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e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.2.4 Encryption using Target End-Point Certificates | 8.5.2.2.4.1 Associating Public Key Certificate with Target End-Points For this Protection Option, each Target End-Point shall be provisioned with a public key certificate which the Source End-Point trusts to be associated with the intended Target End-Point. The following options are supported: • The Target End-Point Certificates may use the following Public Key Certificate flavours identified in clause 8.1.2.1: - In the case of a Raw Public Key Certificate, the Source End-Point shall be securely configured (either directly or remotely) to associate the Target End-Point with the raw public key or its hash. The details of this configuration are not provided in the present document. - In the case of a Device Certificate: The Source End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the Device Certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Source End-Point shall be securely configured to associate the Target End-Point with the globally unique hardware instance identifier. The details of this configuration are not provided in the present document. - In the case of an AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate, the Source-End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Source End-Point then trusts that the Target End-Point with a particular AE-ID or CSE-ID is associated with the certificate that contains that AE-ID or CSE-ID. - In the case of a Node-ID certificate, the Source-End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the Node-ID certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Source End-Point then trusts that the Target End-Point with a particular Node-ID is associated with the certificate that contains that Node-ID. • The Target End-Point Certificates may use other Public Key Infrastructures, particularly when the Target End- Point is in a non-oneM2M system interworking with the oneM2M system. The present document provides no interoperability guarantees when such certificates are used. Public keys for verifying signature cannot be used for this Protection Option. 8.5.2.2.4.2 Obtaining Target End-Point Certificates The Source End-Point is unable to secure a message to the Target End-Point before obtaining the Target End-Point's certificate. The present document does not mandate the mechanism by which the Target End-Point's certificate is provided to the Source End-Point, and there are a variety of mechanisms which are suitable. The e2ESecurityParameters is a mechanism provided by oneM2M to allow the Source End-Point to retrieve certificates associated with a CSE or AE. A Target End-Point AE may make certificates available at the e2ESecurityParameters attribute of the <AE> resource representing that AE. This retrieval process is not a reliably-secure mechanism for associating the Target End-Point with the certificate; clause 8.5.2.2.4.1. A Target End-Point CSE may make certificates available at the e2ESecurityParameters attribute of the <CSE> and <remoteCSE> resources representing that CSE. This retrieval process is not a reliably-secure mechanism for associating the Target End-Point with the certificate; clause 8.5.2.2.4.1 shall also be applied. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.3 Signature-Only ESData Security Class | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.3.1 Signature-Only ESData Security Class Overview | The ESData protection option supported for the Signature-Only ESData Security Class are listed in table 8.5.2.1-1 "ESData protection Options". ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 161 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 1: The present document supports only one Signature-Only ESData Protection Option, but the clause is structured to support additional Signature-Only ESData Protection Options if desired in the future. Signature-Only ESData supports encrypting using any combination of Protection Options and using multiple credentials for each protection option. High Level Sequence of Events. The following text describes the sequence of events when using a Signature-Only Security Class. NOTE 2: The present document does not describe the processes by which the Source End-Point and Target End- Point(s) decide on the credentials to be used for signing a payload, and the algorithms to be applied. A. Credential Configuration: The Source End-Point obtains the credentials needed to sign the payload for the intended Target End-Point(s). This can include any combination of the Protection Options, multiple credentials allowed for each Protection Options: - MIC using Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key: The Source End-Point and Target End-Point(s) are provisioned with Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key as described in clause 8.5.2.2.2. - MIC using TEF: The Source End-Point generates a random secret TEF-registered symmetric key, and registers this key with the TEF as described in clause 8.5.2.2.3. - Digital Signature using Source End-Point Certificates: The Source End-Point selects a private key and corresponding Source End-Point Certificate as described in clause 8.5.2.3.2. B. Source End-Point Signing: B.1 The Payload is encoded, for example, using base 64. B.2 For each credential, the Source End-Point shall generate array of data elements as follows: B.2.i The Source End-Point shall form a Header, identifying the digital