Datasets:
HHazard
/
continuous-learning

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
Community
1
text
stringlengths
13
991
A slight variation of this formation is the "flexbone", where the running backs move to just outside the tackles, but still behind the line of scrimmage. The running back that the play is using for the third option motions in, and while in motion the ball is snapped. The triple option, in this case, is still run mostly the same as the wishbone.
The veer triple option uses two halfbacks and a tight end (TE). The "inside veer" play is similar to the wishbone triple option, but the dive option is performed by the halfback on the side of the play, and the other halfback becomes the pitch man. The veer is more challenging to run to the weak side (the side without the tight end) because there is no lead blocker for the pitch man. The "outside veer" moves the halfback dive option outside the offensive tackle, forcing the outside linebacker to stop the halfback dive, and forcing the defensive backs to play the pitch option.
The triple option can be run out of the I formation as well. With two running backs, it is sometimes called the "I-veer", as the play is similar to the two running back veer offense. Three running back I formations such as the Maryland I and the stack I are more similar to the wishbone play.
Nebraska in 1980–2003 deployed an I formation triple option. They won 3 national titles with it 1994, 1995, and 1997.
In recent years, as spread and zone read offenses have become popular, many teams have begun to run variations of the triple option with the quarterback in the shotgun. This has been greatly popularized by the success of coaches such as Rich Rodriguez, Mark Helfrich, and Urban Meyer. The more traditional version of the triple option uses a quarterback under center and is advocated by the service academy coaches, including Fisher DeBerry, formerly of Air Force, and Paul Johnson, formerly head coach of Navy and Georgia Tech (who installed this offense at Hawai'i and Georgia Southern, the latter school winning several Division I Football Championship Subdivision titles using it).
Paul Johnson, along with former assistant and current Navy head coach Ken Niumatalolo, have had the most success with the triple option/veer in the last few years. The triple option can be used in the spread offense. Teams like Ohio State, Oregon, and Arizona have used an inside zone triple option from the spread. The quarterback reads the defensive end for "give" or "keep". If the defensive end squeezes down to take the dive, the quarterback will pull the ball and take his reading progression to the outside linebacker or defensive back. If the linebacker/defensive back takes the quarterback, the quarterback will pitch the ball to his running back who is running in formation with the quarterback.
The rule change that resulted in the widespread use of RPOs by college offenses was controversial. By "destroy[ing] the ages-old division between passing plays and running plays" the RPO changes offense, defense and officiating roles. "The Wall Street Journal" highlighted the option in the lead-up to the 2017 playoff between Alabama and Clemson, in which both teams "will [try to] use [it] to win".
The RPO has also been utilized in the NFL despite rules disallowing linemen to block more than one yard downfield on passing plays, though NFL QBs must make quicker reads to avoid a penalty if they decide to throw a forward pass.
University of Nevada head coach Chris Ault popularized the single back alignment (and renamed it the "Pistol") in 2005. While the pistol offense has been experimented with by dozens of college football teams such as LSU, Syracuse, Indiana, and Missouri, Ault's Nevada Wolf Pack is most strongly associated with the formation. Using the Pistol Offense, during the 2009 season, Nevada led the nation in rushing at 345 yards a game and were second in total offense at 506 yards. The Wolf Pack also became the first team in college football history with three 1,000-yard rushers in the same season: quarterback Colin Kaepernick and running backs Luke Lippincott and Vai Taua.
Football Championship Subdivision team James Madison University used "The Pistol" to help beat #13 ranked Virginia Tech on September 11, 2010. The pistol has also made the transition to the NFL, mainly being used by the Carolina Panthers with Cam Newton and Robert Griffin III of the Washington Redskins, as well as the aforementioned Colin Kaepernick with the San Francisco 49ers, who in the NFL Playoffs versus the Green Bay Packers set the all-time single game rushing record for a quarterback with 181 yards. Along with the wildcat, the pistol has added more of a college "playmaker" aspect to the professional game.
On December 5, 2010, the Pittsburgh Steelers used the Pistol offense so quarterback Ben Roethlisberger could play with a bad foot.
