Split (1)

train · 25k rows

text stringlengths 13 991
Stunts are a special means of rushing the quarterback done to confuse the opposing team's offensive line. Properly executing a stunt requires two or more defensive lineman working together. One defensive lineman will take an angled path towards an offensive lineman that he is not lined up across from. This will usually cause the offensive lineman he is lined up across from to follow him while also occupying the offensive lineman he angled towards. In turn, the defensive lineman who would have been blocked by the offensive lineman that is being angled to will loop behind his teammate and rush through the gap that was created by the offensive lineman who followed the defensive lineman taking the angle.
E T \| G C G T W
A blitz occurs when the defense sends non defensive-line personnel (either linebackers or defensive backs) to rush the quarterback. A blitz is an expansion upon the effective concept of the aforementioned pass rush.
In attempting to halt the advancing of the football by the offensive team, the defensive team has many options. There are various formations that are commonly employed to defend against a passing attack.
Man-to-man coverage is when every receiver is covered by a defensive back or linebacker. It is a coverage often used while blitzing because there are not enough players available to effectively execute zone coverage. Man-to-man coverage may be used while not blitzing by teams who have superior defensive backs or against teams with inferior receivers.
Zone defense is when defensive players (typically defensive backs and linebackers) are responsible for a specific area on the field during pass coverage. Zones are usually more effective against long passes. When playing in a zone defense, a defensive player is able to observe what the quarterback is attempting to do, anticipate where a pass may be thrown, and perhaps intercept the pass. Zone defenses tend to produce interceptions of passes or outstanding collisions with receivers after they have made pass receptions.
Strategy forms a major part of American football. Both teams plan many aspects of their plays (offense) and response to plays (defense), such as what formations they take, who they put on the field, and the roles and instructions each player are given. Throughout a game, each team adapts to the other's apparent strengths and weaknesses, trying various approaches to outmaneuver or overpower their opponent in order to win the game.
The goal of the offense is, most generally, to score points. In order to accomplish this goal, coaches and players plan and execute plays – based on a variety of factors: The players involved, the opponent's defensive strategy, the amount of time remaining before halftime or the end of the game, and the number of points needed to win the game. Strategically, the offense can prolong their possession of the ball to prevent the opponent from scoring. Offensive scoring chances, or drives, end when they cannot move the ball 10 yards or the ball is turned over via fumble or interception.
On offense, there are three types of players: linemen, backs, and receivers. These players' positions and duties on the field vary from one offensive scheme to another.
The position names (as well as the abbreviations recognized by coaches, players, and fans) vary from one team's playbook to another, but what follow are among the most commonly used:
Backs are so named because they line up behind (in back of) the line of scrimmage at the start of the play.
Before the ball is snapped the offensive team lines up in a formation. The type of formation used is determined by the game situation. Teams often have "special formations" that they only use in obvious passing situations, short yardage, goal line situations, or formations they have developed for that particular game just to confuse the defense.
There are a nearly unlimited number of possible formations – a few of the more common ones are:
When the team is in formation and the quarterback gives a signal, either by calling out instructions or giving a non-verbal cue (a so-called "silent count"), the center snaps the ball to the quarterback and a play begins.
A running play occurs when the quarterback hands the ball to another player, who then attempts to carry the ball past the line of scrimmage and gain yards, or the quarterback keeps the ball himself and runs beyond the line of scrimmage. In both cases, the offensive line's main job is to run block, preventing the defensive players from tackling the ball carrier.
The choice of running play depends on the strengths of an offensive team, the weaknesses of the defense they are opposing, and the distance needed to score a touchdown or gain a first down. There are many kinds of running plays, including:
When a passing play occurs, the backs and receivers run specific patterns, or routes, and the quarterback throws the ball to one of the players. On these plays, the offensive line's main job is to prevent defensive players from tackling the quarterback before he throws the ball (a "sack") or disrupting the quarterback in any other way during the play.
