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e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2.2 Detailed Security Association Establishment Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2.2.1 Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework. This framework enables mutual authentication of two entities corresponding to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE. The Credential for this framework is a long-term symmetric key that has been provisioned into the entities to be authenticated. This key is called a Provisioned Secure Connection Key and is denoted Kpsa. The provisioning of Kpsa could be a pre- provisioning or a remote provisioning thanks to Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks, as described in clause 8.3. The entities authenticate each other by verifying message authentication codes in the Association Security Handshake which were generated using the Provisioned Secure Connection Key. NOTE: Long term Provisioned Secure Connection Keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason Long Term Provisioned Secure Connection Keys are recommended to be stored in Secure Environments. Figure 8.2.2.1-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework. In this description, "Entity A" and "Entity B" correspond to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE or an AE and a CSE (respectively). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 88 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties. Figure 8.2.2.1-1: The sequence of events when using the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework Credential Configuration: The Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) and the corresponding Provisioned Secure Connection Key Identifier, denoted KpsaID, are provisioned to both entities either with pre-provisioning or remote provisioning. The format of KpsaID is defined in clause 10.5. If Entity A is a CSE, then Entity A shall also be configured with its CSE-ID (not shown in figure 8.2.2.1-1). Identity Configuration: See clause 8.2.1. Association Configuration: • Entity A shall be configured with Entity B identity (IdB) prior to performing the Association Security Handshake. Entity A shall use this identity for Entity B authenticating using the above arguments. This identity is also used to route the (D)TLS exchange. Entity A shall associate Entity B's identity with messages secured within Security Contexts established using the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Kpsa associated with the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Identifier KpsaID. • If Entity A is a CSE, then Entity B shall be configured with Entity A's CSE-ID prior to performing the Association Security Handshake. If Entity A is an AE, then Entity B may either be configured with Entity A's identity (IdA) prior to performing the Association Security Handshake, or may determine IdA during registration (Creation of the <AE> resource). Entity B shall use this identity for Entity A authenticating using the above arguments. Entity B shall associate the configured Entity A identity with messages secured within Security Contexts established using the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Kpsa associated with the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Identifier KpsaID. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 89 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Association Security Handshake: The entities shall perform a (D)TLS-PSK handshake [15] to establish a secure session. • The "psk_identity" parameter [15] shall be set to the value of the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Identifier KpsaID. • The entities set the "psk" parameter [15] to the value of the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Kpsa. • The (D)TLS cipher suite profile for the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Security Association Establishment Framework shall conform to clause 10.2.2. • Following successful authentication of Entity B, Entity A shall associate the security context with Id B (Entity B's entity identifier) configured to Entity A during Association Configuration. • Following successful authentication of Entity A, Entity B shall associate the security context with a CSE-ID or AE-ID: - If Entity B was already provided with the CSE-ID or AE-ID corresponding to KpsaID, then Entity B shall associate the security context with that CSE-ID or AE-ID. - Otherwise, Entity B shall associate the security context with the Credential-ID formed from KpsaID as described in clause 10.4. Entity B shall then determine CSE-ID or AE-ID from the Credential-ID as described in clause 8.2.1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2.2.2 Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. Figure 8.2.2.2-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. In this description, "Entity A" and "Entity B" correspond to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 90 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties. Figure 8.2.2.2-1: The sequence of events when using the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework Credential Configuration: The private keys and certificates for each entity shall be pre-provisioned as described in clause 8.1.2.3. If Entity A is a CSE, then Entity A shall also be configured with its CSE-ID (not shown in figure 8.2.2.2-1). Identity Configuration: See clause 8.2.1. Association Configuration: Entity A and Entity B shall be configured with the information needed for the authentication and identification (during Association Security Handshake) of Entity B and Entity A respectively: • The information configured to Entity A shall include the following arguments: - Entity B's certificate information: as described in clause 8.1.2.4. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 91 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - Entity B's identity (IdB). Entity A shall use this identity for Entity B authenticating using the above arguments. This is used to route the (D)TLS exchange. NOTE: The Entity A will associate Entity B's identity with messages secured within Security Contexts established in accordance with the configured Entity B's certificate information. • The information configured to Entity B shall include the following argument: - Entity A's certificate information: as described in clause 8.1.2.4. Association Security Handshake: • Each entity shall verify the other entity's certificate as described in clause 8.1.2.2. • The entities shall authenticate each other using the validated certificates as specified in TLS 1.2 IETF RFC 5246 [5] and DTLS 1.2 IETF RFC 6347 [6] specifications. • The (D)TLS cipher suite profile for the Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework shall conform to clause 10.2.3. • Following successful authentication of Entity B, Entity A shall associate the security context with IdB (Entity B's entity identifier) configured to Entity A during Association Configuration. • Following successful authentication of Entity A, Entity B shall associate the security context with a CSE-ID, AE-ID or list of allowed AE-IDs: - If Entity A establishes a security context by presenting a CSE-ID certificate, then Entity B shall associate the security context with the CSE-ID in the certificate. - If Entity A establishes a security context by presenting an AE-ID certificate, then Entity B shall associate the security context with the Absolute AE-ID in the certificate. - If Entity A establishes a security context by presenting a Node-ID certificate, then Entity B shall associate the security context with the Credential-ID formed from the globally unique Node identifier in the certificate. - If Entity A establishes a security context by presenting a device certificate, then Entity B shall associate the security context with the Credential-ID formed from the globally unique hardware instance identifier in the certificate as described in clause 10.4. Entity B shall then use Credential-ID to determine the CSE- ID, AE-ID or list of allowed AE-IDs as described in clause 8.2.1. - If Entity A establishes a security context by presenting a raw public key certificate, then Entity B shall associate the security context with the Credential-ID formed from the corresponding public key identifier described in clause 10.1.2. Entity B shall then use Credential-ID to determine the CSE-ID or AE-ID as described in clause 8.2.1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.2.2.3 MAF-Based Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Frameworks | This clause describes the MAF-based Security Association Establishment Framework. This framework uses the MAF Security Framework procedures in clause 8.8, with the following mapping of functional roles: • Entity A plays the role of the Source End-Point. • Entity B plays the role of the Target End-Point. The present clause refers to the entities using only the terminology of Entity A and Entity B. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 92 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Security Association Establishment Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Red italic text highlights security-related properties. Figure 8.2.2.3-1: The sequence of events when using the MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework Credential Configuration: 1. Entity A (and Entity B respectively) shall be individually provisioned with credentials for mutual authentication with the MAF, as described in MAF Credential Configuration (clause 8.8.3.1). Pre-provisioning or remote provisioning may be applied. In the case of remote provisioning of symmetric keys, the MAF retrieves the symmetric keys from the MEF during the MAF Client Registration procedure in Identity Configuration. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 93 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Identity Configuration: 2. The MAF is expected to be authorized to provide service to Entity A and Entity B. NOTE 1: The current oneM2M specifications do not describe how this authorization is provided to the MAF. 3. The MAF is configured with information about the identities of Entity B and, optionally, Entity A: - If Entity A is a CSE, then the MAF is expected to be configured with Entity A's CSE-ID (denoted IdA). - If Entity A is an AE, then the MAF is expected to be configured with Entity A's AE-ID (denoted IdA). - The MAF is expected to be configured with Entity B's M2M-SP Assigned CSE-ID (denoted IdB). NOTE 2: The current oneM2M specifications do not describe how this information is configured to the MAF. 4. If Entity A (or Entity B respectively) are remotely provisioned with a symmetric key for use with the MAF, then Entity A (or Entity B respectively) shall individually perform the MAF Client Registration procedure (clause 8.8.2.3) with the MAF. This procedure is used to trigger the MAF to (a) retrieve Km from the MEF, and (b) provide the End-Point with the KmID to be used for subsequently authentication with the MAF at step 5. Association Configuration: Entity A and the MAF shall be configured with the information needed for the authentication and identification during MAF Handshake and Association Security Handshake: 5. Authorizing the SAEF: - Entity A shall be provided with IdB, the CSE-ID for Entity B. See note 2 in clause 8.2.1. - The MAF is expected to be configured with the Entity B Identity (IdB) for which it is authorized to provide Kc for an SAEF with Entity A. 6. Entity A and the MAF shall establish a mutually authenticated secure channel for communication using the MAF Handshake procedure (clause 8.8.2.2), using the credentials provisioned during Credential Configuration. 7. Entity A shall initiate the MAF Key Registration procedure (clause 8.8.2.7) with the MAF. The MAF Key Registration shall include the Security Usage Identifier (SUID) associated with the MAF-Based SAEF and IdB. This procedure results in: - Entity A and the MAF establishing a M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) and associated M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier (KcID), corresponding to the output symmetric key and Key Identifier established by the MAF Key Registration procedure. - MAF providing the lifetime for the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc). The SUID limits the scope within which Kc is authorized to be used. In this case, the SUID is used to ensure that the Entity A shall use Kc only with the MAF-Based SAEF. Association Security Handshake: 8. Entity A shall initiate a (D)TLS-PSK handshake with Entity B, according to clause 10.2.2. 9. Entity A shall send the "Key Identifier" derived from KcID to Entity B (Infrastructure Node) as the "psk_identity" parameter in a (D)TLS-PSK handshake. 10. Entity B recognizes the MAF-FQDN part of the "Key Identifier" in the "psk_identity" parameter, and determines that the corresponding M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) shall be retrieved from the corresponding MAF. Entity B shall set RelativeKeyID as specified in clause 10.3.5. 11. Entity B and the MAF shall perform the MAF Key Retrieval procedure described in clause 8.8.2.8. NOTE 3: The MAF Key Retrieval procedure includes establishing a mutually authenticated secure channel for communication using the MAF Handshake procedure (described in clause 8.8.2.2), using the credentials provisioned during Credential Configuration. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 94 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Entity B shall provide the RelativeKeyID to the MAF. The MAF returns the output symmetric key value, expirationTime, Security Usage Identifier (SUID), and identity for Entity A to Entity B. The value of Kc shall be set to the output symmetric key value. The Kc Lifetime shall be set to the expirationTime. The SUID limits the scope within which Kc will be used. In this case, the SUID is used to ensure that the Entity B shall use Kc only with the MAF-Based SAEF. NOTE 4: Assigning Kc Lifetime is the responsibility of the MAF. 12. Entity A and Entity B shall complete the (D)TLS-PSK handshake with the "psk" parameter set to the value of the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc). 13. Following successful authentication of Entity B, Entity A shall associate the security context with IdB (Entity B's entity identifier) configured to Entity A during Association Configuration. 14. Following successful authentication of Entity A, Entity B shall associate the security context with a CSE-ID or AE-ID: - If the MAF provided Entity B with a CSE-ID or AE-ID, then Entity B shall associate the security context with that CSE-ID or AE-ID. - Otherwise, Entity B shall associate the security context with the Credential-ID formed from KmID (provided by the MAF) as described in clause 10.4. Entity B shall then determines CSE-ID or AE-ID from the Credential-ID as described in clause 8.2.1. 15. Entity A and Entity B may establish a fresh (D)TLS-PSK handshake using Kc at any time within the Kc Lifetime. Once Kc Lifetime expires, then Entity B shall fail the (D)TLS-PSK handshake, which indicates to Entity B that a fresh MAF Handshake is required. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3 Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.1 Overview on Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.1.1 Purpose of Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks | Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPFs) provision credentials to an Enrolee, which is a security principal in a Node or CSE or AE, as part of the Enrolment of the Enrolee to an M2M SP or M2M Trust Enabler. The MEF provides its services on behalf of administrating stakeholders such as M2M SPs or third party M2M Trust Enablers (MTE). An administrating stakeholder authorizes the MEF Service Provider to provide services to MEF clients, and oversees authorizing the management of credentials. The credentials are either: • A symmetric key shared by the Enrolee and an Enrolment Target, which may be a MAF or Node or CSE or AE: - If the Enrolment target is an MAF, then the credential can be used for MAF-based SAEF, MAF-based ESPrim and MAF-based ESData Protection Options, with the provisioned symmetric key used for mutual authentication of the Enrolee and the MAF. - If the Enrolment target is a Node or CSE or AE, then the credential can be used for only one of PSK- based SAEF or PSK- based ESPrim or PSK-based ESData Protection Options. The provisioned symmetric key used for mutual authentication of the Enrolee and the other Node or CSE or AE. NOTE 1: This case should be employed only in cases where the Enrolee is expected to require a symmetric key with relatively few CSE or AE. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 95 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • Certificate(s) for which the Enrolee knows the corresponding private key, and a set of trust anchors for authenticating the M2M SP or MTE's MAF or other entities enrolled with the M2M SP or MTE. These credentials can be used for: - Securing communication directly with other Nodes or CSEs or AEs using Certificate-Based SAEF, Direct End-to-End Key Establishment using Certificates (ESCertKE), and certificate-based ESData protection options. The other Nodes or CSEs or AEs would authenticate themselves using their own certificate(s), chaining to a provisioned trust anchor CA certificate, in these security frameworks. - MAF-based SAEF, MAF-based ESPrim, and MAF-based ESData protection options, with the certificate used for authentication of the Enrolee to the MAF. The MAF would authenticate using its own certificate chaining to a provisioned trust anchor CA certificate. NOTE 2: The RSPFs are specified to provide an interoperable interface for Field Domain entities to interact with an MEF. Use of the specified RSPFs are recommended for use by Field Domain entities because they have been reviewed by the security experts of oneM2M. The RSPFs can also be used by Infrastructure Domain entities (Nodes, AEs, CSEs and MAFs) for interacting with an MEF. It is expected that the MEF may include additional "backend" interfaces, not specified by oneM2M, for coordination of information with administrating stakeholders and MAF Service Providers. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.1.2 High Level Flow | A security principal in a Node or AE or CSE that requires remote provisioning is called an Enrolee or Source MEF Client. When a key is being provisioned, then the Nodes or AEs or CSEs or M2M Authentication Function with whom the Enrolee is to establish the symmetric key is called an Enrolment Target or Target MEF Client. The oneM2M system supports the following authentication methods for Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks: • Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework: A symmetric key is pre-provisioned to the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function for the mutual authentication of those entities. For more details, see clause 8.3.2.1. NOTE 1: The present document supports only pre-provisioned symmetric keys. Future versions intend to add support for authentication using symmetric keys provisioned by other MEF using an RSPF, or other mechanisms. • Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework: The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are each issued with: - a Private Signing Key that is known only to that entity; - a Certificate containing the corresponding Public Verification Key; and - (In the case of a device certificate, Node-ID certificate, CSE-ID certificate or AE-ID certificate) a Certificate Chain from the entity's Certificate to a Trust Anchor Certificate. The Certificate may be pre-provisioned or provisioned within an RSPF using the Certificate Provisioning procedures specified in clause 8.3.6. If an MEF provisions an MEF Client then the MEF Client shall authenticate itself to the MEF using the latest provisioned certificate from the MEF. The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function shall validate each other's Certificate before trusting the Public Verification Keys in the Certificate. Within the Security Handshake, the M2M Enrolment Function creates a digital signature of the session parameters using its private signing key and the Enrolee verifies the digital signature using the M2M Enrolment Function's public verification key. Then the roles are reversed: the Enrolee creates a digital signature and the M2M Enrolment Function verifies it. For more details see clause 8.3.2.2. • GBA-based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. In this case, the role of the M2M Enrolment Function is performed by a GBA Bootstrap Server Function. This framework uses 3GPP or 3GPP2 symmetric keys to authenticate the Enrolee and the M2M Enrolment Function (which is also a GBA BSF). The details are specified by ETSI TS 133 220 [13] and TIA TIA-1098 [14]. For more details, see clause 8.3.2.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 96 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks are comprised of the following phases: • MEF Client Credential Configuration: The MEF Client and M2M Enrolment Function are provisioned with the Bootstrap Credential that the entity will use to authenticate itself to the other entity. This phase is also denoted as Bootstrap Credential Configuration. - Frequency: If the credential is a symmetric key, then this occurs once per association between the MEF Client and MEF. If the credential is a certificate, then this occurs once per MEF Client. • MEF Client Service Configuration: - The MEF Client is configured with the M2M Enrolment Function URI (for the purpose of routing the (D)TLS messages to the M2M Enrolment Function). Additionally, in the case of Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework: - The MEF Client is configured with the M2M Enrolment Function Trust Anchor CA Certificates that the MEF Client will use to verify the M2M Enrolment Function. - The M2M Enrolment Function is configured with the MEF Client's certificate information that the M2M Enrolment Function will use to verify the MEF Client's certificate. The necessary certificate information is dependent on the MEF Client's certificate's flavour, with details provided in clause 8.1.2.4. - Frequency: This occurs once per association between the MEF Client and MEF. NOTE 2: In the case of the PPSK RSPF and GBA-Based RSPF, the MEF Client Credential Configuration and MEF Client Assignment would typically occur simultaneously. In the case of the Certificate-based RSPF, the MEF Client Assignment can be separate from MEF Client Credential Configuration. • Administrating Stakeholder coordination with MEF (details are not described in the present document). An Administrating Stakeholder authorizes the MEF to provide services to MEF clients, oversees authorizing the distribution of symmetric keys, and oversees management of security-related MOs on the MEF Client. This typically occurs prior to the MEF Handshake. - Frequency: This occurs as requested by the Administrating Stakeholder. • Provisioning Procedure Instructions: The MEF Client either implicitly determines that it is to perform specific provisioning procedures, or is provided with explicit instructions. This triggers the MEF Client to perform the MEF Handshake and initiate provisioning procedures in the Enrolment Exchange. - Frequency: This occurs whenever the MEF Client is to initiate a set of provisioning procedures. MEF Client Service Configuration, Administrating Stakeholder coordination with MEF, and Provisioning Procedure Instructions phases together are also denoted as Bootstrap Instruction Configuration. • MEF Handshake: Identification, authentication and security context establishment between the MEF Client and M2M Enrolment Function. - Frequency: MEF Handshake occurs whenever the MEF client is triggered by Provisioning Procedure Instructions. This phase is also denoted as Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake. • Enrolment Exchange: - After a successful MEF Handshake in the GBA-Based RSPF, the MEF Client and MEF have established a symmetric key from which keys can be derived for use with other AEs, CSEs or MAF. There is no further interaction between the MEF Client and MEF until the established symmetric key expires, at which point a new handshake is performed. