hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 5 12 | section stringlengths 5 1.47k | content stringlengths 0 6.67M |
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.2 Solution details
| The Sensing service consumer acts as external Application Function (AF) to interact with the network.
If the Sensing service consumer acting as external AF then it only interacts with network via NEF. In this case the security mechanisms in clauses 12 of [5] are reused to provide mutual authentication, authorisation, ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.4.3 Evaluation
| TBD.
6.1.5 Solution #1.5: authorize sensing service request using OAuth-based authorization mechanism
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.1 Introduction
| The solution addresses KI#1 to authorize sensing service request from the sensing service consumer
Key issues related to System Architecture to Support Sensing, Authorization and Revocation to Support Sensing Service, and Sensing Result Exposure are studied in TR 23.700-14 [2]. Based on solutions for those KIs, a sens... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.2 Solution details
| 6.1.5.2.1 Sensing service consumer is an AF inside the trusted domain
Precondition:
• OAM provisions sensing authorization policies in NRF enabling which sensing consumers are allowed to access / trigger what type of sensing operation on which kind of object in which area at which time with what level of accur... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.5.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
6.1.6 Solution #1.6: Sensing Service Authorization at the Sensing Function
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the potential authorization requirement of Key Issue #1: Security of authorization for sensing service invocation and revocation:
“The 5G system shall be able to authorize sensing service request from a sensing service consumer..”
It is proposed that the Sensing Function performs the authoriza... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.1.6.2-1: Sensing Service Authorization at the Sensing Function
1. It is assumed the Sensing Service Consumer (AF) and the NEF have a security association as described in 3GPP TS 33.501 [5], clause 12 “Security aspects of Network Exposure Function (NEF)”. The Sensing Service Consumer sends a Sensing Service ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
This solution fullfills the potential security requirements of key issue #1:
Sensing Service Consumer (AF) authentication and auhtorization at the NEF as well as integrity protection,... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the Key Issue #1 (security of sensing service authorization and sensing result exposure). Authentication, communication security, and authorization aspects for NEF and AF interaction have already been specified in Clause 12 of TS 33.501 [5]. The interface between the sensing service consumer act... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.2 Solution details
| Two network entities may be involved to perform authorization of the sensing service requested by a sensing service consumer (AF) from the network. After receiving a sensing service request, NEF determines whether the sensing service consumer is authorized to invoke sensing APIs to the network. The security mechanism, ... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.1.7.3 Evaluation
| The solution addresses the security of sensing service authorization and security of sensing results exposure. It fulfils all the security requirements mentioned in Key Issue #1.
Editor’s Note: Whether the solution fulfills all SA2 use cases is FFS.
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2 Solutions to KI#2
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.1 Solution #2.1: Security for sensing service operation
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the following requirement of Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations: “The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.”
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.2 Solution details
| The solution proposes a security mechanism to secure the connection between the sensing entity and SF.
For the interface between the sensing entities and SF, the communication between the sensing entity and the SF is secured by the NDS/IP security procedures specified in TS 33.210 [7].
Editor’s Note: Whether using di... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.1.3 Evaluation
| This solution addresses the following requirement of Key Issue #2: Security protection for sensing service operations: “The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing entity and SF.”
This solution is based on the assumpti... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.1 Introduction
| This solution aims to address Key Issue #2.
This solution to secure the connection between Sensing Entity and Sensing Function (SF). SF is responsible for to handle both sensing service control and sensing data processing.
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.2 Solution details
| The SF supports a direct interface (e.g. Nx interface) to send the sensing service control signalling to sensing entity, and the sensing entity uses the same interface to reply the sensing data to the SF.
In this architecture, the integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connectio... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.2.3 Evaluation
| This solution assumes the SF and sensing entity are connected via direct connection.
This solution reuses existing mechanisms to address the following security requirement: The 5G system shall be able to support integrity protection, confidentiality protection and replay protection for the connection between sensing e... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.1 Introduction
| This solution is for security protection for sensing service operations between sensing entity and Sensing Function (SF) Security.
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03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.2 Solution details
| Security between SF (Sensing Function) and sensing entity is same as security procedures for non-service based interface security defined in clause 9 of 33.501 [5] using DTLS/IPsec.
Security profiles for DTLS implementation and usage shall follow the TLS profile given in clause 6.2 of TS 33.210 [6] and the certificat... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 6.2.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled.
