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• The blood is processed in the right ventricle of the heart; • Heart septum does not allow the blood flow; • The heart has only two ventricles, not three, "as Avicenna says"; • V. arteriosa (pulmonary artery) lead the blood from the right ventricle to the lungs where the blood mixes with air; • The lung has a passages...
• Sharh Masa'il Hunain (Comments of Questions by Hunain Ibn Ishaq); • Sharh al-Hidaya fi-it-Tibb (Comment of Avicenna's Guide to Medicine); • Mufradat Sharh al-Qanun (Comment on simple medications from Canon); Usaybia mentioned several papers in medicine, much of which none of the other biographers, including Umaruia a...
On the other hand, to Ibn-Nafis the Galen theory was far from perfect and acceptable for his independent mind that always relied on "careful research and common sense." For him the Galen's theory about the invisible pores in chamber was a paradox. As longer he studied the works of Galen and Avicenna, he was more convin...
The difference between Ibn al-Nafis and Galen is not simply a difference of opinion of two doctors, but the difference between the two sets of anatomical-physiological data and their interpretation. Ibn al-Nafis is not afraid to stand up against the established beliefs of his time, nor Galen, nor afraid At the beginnin...
Its importance was the fact that Ibn al-Nafis, unlike the author of the Canon-Ibn Sina, by processing the extracts from the first and third book of Canon, for the first time in the history of Arab-Islamic medicine gave a presentation of anatomy, as a separate and independent entity. By his description of the anatomy in...
Ibn al-Nafis, also, in his description of the anatomy of the heart in Theshrih gives, at that time, the closest description of cardiac blood flow, which will be described in detail later by the Englishman William Harvey in 1628 (3, 9). As for the interest in al-Nafis Mu'giz at the East, it was from the beginning very g...
In section 1 Slote understands empathy as Ba direct way of knowing about other minds^. By doing so he says nothing about the affective element involved in empathy. This may mean that empathy is understood as cognitive rather than affective. Moreover, the kind of objects of knowledge grasped through empathy or the kind ...
When Slote says that empathy Bhelps us learn facts about the world^, he expands its meaning even more. Does it mean that these facts are not of special character, say, being directed at other persons' feelings? (Slote says that Bempathy helps to put us cognitively in touch with what others are feeling^but he does not d...
Example Slote gives refers to osmosis and/or introjection or contagion rather than to empathy. He speaks about a child who learns fearing snakes because he empathically pick up on parents' fear of snake. If empathy is indeed such an uncritical Bway of learning about the world^(children have no Bindependent reason to do...
In section 2 Slote speaks about Bbeing warmed by warmth or chilled by cold-hearted (or heartless)^as Ban empathic process^. This is another face of empathy: Bempathically registered warmth and chill as, respectively, states of moral approval and disapproval^. Empathy looks now as an autonomous and (always?) right aware...
In section 3 a third face of empathy amounts to Brecogniz[ing] the feelings of others^. Slote applies the concept of empathy so understood to Bwhat people say^, which, in turn, is manifest of Bwhat they are thinking, wanting, or feeling^. I can agree with Slote that Bempathy enters into the functioning of assertion and...
In his last section Slote comes back to empathizing with someone else's fear. Yet, whereas in section 1 it was child's empathizing with parent's fear of snake, now it concerns an adult's empathizing with child's fear of worms. He says: Bif one empathically picks up on a child's fear of worms but has independent reason ...
But now we are given what was absent is section 1, this is an epistemic criticism going together with empathy. Why this difference? Criticism regarding the object of feeling whom I empathize with is irrelevant because child's fear as such is a different object of empathizing than the object of this child's fear, while ...
In spite of its effort to be transculturally relevant, the psychology of religion is quite ethno-or rather Western-centric. This becomes very clear when one tries to "translate" Indian folk religiosity into concepts taken from mainline theories; i.e. social, cognitive or psychoanalytical psychology of religion. Not onl...
The psychological makeup of persons in societies so civilizationally different as India is embedded in fundamentally distinct principles of these cultures and the social patterns and child rearing that these principles shape (Marsella et al 1985). Therefore it is clear that a western scholar and an Indian devotee are q...
There are profound intrinsic interrelationships between the cultural conceptualizations of human nature, the psychological makeup of the individual and the nature of interpersonal relationships in a given culture (Hallowell 1955; Spiro 1965). The western impregnated concepts "self', identity", "belief' or "faith" as sc...