In American football, a smashmouth offense is an offensive system that relies on a strong running game, where most of the plays run by the offense are handoffs to the fullback or tailback. It is a more traditional style of offense that often results in a higher time of possession by running the ball heavily. So-called "smash-mouth football" is often run out of the I-formation or wishbone formation, with tight ends and receivers used as blockers. Though the offense is run-oriented, pass opportunities can develop as defenses play close to the line. Play-action can be very effective for a run-oriented team.
"Three Yards and a Cloud of Dust".
This term describes run-heavy offenses such as those used by coach Woody Hayes of Ohio State University in the 1950s and 1960s. A grind-it-out ball control offense, it relies on time of possession utilizing a high percentage of inside running plays off of handoffs by the quarterback to advance the ball down the field. Hayes relied primarily on the fullback off-tackle play. A quarterback under Hayes would often throw fewer than 10 passes a game. Hayes is credited as saying "Three things can happen when you pass the ball, and two of them are bad".
Pro Football Focus (also written as ProFootballFocus, and often referred to by its initials, PFF) is a website that focuses on thorough analysis of the National Football League (NFL) and NCAA Division-I football in the United States. PFF produces 0-100 Player Grades and a range of advanced statistics for teams and players by watching, charting and grading every player on every play in every game both at the NFL and FBS level.
PFF was founded by Neil Hornsby in the United Kingdom. Dissatisfied with some limitations of standard statistics, Hornsby began grading players in 2004. The staff gradually expanded over the next few years, and the site was launched in 2007. The 2006 NFL season is the first season for which PFF has complete data. For the 2011 season, PFF provided customized data to three NFL teams, agents, media and NFL players. In 2014, sports commentator and former NFL player Cris Collinsworth bought a majority interest in the service, which moved its operations to Cincinnati, near where Collinsworth lives in Ft. Thomas, Kentucky. PFF began collecting data for every NCAA Division-I college football game in 2014.
As of 2019, PFF provides customized data to all 32 NFL teams, 74 NCAA FBS teams, 4 CFL teams, national/regional media (i.e. Washington Post, The Athletic, ESPN) and sports agencies/agents.
PFF grades every NFL player on every play on a scale of -2 to +2 using half point increments. The grades are based on context and performance. A four-yard run that gains a first down after two broken tackles will receive a better grade than a four-yard run on 3rd & 5, where the ball carrier does nothing more than expected. A quarterback who makes a good pass that a receiver tips into the arms of a defender will not negatively affect the quarterback's grade on that play, despite the overall negative result for the team.
Furthermore, grades are separated by play type. Beyond just an overall grade, an offensive lineman receives one grade for pass-blocking and one for run-blocking. The average grade is meant to be zero, and raw grades are normalized.
In watching every game, PFF is also able to record information and create data that is typically unavailable. One example is how frequently individual offensive linemen yield pressure.
PFF covers every player on every play of every game at the NFL and major college football level and creates advanced stats based on the information gleaned from this.
PFF has been criticized by the analytics community regarding the accuracy and veracity of its ratings. In contrast to the purely quantitative ratings released by sources like Football Outsiders, TeamRankings, and numberFire, PFF uses qualitative and opinion-based grading as the root of its 0-100 Player Grades -- not its advanced statistics. As such, the 0-100 Player Grades are not truly quantitative and could be seen as being prone to bias, poor sample sizing, or other issues.
The hurry-up offense is nearly as old as football itself. John Heisman's 1899 Auburn Tigers ran an early version of the hurry-up. Michigan coach Fielding Yost was known as "Hurry up;" as he had Bennie Owen call signals for the next play - even while still lying beneath the tackle pile from the previous snap.
The first team to employ a version of the no-huddle approach as the normal offensive play strategy was the 1988 Cincinnati Bengals under Sam Wyche with Boomer Esiason as the quarterback. This approach, called the "attack offense," involved a number of strategies including shortened huddles and huddling much closer to the line of scrimmage than usual. The no-huddle approach was used by many teams before but in specific situations for a limited time. This strategy proved to be very effective in limiting substitutions, creating fatigue in the opposing defense, creating play-calling issues for the defense, and various other advantages. The Bengals' regular employment of this offense was extremely effective. The employment of this version of the "no-huddle" propelled the Bengals to their second appearance in the Super Bowl.
