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01cd6ebc349e0889678e3746d8ba2764 | 105 200-3-1 | 6.3 Values | Table 3 shows banding values that have been obtained from a survey of ICT sites in France and are applied for all members of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) eG4U. It is clear from Table 3 that a consistent policy objective is applied to all values of KPIEC (and therefore DCG). ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 16 Table 3: DCG policy used by eG4U KPIEC range DCG WREUSE WREN ≤ 0,04 GWh XXS 1,0 0,8 0,04 GWh < KPIEC ≤ 0,2 GWh XS 1,0 0,8 0,2 GWh < KPIEC ≤ 1 GWh S 1,0 0,8 1 GWh < KPIEC ≤ 5 GWh M 1,0 0,8 5 GWh < KPIEC ≤ 25 GWh L 1,0 0,8 25 GWh < KPIEC ≤ 120 GWh XL 1,0 0,8 > 120 GWh XXL 1,0 0,8 Table 4 shows the performance bands for KPIEP and the resulting designations of DGCLASS adopted by eG4U at the time of publication of the present document. Table 4: DCCLASS bands used by eG4U KPIEP range DCClass ≤ 1,00 A 1,00 < KPIEP ≤ 1,40 B 1,40 < KPIEP ≤ 1,70 C 1,70 < KPIEP ≤ 1,90 D 1,90 < KPIEP ≤ 2,10 E 2,10 < KPIEP ≤ 2,30 F > 2,30 G |
01cd6ebc349e0889678e3746d8ba2764 | 105 200-3-1 | 7 Trend analysis | Trending can only be significant when comparing data using the same policy. Note that a change of KPIEC band may change the two weighting parameters (WREN, WREUSE). Banded values of KPIEC (i.e. DCG) are not particularly useful for assessing trends, but banded values for KPIEP (i.e. DCCLASS) as defined in ETSI EN 305 200-3-1 [2] may provide more accurate trending inside a given policy although not part of the public report. KPIEP applies to a single ICT site or to a group of ICT sites. Figure 2 represents the KPIEP evolution of an ICT site or group of sites during its/their "ramp-up" phase using a single policy, with an addition of renewable energy at T4. Figure 2 also shows the KPIEP banding of Table 4. Figure 2: Evolution of KPIEP during ramp-up 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 KPIEC (kWh) KPIEP KPIEP vs. KPIEC during ICT site “ramp-up” Introduction of renewable energy Time D C B KPIEC KPIEP ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 17 A single graph for a common assessment period can combine the KPIDCEM for multiple ICT sites in a group as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: KPIDCEM for multiple ICT sites The same graph can be used to show trends of each ICT site in the group as shown in Figure 4. The initial values of Figure 3 are shown as dotted boxes and the current values are shown by the coloured boxes. In the example in Figure 4, the policy objectives are a reduction of KPIEC and a reduction KPIEP and the trends are shown by means of different coloured boxes where: • "green" indicates an improvement in line with the relevant policy objectives; • "amber/orange" indicates no progress against the relevant policy objectives; • "red" indicates a deterioration against the relevant policy objectives. Figure 4: Trends in KPIDCEM for a multiple ICT sites 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 KPIEC KPIEP 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 KPIEC KPIEP 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 18 |
01cd6ebc349e0889678e3746d8ba2764 | 105 200-3-1 | 8 Reporting templates | For public reporting purposes Table 5 shall be used. All assessment periods shall be one year including allowable inaccuracies as defined in ETSI EN 305 200-3-1 [2]. Table 5: Template to be used for public reporting Name of ICT site (or group of ICT sites) See note 1 End of assessment period See note 2 Statistical accuracy See note 3 DCCLASS DCG KPIEC KPITE KPIREUSE KPIREN WREN WREUSE NOTE 1: List or description shall be provided (e.g. DC1 DC2, all my ICT sites, all access sites). NOTE 2: Date when the assessment period ended. NOTE 3: When estimated one year measurements are used (see clause 5.2.1). ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 19 Annex A (informative): Correlation to CENELEC EN 50600-4-x standards The CENELEC EN 50600-4 series specifies a series of KPIs similar to the objective KPIs defined in ETSI EN 305 200 series [1]: • CENELEC EN 50600-4-2 [i.1], Power Usage Effectiveness, is similar to KPITE. • CENELEC EN 50600-4-6 [i.3], Energy Reuse Factor, is similar to KPIREUSE. • CENELEC EN 50600-4-3 [i.2], Renewable Energy Factor is similar to KPIREN. Although the KPIs of the CENELEC EN 50600-4 standards take into account most of the content of the ETSI standards they differ slightly for the reasons explained below. Considering task efficiency: • KPITE defines penalties for measuring consumptions away from the actual ICT equipment or downstream of the delivery points whereas Power Usage Effectiveness of CENELEC EN 50600-4-2 [i.1] proposes decreasing accuracy Categories when measuring upstream of the ICT equipment and does not consider measuring downstream delivery points. • Power Usage Effectiveness of CENELEC EN 50600-4-2 [i.1] includes energy supplied from waste heat such as combined heat and power systems and natural resources whereas KPITE does not. Considering energy reuse, in order to promote the efficiency of the whole reuse chain KPIREUSE only takes into account the energy reused by the final user and energy consumed to process the waste heat up to the handoff point is excluded from (although included in KPIEC). In comparison the Energy Reuse Factor of CENELEC EN 50600-4-6 [i.3] takes it into account at the "handoff" point. Considering renewable energy, the Objective KPIs of the ETSI EN 305 200 series [1] promote the implementation of ICT sites with effective energy management. For this reason, any statements of "green energy content" of utility supplies are not taken into account in KPIREN which only considers renewable energy produced on-site or from a plant under common governance with the ICT site. In comparison the Renewable Energy Factor of CENELEC EN 50600-4-3 [i.2] allows the inclusion of documented written evidence from the source utility provider(s) regarding the energy supplied. ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 20 Annex B (informative): Change History Date Version Information about changes 05-2019 0.0.1 First formal WD for circulation and comment 05-2019 0.0.2 Second WD for circulation and comment 05-2019 0.0.3 Third WD for circulation and comment 06-2019 0.0.4 Fourth WD for circulation and comment prior to stable draft 29-07-2019 0.0.5 Stable draft ETSI ETSI TS 105 200-3-1 V1.2.1 (2019-12) 21 History Document history V1.1.1 February 2018 Publication as ETSI EN 305 200-3-1 V1.2.1 December 2019 Publication |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 1 Scope | The present document defines security solutions applicable within the M2M system. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 2 References | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the ETSI docbox. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 118 101: "oneM2M; Functional Architecture (oneM2M TS-0001)". [2] ETSI TS 118 111: "oneM2M; Common Terminology (oneM2M TS-0011)". [3] Void. [4] ETSI TS 118 104: "oneM2M; Service Layer Core Protocol Specification (oneM2M TS-0004)". [5] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". NOTE 1: TLS 1.3 will be considered in a future release of the document. NOTE 2: Obsoleted by IETF RFC 8446. [6] IETF RFC 6347: "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2". NOTE: Obsoleted by IETF RFC 4347. [7] ETSI TS 102 225 (V11.0.0): "Smart Cards; Secured packet structure for UICC based applications (Release 11)". [8] ETSI TS 102 226 (V11.0.0): "Smart Cards; Remote APDU structure for UICC based applications (Release 11)". [9] ETSI TS 131 115 (V10.1.1): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Secured packet structure for (Universal) Subscriber Identity Module (U)SIM Toolkit applications (3GPP TS 31.115 version 10.1.1 Release 10)". [10] ETSI TS 131 116 (V10.2.0): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Remote APDU Structure for (U)SIM Toolkit applications (3GPP TS 31.116 version 10.2.0 Release 10)". [11] TIA TIA-1106: "Secured Packet Structure for CCAT Applications". [12] TIA TIA-1107: "Remote APDU Structure for CCAT Applications". [13] ETSI TS 133 220: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) (3GPP TS 33.220)". [14] TIA TIA-1098: "Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Framework". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 14 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 [15] IETF RFC 4279: "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)". [16] Void. [17] Void. [18] IETF RFC 5705: "Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)". [19] IETF RFC 3629: "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646". [20] Unicode 13.0.0 UAX #15: "Unicode® Standard Annex #15; Unicode Normalization Forms", February 2020. [21] GlobalPlatform® GPD_SPE_120: "TEE Management Framework v1.0". [22] GlobalPlatform® GPD_SPE_009: "TEE System Architecture v1.1". [23] ETSI TS 102 671: "Smart Cards; Machine to Machine UICC; Physical and logical characteristics". [24] ETSI TS 102 221: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics". [25] ETSI TS 102 484: "Smart Cards; Secure channel between a UICC and an end-point terminal". [26] ISO/IEC 7816-4: "Identification cards -- Integrated circuit cards -- Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange". [27] ETSI TS 101 220: "Smart Cards; ETSI numbering system for telecommunication application providers". [28] Void. [29] Void. [30] Void. [31] IETF RFC 6655: "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)". [32] IETF RFC 5289: "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)". [33] IETF RFC 2104: "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication". [34] IETF RFC 5280: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile". [35] IETF RFC 6960: "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP". [36] IETF RFC 6961: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension". [37] IETF RFC 7250: "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)". [38] Void. [39] NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-4: "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)". [40] IETF RFC 6920: "Naming Things with Hashes". [41] IETF RFC 4648: "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings". [42] IETF RFC 5487: "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode". [43] IETF RFC 8422: "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 15 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 [44] IETF RFC 6066: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions". [45] IETF RFC 7251: "AES-CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for TLS". [46] IETF RFC 5480: "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information". [47] GlobalPlatform® GPD_SPE_008: "Secure Element Remote Application Management v1.0.1". [48] IETF RFC 5869: "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)". [49] IETF RFC 7518 (2015): "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)". [50] IETF RFC 7516 (2015): "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)". [51] IETF RFC 7515 (2015): "JSON Web Signature (JWS)". [52] W3C® Recommendation: "XML Signature Syntax and Processing v1.1", 2013. [53] IETF RFC 7519 (2015): "JSON Web Token (JWT)". [54] OpenID Foundation: "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", 2014. [55] W3C® Recommendation: "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing v1.1", 2013. [56] Void. [57] ETSI TS 118 122: "oneM2M; Field Device Configuration (oneM2M TS-0022)". [58] ETSI TS 118 132: "MAF and MEF Interface Specification (oneM2M TS-0032)". [59] IETF RFC 7030: "Enrollment over Secure Transport". [60] Void. [61] Void. [62] Void. [63] GlobalPlatform® GPC_SPE_034: "Card Specification v2.3.1". [64] CEN EN 419 212-1:2017: "Application Interface for Secure Elements For Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trusted Services – Part 1: Introduction and common definitions". [65] Void. [66] IETF RFC 8894: "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol". [67] ETSI TS 118 116: "oneM2M; Secure Environment Abstraction (oneM2M TS-0016)". [68] Void. [69] NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201-2: "Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors". NOTE: Superseded by FIPS 201-3. [70] GSMA: "SGP.01 - Embedded SIM Remote Provisioning Architecture". [71] NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-2: "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)". [72] IETF RFC 5116 (2008): "An interface and algorithms for authenticated Encryption". [73] ISO 9797 (2011): "Information Technology - Security Techniques -- Message Authentication Codes (MACs)". [74] SOG-IS: "SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms", Version 1.2, January 2020. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 16 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 [75] IETF RFC 5639: "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation". [76] ETSI TS 118 108: "oneM2M; CoAP Protocol Binding (oneM2M TS-0008)". [77] ETSI TS 123 246 (V15.0.0): "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Architecture and functional description (3GPP TS 23.246 version 15.0.0 Release 15)". [78] ETSI TS 133 246 (V14.2.0): "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3G Security; Security of Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) (3GPP TS 33.246 version 14.2.0 Release 14)". [79] ISO 8601: "Date and time -- Representations for information interchange ". [80] IETF RFC 7525: "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)". |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long-term validity. The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document. [i.1] oneM2M Drafting Rules. [i.2] Void. [i.3] Void. [i.4] ETSI TR 118 508: "Analysis of Security Solutions for the oneM2M System (oneM2M TR-0008)". [i.5] eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 3.0. 22 January 2013. OASIS Standard. [i.6] Handbook of Applied Cryptography, A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, S. A. Vanstone, CRC Press, 1996. [i.7] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (10/2016): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks". [i.8] Void. [i.9] OMA-TS-REST-NetAPI-TerminalLocation-V1-0-20130924-A: "RESTful Network API for Terminal Location", Version 1.0. [i.10] ISO 3166-1:2013: "Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions -- Part 1: Country codes". [i.11] ISO/IEC 7816-5: "Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 5: Registration of Application Providers". [i.12] NIST Special Publication 800-162: "Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations". [i.13] National Institute of Standards and Technology: "Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)". [i.14] Void. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 17 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 [i.15] oneM2M TR-0019: "Dynamic Authorization for IoT". [i.16] ETSI TR 118 512: "oneM2M; End-to-End security and Group Authentication (oneM2M TR-0012)". [i.17] Void. [i.18] IANA JSON Web Token (JWT) registry. [i.19] IETF RFC 6455: "The Web Socket Protocol", December 2011. [i.20] IETF RFC 7230: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing". [i.21] IETF RFC 7252: "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)". [i.22] Void. [i.23] Void. [i.24] Void. [i.25] Void. [i.26] https://github.com/certnanny/sscep. [i.27] https://github.com/jscep/jscep. [i.28] https://github.com/certnanny/sscep/issues/42. [i.29] ETSI TS 118 105: "oneM2M; Management Enablement (OMA) (oneM2M TS-0005)". [i.30] ETSI TS 118 106: "oneM2M; Management Enablement (BBF) (oneM2M TS-0006)". [i.31] Broadband Forum TR-069: "CPE WAN Management Protocol". [i.32] BSI TR 03109: "Smart Meter Gateway specification". [i.33] ETSI TS 103 645: "CYBER; Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements". [i.34] IoTF Security Foundation. Secure Design Best Practice Guide, Release 2 November 2019. [i.35] GSMA - IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 118 111 [2] and the following apply: additional authenticated data [14]: data that is authenticated, but not encrypted by an authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm AE-ID Certificate: certificate with a certificate chain to a trust anchor certificate and containing an AE-ID in the subjectAltName extension NOTE: An AE_ID certificate can be used to verify that an entity has been assigned the AE-ID in the certificate. association configuration: phase of a Security Association Establishment Framework in which the entity establishing the Security Association (and the Central Key Distribution Server, in the case of Centralized Security Frameworks), are provided with identities (and any other relevant credentials) to ensure that the security association is established between the intended entities ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 18 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 association security handshake: phase of a Security Association Establishment Framework in which the security association endpoints perform mutual authentication authenticated encryption with associated data [14]: algorithm providing confidentiality for the plaintext and a way to check its integrity and authenticity while providing the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some additional authenticated data NOTE: In this context plaintext refers to data that is authenticated and encrypted. bootstrap credential: pre-provisioned credential enabling mutual authentication of the Enrolee and the M2M Enrolment function bootstrap credential configuration: phase of a Remote Security Provisioning Framework in which the Bootstrap Credentials are pre-provisioned to the Enrolee and the M2M Enrolment function bootstrap enrolment handshake: phase of a Remote Security Provisioning Framework in which the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function perform mutual authentication bootstrap instruction configuration: phase of a Remote Security Provisioning Framework in which the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are provided with identities (and any other relevant credentials) to enable the M2M Enrolment function to establish a Master Credential between the intended Enrolee and M2M Authentication Function bootstrap server function [13]: BSF is hosted in a network element under the control of a Mobile Network Operator. BSF, HSS, and UEs participate in GBA in which a shared secret is established between the network and a UE by running the bootstrapping procedure NOTE: The shared secret can be used between NAFs and UEs, for example, for authentication purposes. bootstrapping transaction identifier [13]: bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) is used to bind the subscriber identity to the keying material in GBA reference points Ua, Ub and Zn CA-Certificate [i.6]: certificate created by one Certification Authority (CA) certifying the public key of another CA certificate: See Public Key Certificate. certificate authority: trusted entity that issues digital certificates certificate chain: sequence of one or more CA-certificates, where: the Public Verification Key in each CA-certificate is certified in the previous CA-certificate; and the public key of the first CA-Certificate is trusted a priori NOTE: Trust in the public key in each CA-certificate can be based on trust in the previous CA-Certificate. certificate name: unique identifier in a name field of a Certificate (e.g. in the X.509 "Subject" or "Subject Alternative Name" attribute) certificate provisioning (procedure): procedure performed by a Security Principal and a MEF for provisioning the Security Principal with an MEF-Provisioned Certificate and Certificate(s) of the MEF Certificate Authority NOTE: Additional Certificate Authority Certificates can also be provisioned via other means such as pre-provisioning or ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. certificate re-provisioning (procedure): Certificate Provisioning procedure performed when the Security Principal can authenticate itself with a valid Enrolled Certificate certificate signing request: message used to request a Public Key Certificate certificate verification: process necessary to trust an entity's Certificate certification authority [i.6]: authority responsible for establishing and vouching for the authenticity of public keys NOTE: This includes binding public keys to distinguished names through signed certificates, managing certificate serial numbers, and certificate revocation. content encryption key: symmetric key used to encrypt plaintext to produce the ciphertext and generate a Message Integrity Check (MIC) ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 19 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: In Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), the content encryption key is used directly, while in other algorithms the content encryption key is used to generate distinct keys for the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm. credential configuration: phase of a Security Association Establishment Framework in which the Credentials necessary for the Security Association Establishment Framework are configured to the relevant entities and functions Credential-ID type-ID: portion of a Credential-ID indicating the type of credential being identified CSE-ID certificate: certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing a CSE-ID in the subjectAltName extension NOTE: A CSE_ID certificate can be used to verify that an entity has been assigned the CSE-ID in the certificate. device certificate: certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing at least one globally unique hardware instance identifier in the subjectAltName extension NOTE: A device certificate can be used to verify that an entity is executing on the identified hardware instance. digital signature [i.7]: information is signed by appending to it an enciphered summary of the information NOTE: The summary is produced by means of a one-way hash function, while the enciphering is carried out using the private key of the signer. ESCertKE Initiating End-Point: ESCertKE end-point which initiates the ESCertKE Procedure ESCertKE Messages: messages exchanged between the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point and ESCertKE Terminating End-Point as part of End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment ESCertKE Procedure: sequence of exchanged ESCertKE Messages and processing based on those ESCertKE Messages, for the purposes of End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment ESCertKE Terminating End-Point: ESCertKE end-point with which the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point intends to perform the ESCertKE Procedure End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment: interoperable framework for two end-points to use certificates for establishing end-to-end secret symmetric keys for use in other end-to-end security frameworks such as End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) or End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) End-to-End security of data: interoperable framework for protecting data that ends up transported using oneM2M reference points, in order that transited CSEs do not need to be trusted with that data End-to-End Security of Primitives: interoperable framework for securing the exchange of oneM2M primitives so that CSEs do not need to be trusted with the confidentiality and integrity of the primitives enrolee: AE or CSE that requires remote provisioning of a symmetric key to be shared with an enrolment target enrolment key: symmetric key established between an Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function following successful mutual authentication NOTE: A symmetric key to be shared by the Enrolee and an Enrolment Target may be derived (at the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function) from the currently valid Enrolment Key, and the M2M Enrolment Function subsequently securely delivers the symmetric key to the Enrolment Target. enrolment key generation: phase of remote security provisioning Framework in which the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment function establish an Enrolment Key and Enrolment Key identifier enrolment phase: step in the lifecycle of an M2M equipment where it becomes provisioned for operation with a specific M2M Service Provider enrolment target: M2M Authentication Function, CSE, or AE with whom an Enrolee wishes to establish a symmetric key (master credential or pre-provisioned secure connection key) using remote security provisioning entity identifier: CSE-ID (or AE-ID respectively) of a CSE (or AE respectively) ESData Envelope: data object containing the result of protecting an End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Payload using the ESData procedures ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 20 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 ESData Payload: data to be protected using End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) FQDN certificate: certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing an FQDN generic bootstrap architecture: set of 3GPP and 3GPP2 specifications providing security features and a mechanism to bootstrap authentication and key agreement for application security from the 3GPP and 3GPP2 underlying network authentication mechanisms initial certificate provisioning (procedure): Certificate Provisioning procedure performed when the Security Principal cannot authenticate itself with a valid Enrolled Certificate inner request primitive: request primitive to be protected by End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) inner response primitive: response primitive to be protected by End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) message integrity code: tag computed from a message and a symmetric key, and attached to a message NOTE 1: The purpose of a messages integrity code is to facilitate, without the use of any additional mechanisms, assurances regarding both the source of a message and its integrity. NOTE 2: A Message Integrity Code is sometimes called a "Message Authentication Code" - "Message Integrity Code" has been used since the abbreviation of "Message Authentication Code" (MAC) might be misunderstood to refer to "Media Access Control". The definition is based on text from [i.6] (p323). M2M secure connection key: symmetric key established between two entities (CSEs or AEs), by an of M2M Authentication Function, in order to secure the communication between those two entities NOTE: This M2M Secure Connection Key results from a successful M2M Security Association Establishment procedure. M2M trust enabler: stakeholder trusted with enabling authentication of CSEs/AEs to other CSEs/AEs MAF client: CSE or AE configured to use the services of an M2M Authentication Function MAF Credential Configuration procedure: MAF Security Framework procedure used for Enrolment Phase of an End-Point by establishing credentials for mutual authentication between an End-Point and an MAF MAF handshake procedure: MAF Security Framework procedure in which an entity and the MAF perform mutual authentication and generate a Symmetric Key which can then be used in the Association Security Handshake for mutual authentication between that entity and other entities MAF key registration procedure: MAF Security Framework procedure in which a Source End-Point and the MAF generate a Symmetric Key which can then be used for mutual authentication between the Source End-Point and one or more other Target End-Points MAF key retrieval procedure: MAF Security Framework procedure in which a Target End-Point retrieves the Symmetric Key previously generated by the MAF and a Source End-Point, to enable mutual authentication between the Source End-Point and the Target End-Point master credentials: credentials used to mutually authenticate between an ASN/MN-CSE and the MAF. This is done to secure access to the infrastructure of an M2M Service Provider NOTE: The Master Credentials are either pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned (without relying on those credentials). MEF certificate authority: role of a Certificate Authority which issues MEF-Provisioned Certificates to a Security Principal through the MEF NOTE: The term is relative to the MEF, so an MEF Certificate Authority with respect to one MEF is not an MEF Certificate Authority with respect to another MEF MEF client: functionality for performing MEF procedures on behalf of an associated CSE or AE, or on behalf of CSE or AE(s) present on an associated Node, or an associated MAF MEF-provisioned certificate: certificate issued by a Certificate Authority, via an MEF, for authenticating the Security Principal ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 21 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: The term is relative to the MEF, so a MEF-Provisioned Certificate with respect to one MEF is not a MEF-Provisioned Certificate with respect to another MEF. Node-ID Certificate: certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing a M2M-Node-ID of a Node in the subjectAltName extension NOTE: A Node-ID certificate can be used to verify the identity of a Node. (oneM2M) security principal: CSE or AE or Node or M2M Device which can be authenticated NOTE: When the Security Principal is a Node or M2M Device, then Node or M2M Device is acting on behalf of the CSE and/or AE executing on the Node or M2M Device. Online Certificate Status Protocol: protocol for requesting a report on the status of one or more X.509 certificates (IETF RFC 6960 [35]) operational phase: period in the lifecycle of an M2M equipment where it is actually used for providing M2M services outer request Primitive: request primitive used to transport the data object containing an inner request primitive to which End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) has been applied outer response Primitive: response primitive used to transport the data object containing an inner response primitive to which End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) has been applied Personally Identifiable Information [i.13]: any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including: 1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, or biometric records; and 2) any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. policy decision point [i.5]: system entity that evaluates applicable policy and renders an authorization decision policy enforcement point [i.5]: system entity that performs access control, by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions policy information point [i.5]: system entity that acts as a source of attribute values policy retrieval point: system entity that retrieves applicable policy or policy set pre-provisioned secure connection key: Symmetric Key that is pre-provisioned to two entities (which may be AEs or CSEs) to be used for mutual authentication of those entities in Security Association Establishment pre-provisioned secure connection key identifier: Identifier for a Pre-Provisioned Secure Connection Key pre-provisioned symmetric enrolee key: Symmetric Key that is pre-provisioned to the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function pre-provisioned symmetric enrolee key identifier: identifier for a Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key private signing key: secret key that can generate signatures that can be verified using a corresponding Public Verification Key public key certificate: electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key with an identity NOTE: [i.6] A public-key certificate is a data structure consisting of a data part and a signature part. The data part contains cleartext data including, as a minimum, a public [verification] key and a string identifying the part (subject entity) to be associated therewith. The signature part consists of the digital signature of a certification authority over the data part, thereby binding the subject entity's identity to the specified public key. public key certificate flavour: name describing the usage of a public key certificate within the scope of oneM2M public key infrastructure: set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke Public Key Certificates ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 22 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: For more details, see [i.6]. public verification key: credential that can verify digital signatures generated by a corresponding Private Signing Key, but which cannot be used to generate digital signatures raw public key certificate: certificate comprising only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of an X.509 certificate that carries the parameters necessary to describe the public key [37] registration authority: functional entity responsible for verifying Certificate Signing Requests and authorizing a Certification Authority to issue a corresponding Certificate relative enrolment key identifier: part of the enrolment key identifier that is unique within the context of a M2M Enrolment Function secure environment: logical entity that protects Sensitive Data and Sensitive Functions from tampering, unauthorized monitoring or execution and that provides access to these Sensitive Data and Sensitive Functions to authorized oneM2M entities security association establishment: sequential processing of credential configuration, association configuration and association security handshake between two entities security association establishment framework: security framework for security association establishment security bootstrap framework or remote security provisioning framework: mechanism for remotely provisioning a Master Credential and Master Credential Identifier to an Enrolee and an M2M Authentication Function security framework: set of procedures providing Security Association Establishment or Remote security provisioning security usage identifier: identifies a security feature (e.g. Security Association Establishment Framework, End-to-End Security of Primitives or End-to-End Security of Data), a protocol used for that security feature, and (where applicable) an option within a single protocol NOTE: The security usage identifier is used to limit how a credential may be used. self-signed certificate: Public Key Certificate that is signed by the same entity whose identity it certifies sensitive function: function processed within the secure environment requiring protection from unauthorized monitoring, tampering or execution and that is operating on sensitive data, e.g. derivation of keys from M2M long-term service-layer keys and cryptographic algorithms source ESData end-point: entity producing an End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Envelope from an ESData Payload symmetric key: secret key that is shared between two entities target ESData end-point: entity producing the verified End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Payload from an ESData Envelope trust anchor certificate: certificate that is trusted a priori X.509: Recommendation ITU-T for a Public Key Infrastructure |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 3.2 Symbols | For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply: || Concatenation |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 118 111 [2] and the following apply: (D)TLS-PSK (D)TLS Pre-Shared Key (ciphersuites) 3GPP2 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 23 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting ABAC Attribute Based Access Control ACP Access Control Policy Instance AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data AE-ID Application Entity IDentifier App-ID Application IDentifier ASE Asymmetric Secure Element ASN-CSE Common Service Entity which resides in the Application Service Node AuthorSignReqInfo Authorization Signature Request Information AuthorSign Authorization Signature AuthorRelMapRecord Authorization Relationship Mapping Record AuthorRelIndicator Authorization Relationship Indicator AuthorSignIndicator Authorization Signature Indicator BSF Bootstrapping Server Function B-TID Bootstrapping Transaction IDentifier CA Certification Authority or Certificate Authority CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing CoAP Constrained Application Protocol CSE-ID Common Service Entity IDentifier CSR Certificate Signing Request DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security (Protocol) ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography EKU Extended Key Usage ESCertKE End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment Enrolee-ID Enrolee Identity ESData End-to-End Security of Data ESF End-to-End Security Function ESPrim End-to-end Security of Primitives EST Enrolment over Secure Transport ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name GBA_ME Mobile Equipment -based GBA GBA_U GBA with UICC-based enhancements GUSS GBA User Security Settings HLR Home Location Register HSS Home Subscriber System HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol HW Hardware ID Identifier IdA Identifier for entity A IdB Identifier for entity B IN-CSE CSE which resides in the Infrastructure Node IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4 IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6 IV Initialization Vector M2M-SP Machine-toMachine Service Provider MAF M2M Authentication Function MAF-ID M2M Authentication Function Identifier Mca reference Point for M2M Communication with AE Mcc reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE Mcc' reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE of different M2M Service Provider Mcn reference Point for M2M Communication with NSE MEF M2M Enrolment Function MIC Message Integrity Code MN-CSE CSE which resides in the Middle Node MTE M2M Trust Enabler NAF Network Application Function Node-ID Node Identifier OAEP Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol PDP Policy Decision Point PEP Policy Enforcement Point ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 24 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 PII Personally Identifiable Information PIN Personal Identification Number PIP Policy Information Point PKI Public Key Infrastructure PRP Policy Retrieval Point RA Registration Authority RSA Rivest, Shamir und Adleman RSAES RSA Encryption Scheme RSASSA RSA Signature Scheme Algorithm RSPF Remote Security Provisioning Framework SAEF Security Association Establishment Framework SCEP Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol SE Secure Environment SUID Security Usage IDentifier SW SoftWare T&C Terms and Conditions TEE Trusted Execution Environment TEF Trust Enabling Function TLS Transport Layer Security (Protocol) UE (3GPP) User Equipment UNSP Underlying Network Service Provider URI Uniform Resource Identifier USS User Security Settings XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 4 Conventions | The keywords "Shall", "Shall not", "May", "Need not", "Should", "Should not" in the present document are to be interpreted as described in the oneM2M Drafting Rules [i.1]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5 Security Architecture | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.1 Overview | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.1.0 Introduction | Figure 5.1.0-1 provides a high level overview of the Security architecture. The architecture consists of following layers: • Security Functions layer: - This layer contains a set of security functions that are exposed at reference point Mca and Mcc. These security functions can be classified into six categories; they are Identification, Authentication, Authorization, Security Association, Sensitive Data Handling and Security Administration. • Security Environment Abstraction Layer: - This layer implements various security capabilities such as key derivation, data encryption/decryption, signature generation/verification, security credential read/write from/to the Secure Environments, and so on. The security functions in the Security Functions Layer invoke these functions in order to protect the operations in the Secure Environments. In addition this layer also provides physical access to the Secure Environments. Implementation of this is out of scope of the present document. This layer is specified in ETSI TS 118 116 [67]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 25 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • Secure Environment layer: - This layer contains one or multiple secure environments that provide various security services providing adequate protection to sensitive data storage and sensitive function execution. The sensitive data includes SE capability, security keys such as long term symmetric keys and asymmetric private keys, local credentials, security policies, identity information, subscription information, and so on. The sensitive functions include data encryption, data decryption, and so on. Though implementation of secure environments is out of scope of the present document, reference frameworks to interface M2M entities with common tamper-resistant hardware SE are provided in annexes D and L. Security Services: e.g. Secure Environment Abstraction API* Security Functions Layer Security Association Establishment Identification and Authentication Authorization Security Administration Identity Management Identity Protection M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) Sensitive Data Handling M2M Authenticaton Function (MAF) Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) Privacy Policy Manager (PPM) Access Management Trust Enabling Security Functions Secure Environments Layer Security Environments 1 Security Environments 2 Secure Environment n Sensitive Data Sensitive Functions Secure Environment Abstraction Layer Secure Environment Abstraction* Figure 5.1.0-1: High level overview of the Security architecture Design principles: • Security Services are modular and configurable according to the needs of the hosting CSE, its supported reference points and its purpose. • The architecture is split into several components and sub-components providing a modular design. With this design, mapping of the architecture to different nodes and entities is enabled. • Depending on the requirements of each entity, Security consists of components relevant to fulfil the requirements of the respective node or entity and the intended use case. • The architecture needs to be adapted to be suitable for implementation in different entities. For example, the architecture can be mapped to different device classes. • The security administration component is supposed to enable administration of all sensitive resources (data and functions) and also allow configuration and extension of Security services itself. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 26 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • The Secure Environment within the CSE is accessed via the Secure Environment Abstraction layer and is expected to provide adequate level of protection to the sensitive information listed in clause 6.2.3.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.1.1 Identification and Authentication | The Identification and Authentication function is in charge of identification and mutual authentication of CSEs and AEs. Identification is the process of checking if the identity provided for authentication is valid. How to perform an identification process will depend on the purpose of authentication. For example, in the case of resource access, the authentication function can require the identification to check if the AE or CSE has registered with the local CSE; in the case of AE or CSE registration, the authentication function can require the identification to check if the identity provided by an AE or CSE fits a certificate from a trusted Certificate Authority. Once passing this checking process, the AE or CSE is identified, and the identified identity will be supplied to authentication process. Authentication is the process of validating if the identity supplied in the identification step is associated with a trustworthy credential. How to perform an authentication process will depend on which mutual authentication mechanism is used. For example, in the case of using certificate based authentication mechanism, the authentication function can require the authentication to verify a digital signature; in the case of using symmetric key based authentication mechanism, the authentication function can require the authentication to verify a Message Integrity Code (MIC). When this validating process has been completed, the AE or CSE is authenticated. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.1.2 Authorization | The Authorization function is responsible for authorizing services and data access to authenticated entities according to provisioned Access Control Policies (ACPs) and assigned roles. Access control policy is defined as sets of conditions that define whether entities are permitted access to a protected resource. The authorization function can support different authorization mechanisms, such as Access Control List (ACL), Role Based Access Control (RBAC), etc. The Authorization function could need to evaluate multiple access control policies in an authorization process in order to get a final access control decision. This process is further described in clause 7. Authorization evaluation process is based on the Service Subscription resource which specifies what M2M Services and M2M Service roles the authenticated entity has subscribed to and the access control policies associated with the protected resource. The authorization evaluation process can also consider contextual attributes such as time or geographic location. Prior to authorization mutual authentication between the originator CSE or AE and hosting CSE can be performed as specified in clause 8. Clause 6.1.2.2.1 describes the conditions under which mutual authentication is mandatory. An access control rule can also include an indicator that the access control rule applies only when mutual authentication has been performed successfully and the result of mutual authentication is still current; see clause 7.1.3 for details. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.1.3 Identity Management | The Identity Management function provides oneM2M identities/identifiers to the requesting entity in case those identities are stored within the secure environment. oneM2M identifiers as defined in the oneM2M Architecture (ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) can also be treated as sensitive data that are accessible to AEs or CSEs and used independently of Authentication or Authorization functions. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.2 Security Layers | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.2.1 Security Service Layer | The security service layer provides the following services: • Access Management: - Identification and Authentication. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 27 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - Authorization. - Access Control. • Sensitive Data Handling: - Sensitive Functions protection. - Secure Storage. • Trust Enabling Security Functions: - MEF (M2M Enrolment Function) - MAF (M2M Authentication Function) - DAS (Dynamic Authorization System) - PPM (Privacy Policy Manager) • Security Association Establishment: - Secure Connection via secure session establishment. - Secure Connection via object security. • Security Administration (including remote security provisioning). • Identity Protection. Each of these services provides functions and resources on the Security Service and Administration API. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.2.2 Secure Environment Abstraction Layer | The Secure Environment Abstraction Layer (not specified in the present document) provides access to the Secure Environment via a general Security Transport API. A Plug-in associated to the type of Secure Environment provides physical/logical connectivity to the secure environment. The Secure Environment Abstraction Layer also has to be accessible on the Service Layer. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 28 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 5.3 Integration within overall oneM2M architecture | Security services are provided within the following architectural components and interact on the different reference points as described in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. AE AE Mca Mca Mca Mcc Mcn Mcn CSE CSE NSE NSE Field Domain Infrastructure Domain To Infrastructure Domain of other Service Provider Mcc’ Figure 5.3-1: oneM2M Functional Architecture |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6 Security Services and Interactions | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1 Security Integration in oneM2M flow of events | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.1 Interactions between layers | Before any M2M Common Services layer procedure can take place, connectivity has to be established in the underlying Network Services Layer, which may involve independent provisioning and service registration procedures specified by the underlying network. The Service Layer Security provisioning (security pre-provisioning or security bootstrapping) and Security Association Establishment procedures specified in the present document can take place independently (and generally consecutively) from any required Network Service Layer connectivity establishment procedures. Finally, the security provisioning and security association establishment requirements imposed by M2M Application Service Providers have to be accounted for. At the service layer level, the security association establishment results in a TLS or DTLS session which protects messages being exchanged between adjacent AE/CSE, i.e. hop-by-hop. AEs that need to preserve the privacy of their information exchange from untrusted intermediate nodes can be provisioned to support a direct security association between them. Such security associations enable to encrypt the content of resources exchanged between AEs through the service layer. In some scenarios (see clause 8.2.1), security association establishment between adjacent AE/CSE requires separate TLS or DTLS sessions for each transmission direction, i.e. a pair of security associations. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 29 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2 High level sequence of events | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2.1 Enrolment phase | M2M equipment typically requires provisioning and configuration phases before being put in actual operation. This can be performed by a pre-provisioning that can be integrated in the manufacturing or product deployment phase, or by means of a security bootstrapping procedure (i.e. remote security provisioning) that takes place before the equipment starts actual operation. At the service layer level, such provisioning and configuration requires selection of the stakeholder that will provide services through the equipment, especially the M2M Service Provider. Enrolment phase may occur several times during the lifecycle of an M2M equipment, but is only repeated when a change in the Service Provider affects the provisioning or configuration of the equipment. The security provisioning phase for the different layers can be combined using a common method of security pre- provisioning. Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPF) provides post-provisioning of the essential information to establish a security association between a Field Domain entity and the M2M Authentication Function of a chosen M2M Service Provider. The essential security information includes the security credentials and identifiers. Remote Security Provisioning procedures rely on an M2M Enrolment Function which can be external to the M2M Service Provider to establish appropriate credentials: • Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework: A symmetric key is pre-provisioned to the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function for the mutual authentication of those entities. For more details, see clause 8.3.2.1. • Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework: The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are each issued and authenticate themselves with private signing keys and Certificates containing the corresponding Public Verification Key. For more details see clause 8.3.2.2. • GBA-based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. In this case, the M2M Enrolment Function includes the functionality of a GBA Bootstrap Server Function. This framework uses 3GPP or 3GPP2 symmetric keys to authenticate the Enrolee and the M2M Enrolment Function (which is also a GBA BSF). The details are specified by ETSI TS 133 220 [13] and TIA TIA-1098 [14]. For more details see clause 8.3.2.3. Figure 6.1.2.1-1 illustrates the different Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks. Note there is no communication between M2M Entities A and B in the Remote Security Provisioning procedure. After successful completion of the Remote Security Provisioning procedure, a Security Association Establishment procedure is applied. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 30 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 6.1.2.1-1: Entities involved in Remote Security Provisioning |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2.2 Operational phase | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2.2.1 M2M Service Access | M2M services are offered by CSEs to AEs and/or other CSEs. To be able to use M2M services offered by one CSE, the AEs and/or CSEs need to be mutually identified and authenticated with that CSE, in order to provide protection from unauthorized access and Denial of Service attacks. This mutual authentication enables to additionally provide encryption and integrity protection for the exchange of messages across a single Mca, Mcc or Mcc' reference point. In addition, communicating AEs that require similar protection for their own information exchanges can be provisioned to apply the same security method to their communications. This is the purpose of the Security Association Establishment procedure, which needs to be executed before the service related procedures specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for the corresponding reference point. On the Mca and Mcc reference points, security association establishment between a field domain AE or CSE, respectively, and an IN-CSE is mandatory. On the Mcc' reference point, security association establishment between IN-CSE and IN-CSE is mandatory. On the Mca reference point, security association establishment between AE and the CSE in the field domain is strongly recommended. NOTE: Security Association Establishment on the Mca interface in a local domain is optional depending on risk assessment, for instance in scenarios where unauthorized access can be prevented by other security measures out of scope of the present document. This includes the following use cases: AE and CSE (i.e. Mca end-points) are securely integrated on the same physical device (i.e. an ASN). Secure communication is guaranteed by the Underlying Network (e.g. WLAN or VPN). Mca communication takes place on a wire (e.g. Ethernet) in a safe physical environment. The security association establishment phase of the M2M Service Layer and M2M Application Layer are generally independent from similar procedures possibly required by the Network Layer, though they can rely on the security services provided by the Network Layer. M2M Entity A M2M Entity B UN-SP Domain Field Domain 3rd Party Domain or M2M-SP Infrastructure Domain M2M-SP Infrastructure Domain GBA BSF (=MEF) MAF MEF SAEF after RSPF ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 31 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The oneM2M system supports the following authentication mechanisms for Security Association Establishment, described in more detail in clause 8.2.1: • Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework: A symmetric key is pre- provisioned to the Security Association end-points. For more details see clause 8.2.2.1. • Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework: Security Association end-points authenticate themselves using private signing keys and Certificates containing the corresponding Public Verification Key. For more details see clause 8.2.2.2. • M2M Authentication Function (MAF) Security Association Establishment Framework: For MAF-based SAEF, the centralized key distribution server is a MAF hosted either by a 3rd party service provider which has a service relationship with the M2M Service Provider (M2M-SP), or hosted by the M2M-SP itself. The MAF authenticates a Field Domain entity on behalf of an IN-CSE using a symmetric key. For more details see clause 8.2.2.3. Figure 6.1.2.2.1-1 illustrates the different use cases and entities involved in the various Security Association Establishment Frameworks (SAEF) considered in the present document. Figure 6.1.2.2.1-1: Entities involved in Security Association Establishment Once a security association is established between a Registrar CSE and a Registree AE, the resulting secure session may be used to secure messages that are exchanged between one or more M2M Service Users of the Registree AE and the Registrar CSE for the purpose of authenticating the M2M Service Users associated with the Registree AE. Authentication of an M2M Service User allows the Registrar CSE to verify that the M2M Service User knows its M2M-User-ID and corresponding credential. There are many well-known methods for performing user-based authentication. Some examples, include HTTP username:password based authentication, LDAP based authentication, multifactor authentication, etc. The selection of which method to use typically depends on deployment requirements. For this reason, the definition of this message exchange is out of scope of the present document. Once a M2M Service User is authenticated and its M2M-User-ID is trusted, the Registrar CSE shall check whether the M2M Service User is authorized to access the Registrar CSE via the Registree AE's established security association. The method to perform this check is specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2.2.2 Authorization to access M2M resources | Once an AE or CSE has been granted access to M2M services, the Access Control decision procedure specified in clause 7.1.5 of the present document is executed before accessing an M2M resource, as specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. M2M Entity A M2M Entity B UN-SP Domain Field Domain 3rd Party Domain or M2M-SP Infrastructure Domain M2M-SP Infrastructure Domain MAF Provisioned Symmetric Key and Certificate-Based SAEF MAF Based SAEF ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 32 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.1.2.2.3 Security for multicast group fanout procedures | Multicast group fan out is specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. When this procedure is employed, request primitives originating from a Group Hosting CSE and received by Member Hosting CSEs are transferred on the Mcc reference point over a multicast capable underlying network such as 3GPP MBMS (ETSI TS 123 246 [77]). The multicast group fan out procedure is applicable only in conjunction with the CoAP binding protocol specified in ETSI TS 118 108 [76]. However, DTLS-based Security Association Establishment cannot be used for multicast. When multicast group fanout over 3GPP MBMS is employed, security as defined in ETSI TS 133 246 [78] shall be applied. Security between Group Hosting CSE and BM-SC is not in the scope of the present document. The present document does not specify a specific security mechanism on the oneM2M Service Layer (reference point Mcc). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2 Security Service Layer | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.1 Access Management | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.1.1 Identification and Authentication | This component provides authentication services to the Application Layer. Annex B provides a general description of Authentication mechanisms. oneM2M mutual authentication schemes allow oneM2M entities to prove that they know related credentials such as Master Credentials, without having to exchange value of those credentials, and sensitive data such as security identities and security identifiers. To prevent reading and copying of credentials, a secure environment within the Security CSF provides protection against tampering of those credentials and related processed information. For more information see annex B. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.2 Authorization Architecture | Figure 6.2.2-1 provides a high level overview of a generic authorization architecture. This architecture comprises four subcomponents that are described as follows: • Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): - PEP intercepts resource access requests, makes access control decision requests, and enforces access control decisions. The PEP coexists with the entity that needs authorization services. • Policy Retrieval Point (PRP): - PRP obtains applicable authorization policies according to an access control decision request. These applicable policies should be combined in order to get a finial access control decision. The PRP is located in the Authorization service. • Policy Information Point (PIP): - PIP provides attributes that are needed for evaluating authorization policies, for example the IP address of the requester, creation time of the resource, current time or location information of the requester. The PIP is located in the Authorization service. • Policy Decision Point (PDP): - PDP interacts with the PRP and PIP to get applicable authorization polices and attributes needed for evaluating authorization policies respectively, and then evaluates access request using authorization policies for rendering an access control decision. The PDP is located in the Authorization service. The Authorization service can comprise any of the subcomponents: PDP, PRP and/or PIP. This means that the subcomponents PEP, PRP, PDP and PIP could be distributed across different nodes. For example the PEP is located in an ASN/MN and the PDP is located in the IN. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 33 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The present release supports separation of PRP and PIP on different CSE from PDP as detailed in clause 7.5. The generic procedure described below is provided for information and to support further extensions, while clause 7 provides the details of authorization mechanisms in the current release. Figure 6.2.2-1: Overview of the authorization architecture The generic authorization procedure is shown in figure 6.2.2-2. Figure 6.2.2-2: Authorization Procedure Step 1: Mutual authentication (Pre-requisite). Step 2: Access Requester sends an Access Request to the PEP. Step 3: PEP makes an Access Control Decision Request according to the requester's Access Request, and sends the Access Control Decision Request to the PDP. Step 4: PDP sends an Access Control Policy Request that is generated based on the Access Control Decision Request to the PRP. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 34 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Step 5: PRP finds all applicable access control policies to the access request and sends them back to the PDP. When multiple access control policies are involved, the PRP also provides a policy combination algorithm for combining multiple evaluation results into one finial result. Step 6 PDP sends Attribute Request to the PIP if any attributes are required for evaluating these access control policies. Step 7: PIP gets required attributes and sends them back to the PDP. Step 8: PDP evaluates Access Request using access control policies. When there are multiple applicable access control policies, the PEP needs to calculate a final Access Control Decision using the policy combination algorithm. Step 9: PDP returns the Access Control Decision back to the PEP. Step 10: PEP enforces the access control decision, i.e. either forwards the Access Request to the resource or denies this access. Step 11: PEP returns access result back to the Access Requester. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.3 Security Administration | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.3.0 Introduction | The Security Administration service provides the capability to manage the Security functions, resources and attributes. This includes management of resources provided via the secure environment. In addition it can provide functions to manage sensitive data with their associated identifiers and subscriptions on behalf of other entities. Security administration is therefore dependent upon the type of secure environment being used (independent hardware module, integrated trusted execution environment or software protection). Depending on the type of Secure Environment, distinct existing standards can be used for remote administration of those Secure Environments. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.3.1 Security Pre-Provisioning of SE | Several sensitive data and associated objects are often configured by pre-provisioning of a secure environment (see clause 6.3.1) prior to deploying the M2M device it is associated with. UICCs specified in ETSI TS 102 671 [23] and ETSI TS 102 221 [24] are commonly used for such purpose because their use is required to access some underlying networks, they provide a high security level, and they offer an interoperable transport interface specified in ETSI TS 102 221 [24]. UICC-based oneM2M pre-provisioning shall follow the framework specified in annex D to ensure interoperability. For asymmetric security schemes relying on public / private key pairs, the interoperable framework to interface an M2M device with a secure environment hardware supporting generation of asymmetric key pairs, described in annex L, may be supported, so that private keys are never exposed outside of the secure environment. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.3.2 Remote security administration of SE | Security sensitive data and functions that are protected and isolated within the SE may remain remotely accessible to legitimate security administrators after deployment. Remote security administration differs from standard device management by the expectation that a secure channel is intended to be established between the administration server and the Secure Environment of the M2M Node (i.e. the secret used to secure the connection is not available in the M2M node outside of the Secure Environment). Applicable remote security administration protocols are dependent on the risk level of each M2M application and not just on the underlying network technologies. Widespread technologies that enable remote security administration for the different security levels distinguished in ETSI TR 118 508 [i.4] are considered in annex C. Since remote security administration requires the target sensitive information to be remotely modifiable, protection of such sensitive information from remote software hacking of the device is particularly critical. In case the Secure Environment relies on software protection only, remote security administration of the following data should be allowed only where remote access by potential attackers can be mitigated: • Private key and associated identifiers. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 35 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • Long-term shared symmetric key (compared to expected lifetime of the M2M node) and associated identifiers. • Any process and parameters thereof that manipulates the above information, i.e. security functions. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.4 Identity Protection | Identity Protection provides services to the Application Layer such as pseudonyms and protecting the anonymity of transactions. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.5 Sensitive Data Handling | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.5.0 Introduction | The Sensitive Data Handling service provides certain Sensitive Functions to the Application Layer. Sensitive Functions comprise the following functions: • Secure Storage. • Cryptographic operations. • Methods for bootstrapping initial secrets (e.g. GBA symmetric key derivation supported in annex D, or generation of asymmetric key pairs in a secure environment as specified in annex L). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.5.1 Sensitive Functions | This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to Sensitive Functions of the SE. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.5.2 Secure Storage | This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to the secure storage capability of the SE. Data securely stored by the AE or CSE is intended to be accessible only through the Security API and by authorized entities. Secure Storage should be managed by the Secure Environment. Securely stored data is intended to remain under the control of the stakeholder owning the data, i.e. the entity that requested the data to be stored within the secure storage, independently of other stakeholders. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.2.6 Trust Enabling security functions | oneM2M Trust Enabling Architecture may require the presence of security functionalities within the Infrastructure Domain: an M2M Authentication Function (MAF) and an M2M Enrolment Function (MEF), both classified as Trust Enabling Functions (TEF) and serving authentication and end-to-end security purposes, as well as Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) server or Role Authorities serving authorization purposes. The M2M Authentication Function and the M2M Enrolment Functions shall incorporate the ability to provide for End-to-End credential registration and provisioning. In addition, a Privacy Policy Manager functionality (PPM) may be implemented to protect user's privacy. All of these functions can be either under M2M Service Provider control or delegated to a M2M Trust Enabler (i.e. a party trusted by all involved M2M ecosystem stakeholders). • M2M Enrolment Function (MEF): - The MEF is used during the enrolment phase and supports the security bootstrap procedure enabling the provisioning of the Master Credentials to be used to mutually authenticate entities accessing the infrastructure of an M2M Service Provider. The MEF relies on an initial credential pre-provisioned in the M2M node (e.g. during manufacturing). - The credentials provisioned by an MEF can be used for authentication with an M2M Authentication Function in the MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework (SAEF), End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) or End-to-End Security of Data (ESData). Alternatively, the provisioned credentials may be used directly in the SAEF, ESPrim or ESData. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 36 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • M2M Authentication Function (MAF), used during the operational phase of M2M Services: - Master Credentials, used to mutually authenticate CSEs/AEs during the operation phase, are securely stored in a specific infrastructure functionality named M2M Authentication Function (MAF). - The MAF securely contains the set of Master Credentials that are used for authenticating CSEs/AEs that have been enrolled through the M2M SP or M2M Trust Enabler. The MAF stores the Master Credentials and possibly the identifiers of the associated CSE/AE. - A single MAF may support all communication security services (SAEF, ESPrim and ESData) or only a selection of them. An MAF providing MAF-based SAEF is operated by the M2M SP, or by an M2M Trust Enabler on behalf of the M2M SP. Other MAF can be operated by M2M Trust Enabler or M2M SP, and there is no assumption of a trust relationship existing between the M2M Trust Enabler and M2M SP in those cases. - The MAF is also in charge of all security operations involving the usage of the Master Credentials. • Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) server and Role Authorities: These functionalities manage authorization privileges to access resources that may be assigned during operation and are described in clauses 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. • Privacy Policy Manager (PPM): This functionality assists in the management of privacy preferences expressed by data subject with respect to service requirements and applicable regulations, and is described in clause 11. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.3 Secure Environment Abstraction Layer Components | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.3.1 Secure Environment | The Secure Environment component is an entity that provides Sensitive Functions operating on Sensitive Data, Secure Storage and other resources/functions. The security sensitive data and security functions contained in M2M field domain nodes are intended to be protected from unauthorized access or alteration, as determined by risk analysis. Sensitive data and functions include security credentials and algorithms that manipulate them. The purpose of a Secure Environment is to provide the required protection level (see table 6.3.1-1) to sensitive data during storage and usage, including primarily any long term symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic secret used during operation. Additionally, isolation of security sensitive data and functions controlled by different stakeholders within an M2M node can be ensured by distinct secure environments. This is especially critical for M2M Nodes that can be remotely or physically accessed by potential attackers. The choice of a Secure Environment is guided by a risk analysis considering all layers of an M2M application, though it should leverage where possible on capabilities provided by the M2M Service Layer or the Underlying Network, e.g. UICC in 3GPP and 3GPP2 networks, or Trusted Execution Environment requirements. There is no assumption made on the particular implementation of the Secure Environment. A SE may be implemented as an independent HW Secure Element or as an integrated SW function. Each Secure Environment can be associated with one certain Security Level depending on the particular implementation of the SE. Different Secure Environments provide different Security Levels and protection levels as indicated in table 6.3.1-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 37 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 6.3.1-1: Classification of Protection levels Protection Level Description 0 No protection. The data are exposed even without active attacks. 1 Low protection, data are protected from passive observers but could be exposed by active attacks, be they local or remote. E.g. software solutions exist that rely on general purpose processing hardware of the supporting equipment. 2 Medium protection, protection of the data from remote attacks is addressed, but local attacks, especially physical attacks, remain possible, i.e. Medium protection provides countermeasures against software attacks only. E.g. Software solutions to protect data and sensitive functions rely on specific processing providing enforced isolation and enables sensitive code and data to be kept away from an unprotected operating environment, software and memory. The code running in the protected environment is cryptographically verified for integrity assurance. 3 High protection, addressing both remote and local attacks to access the data, including attacks involving physical access. This includes strong counter measures against software and hardware attacks, such as detection of abnormal operating conditions and scrambling plus hardware masking of the memory and side channel analysis of operations involving sensitive data. There is intended to be at least one Secure Environment in each M2M node providing secure storage to the local CSEs and AEs, however there could be multiple. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.3.2 SE Plug-in | The SE Plug-in enables physical access to the respective Secure Environment. Depending on the type of Secure Environment, the SE Plug-in can be implemented differently for each Secure Environment. NOTE: Specification of the SE Plug-in is out of scope of the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 6.3.3 Secure Environment Abstraction | This component is specified in ETSI TS 118 116 [67]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7 Authorization | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1 Access Control Mechanism | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1.1 General Description | The M2M authorization procedure controls access to resources and services hosted by CSEs and AEs. The authorization procedure requires that the originator of the resource access request message has been identified to the Authentication Function, and originator and receiver are mutually authenticated with each other. The resource addressed in a request message has an associated accessControlPolicyIDs attribute (either included explicitly as an attribute of the resource addressed in the request message, implied from the parent of the resource, or set fixed by the system, see clause 9.6.1 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]). The accessControlPolicyIDs attribute contains a list of identifiers of <accessControlPolicy> resources applicable to the resource addressed in the request message. The overall structure of <accessControlPolicy> resources is described in clause 9.6.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]). Each of these <accessControlPolicy> resources include privileges and selfPrivileges attributes, which comprise the information, denoted as access control rules in the present document, that is evaluated against the parameters associated with the request message to obtain the access decision. Figure 7.1.1-1 illustrates the relation between <accessControlPolicy> resource instances (ACP) and the instances of the protected resources, denoted Resource_1 to Resource_N. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 38 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.1.1-1: Relation between Resource Instances and Access Control Policies Access requests to ACP's itself are evaluated against the selfPrivileges attribute of that ACP. Access requests to instances of all other resource types, are evaluated against the privileges attributes of the ACP set associated with the targeted resource. For requests to <accessControlPolicy> resource type, authorization is granted if the request is evaluated to "Permit" for at least one selfPrivileges attribute. For other resource types, authorization is granted if the request is evaluated to "Permit" for at least one privileges attribute. The privileges and selfPrivileges defined in the accessControlPolicy resource determine which request originator is allowed to access the resource containing this attribute, for which specific operation (i.e. Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, etc.) and for which specific context constraints (i.e. constraints regarding access time, originator's IP address and originator's location). The access control approach specified here conforms to the concept of Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) as defined in [i.12]. The policies defined in the <accessControlPolicy> resources are enforced by an access control mechanism which employs the authorization logical architecture outlined in clause 6.2.2. The access control mechanism assembles the information needed to render the access decision which consists of: • Information included in the resource access request message as defined in clause 7.1.2 (table 7.1.2-1). • Contextual information as defined in clause 7.1.2 (table 7.1.2-2). • Tokens (if any) associated with the resource access request. • The policies governing the access as defined in clause 7.1.3. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1.2 Parameters of the Request message | This clause specifies the parameters of a request message which are evaluated by the access control mechanism. The data types applicable to these parameters are defined in clause 6.4 of ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The parameters are listed in table 7.1.2-1. Resource_2 ... ACP_1 ACP_2 ACP_3 ACP_4 Instances of accessControlPolicy resources (ACP) Example: ACP set = (ACP_1, ACP_2) assigned to Resource_1 Each ACP includes one privileges and one selfPrivileges attribute. privileges and selfPrivileges attributes include a set of access control rules (defined in Section 7.3) List of IDs in accessControlPolicyIDs attribute of Resource_1 Resource_1 Resource_3 Resource_N ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 39 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.1.2-1: Parameters indicated in the request message Parameter Description Mandatory/ Optional Usage in access control mechanism To URI of target resource M Selection of accessControlPolicy associated with the target resource From Identifier representing the originator of the request M (see note 1) Evaluated against accessControlOriginators in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes Role IDs Role IDs of the originator O Evaluated against accessControlOriginators in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes Operation Requested operation M Evaluated against accessControlOperations in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes Resource Type Type of the target resource O (see note 2) Evaluated against accessControlObjectDetails in privileges attributes. Applicable to Create operations only. Filter Criteria filterUsage condition tag in Filter criteria O Differentiation between Retrieve and Discovery operations Tokens ESData-protected Tokens O Contains authorization information (e.g. Role-IDs) to be used in the decision for the request Token IDs tokenIDs or Local-Token-ID O Identifies Tokens containing authorization information (e.g. Role-IDs) to be used in the decision for the request M2M Service User Identity of a M2M Service User O Evaluated against the accessControlUserIDs sub- parameter of the accessControlContexts parameter of the privileges and selfPrivileges attributes NOTE 1: The From primitive parameter is Mandatory in all requests except for AE registration procedure where it is optional, as specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. NOTE 2: The resource Type primitive parameter is present in Create request primitives only. Table 7.1.2-2 lists the context parameters associated with a request message which are evaluated by the access control mechanism. These parameters are not explicitly included in a request message but can be obtained at the receiver and validated against the context policy parameters as given in table 7.1.2-2. Table 7.1.2-2: Context parameters associated with a request message Parameter Description Usage in access control mechanism rq_time Time stamp when the request message was received at the hosting CSE. Obtained by the hosting CSE's system time clock. Validated against accessControlTimeWindow parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3. rq_loc Location information about the originator of the request. Obtained over the Mcn reference point. Validated against accessControlLocationRegion parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3. rq_ip IP source address associated with the IP packets that carry the request message. Obtained over the Mcn reference point. Validated against accessControlIpAddress parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3. Tokens, as defined in clause 7.3.2.4, may be associated with a request message. A Token may be associated with a request as a result of being included in the Tokens primitive parameter of the request message or identified in the Token IDs primitive parameter of the request message. If the Hosting CSE obtained a token from the Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) Server using Direct Dynamic Authorization, then this Token shall be associated with a request if the holder parameter in the Token matches the Absolute AE-ID or CSE-ID of the Originator of the request. Dynamic Authorization is specified in clause 7.3. Table 7.1.2-3 lists the security context parameters associated with a request message. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 40 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.1.2-3: Security Context parameters associated with a request message Parameter Description Mandatory/ Optional Usage in access control mechanism rq_authn Boolean value (TRUE/FALSE) indicating if the Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE, and the From parameter matched the authenticated identity of the Originator. M Validated against accessControlAuthenticationFlag parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3. The following criteria shall be applied to determine if an Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. • If the Originator is an AE registered to the Hosting CSE, then the criteria for deciding whether the Originator is considered authenticated is deployment and/or implementation specific and depends on the trust guaranteed by the field device's physical and logical embodiment bearing the AE(s) and Hosting CSE (e.g. secure boot and tamper resistance). In many cases it is appropriate to expect a secure channel implying authentication (e.g. a TLS or DTLS session) to be used to protect primitives on the Mca interface, in which case the authentication shall be considered valid for the duration of the TLS session, When this is not the case, e.g. because the physical and logical design is trusted, authentication may be considered to be permanently valid unless it is detected that the device is compromised. • If the Originator is a CSE registered with the Hosting CSE, then the Originator shall be considered authenticated for the duration of a (D)TLS session because the Mcc is always required to be protected by TLS or DTLS according to a Security Association Establishment Framework (SAEF) as described in clause 8.2. The other CSE may be the Registrar or Registree with respect to the Hosting CSE. • If the Originator is an AE or CSE registered with a CSE other than the Hosting CSE, then the Originator is considered authenticated by the Hosting CSE if and only if the request primitive is protected using End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) as described in clause 8.4. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1.3 Format of privileges and selfPrivileges Attributes | The privileges and selfPrivileges attributes exhibit the same data type format which is specified as follows. Each privileges or selfPrivileges attribute comprises a set of access control rules. In the following, the set of access control rules is denoted as acrs and an individual access control rule in this set as acr. The access control rules in acrs are indexed with the letter k. The number of access control rules in the set is denoted with the letter K: acrs = { acr(1), acr(2), ..., acr(k), ..., acr(K) } Each access control rule acr(k) is comprised of mandatory accessControlOriginators and accessControlOperations components and optional accessControlContexts, accessControlObjectDetails, accessControlAuthenticationFlag and accessControlAttributes components. Hence, an access control rule acr(k) is either represented as a pair: acr(k) = {acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations} or as a 3-tuple, 4-tuple, 5-tuple or 6-tuple. For example, a 3-tuple such as the following: acr(k) = {acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations, acr(k)_accessControlContexts} The generic term "access-control-rule-tuple" is used when referring to a rule acr(k). A set acrs of access control rules may consist of a mix of pairs,3-tuples, 4-tuples, 5-tuples or 6-tuples. For pairs or for any tuples not containing accessControlContexts, any context parameters associated with a request message are admissible. The six component parameters of an access-control-rule-tuple supported in the present document are shown in table 7.1.3-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 41 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.1.3-1: Parameters of an access-control-rule-tuple Parameter Usage Description Mandatory/Optional Format accessControlOriginators Set of Originators that can be authorized M List of CSE-IDs and/or AE-IDs, or keyword "all" to grant access to all originators accessControlOperations Set of Operations that can be authorized M Enumerated list of operations Create Retrieve, Update, Delete, Discover, Notify accessControlContexts See table 7.1.3-3 O See table 7.1.3-3 accessControlObjectDetails See table 7.1.3-4 O See table 7.1.3-4 accessControlAuthenticationFlag Indicates whether the rule applies only to Originators which are considered to be authenticated by the Hosting CSE O Boolean accessControlAttributes Set of resource attributes for which access can be authorized O List of resource attribute name(s). The accessControlOriginators parameter comprises a list of SP domain names, CSE-IDs, AE-IDs, resource-IDs of <group> resources and/or Role IDs of any format defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. If access for all originators is to be allowed, the reserved keyword "all" may be included into the value space of accessControlOriginators. Using a SP domain name in accessControlOriginators means all AE-IDs and CSE-IDs matching the given domain name can be authorized. It is furthermore allowed to use wildcard character "*", in representations of M2M-SP-ID (i.e. SP domain names), CSE- ID and AE-ID. The scope of a "*" is terminated by a following "/" character. Table 7.1.3-2 shows examples of using wildcard characters in CSE-IDs and AE-IDs. Wildcard characters are not permitted in resource-IDs of <group> resources and Role IDs. Table 7.1.3-2: Examples of using wildcard characters in CSE-IDs and AE-IDs of accessControlOriginators Form of ID Examples Meaning CSE-ID Absolute //m2msp.org/myCSEID //*/myCSEID //*/myCSE* Any CSE whose ID matches the wild cards SP-relative /myCSEID /myCSE* Any matching CSE from the SP that is hosting the target resource AE-ID Absolute //m2msp.org/S988 //*/myCSEID/C9886 //*/myCSE*/C9886 Any AE whose ID matches the wild cards SP-relative /myCSEID/C9886 /myCSEID/C98* /myCSE*/C98* /SmyAE* Any matching AE from the SP that is hosting the target resource The data type applicable to accessControlOriginators is defined in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The accessControlOperations parameter comprises a list of admissible operations which can be any subset of the following elements: Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, Discover, and Notify. While Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, and Notify operation are explicitly indicated in the op parameter of a request message, the Discovery operation is indicated by the filterUsage condition of the Filter Criteria request parameter having a value of "Discovery", "Discovery-based Operation" or "IPE On-Demand Discovery". The data type applicable to accessControlOperations is defined in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The accessControlContexts parameters are listed in table 7.1.3-3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 42 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.1.3-3: Parameters of accessControlContexts Parameter Usage Description Mandatory/Optional Formats accessControlTimeWindow Set of Time Windows that can be authorized O List of time intervals where access can be granted in extended crontab format accessControlLocationRegion Set of Location Regions that can be authorized O 1) Latitude/longitude coordinates, and a radius defining a circular region around the coordinates 2) Country code accessControlIpAddress Set of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that can be authorized O IPv4: dotted-decimal notation with CIDR suffix IPv6: colon separated groups of hexadecimal digits with CIDR suffix accessControlUserIDs Set of M2M Service Users that can be authorized O List of M2M-User-IDs accessControlEvalCriteria Set of conditions that are factored into authorization decisions O A tuple consisting of a mandatory resource identifier of a subject resource and an set of evaluation criteria applicable to the subject resource. accessControlLimit Number of times access to a resource can be authorized O A number that indicates how many times access can be granted. The accessControlTimeWindow parameter represents a list of elements that comply with the extended crontab syntax as defined in clause 7.3.8 of ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. It allows definition of periodically recurring time intervals at which access can be granted, when the rq_time parameter associated with the access request message falls into such interval. For the elements of accessControlLocationRegion there are two representation choices. These can be represented by a 2-character country code or a circle with radius R centred at a point defined in terms of longitude and latitude parameters. Refer to annex F for detailed information. Each element of accessControlLocationRegion defines an admissible location region, which is compared with the rq_loc parameter associated with the access request message. The data types applicable to accessControlLocationRegion and rq_loc are defined in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The accessControlIpAddress parameter represents a list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in dotted-decimal notation with CIDR suffix or colon separated groups of hexadecimal digits with CIDR suffix, respectively. If the rq_loc parameter associated with the access request message matches one of these addresses, access may be granted with regard to this criterion. The data types applicable to accessControlIpAddress and rq_ip are defined in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The accessControlUserIDs parameter comprises a list of M2M-User-IDs having a format defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Using just a SP domain name in accessControlUserIDs means all M2M-User-IDs matching the given domain name can be authorized. For example, "//m2msp.org". It is furthermore allowed to use a wildcard character "*" within the SP-Relative-M2M-User-ID portion of a M2M-User-ID. For example, //m2msp.org/homeowner*. A wildcard character is not permitted within the SP domain name portion of a M2M-User-ID. The data type applicable to accessControlUserIDs is defined in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. This accessControlEvalCriteria parameter represents the conditions determining if the request operation is to be allowed. It allows conditional access to the resource based on conditions not contained in the received request. The accessControlEvalCriteria parameter is a tuple that consists of a mandatory subjectResourceID element as defined in table 9.6.61-2 in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] and an evalCriteria element defined in table 9.6.61-3 in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The accessControlLimit parameter represents the number of times that the policy defined by an access-control-rule- tuple can allow authorization to the requested resource. This attribute maintains the number of remaining accesses allowed. The parameter is decremented each time an access to the requested resource is granted. If the value is greater than zero then access is granted, otherwise access is denied. If the accessControlLimit parameter is not present in an access-control-rule-tuple, then there are no restrictions on the number of times access is granted. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 43 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The accessControlAuthenticationFlag parameter is a Boolean value. If the accessControlAuthenticationFlag parameter is not present, then the value is assumed to be FALSE. If the accessControlAuthenticationFlag parameter is TRUE, then this indicates that the access control rule applies only to Originators considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. Clause 7.1.2 specifies the criteria used to decide whether or not the Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. The accessControlObjectDetails parameters are listed in table 7.1.3-4. Table 7.1.3-4: Parameters of accessControlObjectDetails Parameter Usage Description Mandatory/Optional Formats resourceType Resource type on which access control rule applies O Resource type identifier specializationID Identifier of mgmtDefinition or containerDefinition O mgmtDefinition or containerDefinition represented as a string. childResourceType Set of resource type identifiers that can be created under the parent resource. O Resource type list. The accessControlObjectDetails attribute specifies a subset of child resource types of the targeted resource to which the access control rule applies. If an access control rule includes accessControlObjectDetails, then childResourceType is specified. An access control rule which does not include any accessControlObjectDetails parameters applies to all child resource types of the target resource. The accessControlObjectDetails parameter is described in table 9.6.2.4-1 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Child resource types listed in the childResourceType component are subject of access control for the Create operation only. Once a child resource is created, the Access Control Policies assigned directly to it apply. The resourceType and specializationID elements are optional. If either the resourceType or specializationID element is present in accessControlObjectDetails, the CSE matches the type of resource or specialization of the targeted resource with the value specified in the resourceType or specializationID element. Further checking of childResourceType is done only if the resourceType or specializationID match occurs. However, if the resourceType and specializationID elements are not provided, then only childResourceType match is performed. The accessControlAttributes attribute specifies a list of one or more resource attribute names. If there is a rule for which all conditions of the rule are satisfied, then other rules shall be ignored. Otherwise, rules that contain accessControlAttributes and that satisfy all conditions apart from accessControlAttributes are considered to be applicable rules. In this case, the resource attributes associated with the request and its response are evaluated against the union of resource attributes defined across all the accessControlAttributes of these applicable rules to determine if access is allowed. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1.4 Access Control Decision | The access decision is derived by comparing the parameters associated with a resource access request message as described in clause 7.1.2 with the access control rules included in the privileges or selfPrivileges attributes of all ACP sets assigned to the protected resource by means of the accessControlPolicyIDs, see figure 7.1.1-1. The result of the access decision algorithm, i.e. the access decision, is the overall result of evaluating the applicable set of access control rules, acrs, against the parameters associated with the access request message. This access decision can be represented by a value of binary data type. The overall result of the access decision algorithm is denoted here with the variable name res_acrs: = else 0 or FALSE rules control access the matches request the if 1 or TRUE res_acrs The reference access decision algorithm is specified in clause 7.1.5. For any given sets of inputs, an implementation of the access decision processing shall return the same result as the reference access decision algorithm would return for those inputs. If the access decision algorithm yields the result res_acrs = TRUE, then the access decision for the requested resource shall be "Permit". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 44 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 If the access decision algorithm yields the result res_acrs = FALSE, or the access decision algorithm is not capable of deriving a final result (e.g. due to indeterminate parameters), then the access decision for the requested resource shall be "Deny". The access decision algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase evaluates each of the applicable access control rules on an individual basis to determine whether an individual access control rule permits access to the requested resource. If the access control decision for an individual access control rule results in res_acrs = TRUE, the algorithm stops, and the second phase of the algorithm is not performed. However, if the first phase of the reference access decision algorithm results in res_acrs = FALSE, but during the processing of the first phase of the algorithm, one or more access-control-rule-tuple including an accessControlAttributes condition is processed, then a second phase of the algorithm is performed. In this second phase, the set of access control rules that have accessControlAttributes conditions and that have satisfied all conditions of the first phase of the access decision algorithm, apart from their accessControlAttributes conditions, are collectively evaluated. If the union of resource attributes defined across all their accessControlAttributes conditions permit access to the requested resource then res_acrs = TRUE, otherwise res_acrs = FALSE. Note, although the access decision algorithm is defined as having two phases, it is left to implementation whether these two phases require one or more passes over the access control rules. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.1.5 Description of the Access Decision Algorithm | The reference access decision algorithm specified in this clause combines partial access control results obtained for each of the individual access control rules contained in a privileges or selfPrivileges attribute. Further, if multiple ACP instances are assigned to the protected resource, the reference access decision algorithm combines the partial access control results obtained for the individual ACPs of an ACP set. The algorithm specified in this clause adopts a "Permit-overrides" combining algorithm with respect to access control rules and ACPs as defined in XACML [i.5]. This algorithm has the following behaviour: 1) The first phase of the algorithm determines if the result is "Permit" if a single access control rule included in the privileges (or selfPrivileges) attribute of a single ACP permits access to the targeted resource. 2) The second phase of the algorithm determines if the result is "Permit" if the set of applicable access control rules containing accessControlAttributes collectively as a union permit access to the targeted resource. 3) Otherwise, the result is "Deny". The logic for evaluating a request against a privilege can be described mathematically as follows. A privileges or selfPrivileges attribute included in an <accessControlPolicy> resource represents a set of access control rules, acrs, which is built as in figure 7.1.5-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 45 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 acrs = { acr(1), arc(2), …, arc(k), …, arc(K) } acr(k) = {acr(k)_accessControlAuthenticationFlag, acr(k)_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)_accessControlOperations, acr(k)_accessControlContexts, acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails, acr(k)_accessControlAttributes} Set of originator parameters. Examples: {CSE-ID1, AE-ID1, AE- ID2, Role-ID1} {all} Set of allowed operations. Examples: {Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, Discover, Notify} {Retrieve, Discover, Notify} Set (list) of M_k context constraints (number of elements M_k can be different for each acr(k)): {acr(k)_accessControlContext(k, 1), … …, acr(k)_accessControlContext(k, m), … …, acr(k)_accessControlContext(k, M_k)} Set of context constraints consisting of the 3 elements: {accessControlTimeWindow(k, m), accessControlLocationRegion(k,m), accessControlIpAddress(k, m), accessControlUserIDs(k,m)} Set of time windows defined by start and end time Example: {daily 04:30 – 06:00, 11:30 – 12:30, 22:15 – 00:30} Set of location regions defined by list of objects representing geographical regions Example: {geoRegion1, geoRegion2, geoRegion3} Set of IP addresses or address blocks Example (IPv4): {212.75.201.105, 88.77.0.0/16, 116.27.123.0/24} Set of child resource type Ids allowed to be created under the target resource . Examples: (a) Target resource type = 3 (container) Child resource type = {4} (contentInstance) (b) Target resource type = 2 (AE) Child resource type = {3 23} (container and subscription) Set of M2M Service Users Example: {homeowner1, supervisor*} {all} Set of allowed attribute names Examples: {creator, lastModifiedTime, e2eSecInfo, labels, creationTime, announcedAttributes, announceTo} Figure 7.1.5-1: Logic to evaluate privileges in the reference access decision algorithm The parameters associated with a request, which are evaluated against the parameters contained in the access control rules are specified in clause 7.1.3. The access decision res_acrs defined in clause 7.1.4 is derived by evaluating whether or not the parameters associated with the request message listed in tables 7.1.2-1 and 7.1.2-2 match any of the access control rules contained in the access control rule set defined in clause 7.1.3 as follows: res_acrs = res_acr(1) OR res_acr(2) ... OR res_acr(k) … OR res_acr(K), where res_acr(k) represents the logical evaluation result (i.e. TRUE/FALSE or 1/0) of the request parameters against the kth access control rule in the set acrs, which can be expressed as follows: res_acr(k) = res_authn(k) AND res_origs(k) AND res_ops(k) AND res_ctxts(k) AND res_objd(k) AND res_attrs(k), where k = 1…K. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 46 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The first partial logical result variable res_authn(k) on the right side of above equation shall be evaluated according to table 7.1.5-1: Table 7.1.5-1: Evaluating res_authn(k) acr(k)_accessControlAuthenticationFlag rq_authn res_authn TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE The next 4 partial logical result variables on the right side of above equation can be defined by using the following set function: ∈ = else 0 or FALSE setX if 1 or TRUE setX) , ismember( x x With this definition: res_origs(k) = ismember(Originator, acr(k)_accessControlOriginators) res_ops(k) = ismember(Operation, acr(k)_accessControlOperations) In the above equation, the Originator variable refers to the authenticated identity of the originator of the request primitive which matches the From parameter. The fourth partial logical result res_ctxts(k) is derived as follows: res_ctxts(k) = res_context(k, 1) ... OR res_context(k, m) ... OR res_context(k, M_k), where: res_context(k, m) = res_time(k, m) AND res_ip(k, m) AND res_loc (k, m) AND res_uids(k, m), k = 1…K, m = 1…M_k and res_time(k, m) = ismember(rq_time, acr(k)_accessControlTimeWindow(m)) res_ip(k, m) = ismember(rq_ip, acr(k)_accessControlIpAddress(m)) res_loc (k, m) = ismember(rq_loc, acr(k)_accessControlLocationRegion(m)) res_uids(k, m) = ismember(M2M Service User, acr(k)_accessControlUserIDs(m)) The fifth partial logical result res_objd(k) applies to Create request primitives only and is derived as res_objd(k) = res_objdetails(k, 1) ... OR res_objdetails(k, m) ... OR res_objdetails(k, M_k), where: res_objdetails(k, m) = res_resourceType(k, m) AND res_specializationID(k, m) AND res_childResource(k,m), for m = 1…M_k. The three logical arguments are defined below. For each given element acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails(m) in an access control rule determine if the optional resourceType parameter is present resourceType = acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails(m)/resourceType Depending on the presence of resourceType, res_resourceType(k, m) is derived as ≠ = = urceTypeID targetReso pe resourceTy urceTypeID targetReso pe resourceTy m k acr m k ceType res_resour and present if 0, or FALSE and present if 1, or TRUE ) tDetails( ntrolObjec )_accessCo ( in present not if 1, or TRUE ) , ( ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 47 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 where targetResourceTypeID is the resource type identifier associated with the resource addressed in the To parameter of the Create request primitive. If the value of the resourceType element is 13 (<mgmtObject> specialization) or 28 (<flexContainer> specialization>), the optional specializationID element shall also be included in accessControlObjectDetails: specializationID = acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails(m)/specializationID If specializationID is present, it shall be matched against the mgmtDefinition or containerDefinition attributes given in the Content parameter of the Create request primitive. = ≠ = ≠ = = = = = 28) ( 0, or FALSE 13) ( 0, or FALSE 28) ( 1, or TRUE 13) ( 1, or TRUE ) tDetails( ntrolObjec )_accessCo ( in present not if 1, or TRUE ) . ( pe resourceTy efinition containerD tionID specializa pe resourceTy tion mgmtDefini tionID specializa pe resourceTy efinition containerD tionID specializa pe resourceTy tion mgmtDefini tionID specializa m k acr tionID specializa m k lizationID res_specia The childResourceType element is mandatory in any given accessControlObjectDetails element of an access control rule. It includes a list of j = 1…J child resource type identifiers to which the rule applies. The jth list element is denoted as follows childResourceType(k, m. j) = acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails(m)/childResourceType(j), j = 1…J The logical variable res_childResource(k, m) is derived as res_childResource (k, m) = ismember(Resource Type, childResourceType(k, m, j)) where Resource Type refers to the value of the parameter of the given Create request primitive. NOTE: If resourceType and specializationID are not present in acr(k)_accessControlObjectDetails(m), res_objdetails(k, m) = res_resourceType(k, m) AND res_specializationID(k, m) AND res_childResource(k,m) = res_childResource(k,m). The sixth partial logical result res_attrs(k) is derived as follows: res_attrs(k) TRUE or 1, if the operation specific acr(k)_accessControlAttributes rules described below are satisfied FALSE or 0, if the operation specific acr(k)_accessControlAttributes rules described below are not satisfied Depending on the type of operation, the requested attribute names defined within the parameters of the request (e.g. To, Content, Filter Criteria) or within the targeted resource shall be compared against the names of attributes present in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes to determine the value of res_attrs(k) as follows: • For an operation that includes a Filter Criteria parameter and that requires access to the attributes of a resource to process the Filter Criteria (i.e., matching conditions defined within a discovery operation, discovery-based operation, IPE On-demand discovery operation or a conditional operation), acr(k)_accessControlAttributes defines the attributes that can be accessed. If the Filter Criteria includes the names of attributes that are not defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. Otherwise, if the names of all the attributes are defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then the value of res_attrs(k) shall be determined by the operation specific steps described below: - For a Retrieve operation, acr(k)_accessControlAttributes defines the attributes that can be retrieved and included in the response. - For a Retrieve operation that targets a resource, in which all the names of the attributes present in the targeted resource are included in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is True or 1. Otherwise, if one or more of the names of the attributes present in the targeted resource are not included in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. - For a Retrieve operation that targets one or more