Outside the Pradeep Hotel, in central Banaras, I met ten riksha-drivers who allowed me to follow them to their daily puja, to observe and interview them about their religion. Out of them I chose to follow more closely those seven drivers who regularly visited the Ganges in the evenings. All of the drivers were living i...
The Kashikedara temple in the southern sector of the city of Banaras is called Kedara Khanda. It is is a river temple sitting on the top of an impressing ghat high above the water's edge on a long hill. From the river the temple is distinguished by its vertical red and white stripes, which indicate the South Indian han...
According to my informants, the main reason to visit the temple was "to take" Darsån. The same concept was used for the small glance they made at a site or a Nandi or a Lingam waiting for a customer or after the midday rest. A common theme for my informants was the importance of seeing the images of the deity regularly...
But seeing the Lord is not initiated by the worshipper. Rather, the deity presents itself to be seen in his image as a sacred perception. The prominence of the interaction of man and god through the eyes instead of through the ears, as in western traditions like Christian, Jewish, Muslim and Hindu deities, also reminds...
Both interviews and observations confirmed to a very high degree that the behavioural/ritual, the olfactory, dramatic, the tactile and the perceptive dimensions of the ritual are of immense importance. When one searches for valid models for a psychological understanding, these non-cognitive dimensions of religiosity mu...
In western verbal religious traditions these visual and behavioural elements always have to compete, so to speak, with the cognitive content of the dogma, a preaching of a priest or the systematic thoughts of the theologians. In the puja or in the arati, and above all in the informants' stories of why they undertook th...
In my interviews I found a radically polytheistic religiosity. At virtually all levels of life and thought, there seemed to be a cultural and religious multiplicity (Hertel et al 1993). It is not monotheism and it is not polytheism, at least if we label polytheism as the worship of many gods, each with partial authorit...
In addition to the central sanctum, dedicated to Lord Shiva, there were a dozen shrines to other deities. Asked about how many gods there are, all answer something like: of course there are many gods. There is Shiva there and Ganesha, Hanuman, Ganga, Durga, Kali and the others, but at the same time there is really only...
The drivers inner representation of Lord Shiva as a psychological reality is not glued together so much in terms of early experiences in relation to a particular mother or father figure (McDargh 1982; Kakar 1982 ) -a reductionistic simplification -but it must instead be underst000d more as a continuous social construct...
If we translate these observations to the object-relation theory, we must say that the concept "the" god representation -in the singular -that has been in the centre of the past decades' debate in psychology of religion (Jones 1991) must be broadly elaborated in order to do justice to the Indian folk religiosity, where...
This brings me to a general discussion of how the regular Darsän of Lord Shiva relates to the informants' three selves: the individual, the family and the spiritual self. This spiritual self is often ignored in psychological studies or reduced, but as I found it, it is the central system in my informants' identity form...
From a cross-cultural perspective, the distinctions between these three broad categories of self are of value in various ways. By familiar self I mean a basic inner psychological organization that enables women and men to function well within the hierachical intimacy relationship of the extended family, community of gr...
The individualized self, on the other hand, is the predominant inner psychological organization enabling a person to function in a highly mobile society were considerable autonomy is granted if not even imposed upon the individual. The individual must choose from a variety of options in a contractual, egalitarian relat...
In hierarchical social relationships governed by the quality of the person, there is a marked veneration of the superior, with strong efforts to subordinate oneself, to be as close as possible to a religious symbol or a sannyasin in order to incorporate, identify with and share the superior qualities of the other for t...
In bhakti devotional worship, various facets of symbiosis-reciprocity involved in hierarchical intimacy relationships become clearly accentuated. Intense emotional connectedness and reciprocal affective exchanges, a sense of we-ness, and permeable ego boundaries are all intensely involved in bhakti. The devotee seeks t...
manifestation in German cosmology of space in which the public 'courtyard' (Midgard) is rooted. This is likely one reason why, in A Secular Age, Taylor reduced the secular to a certain presupposition of neutral space. The Greek aion, which refers to being of this world in its spatial and temporal settings, can be thoug...
A reflection on the world and neutrality directly leads to Phenomenology, which, since its inception, has operated as a matter of course in studying what appears in the world, how the conscious 'grasping' of those appearances can be experienced, and what is to be done with their supposedly clear and 'obvious' manifesta...