In recent times Peyton Manning, formerly with the Indianapolis Colts and later the Denver Broncos, is best known for this technique, frequently changing the play at the line of scrimmage depending on the coverage that he sees from the opposing defense.
In 2013, Chip Kelly became head coach of the Philadelphia Eagles and adapted the hurry-up offense that he used effectively at Oregon to the NFL. During the 2014 season, the Eagles averaged around 22 seconds per play, which is the fastest time of any NFL team since this statistic has been kept.
Differences between the NFL and college approaches.
The two-minute drill is a high-pressure and fast-paced situational strategy where a team will focus on clock management, maximizing the number of plays available for a scoring attempt before a half (or game) expires. The tactics employed during this time involve managing players, substitutions, time-outs, and clock-stopping plays to get as many plays in as possible. In the first half, either team may employ the two-minute drill; however, near the end of the game, only a team tied or losing employs the strategy. Most famously, the two-minute drill references end-of-game drives by a team tied or trailing by one possession.
The two-minute drill is named for the point in the game, frequently after the two minute warning, when it is employed. If significantly more time remains, a team's standard strategies are still viable; if significantly less, a team has little option beyond a Hail Mary pass or the hook and lateral.
Finally, as the offense gets closer to scoring, their clock management stance may shift towards running out the clock in an effort to deny the opponent their own opportunity for a two-minute drill.
In American football, the West Coast offense is an offense that places a greater emphasis on passing than on running.
There are two similar but distinct offensive strategic systems that are commonly referred to as "West Coast offenses". Originally, the term referred to the Air Coryell system popularized by Don Coryell. Following a journalistic error, however, it now more commonly refers to the offensive system devised by Bill Walsh while he was the offensive coordinator of the Cincinnati Bengals. The offense is characterized by short, horizontal passing routes in lieu of running plays to "stretch out" defenses, opening up the potential for long runs or long passes. It was popularized when Walsh was the head coach of the San Francisco 49ers.
Initially, Walsh resisted having the term misapplied to his own distinct system and was especially incensed by the use of the word "finesse" in reference to his sophisticated offensive schemes. Zimmerman notes that an article of his so misapplying the term provoked a phone call from an upset Walsh: "He called me up... (saying) that wasn't his offense". Still, the moniker stuck. Now the term is commonly used to refer to a range of pass-oriented offenses that may not be closely related to either the Air Coryell system or Walsh's pass-strategy.
The origins of the offensive system devised by Walsh go back to Paul Brown, coach of the Cleveland Browns and later the Cincinnati Bengals. Under Brown's tenure, Walsh was tasked with devising an offensive plan suited to Bengal quarterback Virgil Carter, who had an accurate but relatively weak arm. In response, Walsh created a system based on short, high-percentage passes, favoring straight and direct ten- to fifteen-yard strikes over forty- to fifty-yard "bombs". This system compensated for any weakness in the quarterback's arm, as it allowed the ball to be thrown to short and intermediate routes where receivers with running ability could make up for any shortage in yards after the catch.
Bernie Kosar used the term to describe the offense formalized by Sid Gillman with the AFL
Chargers in the 1960s and later by Don Coryell's St. Louis Cardinals and Chargers in the 1970s and 1980s. Al Davis, an assistant under Gillman, also carried his version to the Oakland Raiders, where his successors John Rauch, John Madden, and Tom Flores continued to employ and expand upon its basic principles. This is the "West Coast offense" as Kosar originally used the term. It is now commonly referred to as the "Air Coryell" timed system, however, and instead the term West Coast offense is usually used to describe Walsh's system.
The offense uses a specific naming system, with the routes for wide receivers and tight ends receiving three digit numbers, and routes for backs having unique names. For example, a pass play in 3 digit form might be "Split Right 787 check swing, check V". (see Offensive Nomenclature). This provides an efficient way to communicate many different plays with minimal memorization. Conversely, the Walsh "West Coast offense" could in theory have more freedom, since route combinations are not limited by 0-9 digits, but at the price of much more memorization required by the players.