When successful, passing plays tend to cover more ground than running plays, so they are often used when the offensive team needs to gain a large number of yards. Even if they do not need to gain a large number of yards, it would be foolish to keep doing run plays because the defense could predict it. However, run plays are used to tire the defensive linemen in between passing plays in order to protect the QB from sacks.
One general rule teams must take into account when creating their passing strategy is that only certain players are allowed to catch forward passes. If a player who is not an eligible receiver receives a thrown pass, the team could be penalized. However, if prior to a play the team reports to the referee that a normally ineligible receiver will act as an eligible receiver for one play, that player is allowed to catch passes. Teams will use this strategy from time to time to confuse the defense or force them to devote more attention to possible pass catchers.
Using a combination of passing plays and running plays, the offense tries to gain the yards needed for a first down, touchdown, or field goal. Over the years several football coaches and offensive coordinators have developed some well-known and widely used offensive strategies:
Distinct from the offensive strategies or philosophies, which govern how a team moves the ball down the field, whether a team relies on downfield passes, short passes, inside runs, etc. are the ways in which plays are called. These play calling systems often developed alongside certain offensive strategies, though the systems themselves can work with any strategy. The differences between the systems focus on the specific language used to communicate plays to players. In the NFL, three basic systems predominate:
The goal of defensive strategy is to prevent the opposing offense from gaining yards and scoring points, either by preventing the offense from advancing the ball beyond the line of scrimmage or by the defense taking the ball away from the offense (referred to as a turnover) and scoring points themselves.
On defense, there are three types of players: linemen, linebackers, and defensive backs (also called secondary players). These players' specific positions on the field and duties during the game vary depending on the type of defense being used as well as the kind of offense the defense is facing.
The defensive line lines up in front of the offensive line. The defensive lineman's responsibility is to prevent the offensive line from opening up running lanes for the running back or to sack the quarterback, depending on whether the play is a passing or running play. Most of the time, defensive linemen attack the offensive line but in some plays they drop back in pass coverage to confuse the opposite team.
Linebackers stand behind the defensive linemen or set themselves up on the line of scrimmage. Depending on the type of defensive strategy being used, a linebacker's responsibilities can include helping to stop the run, rushing the quarterback, or dropping back in pass protection.
Defensive backs stand behind the linebackers. Their primary responsibility is pass coverage, although they can also be involved in stopping the run or rushing the quarterback.
By far the most common alignments are four down linemen and three linebackers (a "4–3" defense), or three down linemen and four linebackers ("3–4"), but other formations such as five linemen and two linebackers ("5–2"), or three linemen, three linebackers, and five defensive backs ("3–3–5") are also used by a number of teams.
As with offensive formations, there are many combinations that can be used to set up a defense. Unusual defensive alignments are constantly used in an effort to neutralize a given offense's strengths. In winning Super Bowl XXV, the New York Giants played with two down linemen, four linebackers and five defensive backs, a strategy that prevented their opponents, the Buffalo Bills, a team with a strong passing game, from completing long passes. In a 2004 game, the New England Patriots used no down linemen and seven linebackers for two plays against the Miami Dolphins.
Some of the more familiar defensive formations include:
The defense must wait until the ball is snapped by the opposing center before they can move across the line of scrimmage or otherwise engage any of the offensive players. Once an opposing offense has broken their huddle and lined up in their formation, defensive players often call out instructions to each other to make last-second adjustments to the defense.
To prevent the opposing offense from gaining yards on the ground, a defense might put more emphasis on their run defense. This generally involves placing more players close to the line of scrimmage to get to the ball carrier more quickly. This strategy is often used when the opposing offense only needs to gain a few yards to make a first down or score a touchdown.
When the defense believes the opposing offense will pass the ball, they go into pass defense. There are two general schemes for defending against the pass:
There are times when a defense believes that the best way to stop the offense is to rush the quarterback, which involves sending several players charging at the line of scrimmage in an attempt to tackle the quarterback before he can throw the ball or hand it to another player. Any player on the defense is allowed to rush the quarterback, and many schemes have been developed over 50 years that involve complicated or unusual blitz "packages".