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 97 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - After a MEF Handshake in a PPSK-based and Certificate-based RSPFs, the MEF Client and MEF have established a secure channel which is used to protect the Enrolment Exchange used to provision credentials. The Enrolment Exchange is described in more detail in clause 8.3.4. The Enrolment Exchange can include following types of procedures: MEF Client Registration, Symmetric Key Provisioning, Certificate Provisioning, and Device Configuration. The sequence of Enrolment Exchange procedures can be controlled by the MEF Client Command procedure which is outlined in clause 8.3.4 and specified in detail in clause 8.3.9. - Frequency: This occurs whenever triggered by Provisioning Procedure Instructions. • Usage of Provisioned Credentials The provisioned credentials can then be used in the following types of security frameworks: - Certificate-Based SAEF, ESPrim and ESData: Certificates and configured trust anchors, are used directly in certificate-based security frameworks with the other Nodes, AEs or CSEs. Trust Anchors can also be configured separately, for example, using ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. - PSK-Based SAEF, ESPrim and ESData: The Source MEF Client and MEF have established a usage- constrained symmetric key, corresponding key identifier and a list of authorized Target MEF Client(s). The Source MEF Client provides the key identifier to Target MEF Client(s) in the security protocol. The Target MEF Client(s) establishes a secure connection to the MEF, and performs the MEF Key Retrieval Procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.8) to retrieve the symmetric key subject to authorization at the MEF. - MAF-Based SAEF, ESPrim and ESData: If certificates are to be used for authentication to the MAF, then the certificate and trust anchors provisioned during Certificate Enrolment are used for mutual authentication of the MEF Client and MAF. If a symmetric key is used for mutual authentication, then the MEF Client and MEF have established a symmetric key and corresponding key identifier, with constraint for use with a specific MAF. The MEF Client (now acting as a MAF Client) performs the MAF Client Registration procedure, during which the MEF Client/MAF Client provides the key identifier to the MAF. The MAF establishes a secure connection to the MEF, and performs the MEF Key Retrieval Procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.8) to retrieve the symmetric key subject to authorization at the MAF. The MAF provides a KmID for the MEF Client/MAF Client to use in subsequent MAF Handshake procedures. NOTE 3: If the Enrolment Target hosts a <ServiceSubscribedAppRule> resource, then the fetched credentials from the M2M Enrolment Function or the M2M Authentication Function needs to be stored after the Enrolment Target establishes a secured connection with the Enrolee. A Credential ID value in the format as mentioned in clause 10.4 is generated using the credential used for the secured connection establishment and is added into the applicableCredIDs attribute of the <ServiceSubscribedAppRule> resource. NOTE 4: If the Enrolee-ID of the Enrolee is retrieved from the M2M Enrolment Function or the M2M Authentication Function, then the same is saved in the allowedAEs attribute of the <ServiceSubscribedAppRule> resource. Figure 8.3.1.2-1 illustrates the phases of the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 98 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Provisioning Procedure Instructions Administrating Stakeholder coordination with MEF (out of scope) Use of Provisioned Credential (Use of Symmetric Key shown) Enrolment Exchange MEF Client Credential Configuration GBA-Based RSPF (Enrolee= UE, MEF = GBA BSF) Certificate-Based RSPF MEF Client Service Configuration MEF Handshake MEF Client Ks, B-TID UN specific Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key RSPF MEF Enrolee (UE) MEF (BSF) KpmID Kpm, KpmID MEF Client MEF MEF Client Cert+ (O) Chain MEF Cert+ Chain Communication of [parameters] Mutual authentication Key [parameter] Internal generation of [parameters] [parameter] Ks, B-TID Enrolee In UNSP (in GBA USS): Authorized list of Enrolment Target ID Authorized list of Enrolment Target IDs & SUIDs Kpm, KpmID UE-to- BSF authentication is out of scope. Enrolment-Target-to-BSF authentication is out of scope MEF Client Private Key, Cert +(O)Chain MEF Private Key, MEF Cert +(O)Chain MEF Client Cert Information MEF Client MEF (BSF) Provisioning Procedures (o) CA (o) Cert issuance text Informative Text [parameters] Configuration of [parameters] by other mechanisms [procedure] A procedure involving interaction MEF URI MEF URI MEF URI, MEF trust anchors MEF Authorized list of Enrolment Target IDs & SUIDs B-TID/Key Identifier B-TID RelativeKeyID Ks_(int/ext)_NAF Key Value MEF Handshake Enrolment Target (MAF/Node/AE/CSE MEF Figure 8.3.1.2-1: Overview of the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks supported by oneM2M |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.2 Detailed Remote Security Provisioning Framework | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.2.1 Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework | This clause describes the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework. The Bootstrap Credential for this framework is a long-term symmetric key that has been pre-provisioned into the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function; this key is called a Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key and is denoted Kpm. NOTE 1: Long term Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason it is recommended that Long term Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Keys are stored in Secure Environments. Figure 8.3.2.1-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 99 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.3.2.1-1: The sequence of events when using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework Bootstrap Credential Configuration: The Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key (Kpm) and the corresponding Pre- Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Identifier, denoted KpmID, are pre-provisioned to both entities. The Enrolee is also pre-provisioned with the M2M Enrolment Function's URI (MEF URI), for the purpose of routing the (D)TLS exchange. NOTE 2: This pre-provisioning (by definition) uses mechanisms not specified by oneM2M. Bootstrap Instruction Configuration: The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are configured with the information needed for authorizing the remote provisioning: • The Enrolee is configured with (or otherwise obtains) the following arguments to initiate remote provisioning: - The Enrolment Target identity: Identifying the Enrolment Target for which the Enrolee is to be provisioned. - The Enrolee associates these arguments with the M2M Enrolment Function. The M2M Enrolment Function can be identified to the Enrolee using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Identifier (KpmID) or the M2M Enrolment Function URI. Enrolment Expiry: Life Time to be applied for the key generated, i.e. Ke as mentioned in clause 10.7. • M2M Enrolment Function is configured with the following arguments to authorize the M2M Enrolment Function to remotely provision the Enrolee for an Enrolment Target: - The Enrolment Target Identity: Identifying the Enrolment Target for which the Enrolee is to be provisioned. - Enrolee's assigned CSE-ID or AE-ID (Enrolee-ID). The M2M Enrolment Function is to provide this entity identity for the Enrolee with the Km or Kpsa to the Enrolment Target, when requested by the Enrolment Target. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 100 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - The M2M Enrolment Function associates these arguments with an Enrolee. The Enrolee can be identified to the M2M Enrolment Function using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Identifier (KpmID). Enrolment Expiry: Life Time to be applied for the keys generated, i.e. Ke. The M2M Enrolment Function may provide this lifetime along with Km or Kpsa to the Enrolment Target. Bootstrap Security Handshake: 1. The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function shall perform a (D)TLS-PSK handshake [15] to establish a secure session. - The "psk_identity" parameter [15] is set to the value of the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Identifier (KpmID). - The "psk" parameter [15] is set to the value of the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key (Kpm). - The (D)TLS cipher suite profile is specified in clause 10.2.2. Enrolment Key Generation: 2. The Enrolment Key (Ke), RelativeKeID, and Enrolment Re-authentication Key (Ker) are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. 3. The Enrolment Key Identifier (KeID) is generated from the RelativeKeID and the M2M Enrolment Function's FQDN by the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function, as described in clause 10.3.4. 4. The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function store the Enrolment Key (Ke) and Enrolment Key Identifier (KeID), and Enrolment Re-Authentication Key (Ker). NOTE 3: The Enrolment Key Generation for the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework is identical to the Enrolment Key Generation for the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Enrolment Exchange: 5. The Enrolee shall compose a request with a payload containing the parameters and values shown in table 8.3.2.1-1. These parameters could be serialized using, for example, XML or JSON formats. Table 8.3.2.1-1: Initial request from Enrolee to MEF Parameter Name Parameter Value Certificate Enrolment Indication <True/False> MAF Enrolment Indication <True/False> Remote Management Indication <True/False> 6. These indications indicate whether or not the Enrolee is prepared to execute these procedures if instructed by the MEF. The Enrolee shall send the request to the MEF's Enrolment Exchange URI. 7. The MEF shall process the request against the preferences for this Enrolee (see pre-conditions) to determine how the Enrolee is to be provisioned. NOTE 4: The present document does not define this processing. 8. If the Enrolee does not need to be remotely provisioned for certificate-based authentication with Enrolment Targets, then the MEF shall proceed to step 10. To remotely provision the Enrolee for certificate-based authentication with Enrolment Targets, the MEF shall compose a response with a payload containing the parameters and values shown in table 8.3.2.1-2. These parameters may be serialized using, for example, XML or JSON formats. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 101 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.2.1-2: Response from MEF to Enrolee triggering Certificate Enrolment Parameter Name Parameter Value Instruction Type <Indicating Certificate Enrolment> URI <Base certificate enrolment URI> 9. The MEF shall send the response to the Enrolee. 10. If the MEF instructs the Enrolee to perform Certificate Enrolment, then the Enrolee shall perform Certificate Enrolment procedure as described in clause 8.3.6. 11. When Certificate Enrolment is complete, then the Enrolee shall send a request to the MEF indicating success. 12. If the Enrolee does not need to be remotely enrolled with a M2M Authentication Function (MAF), then the MEF shall proceed to step 13. To remotely enrol the Enrolee with a MAF, the MEF shall compose a response with a payload containing the parameters and values shown in table 8.3.2.1-3. These parameters may be serialized using, for example, XML or JSON formats. Table 8.3.2.1-3: Response from MEF to Enrolee triggering remote enrolment with a MAF Parameter Name Parameter Value Instruction Type Indicating MAF Enrolment Credential Type <Indicating whether to use certificates or symmetric key for authenticating to MAF> MAF Key Registration URI <The URI through which MAF Key Registration is performed> MAF Key Retrieval URI The URI through which MAF Key Retrieval is performed (Optional) MAF Client Registration URI The URI from which the MAF-assigned KmID is retrieved (Optional) Trust Anchors Trust anchor CA certificates for MAF certificate (Optional) Lifetime Lifetime when the symmetric key shared with MAF will expire 13. The MEF shall send the response to the Enrolee. 14. Upon receipt of this message, the Enrolee shall perform the MAF Client Registration procedure as described in clause 8.8.2.4. This procedure includes the "Use of Remote Provisioned Credential". 15. When the MAF Client Registration procedure is complete, then the Enrolee shall send a message to the MEF indicating success. The MEF may return to step 10, to provision the Enrolee for another MAF. 16. If the Enrolee does not need to be remotely provisioned for remote management server to contact for further configuration, then the MEF shall proceed to step 15. To remotely provision the Enrolee for remote management server, the MEF shall compose a response with a payload containing the parameters and values shown in table 8.3.2.1-4. These parameters may be serialized using, for example, XML or JSON formats. Table 8.3.2.1-4: Response from MEF to Enrolee provisioning the Enrolee for a remote management server Parameter Name Parameter Value Instruction Type <Indicating Remote Management Server> URI <Base URI of Remote Management Server > 17. The MEF shall send the response to the Enrolee. 18. The Enrolee shall send a message to the MEF acknowledging that it received the instruction. The Enrolee shall initiate contact with the remote management server after the TLS/DTLS session with the MEF is closed. 19. The MEF shall send a response indicating the end of the enrolment exchange. 20. The MEF shall close the TLS/DTLS session. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 102 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Use of Remotely Provisioned Credential: In the case where the Enrolment Target is an MAF, the Enrolee is instructed to contact a specific MAF with which to perform Enrolment. a) If the Enrolee is remotely provisioned with a certificate and trust anchors during the Enrolment Exchange, then the Enrolee may use these in security protocols with the Enrolment Target. Otherwise, the Enrolee shall use the KeID in security protocols with the Enrolment Target as described in the remaining steps. b) The Enrolee shall provide KeID as a symmetric key identifier in the security protocol. c) The Enrolment Target checks to see if it has the credentials associated with KeID and if it does not have the credentials, then the Enrolment Target prepares to fetch the credentials from the MEF. d) The Enrolment Target has been pre-configured with the MEF's FQDN/URL and in order to establish a secured connection, it either uses the PSK credentials or certificate which has also been pre-configured between the Enrolment Target and the MEF. In the case of an Enrolee B, an Enrolment Re-Authentication Key (Ker) established with the MEF may be used for authentication, or a certificate provisioned by the MEF may be used for authentication. e) If the Enrolment Target wishes to fetch any credential information from the MEF, a retrieve request to MEF with the target URI set to/fetchCredentials/<KeID>/<security-usage-identifier> shall be formed, where <security-usage-identifier> is the SUID for the particular usage of the symmetric key. The originator field of the retrieve request (e.g. X-M2M-Origin header when using HTTPS) contains the ID (AE-ID/CSE-ID/MAF- ID) of the Enrolment Target/MAF. f) Upon receiving the retrieve request, the MEF performs the following: i. The MEF extracts the KeID from the Target URI. The MEF shall retrieve the Enrolment Key (Ke) for the corresponding KeID, as per the Enrolment Key Generation process defined in clause 8.3.1.2. If the MEF is unable to retrieve this information, a response shall be sent with an error as per step 'f)vii'. ii. The Enrolment Target's ID is extracted from the originator field included in the retrieve request, and the Security Usage Identifier (SUID) is extracted from the target URI. The MEF shall validate if the particular Enrolment Target is allowed to fetch credentials for the Enrolee with the particular Security Usage Identifier. iii. If the validation fails, a response shall be sent as per step 'f)vii'. If the validation is successful, then the key shall be generated with the Enrolment Key (Ke) retrieved in step f)i' as mentioned in clause 10.3.7. iv. The Enrolee ID corresponding to the KeID is determined by the MEF. v. The Enrolee Lifetime parameter for the KeID is determined by the MEF. This is a pre-configured value which indicates the validity period of the credentials that are provided to the Enrolment Target/MAF. vi. A response shall be composed along with a payload containing the parameters and values shown in table 8.3.2.1-5. These parameters may be serialized using, for example, XML or JSON formats. Table 8.3.2.1-5: Success Response from the MEF to Enrolment Target Parameter Name Parameter Value Status True Credential <Key> EnroleeID <Enrolee ID Value> Lifetime <Lifetime of generated Key> vii. Upon any errors in the above steps, the MEF shall compose a response with the parameters shown in table 8.3.2.1-6. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 103 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.2.1-6: Failure Response from the MEF to Enrolment Target Parameter Name Parameter Value Status False ErrorString <Failure Reason> g) The Enrolment Target upon receiving the credentials proceeds to use the credentials in the security protocol with the Enrolee. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.2.2 Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework | This clause describes the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. The Bootstrap Credentials for this framework are Certificates based on asymmetric key pairs. NOTE 1: Long term asymmetric private keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason it is recommended that they are stored in Secure Environments. Annex L provides a framework to generate and secure asymmetric key pairs in hardware based Secure Environments. Figure 8.3.2.2-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 104 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.3.2.2-1: The sequence of events when using the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Bootstrap Credential Configuration: For this Remote Security Provisioning Framework, Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function authenticate each other using a Public Key Certificate. The Bootstrap Credentials for the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are pre-provisioned as described in clause 8.1.2.3. NOTE 2: The identities of the M2M Enrolment Function and Enrolment Target are assumed to have been configured prior to this phase. Bootstrap Instruction Configuration: In addition to the information identified in clause 8.3.1.2, the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function are configured with the information needed for authorizing the remote provisioning: • The Enrolee is configured with (or otherwise obtains) the following arguments to initiate remote provisioning: - Information needed for certificate authentication of the M2M Enrolment Function using an MEF certificate as described in clause 8.1.2.4. • The M2M Enrolment Function is configured with the following arguments describing Enrolee authorized to perform Security Handshake with M2M Enrolment Function: - Information needed for certificate authentication of the Enrolee, as described in clause 8.1.2.4. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 105 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Bootstrap Security Handshake: The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function perform a (D)TLS handshake as specified in TLS 1.2 IETF RFC 5246 [5] and DTLS 1.2 IETF RFC 6347 [6] specifications.to establish a secure session. • Each entity (Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function) verifies the other entity's certificate as described in clause 8.1.2.5. • The Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function authenticate each other using the validated certificates as specified in TLS 1.2 IETF RFC 5246 [5] and DTLS 1.2 IETF RFC 6347 [6] specifications. • The (D)TLS cipher suite profile is specified in clause 10.2.3. Enrolment Key Generation, Enrolment Exchange and Use of Provisioned Credentials: • The steps are identical to those shown for "Enrolment Key Generation", "Enrolment Exchange" and "Use of Provisioned Credentials" in clause 8.3.2.1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.2.3 GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework | To share a long term Master Credential (Km) or Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) between an Application Service/Middle Node and an Enrolment Target, the M2M Application Service/Middle Node shall perform a successful GBA bootstrapping and derive a NAF key (Ks_(ext/int)_NAF). This NAF key is the Master Credential (Km) or Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 106 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake Enrolment Key Generation Bootstrap Credential Configuration Enrolee M2M Enrolment Function / BSF Enrolee configured with Enrolment Target ID MEF configured with Enrolee’s GUSS Enrolment Targret (MAF, Enrolee-B) Enrolment Target is already configured with its identity KeID KeID Km/Kpsa, Lifetime of Km/Kpsa, USS (inc. Enrolee-ID) Mutual Authentication Integration to Association Security Handshake Derive Km/Kpsa (NAF-key) from Ke and Enrolment Target-ID Set KmId/KpsaId = KeId Set KmId/KpsaId = KeId Derive Km/Kpsa (NAF key) from Ke and Enrolment Target-ID Bootstrap Instruction Configuration Communication of [parameters] Mutual authentication Key [parameter] Internal generation of [parameters] [parameter] Credentials are configured as described in 3GPP GBA Bootstrapping Ks, B-TID Ks, B-TID Ke = Ks KeId = B-TID Ke = Ks KeId = B-TID Mutual Authentication GET Request GET Response NOTE: The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to: Black text contains Remote Security Provisioning -Framework-independent details. Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M. Figure 8.3.2.3-1: The sequence of events when using the GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Bootstrap Credential Configuration: The credentials configuration for Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) is described in ETSI TS 133 220 [13]. The MEF plays the role of the BSF. The credentials used to perform mutual authentication between Enrolee and MEF are UNSP specific. Bootstrap Instruction Configuration: The Enrolee, the MEF and the Enrolment Target shall be configured with the information needed for authorizing the remote provisioning: • The Enrolee shall be configured with the Enrolment Target Identity: identifying the Enrolment Target for which the Enrolee is to be provisioned. • The MEF shall be configured with the Enrolee-ID and the Enrolment Target Identity: - The Enrolment Target Identity: Identifying the Enrolment Target for which the Enrolee (authenticated using the GBA) is to be provisioned. - The Enrolee's assigned CSE-ID or AE-ID (Enrolee-ID), The M2M Enrolment Function is to provide this entity identity for the Enrolee with the Km or Kpsa to the Enrolment Target, when requested by the Enrolment Target. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 107 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - Enrolee's GBA User Security Settings (GUSS) enables indicating if Enrolee is allowed to establish a NAF-specific key with the Enrolment Target or/and if the BSF can distribute a NAF specific key to the Enrolment Target. Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake: The Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake enables the establishment of a GBA bootstrapped key (Ks) shared between the Enrolee and the MEF with associated Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier (B-TID) and key lifetime, by performing to the GBA Bootstrapping phase described in ETSI TS 133 220 [13]. If a bootstrapped key Ks is already shared between Enrolee and the MEF and still valid, then the Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake phase is not needed. The Enrolment Key Generation phase can take place with the existing GBA Bootstrapped key Ks. Enrolment Key Generation phase: The Enrolment Key (Ke) shall be the GBA Bootstrapped key (Ks) established during the Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake. The Enrolment Key Identifier (Ke-ID) shall be the Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier (B-TID) generated during the Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake. Integration to the Association Security Handshake: • The Enrolee and the Enrolment Target shall establish the Master Credential (Km) or the Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) thanks to procedures described in ETSI TS 133 220 [13] using the Enrolment Key (Ke) as GBA bootstrapped key Ks and the Enrolment Key Identifier (Ke-ID) as B-TID. The Enrolment Target plays the role of a NAF. - The Enrolee and the Enrolment Target shall establish NAF-specific key(s) as described in ETSI TS 133 220 [13]. A key lifetime is associated to the NAF-specific keys. The Enrolment Target also receives the Enrolee's User Security Settings (USS) from the MEF/BSF: The FQDN of the NAF, used as input to generate the Ks_(int/ext)_NAF, shall be set as follows: - In the case where the Enrolment Target is an M2M Authentication Function, then the FQDN of the NAF is set to the FQDN of the M2M Authentication Function. - In the case where the Enrolment Target is a CSE, then the FQDN of the NAF is set to the public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. In case of GBA_ME, NAF-specific key is Ks_NAF. In case of GBA_U, NAF-specific keys are Ks_int_NAF and Ks_ext_NAF. - The Master Credential (Km)) or the Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) shall be the NAF-specific key: In case of GBA_ME, Km/Kpsa = Ks_NAF. In case of GBA_U, Km/Kpsa = Ks_int_NAF if HTTP Client application resides in the UICC. Otherwise, Km/Kpsa = Ks_ext_NAF. - The Enrolee and the Enrolment Target shall set the Master Credential Identifier (KmID) or the Provisioned Secure Connection Key Identifier (KpsaID) to the value of KeID. Enrolee and Enrolment Target shall perform (D)TLS-PSK handshake (IETF RFC 4279 [15]) with the Master Credential (Km) or Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) as Pre-Shared Key in compliance with clause 10.2.2. If UICC is used as Secure Environment supporting Remote Security Provisioning, GBA-U with Km/Kpsa = Ks_int_NAF shall be used for authentication and key exchange. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 108 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.3 Void | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4 Enrolment Exchange | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.1 Enrolment Exchange Procedures | The following procedures may occur within an Enrolment Exchange: • MEF Client Registration procedures. • Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures. • Certificate Provisioning procedure. • Device Configuration procedures, per ETSI TS 118 122 [57] can be applied, with the MEF interacting with a DM Server and MEF Client interacting with the DM Client on the Managed Entity. • MEF Client Command Procedures (i.e. CRUD procedures targeting at a <mefClientCmd> resource), which enable the MEF to control the sequence of Enrolment Exchange procedures. The clauses below describe triggering mechanisms specific to each set of procedures. Alternatively, other mechanisms, not specified by oneM2M, can be used to trigger any Enrolment Exchange procedure, with the condition that such mechanisms provide a satisfactory level of security. Example mechanisms include pre-configuration and manual configuration. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.2 MEF Client Registration | MEF Client Registration procedures are specified in clauses 8.3.5.2.3, 8.3.5.2.4, 8.3.5.2.5 and 8.3.5.2.6. MEF Client Registration procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. MEF Client Registration procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered using Device Configuration. Device Configuration, specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57], can trigger MEF Registration Procedures: - Adding a [MEFClientRegCfg] MO triggers the MEF Client to perform the MEF Client Registration Procedure, specified in clause 8.3.5.2.3. - Deleting a [MEFClientRegCfg] MO triggers the MEF Client to stop using the associated MEF Client registration, delete any credentials associated with that MEF Client registration and end the associated MEF Client registration on the MEF. The MEF achieves the final step by performing the MEF Client De-Registration Procedure, specified in clause 8.3.5.2.6. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.3 Symmetric Key Provisioning | Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures are specified in clauses 8.3.5.2.7, 8.3.5.2.8, 8.3.5.2.9 and 8.3.5.2.10. These procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. These procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered using a "MO_Node" MEF Client Command: Device Provisioning (ETSI TS 118 122 [57]) can be used to configure MEF Client with an [authenticationProfile] MO which has a child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node to instruct the MEF Client that Symmetric Key Provisioning will be used for credentials used in that [authenticationProfile] MO. If a MEF Client receives of an "MO_NODE" MEF Client Command matching the path of such a [authenticationProfile] MO, then this can trigger a Symmetric Key Provisioning procedure according to the information elements in the MEF Client Command and the current values of the parameters in these MO nodes. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 109 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE: Using Device Configuration to update or delete the [authenticationProfile] MO and/or its child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node does not implicitly trigger a Symmetric Key Provisioning procedure. The update or delete will not take effect until a Symmetric Key Provisioning procedure is trigger by some other mechanisms. • Procedures triggered by an expiry of a MEF Key Registration. If the MEF Client previously (successfully) executed an MEF Key Registration procedure under the control of an [authenticationProfile] MO on the MEF Client, and the current time is greater than the expirationTime of the [authenticationProfile] resource, and if the current time is close to or greater than the expirationTime of the most recent MEF Key Registration, then this can trigger the MEF Client to perform MEF Key Registration. The criteria for being "close to the expirationTime" is left up to the implementation of the MEF Client. • Procedures triggered by receiving, within a oneM2M security protocol, a symmetric key identifier whose FQDN matches the MEF's FQDN. If a Target MEF Client receives, within a oneM2M security protocol, a symmetric key identifier whose FQDN matches the MEF's FQDN, then this can trigger the Target MEF Client to execute the MEF Key Retrieval Procedure specified in clause 8.3.5.2.8. See steps 6 and 7 in clause 8.3.5.1. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.4 Certificate Provisioning | Certificate Provisioning procedures are specified in clause 8.3.6. These procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. These procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggering using MEF Client Command Procedure: If the MEF Client receives a MEF Client Command identifying a Certificate Provisioning Procedure, then this triggers the MEF Client to execute the Certificate Provisioning procedure using the information elements included in the command. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.5 Device Configuration | Device Configuration is specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. Device Configuration can be performed within an Enrolment Exchange with a MEF, or in a DM session with other DM servers (separate from an Enrolment Exchange). Clause 8.3.8 specifies use of Device Configuration within an Enrolment Exchange with a MEF. Device Configuration can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered using MEF Client Command Procedure: If the MEF Client receives a MEF Client Command identifying the Device Configuration Procedure, then this trigger the MEF Client to execute a Device Configuration session using the information elements included in the command. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.4.6 MEF Client Command | MEF Client Command procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9. MEF Client Command procedures can only be performed within an Enrolment Exchange. MEF Client Command procedures can be triggered by the following oneM2M-specified mechanisms: • Procedures triggered following MEF Client Registration Procedure - A MEF Client Command Retrieve shall be executed following an MEF Client Registration procedure (other than MEF Client De-registration). • Procedures triggered according to retryDuration - When the MEF issues a NO_MORE_COMMANDS MEF Client Command, then the cmdArgs includes a retryDuration providing the duration after which the MEF Client attempts MEF Client Command Retrieve. A retryDuration is cancelled whenever the MEF Client successfully interacts with the MEF prior to this time. For further details see clause.8.3.9.6. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 110 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • Procedures triggered following an attempt to perform an issued MEF Client Command - If the MEF Client has attempted executing a previously issued MEF Client Command, then the MEF Client shall perform the MEF Client Command Update procedure to report on the status of that execution. The MEF can issue a MEF Client Command in the response. An Example of a MEF Client Command procedure is illustrated in figure 8.3.4.6-1. Figure 8.3.4.6-1: Example MEF Client Command procedure 1) The MEF client sends an MEF Client Registration request. 2) The MEF creates a <mefClientReg> resource. 3) If the MEF wants to issue a MEF Client Command it creates a <mefClientCmd> resource as child of the <mefClientReg> resource. 4) The MEF sends the MEF Client Registration response which includes a representation of the <mefClientReg> resource, including the childResource reference, whose value represents the resource ID of a <mefClientCmd> resource. 5) The presence of the childResource reference triggers the MEF client to retrieve the <mefClientCmd> resource. The MEF Client sends a MEF Client Command Retrieve request to the MEF. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 111 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 6) The MEF forms the response. 7) The MEF returns a MEF Client Command Retrieve response which includes the <mefClientCmd> resource. 8) The MEF client parses the received response and executes the command included therein. 9) After execution of the command, the MEF client reports the result to the MEF by a MEF Client Command Update Request. 10) The MEF updates the <mefClientCmd>. If the MEF has a new command for the MEF Client it indicates a trigger in the representation of the <mefClientCmd> resource. 11) The MEF sends the MEF Client Command Update Response. If the received response includes another MEF Client Command, steps 8 to 11 are repeated. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5 Symmetric Key Provisioning Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.1 Introduction | Clause 8.3.5 describes the common details and procedures for using an RSPF to provision symmetric keys. These frameworks use a MEF to provide authentication and distribution of symmetric key for use by a Source End- Point initiating establishing the symmetric key, and one or more Target End-Points. Table 8.3.5.1-1 MEF Clients can retrieve the output symmetric key from the MEF. The MEF provides its services on behalf of administrating stakeholders such as M2M SPs or third party M2M Trust Enablers (MTE). An administrating stakeholder authorizes the MEF to provide services to MEF clients, and oversees authorizing the distribution of symmetric keys. Table 8.3.5.1-1 describes the mapping of Source MEF Client and Target MEF Client to roles in the specific MEF-Based Frameworks, and the allowed number of Target MEF Clients. Table 8.3.5.1-1: Mapping to specific Security Frameworks MEF-Based Security Framework Source MEF Client Target MEF Client Number of Target MEF Clients Output Symmetric Key MAF Security Frameworks MAF Client MAF 1 M2M Master Key (Km) Security Association Establishment Framework (SAEF) Entity A Entity B 1 M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Originator Receiver 1 pairwiseESPrimKey End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Source ESData End-Point Target ESData End-Point 1..n ESData Key This clause 8.3.5 specifies MEF Procedures between the MEF Clients and associated messages. The operation and management of the MEF, beyond the details provided for the MEF Procedures, are not specified in the present document. The general sequence for using the MEF procedures is shown in figure 8.3.5.1-1 and described as follows: 1. Each MEF Client shall separately establish credentials for mutual authentication with the MEF as described in MEF Client Credential Configuration (clause 8.3.7.1). 2. Each MEF client shall be separately configured to register on the MEF with a specific administrating stakeholder. MEF Client Registration Configuration (clause 8.3.7.2) provides the necessary parameters. 3. Each MEF Client shall perform a MEF Client Registration procedure with the MEF. This provides confirmation that the MEF Client is willing to use the services of the MEF, under the authorization of the administrating stakeholder. The MEF client shall register separately for each administrating stakeholder, even when registering via a single MEF. If the MEF Client is remotely provisioned for mutual authentication with the MEF, then the MEF shall provide the MEF Client with the KmID to be used for subsequently authentication with the MEF. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 112 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 At a later time independent of this sequence of events, the MEF Client Registration Update procedure may be performed to confirm that the MEF Client is willing to use the services of the MEF and or establish a new Km and KmID, and the MEF Client De- Registration procedure may be performed to signal that the MEF Client is ceasing use the services of the MEF. 4. The Source MEF client shall be configured to establish secure communication using a security feature (SAEF, ESPrim or ESData) with symmetric keys established via the MEF. The details of this configuration is specific to the security feature being invoked, but shall include the MEF Key Registration Configuration (clause 8.4.4.3). 5. The Source MEF Client shall perform a MEF Key Registration procedure to establish a symmetric key and corresponding identifier. The Source MEF Client shall also provide the Security Usage Identifier (SUID) limiting the scope of the credential by identifying the security feature (SAEF, ESPrim or ESData). This procedure shall include the MEF Handshake procedure for mutual authentication of the Source MEF Client and MEF. At a later time independent of this sequence of events, the MEF Key Registration Update procedure may be performed to update the expiration of the registered key or update the list of Target MEF Clients, and the MEF Key De-Registration procedure may be performed to delete the key registration from the MEF. 6. The Source MEF Client shall provide, to the Target MEF Client(s), the symmetric key identifier established in the MEF Key Registration procedure. The details of this step depend on the security feature as identified by the SUID. 7. The Target MEF Client shall perform the MEF Key Retrieval procedure, to retrieve the symmetric key and corresponding information. This procedure shall include the MEF Handshake procedure for mutual authentication of the Target MEF Client and MEF. 8. The symmetric key shall be used in the security protocol between the Source MEF Client and Target MEF Client. If the security protocol requires a single symmetric key, then the first half of the distributed symmetric key shall be used. If the security protocol requires two symmetric keys (for example, an encryption key and a separate integrity key), then the two halves of the distributed symmetric key shall be used as the two security protocol symmetric keys. The details of this step depend on the security feature. Figure 8.3.5.1-1: The sequence of events when using the MEF Security Framework as part of a security feature Clause 8.3.5.2 describes the processing and information flows of the MEF Procedures. Clause 8.3.7 describes the information in the MEF Client Credential Configuration, MEF Client Registration Configuration and MEF Key Registration Configuration. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2 MEF Security Framework Processing and Information Flows | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.1 Introduction | Clause 8.3.5.2 specifies the processing and information flows of the MEF procedures. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 113 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.2 MEF Handshake Procedure | Purpose: A MEF Handshake procedure establishes a mutually authenticated TLS or DTLS session for protecting the communication between an MEF Client and MEF. In the case of the MEF Key Registration procedure, the TLS or DTLS session may be used by the Source MEF Client and MEF to establish the Key Value. Pre-Conditions: One of the following conditions shall hold: • The MEF Client and MEF have been provisioned with certificates as described in the MEF Client Credential Configuration details in clause 8.8.3.1, and configured with CA certificates for validating certificates as described in the MEF Client Registration Configuration details in clause 8.8.3.2. • The MEF Client and MEF have established a symmetric Master Credential (Kpm) with corresponding Master Credential Identifier (KpmID). The Kpm and KpmID may be pre-provisioned, or Kpm may be established using Remote Security Provisioning Framework with KpmID established using the MEF Client Registration procedure. NOTE: In the case of establishing Kpm via remote provisioning, MEF Handshake cannot be performed during MEF Client Registration because (a) the MEF does not know Kpm prior to MEF Client Registration and (b) KpmID has not been assigned prior to MEF Client Registration. Procedure description: • If the MEF Client and MEF have established a symmetric Master Credential (Kpm) with corresponding Master Credential Identifier (KpmID), then the MEF Client and MEF shall establish the TLS or DTLS session using the TLS-PSK handshake according to clause 10.2.2, with the following details: - The "psk_identity" parameter [15] shall be set to the value of the Master Credential Identifier (KpmID). - The "psk" parameter [15] shall be set to the value of the Master Credential (Kpm). • If the MEF Client and MEF are to authenticate using certificates, then the MEF Client and MEF shall establish the TLS or DTLS session using the certificate-based TLS handshake according to clause 10.2.2, with the following details: - The TLS server certificate shall be the MEF's certificate. The MEF Client shall verify the MEF's certificate against the set of provisioned MEF certificate trust anchors as described in clause 8.1.2.5. - The TLS client certificate shall be the 'MEF Client's certificate. The MEF shall verify the 'MEF Client's certificate against the provisioned MEF Client Certificate Information as described in clause 8.1.2.5. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.3 MEF Client Registration Procedure | Purpose: The MEF Client registers with the MEF to confirm that it is willing to use the services of the MEF, under the authorization of the administrating stakeholder. NOTE: The MEF Client Registration procedure is equivalent to CSE or AE registration, but in this case the MEF Client is "registering" to the MEF, and not the registrar CSE. Pre-Conditions: The MEF Client, MEF, and (where applicable) MEF have been provisioned with the parameters described in clause 8.3.7. Procedure description: 1) The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF by performing the MEF Handshake procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.2). This provides the MEF with an authenticated identity for the MEF Client. 2) The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client Registration request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.3-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 114 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.5.2.3-1: MEF Client Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the registration shall expire. 1 Labels Labels to aid discovery the record of the MEF Client's registration. 0..1 adminFQDN FQDN of the administrating stakeholder, provided in the MEF Client Registration Configuration 1 3) Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. The MEF may assign different values for parameters received from the MEF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall compose a MEF Client Registration response request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.3-2. Table 8.3.5.2.3-2: MEF Client Registration Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEFClientRegID An identifier for the new MEF Client Registration record. 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the MEF Client Registration record 0..1 expirationTime Time when the MEF Client Registration record shall expire. 1 MEF Client ID Identifier of the MEF Client 1 adminFQDN FQDN of the administrating stakeholder 1 The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. 4) The MEF Client and MEF shall store the parameters. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.4 MEF Client Configuration Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to retrieve MEF Client Configurations provided by the administrating stakeholder to the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Registration record. • The MEF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF as described in step 1 of clause 8.3.5.2.3. 2. The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client Configuration Retrieval request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.4-1. Table 8.3.5.2.4-1: MEF Client Configuration Retrieval Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 MEFClientRegID Identifier for the MEF Client registration record being updated 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, including if there is no MEF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MEF Client registration record, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall attempt to retrieve the MEF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MEF Client registration record. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 115 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 4. The MEF shall compose a MEF Client Configuration Retrieval response a containing the following parameters. Table 8.3.5.2.4-2: MEF Client Configuration Retrieval Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEFClientCfg MEF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MEF Client registration record 1 The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. 5. The MEF Client shall apply the MEF Client Configuration. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.5 MEF Client Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to update the MEF Client registration by any combination of extending the expirationTime of the MEF Client Registration record or updating the labels. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Registration record. • The MEF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF as described in step 1 of clause 8.3.5.2.3. 2. The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client Registration Update request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.5-1. Table 8.3.5.2.5-1: MEF Client Registration Update Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 MEFClientRegID Identifier for the MEF Client registration record being updated 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the MEF Client registration record shall expire 0..1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the MEF Client registration record 0..1 NOTE: At least one of expirationTime and labels shall be included. 3. Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall update the MEF Client Registration record with the proposed values if authorized by the administrating stakeholder. The MEF may assign different values for parameters received from the MEF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 4. The MEF shall compose a MEF Client Registration Update response containing the following parameters. Table 8.3.5.2.5-2: MEF Client Registration Update Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Updated time when the MEF Client Registration record shall expire. 0..1 labels Updated labels to aid discovery of the MEF Client Registration record 0..1 NOTE: The response only includes expirationTime and/or labels if those parameters were present in the corresponding request. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 116 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. 5. The MEF Client and MEF shall store the parameters. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.6 MEF Client De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MEF Client to end its registration with the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Client Registration procedure to create the MEF Client Registration record. • The MEF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF as described in step 1 of clause 8.3.5.2.3. 2. The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client De-Registration request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.6-1. Table 8.3.5.2.6-1: MEF Client De-Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 MEFClientRegID Identifier for the MEF Client Registration record being ended 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall delete the information associated with the identified MEF Client Registration record. 4. The MEF shall compose a MEF Client Registration Update response indicating the success of the operation. The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.7 MEF Key Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to establish a symmetric key with the MEF which can be retrieved for use by one or more Target MEF Clients. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The Source MEF Client is provided with (or has otherwise determined) the information in the MEF Key Registration Configuration (clause 8.3.7.3). • The Source MEF Client has performed the MEF Client Registration procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.3) with the MEF for the administrating stakeholder identified in the MEF Key Registration Configuration. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The Source MEF Client shall establish a TLS or DTLS session with the MEF using the MEF Handshake procedure, described in clause 8.3.5.2.2. A by-product of the MEF Handshake procedure is that the MEF establishes an authenticated identity for the Source MEF Client. 2. The Source MEF Client selects the value of the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) to be distributed by the MEF. The value shall be one of the following: - The Source MEF Client generates the output symmetric key value from the (D)TLS session secrets using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 117 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - The output symmetric key value is self-generated by the Source MEF Client, independently of the (D)TLS session secrets. 3. The Source MEF Client shall compose a list of Target MEF Clients to whom the MEF is authorized to provide the output symmetric key value: - In the case of MEF-Based SAEF or MEF-Based ESPrim: The list shall contain exactly one Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-ID. - In the case of MEF-Based ESData: The list shall contain any non-zero number of Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-IDs. NOTE 1: How the Source MEF Client selects the list of Target MEF Clients is application dependent. 4. The Source MEF Client shall send a MEF Key Registration request, including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.7-1. Table 8.3.5.2.7-1: MEF Key Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the Key Registration shall expire. 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used. 1 targetIDs (Optional) list of identifiers for the initial set of Target MEF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. 0..1 Key Value (Optional) If present, this parameter contains an output symmetric key value which is self-generated by the Source MEF Client. If this parameter is not present, then the Source MEF Client and MEF will generate the output symmetric key value using TLS Exporter 0..1 5. The MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall authorize establishing a Key Value, based on the authenticated identity for the Source MEF Client. NOTE 2: The present document provides no details for the authorization of this request. 6. If the request included a value in the Key Value parameter, then the MEF shall store this value. Otherwise, the MEF shall generate Key Value from the (D)TLS session using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. 7. The MEF shall initialize the list of authorized Target MEF Clients (those MEF Clients which may to retrieve this credential) to the list provided in the request. - In the case of MEF-Based ESData: This list may be further updated by administrating stakeholders during or after the MEF Key Registration procedure. NOTE 3: The present document does not provide any details about administrating stakeholders updating the list of authorized Target MEF Clients on the MEF. The MEF could provide its own logic and interface allowing administrating stakeholders to manage this list. 8. The MEF shall select a previously-unused value of RelativeKeyID. 9. The MEF may assign different values for parameters received from the MEF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 10. The MEF shall send a response, to the Source MEF Client, including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.7-2. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 118 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.5.2.7-2: MEF Key Registration response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration 1 expirationTime Time when the Key Registration shall expire. 