6.X Solutions to KI#X
6.X.Y Solution #X.Y: <Solution Title>
6.X.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.X.Y.2 Solution deta... |
03f08e095da0e7d00cf764af0a02ab5a | 33.777 | 7 Conclusions
| Editor's Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions that will form the basis for any normative work.
7.X Conclusions for KI#1
If the sensing service consumer is the third-party AF, already existing security mechanisms in clause 12 of TS 33.501 [5] are reused to provide mutual authentication, authorisation, int... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 1 Scope
| The present document identifies potential challenges and requirements for supporting AEAD algorithms specified in TS 35.240 [2], TS 35.243 [3], and TS 35.246 [4] for NAS and AS security (including control and user plane security) in the 6G System, including the following:
- Impact to AS and NAS security
- Key hierar... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
Example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
AKA Authenti... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 4 Overview and assumption
| Editor’s Note: This clause gives a brief explanation for background information of this SID, e.g. security assumption, existing algorithm specifications and a brief description of AEAD.
The solution of present document does not cover architecture dependent procedure aspects, such as Xn handover, but will cover archite... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5 Key issues
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains all key issues identified during the study. Due to the nature of this study, not all issues are derived from security threats but all are essential for the adoption of AEAD algorithms in 6G System.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.1 Key issue #1: Algorithm selection
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| The current 5G System uses dedicated algorithms for encryption (NEA0, 128-NEA1, 128-NEA2, 128-NEA3) and integrity protection (NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2, 128-NIA3) which are selected independently. This means a given session may use the same or different algorithms for encryption and integrity protection (including NULL)... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.1.2 Security threat
| There is a threat where unintended algorithm being selected if there is no clear definition of the algorithm selection.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.1.3 Potential requirements
| Algorithm selection may need an enhancement to support AEAD algorithms.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.2 Key issue #2: AEAD algorithm interface
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.2.1 Key issue details
| One of the advantages of using a combined AEAD mode is that some important security decisions have already been made in the construction of the mode, such as in which order encryption and integrity protection is applied. From SA3 perspective, this means that we don’t need to discuss in which order operations are to be ... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.2.2 Security threats
| There is a threat to system evolution. For example, if the interface is not designed well from day one, it will not be stable for future enhancements and there can be problems to add new functionality. This will not only increase complexity of the system but will also make it more difficult to analyze from a security p... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.2.3 Potential security requirements
| The input and output parameters (e.g. format, sizes and allowed values) of the AEAD algorithms shall be specified in a way that is independent of the realisation of the AEAD algorithm.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.3 Key issue #3: AEAD Keys
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.3.1 Key issue details
| The AEAD algorithms differ from the current set of algorithms as they use a single key for both encryption and integrity protection. However, the existing key hierarchy does not include single keys to be used by AEAD algorithms.
As described in clause 6.2 of TS 33.501 [5], the existing 5G key hierarchy is derived from... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.3.2 Security threats
| Inappropriate AEAD key derivation can lead to breach of confidentiality or integrity.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 5.3.3 Potential security requirements
| 6GS shall support key derivation for the AEAD algorithms.
NOTE: Full key hierarchy is studied in the scope of TR 33.801-01 [7].
5.X Key issue #X: <Key issue name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study. Not all key issues may have security threats due to the nature of th... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6 Solutions
| Editor’s Note: This clause addresses potential requirements on procedures and protocols to support AEAD algorithms.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.0 Mapping of solutions to key issues
| Table 6.0-1: Mapping of solutions to key issues
Solutions
KI#1
KI#2
KI#3
KI#4
KI#5
Solution 1: NAS and AS SMC enhancement with AEAD
X
Solution 2: enhancement for security mode command
X
Solution 3: NAS SMC enhancement to support AEAD algorithms
X
Solution 4: AEAD Algorithm negotiati... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.1 Solution 1: NAS and AS SMC enhancement with AEAD
| Existing NAS Security mode command procedure, AS security mode procedure, RRC reconfiguration procedure is enhanced with AEAD algorithm selection.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.1.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#1.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.1.2 Solution details
| Editor’s Note: Definition/clarification of the AEAD mode is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Clarification on the reuse of the procedures is FFS.
Editor’s Note: Explanation of the purpose of sending the NAS SMC both in plaintext and encrypted is FFS.