individual attributes of a resource (i.e. partial retrieve) and these attributes are all defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is True or 1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 48 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Otherwise, if one or more individual attributes are not defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. • For a Delete operation, acr(k)_accessControlAttributes defines the attributes that can be deleted. If all the attributes present in the targeted resource of a Delete operation are defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is True or 1. Otherwise, if one or more of the attributes are not defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. • For an Update operation, acr(k)_accessControlAttributes defines the attributes that can be included in the Content parameter of a request and its response. For an Update operation that attempts to create, update or delete one or more attributes of a resource that are all defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is True or 1, however any attributes of the targeted resource not included in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes shall be filtered and not included in the response. Otherwise, if one or more of the attributes of the Update operation are not defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. • For a Create operation, acr(k)_accessControlAttributes defines the attributes that can be included in the Content parameter of a request and its response. For a Create operation that attempts to create a resource with attributes that are all defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is True or 1, however any attributes of the targeted resource not included in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes shall be filtered and not included in the response. Otherwise, if one or more attributes of the Create operation are not defined in acr(k)_accessControlAttributes, then res_attrs(k) is False or 0. Thanks to the "Permit-overrides" combining approach, if the access control decision for one access control rule results in res_acr = TRUE, the reference access decision algorithm can stop without evaluating any other applicable access control rules of the current ACP or any other ACPs in the ACP set, and the final access decision is "Permit" (i.e. res_acrs = TRUE). However, if the first phase of the reference access decision algorithm results in res_acrs = FALSE, and during the processing of the algorithm, one or more access-control-rule-tuple including an accessControlAttributes condition is processed, then a second phase of the access decision algorithm shall determine the final access decision. In the second phase of the access decision algorithm, the following steps shall be performed: • All access control rules having accessControlAttributes conditions, that have satisfied all conditions of the access decision algorithm apart from their accessControlAttributes condition, shall be collectively considered an applicable set of access control rules, • Depending on the type of operation, the requested attribute names defined within the parameters of the request (e.g. To, Content, Filter Criteria) or within the targeted resource shall be compared against the names of attributes present in the union of resource attributes defined across all the accessControlAttributes of the applicable set of access control rules to determine the value of res_acrs as follows: - If a Retrieve, Delete, Update or Create operation includes a Filter Criteria parameter with names of one or more attributes that are not defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Deny". Otherwise, if the names of the attributes are all defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be determined by the operation specific steps described below: - For a Retrieve operation that targets a resource, the final access decision shall be "Permit", but any attributes not included in the union of accessControlAttributes shall be filtered and not included in the response. If none of the attributes defined in the union of accessControlAttributes match the names of the attributes present in the targeted resource, then no attributes shall be returned in the response. - For a Retrieve operation that targets one or more individual attributes of a resource (i.e. partial retrieve) and these attributes are all defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Permit". Otherwise, if one or more individual attributes are not defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Deny". - For a Delete operation, if all the attributes present in the targeted resource are defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Permit". Otherwise, if one or more of the attributes present in the targeted resource are not defined in union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Deny". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 49 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - For an Update operation that attempts to create, update or delete one or more attributes of a resource that are all defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Permit", however any attributes of the targeted resource not included in the union of accessControlAttributes shall be filtered and not included in the response. Otherwise, if one or more of the attributes of the attempted Update operation are not defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Deny". - For a Create operation that attempts to create a resource with attributes that are all defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Permit", however any attributes of the targeted resource not included in the union of accessControlAttributes shall be filtered and not included in the response. Otherwise, if one or more attributes of the attempted Create operation are not defined in the union of accessControlAttributes, then the final access decision shall be "Deny". |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.2 Impersonation Prevention | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.2.1 Registrar verification of AE-ID | Since several AEs can behave maliciously and pretend to be another AE with their ID changed, the Hosting CSE needs prevention mechanism for AE impersonation. This mechanism works at Registrar CSE since Registrar CSE is an entry point of M2M system. When the Registrar CSE receives a request, the Registrar CSE shall perform the following procedure. Figure 7.2.1-1: AE impersonation checking procedure 0. Security association establishment may be performed. Clause 6.1.2.2.1 describes the scenarios when security association establishment between an AE and CSE is mandatory, and describes the scenarios when security association establishment between an AE and CSE is recommended. The subsequent procedures shall be performed if a security association has been established. 1. The AE sends a request to Hosting CSE via its Registrar CSE as specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] (Hosting CSE is not represented on this figure and can either be the Registrar CSE or another CSE). 2. The Registrar CSE checks if the value in the From parameter is the same as the ID associated in security association: 3. If the values are not identical, then the Registrar CSE shall send a response with Response Status Code '4106' ("ORIGINATOR_HAS_NOT_REGISTERED"). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 50 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 4. If the values are identical, then the Registrar CSE shall perform the procedures specified in clause 8.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Depending on the number of Transit CSEs, the Registrar CSE shall either process the request or forward it to the Hosting CSE or to another Transit CSE. NOTE: This impersonation verification procedure is not applicable for CSE. This is because when a Transit CSE forwards a request to another CSE, the From parameter of the request is the identifier of the Originator which is different from the identifier of the Transit CSE. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.2.2 Verification Using End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) | End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), clause 8.4, allows a Target (a Hosting CSE or AE) to authenticate the Originator of a request primitives that are processed by Transit CSEs. ESPrim also provides confidentiality and integrity protection of these request and response primitives. The primitives being protected are called the inner primitives. ESPrim encryption is applied to the inner primitives to form ESPrim Objects. Outer primitives are used to transport the ESPrim objects between the Originator and Target CSE or AE. The Originator's Registrar cannot view the encrypted inner primitive, and cannot verify that the From parameter of the inner primitive is correct. Instead, the Target is expected to verify that the From parameter of the inner primitive agrees with the authenticated identity of the Originator. When the Target receives an ESPrim-protected request, the Target shall perform the following procedure. Figure 7.2.2-1: Impersonation checking procedure 0. The Target and Originator have previously established a symmetric pairwiseESPrimKey. The Target associates an identity with the symmetric pairwiseESPrimKey. 1. The Originator composes the inner request primitive, encrypts it using ESPrim to form an ESPrim Object, and sends it to the Target as described in clause 8.4. NOTE: Regardless of whether ESPrim is applied, each Mcc "hop" is always protected using an SAEF, and each Mca "hop" is optionally protected using an SAEF; see clause 6.1.2.2.1. 2. The Target applies the procedures in clause 8.4 to decrypt the ESPrim Object and obtain the inner request primitive. 3. The Target checks if the value in the From parameter is the same as the ID associated with the pairwiseESPrimKey: 4. If the values are not identical, then the Target shall send a response with Response Status Code '4116' ("ESPRIM_IMPERSONATION_ERROR"). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 51 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 5. If the values are identical, then the Target shall record that the Originator has been authenticated, and performs procedures specified in clause 8.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3 Dynamic Authorization | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.1 Purpose of the Dynamic Authorization | The Dynamic Authorization provides an interoperable framework for an Originator to be dynamically issued with temporary permissions providing the Originator with access to one or more resources on one or more CSEs. Applicable use cases, requirements and proposals are discussed in oneM2M TR-0019 [i.15]. The present document specifies the exchanged Dynamic Authorization parameters and associated processing at the Originator and Hosting CSE. The transport of dynamic authorization parameters is specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] and ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2 Dynamic Authorization Stage 2 Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.1 Dynamic Authorization Reference Model | The Dynamic Authorization reference model is shown in figure 7.3.2.1-1. Figure 7.3.2.1-1: Dynamic Authorization reference model The Dynamic Authorization reference model introduces the following systems and entities: • Dynamic Authorization System (DAS): A system supporting dynamic authorization on behalf of resources owners. The present document does not describe the processing and exchange of messages within the Dynamic Authorization System. This system may reside either internally or externally within the service provider network. • Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) Server: A server configured with policies for dynamic authorization, and provided with credentials for issuing Tokens. The DAS Server may include an AE for interaction with the oneM2M system. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 52 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The following Dynamic Authorization procedures are specified: • Direct Dynamic Authorization, summarized in figure 7.3.2.1-2. In this procedure, Hosting CSE interacts with the DAS Server to obtain Dynamic Authorization. When AE, Hosting CSE and the DAS server support creating the Authorization Relationship Mapping Record, then steps 5-7 will be applied. NOTE: Original request may include Tokens or Token IDs. Applicable details in other figures. Figure 7.3.2.1-2: Direct Dynamic Authorization • Indirect Dynamic Authorization, summarized in figure 7.3.2.1-3: - Steps 1 and 2: The Hosting CSE may provide the Originator with Token Request Information in the unsuccessful response. - Step 3: The Originator interacts with the DAS Server with the intention that the DAS Server issue Tokens authorizing the Originator, and the Originator is provided with the Token or a Token-ID. If the Originator is an AE, whose AE-ID-Stem is assigned by the registrar CSE, and both AE and DAS server support to create the Authorization Relationship Mapping Record, then the DAS Server shall request the AE to create the authorization relationship mapping record. The interaction is not described in the present document. - Step 4: If the DAS Server starts the process of AuthorRelMapRecord creation in step 3, then the AE shall create the AuthorRelMapRecord in the DAS Server. - Steps 5 to 8: The Originator provides the Hosting CSE with a Token, Token-ID to indicate that the Token is to be considered in the access decision. In the case of a token-ID, the Hosting CSE retrieves the corresponding Token via an AE of the DAS Server. These are then used in the access decision. If the AuthorRelMapRecord is created in step 4, then the Originator shall also indicate the related information to the Hosting CSE. The Hosting CSE may provide the Originator with a Local-Token-ID that may be used to identify the Token. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 53 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.3.2.1-3: Indirect Dynamic Authorization |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.2 Direct Dynamic Authorization | The present document specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at the Hosting CSE. The transport of parameters is specified in clause 11.5.2, ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The message flow for the Direct Dynamic Authorization is shown in figure 7.3.2.2-1, and described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 54 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.3.2.2-1: Message flow for Direct Dynamic Authorization 1. The Originator sends request (called the request from the Originator for this message flow) to the Hosting CSE. This request may include Tokens or Token-IDs; see the clause 7.3.2.3. 2. Initial Hosting CSE processing: 2.1 If the request from the Originator includes Tokens or Token-IDs then these are processed as described in clause 7.3.2.3. The Hosting CSE evaluates the access decision algorithm, but is unable to grant access for the request from the Originator based on configured access control policies. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 55 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2.2 The Hosting HCSE determines the set of DAS Server with which Direct Dynamic Authorization may be performed: 2.2.1 The HCSE examines all accessControlRules for which request satisfies the accessControlOperations and accessControlContexts in the <accessControlPolicy> resources linked to the requested resource. The HCSE collects the set of all Role-IDs in the accessControlOperators of these accessControlRules. This Role-IDs are grouped according to the DAS Server AE-ID identified by the Role-ID. NOTE 1: Regarding the Role-ID(s) parameter: The Originator would be granted access if a Token(s) is issued which associates the Originator with one or more of the Role-ID(s). Providing this list to the DAS Server allows the DAS Server to select a suitable set of one or more Role-ID(s) to associate with the Originator in Token(s), thereby authorizing the Originator to access the requested resources. The policies configured to the DAS Server would dictate which Role-ID(s) (if any) are included in Token(s) issued to the Originator. 2.2.2 The HCSE shall also collect the set of <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> resources linked to the requested resource, and group these according to the DAS Server's dynamicAuthorizationPoA attribute of the <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> resource. 2.3 The Hosting CSE selects a DAS Server (from the set determined in step 2.2) and sends a oneM2M request message containing the information described in table 7.3.2.2-1. The transport of parameters is specified in step 2.3, clause 11.5.2, ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Table 7.3.2.2-1: Information sent from Hosting CSE to DAS Server during the Direct Dynamic Authorization Parameter Description Mandatory/ Optional Originator Identifier of the Originator of the request received by the Receiver M Originator Resource Type Type of resource targeted by originated request received by Receiver M Operation Type of operation specified in originated request received by the Receiver M Originator IP Address IP address of Originator of request received by Receiver O Originator Location Location of Originator of request received by Receiver O Originator Role IDs Role IDs of Originator of request received by Receiver O Request Timestamp Timestamp when originated request was received by Receiver O Targeted Resource ID Resource ID targeted by originated request received by Receiver O Proposed Privileges Lifetime Proposed lifetime of authorization privileges requested by the Receiver O Role IDs From ACPs The set of Dynamic Access Roles in the accessControlDynAuthRole parameters associated with the DAS Server AE-ID. O Token IDs The set of token identifiers associated with the Originator O AuthorSignIndi cator An indicator included in the request received by Receiver to indicate the capability to sign for creating AuthorRelMapRecord when Originator is an AE. It is used in the case that the AE-ID-Stem is assigned by the Registrar CSE of the AE so that the AE-ID may change in a new registration (see clause 7.3.2.7.1). If the Hosting CSE does not support this parameter, then the Hosting CSE shall ignore it. O 3. DAS Server processing: 3.1 The DAS Server processes the received parameters. The DAS Server may decide to provide Token(s) and/or dynamicACPInfo which will be used by the Hosting CSE to create a dynamic <accessControlPolicy> resource. The DAS Server applies the policies with which it is configured to decide on the appropriate actions. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 56 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 2: The details of this decision are specific to the Dynamic Authorization System being employed; these details are not visible to the oneM2M system, and are not addressed in the present document. NOTE 3: The DAS Server that is contacted by the Hosting CSE can contact one or more additional DAS Servers to request additional tokens (e.g. tokens applicable to more sensitive or privileged resources). The DAS Server contacted by the Hosting CSE can then return a list of one or more Tokens to the Hosting CSE. The Issuer field inside the Token structure defined in clause 7.3.2.4 will indicate which DAS Server provided which Token. The messaging that takes place between DAS Servers is out of scope of oneM2M specifications. The Token(s) (if any) shall conform to clause 7.3.2.4, with the following profile: The "holder" parameter shall contain the Originator's Absolute CSE-ID or AE-ID received from the HCSE, and may contain other CSE-IDs and AE-IDS. The "audience" parameter shall contain only the HCSEs CSE-ID. The DAS Server shall apply an ESData protection option to the individual Tokens with the following requirements The DAS Server may encrypt the Token such that the Token can be decrypted by the Hosting CSE. The Hosting CSE shall be able to verify that the DAS Server issued the token. The ESData processing results in an ESData envelope which is called the ESData-protected Token for the purposes of this message flow. If the DAS Server decides to authorize the Hosting CSE to create a dynamic <accessControlPolicy> resource, then the DAS Server shall form a dynamicACPInfo parameter containing the following information are listed in table 7.3.2.2-2. Table 7.3.2.2-2: Information included in the dynamicACPInfo parameter Parameter Description Mandatory/Optional Granted Privileges List of granted privileges O Privileges Lifetime Lifetime of granted privileges O Tokens List of issued tokens O 3.2 The DAS Server shall send the ESData-protected Token(s) (if any) and (optional) dynamicACPInfo parameter via the DAS Server AE to the Hosting CSE. The transport of parameters is specified in step 2.3, clause 11.5.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. If the DAS Server receives the AuthorSignIndicator from the Hosting CSE and the DAS server itself also supports to trigger creating the authorization relationship mapping record, then the DAS Server shall send an AuthorSignReqInfo to the Hosting CSE to request the AE to create the authorization relationship mapping record. 4. HCSE Processing: 4.1 The HCSE processes the ESData-protected Token(s) (if present) and dynamicACPInfo parameter (if present): 4.1.1 The HCSE shall perform the following verifications for each ESData-protected Token: 4.1.1.1 The HCSE shall apply ESData processing to the ESData-protected Token to extract the authenticated Token. 4.1.1.2 The HCSE shall perform the following verifications: 4.1.1.2.1 The "issuer" parameter in the Token shall exactly match the identity of the DAS Server. 4.1.1.2.2 The HCSE's CSE-ID shall match the CSE-ID in the "audience" parameter in the Token. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 57 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 4.1.1.2.3 The "holder" parameter in the Token shall exactly matches the Absolute CSE-ID or AE-ID of the Originator from whom the request was received. 4.1.1.2.4 The HCSE shall verify that the Token has not expired, by comparing the current time to the "notAfter" parameter in the Token. 4.1.1.3 The HCSE shall cache the verified Token, and may later delete the verified Token when the Token expires (as defined in step 4.1.2.4). If the Hosting CSE receives an AuthorSignReqInfo from DAS Server AE, then the Hosting CSE shall make sure the Absolute AE-ID of the Originator shall be assigned to the holder attribute of the cached token. 4.1.2 If dynamicACPInfo is provided by the DAS Server, then the Hosting CSE shall create a dynamic <accessControlPolicy> resource matching the dynamicACPInfo. 4.2 The Hosting CSE repeats the access decision mechanism in clause 7.1.4. 4.3 If access is granted, then the Hosting CSE performs the operation requested in the request from the Originator, resulting in the Hosting CSE sending a request to the Originator. 5. The Hosting CSE shall send a response message containing the ESData-protected Token(s) (if present) or TokenID(s), and AuthorSignReqInfo if the Hosting CSE receives and supports the AuthorSignReqInfo from DAS Server AE. If the AuthorSignReqInfo is not included in the response, then the steps 6 to 8 will not be applied. 6. Originator processing: 6.1 If the Originator receives AuthorSignReqInfo, then the Originator shall generate AuthorSign(s) on Token(s) or TokenID(s) for each Token. NOTE 4: AuthorSign is a signature generated using the certificate of the AE or a MIC generated using a symmetric key shared between the AE and Hosting CSE. How a symmetric key is distributed to the AE and DAS server is not specified in the present document. NOTE 5: If the Originator includes the AuthorSignIndicator in step 1, but there is no AuthorSignReqInfo included in the response in step 5, then it indicates that the Hosting CSE or the DAS server does not support creating the authorization relationship mapping record. 6.2 The Originator sends the AuthorSign(s) with the corresponding Token(s) or TokenID(s) to the Hosting CSE. 7. The Hosting CSE forwards the parameters from the Originator to the DAS server AE. 8. DAS server AE shall create AuthorRelMapRecord(s) containing the following information listed in table 7.3.2.2-3 for each Token: Table 7.3.2.2-3: Information included in the AuthorRelMapRecord Parameter Description Mandatory/Optional SubjectID Absolute AE-ID of the AE O Token The token issued for the AE M SignatureAuth orSign Generated from Token or TokenID M ResourceID The resource ID of the resource AE requests to access O |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.3 Indirect Dynamic Authorization | The present document specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at the Originator and Hosting CSE. The transport of parameters is specified in clause 11.5.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The message flow for Indirect Dynamic Authorization is shown in figure 7.3.2.3-1, and described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 58 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.3.2.3-1: Message flow for Indirect Dynamic Authorization 1. (Optional) The Originator sends request to the Hosting CSE. The Originator includes an indication that the Originator is prepared to request Tokens from DAS Servers for this request. This request may include a combination of Tokens, tokenIDs, Local-Token-IDs but this message flow assumes that these do not provide sufficient permissions for accessing the requested resource. 2. (Optional) Initial Hosting CSE processing: 2.1 Hosting CSE performs the access decision for the request from the Originator. This call flow assumes that the request from the Originator is denied as a result of the access decision. The Hosting CSE observes the indication that the Originator prepared to request Tokens from DAS Servers for this request. 2.2 The Hosting CSE forms a list of DAS Server's and associated Role-ID(s) (if any) as described in step 2.2.1 of the Direct Dynamic Authorization in clause 7.3.2.2. For each DAS Server, then Hosting CSE may apply ESData to the set of Role-IDs for decryption by the DAS Server. For example, the ESData may encrypt the set of Role-IDs so they are not visible to the Originator. 2.3 The Hosting CSE shall send an unsuccessful response to the Originator, including the list of DAS Servers and associated set of optionally-ESData-protected Role-IDs. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 59 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2.4 The Originator selects a DAS Server identified in the response. 3. The Originator shall interact with the DAS Server to request the issuance of a Token. The Originator can provide the optionally-ESData-protected set of Role-IDS to the DAS Server, and parameters from the original resource access request. If the Originator is an AE and the AE-ID-Stem is assigned by the Registrar CSE of the AE, and the Originator supports to create the authorization relationship mapping record, then the Originator shall provide the AuthorSignIndicator parameter in order to ask the DAS server to maintain the authorization relationship (see clause 7.3.2.7.2) in case the AE-ID of the Originator may change in a new registration. If the set of Role-IDS is protected using ESData, the DAS Server applies ESData to extract the set of Role-IDS. The DAS Server issues a Token(s) and provides the tokenID(s) and optionally the ESData-protected Token(s) to the Originator. The DAS Server can also provide the Originator with other parameters from the Token; for example, the time window in which the Token is valid. If the DAS Server receives the AuthorSignIndicator from the Originator, and the DAS server supports creating the authorization relationship mapping record, then the DAS server shall provide the Originator with an AuthorSignReqInfo to request the Originator to return AuthorSign(s) for each Token. This interaction is specific to the Dynamic Authorization System technology being used. NOTE 1: The DAS Server that is contacted by the Hosting CSE can contact one or more additional DAS Servers to request additional tokens (e.g. tokens applicable to more sensitive or privileged resources). The DAS Server contacted by the Hosting CSE can then return a list of one or more Tokens to the Hosting CSE. The Issuer field inside the Token structure defined in clause 7.3.2.4 will indicate which DAS Server provided which Token. The messaging that takes place between DAS Servers is out of scope of oneM2M specifications. 