1 Source MEF Client ID Identifier of the Source MEF Client 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used. 1 targetIDs List of identifiers for the initial set of Target MEF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. This list may have been modified from the list provided by the MEF Client, or created by the MEF (if the MEF Client did not provide a list). 1 11. The Source MEF Client and MEF shall store the output symmetric key value and corresponding Key Identifier. - The Key Identifier is generated from the RelativeKeyID and the M2M Authentication Function's FQDN by the Source MEF Client and MEF, as described in clause 10.3.5. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.8 MEF Key Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Target MEF Client to retrieve the Key Value from a MEF corresponding to a RelativeKeyID received by the Target MEF Client. Pre-Conditions: • The Target MEF Client has performed the MEF Client Credential Configuration (clause 8.3.5.2.1) with the MEF, including configuration of the MEF Key Retrieval URI. • The Source MEF Client has performed the MEF Key Registration procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.2) with the MEF, resulting in a registered Key Value and assigned RelativeKeyID for a specific administrating stakeholder and Security Usage Identifier (SUID). • The Target MEF Client received a Key Identifier from the Initiating-MEF Client in a security feature with the SUID which the Source MEF Client provided to the MEF during the MEF Key Registration procedure (clause 8.3.5.2.7). The Key Identifier shall be composed of the FQDN of the MEF and the RelativeKeyID assigned to the registered key. • The Target MEF Client may expect that it is authorized to obtain the corresponding output symmetric key value. NOTE: The Target MEF Client should not repeat this procedure if the Target MEF Client is already in possession of the corresponding Key Value. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The Target MEF Client shall establish a TLS or DTLS session with the MEF using the MEF Handshake procedure, described in clause 8.3.5.2.2. A by-product of the MEF Handshake procedures is that the MEF establishes an authenticated identity for the Target MEF Client. 2. The Target MEF Client shall send a MEF Key Retrieval request to the MEF including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.8-1. Table 8.3.5.2.8-1: MEF Key Retrieval Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier received from the Source MEF Client in a security feature 1 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 119 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 3. The MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall identify the key registration using the RelativeKeyID. 4. The MEF shall determine if the Target MEF Client is authorized to retrieve the registered key and metadata by comparing the authenticated identifier for Target MEF Client against the list of identifiers for authorized Target MEF Clients. If the Target MEF Client is not authorized, then the MEF shall send, to the Target MEF Client, an error message. Otherwise, the MEF shall proceed to the next step. 5. The MEF shall send a response, to the Target MEF Client, including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.8-2. Table 8.3.5.2.8-2: MEF Key Registration response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Time when the Key Registration shall expire. 1 Source MEF Client ID Identifier of the Source MEF Client 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used. 1 Key Value The registered value of the output symmetric key 1 6. The Target MEF Client shall associate the parameters with the key identifier. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.9 MEF Key Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to update the metadata associated with a registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key registration is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF as described in step 1 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. 2. The Source MEF Client shall compose a list of Target MEF Clients to whom the MEF is authorized to provide Kc: - In the case of MEF-Based SAEF or MEF-Based ESPrim: The list shall contain exactly one Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-ID. - In the case of MEF-Based ESData: The list shall contain any non-zero number of Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-IDs. NOTE 1: The present document does not provide any details about how the Source MEF Client selects the list of Target MEF Clients. 3. The Source MEF Client shall send a MEF Key Registration Update request, including the updated information shown in table 8.3.5.2.9-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 120 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.5.2.9-1: MEF Key Registration Update Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the Key Registration shall expire. 0..1 labels Proposed Labels to aid discovery of the registered key 0..1 targetIDs (Optional) proposed list of identifiers for the set of Target MEF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key 0..1 NOTE: At least one of expirationTime, labels or targetIDs shall be provided. 4. The MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an appropriate error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall update the metadata with the proposed values if authorized by the administrating stakeholder. The MEF may assign different values for parameters received from the MEF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 5. The MEF shall send a response, to the Source MEF Client, including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.9-2. Table 8.3.5.2.9-2: MEF Key Registration Update response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Current time when the key registration shall expire, if changed since the last time the MEF Client was provided with the expiration time. 0..1 labels Updated list of labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration, if any. 0..1 targetIDs Current list of identifiers for the initial set of Target MEF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. This list may have been modified from the list provided by the MEF Client. 0..1 NOTE: The response includes only those parameters that were present in the corresponding request. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.2.10 MEF Key De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MEF Client to request the MEF to stop distributing the registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MEF Client and the MEF. Pre-Conditions: • The MEF Client has previously performed the MEF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key registration is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MEF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MEF as described in step 1 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. 2. The MEF Client shall send MEF Key De-Registration request including the information shown in table 8.3.5.2.10-1. Table 8.3.5.2.10-1: MEF Client De-Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MEF-FQDN FQDN of the MEF, from MEF Instruction Configuration 1 RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration 1 ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 121 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 3. Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall delete the information associated with the identified key registration. 4. The MEF shall compose MEF Client De-Registration response indicating the success of the operation. The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.5.3 Mapping to Protocol in ETSI TS 118 132 | The Mmef Interface defined in ETSI TS 118 132 [58] shall be used for symmetric key provisioning procedures. The mapping of the MEF Procedures described in clause 8.3.5.2 to the Mmef interface is described in ETSI TS 118 132 [58]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6 Certificate Provisioning Procedure Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.1 Introduction | The Certificate Provisioning procedure includes the following actors: • MEF Client: a Security Principal requesting provisioning of an MEF-Provisioned Certificate. The MEF Client uses the MEF-Provisioned Certificate for subsequent authentication of itself to the MEF. The Security Principal can use the MEF-Provisioned Certificate for subsequent authentication of itself in other oneM2M Security Principals. • MEF CA: issuing MEF-Provisioned Certificates. • MEF: serving requests from the MEF Client, and acting as a Registration Authority (RA) to forward Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) towards the MEF CA. The MEF can request the MEF CA to add attributes to those attributes already present in the CSR, and can request deletion or modification of attributes present in the CSR. The Certificate Provisioning Procedure only specifies the interaction between the MEF Client and the MEF. NOTE 1: The present document does not describe the interaction between the MEF and MEF CA. The Certificate Provisioning Procedure achieve the following outcomes: • The MEF Client obtains MEF-Provisioned Certificate. • The MEF Client obtains the MEF CA's Certificate(s). This certificate(s) shall be used by the MEF Client for subsequent validation of certificates authenticating the MEF. This certificate(s) may be used by the Security Principal for subsequent validation of certificates authenticating other Security Principals and MAFs. NOTE 2: Additional trust anchor CA certificates for validation of other Security Principals and MAFs can also be provisioned by configuration of MOs based on the [trustAnchorCred] resource. The Certificate Provisioning Procedure comprises two procedures: • Initial Certificate Provisioning Procedure: used when the MEF Client does not possess a valid MEF-Provisioned Certificate that was previously provisioned by the MEF. • Certificate Re- Provisioning Procedure: used by a MEF Client to renew/rekey its existing valid MEF-Provisioned Certificate that was previously provisioned by the MEF. The present document describes use of the following protocols for the Certificate Provisioning Procedure: • Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST), specified in IETF RFC 7030 [59]. The use of this protocol is described in clause 8.3.6.2. • Certificate Provisioning functions using Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol (SCEP) [66]. The use of this protocol is described in clause 8.3.6.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 122 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2 Certificate Provisioning procedures using EST | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2.1 Introduction | The Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol is specified in IETF RFC 7030 [59]. When EST is used for Certificate Provisioning procedures, then the following mapping of concepts shall be applied. • The MEF Client acts as the EST Client. • The MEF acts as the EST Server. • The MEF CA acts as the EST CA. • The MEF-Provisioned Certificate is equivalent to the EST Client Certificate. If a MEF or MEF Client claiming support of the Certificate Provisioning Procedure using EST, then: • The MEF or MEF Client shall support the mandatory EST operations and the optional "CSR Attributes" operations (see figure 5 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]). • The MEF or MEF Client shall support TLS server authentication with certificates and TLS client authentication with certificates as specified for EST in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]. NOTE 1: This is used when a Certificate-based RSPF is used. The Certificate-based RSPF mandates that the MEF Client and MEF use only trust anchor CA certificates which have been explicitly identified for use for validating MEF Certificates and MEF Client Certificates. These correspond to the Explicit Trust Anchors (TAs) as defined in section 1.1 of [59]. Consequently, the MEF Client/EST Client uses an EST Client Explicit TA database, and the MEF/EST Client uses an EST Client Explicit TA database, where these databases are defined in figure 4 of [59]. • If the MEF or MEF Client supports PPSK-based RSPF, then the MEF or MEF Client shall support EST Certificate-Less TLS Mutual Authentication (section 3.3.3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]). • The MEF or MEF Client may support linking identity and Proof-of-Possession information (section 3.5 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]). NOTE 2: Until widely-used cryptographic libraries are available which support this functionality, it is unlikely that this functionality would be supported by the MEF or MEF Client. • The MEF or MEF Client shall not use the HTTP-based client authentication feature of EST (section 3.2.3 of [59]). NOTE 3: HTTP-based client authentication in EST can be used in scenarios where the MEF Client is authorized using user authentication as discussed in section 2.2.3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]. These scenarios have not yet been considered by the present document. These scenarios can be supported in the future by adding support for HTTP-based client authentication. • The MEF Client shall support generation of private/public key pairs. The MEF Client and MEF shall use server-side key generation feature of EST (sections 2.4 and 4.4 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2.2 Initial Certificate Provisioning procedure using EST | Purpose: Enabling an MEF Client to request its first certificate from the MEF. See also the initial enrolment operational scenarios in section 2.2 of IETF RFC 7030 [59], noting the supported authentication methods listed in clause 8.3.6.2.1. Pre-Conditions: A. Common Pre-conditions for all Certificate Provisioning Procedures: i. The MEF Client and MEF support EST. ii. The MEF Client is provided with the estBaseURI whose FQDN shall match the FQDN of the MEF. iii. The MEF Client is triggered to perform EST. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 123 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 1: The estBaseURI in pre-condition A.ii can be provided in the message triggering EST in pre-condition A.iii. B. The MEF Client and MEF have successfully performed a MEF Handshake and the MEF associates an identifier with the MEF Client. For the Initial Certificate Provisioning procedure, one of the following RSPFs shall be used: i. PPSK-Based RSPF (clause 8.3.2.1) corresponding to certificate-less TLS authentication in EST, described in section 3.3.3 of [59]. ii. Certificate-Based RSPF (clause 8.3.2.2) corresponding to mutual, certificate-based TLS authentication in EST: 1) The certificate used to authenticate the MEF/EST Server corresponds to the EST Server certificate (defined in figure 3 of [59]) which the MEF Client/ EST Client validates against the EST Client Explicit Trust Anchor database (see note 1 in clause 8.3.6.2.1). EST describes the EST Server authentication in section 3.3.1 of [59], which mandates the EST Client perform EST Server authorization checks in section 3.6 of [59] with details specific to authorization checks for an EST Client Explicit TA database in section 3.6.1 of [59]. 2) The certificate used to authenticate the MEF Client/EST Client corresponds to a Third-Party EST Client certificate, (defined in figure 3 of [59]) which the MEF/ EST Server validates against the EST Server Explicit Trust Anchor database (see note 1 in clause 8.3.6.2.1). EST describes the EST Client authentication in section 3.3.2 of [59], which mandates the EST Server perform authorization checks in section 3.7 of [59]. NOTE 2: HTTP-based client authentication of the user or EST Client is not supported by the Initial Certificate Provisioning procedure. See note 3 in clause 8.3.6.2.1. Procedure Description: 1. Obtaining trust anchor CA certificates. See section 4.1 of [59]. a. The MEF Client shall request the set of trust anchor CA certificates as described in section 4.1.2 of [59]. b. The MEF shall respond a set of trust anchor CA certificates as described in section 4.1.3 of [59]. c. The MEF Client is expected to install the trust anchor CA certificates. NOTE 3: Certification path validation and certificate status verification needs to be performed by the MEF Client as specified in clause 8.1.2.2. 2. Obtaining the set of CSR attributes. See section 4.5 of [59]. a. The MEF Client shall request the set of CSR attributes from the MEF as described in section 4.5.1 of [59]. b. The MEF shall respond with the set of required CSR attributes as described in section 4.5.2 of [59]. The set of required CSR attributes shall comply with the CSR Profile in clause 10.1.4. This set includes a challengePassword and an identity attribute for the type of identifier which the MEF associates with the MEF Client (see pre-conditions). 3. Obtaining a Certificate. a. The MEF Client shall either generate a public/private key pair of suitable key length, or select an existing public/private key pair of suitable key length. b. The MEF Client shall generate a CSR with the requested CSR attributes using the key pair. c. The MEF Client shall request a EST Client certificate using "Simple Enrolment of Clients" as described in section 4.2.1 of IETF RFC 7030 IETF RFC 7030 [59]. d. The MEF shall validate the attributes, including the challengePassword, against those provided in step 2. The MEF shall validate the identity attribute against the authenticated identity associated with the MEF Client (see precondition B). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 124 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 4: The MEF, acting as a Registration Authority (RA), forwards the CSR to a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues the EST Client certificate (defined in figure 3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]) and returns the certificate to the MEF. e. The MEF shall send the EST Client certificate (defined in figure 3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]) to the MEF Client in the response as described in section 4.2.3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]. f. The MEF Client is expected to install the EST Client certificate and associates it with the corresponding private key. The EST Client certificate shall be used for subsequent authentication with the MEF. The EST Client certificate may also be used as an end-entity certificate in other security protocols. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.2.3 Certificate Re-Provisioning procedure using EST | Purpose: Enabling an MEF Client to renew/rekey a currently valid Enrolled Certificate. See also the client certificate reissuance operational scenario in section 2.3 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]. Pre-Conditions: [59] A. Common Pre-conditions for all Certificate Provisioning Procedures: see pre-condition A in clause 8.3.6.2.2. B. The MEF Client has previously performed the Initial Certificate Provisioning procedure or Certificate Re-Provisioning Procedure with the MEF, and the MEF Client has installed its EST Client certificate and EST Client Explicit Trust Anchor database from the most recent such procedure. C. The MEF Client and MEF have performed a MEF Handshake for the Certificate-Based RSPF (clause 8.3.2.2) with the MEF Client using its EST Client certificate and EST Client Explicit Trust Anchor database as discussed in precondition B. The details are identical to pre-condition B.ii in clause 8.3.6.2.2, with the difference that the MEF Client/EST Client authenticates itself with an EST Client Certificate (defined in figure 4 of [59]) rather than the EST Third-Party EST Client certificate in pre-condition B.ii.2. Procedure Description: 1) Obtaining trust anchor CA certificates. As for step 1 in clause 8.3.6.2.2. 2) Obtaining the set of CSR attributes. As for step 2 in clause 8.3.6.2.2. 3) Obtaining a Certificate. As for step 3 in clause 8.3.6.2.2, except step 3.c and 3.d are replaced with the following: 4) The MEF Client shall request the renewal/rekeying of its EST Client certificate using "Simple Re-Enrolment of Clients" as described in section 4.2.2 of [59]. 5) The MEF shall validate the challengePassword and EKU(s) against those provided in step 2. The MEF validates the provided identity against the identity associated with the MEF Client (see precondition C). |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.3 Certificate Provisioning procedures using SCEP | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.3.1 Introduction | The Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol (SCEP) is specified in the IETF RFC 8894 [66]. When SCEP is used for Certificate Provisioning procedures, the following mapping of concepts shall be applied: • The M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) Client acts as the SCEP Client. • The MEF acts as the SCEP Server (also known as a SCEP Responder). • The MEF CA acts as the SCEP CA. • The MEF-Provisioned Certificate is equivalent to the SCEP Client Certificate. If a MEF or MEF Client claim support of the Certificate Provisioning Procedure using SCEP, then: • The MEF or MEF Client may support linking identity and Proof-of-Possession information. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 125 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 1: Until widely-used cryptographic libraries are available which support this functionality, it is unlikely that this functionality would be supported by the MEF or MEF Client. • The MEF or MEF Client shall not use the HTTP-based client authentication. NOTE 2: HTTP-based client authentication in SCEP can be used in scenarios where the MEF Client is authorized using user authentication. These scenarios have not yet been considered by the present document. These scenarios can be supported in the future by adding support for HTTP-based client authentication. • The MEF Client shall support generation of private/public key pairs. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.6.3.2 Details of Certificate Provisioning procedures using SCEP | Purpose: Enabling an MEF Client to request its first certificate and subsequent certificates from the MEF using SCEP as specified in IETF RFC 8894 [66]. Pre-Conditions: A. Common Pre-conditions for all Certificate Provisioning Procedures: i) The MEF Client and MEF support SCEP. ii) The MEF Client is provided with the base URI whose FQDN shall match the FQDN of the MEF. iii) The MEF Client is triggered to perform SCEP. NOTE 1: The base URI in pre-condition A.ii can be provided in the MEF Client command triggering SCEP in pre- condition A.iii. B. If the client does not have an appropriate existing certificate then it shall generate locally a self-signed certificate. The keyUsage extension in the certificate shall indicate that it is valid for digitalSignature and keyEncipherment. The self-signed certificate should use the same subject name as in the PKCS #10 request. See section 2.4 of IETF RFC 8894 [66]. Procedure Description: 1. Obtaining trust anchor CA certificates. See section 4.2 of [66]. a) The MEF Client shall request the set of trust anchor CA certificates. b) The MEF shall respond a set of trust anchor CA certificates. c) The MEF Client is expected to install the trust anchor CA certificates. NOTE 2: Certification path validation and certificate status verification needs to be performed by the MEF Client as specified in clause 8.1.2.2. 2. Obtaining the CA capabilities. See section 3.5 of IETF RFC 8894 [66]. a) The MEF Client shall request the set of CA capabilities from the MEF as described in section 3.5.1 of [66]. b) The MEF shall respond with the set of required CSR attributes as described in section 3.5.2 of IETF RFC 8894 [66]. 3. Obtaining a Certificate. a) The MEF Client shall either generate a self-signed public/private key pair of suitable key length, or select an existing public/private key pair of suitable key length. b) The MEF Client shall generate a CSR with the requested CSR attributes using the key pair. c) The MEF Client shall request a SCEP Client certificate using "Certificate Enrolment" as described in section 4.3 of IETF RFC 8894 [66]. d) The MEF shall validate the attributes, optionally also a challengePassword. The MEF shall validate the identity attribute against the authenticated identity associated with the MEF Client. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 126 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 3: The MEF, acting as a Registration Authority (RA), forwards the CSR to a Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues the SCEP Client certificate and returns the certificate to the MEF. e) The MEF shall send the SCEP Client certificate to the MEF Client in the response as described in section 4.3.1 of IETF RFC 8894 [66]. f) The MEF Client is expected to install the SCEP Client certificate and associates it with the corresponding private key. The SCEP Client certificate shall be used for subsequent authentication with the MEF. The SCEP Client certificate may also be used as an end-entity certificate in other security protocols. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.7 MEF Client Configuration Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.7.1 MEF Client Credential Configuration Details | The MEF Client and MEF shall be configured with credentials for mutual authentication of the MEF Client and MEF. The credentials for mutual authentication shall be either pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned by another MEF using Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks, or by Device Configuration as specified in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]. Either symmetric key credentials or certificate credentials maybe provisioned. Symmetric key credentials may be used for authenticating some MEF Clients and certificate credentials may be used for authenticating other MEF Clients. The selection may be based on the capabilities of the MEF Client. The details depend on the type of credential (symmetric key or certificates) and, in the case of symmetric keys, the type of provisioning (pre-provisioning or remote provisioning). 1) Details specific to Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Keys (PPSKs): the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key (Kpm) and corresponding key Identifier (KpmID) shall be provisioned to the MEF Client (assuming the role of Enrolee) and the MEF. 2) Details specific to Remotely-Provisioned Symmetric Keys (RPSKs): The MEF Client and an M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) shall be provisioned with credentials for performing a Remote Security Provisioning (RSPF) Framework. The MEF Client shall be authorized to use the services of the MEF. For more details, see clause 8.3.2. NOTE 1: In this case, the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key (Kpm) and key Identifier (KpmID) are established during the MEF Client Registration procedure. 