NAS and AS procedure (option1)
Overview: With this approach, the AMF and RAN ... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.1.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation to be added.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.2 Solution 2: enhancement for security mode command
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.2.1 Introduction
| This solution address KI#1: Algorithm selection. Clause 5.11.1 of TS 33.501 [5] defines algorithm identifiers for encryption and integrity protection algorithms. In NAS and AS security mode command message, these identifiers are exchanged between UE and network to decide which algorithm is used for a session. The ident... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.2.2 Solution details
| During the security mode command message exchange, UE sends its security capability. Based on the received security capability, network selects the algorithm and notifies to the UE. This solution proposes to split the security mode command procedures into two phases as shown in Figure 6.2.2-1.
Figure 6.2.2-1 Securit... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.2.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.3 Solution 3: NAS SMC enhancement to support AEAD algorithms
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions for key issues. Not all solutions may have evaluation due to the nature of this study.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.3.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses Key Issue #1: Algorithm selection.
This solution proposes to take the existing NAS SMC procedure in clause 6.7.2 of TS 33.501 [5] as baseline and introduce adaption to support AEAD algorithm selection.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.3.2 Solution details
| The enhanced NAS SMC procedure is as depicted in figure 6.3.2-1.
Figure 6.3.2-1: Enhanced NAS Security Mode Command procedure
1a. The AMF decides whether AEAD mode is to be used. If AEAD mode is not to be used, the existing procedures are used for NAS SMC. Otherwise, the AMF derives KNASaead and activates the NAS i... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.3.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
TBD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.4 Solution 4: AEAD Algorithm negotiation
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.4.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue #1. The solution lists possible AEAD algorithm negotiation for both AEAD-only and AEAD & standalone options.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.4.2 Solution details
| UE sends UE 6G Security capabilities to the network entity.
The network entity select AEAD algorithm based on the UE 6G Security capabilities and algorithm priority list.
AEAD-only:
The UE 6G Security capabilities only include NCA algorithms, i.e. NCA4, NCA5, NCA6.
The selected AEAD algorithm (e.g. NCA4) is indicat... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.4.3 Evaluation
| TBA.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.5 Solution 5: AEAD algorithm negotiation
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.5.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#1 on algorithm selection.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.5.2 Solution details
| Each network entity (e.g., RAN, AMF) is assumed to be configured with be one list for NAS AEAD algorithms, similarly to how it is done in TS 33.501[5].
The network entity then initiates a security mode command procedure, and include the chosen algorithm. If the AEAD algorithm is chosen, the whole message including th... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.5.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.6 Solution 6: AEAD algorithms negotiation
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.6.1 Introduction
| This solution proposes to address the security requirement of Key Issue #1.
Based on the UE security capability and network security capability, the UE and the network can negotiate the AEAD algorithms. If the AEAD algorithms are supported by both the UE and network, the network selects one AEAD algorithm for integrit... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.6.2 Solution details
| For AEAD algorithms negotiation, the UE provides its security capability to the network. The network selects the algorithms considering the UE security capability and the associated priority. The network provides the selected algorithms to the UE. The negotiation can be categorized into the following cases:
Case 1: T... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.6.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.7 Solution 7: AEAD key usage for NAS and AS algorithm
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.7.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#2.
Like the existing NAS algorithms and AS algorithms for integrity protection and ciphering (reference from Annex D of TS 33.501 [5]), the combined algorithm needs to be shown for the AS and NAS module usage.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.7.2 Solution details
|
Figure 6.7.2-1: Derivation of MAC-I
The input parameters to the NCA (NG Combined Algorithm) algorithm are 256-bit (array of 32 bytes) security Key (example: KNASAEAD or KRRCAEAD or KUPAEAD), 32-bit NAS or PDCP COUNT (UL or DL COUNT),1 bit of MODE of 0(encrypt) or 1(decrypt), 5-bits of BEARER identity, DIRECTION bit ... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.7.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation to be added.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.8 Solution 8: Input & output definition
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.8.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses KI#2: AEAD algorithm input and output.
The input and output for AEAD algorithm basically follow the definition of RFC 5116 [6]. It defines the input of the AEAD as 1) a secret key, 2) a nonce, 3) a plaintext, 4) the associated data, and the output as a ciphertext. The ciphertext also includes d... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.8.2 Solution details
| The input for encryption is defined as (K, N, AD, P, ENC_ONLY).
