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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 4 Security Assumptions
| The AIMLE security should use authorization aspects specified in TS 33.434 [2] as baseline.
The AIMLE server is deployed as a SEAL server, hence SEAL architecture is enhanced to incorporate the AIMLE service as shown below, where Figure 4-1 illustrates the service-based representation including AIMLE server as part of... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5 Key Issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
|
3GPP TS 23.482 [3] introduces support for AIMLE services, enabling AI/ML operations through interactions between the AIMLE client and AIMLE server(s) over the AIML-UU reference point, and between the VAL servers and AIMLE servers over AIML-S respectively. These services involve distributed AI/ML operations across mul... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| Unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) participating in AIMLE services may gain access to data exchanged between AIMLE clients and servers.
Lack of robust authorization allows unreliable or unauthorized AIMLE members (e.g., FL members) to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support authorization mechanisms for AIML members (e.g., FL members) utilising AIMLE services for various AIMLE procedures.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.2 Key Issue #2: Secure AIMLE ML Model Access
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.2.1 Key Issue details
| TS 23.482 [3] describes AIMLE services which supports ML Model retrieval, ML model training, ML model management (model information storage and discovery) ML model update, and ML model selection aspects. AIMLE Services uses SEAL as the fundamental architecture and the authorization aspects of SEAL Security in TS 33.434... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| Unauthorized AIMLE client(s)/ VAL server using AIMLE services may gain access to ML model data leading to leakage of model.
Lack of robust authorization allows unauthorized AIMLE client(s) or VAL servers to degrade the quality, efficiency, or availability of AIMLE operations.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The 3GPP system shall support authorization to secure AIMLE service-based ML Model operations such as retrieval, training, update, selection, and management (i.e., ML model information storage and discovery).
5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>
5.X.1 Key Issue details
5.X.2 Security threats
5.X.3 Potential securit... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.1 Solution #1: Authorization for AIMLE Services
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| AIMLE authorization related to AIML Services can reuse the authorization procedure specified in TS 33.434 [2] clause 5.2.2 (SEAL service authorization) and clause B.3.3 (SEAL service authorization) as the baseline where, SIM-S or AIMLE Server (with SIM capabilities) acts as an authorization server and issues access tok... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| The solution uses the SEAL service authorization procedure as baseline with the following impacts:
To secure the SEAL based AIMLE Services, this solution provides enhancements to the access token claims (such as scope and audience) to indicate AIMLE procedure and information flow specific information to allow related... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.2 Solution #2: Authorization of AIMLE clients acting as FL members for access to AIMLE Service Security
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes the authorization of AIMLE clients in support of federated learning (FL). It ensures that only authorized clients (FL members) are selected, and that secure token-based verification is performed using authorization server. Tokens include only the minimum required claims such as ML model ID / Appl... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.2.2 Solution details
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.2.2.1 The procedure for AIMLE clients’ authorization
|
Figure 6.2.2.1-1 Authorization’s procedure of AIMLE clients acting as FL members
1. The VAL server sends a FL member grouping support request to the AIMLE server. The request includes the requestor ID, security credentials, and FL grouping criteria (e.g., grouping method, member selection criteria). The initial requ... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution ensures that only authorized AIMLE clients participate as members in FL process. It introduces a token-based authorization process handled by the AIMLE server with support from SEAL.
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation is FFS.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.3 Solution #3: Re-using existing mechanisms
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses key issue #1 (Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members) and key issue #2 (Secure AIMLE ML Model Access) by re-using existing mechanisms available in SEAL security architecture.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| There is no new interface specified for AIMLE services.
Editor’s Note: Further analysis and clarification on interfaces are FFS.
Thus, security for all the interfaces used in the AIMLE has already been addressed including the authorization aspects. Finer granular authorization such as who can be involved in the FL o... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.4 Solution #4: Authorization for Secure AIMLE based ML Model Access
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#2.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| AIMLE authorization related to AIML Services can reuse the authorization procedure specified in TS 33.434 [2] clause 5.2.2 (SEAL service authorization) and clause B.3.3 (SEAL service authorization) as the baseline where, SIM-S or AIMLE Server (with SIM capabilities) acts as an authorization server and issues access tok... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| The solution uses the SEAL service authorization procedure as baseline with the following impacts:
To secure the SEAL based AIMLE Services, this solution provides enhancements to the access token claims (such as scope and audience) to indicate AIMLE procedure and information flow specific information to allow related ... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.5 Solution #5: FL member authorization for AIMLE services
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| As specified in TS 23.482[3], the FL members consuming the AIMLE services are AIMLE or VAL server or VAL clients. There are several procedures defined such as ML model retrieval, ML model training, FL member registration, event subscription, AIMLE client registration/discovery/selection/participation so on.
As most of... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| For any interaction between AIMLE clients and the AIMLE server, the AIMLE client is provided with the access token by the SIM-S as specified in 5.2 of clause 33.434[2].