3) Details specific to Certificates (whether pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned): The MEF Client shall be provisioned with an MEF Client certificate with optional certificate chain. The MEF Client certificate shall be a device certificate, Node-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate. NOTE 2: The configuration of MEF trust anchor CA certificates is addressed in MEF Client Registration Configuration, and can occur separately from MEF Client Credential Configuration. The oneM2M Device Configuration specification ETSI TS 118 122 [57] provides a set of <mgmtObj> specializations that shall be used for MEF Client Credential Configuration when the MEF Client supports device management (either remotely or via manual input). The present document does not specify how the MEF Client Credential Configuration is represented when the MEF Client does not support device management. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.7.2 MEF Client Registration Configuration Details | Purpose: The MEF Client Registration Configuration describes the information provisioned to a MEF Client to enable it to perform MEF procedures authorized by an administrating stakeholder. The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MEF Client Registration Configuration to be provided to the MEF Client. Pre-conditions: • The MEF Client and MEF have been configured with credentials which can be used for mutual authentication: see MEF Client Credential Configuration in clause 8.3.7.1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 127 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • If the MEF Client and MEF will use certificates for mutual authentication, then: The administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder) possesses a copy of the MEF Client's Certificate Information as defined in clause 8.1.2.4. The MEF is provided with a copy of the MEF Client's Certificate Information. The present document does not specify how this information is provided to the MEF by the administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder). The administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder) possesses a copy of the MEF Trust Anchor CA Certificates. The MEF Client is provided with a copy of the MEF Trust Anchor CA Certificates. • The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MEF to allow the MEF Client to perform MEF Client Registration. This could involve pre-authorization or real-time authorization. Details: The MEF Client Registration Configuration (mefClientRegCfg) includes the information shown in table 8.3.7.2-1, and has data type sec:clientRegCfg (see clause 12.4.2). Table 8.3.7.2-1: Information in the MEF Client Registration Configuration Element Name Multiplicity Notes expirationTime 0..1 Time when the configuration expires labels 0..1 List of labels to enable discovery of the MEF Client registration record fqdn 1 MEF-FQDN (also known as MEF-ID) adminFQDN 1 FQDN of the administrating stakeholder httpPort 0..1 Port number when using HTTP [i.20] coapPort 0..1 Port number when using CoAP [i.21] websocketPort 0..1 Port number when using WebSocket [i.19] |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.7.3 MEF Key Registration Configuration Details | Purpose: The MEF Key Registration Configuration describes the information provisioned to a MEF Client to enable it to perform MEF procedures authorized by an administrating stakeholder. The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MEF Client Registration Configuration to be provided to the MEF Client. Pre-conditions: • The MEF Client has performed the MEF Client Registration procedure with the MEF for the administrating stakeholder. • The MEF Client has currently-valid credentials for mutual authentication with the MEF. Details: The MEF Key Registration Configuration (mefKeyRegCfg) includes the information shown in table 8.3.7.3-1, and has data type sec:keyRegCfg (see clause 12.4.3). Table 8.3.7.3-1: Information in the MEF Key Registration Configuration Element Name Multiplicity Notes expirationTime 0..1 Expiration time labels 0..1 List of labels to enable discovery of the key registration adminFQDN 1 FQDN of the administrating stakeholder SUID 1 SUID constraining the usage of the Key Value established during the MEF Key Registration procedure. targetIDs 0..1 List of identifiers for authorized target MEF Clients ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 128 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.8 Profile for Device Configuration within an Enrolment Exchange | ETSI TS 118 122 [57] specifies a series of resources types, and procedures on those resource types, for configuration of AEs and CSEs on Field Devices. As stated in clause 8.3.4.5, Device Configuration can be performed within an Enrolment Exchange with a MEF, or in a DM session with other DM servers (separate from an Enrolment Exchange). When Device Configuration is used with an Enrolment Exchange, then there are two constraints on the Device Configuration <mgmtObj> specializations: [myCertFileCred]: This <mgmtObj> specialization is not configured by a MEF. Instead, a MEF shall use the Certificate Provisioning procedures of clause 8.3.6 for provisioning a certificate for the MEF Client to use for authenticating itself. [authenticationProfile]: The symmKeyValue attribute of this <mgmtObj> specialization for provisioning symmetric keys is not used by the MEF (See note below). Instead, a MEF shall use the Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures of clause 8.3.5 for provisioning symmetric keys to the MEF Client. This is achieved in two steps: 1) The MEF uses Device Configuration to configure a MO corresponding to the [authenticationProfile], with the following constraints: - The [authenticationProfile] shall link to the [MEFClientRegCfg] associated with the registration on the MEF for the administrating stakeholder which authorized the [authenticationProfile]. - The [authenticationProfile] shall include the expirationTime, and MAFKeyRegDuration attributes, and may include the MAFKeyRegLabels. - The [authenticationProfile] resource does not include the values corresponding to the symmKeyID and symmKeyValue attributes. 2) The MEF subsequently issues a MO_NODE MEF Client Command matching the [authenticationProfile] MO node, as described in clause 8.3.4.3. This triggers executing a MEF Key Registration procedure which establishes a symmetric key and symmetric key identifier at the MEF Client and MEF. NOTE: The symmKeyValue is present in the [authenticationProfile] for Device Configuration scenarios where the DM Server is not an MEF. The Symmetric Key Provisioning procedures specified in the present document provide greater security, which is why they are mandatory when the DM Server is an MEF. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9 MEF Client Command Processing | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.1 Introduction | Purpose: The MEF Client Commands are used by an MEF to control the sequence of Enrolment Exchange procedures executed by the MEF Client. A MEF Client Command is issued, or reissued, by the MEF to the MEF Client in the response of a MEF Client Command Retrieve procedure (clause 8.3.9.2) or MEF Client Command Update procedure (clause 8.3.9.3). The resulting status, following the attempt to parse and execute the command, is reported to the MEF Client in the request of a MEF Client Command Update procedure (clause 8.3.9.3). A MEF Client Command Retrieve response or MEF Client Command Update response includes cmdID, cmdDescription, and initial cmdStatusCode of a MEF Client Command being issued, or reissued, by the MEF to the MEF Client. A MEF Client Command Update request, sent from the MEF Client to the MEF, includes cmdID and cmdStatusCode indicating the result of attempting to parse and execute the command. These three elements serve the following purposes: • cmdID: disambiguates between sequential MEF Client Commands issued within the context of an MEF Client Registration (which, in some cases, may be one of multiple MEF Client Registrations on the MEF). The cmdID serves two purposes: ensuring that a command is not accidentally executed twice; and correlating a MEF Client Command status to the corresponding issued command. • cmdDescription: providing a description of the command to be executed. • cmdStatusCode: enables the MEF to indicate if a command is a reissued command or not, and enables the MEF Client to indicate the result of attempting to parse and execute the command. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 129 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 MEF Client Command procedures are performed within the context of a (non-expired) MEF Client Registration with the MEF. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.2 MEF Client Command Retrieve Procedure | Triggering the Procedure: See clause 8.3.4.6 for mechanisms which can trigger MEF Client Command procedures. Pre-Conditions: a) The MEF and MEF Client have performed an MEF Handshake, see clause 8.3.5.2.2. b) The MEF Client Registration is not expired, and the MEF Client has obtained the MEFClientRegID for the registration. c) The MEF Client shall not send an MEF Client Command Retrieve in between the time when an MEF Client receives an MEF Client Command from the MEF and the time when the MEF Client sends a corresponding MEF Client Command Update to report on the status. d) The MEF Client shall not initiate an MEF Client Command Retrieve while waiting for a MEF Client Command Response from the MEF, unless the MEF takes too long to respond. The time duration for waiting for a response from the MEF is an implementation-specific decision of the MEF Client. Procedure: 1) The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client Command Retrieve request including the information shown in table 8.3.9.2-1. Table 8.3.9.2-1: MEF Client Command Retrieve Request message information Element Description Multiplicity MEFClientRegID Identifier for the MEF Client registration record for which the MEF Client Command is being requested. See Pre- Condition B. This is the resource identifier of the parent <mefClientReg> resource of the MEF Client Command. 1 2) Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MEF shall send an error response. 3) If the request is processed successfully, then the MEF shall attempt to retrieve the MEF Client Command currently associated with the identified MEF Client registration record: - If there are currently no more MEF Client Commands to be issued to the MEF Client, then the MEF forms the cmdDescription as specified in clause 8.3.9.6. - If MEF Client Command will trigger a Certificate Provisioning procedure, then the MEF forms the cmdDescription as specified in clause 8.3.9.7. - If MEF Client Command will trigger Device Configuration, then the MEF forms the cmdDescription as specified in clause 8.3.9.8. - In the case of an MO_NODE MEF Client Command, then the MEF forms the cmdDescription, as specified in clause 8.3.9.9. 4) The MEF shall compose a MEF Client Command Retrieve response containing the following parameters. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 130 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.9.2-2: MEF Client Command Retrieve Response message information Element Description Multiplicity cmdID An identifier for a MEF Client Command issued by the MEF (see data type definition in clause 8.6.1 of ETSI TS 118 132 [58]) 1 cmdDescription Description of the MEF Client Command being issued or reissued. 1 cmdStatusCode cmdStatusCode set to MEF_CLIENT_CMD_ISSUED or MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REISSUED as appropriate (see clauses 8.3.9.5.2 and 8.3.9.5.3) 1 The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. 5) The MEF Client shall attempt to parse and execute the response information a) The MEF Client attempts to parse the Response message information into cmdID, cmdDescription and cmdStatusCode elements; and parse cmdDescription into its constituent cmdClassID and cmdArgs elements. If parsing succeeds, then the MEF client proceeds to step 5b. If parsing fails, then the MEF Client may choose to exit the procedure, or may return to step 1. b) The MEF Client compares the cmdID of the Response message with cmdID sent in the most recent MEF Client Command Update procedure. If the cmdID values are distinct, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5.c. If the cmdID values are identical then the MEF_Client exits the procedure, triggering MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REPEATED_CMD_ID. c) The MEF Client interprets cmdClassID, to determine the corresponding MEF Client Command Class. If the MEF Client supports the MEF Client Command Class then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5.d. If the MEF Client does not support the MEF Client Command Class then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CLASS_NOT_SUPPORTED. d) The MEF Client initiates the MEF Client Command Class-specific procedures: The NO_MORE_COMMANDS MEF Client Command Class-specific procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9.6. The CERT_PROV MEF Client Command Class-specific procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9.7. The DEV_CFG MEF Client Command Class-specific procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9.8. The MO_NODE MEF Client Command Class-specific procedures are specified in clause 8.3.9.9. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.3 MEF Client Command Update procedure | Triggering: The MEF Client shall initiate the MEF Client Command Update procedure only when triggered from within the MEF Client Command Retrieve procedure (clause 8.3.9.2), or MEF Client Command Update procedure (as defined in the present clause) or a MEF Client Command Class-specific procedure (clauses 8.3.9.6, 8.3.9.7, 8.3.9.8 and 8.3.9.9). The trigger includes the values for cmdID and cmdStatusCode. Pre-Conditions: A. The MEF and MEF Client have performed an MEF Handshake, see clause 8.3.5.2.2. B. The MEF Client Registration is not expired, and the MEF Client has obtained the MEFClientRegID for the registration. Procedure: 1) The MEF Client shall send a MEF Client Command Update request including the information shown in table 8.3.9.3-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 131 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.9.3-1: MEF Client Command Update Request message information Element Description Multiplicity MEFClientRegID Identifier for the MEF Client registration record for which the MEF Client Command is being requested. See Pre- Condition B. 1 cmdID Provided when the procedure was triggered 1 cmdStatusCode Provided when the procedure was triggered 1 2) Upon receiving the request, the MEF shall process the request. a) The MEF attempts to parse the request message information into MEFClientRegID, cmdID and cmdStatusCode elements. If parsing succeeds, then the MEF proceeds to step 2b. If parsing fails, then the MEF shall send an MEF Client Command Update response with the BAD_REQUEST request Status Code from table 5.1.2-3 in ETSI TS 118 132 [58], and no further steps are performed. b) The MEF compares the cmdID in the request to the cmdID of the most recently issued MEF Client Commands. If there is no match then the cmdID and cmdStatusCode are discarded. If there is a match, then the MEF can records the cmdID and cmdStatusCode. 3) The MEF determines the next MEF Client Command to issue to the MEF Client, as described in step 3 of clause 8.3.9.2. 4) The MEF shall compose a MEF Client Command Update response containing the same elements as an MEF Client Command Retrieve response, shown in table 8.3.9.2-2 in step 4 of clause 8.3.9.2. The MEF shall send the response to the MEF Client. 5) The MEF Client shall attempt to parse and execute the response message information, as specified in step 5 of clause 8.3.9.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.4 The cmdDescription element | The cmdDescription element has data type sec:cmdDescription defined in clause 12.4.4 and includes the following elements: • cmdClassID: identifying a class of MEF Client Commands. • (conditional on cmdClassID) cmdArgs: containing arguments specific to the cmdClass. • (optional) targetID: When the MEF Client is a Node acting on behalf of a CSE and/or multiple AE, then the targetID identifies to which entity the command applies. MEF Client Command processing supports the following classes of MEF Client Commands: • NO_MORE_COMMANDS: indicating that the MEF has no more MEF Client Commands for the MEF Client. The NO_MORE_COMMANDS MEF Client Command is specified in clause 8.3.9.6. • CERT_PROV: for triggering Certificate Provisioning procedures. The CERT_PROV MEF Client Commands are specified in clause 8.3.9.7. • DEV_CFG: for triggering Device Configuration. The DEV_CFG MEF Client Commands are specified in clause 8.3.9.8. • MO_NODE: for triggering procedures. The CERT_PROV MEF Client Commands are specified in clause 8.3.9.9. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5 The cmdStatusCode element | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.1 Introduction | The cmdStatusCode is used by the MEF and MEF Client to indicate the status of an issued Command. The value in the cmdStatusCode element is of datatype sec:cmdStatusCode, specified in clause 12.3.2.4. Table 8.3.9.5.1-1 provides an informative summary of the cmdStatusCode, with normative description in the remaining clauses of 8.3.9.5. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 132 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.3.9.5.1-1: Overview of the cmdStatusCode element cmdStatusCode Assigned by cmdClass of issued MEF Client Command Clause MEF_CLIENT_CMD_ISSUED MEF Any 8.3.9.5.2 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REISSUED MEF Any 8.3.9.5.3 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK MEF Client Any. See note. 8.3.9.5.4 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REPEATED_CMD_ID MEF Client Any 8.3.9.5.5 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CLASS_NOT_SUPPORTED MEF Client Any. See note. 8.3.9.5.6 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_BAD_ARGUMENTS MEF Client Any. 8.3.9.5.7 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGUMENTS MEF Client CERT_PROV, DEV_CFG, MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.8 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_SERVER_ERROR MEF Client CERT_PROV 8.3.9.5.9 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_CLIENT_ERROR MEF Client CERT_PROV 8.3.9.5.10 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_SERVER_ERROR MEF Client DEV_CFG 8.3.9.5.11 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_CLIENT_ERROR MEF Client DEV_CFG 8.3.9.5.12 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_NOT_FOUND MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.13 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_TYPE_CONFLICT MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.14 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_BAD_ARGS MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.15 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGS MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.16 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_INCONSITENT_CONFIG MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.17 MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED MEF Client MO_NODE 8.3.9.5.18 NOTE: In normal circumstances, an MEF Client should not provide this cmdStatusCode when the issued command has cmdClass indicating NO_MORE_COMMANDS. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.2 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_ISSUED | The MEF is issuing the command, and the MEF expects that this is the first time that the MEF Client is receiving the command. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.3 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REISSUED | The MEF previously issued the command, and did not receive a corresponding MEF Client Command Update from the MEF Client (in particular, providing the status of the executed command), and consequently the MEF is reissuing the command. If the MEF Client already performed the command, then it reports the status, otherwise the MEF Client performs the command. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.4 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK | The MEF Client successfully performed the command. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.5 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_REPEATED_CMD_ID | The cmdID in the MEF Client Command Response message matches the cmdID sent in the most recent MEF Client Command Update procedure. This would indicate some processing error on the MEF. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.6 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CLASS_NOT_SUPPORTED | The MEF Client does not support the requested cmdClass. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 133 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.7 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_BAD_ARGUMENTS | The MEF Client supports the cmdClass, but the MEF Client could not parse cmdArgs. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.8 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGUMENTS | The MEF Client supports the cmdClass, and the MEF Client parsed cmdArgs element, but at least one of the elements of cmdArgs which could be processed by the MEF Client had an unacceptable value. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.9 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_SERVER_ERROR | The MEF Client supports the CERT_PROV cmdClass, and the MEF Client parsed the cmdArgs element, but was unable to perform the command due to some error regarding communicating with the Certificate Provisioning server or an error internal to the Certificate Provisioning server. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.10 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_CLIENT_ERROR | The MEF Client supports the CERT_PROV cmdClass, and the MEF Client parsed the cmdArgs element, but was unable to perform the command due to a processing error on the MEF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.11 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_SERVER_ERROR | The MEF Client supports the DEV_CFG cmdClass, and the MEF Client parsed the cmdArgs element, but was unable to perform the command due to some error regarding communicating with the Device Configuration server or an error internal to the Device Configuration server. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.12 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_CLIENT_ERROR | The MEF Client supports the DEV_CFG cmdClass, and the MEF Client parsed the cmdArgs element, but was unable to perform the command due to some issue a processing error on the MEF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.13 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_NOT_FOUND | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, and parsed the cmdArgs element, but could not find the MO node at the objectPath element in the MEF Client Command arguments. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.14 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_TYPE_CONFLICT | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, parsed the cmdArgs element, and found the MO node at the objectPath element, but the type of the MO Node does not match the objectType element in the MEF Client Command arguments. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.15 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_BAD_ARGS | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, parsed the cmdArgs element, and found the MO node at the objectPath element, and the type of the MO Node matches the objectTypeID element, but the MEF Client could not parse the objectTypeSpecifcArgs elememt. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.16 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGS | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, parsed the cmdArgs element, and found the MO node at the objectPath element, and the type of the MO Node matches the objectType element, and the MEF Client could not parse the objectTypeSpecifcArgs element but the remaining MO-type-specific arguments in MEF Client Command arguments are unacceptable to the MEF Client. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 134 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.17 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_INCONSISTENT_CONFIG | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, parsed the cmdArgs element, and found the MO node at the objectPath element, and the type of the MO Node matches the objectTypeID element, and the remaining MO-type- specific arguments in MEF Client Command arguments are acceptable, but the configuration of the MO nodes is inconsistent and preventing MO Node processing. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.5.18 cmdStatusCode MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED | The MEF Client supports the MO_Node cmdClass, parsed the cmdArgs element, and found the MO node at the objectPath element, and the type of the MO Node matches the objectType element, and the remaining MO-type-specific arguments in MEF Client Command arguments are acceptable, but there has been some other error in executing the MO Node processing. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.6 NO_MORE_COMMANDS MEF Client Command Class-specific Processes | Purpose: When cmdClassID indicates NO_MORE_COMMANDS, then the MEF is indicating that it has no more MEF Client Commands for the MEF Client. Elements of cmdArgs: If cmdDescription contains cmdClassID indicating NO_MORE_COMMANDS, then cmdArgs shall contain the noMoreCmdArgs element of data type sec:noMoreCmdArgs which includes the following elements: • retryDuration: indicating a time duration, after which the MEF Client is expected to attempt MEF Client Command Retrieve. The retryDuration is cancelled if the MEF Client successfully performs another MEF Client Command procedure, within the scope of the MEF Client Registration, before the retryDuration completes. See clause 8.3.4.6 for other mechanisms which can trigger MEF Client Command procedures. Forming cmdDescription: 1) The MEF shall form cmdArgs containing the elements described in "Elements of cmdArgs" above: - retryDuration: set to the time duration before the MEF wishes the MEF Client to attempt the next MEF Client Command Retrieve, with the understanding that the retryDuration is cancelled if the MEF Client successfully performs another MEF Client Command procedure. 