Walsh formulated what has become popularly known as the West Coast offense during his tenure as assistant coach for the Cincinnati Bengals from 1968 to 1975, while working under the tutelage of mentor Paul Brown. Bengals quarterback Virgil Carter would be the first player to successfully implement Walsh's system, leading the NFL in pass completion percentage in 1971. Ken Anderson later replaced Carter as Cincinnati's starting QB, and was even more successful. In his 16-year career in the NFL, Anderson made four trips to the Pro Bowl, won four passing titles, was named NFL MVP in 1981 (and also appeared in Super Bowl XVI that year), and set what was then the record for completion percentage in a single season in 1982 (70.66%).
Several members of Bill Walsh's coaching tree went on to successfully implement his West Coast Offense system.
George Seifert succeeded Walsh as San Francisco's head coach in 1989, and won two Super Bowls with the 49ers; once with Joe Montana at quarterback in 1989, and later with fellow Hall of Famer Steve Young in 1994.
Paul Hackett was another former assistant coach who once served under Walsh. He served as a 49ers assistant from 1983 to 1985, coaching quarterbacks and wide receivers. During this time, Hackett helped San Francisco win Super Bowl XIX. He next served as offensive coordinator for the Dallas Cowboys under Tom Landry from 1986 to 1988. Hackett would later teach his version of Walsh's offense to several coaches, including former Green Bay Packers head coach Mike McCarthy. McCarthy, who was the Packers head coach from 2006 until December 2018, would go on to win a Super Bowl himself with the use of the West Coast offense in 2010, with the help of superstar quarterback Aaron Rodgers.
One of Holmgren's former assistants, Jon Gruden, has had reasonable success running the West Coast offense in his own right. He started his head coaching career with the Oakland Raiders, leading them from 1998 to 2001, and turned the Raiders into a strong playoff contender. Gruden then went on to become head coach of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, winning Super Bowl XXXVII after the 2002 season. Gruden coached the Buccaneers from 2002 to 2008. After several years as a color commentator on ESPN Monday Night Football, he signed a deal to return to the Raiders as head coach for the 2018 NFL season.
Shanahan also served as head coach of the Washington Redskins from 2010 to 2013, but his time in Washington was significantly less successful than his tenure with the Broncos. Despite guiding the Redskins to the NFC East division title in 2012, along with a trip to the NFL playoffs, he only compiled a 24–40 record over 4 seasons with an 0-1 playoff mark. Overall, Shanahan accumulated an overall record of 178-144: 170–138 in the regular season, with an 8-6 postseason record that included 2 Super Bowl victories.
Gary Kubiak has had a stellar career as an NFL head coach in his own right. Kubiak served as the head coach of the Houston Texans from 2006 to 2013. After serving as the Baltimore Ravens' offensive coordinator in 2014, he became head coach of the Broncos in the 2015 season, and won Super Bowl 50.
LaVell Edwards and Dewey Warren created an offensive system similar to the West Coast offense at Brigham Young University (BYU) in 1973.
One reason for the success of this version of the offense was in its simplicity. Norm Chow said the offenses had around 12 basic pass plays and 5 basic run plays that were run from a variety of formations, with only some plays tagged for extra versatility, so that the players knew the offense by the second day of practice.
The highpoint of the BYU offense was an NCAA Division I-A national football championship in 1984 and a Heisman Trophy for Ty Detmer in 1990. BYU broke over 100 NCAA records for passing and total offense during Edwards' tenure. Several coaches and players associated with BYU's football program had success with this offense at BYU and elsewhere, including Virgil Carter, Mike Holmgren, Andy Reid, Brian Billick, Ted Tollner, Doug Scovil, Norm Chow, Jim McMahon, Steve Young, Ty Detmer, and Steve Sarkisian.
The University of Washington Huskies were among the first of the Pac-10 teams and in 1970, under coach Jim Owens and quarterback Sonny Sixkiller, used the "Sixkiller" variation of Coryell's West Coast offense with great success. Years later in 2002, under coach Keith Gilbertson and quarterback Cody Pickett, the Huskies ran a variation of Walsh's West Coast offense to a conference championship and a top four passing attack averaging 352.4 yards per game. Today, the West Coast offense no longer only resides on the west coast, but can be found in schools across the nation, including Boise State, and Vanderbilt. Former Pittsburgh and Stanford head coach Walt Harris also used a variation of the West Coast offense during his stint at Pittsburgh.