- The key K is a secrete key only known to a sender and a receiver. Clause 6.2 of TS 33.501[5] defines the key hierarchy for 5G from long term key to algorithm keys. The key for AEAD can be defined in the similar way.
- A nonce N can be public but cannot... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.8.3 Evaluation
| TBD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.9 Solution 9: Interface of AEAD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.9.1 Introduction
| This solution is proposed to address the key issue#2 on AEAD interface.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.9.2 Solution details
| The input parameters to the AEAD algorithm include:
• a 256-bit AEAD key named KEY,
• a 48-bit EXTRA_IV,
• a 32-bit COUNT,
• a 5-bit bearer identity BEARER,
• the 1-bit direction of the transmission i.e. DIRECTION. The DIRECTION bit shall be 0 for uplink and 1 for downlink.
• 1-bit MO... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.9.3 Evaluation
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.10 Solution 10: Creation of EXTRA_IV
| Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions for key issues. Not all solutions may have evaluation due to the nature of this study.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.10.1 Introduction
| Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
This solution addresses key issue #2 “AEAD algorithm interface”. Specifically, this proposal addresses the issue of the generation of EXTRA_IV.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.10.2 Solution details
| When deriving keys for AEAD algorithms, the EXTRA_IV can also be derived at the same time using an EXTRA_IV distinguisher.
For example, the following parameters can be used to form the string S.
- FC = 0xZZ
- P0 = algorithm type distinguisher
- L0 = length of algorithm type distinguisher (i.e. 0x00 0x01)
- P1 = “E... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.10.3 Evaluation
| Editor’s Note: Place holder for an evaluation if necessary.
TBD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.11 Solution 11: Key Derivation for NAS and AS AEAD
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.11.1 Introduction
| This solution addresses the key issue#3.
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f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.11.2 Solution details
| Keys for NAS signalling:
- KNASAEAD is a key derived for particular combined algorithm (256-NCA4/256-NCA5/256-NCA6).
Keys for UP traffic:
- KUPAEAD is a key derived for a particular combined algorithm(256-NCA4/256-NCA5/256-NCA6).
Keys for RRC signalling:
- KRRCAEAD is a key derived for a particular integrity & ... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 6.11.3 Evaluation
| TBD
Editor’s Note: Further evaluation to be added.
6.Y Solution Y: <Solution Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains solutions for key issues. Not all solutions may have evaluation due to the nature of this study.
6.Y.1 Introduction
Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.
6.Y.2 ... |
f12fa66a3c153eea0bbe41f49f769527 | 33.771 | 7 Conclusion
| 7.Z Key Issue #Z: <Key Issue Name>
Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions for Key Issue #Z.
Annex A: Introduction to AEAD
A.1 Protection provided by AEAD
The key characteristic of Authenticated Encryption (AE) is that ciphering, and integrity protection are executed in a combined operation. Thi... |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 2 References
| The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
-... |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
| |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 3.1 Terms
| For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
example: text used to clarify abstract rules by applying them literally.
|
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 3.2 Symbols
| For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:
<symbol> <Explanation>
|
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 3.3 Abbreviations
| For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].
<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 4 Architecture assumption
| Annex AA in TS 33.501[2] is the starting point of this study.
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 5 Key issues
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 5.1 Key issue #1: PSK support for MPQUIC TLS
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78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 5.1.1 Key issue details
| In TS 33.501 [1] Annex AA.2, server authentication for MPQUIC/TLS [2], [3], [5] is specified. The scope of this key issue is to cover the PSK-based option for MPQUIC/TLS. Solutions to this key issue are expected to provide the means for enabling the PSK option for MPQUIC/TLS. More specifically, the PSK option refers to... |
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 5.1.2 Security threats
| N/A
|
78aa6a85972743b91dba1779a75243c8 | 33.778 | 5.1.3 Potential security requirements
| The 5G system shall be able to securely derive, deliver, update, and use the PSK (i.e., TLS 1.3 psk_dhe_ke) between UE and UPF to be used for authentication with MPQUIC/TLS.
5.X Key Issue #X: key issue names
5.X.1 Key issue details
Editor’s Note: This clause is going to capture the key issue detail of a key issue.
... |
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