2) The MEF shall form cmdDescription with cmdClassID indicating NO_MORE_COMMANDS and cmdArgs formed in step 1. Parsing and Executing cmdArgs: 1) The MEF Client shall attempt to parse cmdArgs into the elements described in "Elements of cmdArgs". If the parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 4. If parsing fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_BAD_ARGUMENTS. 2) The MEF Client MEF Client Command will not perform a MEF Client Command Retrieve procedure or MEF Client Command Update procedure unless triggered. 3) The MEF Client shall set a timer based on retryDuration: a) The timer shall be cancelled if, by some other mechanism as described in clause 8.3.4.6, the MEF Client is triggered to performs an MEF Client Command Retrieve procedure or MEF Client Command Update procedure before the timer expires. b) If the time expires, then the MEF Client shall perform an MEF Client Command Retrieve procedure, (clause 8.3.9.2), at some time selected by the MEF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.7 CERT_PROV MEF Client Command Class-specific Processes | Purpose: When cmdClassID indicates CERT_PROV, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to perform a Certificate Provisioning Procedure with the MEF. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 135 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Elements of cmdArgs: If cmdDescription contains cmdClassID indicating CERT_PROV, then the cmdArgs shall contain the certProvArgs element of data type sec:certProvArgs which includes the following elements: • certProvProtocol: indicating the Certificate Provisioning protocol (EST or SCEP) that the MEF Client is to use. • URI: indicating the base URI to be used for the indicated Certificate Provisioning protocol. • certSubjectType: indicating if the subject of the provisioned certificate will be a Node, CSE or AE. • certSubjectID: the Node-ID or CSE-ID or AE-ID of the subject of the certificate Forming cmdDescription: 1) The MEF shall form cmdArgs containing the elements described in "Elements of cmdArgs" above: - certProvProtocol: The MEF shall assign this element to indicate the protocol (EST or SCEP) that the MEF Client is to use for Certificate Provisioning. - URI: The MEF shall assign this element to base URI to be used for the indicated Certificate Provisioning protocol. The FQDN of the base URI shall match the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client Command. - certSubjectType: The MEF Client shall assign this element to indicate if the subject of the provisioned certificate will be a Node, CSE or AE. - certSubjectID: the MEF shall assign this element to be the Node-ID or CSE-ID or AE-ID of the subject of the certificate. 2) The MEF shall form cmdDescription with cmdClassID indicating CERT_PROV and cmdArgs formed in step 1. Parsing and Executing cmdArgs: 1) See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. 2) The MEF Client shall verify that the cmdArgs elements are acceptable: - certProvProtocol: Verification of this element succeeds only if the indicated protocol (EST or SCEP) is supported by the MEF Client. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client selects the Certificate Provisioning protocol indicated by the element. - URI: Verification of this element succeeds only if the FQDN of the base URI matches the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client Command. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client set the base URI to the value in this element. - certSubjectType: If the MEF Client is in a Node acting on behalf of a CSE and/or multiple AE then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a Node, CSE or AE. If the MEF Client is in a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a CSE. If the MEF Client is in a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a CSE. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client records the certSubjectType as the certificate subject type. - certSubjectID: Verification of this element depends on the value of certSubjectType: If subjectType indicates a Node, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a Node-ID. If certSubjectType indicates a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a AE-ID. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 136 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 If certSubjectID indicates a AE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a CSE-ID. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client records the certSubjectID as the certificate subject identity. If the verification of any argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGUMENTS. 3) The MEF Client shall attempt executing the selected Certificate Provisioning procedure (EST specified in clause 8.3.6.2 or SCEP specified in clause 8.3.6.3), with base URI, certificate subject type and certificate subject identity as determined in step 4. The certificate subject identity shall be provided in the SubjectAltName extension of the certificate signing request. 4) Following the attempt to execute the selected Certificate Provisioning procedure, the MEF Client shall perform the MEF Client Command Update Procedure with cmdID assigned to the cmdID of the received command and cmdStatusCode assigned as follows: - If the Certificate Provisioning procedure completed successfully, then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. - If the Certificate Provisioning procedure did not complete successfully due to an error regarding communicating with the Certificate Provisioning server or an error internal to the Certificate Provisioning server, then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_SERVER_ERROR. - If the Certificate Provisioning procedure did not complete successfully due to an error occurring in the Certificate Provisioning client (in the MEF Client), then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_CLIENT_ERROR. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.8 DEV_CFG MEF Client Command Class-specific Processes | Purpose: When cmdClassID indicates DEV_CFG, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to perform a Device Configuration (ETSI TS 118 122 [57]) with the MEF Client acting as the DM Client and the MEF acting as the DM Server. Elements of cmdArgs: If cmdDescription contains cmdClassID indicating DEV_CFG, then the cmdArgs shall contain the devCfgArgs element which includes the following elements: • devMgmtID: indicating the DM protocol (e.g. OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069) that the MEF Client is to use for Device Configuration. • URI: URI of the DM Server. Forming cmdDescription: 1) The MEF shall form cmdArgs containing the elements described in "Elements of cmdArgs" above: - devMgmtID: The MEF shall assign this element to indicate the protocol (e.g. OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069 [i.31] ) that the MEF Client is to use for Device Configuration. - URI: The MEF shall assign this element to the URI of the DM Server. The FQDN of the base URI shall match the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client Command. 2) The MEF shall form cmdDescription with cmdClassID indicating DEV_CFG and cmdArgs formed in step 1. Parsing and Executing cmdArgs: 3) See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 137 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 4) The MEF Client shall verify that the cmdArgs elements are acceptable: - devMgmtID: Verification of this element succeeds only if the indicated protocol (e.g. OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069) is supported by the MEF Client. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client selects the DM protocol indicated by the element. - URI: Verification of this element succeeds only if the FQDN of the base URI matches the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client Command. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client set the DM Server URI to the value in this element. If the verification of any argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGUMENTS. 5) The MEF Client shall attempt executing Device Configuration per ETSI TS 118 122 [57] using the DM protocol and DM Server URI determined in step 4. 6) Following the attempt to execute Device Configuration, the MEF Client shall perform the MEF Client Command Update Procedure with cmdID assigned to the cmdID of the received command and cmdStatusCode assigned as follows: - If the Device Configuration procedure completed successfully, then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. - If the Device Configuration procedure did not complete successfully due to an error regarding communicating with the DM server or an error internal to the DM server, then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_SERVER_ERROR. - If the Device Configuration procedure did not complete successfully due to an error occurring in the DM client (in the MEF Client), then the MEF Client shall set cmdStatusCode to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_CLIENT_ERROR. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9 MO_NODE MEF Client Command Class-specific Processes | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.1 Generic MO_NODE Processes | Purpose: When cmdClassID indicates MO_NODE, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to process an MO_NODE that has been already configured to the DM Client of the MEF Client (e.g. using Device Configuration in ETSI TS 118 122 [57]). Elements of cmdArgs: If cmdDescription contains cmdClassID indicating MO_NODE, then the cmdArgs shall contain the MONodeCmdArgs element which includes the following elements: • objectPath: the path of the MO node to be processed. • objectTypeID: indicating the type of the specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource which provides the data model for the MO node to be processed. • (Optional) objectTypeSpecificArgs: additional arguments dependent on type of the specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource (see objectTypeID): - If objectTypeID matches the [authenticationProfile] specialization of the <mgmtObj>resource, then objectTypeSpecificArgs is present, and is defined in clause 8.3.9.9.2. - For all other specializations, this element is not present. Forming cmdDescription: 1) The MEF shall form cmdArgs containing the elements described in "Elements of cmdArgs" above: - objectPath: The MEF shall assign this element to the path of the MO node to be processed. - objectTypeID: The MEF shall assign this element to the identifier of the type of MO node to be processed. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 138 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - (Optional) objectTypeSpecificArgs: If objectTypeID matches the [authenticationProfile] specialization of the <mgmtObj>resource, then objectTypeSpecificArgs is formed as specified in "Forming objectTypeSpecificArgs" in clause 8.3.9.9.2. For all other specializations, this element is not present. 2) The MEF shall form cmdDescription with cmdClassID indicating MO_NODE and cmdArgs formed in step 1. Parsing and Executing cmdArgs: 3) See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. 4) The MEF Client shall verify that the cmdArgs elements are acceptable: a) objectPath: Verification of these elements succeeds only if there is an MO node addressed by the objectPath. If verification succeeds the MEF Client proceeds to step 4b. If the verification of this argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_NOT_FOUND. b) objectTypeID: Verification of these elements succeeds only if objectTypeID matches the type MO node addressed by the objectPath (see step 4a). If verification succeeds the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If the verification of this argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_TYPE_CONFLICT. 5) The MEF Client applies the processing specific to the objectTypeID: • If objectTypeID matches the [authenticationProfile] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource, then the MEF Client shall perform "Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.2. • If objectTypeID matches the [trustAnchorCred] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource, then the MEF Client shall perform "Processing a [trustAnchorCred] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.7. • If objectTypeID matches the [MAFClientCfgReg] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource, then the MEF Client perform "Processing a [MAFClientCfgReg] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.8. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.2 [authenticationProfile]-specific Processes | Purpose: Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node ensures that the MEF Client has been able to establish the credentials needed to use that [authenticationProfile] MO node for mutual authentication. Elements of objectTypeSpecificArgs: when objectTypeID matches the [authenticationProfile] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource, then the objectTypeSpecificArgs element shall be present and shall contain the authProfileMONodeArgs element which includes the following elements: • SUID: this value matches the SUID in the addressed MO Node. Forming objectTypeSpecificArgs: 1) The MEF shall form objectTypeSpecificArgs containing authProfileMONodeArgs with the elements described in "Elements of objectTypeSpecificArgs" above: - SUID: The MEF shall assign this element to the value in the SUID element expected to be in the MO node located at the objectPath on the MEF Client. Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO Node: 2) The MEF Client shall attempt to parse objectTypeSpecificArgs into the elements described in "Elements of objectTypeSpecificArgs". If the parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 3. If parsing fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MN_NODE_BAD_ARGS. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 139 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 3) The MEF Client shall verify that the objectTypeSpecificArgs elements are acceptable: - SUID: Verification succeeds if the SUID in objectTypeSpecificArgs matches the SUID in the addressed MO_NODE. If objectTypeSpecificArgs elements verification succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If objectTypeSpecificArgs elements verification fails for any element, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGS. 4) The MEF Client shall verify that the SUID matches the configuration of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node and its parent and child MO Nodes: - If the SUID is in the set {11, 21, 31, 41}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node does not correspond to the [MAFClientRegCfg] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource, - If the SUID is in the set {12, 22, 32, 42}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node does not correspond to the [registration] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource. - If the SUID is in the set {13, 23, 33, 43}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node does not correspond to the [dataCollection] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource. - If the SUID is in the set {11,12,13}, then verification shall fail if the symmKeyID attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node. - If the SUID is in the set {21,22,23}, then verification shall fail if: The keyRegDuration attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node, or The child MO Node of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node does not correspond to the [MEFClientRegCfg] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource. - If the SUID is in the set {31,32,33}, then verification shall fail if: The keyRegDuration attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node, or The child MO Node of the [authenticationProfile] MO Node does not correspond to the [MAFClientRegCfg] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource. - If the SUID is in the set {11, 12, 21, 22, 31, 32}, then verification shall fail if: The TLSCiphersuites attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node, or The TLSCiphersuites attribute is present but does not include the mandatory DTLS or TLS Ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-Based Security Frameworks in clause 10.2.2. - If the SUID is in the set {41, 42, 43}, then verification shall fail if: The myCertFingerprint attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node, or The TLSCiphersuites attribute is not present in the [authenticationProfile] MO Node or the TLSCiphersuites attribute is present but does not include the mandatory DTLS or TLS Ciphersuites for Certificate-Based Security Frameworks in clause 10.2.3, or The [authenticationProfile] MO Node has one or more child MO nodes corresponding to the [trustAnchorCred] specialization of the <mgmtObj> resource. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If the verification of this argument fails for any element, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_INCONSISTENT_CONFIG. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 140 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 5) The MEF Client applies the processing specific to the SUID: - If the SUID is in the set {11,12,13}, corresponding to a pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.3. - If the SUID is in the set {21,22,23}, corresponding to a MEF-established symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.4. - If the SUID is in the set {31,32,33}, corresponding to a MAF-established symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MAF-established symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.5. - If the SUID is in the set {41,42,43}, corresponding to a certificate SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with certificate SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.6. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.3 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with pre-provisioned symmetric key | Purpose: Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID (in the set {11,12,13}) ensures that the MEF Client has access to a local copy of the pre-provisioned symmetric key, for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. Preconditions: A. This procedure will succeed only if there is a local copy of the pre-provisioned symmetric key value which can be accessed by the MEF. Procedure: 1. The MEF Client shall determine if the symmKeyValue attribute is present in the [authenticationProfile] MO node: - If the attribute is not present, then the MEF Client shall proceed to step 2. - If the attribute is present, then the MEF Client has access to the pre-provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. 2. The MEF Client obtains the value of the symmKeyID attribute of the [authenticationProfile] MO node. The MEF Client determines if the MEF Client has a local copy of the symmetric key value with identifier matching the symmKeyID attribute: - If a local copy of the symmetric key value is not present, then the MEF Client does not have access to the pre-provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. - If a local copy of the symmetric key value is present, then the MEF Client has access to the pre- provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.4 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MEF-established symmetric key | Purpose: Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID (in the set {21, 22, 23}) ensures that the MEF Client establishes a symmetric key with the MEF for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. Preconditions: A. This procedure will succeed only if the [authenticationProfile] MO node has a child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node and a parent MO Node which may be of type [MAFClientRegCfg], [registration] or [dataCollection]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 141 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 B. This procedure assumes that the MEF Client has a currently-valid MEF Client Registration with the MEF and administrating stakeholder identified in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node. Procedure: The MEF Client shall attempt the MEF Key Registration procedure as described in clause 8.3.5.2.7, with the MEF Client acting as the Source MEF Client and with following clarifications: At step 4 in clause 8.3.5.2.7, the MEF Client shall form the MEF Key Registration Request (see table 8.3.5.2.7-1) as follows: • MEFFQDN: shall be set to the value of the fqdn attribute in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node; • expirationTime shall be computed by adding the current time to the value of the keyRegDuration in the [authenticationProfile] MO node; • labels shall be assigned the value of the keyRegLabels attribute in the [authenticationProfile] MO node; • adminFQDN: shall be assigned to the value of the adminFQDN attribute in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node; • SUID: shall be assigned to the value of the SUID attribute in the child [authenticationProfile] MO node; • targetIDs: shall be assigned according to the parent MO node of the [authenticationProfile] MO node: - In the case of a parent [registration] MO node, the targetIDs shall be assigned the CSE-ID of the Registrar CSE. - In the case of a parent [dataCollection] MO node, the targetIDs shall be assigned the CSE-ID determined from the containerPath attribute of the [dataCollection] MO node. - In the case of a parent [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node, the targetIDs shall be assigned the fqdn attribute of the [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. • keyValue: shall not be present. The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MEF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MEF as indicated by the presence of the httpPort, coapPort and websocketPort in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate httpPort, coapPort or websocketPort attribute of the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node. At step 10 in clause 8.3.5.2.7, if the MEF Client receives a successful MEF Key Registration Response (see table 8.3.5.2.7-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MEF Key Registration Response: • expirationTime: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. • Source MEF Client ID: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. • adminFQDN: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. • SUID: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. • targetIDs: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF Key Registration Response and associate this information with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. If verification fails, or if procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 142 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.5 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MAF-established symmetric key | Purpose: Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID (in the set {31,32,33}) ensures that the MEF Client, acting as a Source MAF Client, establishes a symmetric key with the MAF for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. Preconditions: A. This procedure will succeed only if the [authenticationProfile] MO node has a child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node and a parent MO Node which may be of type [registration] or [dataCollection]. B. This procedure assumes that the MEF Client, acting as an MAF Client, has a currently-valid MAF Client Registration with the MAF and administrating stakeholder identified in the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. Procedure: The MEF Client shall attempt the MAF Key Registration procedure as described in clause 8.8.2.7, with the MAF Client acting as the Source MAF Client and with following clarifications. At step 4 in clause 8.8.2.7, the MEF Client shall form the MAF Key Registration Request (see table 8.8.2.7-1) as follows: • MAF-FQDN: shall be set to the value of the fqdn attribute in the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node; • expirationTime shall be computed by adding the current time to the value of the keyRegDuration in the [authenticationProfile] MO node; • labels shall be assigned the value of the keyRegLabels attribute in the [authenticationProfile] MO node; • adminFQDN: shall be assigned to the value of the adminFQDN attribute in the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node; • SUID: shall be assigned to the value of the SUID attribute in the child [authenticationProfile] MO node; • targetIDs: shall be assigned according to the parent MO node of the [authenticationProfile] MO node: - In the case of a parent [registration] MO node, the targetIDs shall be assigned the CSE-ID of the Registrar CSE. - In the case of a parent [dataCollection] MO node, the targetIDs shall be assigned the CSE-ID determined from the containerPath attribute of the [dataCollection] MO node. • keyValue: shall not be present. The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MAF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MAF is indicated by the presence of the httpPort, coapPort and websocketPort in the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate httpPort, coapPort or websocketPort attribute of the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. At step 10 in clause 8.8.2.7, If the MEF Client receives a successful MAF Key Registration Response (see table 8.8.2.7-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MAF Key Registration Response: • expirationTime: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. • Source MEF Client ID: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. • adminFQDN: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. • SUID: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. • targetIDs: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 143 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF Key Registration Response and associate this information with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. If verification fails, or if procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.6 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with Certificate | Purpose: Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with Certificate SUID (in the set {41,42,43}) ensures that the MEF Client has access to a local copy of the MEF Client's Certificate and corresponding private key, for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. Preconditions: A. This procedure will succeed only if the Node has been provisioned with the certificate matching the myCertFingerprint attribute in the [authenticationProfile] MO node. Procedure: The MEF Client obtains the value of the myCertFingerprint attribute in the [authenticationProfile] MO node. The MEF Client determines if it has a local copy of a certificate corresponding private key with the certificate matching the myCertFingerprint attribute corresponding private key. • If a local copy of the certificate and corresponding private key are not present, then the MEF Client associates the certificate and corresponding private key with the [authenticationProfile] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. • If a local copy of the certificate and corresponding private key are present, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.7 [trustAnchorCred]-specific Processes | Purpose: Processing a [trustAnchorCred] MO node ensures that the MEF Client has a local copy of the trust anchor CA certificate identified by the [trustAnchorCred] MO node. Elements of objectTypeSpecificArgs: The objectTypeSpecificArgs element is not present for the [trustAnchorCred] specialization. Processing a [trustAnchoCred] MO Node: 1) The MEF Client retrieves the value of the certFingerprint attribute of the [trustAnchorCred] MO Node. The MEF Client determines if the MEF Client has a local copy of a certificate matching the certFingerprint attribute: - If a local copy of the certificate is present, then the MEF Client associates the certificate with the [trustAnchorCred] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. - If a local copy of the certificate is not present, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 2. 