Defensive strategies differ somewhat from offensive strategies in that, unlike offenses that have very specific, detailed plans and assignments for each player, defenses are more reactive, with each player's general goal being to "stop the offense" by tackling the ball carrier, breaking up passing plays, taking the ball away from the offense, or sacking the quarterback. Whereas precision and timing are among the most important parts of offensive strategy, defensive strategies often emphasize aggressiveness and the ability to react to plays as they develop.
Nevertheless, there are many defensive strategies that have been developed over the years that coaches use as a framework for their general defense, making specific adjustments depending on the capabilities of their players and the opponent they are facing.
Some of the most commonly known and used defensive strategies include:
A special team is the group of players who take the field during kickoffs, free kicks, punts, and field goal attempts. Most football teams' special teams include one or more kickers, a long snapper (who specializes in accurate snaps over long distances), kick returners who catch and carry the ball after it is kicked by the opposing team, and blockers who defend during kicks and returns.
Most special teams are made up of players who act as backups or substitutes on the team's offensive and defensive units. Because of the risk of injury, it is uncommon for a starting offensive or defensive player to also play on a special teams unit.
A variety of strategic plays can be attempted during kickoffs, punts, and field goals—to surprise the opposition and score points, gain yardage or first downs, or recover possession of the kicked ball.
A kickoff occurs at the beginning of each half, overtime period (not in college), and following each touchdown, successful field goal, or safety. Strategically, the coach of the other team may choose to have his players kick the ball in one of several ways:
The "no punting" strategy is one that forsakes the practice of punting and instead attempts to make fourth down conversions on as many plays as possible. It has been implemented at Pulaski Academy, a top-ranked prep school, and has been advocated by Gregg Easterbrook in his "Tuesday Morning Quarterback" column and by author Jon Wertheim. Fourth down decisions to punt have been analyzed mathematically by David Romer.
Field goals are worth one point after a scored touchdown, or three points in the event that a team does not score a touchdown but feels it is positioned close enough for the kicker to make the attempt.
Thus it is strategically important for kicking teams to get as close to the ball as possible after a punt, so that they may quickly tackle a returner, down the ball as close to the opposing team's end zone as possible, and (if possible) recover the ball after a fumble and regain possession of the ball.
The Hidden Game of Football is an influential book on American football statistics published in 1988 and written by Bob Carroll, John Thorn, and Pete Palmer. It was the first systematic statistical approach to analyzing American football in a book and is still considered the seminal work on the topic.
Football Outsiders (FO) is a website started in July 2003 which focuses on advanced statistical analysis of the NFL. The site is run by a staff of regular writers, who produce a series of weekly columns using both the site's in-house statistics and their personal analyses of NFL games.
In 2005 and 2006, the site partnered with FOXSports.com to cross-publish many of the Outsiders' regular features, including power rankings based on a "weighted" version of the DVOA (Defense-adjusted Value Over Average) statistic. In 2007, Football Outsiders content appeared on FOXSports.com (in a reduced capacity) along with AOL Sports and ESPN.com. Since 2008, the site has partnered exclusively with ESPN and provides mostly ESPN Insider content. In 2009, Football Outsiders began analyzing college football using similar statistical principles.
Football Outsiders was launched in August 2003 by Aaron Schatz, with two regular columns, one of which used an early version of the proprietary DVOA statistic. The original purpose of the site was to disprove a statement by "Boston Globe" reporter Ron Borges that the 2002 New England Patriots failed to make the postseason because they could not establish the run. Over the course of time, the site added more writers, and hosted Gregg Easterbrook for part of 2003.
Between 2004 and 2005, the site introduced new statistics such as Defense-adjusted Points Above Replacement (DPAR, later Defense-adjusted "Yards" Above Replacement, DYAR) and Adjusted Line Yards (ALY). In 2005, the site began to cross-publish many of its columns on FOXsports.com. In 2005, Football Outsiders also took over publication of "Pro Football Prospectus", a book giving a preview of the upcoming NFL season. In 2009, the annual was renamed "Football Outsiders Almanac".