The popular term "West Coast Offense" is more of a philosophy and an approach to the game than it is a set of plays or formations. Traditional offensive thinking argues that a team must establish its running game first, which will draw the defense in and open up vertical passing lanes downfield; "i.e.", passing lanes that run perpendicular to the line of scrimmage.
Bill Walsh's West Coast Offense differs from traditional offense by emphasizing a short, horizontal passing attack to help stretch out the defense, thus opening up options for longer running plays and longer passes that can achieve greater gains. The West Coast Offense as implemented under Walsh features precisely run pass patterns by the receivers that make up about 65% to 80% of the offensive scheme. With the defense stretched out, the offense is then free to focus the remaining plays on longer throws of more than 14 yards and mid to long yard rushes.
Walsh's West Coast Offense attempts to open up running and passing lanes for the backs and receivers to exploit, by causing the defense to concentrate on short passes.
Since most down and distance situations can be attacked with a pass or a run, the intent is to make offensive play calling unpredictable and thus keep the defense's play "honest", forcing defenders to be prepared for a multitude of possible offensive plays rather than focusing aggressively on one likely play from the offense.
Another key part of the Walsh implementation was "pass first, run later", It was Walsh's intention to gain an early lead by passing the ball, then run the ball on a tired defense late in the game, wearing them down further and running down the clock. The San Francisco 49ers, under both Bill Walsh and George Seifert, often executed this strategy very effectively.
The majority of West Coast routes occur within 15 yards of the line of scrimmage. 3-step and 5-step drops by the quarterback take the place of the run and force the opposing defense to commit their focus solely on those intermediate routes. Contrary to popular belief, the offense also uses the 7-step drop for shallow crosses, deep ins and comebacks. For instance, past Michigan Wolverines offenses utilized the 5- and 7-step drops about 85% of the time with West Coast pass schemes implemented by then-quarterbacks coach Scot Loeffler. Because of the speed of modern defenses, only utilizing the 3- and 5-step pass game would be ineffective since the defense could squat and break hard on short-to-intermediate throws with no fear of a down field pass.
The original West Coast Offense of Sid Gillman uses some of the same principles (pass to establish the run, quarterback throws to timed spots), but offensive formations are generally less complicated with more wideouts and motion. The timed spots are often farther down field than in the Walsh-style offense, and the system requires a greater reliance on traditional pocket passing.
Another aspect that makes the West Coast one of the most difficult to master is that it requires a deeper connection between quarterback and receiver, and an ability to communicate mid-play. On any given route, a receiver has as many as three options; a hitch, a slant and a fly, depending on what the defense is showing. The quarterback is responsible for recognizing the defense and the reaction of the receiver to it and adjusting the route if needed. This explains the communication mistakes that commonly occur on West Coast offensive plays where the quarterback throws to a spot that the receiver is running away from.
The West Coast offense requires a quarterback who throws extremely accurately, and often blindly, very close to opposing players. In addition, it requires the quarterback to be able to quickly pick the best one of five receivers to throw to, certainly much more quickly than in previously used systems. Often, the quarterback has no time to think about the play and must act robotically, executing the play exactly as instructed by the offensive coordinator, who calls the plays for him.
Another aspect of the West Coast offense is the use of fast running quarterbacks. In blitz or short-yardage situations, many of the West Coast offense's strengths are negated by defenses blocking running and passing lanes. A running quarterback can compensate by acting as a runner himself, paralyzing an overly aggressive defense. Quarterbacks such as Randall Cunningham and Michael Vick have been successful runners in this offense, as well as other notable scrambling quarterbacks such as Jake Plummer, Donovan McNabb, Aaron Rodgers, Russell Wilson and Tyrod Taylor. The west coast offense also utilizes play-action passes to fool the defense in order to get receivers open, which is usually successful with running quarterbacks.
Although not related to the West Coast offense, the similar "dink-and-dunk" offense has also helped quarterbacks that are more adept to older systems. Kurt Warner (a disciple of a variation of Air Coryell) and Ben Roethlisberger (a traditional gunslinger) are notable examples of non-West Coast quarterbacks that found success in the "dink-and-dunk" system.
In American football a play is a close to the ground "plan of action" or "strategy" used to move the ball down the field. A play begins at either the snap from the center or at kickoff. Most commonly plays occur at the snap during a down. These plays range from basic to very intricate. Football players keep a record of these plays in their playbook.