4. If the Originator receives an AuthorSignReqInfo from DAS server, then the Originator shall return the AuthorSign(s) to DAS server: 4.1 The Originator generates AuthorSign(s) on Token(s) or TokenID(s) for each Token. NOTE 2: AuthorSign are a signature generated using the certificate of the AE or a MIC generated using a symmetric key shared between the AE and DAS server. How a symmetric key is distributed to AE and DAS server is not specified in the present document. 4.2 The Originator sends the AuthorSign(s) to DAS server with the corresponding Token(s) or TokenID(s). 4.3 The DAS server shall create AuthorRelMapRecord(s) containing the information listed in table 7.3.2.2-3 for each Token. 5. For request that the Originator wishes to have authorized using an issued Token, the Originator shall add ESData-protected Token provided by the DAS Server or tokenID (if no ESData-protected Token was provided) if the corresponding ESData-protected Token(s) was not provided by the DAS Server. In particular, if the request at step 1 was unsuccessful at step 2.3, then the Originator may repeat the request with new Token(s) and/or tokenID(s). A token may be used in multiple request. If step 4 is performed, then the request shall contain the AuthorRelIndicator to indicate to the Hosting CSE that the relationship between the AE and the Token(s) are maintained in the DAS server. The Originator shall send the request to the Hosting CSE. 6. (Optional) If the request includes tokenID(s), then for each tokenID the Hosting CSE identifies the corresponding DAS Server AE from which to request the corresponding Token: 6.1 The Hosting CSE sends the tokenID(s) to the DAS Server via a DAS Server AE. 6.2 The DAS Server shall return the corresponding valid ESData-protected Token(s) to the Hosting CSE via the DAS Server AE. 7. Hosting CSE Processing: 7.1 Token Processing: 7.1.1 The Hosting CSE shall apply ESData to the ESData-protected Token(s), either provided in the request or retrieved from the DAS Server, to extract the authenticated Token(s). 7.1.2 If a Local-Token-ID was provided in the request, then the Hosting CSE attempts to retrieve the cached token. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 60 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 7.1.3 The HCSE shall perform the following verifications for each authenticated and cached token associated with the request: - The HCSE's CSE-ID shall match one of the Absolute CSE-IDs (optionally including wildcards) in the "audience" parameter in the Token. - The "holder" parameter in the Token shall exactly match the Absolute CSE-ID or AE-ID of the Originator from whom the request was received. - The HCSE shall verify that the Token is currently valid and not expired, by comparing the current time to the "notBefore" and "notAfter" parameter in the Token. If a cached Token has expired, then the Token may be removed from the cache. 7.1.4 If any identified Token could not be retrieved in steps 6 or 7.1.2, or if any ESData-protected Token-ID failed verification at step 7.1.1, or if any Token failed the verification at step 7.1.3, then the Hosting CSE shall respond with an error. 7.1.5 The Hosting CSE may cache any new Token(s). If the Hosting CSE receives the AuthorRelIndicator in step 5, then the Hosting CSE shall make sure the Absolute AE-ID of the Originator is assigned to the holder attribute of the cached token. 7.2 The Hosting CSE may assign Local-Token-ID(s) to cached Token(s). 7.3 The Hosting CSE shall perform the access decision as described in clause 7.1.4, including the information in the Token(s) identified in the request. If access is granted, then the requested operation shall be performed. 8. Response: 8.1 The Hosting CSE sends a response to the Originator. For each new Local-Token-ID(s) that has been assigned, the Hosting CSE provides the Local-Token-ID and corresponding tokenID in the response parameters. 8.2 The Originator associates the Local-Token-ID with tokenID. In subsequent requests, the Originator may use the Local-Token-ID instead of the Token or tokenID. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.4 Token Structure | A token is used to carry authorization information that can be roles assigned to the token holder or access control policies applicable to the token holder. The structure of token is shown in figure 7.3.2.4-1, it contains the following data fields: • version: version of the token. • tokenID: unique ID of the token. • holder: ID of the token holder. • issuer: ID of the token issuer. • notBefore: token valid from this time. • notAfter: token expired after this time. • tokenName: optional, human readable name of the token. • audience: optional, list of CSE_IDs of the CSEs expected to accept the token. • permissions: permissions associated with the token. Its format is specified in clause 9.6.39 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. • extension: used for store other information, e.g. application-specific information. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 61 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.3.2.4-1: Structure of token A token shall be protected by the ESData security mechanism. A token shall be signed, encrypted or signed and encrypted. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.5 Token Evaluation | The generic process of evaluating a token can be described as follows: 1) Token security validation: Depending on the security mechanism used by a token, the validation may be: - Verifying signed token; - Decrypting encrypted token; or - Decrypting and verifying signed and encrypted token. After passing the token security validation, the plain text of the token can be used for further validation. 2) Token content validation: Depending on the content contained in the token, the validation may check: - If the identity of the Originator equal to the token holder specified in the holder data field. - If the token issuer specified in the issuer data field is valid. - If this token is not expired according to the notBefore and notAfter data fields. - If the identifier of the Hosting CSE is in the CSE-ID list specified by the audience data field (in case the audience data field is not empty). After passing the token content validation, the permissions associated to this token shall be used for access control. 3) Token permissions evaluation: Checking the permission element in the permission list one by one until the access request is permitted by one of the permissions or end of the list. For each permission in the list of the permissions the evaluation shall be done as follows: - Checking resourceIDs element. If it is present, then the authorization information described in privileges and/or roleIDs elements shall apply only to the resources specified by this element. If the privileges element is present, then this element shall be present. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 62 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - If the privileges element is present, the access control rules held in this element shall be used as applicable access control policy in the current access control decision making process. - If the roleIDs element is present, the Role-IDs held in this element shall be used as valid roles in the current access control decision making process. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6 oneM2M JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.1 Introduction to oneM2M JWTs | oneM2M specifies a JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) representation (IETF RFC 7519 [53]) for Tokens used in oneM2M. A JWT compliant with the present clause is called a oneM2M JWT. Background: A JWT uses either the JSON Web Signature (JWS) Compact Representation, or JSON Web Encryption (JWE) Compact Representation, specified in IETF RFC 7515 [51] and IETF RFC 7519 [53]. The JWT specification IETF RFC 7519 [53] also defines an unsecured JWT which is a JWS using the "alg" Header Parameter value "none" and with the empty string for its JWS Signature value. The JWT specification defines a JSON element which is the structure of the payload of the JWS or JWE when used as a JWT. This payload comprises a set of JWT claims, with IETF RFC 7519 [53] standardizing an initial set of JWT claim names. IANA maintains a registry of JWT claim names [i.18]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.2 oneM2M JWT Profile | oneM2M JWT Claims: Table 7.3.2.6.2-1 provides the mapping from the JWT claim names, in a oneM2M JWT, to the elements of the m2m:tokenClaimSet complex data type described in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. Where available, JWT claim names registered with IANA [i.18] have been used. ETSI TS 118 104 [4] specifies which elements are mandatory and which elements are optional. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 63 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.3.2.6.2-1: The oneM2M JWT claim set and mapping to elements of m2m:tokenClaimSet Token Claimset Object Element Path Token Claimset Object Element Short Name oneM2M JWT claim name Where is this JWT claim name defined? Additional details for mapping from Token Claimset Object values to JWT Claim values version tkvr "tkvr" ETSI TS 118 104 [4] short names Values shall be identical tokenID tkid "jti" IETF RFC 7519 [53] Values shall be identical issuer tkis "iss" IETF RFC 7519 [53] Values shall be identical holder tkhd "azp" OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [54] Values shall be identical notBefore tknb "nbf" IETF RFC 7519 [53] Token Claimset Object element "notBefore" is in ISO8601 [79] "Basic Format", see ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. This element shall be mapped to JWT Claim "nbf" which uses NumericDate format [53]. notAfter tkna "exp" IETF RFC 7519 [53] Token Claimset Object element "notAfter" is in ISO8601 [79] "Basic Format", see ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. This element shall be mapped to JWT Claim "exp" which uses NumericDate format [53]. tokenName tknm "tknm" ETSI TS 118 104 [4] short names Values shall be identical audience tkau "aud" IETF RFC 7519 [53] Token Claimset Object element "audience" is a list of m2m:ID. This list shall be mapped to JWT Claim "aud" comprising an array of case-sensitive strings, each containing a StringOrURI value [53]. permissions tkps "tkps" ETSI TS 118 104 [4] short names Values shall be identical extension tkex "tkex" ETSI TS 118 104 [4] short names Values shall be identical oneM2M JWT Security Profile: The JWS Compact Representation and JWE Compact Representation are both supported by ESData (see clause 8.5.3). A oneM2M JWT may use any ESData security class: Encryption-only, Signature-only or Nested-Sign-then-encrypt. A oneM2M JWT may use any algorithm supported by ESData for the JWS Compact Representation and JWE Compact Representation. A oneM2M JWT may be an unsecured JWT, in which case the oneM2M JWT is considered to use the unsecured ESData security class. IETF RFC 7519 [53] discusses security considerations of JWTs, and operators of Token Issuers (Dynamic Authorization Servers and Authorization Authorities) should consult that text when deciding on ESData security class and algorithms. JOSE header parameters of oneM2M JWTs: When the Encryption-only ESData security class is used, then: • The JOSE header of the JWE shall include the "typ" parameters set to "JWT". • The JOSE header of the JWE shall not include the "cty" parameter. When the Signature -only ESData security class is used, then: • The JOSE header of the JWS shall include the "typ" parameters set to "JWT". • The JOSE header of the JWS shall not include the "cty" parameter. When the Nested-Sign-then-encrypt ESData security class is used, then the JWT claims are the payload of a JWS, and the JWS becomes the payload of a JWE. In this case: • The JOSE header of both the JWS and the JWE shall include the "typ" header parameters set to "JWT". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 64 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • The JOSE header of the JWE shall include the "cty" parameter set to be "JWT", to indicate that a Nested JWT is carried in this JWT. • The JOSE header of the JWS shall not include the "cty" parameter. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.6.3 oneM2M JWT Procedures | Configuring CSEs for verifying Tokens from a Token Issuer: In order for a CSE to verify oneM2M JWTs issued by a particular Token Issuer, the CSE shall be provided with the following information in a secure manner: • The combinations of ESData Security classes and algorithms permitted by the Token Issuer. • Credentials for verifying Tokens conforming to those ESData Security classes and algorithms, noting that no credentials are needed for verifying tokens using the unsecured ESData Security class. The present document does not specify mechanisms for providing this information to the CSE. The present document does not define data structures for storing this information on the CSE. The security level to apply on each particular CSE has to be derived from application specific risk assessment. Creating a oneM2M JWT: When a Token Issuer is triggered to create a token, then the Token issuer shall perform the following steps: 1) The Token Issuer shall form a Token Claimset Object compliant with data type m2m:tokenClaimSet, with the permission element using the JSON serialization. 2) The Token Issuer shall create the corresponding oneM2M JWT claim set using the mapping in table 7.3.2.6.2-1. 3) The Token Issuer shall select an ESData Security Class, algorithms and corresponding credentials. This step may also be performed before step 1) or between steps 1) and 2). 4) The Token Issuer shall create oneM2M JWT using the oneM2M JWT claims, ESData Security Class, algorithms and corresponding credentials. This step uses the process described for JWTs in IETF RFC 7519 [53]. The resulting oneM2M JWT has data type m2m:dynAuthJWT. Validating a oneM2M JWT: When a CSE receives a oneM2M JWT for use in an access decision, then the CSE shall perform the following steps: 1) The CSE shall validate that the oneM2M JWT conforms to the m2m:dynAuthJWT data type. 2) The CSE shall validate the security of the oneM2M JWT as described in clause 7.3.2.5, using the JWT-specific details in IETF RFC 7519 [53] and configured credentials (if required). A CSE shall discard a oneM2M JWT which uses an ESData Security class or algorithms which are not permitted by the Token Issuer. 3) The CSE shall create a Token Claimset Object from the oneM2M JWT claim set by reversing the mapping in table 7.3.2.6.2-1. 4) The CSE shall validate the Token Claimset Object as described in clause 7.3.2.5. The Token Claimset Object permissions element can now be processed as described in clause 7.3.2.5. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7 AE Authorization Relationship Update | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7.1 AE Direct Authorization Relationship Update | This clause specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at AE and Hosting CSE. The message flow for the Direct Authorization Relationship Update is shown in figure 7.3.2.7-1, which is described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 65 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Hosting CSE DAS Server AE 1. Original request: new AE-ID, Token or TokenID, resourceID 2.1. Perform access control 2.2. Request AuthorSign: AuthorSignReqInfo, the coresponding Token or TokenID, (opt) new AE-ID AE AE 3. Signature 4. Response: AuthorSignReqInfo 5. Request: new AE-ID, Token, resourceID,AuthorSign 6.1. Verify the AuthorSign 6.2. Update the cached Token Response Figure 7.3.2.7-1: AE Direct Authorization Relationship Update 1． An AE sends a resource access request message to a Hosting CSE, which carries the new AE-ID, and the Token or the TokenID issued for it. 2． The Hosting CSE shall verify the Token or TokenID: 2.1 The Hosting CSE shall verify whether this Token or the Token identified by this TokenID is valid, in the present document one way is provided to verify the Token, but there is no limitation on how to verify the Token. the Hosting CSE can search whether there is a cached Token which has the same TokenID as the TokenID received from the AE. If the holder attribute of the cached Token is not equal to the AE-ID of the originator, then the Hosting CSE performs the following steps to verify whether the AE has the possession of the Token. 2.2 The Hosting CSE sends a request message to DAS Server AE to get the value of AuthorSign for this Token, which containing the information: AuthorSignReqInfo, the corresponding Token or TokenID received from the AE. 3． The DAS Server AE examines its AuthorRelMapRecord list to find if there is the record whose Token parameter or TokenID of the Token parameter is equal to the Token or TokenID in the request message. If a record exists, then the DAS Server AE returns the Signature parameter to the Hosting CSE. 4． The Hosting CSE rejects the request to access the resource, including an AuthorSignReqInfo in the response message to indicate AE to return the AuthorSign for this Token. 5． The AE sends the resource access request message again including the information: AuthorSign, resourceID and Token. 6. After receiving the AuthorSign, the Hosting CSE shall check whether the AuthorSign is equal to the value of Signature returned from DAS Server AE. If the signatures are identical, then the Hosting CSE shall update the value of the holder attribute of the cached Token on the Hosting CSE to the new AE-ID. If DAS Server AE does not return a Signature value in step 3 or the result of the comparison in step 6 determines that the signatures are not identical, then the Hosting CSE shall refuse the request with no further process. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.3.2.7.2 AE Indirect Authorization Relationship Update | This clause specifies the exchanged parameters and associated processing at AE and Hosting CSE. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 66 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The message flow for the Indirect Authorization Relationship Update is shown in figure 7.3.2.7-1, which is described in the following text. Hosting CSE DAS Server AE 1. Original request: new AE-ID, Token or TokenID, resourceID 2. Perform access control 4. Request DAS server process AuthorRelationship update using its Token or TokenID, if DAS server finds a AuthorRelMapRecord for this Token, DAS server response the Originator with AuthorSignReqInfo 3. Response refuse 5. 1. Request DAS server process AuthorRelatioship update again using Token, AuthorSign, Hosting CSE Response Dertermine if there is a AuthorRelMapRecord for this Token 5.2. Verify the AuthorSign and update AuthorRelMapRecord 5.3.Request Hosting CSE process AuthorRelatioship update: Token-ID, new AE-ID, AE AE 5.4. Update the cached Token Figure 7.3.2.7-2: AE Indirect Authorization Relationship Update 1． The AE sends a resource access request message to the Hosting CSE, which carries the new AE-ID, and the Token or the TokenID issued for it. 2． The Hosting CSE verifies the Token or TokenID. 3． If the holder attribute of the cached Token is not equal to the AE-ID of the originator, then the Hosting CSE refuses the request to access the resource. 4． The AE requests the DAS Server to update the authorization relationship using the Token or TokenID, and the DAS server shall search if there is an AuthorRelMapRecord whose value of the Token parameter or TokenID of the Token parameter is the same with the Token or TokenID received from AE. If the result is ok, then the DAS server shall return an AuthorSignReqInfo to AE to request the AuthorSign of the Token. 5． The AE provides the AuthorSign to prove the possession of the Token: 5.1 The AE sends the update request containing Hosting CSE ID, AuthorSign, resourceID and Token. 5.2 After receiving the AuthorSign, the DAS Server shall check if this AuthorSign is equal to the value of Signature parameter in the AuthorRelMapRecord corresponding to this Token. 5.3 If the check result in step 5.2 is true, then the DAS Server AE shall send a request message to the Hosting CSE to update the authorization relationship. 5.4 The Hosting CSE updates the value of the holder attribute of the cached Token locally stored to the new AE-ID. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 67 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4 Role Based Access Control | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.1 Role Based Access Control Architecture | Figure 7.4.1-1 provides a high level overview of the role based access control architecture in the oneM2M System. The entities related to role issuance and role based access control are described as follows: • Authorization Authority: It is responsible for assigning roles to Originators through creating <role> and/or <token> resources in Role and/or Token Repositories. • Role Repository: It is a CSE that is responsible for storing <role> resources. • Token Repository: It is a CSE that is responsible for storing <token> resources. NOTE: The arrows shown in figure 7.4.1-1 are the logical relations among the entities and not the registration relations that form the real data paths. Figure 7.4.1-1: Role based access control architecture The generic procedure of this architecture is described as follows: 1. An Originator may apply for a role from an Authorization Authority. This step may not exist in some situations, e.g. the Authorization Authority directly assigns a role to an Originator. This step is not specified in the present document. 2. The Authorization Authority shall check if the applied privilege can be assigned to the Originator. If it is permitted, the Authorization Authority need to create a <role> resource that specifies the role assignment in a role repository, or issue a token that contains the assigned role to the Originator. The issued token may be stored in a <token> resource in a token repository. 3. The Authorization Authority informs the Originator on the result of a role assignment. The returned information may contain role ID, token ID, token or the information about the created <role> or <token> resources. There are two cases to be considered. a) In case the Originator sends a role assignment request to the Authorization Authority, the Authorization Authority returns the result of the role assignment via a role assignment response. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 68 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 b) In case the Authorization Authority directly assigns a role to an Originator, the Authorization Authority informs on the result of a role assignment via a role assignment notification. This step is not specified in the present document. 4. The Originator may retrieve the assigned roles and/or tokens from a Role and/or Token Repositories using the information provided by an Authorization Authority in order to get detailed information about the assigned roles and/or tokens. 5. The Originator sends an access request to the target resource in the Hosting CSE. The request may contain the role information that may be the role IDs, tokens or token IDs. 6. The Hosting CSE may send an access control decision request to a PDP. 7. The PDP may need to retrieve the Originator's role assignment information according to the Role-IDs and/or Token-IDs from the Role and/or Token Repositories. 8. The PDP verifies the Originator's roles and/or tokens, and then makes an access control decision according to the access control policies and roles. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.2 Role Issuing Procedure | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.2.1 Introduction | There are two ways to assign roles to an Originator: 1) One way is to create a <role> resource that describes what role is assigned to the originator. The <role> resources are stored in role repositories from which the AEs and CSEs can retrieve <role> resources in order to get an Originator's role assignment information. 2) Another way is to issue a token that describes what role is assigned to the token holder (i.e. the Originator). The issued token may also be stored in a <token> resource in a token repository from which the issued token can be retrieved. A <role> resource may also point to a <token> resource in which the token that holds the assigned role is stored through the tokenLink attribute. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.2.2 Role Assignment Procedure | The general procedure of assigning a role to an Originator is shown in figure 7.4.2.2-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.2.2-1: Procedure of role assignment ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 69 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The procedure of role assignment is: 1. The Originator may send role assignment request to the Authorization Authority. The specification about this step is however out of scope of the present document. 2. The Authorization Authority shall check if the applied role can be assigned to the Originator. After passing the privilege authorization check, the Authorization Authority shall assign the role to the Originator. 3. The Authorization Authority shall send a <role> resource creation request to the Role Repository. 4. The Role Repository shall create a <role> resource according to the creation request. 5. The Role Repository shall return the result of <role> resource creation back to the Authorization Authority. 6. The Authorization Authority shall return the result of the role assignment back to the Originator. The specification about this step is however out of scope of the present document. 7. The Originator may send <role> resource retrieve request to the Role Repository in order to get the role assignment information. 8. The Role Repository shall return retrieved content of the <role> resources back to the Originator. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.2.3 Issuing Token Associated with Role | The general procedure of issuing a role token (a token associated with assigned role) to an Originator is shown in figure 7.4.2.3-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.2.3-1: Procedure of role token issuance The procedure of role token issuance is: 0. The Authorization Authority creates a <role> resource in a Role Repository for a role assignment. 1. The Authorization Authority issues a token that contains the role assigned to the Originator. 2. The Authorization Authority shall send a <token> resource creation request to a Token Repository. 3. The Token Repository shall create a <token> resource according to the creation request. 4. The Token Repository shall return the result of <token> resource creation back to the Authorization Authority. 5. The Authorization Authority shall update the tokenLink attribute of the <role> resource with the address of the <token> resource. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 70 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 6. The token issuance information shall be passed to the Originator. There are two ways to deal with the notification: a) The Authorization Authority uses the NOTIFY operation inform the Originator. b) The Token Repository NOTIFY the Originator according to the subscription made by the Originator to the <role> resource. 7. The Originator may send a <token> resource retrieve request to the Token Repository in order to get the token issuance information. 8. The Token Repository shall return the retrieved content of the <token> resource back to the Originator. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.4.3 Role Based Access Control Procedure | The general procedure of using a role in an authorization process is shown in figure 7.4.3-1 and described as follows: Figure 7.4.3-1: Role based access control procedure 1. The Originator shall include the applicable Role-IDs, Token-IDs or tokens into the request sent to the Hosting CSE. 2. In case of Role-IDs or Token-IDs, the Hosting CSE (acting the role of PIP) shall send a <role> or <token> resource retrieve request to the Role or Token Repository. 3. The Role Repository or Token Repository shall return the attributes of <role> or <token> resource back to the Hosting CSE. 4. The Hosting CSE (acting in the role of PDP) shall verify the received roles and/or tokens, the verification shall include: if a role/token is issued by a valid Authorization Authority, if holder of the role/token is equal to the Originator, and if the role/token is still valid. Only valid roles/tokens shall be used for access control. 5. The Hosting CSE (acting in the role of PDP) shall evaluate the access request of the Originator using access control policies and/or Role-IDs for making an access control decision as described in clause 7.1. 6. The Hosting CSE shall enforce the access control decision, i.e. either perform the resource access on behalf of the Originator or deny the resource access. 7. The Hosting CSE shall return the result of resource access back to the Originator. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 71 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5 Distributed Authorization | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5.1 Introduction | The distributed authorization provides an interoperable framework between PEP, PDP, PRP and PIP when these authorization sub-components are distributed in different CSEs. The <authorizationDecision>, <authorizationPolicy> and <authorizationInformation> resource types are defined to support the distributed authorization framework. The PDP, PRP and PIP procedures are bound to the <authorizationDecision>, <authorizationPolicy> and <authorizationInformation> resources respectively. An UPDATE operation on these resources will trigger the bound procedures. An access control decision request or access control policy request or access control information request is passed into the bound authorization procedure via the updated resource attributes. The corresponding access control decision response, access control policy response or access control information response is carried via an UPDATE response. This clause specifies the authorization parameters exchanged between authorization sub-components and associated procedures at these authorization sub-components. The transport of distributed authorization parameters is specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1] and ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5.2 Obtain Access Control Decisions | In distributed authorization an access control decision request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain an access control decision from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.2-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode a: the Hosting CSE that acts as a PEP sends an access control decision request to another CSE that acts as a PDP and then receives an access control decision response from the latter. • Communication mode b: one CSE that acts as a PDP sends an access control decision request to another CSE that acts as a PDP and then receives an access control decision response from the latter. Figure 7.5.2-1: Communication modes for accessing a PDP An access control decision requester shall send an access control decision request to a PDP via an UPDATE operation on an <authorizationDecision> resource. The access control decision request parameters shall be passed through updated resource attributes. The mapping between the access control decision request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes is described in table 7.5.2-1. When a valid access control decision request is passed into an <authorizationDecision> resource, a PDP process bound to the <authorizationDecision> resource shall be triggered. See clause 9.6.42 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <authorizationDecision> resource type and the PDP procedure triggering conditions. If the triggering conditions are not satisfied or there is no PDP procedure being bound to the <authorizationDecision> resource, the UPDATE request is treated as a normal resource by the CSE. How to bind a PDP procedure to an <authorizationDecision> resource is out of scope of the present document. In the case the access control decision requester is the Hosting CSE, it obtains the address of an <authorizationDecision> resource from the authorizationDecisionResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource that is linked to the target resource that the Originator wants to access. See clause 9.6.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <accessControlPolicy> resource type. In other cases how the access control decision requester obtains the address of an <authorizationDecision> resource is out of scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 72 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.5.2-1: Mapping between the access control decision request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes of an <authorizationDecision> Decision request parameter Description Resource attribute Mandatory/ Optional To Same as the To parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. to M From Same as the From parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. from M Operation Same as the Operation parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. operation M Resource Type Same as the Resource Type parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. requestedResourc eType O Filter Criteria Same as the Filter Criteria parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. filterUsage O Role IDs Same as the Role IDs parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. roleIDs O Token IDs Same as the Token IDs parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. tokenIDs O Tokens Same as the Tokens parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. tokens O rq_time Same as the rq_time parameter in table 7.1.2-2 in clause 7.1.2. requestTime O rq_loc Same as the rq_loc parameter in table 7.1.2-2 in clause 7.1.2. originatorLocation O rq_ip Same as the rq_ip parameter in table 7.1.2-2 in clause 7.1.2. originatorIP O The triggered PDP process may perform the following operations: 1. Extracting the access control decision request from the updated resource attributes. 2. Retrieving applicable access control polices locally using the information provided in the access control decision request or retrieving them from another CSE using the process described in clause 7.5.3. How the PDP CSE retrieves the applicable access control policies locally or decides to contact another CSE for obtaining applicable access control policies are out of scope of the present document. 3. In the case there are Role IDs parameter and/or Token IDs parameter in the access control decision request, the PDP CSE retrieves the <role> and/or <token> resources locally or retrieves them from another CSE using the process described in clause 7.5.4. How the PDP CSE retrieves the <role> and/or <token> resources locally or decides to contact another CSE for obtaining the <role> and/or <token> resources are out of scope of the present document. 4. Evaluating the access control decision request against access control policies as described in clause 7.1. The PDP CSE may forward the access control decision request to another CSE that act as a PDP. How the PDP decides to do this is out of scope of the present document. 5. Updating the decision and status attributes with the access control policy evaluation result. 6. Generating an UPDATE response using the decision and status attributes and returning it back to the requester. The possible values of an access control decision returned by a PDP are listed in table 7.5.2-2. The possible values of status returned by a PDP are listed in table 7.5.2-3. 7. The PDP shall delete all the resource specific attributes after the response being sent in order to avoid information leak. Table 7.5.2-2: Access control decision returned by a PDP Decision value Description PERMIT The PDP permits the access control decision request. DENY The PDP denies the access control decision request. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 73 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.5.2-3: Status returned by a PDP Status value Description OK Indicating the access control policy evaluation process is successful. NOT_APPLICABLE The PDP does not have any policy that applies to the access control decision request. MISSING_ATTRIBUTE Indicating some access control information necessary for making an access control decision is not available, e.g. roles or tokens. SYNTAX_ERROR Indicating there is a syntax error in access control information or an access control policy, e.g. invalid tokens or access control rules. PROCESSING_ERROR Indicating an error occurred during access control policy evaluation. In the case where the status value is NOT_APPLICABLE, the access control decision requester should try to contact another PDP for making an access control decision if there are more than one PDP provided in the authorizationDecisionResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource, otherwise the access request of the Originator shall be denied. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5.3 Obtain Access Control Policies | In distributed authorization an access control policy request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain access control policies from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.3-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode c: one CSE that acts as a PDP sends an access control policy request to another CSE that acts as a PRP and then receives an access control policy response from the latter. • Communication mode d: one CSE that acts as a PRP sends an access control policy request to another CSE that acts as a PRP and then receives an access control policy response from the latter. Figure 7.5.3-1: Communication modes for accessing a PRP An access control policy requester shall send an access control policy request to a PRP via an UPDATE operation on an <authorizationPolicy> resource. The access control policy request parameters shall be passed through updated resource attributes. The mapping between the access control policy request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes is described in table 7.5.3-1. When a valid access control policy request is passed into an <authorizationInformation> resource, a PRP procedure bound to the <authorizationPolicy> resource shall be triggered. See clause 9.6.43 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <authorizationPolicy> resource type and the PRP procedure triggering conditions. If the triggering conditions are not satisfied or there is no PRP procedure being bound to the <authorizationPolicy> resource, the UPDATE request is treated as a normal resource by the CSE. How to bind a PRP procedure to an <authorizationPolicy> resource is out of scope of the present document. In the case the access control policy requester is the Hosting CSE, it obtains the address of an <authorizationPolicy> resource from the authorizationPolicyResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource that is linked to the target resource that the Originator wants to access. See clause 9.6.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <accessControlPolicy> resource type. In other cases how the access control policy requester obtains the address of an <authorizationPolicy> resource is out of scope of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 74 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.5.3-1: Mapping between the access control policy request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes of an <authorizationPolicy> Decision request parameter Description Resource attribute Mandatory/ Optional To Same as the To parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. to M The triggered PRP process may perform the following operations: 1. Extracting the access control policy request from the updated resource attributes. 2. Retrieving applicable access control polices and policy combining algorithm locally using the information provided in the access control policy request. How the PRP CSE gets the applicable access control policies and policy combining algorithm locally is out of scope of the present document. The PRP CSE may forward the access control policy request to another CSE that act as a PRP, How the PRP decides to do this is out of scope of the present document. 3. Updating the policies and combiningAlgorithm attributes with the retrieval result. 4. Generating an UPDATE response using the policies and combiningAlgorithm attributes and returning it back to the requester. The possible values of a policy combing algorithm are listed in table 7.5.3-2. The possible values of an error status returned by a PRP are listed in table 7.5.3-3. 5. The PRP shall delete all the resource specific attributes after the response being sent in order to avoid information leak. Table 7.5.3-2: Policy combining algorithm returned by a PRP Decision Description PERMIT_OVERRIDES If an access request is permitted by any access control policy, then the access request is permitted. Table 7.5.3-3: Status returned by a PRP Status value Description OK Indicating the access control policy retrieval process is successful. NOT_APPLICABLE The PRP does not have any policy that applies to the access control policy request. PROCESSING_ERROR Indicating an error occurred during retrieving access control policy. In the case where the status value is NOT_APPLICABLE, the access control policy requester should try to contact another PRP for retrieving access control policies if there are more than one PRP provided in the authorizationPolicyResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource, otherwise the access request of the Originator shall be denied. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5.4 Obtain Access Control Information | In distributed authorization an access control information request may be sent from one CSE to another CSE in order to obtain access control information from the latter. As shown in figure 7.5.4-1 there are two communication modes: • Communication mode e: one CSE that acts as a PDP sends an access control information request to another CSE that acts as a PIP and then receives an access control information response from the latter. • Communication mode f: one CSE that acts as a PIP sends an access control information request to another CSE that acts as a PIP and then receives an access control information response from the latter. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 75 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 7.5.4-1: Communication modes for accessing a PIP An access control information requester shall send an access control information request to a PIP via an UPDATE operation on an <authorizationInformation> resource. The access control information request parameters shall be passed through updated resource attributes. The mapping between the access control information request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes is described in table 7.5.4-1. When a valid access control policy request is passed into an <authorizationInformation> resource, a PIP procedure bound to the <authorizationInformation> resource will be triggered. See clause 9.6.44 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <authorizationInformation> resource type and the PIP procedure triggering conditions. If the triggering conditions are not satisfied or there is no PIP procedure being bound to the <authorizationInformation> resource, the UPDATE request is treated as a normal resource by the CSE. How to bind a PIP procedure to an <authorizationInformation> resource is out of scope of the present document. In the case the access control information requester is the Hosting CSE, it obtains the address of an <authorizationInformation> resource from the authorizationInformationResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource that is linked to the target resource that the Originator wants to access. See clause 9.6.2 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1] for further details of <accessControlPolicy> resource type. In other cases how the access control information requester obtains the address of an <authorizationInformation> resource is out of scope of the present document. Table 7.5.4-1: Mapping between the access control information request parameters and the corresponding resource attributes of an <authorizationInformation> Decision request parameter Description Resource attribute Mandatory/ Optional From Same as the From parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. from M Role IDs Same as the Role IDs parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. roleIDs O Token IDs Same as the Token IDs parameter in table 7.1.2-1 in clause 7.1.2. tokenIDs O The triggered PIP process may perform the following operations: 1. Extracting the access control information request from the updated resource attributes. 2. Retrieving applicable access control information locally using the information provided in the access control information request. How the PIP CSE gets the requested <role> and/or <token> resources locally is out of scope of the present document. The PIP CSE may forward the access control information request to another CSE that act as a PIP, How the PIP decides to do this is out of scope of the present document. 3. Updating the <role> and <token> resources with the retrieval result. 4. Generating an UPDATE response using the <role> and/or <token> child resources and returning it back to the requester. The possible values of an error status returned by a PIP are listed in table 7.5.4-2. 5. The PIP shall delete all the resource specific attributes and child resources after the response being sent in order to avoid information leak. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 76 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 7.5.4-2: Status values returned by a PIP Status value Description OK Indicating the access control information retrieval process is successful. NOT_APPLICABLE The PIP does not have any role or token that applies to the access control information request. PROCESSING_ERROR Indicating an error occurred during retrieving access control information. In the case where the status value is NOT_APPLICABLE, the access control information requester should try to contact another PIP for retrieving access control information if there are more than one PIP provided in the authorizationInformationResourceIDs attribute of the <accessControlPolicy> resource, otherwise the access request of the Originator shall be denied. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 7.5.5 Distributed Authorization Resource Lifecycle | <authorizationDecision>, <authorizationPolicy> and <authorizationInformation> are all the child resources of a <CSEBase> resource. As these resources are related to authorization functions, their creation and maintenance shall be tightly controlled by the authorized entities (e.g. a security administrator). The authorization resource management permissions (e.g. resource creation, update and deleting) shall be specified by the access control policies assigned to the <CSEBase> resource. The access control policies which specify who can send authorization requests to the authorization resources shall be assigned to the authorization resources directly. Before an authorization resource is bound to an authorization process (i.e. a PDP, PRP or PIP process), it acts as a normal resource to a Create (C), Retrieve (R), Update (U), Delete (D) or Notify (N) operation. After being bound to an authorization process, an UPDATE operation on this resource may trigger the bound process. How to bind an authorization process to these authorization resources is out of scope of the present document. An entity that needs to send authorization requests to an authorization resource shall only have the update permission on the authorization resource specific attributes and/or child resources. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8 Security Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1 General Introductions to the Security Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.0 General | To accommodate the variety of deployment scenarios that can be encountered in M2M applications, the present document supports a diversity of methods to provision and establish security in M2M systems. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.1 General Introduction to the Symmetric Key Security Frameworks | In the Symmetric Key Security Frameworks, each pair of entities that need to authenticate each other is provisioned with its own shared symmetric key. This is performed through pre-provisioning, e.g. during device manufacturing or deployment, or a remote security provisioning framework. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2 General Introduction to the Certificate-Based Security Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.0 Introduction | This clause describes the Credential Configuration and Certificate Verification used in the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 77 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.1 Public Key Certificate Flavours | The present document defines procedures using the following Public Key Certificate flavours: • Raw Public Key Certificates: - Description: A raw public key certificate (IETF RFC 7250 [37]) contains only the raw public key, without other information normally provided in a certificate. The raw public key certificate is exchanged in the TLS handshake in the place of a traditional certificate (see IETF RFC 7250 [37]). - Use: A raw public key certificate can be used for authenticating a CSE or AE either during the Association Security Handshake phase of the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment or during the Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake phase of the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. • Device certificates: - Description: These certificates have a certificate chain to a trust anchor and include one or more globally unique hardware instance identifier (such as the Object Identifier Based M2M Device identifiers discussed in annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. A device certificate can be used to verify the identity of the hardware instance on which the entity is being executed. - Use: Device certificates can be used to authenticate a CSE or AE executing on a specific M2M Device. If the M2M device is an ASN or MN (which supports a CSE), then the device certificate is implicitly associated with the CSE that executes on the device. If the device is an ADN (which does not support a CSE) then the device certificate is not implicitly associated with a specific AE executing on the hardware. A device certificate can be used for authenticating a Field Domain CSE either during the Association Security Handshake phase in the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework or during the Bootstrap phase of the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. • Node-ID certificates: - Description: These certificates have a certificate chain to a trust anchor and include the Node-ID of a Node (see ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. A Node-ID certificate can be used to verify the identity of a Node. - Use: A Node-ID certificate can be used to authenticate a Security Principal on a Node acting on behalf of the CSE and/or AE(s) executing on a specific Node. If the Node supports a CSE i.e. an ASN or MN, then the Node-ID certificate is implicitly associated with the CSE that executes on the Node. If the Node does not support a CSE i.e. an ADN, then the Node-ID certificate is not implicitly associated with a specific AE executing on the Node. • CSE-ID certificates: - Description: These certificates have a certificate chain to a trust anchor and include the public domain name representation of a CSE-ID (see ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. A CSE-ID certificate verifies that the entity presenting the certificate has been assigned a particular CSE-ID. - Use: A CSE-ID certificate can be used to authenticate a CSE only. • AE-ID certificates: - Description: These certificates have a certificate chain to a trust anchor and include the full URI representation of an AE-ID in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. An AE-ID certificate verifies that the entity presenting the certificate has been assigned a particular AE-ID. - Use: An AE-ID certificate can be used to authenticate an AE only. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 78 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • FQDN certificates: - Description: These certificates have a certificate chain to a trust anchor and include the FQDN of an M2M Enrolment Function in the subjectAltName extension of the certificate. An FQDN certificate verifies that the entity presenting the certificate has been assigned a particular FQDN. - Use: A FQDN certificate is used to authenticate an M2M Enrolment Function to an Enrolee during a Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake phase in a Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. NOTE: The flavours, and the details specific for these flavours, are specified to support a range of deployment models while ensuring that oneM2M entities have clear procedures for authenticating other oneM2M entities using certificates. The profiles for these certificates are found in clause 10.1.1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.2 Certification Path Validation and Certificate Status Verification | If an entity is to authenticate another entity using a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate, then the entity shall perform basic certification path validation (section 6.1of IETF RFC 5280 [34]) as part of verifying the other entity's certificate (see clause 8.1.2.4). CA certificates shall include the name constraint extensions (section 4.2.1.10 of IETF RFC 5280 [34]) and shall constrain the names (object identifier M2M Device IDs from annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" of ETSI TS 118 101 [1], public domain name representation of the CSE-ID, Absolute AE-ID, Node-ID or FQDNs) which may be in the subsequent certificate used to authenticate the entity (device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate respectively). • Section 4.2.1.10 in IETF RFC 5280 [34] describes how the name constraint extension is used for constraining URIs and FQDNs. • Section 10.4.1.4.2 in IETF RFC 5280 [34] describes how the name constraint extension is used for constraining object identifier M2M Device IDs. The trust anchor information (section 6.1.1 of IETF RFC 5280 [34]) is provided to the entity during Credential Configuration, Association Configuration, Bootstrap Credential Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration. NOTE 1: Section 6.1.1 of IETF RFC 5280 [34] states "The trust anchor information is trusted because it was delivered to the path processing procedure by some trustworthy out-of-band procedure". Credential Configuration, Association Configuration, Bootstrap Credential Configuration and Bootstrap Instruction Configuration satisfy the requirements of being trustworthy out-of-band procedures. Certificate status verification: In the case of an Infrastructure Domain entity receiving an MEF certificate, the entity shall verify the status of the certificate using a Certificate Revocation List as described in IETF RFC 5280 [34]. A mapping of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) onto HTTP may be used, as described in Appendix A of IETF RFC 6960 [35], however a mapping of OCSP onto CoAP is not currently defined. Furthermore, OCSP may also not be easily applicable in all environments. An alternative approach may be using the TLS Certificate Status Request extension (section 8 of IETF RFC 6066 [44]; also known as "OCSP stapling") or preferably the Multiple Certificate Status Extension (IETF RFC 6961 [36]), if available. NOTE 2: Most of the above paragraph is based on almost identical text in the CoAP specification IETF RFC 7252 [i.21], a protocol with similar (if not identical) considerations to oneM2M deployments. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.3 Credential Configuration for Certificate-Based Security Framework | If an entity is to authenticate itself using a Certificate-Based Security Framework, then the entity shall be pre- provisioned with the following information: • The entity's Private Signing Key, which should remain protected in a secure environment, e.g. using the framework described in annex L. NOTE: An entity authenticates itself to other entities by proving that it knows the Private Signing Key corresponding to a particular Public Verification Key. • The entity's Certificate (and if applicable, Certificate Chain) as described in clause 10.1.1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 79 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • In the case of a CSE-ID certificate the entity shall be configured with the entity's CSE-ID. • In the case of an AE-ID certificate the entity shall be configured with the entity's AE-ID. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.4 Information Needed for Certificate Authentication of another Entity | Entity A shall be configured to trust the following information in order to authenticate Entity B using the certificate-Based SAEF: • An indication of the public key certificate flavour of other Entity B's Certificate (that is, raw public key certificate, device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate). • In the case where Entity B's certificate is a raw public key certificate: - A public key identifier for the raw public key in the certificate (see clause 10.1.2). • In the case where other Entity B's certificate is a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate: - A Globally unique identifier: The globally unique identifier for the entity which is also present in the subjectAltName extension of the other entity's certificate: Device Certificate: A globally unique hardware instance identifier (such as the object identifier M2M Device ID in annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) that is present in the device certificate. CSE-ID Certificate: The public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Node-ID Certificate: The Node-ID of a Node as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. - Trust Anchor Information: For the trust anchor certificates of Entity B's certificate chain (see clause 8.1.2.2). Entity B shall be configured to trust the following information in order to authenticate Entity A using the Certificate-Based SAEF: • An indication of the public key certificate flavour of Entity A's Certificate (that is, raw public key certificate, device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or AE-ID Certificate). • In the case where Entity A's certificate is a raw public key certificate: - A public key identifier for the raw public key in the certificate (see clause 10.1.2). • In the case where Entity A's certificate is a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or AE-ID certificate: - Trust Anchor Information: for the trust anchor certificate for Entity A's certificate chain (see clause 8.1.2.2). In order to authenticate the M2M Enrolment Function using the certificate-based RSPF, an Enrolee shall be configured to trust the trust anchor information of the M2M Enrolment Function's certificate chain. An M2M Enrolment Function shall be configured to trust the following information in order to authenticate an Enrolee using the certificate-based RSPF: • An indication of the public key certificate flavour of Entity B's Certificate (that is, raw public key certificate or device certificate). • In the case where the Enrolee's certificate is a raw public key certificate: - A public key identifier for the raw public key in the certificate (see clause 10.1.2). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 80 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • In the case where the Enrolee's certificate is a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or AE-ID certificate: - A Globally unique identifier: The globally unique identifier which is also present in the subjectAltName extension of the Enrolee's certificate: Device Certificate: A globally unique hardware instance identifier (such as the object identifier M2M Device ID in annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) that is present in the device certificate. CSE-ID Certificate: The public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Node-ID Certificate: The Node-ID of a Node as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. AE-ID Certificate: The Absolute AE-ID assigned to the AE. - Trust Anchor Information: for the trust anchor certification for the Enrolee's certificate chain (see clause 8.1.2.2). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.1.2.5 Certificate Verification | This clause describes how an entity authenticates the other entity in the Security Handshake of a Certificate-Based Security Framework. The other entity's Certificate is received during the Security Handshake. The other entity's Certificate is verified as follows: • If the certificate information configured during the Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration indicates that the other entity's Certificate is a raw public key certificate, then the entity verifies that the public key identifier (received during Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration) corresponds to the raw public key certificate (received during the Security Handshake) using the process described in clause 10.1.2. • If the certificate information configured during the Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration indicates that the other entity's Certificate is a device certificate, CSE-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate, Node-ID certificate or FQDN certificate, then the entity shall perform the following verifications: - The entity shall look for a match between the globally unique identifier described in clause 8.1.2.4 (received during Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration) and the values in the subjectAltName extension of the other entity's Certificate (received during the Security Handshake). If there is not an exact match, then the entity shall abort the (D)TLS handshake: In the case of device certificate, the globally unique identifier is a globally unique hardware instance identifier (such as the object identifier M2M Device ID in annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" ETSI TS 118 101 [1]). In this case, the notion of a "match" depends on how the globally unique hardware instance identifier may be represented in the subjectAltName extension. In the case of a CSE-ID certificate, the globally unique identifier is the public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1], and a match is a FQDN in the subjectAltName extension in the other entity's certificate that is an exact match for the public domain name representation of the CSE-ID. In the case of an AE-ID certificate, the globally unique identifier is the AE-ID, and a match is a URI in the subjectAltName extension in the other entity's certificate that is an exact match for the Absolute AE-ID. In the case of a Node-ID certificate, the globally unique identifier is the M2M-Node-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1], and a match is a Node-ID in the subjectAltName extension in the other entity's certificate that is an exact match for the Node-ID. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 81 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 In the case of an FQDN certificate, the globally unique identifier is the FDQN of the M2M Authentication Function or M2M Enrolment Function, and a match is a URI, FQDN or dNSName in the subjectAltName extension in the other entity's certificate that is an exact match for the FDQN of the M2M Authentication Function or M2M Enrolment Function. - The entity shall perform path validation and certificate status verification using the trust anchor certificate as described in clause 8.1.2.2). If this verification fails, then the entity shall abort the (D)TLS handshake. NOTE: After a successful Security Handshake in which the other entity provides a Certificate Chain, the other entity's identity (received during Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration) can be associated with additional information extracted from the other entity's Certificate Chain (e.g. the other entity manufacturer, other entity owner, or conformance criteria). These details are not described in the present document. 8.1.3 General Introduction to the GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) Framework Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) is a framework that could be used for Remote Security Provisioning. In case of scenario where the M2M Service Provider and the operator of the underlying network have an agreement to use the underlying network credentials as the basis for security between a M2M Application Service/Middle Node and Infrastructure Node (including the case that the M2M Service Provider and the operator of an underlying network are actually the same entity), GBA procedure could be used. It is important that this feature is used only within the scope of an appropriate agreement between the M2M Service Provider and the operator of the underlying network. The normative text for the GBA-Based Security Association Establishment Framework (clause 8.2.2.2) and the GBA-Based Security Bootstrap Framework (clause 8.3.2.2) implicitly assumes that such an agreement is already in place. Since the present document is a technical specification, it does not address the details of such an agreement. A general introduction to GBA is included in ETSI TR 118 508 [i.4]. After a successful GBA bootstrapping, the M2M Application Service/Middle Node and the BSF share a security association which consists of a bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) and key material (GBA bootstrap Ks). This security association can be used by the M2M Application Service/Middle Node to derive NAF keys (Ks_(ext/int)_NAF) shared between a M2M Application Service/Middle Node and a M2M Infrastructure Node or an M2M Authentication Function. There are two modes of GBA: ME-based GBA (GBA_ME) and UICC-based GBA (GBA_U). In case of GBA_ME, one NAF-specific key is derived: the key Ks_NAF. In case of GBA_U, two NAF-specific keys are derived: Ks_ext_NAF (available in the ME) and Ks_int_NAF (which remains inside the UICC). GBA_U can be performed only when the UICC is GBA aware. The BSF determines which mode to run based on the UICC capability indicated in the GBA User Security Settings (GUSS). The usage of GBA_U is recommended since it provides a higher level of security than GBA_ME. The implication of this recommendation is that the entity, AE or CSE, using the GBA_U-based NAF keys should be resident in the UICC. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 82 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: Network Application Function (NAF) may be an Infrastructure Node or an M2M Authentication Function. Figure 8.1.3-1: GBA framework |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2 Security Association Establishment Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2.1 Overview on Security Association Establishment Frameworks | The Security Association Establishment Frameworks (SAEF) described in the present document, apply to direct connections on the Mcc, Mcc' or Mca reference points. The Security Association Establishment Framework end-points are denoted: • Entity A, which may be an AE or CSE. This entity always acts as the client of the security association (TLS/DTLS session). • Entity B, which shall be a CSE. This entity always acts as the server of the security association (TLS/DTLS session). If entity A is request reachable, i.e. capable to receive request primitives from entity B on a separate point of access (see clauses 9.3.2 and 9.6.5 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]), it also acts as the server of a second security association (TLS/DTLS session denoted SA2) and entity B acts as a client of this second security association. The relationship between the first and second security association, SA1 and SA2, is specified below and illustrated in figure 8.2.1-2. The oneM2M system supports the following Security Association Establishment Frameworks: • Security Association Establishment Frameworks: - Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment. A symmetric key is provisioned to the entities: this is called the Provisioned M2M Symmetric Key, and denoted Kpsa. The entities authenticate each other by verifying Message Integrity Codes (MIC) in the Security Handshake which were generated using the symmetric key. For more details see clause 8.2.2.1. - Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment: The entities are each issued with: a Private Signing Key that is known only to that entity; a Certificate containing the corresponding Public Verification Key; and Infrastructure Node - NAF GBA bootstrapping With HTTP Digest Authentication BSF Retrieval of NAF key: Ks_(ext/int)_NAF Retrieval of AV, GBA USS Derivation of NAF key: Ks_(ext/int)_NAF M2M Application Service/Middle Node Stores : B-TID Ks Stores : B-TID Ks Store NAF key(s) Store NAF key(s) HSS ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 83 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 (Optionally) a Certificate Chain from the entity's Certificate to a Root Certificate. The entities validate each other's Certificate before trusting the Public Verification Keys in the Certificate. Within the Security Handshake, entity A creates a digital signature of the session parameters using its private signing key and entity B verifies the digital signature using entity A's public verification key. Then the roles are reversed: entity B creates a digital signature and entity A verifies it. For more details, see clause 8.2.2.2. - M2M Authentication Function (MAF)-based Security Association Establishment. This Security Association Establishment Framework uses mutual authentication of the entity A and the M2M Authentication Function (MAF) and derive a M2M Secure Connection key (Kc) that the MAF delivers to entity B (via separate mutually-authenticated communication). The entities then authenticate each other using the M2M Secure Connection key (Kc). Each of Entity A and Entity B can use either symmetric key credentials or certificates for mutual authentication with the MAF. For more details see clause 8.2.2.3. For a more detailed description of the above Security Association Establishment Frameworks, it is useful to compare the following aspects of the Security Association Establishment Frameworks: • Credential Configuration: - For the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework, Entity A and Entity B are provisioned with the Provisioned M2M Symmetric Key that entities subsequently use to authenticate each other using pre-provisioning or remote provisioning. - For the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Frameworks, Entity A and Entity B are pre-provisioned with the Credential that the entity subsequently use to authenticate itself to the other entity using pre-provisioning or remote provisioning. - For the MAF-based Security Association Establishment Framework, the MAF Credential Configuration procedure (clause 8.8.3.1) is performed twice: once to provision credentials for mutual authentication of Entity A with MAF, and once to provision credentials for mutual authentication of Entity B with MAF. The method for pre-provisioning of credentials for mutual authentication can be deployment dependent. Interoperable frameworks enabling pre-provisioning are described in annex D for UICC and in annex L for independent hardware based secure environments supporting asymmetric cryptography. Mechanisms for remote provisioning are specified in clause 8.3. This includes remote provisioning of credentials using the device configuration mechanisms specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. • Identity Configuration: Identity configuration can occur as part of Credential Configuration, or can occur at a later time. • For the MAF-based Security Association Establishment Framework, the MAF is configured with information about the identities of Entity B and, optionally, Entity A. Clause 8.2.2.3 provides additional details. NOTE 1: The current oneM2M specifications do not describe how this information is configured to the MAF. - Entity A's knowledge of its identity (IdA) has no impact on the security association establishment. - Entity B shall be configured with its CSE-ID (IdB) prior to Association Configuration. • Association Configuration: - Entity A shall be provided with IdB, the CSE-ID for Entity B. NOTE 2: The present document does not describe how Entity A is provided with IdB. Example mechanisms could include configuration via remote management, and discovery mechanisms supported by the Underlying Network(s). - In the case of Certificate-Based Authentication Framework: each entity (Entity A and Entity B) is additionally configured with the certificate information that the entity subsequently uses to verify the other entity. The necessary certificate information is dependent on the flavour of the certificates, with details provided in clause 8.1.2.4. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 84 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - In the case of the MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework: 1. The MAF is provided with the identity of Entity B for which the MAF is authorized to facilitate establishing a security association with Entity A. 2. Entity A and the MAF interact, using the MAF Key Registration procedure (clause 8.8.2.7) to establish M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) and M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier (KcID) and authorize Entity A to establish a security association with Entity B. This step includes mutual authentication using the MAF Handshake Procedure (clause 8.8.2.2). This step includes Entity A providing the MAF with IdB. See note 2 above, • Association Security Handshake: Identification, authentication and security context establishment between the entities: - In the case of the MAF-based Security Association Establishment Framework: 1. Entity A provides the M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier (KcID) to Entity B. 2. Entity B and the MAF interact using the MAF Key Retrieval procedure (clause 8.8.2.8). This step includes mutual authentication using the MAF Handshake Procedure (clause 8.8.2.2). Entity B forwards KcID to the MAF and, if Entity B is authorized, the MAF returns the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) and either IdA or a globally unique identifier for the credential used by the MAF to authenticate Entity A during Association Configuration. 3. The M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) is then used in the Security Handshake for mutual authentication between Entity A and Entity B. Entity A associates the resulting security context with IdB: the AE-ID or CSE-ID for Entity B established during Association Configuration. Entity B associates the security context with one of the following: - A single Absolute CSE-ID, and indication that Entity A is a CSE; - A single Absolute AE-ID, and indication that Entity A is an AE; or - A list of allowed Absolute AE-ID values, and indication that Entity A is an AE. This case applies only when Entity A presents a Device Certificate or a Node-ID Certificate. The present document provides the following approaches for Entity B to determine the applicable CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) prior to registration: - If Entity A is authenticated using a CSE-ID certificate (or AE-ID certificate), then Entity B extracts the CSE-ID (or AE-ID respectively) from the certificate and associates the security context with this CSE-ID (or AE-ID respectively), as described in the certificate profile in clause 10.1.1. - In all other cases, Entity B forms a globally unique Credential-ID (see clause 10.4) identifying the credential used by Entity A in the security association establishment mechanism. The Credential-ID identifies one of a Kpsa (in the case of a PSK SAEF), certificate (in the case of a Certificate-Based SAEF) or the Km (in the case of an MAF-Based SAEF). Entity B subsequently determines the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) which are applicable for this Credential-ID. If Entity B assigned the AE-ID(s) corresponding to this Credential-ID, then Entity B is responsible for determining the AE-ID(s) corresponding to this Credential-ID. Otherwise, the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) can be made available to Entity B via one of the following approaches. The M2M SP is expected to ensure one of these approaches will successfully provide the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) of Entity A. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 85 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - If the Security Association Establishment procedure is facilitated by an M2M Authentication Function, then the M2M Authentication Function may be provided with the CSE-ID or AE- ID and the M2M Authentication Function may provide this to Entity B at the same time as Kc is provided to Entity B. The M2M Authentication Function could have been provided with the CSE-ID or AE-ID during provisioning, including the case where the M2M Authentication Function is provided with the CSE-ID or AE-ID during remote provisioning by an M2M Enrolment Function (which is similar to the case described in the following bullet). - If the Security Association Establishment procedure uses a Provisioned Symmetric Key which was remotely provisioned to Entity A and Entity B, then the M2M Enrolment Function may provide Entity B with CSE-ID or AE-ID during the Remote Security Provisioning procedure. - If the M2M Service Provider assigns Entity A's entity identifier(s), then the CSE-ID or AE- ID(s) may be securely configured by the M2M Service Provider to Entity B prior to the Association Security Handshake. For example, the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) may be configured as part of Credential Configuration or Association Configuration. The present document permits using other mechanisms, with the assumption that the mechanism provides authentication, integrity protection and optionally confidentiality. EXAMPLE 1: If the M2M Service Provider has the opportunity to configure Entity B prior to deployment, then the M2M Service Provider could configure the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s) to Entity B at this time. EXAMPLE 2: A secure remote management protocol could be used to configure Entity B with the CSE-ID or AE-ID(s). However, this is not currently an interoperable feature as there is no standardized management object facilitating this management. - In the case that Entity A is an AE and Entity B is a CSE, the applicable AE-ID(s) may be obtained by retrieving the applicable <serviceSubscribedAppRule> resources which are linked to by the ruleLinks attribute of the Entity B's <serviceSubscribedNode> on the IN-CSE as described in clause 10.1.1.2.2 in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 86 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.2.1-1 provides a summary of the above defined three Security Association Establishment Frameworks. Identity Configuration (Optional) MAF Client Registration Association Configuration Association Security Handshake MAF Key Retrieval MAF Key Registration Key Credential Configuration Pre-Provisioned or Remotely Provisioned MAF-Based Certificate-Based in A: A’s Private Key, A’s Certificate +(O)Chain In B: B’s Private Key, B’s Certificate +(O)Chain In A: IdB, B’s Certificate Info In B: A’s Certificate Info MAF Handshake (D)TLS Handshake with KmID & Km MAF Handshake (D)TLS Handshake with KmID & Km MAF A A B CertA+ (O) ChainA CertB+ (O) ChainB Provisioned Symmetric Key In B: Kpsa, KpsaID A B KpsaID Kc, KcID KcID Kc, IdA or KmID Kc, KcID Communication of [parameters] Mutual authentication [parameters] Internal generation of [parameters] [parameters] KcID In A: Kpsa, KpsaID In A: MAF URIs, credential for MAF authn * Km, KmID or * as for cert-based + MAF trust anchors In A: IdB (o) IdB IdB In B: As for A, but with its own credentials In MAF: Credentials for A/B authn * Km & KmID for A/B (retrieved in MAF Client Registration if remotely provisioned). * MAF private key, MAF cert+chain, trust anchors IdB Entity B is configured with IdB (CSE-ID) B B may also perform MAF Client Registration (D)TLS Handshake with KmID & Km KmID Figure 8.2.1-1: Overview of the Security Association Establishment Frameworks supported by oneM2M If entity A is request reachable, i.e. capable to receive request primitives from entity B on a separate point of access (see clauses 9.3.2 and 9.6.5 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]), then a second security association needs to be established between entity A and entity B to serve secure communications in the reverse direction. In order to allow differentiation between the two security associations between a pair of entities, SA1 and SA2 are used to denote them in the following. SA1 refers to the security association established when entity A acts as the registree which sends requests to its registrar CSE. SA2 refers to the security association established when the registrar entity B sends requests to its request reachable registree entity A. Figure 8.2.1-2 depicts the sequence of steps when establishing SA1 and SA2. Since the request reachable entity A can receive requests only after it has registered to entity B, security association SA1 has to be established always prior to first-time establishment of SA2. Establishment of security association SA1 is performed as outlined in figure 8.2.1-1, using one of the applicable Security Association Establishment Frameworks, i.e. provisioned symmetric key (PSK) based, certificate based or MAF based SAEF. The four phases described above and illustrated in figure 8.2.1-2 are executed: credential configuration, identity configuration, association configuration and association security handshake. The details of these procedures are specified in clause 8.2.2. When security association SA2 is established subsequently, the procedure can take advantage of already available credential configuration, identity configuration and association configuration and does not need to execute these steps again. SA2 establishment reduces to the association security handshake step, i.e. to performing a (D)TLS handshake using the credentials established with security association SA1. When MAF-based SAEF is applied, there is no need to execute the MAF Key retrieval procedure unless the credentials are expired. The symmetric key credentials Kc and KcID established with SA1 can be used directly to perform the (D)TLS PSK handshake. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 87 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Note that for establishment of security association SA2 the roles of entities A and B are reversed compared to SA1 establishment. In SA2, entity B acts as (D)TLS client and entity A acts as (D)TLS server. There is otherwise no difference. Figure 8.2.1-2: Security Associations for request reachable entities |
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