Currently, the site has incorporated the 1983-2020 NFL seasons into their statistics.
Football Outsiders has devised a series of proprietary formulas to calculate different advanced metrics.
DVOA (Defense-adjusted Value Over Average) calculates a team's success based on the down-and-distance of each play during the season, then calculates how much more or less successful each team is compared to the league average. According to Football Outsiders, DVOA "breaks down every single play of the NFL season to see how much success offensive players achieved in each specific situation compared to the league average in that situation, adjusted for the strength of the opponent. ... Football has one objective -- to get to the end zone -- and two ways to achieve that, by gaining yards and getting first downs. These two goals need to be balanced to determine a player's value or a team's performance."
There is a separate DVOA measurement for special teams, which "compare[s] each kick or punt to the league average for based on the point value of field position at the position of each kick, catch, and return."
DYAR (Defense-adjusted Yards Above Replacement) calculates each player's cumulative value above or below a "replacement-level" alternative. DYAR differs from DVOA in calculating a player's total value through the course of a year, and not on a play-for-play rate. States Football Outsiders, "DVOA, by virtue of being a percentage or rate statistic, doesn’t take into account the cumulative value of having a player producing at a league-median level over the course of an above-average number of plays. By definition, a median level of performance is better than that provided by half of the league and the ability to maintain that level of performance while carrying a heavy work load is very valuable indeed."
Adjusted Line Yards (ALY) "differentiate[s] between the contribution of the running back and the contribution of the offensive line." ALY attempts to "separate the effect that the running back has on a particular play from the effect of the offensive line (and other offensive blockers) and the effect of the defense. ... Yardage ends up falling into roughly the following combinations: Losses, 0-4 yards, 5-10 yards, and 11+ yards. In general, the offensive line is 20% more responsible for lost yardage than it is for yardage gained up to four yards, but 50% less responsible for yardage gained from 5-10 yards, and not responsible for yardage past that. Thus, the creation of Adjusted Line Yards."
Drive Stats calculate a team's average success rate on a possession-by-possession basis: "[E]ach team's total number of drives as well as average yards per drive, points per drive, touchdowns per drive, punts per drive, and turnovers per drive, interceptions per drive, and fumbles lost per drive. LOS/Drive represents average starting field position (line of scrimmage) per drive from the offensive point of view. Drive stats are given for offense and defense, with NET representing simply offense minus defense."
Another metric Football Outsiders uses is Pythagorean projection, which estimates wins in a season by a formula originally conceived by baseball analyst Bill James, that takes the square of team points, and divides it by the sum of the squares of team points scored and allowed.
The 2011 edition of "Football Outsiders Almanac" states, "From 1988 through 2004, 11 of 16 Super Bowls were won by the team that led the NFL in Pythagorean wins, while only seven were won by the team with the most actual victories. Super Bowl champions that led the league in Pythagorean wins but not actual wins include the 2004 Patriots, 2000 Ravens, 1999 Rams and 1997 Broncos."
Although Football Outsiders Almanac acknowledges that the formula had been less-successful in picking Super Bowl participants from 2005-2008, it reasserted itself in 2009 and 2010.
Furthermore, "[t]he Pythagorean projection is also still a valuable predictor of year-to-year improvement. Teams that win a minimum of one full game more than their Pythagorean projection tend to regress the following year; teams that win a minimum of one full game less than their Pythagoerean projection tend to improve the following year, particularly if they were at or above .500 despite their underachieving. For example, the 2008 New Orleans Saints went 8-8 despite 9.5 Pythagorean wins, hinting at the improvement that came with the next year's championship season."
Each year, Football Outsiders calculates the best and worst teams, per play, with the DVOA metric (see above). Below is a list of the highest- and lowest-rated teams in the league in each year from 1985-2019.