A play begins in one of two ways:
Once the play begins, it will continue until one of the following events happens:
When the play ends, the ball is set for the next play. For the first three instances above, the ball is set at the point of its "maximum forward progress". That means that if a runner is driven back in the process of a tackle OR is ruled down by lack of forward progress, the ball is placed as close to his opponent's goal line as he had gotten before being driven back. If he runs backwards of his own volition, the ball is marked where he goes down. In the case of an incomplete pass, the ball is placed at the previous line of scrimmage.
The offensive team must have seven players on the line of scrimmage at the start of a play. Those players may be positioned at any place along the line of scrimmage (which extends all of the way across the playing field).
The defensive team may position as many as 11 players on the line of scrimmage. Usually, there are from 3 to 8 defensive players on the line of scrimmage.
In a running play, the ball is advanced beyond the line of scrimmage by a player who receives it from behind the line of scrimmage. The player advancing the ball can be:
Also called "dive", "plunge", "buck", "guts", "slam" or numerous other names. The most basic run play is a run up the middle. In this case, the ball is handed off from the quarterback to a running back. The back then aims for a predetermined hole between his offensive linemen. This hole can be either between center and guard or between guard and tackle. The offensive line will run block, pushing defenders away from the chosen hole. Often, the fullback will lead block through the hole first to clear a path for the half back or running back.
W T G C G T E
The 'bread-and-butter' of a run-oriented offense, this is typically the most common run play. Rather than aiming for a hole in the line, the running back aims for the spot just "outside" the tackle. This type of play allows for more improvisation by the running back once he is past the line, since there is often more open field in this area than in any run up the middle.
In a toss play, the RB "curves out" toward the sideline on either side and the QB pitches ("tosses") the ball to the RB.
In a sweep play, the fullback begins by running towards the sideline before heading forward. This motion allows for some of the offensive linemen, often one or both guards, to "pull" from their normal positions and establish a "lane" for the running back to run through. A lead blocking fullback often leads him through the lane. This play, known as the Packers sweep, was the central play in Vince Lombardi's "run-to-daylight" offense that was so successful for the Green Bay Packers of the 1960s.
In a trap, a guard on the "back" side of the play (away from the direction the fullback or running
back is heading) will pull and lead block for the running back (most of the time, the guard will blindside an unblocked down linemen, and kick him out of the play). Often, the fullback will take the place of the guard, and block the opening allowed by this.
W T G C G | T E
Also called a "misdirection". In this play, the runner begins by taking a step or two "away" from his intended path, then doubling back and heading in the opposite direction. Often defenders are clueing on the first move of the running back. The defenders committed to the first step, but the play moves in the opposite direction.
Counter plays are often (but not always) coupled with "influence" blocking, where the offensive line blocks the defense towards (rather than away from) the intended direction of the play. This gambit often causes the defenders to think the play is going in the opposite direction, and they react as such.
Also called a "delay". In a draw play, the offensive line drops into pass blocking positions, and the quarterback takes a drop as though he were going to pass. He then hands the ball off to his running back (or keeps it himself) and runs forward past the rushing defenders. The idea is that the defenders will be tricked in advancing on the quarterback as though it were a pass play, and this will vacate the area just beyond the line of scrimmage for the runner to take advantage of.
The quarterback fakes a handoff to the running back and continues running with the ball opposite from the direction the running back was headed. The bootleg can have blockers similar to a "sweep" (and in such cases is it often called a "quarterback sweep") or it can be run "naked", that is without any blockers at all. A naked bootleg relies on the defense buying the fake handoff and moving to tackle the running back rather than the quarterback.
The quarterback takes the snap and immediately dives to one side of the center or the other. This is often a short yardage play designed when only a yard or so is needed for a first down or a touchdown. Often the only players on either side of the ball that know the play is coming are the quarterback and the center (hence the "sneak" aspect of it), as the play is often decided by the quarterback upon seeing the defense. The play is often called by a silent signal between quarterback and center (a pinch or a tap in the direction the sneak is headed).