2) The MEF Client obtains the value of the URI attribute of the [trustAnchorCred] MO Node. The MEF Client attempts to retrieve the trust anchor certificate by performing a HTTPS GET procedure towards the URI: - If the HTTPS GET procedure is not successful, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 144 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - If the HTTPS GET procedure is successful, then the MEF Client extracts the payload. The MEF Client parses the payload to determine if it is a certificate, and if parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client verifies that the received certificate matches the certFingerprint attribute of the [trustAnchorCred] MO Node: If parsing succeeds and the received certificate matches the certFingerprint attribute of the [trustAnchorCred] MO Node, then the MEF Client associates the certificate with the [trustAnchorCred] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. Otherwise, the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.3.9.9.8 [MAFClientRegCfg]-specific Processes | Purpose: Processing an [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node ensures that the MEF Client, acting as an MAF Client, has successfully registered with the MAF using the attributes in the [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. Elements of objectTypeSpecificArgs: The objectTypeSpecificArgs element is not present for the [MAFClientRegCfg] specialization. Processing an [MAFClientRegCfg] MO Node: The MEF Client shall attempt the MAF Client Registration procedure as described in clause 8.8.2.3, with the MAF Client acting as the Source MAF Client and with following clarifications: At step 2 in clause 8.8.2.3, the MEF Client shall form the MAF Client Registration Request (see table 8.8.2.3-1) from the attributes of the [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node as follows: • MAF-FQDN: shall be set to the value of the fqdn attribute; • expirationTime shall be assigned to the value of expirationTime attribute; • labels shall be assigned the value of the labels attribute; • adminFQDN: shall be assigned to the value of the adminFQDN attribute; The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MAF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MAF is indicated by the presence of the httpPort, coapPort and websocketPort in the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate httpPort, coapPort or websocketPort attribute of the child [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. At step 3 in clause 8.8.2.3, If the MEF Client receives a successful MEF Key Registration Response (see table 8.8.2.3-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MEF Key Registration Response: • expirationTime: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. • MAF Client ID: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. • adminFQDN: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF Key Registration Request in step 2 of clause 8.8.2.3. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF Key Registration Response and associate this information with the [MAFClientRegCfg] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_OK. If verification fails, or if the procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client Command Update procedure for this cmdID with cmdStatusCode set to the value for MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 145 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4 End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.1 Purpose of E2E Security of Primitives (ESPrim) | End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) provides an interoperable framework for securing oneM2M primitives so CSEs (forwarding the primitive) do not need to be trusted with the confidentiality and integrity of the primitive. ESPrim provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity protection and a freshness guarantee (bounding the age of ESPrim Objects). Applicable use cases and requirements are discussed in ETSI TR 118 512 [i.16]. The present document assumes that the ESPrim end-points are the Originator and Receiver of the primitive. The present document specifies credential management aspects and data protection aspects for ESPrim. Transport of ESPrim Objects is described in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.2 End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Architecture | The credential management aspects and data protection aspects for ESPrim are specified in the present clause. Clause 11.3.2, ETSI TS 118 101 [1] specifies the transport of ESPrim Objects. The primitive to be secured is called the inner primitive, and the primitive which is used to transport a secured inner primitive is called the outer primitive. The inner primitive is protected using encryption and integrity protection which takes a symmetric key sessionESPrimPrimKey as input. The sessionESPrimKey is derived from a pairwiseESPrimKey, established between the Originator and Receiver, and a receiverESPrimRandObject and originatorESPrimRandObject. Sequence of events for ESPrim consists of three main phases: 1) Establishing pairwiseESPrimKey. 2) Establishing sessionESPrimKey at the Originator. 3) Securing a primitive exchange. Figure 8.4.2-1 shows the ESPrim message flow for establishing pairwiseESPrimKey and sessionESPrimKey at the Originator. Figure 8.4.2-2 shows the ESPrim message flow for securing a Primitive Exchange. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 146 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.4.2-1: Message flow for establishing pairwiseESPrimKey and establishing sessionESPrimKey at the Originator in the End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Procedure A. Establishing pairwiseESPrimKey: The pairwiseESPrimKey may be established using either of the following frameworks: - Provisioned pairwiseESPrimKey Framework: The Originator and Receiver shall be provisioned with pairwiseESPrimKey. This credential shall be provisioned via one of: pre-provisioning; a Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPF), specified in clause 8.3; or End-to-End Security Certificate based Key Establishment (ESCertKE) between the Originator and Receiver, specified in clause 8.7. The Originator and Receiver also establish pairwiseESPrimKeyID and optionally pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime during this process. If no pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime, is provided, then then pairwiseESPrimKey never expires. The Originator and Receiver cache the (pairwiseESPrimKeyID, pairwiseESPrimKey, (optional) pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime) object to use for processing subsequent primitives. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 147 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - MAF ESPrim Framework: The Originator and M2M Authentication Function (MAF) authenticate each other using symmetric keys (which may be pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned) and derive a M2M Secure Connection key (Kc) and corresponding key identifier (KcID). The Originator generates pairwiseESPrimKey from Kc and a reserved string. The value of KcID is used in phase C as the pairwiseESPrimKeyID in the JWE/XML-ENC object. The Originator caches the (pairwiseESPrimKeyID, pairwiseESPrimKey) pair to use for processing subsequent primitives. The Receiver retrieves Kc and a credential lifetime from the MAF after it receives an inner request primitive secured using the corresponding pairwiseESPrimKey' see step C.6.a. When pairwiseESPrimKey is established using the MAF option, then it typically has a shorter lifetime than the former option. - Receiver indicates support for ESPrim: If Receiver supports ESPrim, the Receiver shall ensure the following for the Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource on all CSEs which are registered with the Receiver: The Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource shall include the e2eSecInfo attribute. The e2eSecInfo attribute in this resource shall indicate support for ESPrim. B. Establishing sessionESPrimKey at the Originator: The Receiver shall select to either (a) pre-generate a receiverESPrimObject which is distributed for use by multiple Originators for establishing sessionESPrimKey, or (b) generate a unique receiverESPrimRandObject upon request (in which case no action is required prior to receiving such a request). If the Receiver selects to generate a unique receiverESPrimRandObject upon request, then In the latter case, the Receiver shall ensure that the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject parameter is not present in the e2eSecInfo attribute in the Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource on all CSEs which are registered with the Receiver. The absence of the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject parameter indicates that the Receiver will provide a unique receiverESPrimRandObject upon request. B.1 (If the Receiver selected to use pre-generation) Receiver pre-generation of sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject: If the Receiver selected to pre-generate and distribute a receiverE2SPrimandObject, the Receiver performs the following steps every time the Receiver wishes to provide a new shared receiverESPrimRandObject B.1a.1 The Receiver shall generate a receiverESPrimRandObject including the following parameters: The Receiver shall generate a 128-bit fresh random value ESPrimRandValue. The Receiver shall assign ESPrimRandExpiry, indicating when the receiverESPrimRandObject shall cease to be valid. The Receiver shall assign an ESPrimRandID for the receiverESPrimRandObject which shall satisfy the following criteria: (a) the ESPrimRandID shall indicate that the receiverESPrimRandObject is shared; (b) the ESPrimRandID shall be unique among the shared receiverESPrimRandObject issued by the Receiver and valid at the time of issuance. These criteria ensure that the receiverESPrimRandObject can be uniquely identified until it expires. The Receiver shall include a list of sessionESPrimKeyGenerationAlgorithmID values identifying the algorithms that the Receiver is willing to use for generating sessionESPrimKey using this receiverESPrimRandObject. The Receiver shall include a list of AEADAlgorithmID values identifying the AEAD algorithms that the Receiver is willing to use with this receiverESPrimRandObject. B.1b The Receiver shall update the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject parameter of the e2eSecInfo attribute in the Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource on all CSEs which are registered with the Receiver. NOTE 1: At a given point in time, multiple Originators will be using identical values for the current sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 148 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 B.2 Originator obtaining receiverESPrimRandObject: The Originator shall perform the following steps whenever the Originator establishes a sessionESPrimKey with the Receiver: B.2a The Originator shall perform a Retrieve on the e2eSecInfo attribute in the Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource on a CSE, here denoted CSE2, which is registered with the Receiver. B.2b If the e2eSecInfo attribute is present in the Receiver's <remoteCSE> resource on CSE2, then CSE2 shall return the e2eSecInfo attribute. Otherwise CSE2 returns an error message to the Originator. B.2c The Originator determines if the Receiver supports ESPrim, which requires that the e2eSecInfo attribute is present and the e2eSecInfo attribute indicates support for ESPrim. B.2.c.1 If the Receiver does not support ESPrim, then the Originator shall abort the procedure. B.2c.2 If the Receiver supports ESPrim, and the e2eSecInfo attribute includes a sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject parameter, then the Originator examines the ESPrimRandExpiry in this parameter to determine if the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject has expired. If the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject has not expired, then the Originator shall set receiverESPrimRandObject to the value of sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject and proceeds to step B.2g. If the sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject has expired, then the Originator shall proceed to step B.2d. B.2c.3 If the Receiver supports ESPrim, and the e2eSecInfo attribute does not include a sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject parameter, then the Originator shall proceed to step B.2d. B.2d The Originator shall send a message to the Receiver requesting a receiverESPrimRandObject. B.2e The Receiver, upon receiving such a request, shall generate a receiverESPrimRandObject including the following parameters: The Receiver shall generate a 128-bit fresh random value ESPrimRandValue. The Receiver shall assign ESPrimRandExpiry, indicating when the receiverESPrimRandObject shall cease to be valid. The Receiver shall assign an ESPrimRandID for the receiverESPrimRandObject which shall satisfy the following criteria: (a) the ESPrimRandID shall indicate that the receiverESPrimRandObject is not shared; (b) the ESPrimRandID shall be unique among the non-shared receiverESPrimRandObject issued by the Receiver and valid at the time of issuance. These criteria ensure that the receiverESPrimRandObject can be uniquely identified until it expires. The Receiver shall include a list of sessionESPrimKeyGenerationAlgorithmID values identifying the algorithms that the Receiver is willing to use for generating sessionESPrimKey using this receiverESPrimRandObject. The Receiver shall include a list of AEADAlgorithmID values identifying the AEAD algorithms that the Receiver is willing to use with this receiverESPrimRandObject. B.2f The Receiver shall send a message to the Originator with the receiverESPrimRandObject. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 149 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 B.2g The Originator shall generate an originatorESPrimRandObject including the following parameters: - The Originator shall generate a 128-bit fresh random value ESPrimRandValue. - The Originator shall assign ESPrimRandExpiry, indicating when the originatorESPrimRandObject shall cease to be valid. The ESPrimRandExpiry shall not be later than the ESPrimRandExpiry in the receiverESPrimRandObject obtained in step B.2c or B.2f. - The Originator shall assign an ESPrimRandID for the originatorESPrimRandObjectID which shall satisfy the following criteria: (a) the ESPrimRandID shall indicate that the originatorESPrimRandObject is not shared; (b) the ESPrimRandID shall be unique among the non-shared originatorESPrimRandObject issued by the Originator and valid at the time of issuance. These criteria ensure that the originatorESPrimRandObject can be uniquely identified until it expires. - The Originator shall include a single sessionESPrimKeyGenerationAlgorithmID identifier for the algorithm that the Originator is applying for generating sessionESPrimKey using this originatorESPrimRandObject. This shall be one of the algorithms identified by the sessionESPrimKeyGenerationAlgorithmID values in receiverSPrimERandObject obtained in step B.2c or B.2f. - The Originator shall include a list of AEADAlgorithmID values identifying the AEAD algorithms that the Originator is willing to use with this originatorESPrimRandObject. This shall be one or more of the algorithms identified by AEADAlgorithmID in receiverESPrimRandObject obtained in step B.2c or B.2f. B.2h The Originator shall generate the sessionESPrimKey from the pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject received at step B.2c and originatorESPrimRandTuple generated at step B.2.g. NOTE 2: The sessionESPrimKey used to secure an inner request primitive is always used to protect the corresponding inner response primitive, so sessionESPrimKey has to be cached at least until the corresponding inner response primitive is expected to have been received. The Originator typically caches the sessionESPrimKey for a longer period of time since the sessionESPrimKey can be used for securing multiple primitive exchanges. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 150 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.4.2-2: Message flow for securing a primitive exchange in the End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Procedure C. Securing a Primitive Exchange: NOTE 3: The Originator selects the type of serialization (e.g. JSON, XML) of the inner request primitive to be secured. C.1 The Originator selects the object security technology depending on the object security technology supported by the Originator, and the type of serialization of the inner request primitive. C.2 The Originator shall form the serialization of the inner request primitive. C.3 The Originator shall produce a ESPrim Object by applying the object security technology as follows: One or more headers of the a ESPrim Object shall include the following information: - pairwiseESPrimKeyID. - originatorESPrimRandObject used to generate the sessionESPrimKey, or the corresponding ESPrimRandID. If there is the possibility that this ESPrim Object could be the first ESPrim Object received by the Receiver which is secured by the Originator using a specific originatorESPrimRandObject, then the full originatorESPrimRandObject shall be included. Otherwise, one of originatorESPrimRandObject or ESPrimRandID shall be included. - ESPrimRandID of the receiverESPrimRandObject used to generate the sessionESPrimKey. - AEADAlgorithmID for the ESPrim Object. This shall be one of the AEAD algorithms identified in originatorESPrimRandObject. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 151 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The plaintext (to be encrypted) shall be the serialization of the inner request primitive. The sessionESPrimKey shall be used directly as the symmetric key providing authenticated encryption of the plaintext, resulting in the ciphertext in the ESPrim Object. The ciphertext is assumed to include the MIC for verifying integrity of the inner request primitive. C.4 The Originator shall form an outer request primitive for transporting the ESPrim Object as described in in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The Originator shall send the outer request primitive to the Receiver. C.5 The Receiver processes the received outer request primitive to extract the ESPrim Object as described in in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. C.6 The Receiver shall process the ESPrim Object: C.6a The Receiver shall extract the pairwiseESPrimKeyID from the ESPrim Object headers and obtain the corresponding pairwiseESPrimKey: If the pairwiseESPrimKeyID is of the form for a Provisioned pairwiseESPrimKey, then the Receiver shall use the corresponding (previously-provisioned) pairwiseESPrimKey. If the pairwiseESPrimKeyID is of the form for a MAF pairwiseESPrimKey: If this this is the first time that the Receiver received a message with this pairwiseESPrimKeyID, then the following process shall be performed. C.6a.1 The Receiver shall identify the MAF from the pairwiseESPrimKeyID (which is a KcID). C.6a.2 The Receiver shall establish a secure TLS connection to the MAF and request the M2M Secure Connection key (Kc) and Kc Lifetime corresponding to pairwiseESPrimKeyID (which is identical to KcID). C.6a.3 The MAF shall provide Kc and Kc Lifetime to the Receiver. C.6a.4 The Receiver shall generate the pairwiseESPrimKey from Kc and a reserved string. C.6a.5 The Receiver shall set pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime to Kc Lifetime. C.6a.6 The Receiver shall cache (pairwiseESPrimKeyID, pairwiseESPrimKey, pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime) for use for processing subsequent primitives. If the Receiver has previously cached (pairwiseESPrimKeyID, pairwiseESPrimKey, pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime), and pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime has not yet expired, then the Receiver may use the cached pairwiseESPrimKey. C.6b The Receiver shall apply the following process to generate the sessionESPrimKey: C.6b.1 The Receiver shall extract ESPrimRandID of the receiverESPrimRandObject from the headers of the ESPrim object, and attempt to retrieve the corresponding cached value of receiverESPrimRandObject. If no cached value is found, or the cached value is expired, then the Receiver shall respond to the outer request primitive with an error. C.6b.2 The Receiver shall extract the encoding of the originatorESPrimRandObject or ESPrimRandID of the originatorESPrimRandObject from the headers of the ESPrim object, and apply the appropriate decoding. If an originatorESPrimRandObject is provided then it shall be cached. If an ESPrimRandID is provided then the Receiver shall retrieve the corresponding cached value of originatorESPrimRandObject.If no cached value is found, or the cached value is considered expired, then the Receiver shall respond to the outer request primitive with an error message. The Receiver shall process the originatorESPrimRandObject: C.6b.2.i The Receiver shall check the ESPrimExpiry in the originatorESPrimRandObject to verify (a) that this Expiry is not already in the past and (b) the ESPrimExpiry is not later than the ESPrimExpiry in the receiverESPrimRandObject. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 152 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 C.6b.2.ii The Receiver shall extract sessionESPrimKeyGenerationAlgorithmID and verify that the identified algorithm matches one of the sessionESPrimKeyGenrationAlgorithmID in receiverESPrimRandObject. C.6b.2.iii The Receiver shall generate the sessionESPrimKey from the pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject and originatorESPrimRandObject or retrieve the value of sessionESPrimKey if previously generated and cached. NOTE 4: The sessionESPrimKey used to secure an inner request primitive is always used to protect the corresponding inner response primitive, so sessionESPrimKey has to be cached at least until the corresponding inner response primitive is sent. The Receiver typically caches the sessionESPrimKey for a longer period of time since the originator can use the sessionESPrimKey for securing multiple primitive exchanges. C.6c Authenticated decryption steps at the Receiver: C.6c.1 The Receiver shall extract AEADAlgorithmIDs in originatorESPrimRandObject and verify that the identified set of algorithms is a subset of the set in AEADAlgorithmIDs in receiverESPrimRandObject. The Receiver shall process the AEADAlgorithmID in the ESPrim Object headers and verify that the identified algorithm matches one of the AEADAlgorithmIDs in originatorESPrimRandObject. C.6c.2 The Receiver shall apply the AEAD Algorithm identifier in the ESPrim Object header to the ciphertext parameter in the ESPrim Object resulting in verified plaintext, using the sessionESPrimKey. The ciphertext is assumed to include the MIC for verifying integrity of the inner request primitive. The authenticated serialization of the inner request primitive is the verified plaintext output by the AEAD algorithm. C.7 The Receiver shall process the inner request primitive, resulting in a serialization of the corresponding inner response primitive. NOTE 5: Steps C.2 to C.7 are mirrored closely by C.8 to C.12, with the Originator and Receiver swapping their participation in the exchange, and the request primitives replaced by response primitives. There are minor differences: in particular some of the request processing in steps C.2 to C.7 is not required in the response processing since the Originator has already generated sessionESPrimKey; it is only necessary to identify the appropriate sessionESPrimKey, as performed in step C.11.a. C.8 The Receiver shall use the same sessionESPrimKey as used in the ESPrim Object received at step C.5. Consequently, pairwiseESPrimKeyID, originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject are the same as for the received at step C.5. The Receiver shall produce an ESPrim Object by applying the object security technology as follows: One or more headers of the a ESPrim Object shall include the following information: - pairwiseESPrimKeyID - originatorESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID. - receiverESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID - AEADAlgorithmID for the ESPrim Object. This shall be one of the AEAD algorithms identified in originatorESPrimRandObject. The plaintext (to be encrypted) shall be the serialization of the inner response primitive. The sessionESPrimKey shall be used directly as the symmetric key providing authenticated encryption of the plaintext, resulting in the ciphertext in the ESPrim Object. The ciphertext is assumed to include the MIC for verifying integrity of the inner request primitive. C.9 The Receiver shall form an outer request primitive for transporting the ESPrim Object as described in in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. The Originator shall send the outer response primitive to the Receiver. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 153 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 C.10 The Originator processes the received outer response primitive to extract the ESPrim Object as described in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. C.11 The Originator shall process the ESPrim Object. C.11a The Originator shall extract, from the headers of the ESPrim object, the values of pairwiseESPrimKeyID, originatorESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID, receiverESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID. These values shall match the pairwiseESPrimKeyID, originatorESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID, receiverESPrimRandObject's ESPrimRandID of a session that the Originator considers to be currently valid. If any of these values have expired, then the outer response primitive shall be discarded. NOTE 6: For this reason, the expiry of these values need to be great enough to allow receiving the corresponding inner response primitive. Otherwise, the Originator shall use the cached value of sessionESPrimKey corresponding to these values, or may regenerate sessionESPrimKey. C.11b The Originator shall apply the AEAD Algorithm identified in the ESPrim Object header to the ciphertext parameter in the ESPrim Object resulting in verified plaintext, using sessionESPrimKey. The ciphertext is assumed to include the MIC for verifying integrity of the inner request primitive. The authenticated serialization of the inner request primitive is the verified plaintext output by the AEAD algorithm. C.12 The Originator shall process the inner response primitive. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.3 End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Protocol Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.3.1 End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Parameter Definitions | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.3.1.1 originatorESPrimRandObject parameter definition | The structure of the originator2ERandObject parameter is shown in table 8.4.3.1.1-1. This parameter is used in establishing sessionESPrimKey as part of End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), described in clause 8.4.2. The data type of the originatorESPrimRandObject parameter is specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. Table 8.4.3.1.1-1: Structure of the originatorESPrimRandObject parameter Element Path Multiplicity Description esprimRandID 1 An identifier for the originatorESPrimRandObject, assigned by the CSE or AE generating the originatorESPrimRandObject. esprimRandValue 1 A 128-bit randomly-generated value. esprimRandExpiry 1 Time when the originatorESPrimRandObject expires. esprimKeyGenAlgID 1 The enumerated identifier of the algorithm selected for sessionESPrimKey generation by the CSE or AE generating the originatorESPrimRandObject.. esprimProtocolAndAlgIDs 1 A list of enumerated identifiers for AEAD Algorithms supported by the CSE or AE generating the originatorESPrimRandObject. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.3.1.2 receiverESPrimRandObject parameter definition | The structure of the receiver2ERandObject parameter is shown in table 8.4.3.1.2-1. This parameter is used in establishing sessionESPrimKey as part of End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), described in clause 8.4.2. The data type of the receiverESPrimRandObject parameter is specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 154 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.4.3.1.2-1: Structure of the receiverESPrimRandObject parameter Element Path Multiplicity Description esprimRandID 1 An identifier for the receiverESPrimRandObject, assigned by the CSE or AE generating the receiverESPrimRandObject esprimRandValue 1 A 128-bit randomly-generated value esprimRandExpiry 1 Time when the receiverESPrimRandObject expires esprimKeyGenAlgIDs 1 A list of enumerated identifiers for algorithms supported for sessionESPrimKey generation by the CSE or AE generating the receiverESPrimRandObject esprimProtocolAndAlgIDs 1 A list of enumerated identifiers for AEAD Algorithms supported by the CSE or AE generating the receiverESPrimRandObject |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.4.3.1.3 e2eSecInfo resource attribute definition | The e2eSecInfo attribute occurs in the <CSEBase>, <remoteCSE> and <AE> resource types. The structure of the e2eSecInfo resource attribute is shown in table 8.4.3.1.3-1. This parameter is used in establishing sessionESPrimKey as part of End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), described in clause 8.4.2. The data types are specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. Table 8.4.3.1.3-1: Structure of the e2eSecInfo attribute Element Path Multiplicity Description supportedE2ESecurityFeatures 1 A list of Security Usage Identifiers (SUIDs) for the End-to-End Security Features supported by the CSE or AE associated with the <CSEBase>, <remoteCSE> or <AE> resource containing the e2eSecInfo resource attribute. e2ECertificates 0..1 A list of certificates associated with the CSE or AE associated with the <CSEBase>, <remoteCSE> or <AE> resource containing the e2eSecInfo resource attribute. sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject 0..1 A receiverESPrimRandObject parameter (see clause 8.4.3.1.2) generated by the CSE or AE associated with the <CSEBase>, <remoteCSE> or <AE> resource containing the e2eSecInfo resource attribute. 8.4.3.2 ESPrim Object formatting and processing using the JWE Compact Serialization Background: JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specified in IETF RFC 7516 [50], provides a simple format for encrypting any data object. Two JWE serializations are provided: a compact, URI-safe serialization, and a JSON serialization. The JW End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Compact Serialization necessary formatting and parsing can be easily encoded without generic tools for formatting or parsing JSON. In the JWE Compact Serialization, a JWE is represented as the concatenation of five JWE parameters: BASE64URL(UTF8(JWE Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Encrypted Key) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Initialization Vector) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Ciphertext) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE Authentication Tag) where BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per section 2 of the JSON Web Signature specification IETF RFC 7515 [51]. Base64 and base64url encodings are defined in IETF RFC 4648 [41]. NOTE 1: If OCTETS is an empty octet sequence, then IETF RFC 7515 [51] defines BASE64URL(OCTETS) to be the empty string. NOTE 2: The JWE Compact Serialization is not as flexible as the JWE JSON serialization, however the JWE compact serialization provides sufficient flexibility for ESPrim Objects. Moreover ease of formatting and parsing JWE Compact Serialization provides a simple solution for both XML and JSON representations of primitives. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 155 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 JWE Parameter definitions for ESPrim: Table 8.4.3.2-1, specifies these values of the five JWE parameters when the JWE Compact Serialization. Table 8.4.3.2-1: JWE Components used in ESPrim Objects JWE value element type Empty Component Content JWE Protected Header JSON Never See table 8.4.3.2-2 JWE Protected Header Parameters JWE Encryption Key Binary value Always This value is empty for the key management mode used for ESPrim JWE Initialization Vector Binary value Conditional As per IETF RFC 7516 [50] JWE Ciphertext Binary value Never JWE Authentication Tag Binary value Conditional NOTE: Whether these components are empty or not is conditional on the algorithm selected for encryption. Table 8.4.3.2-2 "JWE Protected Header Parameters" describes the parameters in the JWE Protected Header when using JWE for ESPrim. Table 8.4.3.2-2: JWE Protected Header Parameters Element path Multiplicity for ESPrim Purpose Specification of element Description of assigned value "alg" 1 Key management mode [50] "dir" indicating Direct Encryption. "enc" 1 Encryption Algorithm The options available here are the same as for ESData use of JWE. See clause 8.7.3. "kid" 1 Key identifier [50] Identifier for pairwiseESPrimKey. "cty" 0..1 Media type of the secured Content [50] Dictated by the serialization of the primitive (XML or JSON) selected by the Originator. "ori" 1 Identify originators input to session key generation Clause 8.4.3.1.1 esprimRandID of the originatorESPrimRandObject used to generate sessionESPrimKey for this ESPrim Object. "rri" 1 Identify receiver's input to session key generation Clause 8.4.3.1.2 esprimRandID of the receiverESPrimRandObject used to generate sessionESPrimKey for this ESPrim Object. "oro" 0..1 originatorESPrimRandObject Clause 8.4.3.1.1 using JSON serialization JSON representation of an originatorESPrimRandObject generated by the Originator. Sent only by the Originator. "rro" 0..1 receiverESPrimRandObject Clause 8.4.3.1.2 using JSON serialization JSON representation of an receiverESPrimRandObject generated by the Receiver. Sent only by the Receiver. The following text provides further explanation of the parameters in the JWE Protected Header when using JWE for ESPrim. Recall that an ESPrim Object is formed by encrypting the inner primitive using the symmetric key sessionESPrimKey. The generation of sessionESPrimKey from a pairwiseESPrimKey, originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject is separate from the key management available through JWE - from the perspective of JWE, sessionESPrimKey is simply a secret symmetric key value shared between Originator and Receiver. JWE uses the Direct Encryption key management mode in this scenario. The JWE serialization will be required to transport the pairwiseESPrimKey identifier, the esprimRandIDs of the originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject, and optionally a receiverESPrimRandObject or originatorESPrimRandObject so that the Originator and Receiver can generate the correct sessionESPrimKey. • The "alg" (Algorithm) JWE header parameter [50] shall be set to the value of "dir" to indicate Direct Encryption key management mode. • The "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) JWE header parameter [50] may be selected by the sender of the ESPrim Object. The encryption algorithm shall agrees with the esprimProtocolAndAlgIDs in identified originatorESPrimRandObject and the esprimProtocolAndAlgIDs in the identified receiverESPrimRandObject. • The "kid" (Key ID) JWE header parameter [50] shall be set to the pairwiseESPrimKey identifier. • The "cty" shall identify the media type of the representation (JSON or XML) of the inner primitive. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 156 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • The esprimRandIDs of the originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject shall be communicated in the "ori" (Originator Rand ID) and "rri" (Receiver Rand ID) parameters included in the JWE Protected header. These parameters are specific to oneM2M and shall conform to the definition of the esprimRandID in clauses 8.4.3.1.1 and 8.4.3.1.2. • The originator may include a originatorESPrimRandObject in an "oro" (Originator Rand Object) parameter - either at the beginning of an ESPrim session or to refresh the session keys "in-band" during an existing ESPrim session. In the former case, "ori" shall match the esprimRandID in the originatorESPrimRandObject, but this restriction does not apply in the latter case. This parameter is defined in clauses 8.4.2 and 8.4.3.1.1, and the JSON representation shall be used. • The receiver may include a receiverESPrimRandObject in an "rro" (Receiver Rand Object) - to refresh the session keys "in-band" during an existing ESPrim session. This parameter is defined in clauses 8.4.2 and 8.4.3.1.2, and the JSON representation shall be used. Forming an ESPrim Object: The inner primitive representation shall be encrypted as specified for message encryption in [50], with the following clarification: 1) The JWE Protected Header shall be composed as described above. 1.1) The Content Encryption Key (CEK) shall be the sessionESPrimKey generated using the pairwiseESPrimKey, originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject identified in the JWE Protected Header. 2) The plaintext shall be the inner primitive representation. 3) The JWE Initialization Vector, JWE Ciphertext and JWE Authentication Tag shall be generated from the Protected JWE Header, the plaintext and CEK as specified in IETF RFC 7516 [50], according to the identified encryption algorithm 4) The JWE Compact Serialization shall be composed from the JWE parameters. The ESPrim Object is the JWE Compact Serialization. Processing an ESPrim Object: The JWE Compact Serialization shall be processed as specified for message decryption in [50], with the following clarification: 1) The JWE Protected Header shall be composed as described above. 1.1) If originatorESPrimRandObject or receiverESPrimRandObject is included, then these shall be recorded. 1.2) The Content Encryption Key (CEK) shall be the sessionESPrimKey generated using the pairwiseESPrimKey, originatorESPrimRandObject and receiverESPrimRandObject identified in the JWE Protected Header. The generation of SessionESPrimKey is specified in clause 8.4.2. 2) The plaintext shall be generated from the JWE Initialization Vector, JWE Ciphertext, JWE Authentication Tag and CEK as specified in IETF RFC 7516 [50], according to the identified encryption algorithm. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5 End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.1 Purpose of ESData | End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) provides an interoperable framework for protecting data that ends up transported using oneM2M reference points, in order that so transited CSEs do not need to be trusted with that data. The data to be protected is called the ESData Payload. ESData payload could typically compose all or part of an attribute value (e.g. content attribute value of a <contentInstance> resource) or a primitive parameter (e.g. a signed, self-contained access token communicated in a request primitive to obtain dynamic authorization). NOTE: Within the scope of clause 8.5, terms including the word "ESData" can be shortened by removing "ESData" to facilitate readability. For example, "ESData Payload" is often shortened to "Payload". Applicable use cases and requirements are discussed in ETSI TR 118 512 [i.16]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 157 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 ESData assumes that there is a single ESData Source End-Point applying the ESData processing to the Payload to obtain an ESData Envelope containing the secured data and necessary headers, with one or more ESData Target End-Points applying the ESData processing to the Envelope to extract the verified data. The Payload is composed of plaintext (which is to be encrypted and integrity protected) and associated authenticated data (which is to be integrity protected only). There is no inherent restriction on which entities can be Source End-points and Target End-Points; these end-points may be entities inside a oneM2M system (that is, AEs and CSEs) or entities outside of a oneM2M system (for example, entities which are part of a system that interworks with oneM2M). The present document specifies credential management aspects and data protection aspects for ESData. The present document does not address transporting ESData Envelopes. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2 ESData Architecture | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.1 List of ESData Security Classes and ESData Protection Options | The following ESData security classes are provided: • Encryption only: (see note) which offers confidentiality and integrity protection. This payload is protected using symmetric keys, and these symmetric keys are established using one or more of the following: - Symmetric keys otherwise established with the target end-points. In this case, the source end-point can be authenticated - unless the symmetric key was shared with multiple target end-points. - Target end-points certificate. When target end-point certificate are used, the target end-point cannot authenticate the source end-point. NOTE: Strictly speaking, this class provides encryption and integrity protection, but this name aligns usage in protocols such as JSON Web Encryption (JWE) and XML-Encryption which can provide both encryption and integrity protection. • Signature only: which offers source authentication, integrity protection and (when asymmetric digital signatures are used) non-repudiation. This uses either symmetric keys based MIC or asymmetric digital signatures verified using source end-point certificates. • Nested Sign-then-Encrypt: This is used in cases where encryption is required in addition to source authentication and/or non-repudiation using a source end-point certificate. A digital signature(s) on the payload is signed first, and then encryptions is applied to combination of the payload and digital signature. ESData supports using multiple credentials for protecting a single payload unit. Each ESData Security class supports three ESData protection options, as shown in table 8.5.2.1-1. Table 8.5.2.1-1: ESData protection options ESData Security Class ESData Protection Option Key Management Source Verification Non- Repudiation Encryption only (clause 8.5.2.2) Encryption using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key Provisioned Symmetric Key Symmetric - Encryption using TEF TEF Symmetric - Encryption using Target End-Point Certificate Certificate - - Signature only (clause 8.5.2.3) MIC using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key Provisioned Symmetric Key Symmetric - MIC using TEF TEF Symmetric - Digital Signature using End-Point Source End-Point Certificate Certificate Certificate Certificate Nested-Sign- then Encrypt (clause 8.5.2.4) Digital Signature using End-Point Source End-Point Certificate followed by any combination of Encryption-Only Protection Options Provisioned Symmetric Key(s) and/or TEF(s) and/or Certificate(s) for Encryption. Certificate for Signature Certificate Certificate ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 158 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.2 Encryption-Only ESData Security Class | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.2.1 Encryption-Only ESData Security Class Overview | The ESData protection option supported for the Encryption-Only Security Class are listed in table 8.5.2.1-1 "ESData protection Options". Encryption-Only ESData supports encrypting using any combination of Protection Options and using multiple credentials for each protection option. ESData Encryption Mode. ESData Security Class supports two main encryption modes: • ESData Direct Encryption Mode: In this mode, a symmetric key is used directly in the Encryption algorithm for securing the payload. The Direct Encryption mode is recommended only in scenarios meeting the following criterions: - Scenarios in which minimizing overhead of data objects is a very high priority. - The Encryption function will not be used with the same key value more than 232 times, at least for AES GCM, for the reasons discussed in clause 8.4 of IETF RFC 7518 [49]. This mode shall only be used when there is a single symmetric key being used to protect the payload. • ESData Encrypted Key Mode: In this mode, the Content Encryption Key (CEK) (used in the Encryption algorithm for securing the payload) is encrypted using one or more credentials and the encrypted CEK is provided in a header with the secured data. Encryption Mode Applicability Constraints. In scenarios where either: • Encryption using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key is applied using a single provisioned symmetric key; or • Encryption using TEF is applied using a single TEF-registered symmetric key; • Then either Direct Encryption Mode or Encrypted Key Mode may be applied. In all other scenarios, Encrypted Key Mode shall be applied. High Level Sequence of Events. The following text describes the sequence of events when using an Encryption-Only Security Class. NOTE: The present document does not describe the processes by which the Source End-Point and Target End- Point(s) decide on the credentials to be used for securing a payload, and the encryption algorithm to be applied. A. Credential Configuration: The Source End-Point obtains the credentials needed to secure the payload for the intended Target End-Point(s). This can include any combination of the Protection Options, multiple credentials allowed for each Protection Options: - Encryption using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key: The Source End-Point and Target End- Point(s) are provisioned with Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key as described in clause 8.5.2.2.2. - Encryption using TEF: The Source End-Point generates a random secret TEF-registered symmetric key, and registers this key with the TEF as described in clause 8.5.2.2.3. - Encryption using Certificates: The Source End-Point obtains the certificate of the Target End-Point as described in clause 8.5.2.2.4. B. Source End-Point CEK Management: - If Direct Encryption Mode is to be applied, then the Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key or Registered TEF Symmetric Key shall be used directly as CEK. The use of Direct Encryption Mode shall be indicated in the ESData Headers: header parameters of the ESData Envelope. The Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key or Registered TEF Symmetric Key shall be identified in the headers. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 159 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - Otherwise, the Source End-Point shall generates a random secret value for the Content Encryption Key CEK and shall encrypt CEK using the credential(s) obtained in Phase A "Credential Management", as described in clauses 8.5.2.2.2, 8.5.2.2.3 and 8.5.2.2.4. Each encrypted CEKs shall be added to the Headers, along with the identifier for the credential which is to be used to decrypt the encrypted CEK. The CEK value may be used for a single payload or may be used for multiple payloads. C. Source End-Point Encryption: C.1 The Encryption algorithm shall be identified in the Headers. C.2 The Source End-Point shall apply the encryption process for the identified algorithm to the payload using CEK. The plaintext is encrypted to form the ciphertext, and the combination of plaintext and associated Authenticated Data (AAD) is integrity protected by the generated MIC. C.3 The Source End-Point shall form the Envelope from the Headers, ciphertext, AAD and MIC; this process may include encoding data using, for example, base64. The present document does not specify how the Envelope is obtained or provided to the Target End Point(s). The following steps are applied at each Target End-Point. D. Target End-Point CEK Management: D.1 The Target End-Point parses the Envelope, applying any necessary encoding, and extracts the Header parameters. D.2 If Direct Encryption Mode is indicated in the Headers, then the Target End-Point shall use the credential identifiers in the Headers to obtain the identified Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key or Registered TEF Symmetric Key (as described in clauses 8.2.2.2 or 8.5.2.2.3 respectively). The Target End-Point shall use this symmetric key directly as CEK. D.3 Otherwise, the Target End-Point shall use the credential identifiers in the Headers to identify an encrypted CEK that can be decrypted by a credential known or available to the Target End-Point. The Target End-Point shall obtain that credential and decrypt the encrypted CEK as described in clauses 8.5.2.2.2 (Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key case), 8.5.2.2.3 (TEF case) and 8.5.2.2.4 (Target End-Point Certificate case). The Target shall use the resulting CEK for processing the secured payload of the Envelope. The Target End-Point may cache the CEK value due to the possibility of that CEK value being used to protect subsequent payloads. E. Target End-Point Decryption: E.1 The Target End-Point shall determine the appropriate Encryption algorithm identified in the Headers. E.2 The Target End-Point shall apply the Encryption decryption process for the identified algorithm to the ciphertext, AAD and MIC using CEK, outputting the verified plaintext and verified AAD. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.2.2 Encryption using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key | For this Protection Option, the Source End-Point and each Target End-Point shall be provisioned with Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key, Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key Identifier and optionally Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key lifetime. This credential shall be provisioned via one of: • Pre-provisioning; • A Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (RSPF), specified in clause 8.3; or • Certificate based End-to-End Security Key Establishment between the Originator and Receiver, specified in clause 8.7. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.2.3 Encryption using Trust Enabling Function | This is specified in clause 8.6. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 160 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
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