3 Is it possible to describe the subject apart from the world it constitutes? Kant's Critique of Pure Reason established for the first time a phenomenology of the world via the a priori 'intuitions' (those 'ways of showing') of space and time, which when combined with the categories of understanding, provide for the co...
Around eight years before Husserl's Vienna Lecture, Heidegger (1962, Being and Time, henceforward BaT) recast phenomenology's sole task as the questioning of 'the world-hood of the world as such' (93) especially since any phenomenology that supposedly concerns itself with 'things' has already 'tacitly anticipated their...
It is in the context of these phenomenal descriptions of'mood' that Michel Henry takes up where Husserl and Heidegger left off, especially in regards to the affects of 'world', which effectively 'covers over' things in their obviousness. Henry follows Heidegger and Husserl in claiming that modern western thinking (and ...
5 In order to rectify these problems, Henry turns even more radically to 'life', which is perhaps the most inconspicuous of phenomena for its being overlooked precisely due to its obviousness. Life is experienced foremost though the pathos or affective dimension that provides the very key 'internal' to accessing the ap...
Thus, is there a horizon of manifestation to which it is possible to be attuned that does not first necessitate an experience of this neutral world, and if so, might it allow insight into a better understanding of the appearing of 'the world' itself? 8 The aims of this paper are threefold: to further delineate the fine...
Transcendental constitution is a central possibility for Dasein as ek-sisting, as it is never a 'worldly real fact ', (1927, 22) as present-at-hand. Heidegger ultimately comes to treat world in a way that it becomes to a degree intertwined with Dasein itself, as it is in the world that Dasein's cares are crafted and co...
This provides a wider view on Heidegger's most formative phenomenological analysis of world in part 1, section 3 of Sein und Zeit in which an implicit question is posed: is it dubious to attempt to grasp 'the world-hood of the world as such', which would by necessity'show itself in "entities" within the world'? (SuZ, 6...
Each and every entity, the whole world that we talk about straightforwardly and that is the constant field (pre-given as self-evidently real) of all our theoretical and practical activities -all of that suddenly becomes unintelligible. Every sense it has for us, whether unconditionally universal or applicable case by c...
Here, Heidegger questions the way of straightforwardly taking the world as this 'constant' and pre-given actuality, concluding that we in fact make faulty determinations about the world that do not include the careful consideration of ourselves, its constitutors. Yet at the same time, Heidegger (seemingly unlike Henry)...
There is a stunning and fecund quality the world maintains, namely, in 'things' which also must be understood beyond their seemingly 'natural', clear, and objectively ontic conceptions. The sachheit or'material content' of things is the glue that holds the description of an encounter with phenomena together (BaT, 31). ...
Yet this again raises the concern of the subjective problem of constitution, thus prohibiting an understanding of world as a phenomenon outside Dasein. An entirely subjective world precludes any possibly'secular' or public world in which we can relate or come to agreement or 'consensus' (Habermas) concerning what appea...
This finally leads back to the question of how the world itself can be a phenomenon. One particularly valuable aspect of the traditional conception of the world concerns its ontical meaning and the ways in which we relate with things present at hand in everyday life without inquiring into the 'worldly character' (Weltm...
Although Heidegger's 'phenomenology of the inconspicuous' does not get formulated until his last Seminar in Zähringen in 1973, he occasionally referenced 'inconspicousness' throughout his work. His seminars on Heraclitus, for example, allow for an analysis of inconspicousness, as it relates to 'world', as does his 1966...
Precisely the opposite of the world championed by our secular imaginaries today, a Heraclitean sense of world was the space that, contrary to an 'impure' or profane banality, inconspicuously held a shining and radiating potential. The senses and meanings of appearances in/of the world, although radiant, did not'shine' ...
Roughly 30 years prior to the Le Thor seminars, Heidegger (1984, 122) refers to Heraclitus' quip that'Asses choose hay rather than gold' for it is in the 'quiet gleam' of simplicity that the mysterious and uncanny appear from within the world. It is a matter of being-in-the-open or open-here that speaks conceived world...
9 Essence, in other words, as the basis of how the world is worlded, is made up of, and enacted by, this melding of revealing and concealing. He goes to lengths to show how phusis is not the 'invisible', but rather the 'inconspicuous' in its mode of appearance, as he puts it in his other seminars on Heraclitus in GA 55...