The wide receiver takes a handoff directly from the quarterback. The receiver then may proceed to do one of two things: he either runs the ball towards the line of scrimmage in order to gain yardage, or more rarely, he attempts to pass to another eligible pass receiver.
This play resembles a sweep, but before the running back crosses the line of scrimmage, he hands the ball off to a wide receiver going in them reverse (opposite) direction of where the running back was going. If the defense was drawn to the side of the field the running back was going towards, the receiver can outrun the defense to the other side of the field and make a big gain.
An option play is a play in which the quarterback holds the ball and runs to either side of the offensive line, waiting for an opportunity to run upfield and advance the ball. At the same time, the running back follows, allowing the quarterback the 'option' of pitching the ball just before he is tackled. This tactic forces defensive players to commit to either preventing the pitch or tackling the quarterback, allowing the offensive team to choose the best result.
The option play requires a very fast and mobile quarterback to execute it, and employs a considerable deal of risk, because if the pitch is mishandled it is a live ball that can be recovered by the defense, plus the quarterback can be hurt.
The option is rarely seen outside of college football, as high school teams lack the skill to execute it properly, and defensive players on professional teams are quick enough to disrupt the play to the point that it doesn't merit the risk involved, until the increased usages of read-option and RPO offenses in NFL since the 2010s with increasing number of dual-threat quarterbacks.
College football teams West Virginia, Air Force, Florida in 2000s often employ this play style.
A common form of the option executed on the high school, collegiate, and occasionally professional levels is the veer.
A route is a path or pattern that a receiver in American football and Canadian football runs to get open for a forward pass.
A "go" or "fly route" is a deep route used typically when the receiver has a speed advantage over the defensive back. In the route, the receiver will run as fast as possible in straight line parallel to the sideline, in an attempt to outrun the defender who is covering them.
A post is a deep play where wide receivers run straight down the field a short distance (10-15 yards), and then angle in toward the center of the field (toward the goal 'posts') where the ball is caught at high speed. When this play was originally designed, the goal posts were on the "zero" yard line, in the front of the endzone - thus, a cornerback in man coverage would be led into the post.
In a skinny post, the route is shorter and quicker than a deep post, which may cover 30 or 40 yards. This may also be referred to as a "glance in" or a "bang eight."
A "flag" or "corner route" is a deep play where wide receivers run straight down the field a long distance (40–50 yards), and then angle out towards the end zone and sideline. It takes its name from the flags that marked the ends of the goal and end lines before the introduction of flexible pylons.
An out route will usually feature the receiver running 7 to 10 yards downfield and then making a 90 degree turn towards the sideline.-.
The In or Drag route is the opposite of the Out route. As its name suggests, the route will usually feature the receiver running 7 to 10 yards downfield and then making a 90 degree turn towards the center of the field.
A receiver takes two steps or more downfield then cuts diagonally across the field behind the linebackers and in front of the safeties.
An eligible receiver runs a predetermined number of steps or yards upfield before stopping and turning back in slightly to face the quarterback, in the hopes that the defender cannot react and disrupt the pass before positive yardage is made.
Particularly in the highest levels of competition (professional and major college), a play may call for the receiver to 'read' the defensive coverage against him, and run a second route if the first option would be ineffectual. As an example, the receiver may be instructed to begin with a slant route, but if the defender has that covered, switch to an out route. For this to work correctly, the passer must make the same read as the receiver.
A screen pass is a pass that is normally thrown to a receiver or running back behind the line of scrimmage. It is thrown behind the line of scrimmage so that the pulling linemen can get their blocks established. There is another screen called a bubble screen where there are 3 receivers bunched together to one side, and after the snap the ball is almost instantly thrown to the one farthest behind the line of scrimmage.
The quarterback takes the snap and drops back to fake a handoff to the running back. The quarterback then rapidly pulls the ball back from the faked handoff, trying to hide it from the defense. The running back continues to move upfield as if he has the ball in his hands. The offensive line starts to run block, but then quickly goes into pass protection.
The receivers appear to block at first, then go into their routes.
On a play-action pass, which is essentially the opposite of the draw play, the quarterback hopes to fake the defenders into thinking the offense is going to run the ball. The effects of this play is to slow down the pass rush of the defense and it forces the defensive backs to make a decision between covering a receiver or coming up to help stop the run.