For any interaction between VAL server and AIMLE server (e.g., model training), the VAL server is provisioned with an access token by out of band mean... |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| TBD
6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 Solution details
6.Y.3 Evaluation
Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
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d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 7 Conclusions
| |
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 7.1 Key Issue #1: Authorization for AIMLE Service Security for AIML members
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #1.
|
d3002a76697e4bc670268c4c89d2da07 | 33.786 | 7.2 Key Issue #2: Secure AIMLE ML Model Access
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #2.
Annex A: Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-08
SA3#123
S3-252919
AIMLE Service Security TR Skeleton
0.0.0
2025-09
SA3#123
S3-253004
Included Contrib... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 1 Scope
| This document studies potential security and privacy architecture and procedures for 6G mobile networks for improvement of existing services and support of new services, to meet the 6G system requirements and architecture.
One goal of this document is to study how to create lean and streamlined standards for 6G, e.g.... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 4 Security areas and high level security requirements
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 4.1 Security areas
| Editor's Note: This clause further clarifies the scope of the study by listing the security areas that SA3 is working on.
This document includes the following security areas:
1. Security Architecture deals with aspects such as identifying the different security domains and their characteristics, defining the di... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 4.2 Potential high level security requirements
| Editor's Note: This clause will document high-level requirements that guide the study.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5 Key issues
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.1 Security area #1: Security architecture
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.1.1 Introduction
| This security area addresses the security principles, features, and requirements inherent to the security and trust architecture of 6G systems. This will lay the foundation for all the procedures and the mechanisms necessary to protect the communication and facilitate trust establishment between the UE and the network ... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.1.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.1.3.y Key issue #1.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.2 Security area #2: RAN security
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.2.1 Introduction
| Purpose is to study potential attack vectors, vulnerabilities, security and privacy risks, impact and mitigations. This includes the following aspects:
Editor’s Note: To be aligned with TR 38.914 [1] and TR 38.760-2 [2] as 6G RAN study progresses in RAN WGs.
- Radio protocol stack, architecture and procedures
Edito... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.2.2 Security assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.2.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.2.3.y Key issue #2.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.3 Security area #3: UE to Core Network Security
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.3.1 Introduction
| This security area studies how to establish and manage secure communication(s) between the UE and the Core Network. This includes the following aspects:
Editor's Note: work is to be aligned and in coordination with TR 23.801-01 [4] based on SA2 progress.
Editor's Note: Any potential NAS impact due to the use of AEAD... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.3.2 Security assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.3.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.3.3.y Key issue #1.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.4 Security area #4: Security for Core Network, Interconnect and Roaming
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.4.1 Introduction
| Study potential aspects to secure core network communication for the different communication modes within a network and between networks to mitigate threats identified. This is based on the system architecture requirements developed in TR 23.801-1 [6].
Editor's note: This study will be based on agreements documented ... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.4.2 Security assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.4.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.4.3.y Key issue #1.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.5 Security area #5: Subscription Authentication and Authorization
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.5.1 Introduction
| This security area includes the following security aspects related to authentication and authorization between the UE and the 6GS regardless of access type (i.e., 3GPP access and/or non-3GPP access):
Editor’s Note: Whether trusted or untrusted non-3GPP access, or both are in scope is FFS.
-Authentication, key agreem... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.5.2 Security assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.5.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.5.3.y Key issue #3.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.6 Security area #6: security and privacy aspects of network exposure
| |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.6.1 Introduction
| This security area covers the following aspects.
- The security and privacy aspects of the exposure mechanism(s) defined in TR 23.801-01 [4].
Editor’s Note: Other aspects are FFS.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.6.2 Security assumptions
| Editor's Note: This clause will document security assumptions related to each security area.
|
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 5.6.3 Key issues
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the key issues that need to be addressed by SA3 on each security area. The exact contents are FFS.
5.6.3.y Key issue #1.y: <key issue name>
Editor's Note: Key issues within the security area are not in any particular order but they are added incrementally (y = 1, 2, 3…) when n... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 6 Solutions
| 6.x Solutions to Security Area #x <security area name>
6.x.y Solutions to Key Issue #x.y <key issue name>
6.x.y.z Solution #x.y.z: <solution name>
Editor's Note: Solutions are added incrementally (z = 1, 2, 3…) when new solution is identified. 'x' refers to the security area, y to the key issue. If a solution addre... |
f0d8ac8ba87e5fa314bc150073c98efb | 33.801-01 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor’s note: This clause will contain the overall conclusions made by SA3. The structure of this clause is FFS
Annex A
Attacker Model
A.1 General
Editor's Note: This clause includes an introduction to the attacker model.
A.2 Architecture overview
Editor's Note: This will need to be updated as work progress... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 1 Scope
| The present document provides the description and investigation of new AI/ML based use cases, i.e., multi-hop UE trajectory, AI/ML based intra-CU LTM, and other handover enhancements.