Pro Football Prospectus and Football Outsiders Almanac.
From 2005 through 2008, Football Outsiders published the "Pro Football Prospectus" book each year before the football season began. It included an essay for each team analyzing the previous season, evaluating off-season moves, and projecting future performance.
In 2009, Football Outsiders did not publish a "Pro Football Prospectus" volume, but instead produced the self-published "Football Outsiders Almanac 2009". The reason for this is explained in the book:
So why the name change, and why aren’t we in bookstores?
For those who don’t know, our first four books were published through an agreement with Prospectus Entertainment Ventures, the company that owns Baseball Prospectus (as well as the expansion projects Basketball Prospectus and Puck Prospectus). It was PEV that had the publishing contract (first with Workman, then Plume). This year, for various reasons, Plume decided they no longer wanted to publish books related to other sports besides baseball. Other publishers were interested in doing our book, but by the time Plume made their decision, it was too late to get on the publication schedule for 2009.
Bump and run coverage is a strategy formerly widely used by defensive backs in American professional football in which a defender lined up directly in front of a wide receiver and tried to impede him with arms, hands, or entire body and disrupt his intended route. This originated in the American Football League in the 1960s, one of whose earliest experts was Willie Brown of the Oakland Raiders. Mel Blount of the Pittsburgh Steelers specialized in this coverage to such a point as to cause numerous rule changes (see below) strictly limiting when and where a defender may make contact with a potential receiver in order to make it easier for receivers to run their routes and increase scoring.
In contrast, under NCAA rules, contact is allowed anywhere on the field as long as contact is in front of the defender and a pass is not in the air.
This play works well against routes that require the receiver to be in a certain spot at a certain time. The disadvantage, however, is that the receiver can shed contact and get behind the cornerback for a big play. This varies from the more traditional defensive formation in which a defensive player will give the receiver a "cushion" of about 5 yards to prevent the receiver from getting behind him. In the NFL, a defensive back is allowed any sort of contact within the 5 yard bump zone except for holding the receiver, otherwise the defensive back can be called for an illegal contact penalty, costing 5 yards and an automatic first down, enforced since 1978, and known colloquially as the Mel Blount Rule.
In the sports of American football or Canadian football, the act of icing the kicker or freezing the kicker is the act of calling a timeout immediately prior to the snap in order to disrupt the process of kicking a field goal. The intent is to throw the kicker off of their routine and force them to feel pressure for a longer amount of time. The tactic is used at the collegiate and professional levels, although its effectiveness has not been proven.
In order to ice a kicker, either a player or a coach on the defending team will call a timeout just as the kicker is about to attempt a game-tying or game-winning field goal. This is intended to either stop the kick immediately as the kicker is mentally prepared, or allow for the kicker to kick immediately after the timeout so that the initial kick does not count, in an attempt to mentally disrupt the kicker for the actual kick. If the tactic is successful, the kicker will miss the kick due to choking. Should the kicker make the subsequent kick, then the attempt to ice the kicker is considered unsuccessful.
One variant of this tactic, attributed to former Denver Broncos coach Mike Shanahan, is to call time out from the sidelines just before the ball is snapped. This prevents the kicking team from realizing the kick will not count until after the play is over. However, this has the potential to backfire: the invalid first kick could miss or be blocked, only to be followed by a successful second kick.
A similar tactic is also common in basketball, known as icing the shooter. A team may call a time out just before the opposing team's free-throw shooter is given the ball on the final free throw, in an attempt to disrupt the shooter, typically if a missed free throw allows for the calling team to either have a chance to win the game with a successful field goal, or allows the calling team to preserve a lead.
In American football, Air Coryell is the offensive scheme and philosophy developed by former San Diego Chargers coach Don Coryell. The offensive philosophy has been also called the "Coryell offense" or the "vertical offense".