Despite his repeated criticism of the history of western metaphysics and his own efforts to put an end to it, Heidegger's phenomenology recognized […] only the phenomenological presuppositions that had guided, or rather misguided, this thought from the start. By inexorably and ingeniously unveiling the implications of ...
11 Some have understood (mistakenly, in my estimate) that Henry wishes to open-up phenomenology to new intimacies with the invisible, the 'not here' that is therefore reducible to speculation. However, Henry expresses precisely the opposite intentions: to turn phenomenology to its most originary and immanent of experie...
12 This is consistent with the Greek liaprein (to persist), and for Heidegger, this perseverance is not a 'permanence', but a presencing beyond the moment (jetz vuv nunc) that points to the basic form of human life -dwelling. To dwell is to be a life lived in particularity and in accord with the contingency of experien...
The first trait is that the appearing of the world is a matter of being 'outside of self', exterior, other, and different. This exteriority is predicated upon 'difference', which is a division of distance. It is the setting at a distance of things that allows things to appear to me 'in the horizon of the world'. (Henry...
Henry arrives at these conclusions in part because he thinks the outside world is capable of being bracketed because of the self-affection of life, which is interior to the exterior activities of the world. The everyday events in the world are only sometimes giving rise to feelings, for not all feelings are attached to...
There are of course some obvious concerns that Heidegger especially would have leveled at this approach for its seemingly all too subjectivist account of the relation with world. How can the world's reality be associable with the outside without some level of objectivity, and to what degree might the interiority of 'li...
14 Waldenfels (1998, 38) expresses (author's translation) a similar concern: 'does not the negative characterization of self-affection as non intentional, non representational, and non sighted or non ecstatic bear persistent reference to the world relation it purports to suspend?' The Weltbezug or world relation is ind...
15 Henry (2007, 256) begins to address these questions with some degree of sufficiency by turning to the body for further elucidation, namely, how there are two senses of how 'the body is the appearing of the world'. Bodies are revealed in the world, in exteriority, yet they also harbor interior elements and'sensual qu...
The world itself appears, and does so in inconspicuous ways. When one truly experiences 'objects in their how' (Gegenstände im Wie, as Husserl put it) they appear via the appearing of the world itself, and one operates with implicit (and therefore in-need-of-unfolding) conceptions of phenomenality that the objects in t...
To sum up, Henry's understanding of the world is the transcendentally'second order' of experience after one finds oneself 'affected' by the world, which is a result of the auto-revelation of life. To be affected by the world is to first experience oneself as 'living'. That is, the world is the content in which one is a...
One question then becomes: what are the unique ways according to which the world presents itself? For Henry, the disclosive dispositions and affects are the binding material between us and the world's presentation (not merely the phenomenal data it presents); this is the case irrespective of whether or not it is possib...
Although Henry and Heidegger offer differing accounts concerning how it is possible to 'overcome' the world, they both: hold that the world can appear as a phenomenon, recognize the need to get beyond the presumption that the world is the fundament upon which all things invisibly, ordinarily, and neutrally come to take...
In synthesizing the insights of both thinkers, it is not only the world itself that is to be bracketed, but also the world's forms of presentation, which tend to be overlooked by merit of their seemingly straightforward or ordinary givenness. The world is a phenomenon that phenomenalizes in a way seemingly distinct fro...
fully. Yet at the same time, if affects have the revelatory power to manifest worlds then there must be some means by which we can experience their disclosure. A Phenomenology of the inconspicuous can give further clarification into the particular forms according to which phenomena hide, which sheds further light on th...
One point Heidegger and Henry seem to not take interest in is the stunning fact that the world operates with an uncanny ability to hide itself and remain hidden amidst these moods and affects. The world appears and presents itself as neutral. It may be that this is one key to understanding the new secular condition, wh...
It is not by 'getting over' the world, or attempting to conjure 'invisible' phenomena whose metaphysics entrap our very thought of the world that give us access to it, but rather, it is by turning within the world to our very affective relations with it that allow a grasping of a 'world view' via a recognition of how t...
17 As Heidegger (2001, 34) recognized in his Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, even if one presumes a multi-laminated world view, it is never the world itself that is called into question, but its mirage: the systemic and'synoptic order' of characterizing the various 'values' in/of life. It thus is not eno...
1. Calhoun (2010, 36) for example, recently conceived of the secular as perhaps more accurately describable as counter-eternal ('the root notion of the secular is not in contrast to religion, but to eternity'), yet this definition can only be applicable in the case of a rather limited definition of'secular'. 2. A recen...
