Datasets:
Manusagents
/
hacking

Dataset card Data Studio Files
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 Community
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1.99k
|-----------------|--------------|----------------|-----------------|
| A wave0 | CCH | 178 | 5890 |
| A wave0 | SCH | 172 | 5860 |
| B wave1 | SCH | 184 | 5920 |
| B wave1 | SCH | 180 | 5900 |
j2735_version == 2016
The read-only UART is via the hardware side (not 100% confident) so by
soldering the connections it's likely possible to get full UART access.
Additionally, once the EOS loads, the keyboard connected via the USB port
that works up to that point stops functioning so I wasn't ever able to try
any password once shown the login prompt when booting into the RESCUE
image. Same goes for booting into single user mode by adding "single"
to the APPEND kernel parameter line. In fact, when booting into single
user mode, it states ask us for the password and we'll give it to you,
but it still isn't clear if there even is a password.
All kinds of interesting certificates, keys, etc were found. Such as
net-snmp-cert used by the RSU server. os_image_sign.pubkey,
ca-certificates.crt, ssh host keys were also stored in the EEPROM. Also,
if the RSU was configured to have the 'admin' user, that users hashed
password was stored in EEPROM as well. You can also enable/disable that
user via EEPROM changes as well. There was also a 'manage-certs' directory
that contained a ton of links to other organizations cert files, and then
the URLs to enroll the RSU into their ITS traffic management systems (or
perhaps just enable cross communication?).
Think I can leave it at that, there's so much that is interesting,
I can list things forever...
--[ 8 - References
[1] https://apkpure.com/kapsch-ewalk/net.kapsch.ewalk/versions
[2] https://5gaa.org/c-v2x-explained/
[3] https://github.com/usdot-fhwa-OPS/V2X-Hub
[4] https://www.wjbf.com/business/press-releases/accesswire/
983795/kapsch-trafficcom-supports-colorado-connected-vehicle-safety-project/
[5] https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent/
7b221a05b49b2d630a46508667e0d52de5f2efe7/
Reference_Factsheet_Colorado_DOT_I-70_Corridor_EN.pdf
[6] https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent
/59824d4e81dce9d1a902359261304f6cf8231654/KTC-CVS-Reference_Ohio_33-SMC.pdf
[7] https://www.kapsch.net/en/press/releases/ktc-20240702-pr-en
[8] https://www.traffictechnologytoday.com/news/
connected-vehicles-infrastructure
/kapsch-supplying-equipment-for-australias-
largest-c-its-connected-vehicle-pilot-project.html
[9] https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_en/302600_302699/302663/
01.02.00_20/en_302663v010200a.pdf
[10] https://di9mr54a05a64.cloudfront.net/api-mciaustralia.expoplatform.com/
media/MTYxODI3MDY3NzYwNzRkOWQ1ZThlYTI%3D.pdf
[11] https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent/
3d251a8445e0bf50093903ad70b3dbed34dec7e7/
KTC-CVS_RIS-9260_DataSheet.pdf
[12] https://www.kapsch.net/_Resources/Persistent
/b60658fe131d82fe20c5389cdc2f6425064f4a88/
KTC-CVS_RIS-9360_DataSheet.pdf
[13] https://fcc.report/FCC-ID/XZU9160/
[14] https://www.mouser.com/datasheet/2/965/come_mbt10_datasheet-3235566.pdf
[15] https://content.u-blox.com/sites/default/files/
EVK-THEO-P1_UserGuide_%28UBX-15013939%29.pdf
[16] https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20presentations/
DEF%20CON%2025%20-%20Woodbury-and-Haltmeyer-
Linux-Stack-Based-V2X-Framework-Hack-Connected-Vehicles.pdf
[17] https://chipsec.github.io/index.html
[18] https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=Kapsch+TrafficCom+AG&hl=en_US
--[ 9 - Raw Output
For an extensive collection of logs and tool output from the devices
mentioned in this paper, please check out this repo:
https://github.com/GainSec/Phrack-72-Raw-Output-V2X
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=--------------------------=[ A CPU Backdoor ]=-------------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
|=------------------=[ uty <whensungoes@gmail.com> ]=--------------------=|
|=-----------------------------------------------------------------------=|
--[ Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. Known CPU "Backdoors"
2.1 VIA C3 ALTINST Instructions
2.2 AMD Secret Password 0x9C5A203A
2.3 Candidate Backdoor Instructions
3. Designing a CPU Backdoor
3.1 Windows Password Authentication Bypass via Backdoored Instruction
3.2 x86 QEMU TCG-based Prototype
3.3 SPARC64 Backdoor Prototype on OpenSPARC T1 FPGA
3.3.1 *nix Password Authentication Analysis
3.3.2 Backdoor Implementation in RTL
3.4 Intel Goldmont x86 Microcode-Based Backdoor Implementation
3.4.1 Microcode Basics
3.4.2 CMPS Microcode Analysis