing plays. Coach Cisar published a book "Winning Youth Football a Step by Step Plan" in 2006 to help youth coaches install this "old school" offense.
In Connecticut Anthony Sagnella runs the single wing with his North Haven High School Team that reached the 2015 Class L state Championship Game and were defeated by New Caanan, 42–35. Tailback Mike Montano was an All-State Selection as a RB with over 1800 Rushing yards and 30 TDs.
On September 21, 2008, the Miami Dolphins used a version of the single-wing offense (specifically the Wildcat offense) against the New England Patriots on six plays, which produced five touchdowns (four rushing and one passing) in a 38–13 upset victory, after its successful adoption on the college and high school level by several teams.
A pro-style offense in American football is any offensive scheme that resembles those predominantly used at the professional level of play in the National Football League (NFL), in contrast to those typically used at the collegiate or high school level. Pro-style offenses are fairly common at top-quality colleges but much less used at the high school level. The term should not be confused with a pro set, which is a specific formation that is used by some offenses at the professional level.
Generally, pro-style offenses are more complex than typical college or high school offenses. They are balanced, requiring offensive lines that are adept at both pass and run blocking, quarterbacks (QBs) with good decision-making abilities, and running backs (RBs) who are capable of running between the tackles. Offenses that fall under the pro-style category include the West Coast offense, the Air Coryell offense, and the Erhardt-Perkins offensive system.
Often, pro style offenses use certain formations much more commonly than the air raid, run and shoot, flexbone, spread, pistol, or option offenses. Pro-style offenses typically use the fullback (FB) and TEs much more commonly than offenses used at the collegiate or high school levels.
Part of the complexity of the offense is that teams at the professional level often employ multiple formations and are willing to use them at any point during an actual game. One example might be that a team uses a Strong I formation run (FB lined up where the TE is located on the line of scrimmage) on 1st Down followed up by a running play out of the Ace formation on second down before attempting a pass on 3rd down out of a two-WR shotgun formation.
Another aspect of the complexity is that the running game is primarily built on zone blocking or involves a power run scheme. Both of these require an offensive of line that is very athletic, one play they could be trying to zone block a Linebacker, and the following one could be power blocking a defensive line. Most of the blocking schemes involve a series of rules, or a system in which they operate their blocks. The passing game as a result often employs play-action, often with the QB dropping back from under center, as a means of passing the ball while building on the running game.
Coaches who make the transition from the NFL to the NCAA as head coaches often bring with them their pro-style offenses. Such examples include Charlie Weis (former HC at Kansas), Dave Wannstedt (former HC at Pittsburgh), Bill O'Brien (former HC at Penn State). One positive aspect of employing a pro-style offense is that it can help players make transitions from the college level to the professional level quicker as a result of their familiarity with the system's complexity.
The triple option is an American football play used to offer several ways to move the football forward on the field of play. The triple option is based on the option run, but uses three players who might run with the ball instead of the two used in a standard option run.
There are three basic forms of triple option: the wishbone triple option, the veer triple option, and the I formation triple option. These differ in terms of the personnel on the field and their positioning prior to the start of the play.
The wishbone triple option can use several formations including the flexbone or Maryland I. The wishbone triple option is a running play where either the fullback, the quarterback, or one of the halfbacks (also called "running backs" [RB] or "tail backs") runs the ball.
If this is run properly it can be extremely effective as most all defensive players are accounted for by blockers. Once the quarterback or tailback gets beyond the line of scrimmage there should be nobody in front of him because the tackle, guard, tailback, and wide receiver are all downfield picking up the first threat.
The play is called the triple option as the fullback dive is the first option, the quarterback keeping the ball is the second option, and the quarterback pitching to the halfback is the third option.

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