signature or MIC algorithm, and the credential which can be used by a Target End-Point to verify the digital signature or MIC. If required, the header is also encoded, for example using base64. B.2.ii The Source End-Point shall generate a signature/MIC by applying the appropriate digital signature or MIC algorithm to the Payload and Header using the appropriate credential, and encoding, for example using base 64. B.2.iii The Source End-Point shall form a data element from the Headers, Payload and signature/MIC. B.3 The Source End-Point shall form Envelope from the encoded Payload and the array of data elements generated at step B.2. The present document does not specify how the Envelope is obtained or provided to the Target End Point(s). The following steps are applied at each Target End-Point. C. Target End-Point Verification: C.1 The Target End-Point parses the Envelope, extracting the encoded Payload and the array of data elements, each containing a Header and a signature/MIC. C.2 The Target End-Point shall examine the array of data elements to identify data elements which can be verified by a credential which may be trusted by the Target End-Point. For each such data element: C.2.i The Target End-Point shall obtain the identified credential according to clauses 8.5.2.2.2 (Provisioned Symmetric ESData Key case), 8.5.2.2.3 (TEF case), and 8.5.2.3.2 (using Source End-Point Certificate case). C.2.ii The Target End-Point shall verify the MIC or signature in using the credential. C.3 The Target End-Point shall decode the verified encoded Payload - outputting the original Payload - and shall record the credential(s) used to verify the Payload. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 162 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.3.2 Digital Signature using Source End-Point Certificate | 8.5.2.3.2.1 Associating Public Key Certificate with Source End-Point For this Protection Option, each Source End-Point shall be provisioned with a public key certificate which the Target End-Point trusts to be associated with the intended Source End-Point. The following options are supported: • The Source End-Point Certificates may use the following Public Key Certificate flavours identified in clause 8.1.2.1: - In the case of a Raw Public Key Certificate, the Target End-Point shall be securely configured (either directly or remotely) to associate the Source End-Point with the raw public key or its hash. The details of this configuration are not provided in the present document. - In the case of a Device Certificate: The Target End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the Device Certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Target End-Point shall be securely configured to associate the Source End-Point with the globally unique hardware instance identifier. The details of this configuration are not provided in the present document. - In the case of an AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate, the Target-End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Target End-Point then trusts that the Source End-Point with a particular AE-ID or CSE-ID is associated with the certificate that contains that AE-ID or CSE-ID. - In the case of a Node-ID certificate, the Target-End-Point shall be securely configured with the trust anchor in the certificate chain of the Node-ID certificate; typically during initial provisioning. The Target End-Point then trusts that the Source End-Point with a particular Node-ID is associated with the certificate that contains that Node-ID. • The Source End-Point Certificates may use other Public Key Infrastructures, particularly when the Source End-Point is in a non-oneM2M system interworking with the oneM2M system. The present document provides no interoperability guarantees when such certificates are used. Public keys for verifying signatures shall be used for this Protection Option. 8.5.2.3.2.2 Obtaining Source End-Point Certificates The Target End-Point is unable to secure a message to the Source End-Point before obtaining the Source End-Point's certificate. The present document does not mandate the mechanism by which the Source End-Point's certificate is provided to the Target End-Point using any mechanism, and there are a variety of mechanisms which are suitable. The e2ESecurityParameters is a mechanism provided by oneM2M to allow the Target End-Point to retrieve certificates associated with a CSE or AE. A Source End-Point AE may make certificates available at the e2ESecurityParameters attribute of the <AE> resource representing that AE. This retrieval process is not a reliably-secure mechanism for associating the Source End-Point with the certificate; clause 8.5.2.3.2.1 shall also be applied. A Source End-Point CSE may make certificates available at the e2ESecurityParameters attribute of the <CSE> and <remoteCSE> resources representing that CSE. This retrieval process is not a reliably-secure mechanism for associating the Source End-Point with the certificate; clause 8.5.2.3.2.1 shall also be applied. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.2.4 Nested Sign-then-Encrypt | For these options, the following high-level steps are performs (Credential Configuration steps and CEK Management steps are not shown): 1) The Source End-Point shall generate an inner Envelope containing one or more digital signatures for the inner Payload using one or more certificates according to the "Digital Signature using Source End-Point Certificate" Signature-Only Protection Option in clause 8.5.2.