4. This interpretation of Heidegger offering a means to think beyond the secular hypothesis may be controversial in the context of contemporary interpretations of his work in French phenomenology. As Schrijvers (2005, 314) claims, Lacoste holds that Heidegger's understanding of 'world' is a'secular one': 'Lacoste asks ...
Modem genetics has thus far worked principally with the theory of the gene. It now needs the aid of additional tools to work out the genetic understanding of the great majority of complex hereditary qualities of plants, animals and man. Practically all of the structural and functional qualities of the many species with...
When we find a quality which is thus definitely measured, and which tends strongly to "run in the family," and which, after continuous effort cannot, without warping the observed facts, be made to fit into previously found rules of heredity, no matter how general such rules may seem, we must not throw away the observed...
This was the case with racing capacity of the Thoroughbred horse. The yard-stick had first to be invented for measuring quality of performance before a reliable formula for the inheritance of racing capacity could reasonably be sought. This was done by correctly intercompensating sex, age, weight-carried, distance-run ...
The next task is to settle on a prediction-basis-that is, to decide what shall constitute M. We may let the value of the measured subject-quality in the sire alone constitute the prediction-basis; or we may let it be such measure in the dam alone; or we may take the value of the sire, plus the value of the dam, and div...
At this point it should be mentioned that both the particular group of antecedent near-kin selected for the prediction-basis-index, and the relative stresses given to individual antecedent kin, are always subject to revision in the direction of a better prediction-basis or M. If, for example one feels that the sire sho...
The question arises "How can we have two different prediction-bases, that is, two different M's, for the same parents, each giving a different probability-distribution of offspring values, and both of them be true?" This question belongs to the philosophy of probability rather than to the use of probability in such res...
Next it is necessary to decide upon R, the offspring-class-range or "the thing predicted." With a great many data to be used in finding the specific formula for the inheritance of the selected trait, a relatively narrow offspring-class-range can be selected. This is, of course, desirable. In Galton's stature studies he...
We now come to K. In all cases the Formula of Heredity makes prediction in terms of K, that is, of the probability that the particular preindicated offspring will fall into any offspring-class-range selected from the whole series of such ranges. The mathematical summation of all such probabilities for a given predictio...
The principal aim of the Formula of Heredity is to provide an accurate mathematical picture of how Nature transmits, from one generation to another, qualities which are designated as inborn, constitutional or hereditary. Such a formula should use the minimum of "straight-jacketing" of the actual observed data. This mea...
Each formula permits, but does not require, symmetry in the particular functional curve for + M and for -M values. In the Second Structural Unit, Kf, = (jM + kM2)( C -M) + (IM + mM2)(C + M) + n, there are five basic constant, j, k, 1, m and n. Of these, j, k and n are in the + M region, and 1, m and n are in the -M reg...
The w-group constant thus readjusts the y-coordinate to any position from its first readjustment which gave only the desired x-co6rdinate. Since the section of each FC curve used must originate at M = 0, and FC = 0 the final w-group constant in the FC formula is always zero. In the Kf, and a, formulas, the final w-grou...
III. In operation the Formula of Heredity must behave like a machine well designed for its purpose. When we put into it accurate data on antecedent near-kin measurements for a selected trait, the formula must turn out a reliable statement about the possession of a selected trait by the pre-indicated offspring. USE: I. ...
In the geometric analysis of the Formula of Heredity it is noted that there are only three "structural units." Let us make an analogy to ship building. Although the thing we are building is not a ship, it is a manerkon, "a sort of ship turned wrong side out," still its structural units are closely analogous. The first ...
While both manerkonic and Mendelian analyses can be -used successfully as tools on the same problem, still each type, of analysis is essentially suited to the study of some special type of trait which definitely "runs in the family." Mendelian genetics is particularly suited to the analysis of qualities which can be at...
In scientific study accuracy of prediction is one of the best proofs of soundness of interpretation. In most Mendelian studies the best prediction does not state with certainty what a particular pre-indicated offspring will be like, but, from a mating of a given genetic type, it computes the probability that the offspr...
A still different type of use has been made of the General Formula of Heredity. One of its constituent formulas, namely, FC = f(M). has supplied the set-up for determining the direction and measuring the rate of evolution. This analysis brings out clearly that in evolution the thing to measure is not the difference bet...