With Dan Fouts as quarterback, the San Diego Chargers' offense was among the greatest passing offenses in National Football League history. The Chargers led the league in passing yards an NFL record six consecutive years from 1978 to 1983 and again in 1985. They also led the league in total yards in offense 1978–83 and 1985. Dan Fouts, Charlie Joiner, and Kellen Winslow would all be inducted into the Pro Football Hall of Fame from those Charger teams.
The pro set was the default NFL scheme prior to Don Coryell. It was generally a running offense that used play action fakes to set up deep passing attempts when defenses stacked up vs the running game. On pass plays, it provided one or even two backs to help protect the quarterback.
The pro set features a tight end, two wide receivers, a halfback and a fullback, often split behind the quarterback. While QBs can take snaps from under center or from the shotgun position, QBs generally take snaps from under center in the pro set to allow for more effective use of the play action pass. Offenses tended to be ball-control, grind-it-out style offenses. In 1978, the contact from defenders on receivers was minimized with the passing of the Mel Blount Rule.
Coryell opens up passing in the NFL.
Today most NFL offenses' passing games are at least partially based on Coryell conventions.
Former coach of the St. Louis Rams, Mike Martz, says "Don is the father of the modern passing game. People talk about the West Coast offense, but Don started the 'West Coast' decades ago and kept updating it. You look around the NFL now, and so many teams are running a version of the Coryell offense. Coaches have added their own touches, but it's still Coryell's offense. He has disciples all over the league. He changed the game.".
The offense did not have any set formations, as receivers could line up anywhere on any given pass play. Passes were thrown to a spot before the receiver even got there, allowing defenders no hint where the pass was being targeted. Each receiver had two or three different route options they could adjust depending on the coverage during the play. Throwing a deep pass was the first option on each play. Coryell's offense had more progressions than Gillman's, with backup options for screen passes and underneath routes.
The Coryell offense is a combination of deep and mid range passing and power running. The offense relies on getting all five receivers out into patterns that combined stretched the field, setting up defensive backs with route technique, and the quarterback throwing to a spot on time where the receiver can catch and turn upfield. Pass protection is critical to success because at least two of the five receivers will run a deep in, skinny post, comeback, speed out, or shallow cross.
Overall, the goal of the Coryell offense is to have at least two downfield, fast wide receivers who adjust to the deep pass very well, combined with a sturdy pocket quarterback with a strong arm. The Coryell offense uses three key weapons. The first is a strong inside running game, the second is its ability to strike deep with two or more receivers on any play, and the third is to not only use those two attacks in cooperation with each other, but to include a great deal of mid-range passing to a TE, WR, or back.
After the Chargers in 1980 acquired running back Chuck Muncie, the offense started using a single set back featuring Muncie as the lone running back and adding a second tight end into the game. When defenses countered with extra defensive backs, the offense would run the ball. Joe Gibbs, the Chargers offensive coordinator at the time, said that marked "the evolution of the one-back offense."
Originally it was known as the West Coast offense until an article about San Francisco 49ers Head Coach Bill Walsh in "Sports Illustrated" in the early 80s incorrectly called Walsh's offense "the West Coast offense," and this mis-labelling stuck. Subsequently, Coryell's offense scheme was referred to as "Air Coryell"—the name announcers had assigned to his high powered Charger offenses in San Diego, featuring 3 Hall of Famers in QB Dan Fouts, WR Charlie Joiner, & TE Kellen Winslow, as well as Pro Bowl WR Wes Chandler & HB Chuck Muncie. Today it is also known as the "Coryell offense", although the "vertical offense" is another accepted name.
In NFL coaching circles, the most famous and successful advocates of the Air Coryell system are Norv Turner, Mike Martz and Al Saunders.
The Mike Martz variant is a much more robust offense with a more complex playbook. It is a much more aggressive passing offense, frequently deploying pre-snap motion and shifts, with the running game often forgotten. There is much less of a focus on play action. The Martz variant favors an elusive feature back, such as Hall of Famer Marshall Faulk, who can catch the ball, over the power runners the Turner scheme favors. Martz credits both his influences on his variation of the offensive system and his overall coaching philosophy to Don Coryell. Martz learned the so-called 3 digit system the offense is famous for with how the plays are called from Turner when they were both in Washington.