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<Void>
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<Void>
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<Void>
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4 Use cases and Solutions
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6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1 Multi-hop UE trajectory
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6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.1 Use case description
| Editor’s Note: Capture the description of use case
In Rel-18, the cell-based UE trajectory prediction is limited to the first-hop target NG-RAN node.
Multi-hop predicted UE trajectory across gNBs consists of a list of cells belonging to gNBs where the UE is expected to connect and these cells are listed in chronologi... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2 Solutions and standard impacts
| Editor’s Note: Capture the solutions for the use case, including potential standard impacts on existing Nodes, functions, and interfaces
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2.1 Locations for AI/ML Model Training and AI/ML Model Inference
| The following solutions are considered for supporting multi-hop UE trajectory:
- AI/ML Model Training is located in the OAM and AI/ML Model Inference is located in the gNB.
- AI/ML Model Training and AI/ML Model Inference are both located in the gNB.
In case of CU-DU split architecture, the following solutions are p... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2.2 Input data of multi-hop UE trajectory
| To predict the multi-hop UE trajectory, a gNB may need the following information as input data:
From the UE:
- UE measurement report related to serving cell and neighbouring cells, e.g., RSRP, RSRQ, SINR
- UE Mobility History Information
From the neighbouring RAN nodes:
- UE Mobility History Information
From the ... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2.3 Output data of multi-hop UE trajectory
| The following information can be generated as output:
- Multi-hop predicted UE trajectory, including a list of cells that UE is expected to connect to in chronological order and the associated expected time UE stays in the cell
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2.4 Feedback of multi-hop UE trajectory
| To optimize the performance of multi-hop UE trajectory prediction, the following feedback can be considered to be collected from gNBs:
- Measured UE Trajectory collected at each individual gNB
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.1.2.5 Standard impact
| Multi-hop UE trajectory prediction is transferred to the target NG-RAN nodes over the Xn interface via the Handover Preparation procedure. For the subsequent handovers, multi-hop predicted UE trajectory includes a list of cells where the UE is expected to connect to in chronological order.
For the subsequent handovers... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2 AI/ML assisted Intra-CU LTM
| |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.1 Use case description
| Editor’s Note: Capture the description of use case
L1/L2 Triggered Mobility (LTM) is specified in TS 38.300 [2].
Intra-CU LTM is specified in TS38.401[3].
AI/ML can be used to optimise Intra-CU LTM procedures, e.g., to enhance Network and UE performance, optimize resource allocation and reduce mobility failures.
A... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.2 Solutions and standard impacts
| Editor’s Note: Capture the solutions for the use case, including potential standard impacts on existing Nodes, functions, and interfaces
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.2.1 Locations for AI/ML Model Training and AI/ML Model Inference
| For CU-DU split architecture, the following solutions are possible:
- AI/ML Model Training is located in the OAM and AI/ML Model Inference is located in the gNB-CU.
- AI/ML Model Training and Model Inference are both located in the gNB-CU.
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.2.2 Input data of AI/ML based Intra-CU LTM
| Editor’s Note: To be updated
For AI/ML optimization of intra-CU LTM the following information can be considered as input data:
- L3 measurement results
- UE mobility history
- Measured/Predicted radio resource status per cell/SSB area
- Measured/Predicted cell-based UE trajectory
- Historical UE’s candidate LTM ... |
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.2.3 Output data of AI/ML based Intra-CU LTM
| For AI/ML optimization of Intra-CU LTM the following information can be considered as output data:
- Candidate cell and beam for LTM HO Preparation- Target cell and beam selection for cell switch command
- Cell(s) and beam(s) for early synchronization
- Predicted TA value(s) for early UL synchronization
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.2.2.4 Feedback of AI/ML based Intra-CU LTM
| The following data is required as feedback data for intra-CU LTM:
- LTM target cell
- Measured TA value
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.3 Other handover enhancements
| Editor’s Note: Identify other handover enhancements via AI/ML, e.g., inter-CU LTM
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 4.3.1 AI/ML assisted inter-CU LTM
| Inter-CU LTM is specified in TS 38.300 [2].
AI/ML may be used to optimise inter-CU LTM procedures, e.g., for candidate cell selection.
Editor’s Note: If applicable, use agreements for Intra-CU LTM as baseline for inter-CU LTM．
|
6dfc46bcb9bf4ef0655f25761d065721 | 38.745 | 5 Conclusion
|
Annex A:
Change history
Change history
Date
Meeting
TDoc
CR
Rev
Cat
Subject/Comment
New version
2025-10
RAN3#129-bis
R3-256546
Skeleton for TR38.745 v0.0.0
0.0.0
2025-10
RAN3#129-bis
R3-257331
TR 38.745 for Study on AI/ML for NG-RAN Phase 3
0.0.1
2025-10
RAN3#129-bis
R3-257331
... |
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