The interpretation is also confirmed by Aristotle's claim that the relation of soul to body is parallel to that of sight to the eye.7 I shall follow Aristotle below, by thinking of the soul as a set of capacities. The conception does, incidentally, have one great advantage, namely that we undeniably have a soul of the ...
Aristotle's conception of the soul is much broader than this. He takes the view which Descartes castigates, that the nutritive processes are a function of the soul. Plato and others had attributed a soul to plants.10 Plato had 7 DA 412b17-4I3a3. Willie Charlton and Professor Wiggins have pointed out that Aristotle some...
10 Plato Timaeus 77A-B. Empedocles believed he had in a previous incarnation been a bush (fragment II7 in Diels, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker). It may have been because of his belief that souls could be reincarnated in plants that Empedocles forbade the eating of beans (fr. I41). But members of the Orphic sect allow...
An excellent account of Aristotle's biological extension of the concept of soul is given by Solmsen in the American Journal of Philology, loc. cit., note 69 below. 13 A major function of the soul, among early Greek philosophers, was to cause motion (DA 403b26; 405bII; 4o9bI9). Did the soul always cause motion by means ...
For Plato, one function of the soul was to cause motion, but it caused motion by means of some mental activity (Laws 896E-897A). I do not believe that Timaeus 36E says otherwise. and water to a soul within them,14 presumably because the four elements are lifeless things. But although the four elements do not have souls...
According to later writings, desire in animals differs from the nature of a stone, in that it involves a physiological process in virtue of which desire is a cause of motion (DA I. i; Mot. 6-Io). It also differs in being intimately linked with other soul capacities, with nutrition, which maintains the organs in the rig...
some of them conflicting (NE VII.3, Bekker's numbering), some changeable by training (NE II.I), some being only apparent goods, not real goods (NE III.4). attribute to Aristotle a Cartesian strand. Solmsen and Barnes attach importance to the fact that Aristotle makes perception an act of the soul. But given Aristotle's...
Turning to the case on the other side, we should notice that Aristotle has no word corresponding to'mental act', or to Descartes' cogitatio (consciousness). Charles Kahn has suggested that the nearest word is aisthanesthai (perceiving), for this covers a very wide range of mental acts.16 Nonetheless, as Kahn carefully ...
In a very un-Cartesian way, Aristotle insists that, in some sense of 'is', every mental act is a physiological process. Thus anger is a boiling of the blood or warm stuff around the heart, in a sense of 'is' analogous to that in 16 In Aristotle, pleasure and pain (PA 666aI2), awareness of memory-images (DM 45obI4; i6; ...
There is another way in which Aristotle is fundamentally unlike Descartes. He does not divide up the world at the same points. We have already noticed that he does not treat mental acts as a single group, but makes a sharp distinction between perception and thought. Nor does he follow Descartes in trying to separate of...
Of the three Aristotelian ideas that Brentano cites, the first two are used also by Barnes (note 4 above), but neither idea seems to prove the point. I have already commented on the second (p. 68 above). The first concerns receiving form without matter. It is nearly 34 always the sense-organ, or the perceiver, not the ...
The third Aristotelian idea that Brentano cites suits his case best. For Aristotle does say that the actualized object of sense inheres in the sense (if we read tei, the sense, not toi, the organ, at 426a4), and he adds that the actualized object of sense lasts only as long as the act of sensing (426ai 5-26). This fits...
35 Having declined to regard the reception of form without matter as a physiological process, Barnes finds it difficult to attach any very precise meaning to the idea. In fact, the idea is connected with the organ's becoming like the object perceived (DA 429aI5-I6), and with the taking on of colours or temperatures (se...
37 Subsequent authors have offered new criteria of intentional inexistence, in order to defend Brentano's idea that mental phenomena are distinguished by having intentionally inexistent objects. 'Most of us knew in I944 that Eisenhower was the one in command...; but although he was (identical with) the man who was to s...
But even if this particular passage does not support Slakey's materialist interpretation, we ought to take his suggestion seriously. For we could well expect Aristotle to be a materialist, seeing that so many of his predecessors were preoccupied with the physiology of mental acts. Many of their statements, at least if ...
But these statements should not be taken in isolation. They must be read against the background of Aristotle's full theoretical statements in the De Anima. The two main theoretical statements are very prominently placed. One comes in the opening chapter of the first book (403a3-bg9), the other in the closing chapter of...

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