This may have been especially true when the Rams surprisingly lost Super Bowl XXXVI to the New England Patriots. In that contest, the Patriots' defense successfully contained Marshall Faulk, holding him to only 76 yards rushing and 54 yards receiving. The Rams offense gained more yards than the Patriots offense, 427-267. But the New England defense forced 3 St. Louis turnovers. The Patriots scored 17 points off those turnovers. It should also be noted that Kurt Warner's rhythm was disrupted by Patriots head coach Bill Belichick's defensive game plan. Warner went 28-44 on his passing attempts, throwing for 365 yards and scoring 2 touchdowns (1 running, 1 passing). However, Warner also threw two costly interceptions which proved to eventually help the Patriots win the Super Bowl.
The Coryell offense attacked vertically through seams, while the West Coast offense moved laterally as much as vertically through angles on curl and slant routes. The Coryell offense had lower completion percentages than the West Coast offense, but the returns were greater on a successful play. "The Coryell offense required more talented players, a passer who could get the ball there, and men who can really run—a lot of them," said Walsh. He said the West Coast offense was developed out of necessity to operate with less talented players. He noted, "[Coryell] already had the talent and used it brilliantly."
In American football, a two-level defense is a defensive formation with only two layers of defense instead of the customary three layers.
The two-level was invented to combat the run and shoot offense in the 1980s, but has stayed in use due to its adaptability in combating all types of offenses. The defense of spread formations remains a strong suit of this model.
A play calling system in American football is the specific language and methods used to call offensive plays.
It is distinct from the play calling philosophy, which is concerned with overall strategy: whether a team favors passing or running, whether a team seeks to speed up or slow down play, what part of the field passes should target, and so on. The play calling system comprises tactics for making calls for individual plays and communicating those decisions to the players.
In any football play, each of the team's eleven players on offense has a specific, scripted task. Success requires that players' tasks mesh into an effective play. A team maximizes the difficulty for the opposition by having a wide variety of plays, which means that players' tasks vary on different plays. A play calling system informs each player of his task in the current play.
There are constraints in designing a play calling system. The 40-second play clock means a team has 30 seconds or less from the end of one play to prepare for the next play. A complicated play calling system that lets a team tailor a play more precisely is harder for players to memorize and communicate. Noise from the fans in the stadium can interfere with communication, sometimes deliberately. To the extent the opposition can intercept and understand the call, it can prepare for it better.
The design of a play calling system answers the following questions:
Three general approaches to play calling dominate the National Football League:
In the West Coast system, all plays have code names. They indicate the specific formation and tell players where to line up. This code name is followed by modifiers that communicate variations on the play. For running plays, the modifier specifies the blocking scheme and the path that the primary ball carrier takes during the run, usually indicating which of nine numbered gaps, or holes, between offensive-line players he aims for in his run. For passing plays, the modifier indicates what pass route each player is supposed to take.
Here are some plays from one specific West Coast playbook, and what the names mean:
The West Coast system has its roots in the system devised by Paul Brown as the head coach of the Cleveland Browns and Cincinnati Bengals. It became known as the West Coast system when Brown's protege Bill Walsh used a similar scheme as head coach of the San Francisco 49ers during their success of the 1980s and 1990s. The West Coast system was designed alongside the West Coast offense, though it is not confined to that offense.
The heart of the system devised by Don Coryell is a three-digit number that gives assignments to each of three pass receivers; for instance, the split end, the tight end, and the flanker, in that order; or the leftmost receiver, middle receiver, and right receiver, in that order. Each digit is a code for one of nine passing routes the receiver is to run, based on a "route tree". Some routes include a change of direction with which to throw off the defender covering the receiver. Through the route tree, the quarterback knows where each receiver will be and can quickly scan to see who is most open.

Subsets and Splits

No community queries yet

The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.