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 163 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2) The Source End-Point shall set the inner Envelope produced by step 1 to be the plaintext of the outer Payload which is then encrypted using any combination of Encryption-Only Protection Options in clause 8.5.2.2. This results in an outer Envelope. The present document does not specify how the outer Envelope is obtained or provided to the Target End Point(s). The following steps are subsequently applied at each Target End-Point: 3) The Target End-Point shall decrypt the outer Envelope produced by step 1 using one of the Encryption-Only Protection Options in clause 8.5.2.2, resulting in the outer Payload which is also the inner Envelope. 4) The Target End-Point shall verify one or more digital signatures in the inner Envelope using one or more certificates according to the "Digital Signature using Source End-Point Certificate" Signature-Only Protection Option in clause 8.5.2.3, resulting in the verified inner Payload. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.3 End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Protocol Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.3.1 Introduction | The End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESData) security classes support protocols shown in table 8.5.3.1-1. Table 8.5.3.1-1: ESData Security Classes, and mapping to XML-based and JSON-Based security protocols ESData Security Class XML-Based JOSE: JSON-Based Security Encryption only XML-ENC applied to ESData payload JWE applied to ESData payload Signature only XML-SIG applied to ESData payload JWS applied to ESData payload Nested-Sign-then-Encrypt XML-SIG applied to ESData payload, with XML-ENC applied to the result JWS applied to ESData payload, with JWE applied to the result The JOSE option allows a flexible JSON Serializations in addition to less flexible Compact Serializations (which are also URI safe). So there are three serialization options: XML, JWE/JWS using JSON Serialization and JWE/JWS using Compact Serializations. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.3.2 Encryption-Only ESData Security Class Protocol Details | To maintain consistency, key management algorithms are provided which are available in both XML-ENC [55] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [50]: • Direct Encryption. • AES Key Wrap, using 128-bit, 256-bit keys. • RSA-OAEP with MGF1 with SHA256. • Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Agreement in Ephemeral-Static Mode using AES-Key Wrap. Table 8.5.3.2-1 identifies the key management algorithms that are supported in XML-Encryption for the Encryption- only ESData Security Class. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 164 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.5.3.2-1: Key management algorithms that are supported in XML-Encryption for Encryption-only ESData Security Class Key Management Algorithm <xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm=".."> for encrypting the key Other parameters Direction Encryption n/a n/a <ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09 /xmldsig#"> <ds:KeyName>John Smith</ds:KeyName> Symmetric Key Wrap AES Key Wrap, with 128-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es128 192-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es192 256-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es256 RSA RSA-OAEP with MFG1 and SHA-256 http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#rsa- oaep <xenc11:MGF Algorithm="http://www. w3.org/2009/xmlenc11 #mgf1sha256> ECDH Key Agreement ECDH- ES with AES Key Wrap 128-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es128 <xenc:AgreementMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2009/x mlenc11#ECDH‐ES"> 192-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es192 256-bit key http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kwa es256 Table 8.5.3.2-2 identifies the payload encryption algorithms that are supported in XML-Encryption for the Encryption- only ESData Security Class. Table 8.5.3.2-2: Payload encryption algorithms that are supported in XML-Encryption for Encryption-only ESData Security Class Payload Encryption Algorithm <EncryptionMethod Algorithm=".."> AES GCM with 128-bit key http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes128 gcm 192-bit key http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes192 gcm 256-bit key http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlenc11#aes256 gcm The output generated by XML-Encryption is serialized as an XML object. The XML-Encryption object may be transported "plain" – with no encoding, or may be encoded in base64. Table 8.5.3.2-3 identifies the key management algorithms that are supported in JWE for the Encryption-only ESData Security Class. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 165 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.5.3.2-3: Key management algorithms that are supported in JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for Encryption-only ESData Security Class Key Management Algorithm "alg":".." Direction Encryption n/a dir Symmetric Key Wrap AES Key Wrap, with 128-bit key A128KW 192-bit key A192KW 256-bit key A256KW RSA RSA-OAEP with MFG1 and SHA-256 "alg": "RSA-OAEP-256" ECDH Key Agreement ECDH-ES with AES Key Wrap 128-bit key ECDH-ES+A128KW 192-bit key ECDH-ES+A192KW 256-bit key ECDH-ES+A256KW Table 8.5.3.2-4 identifies the payload algorithms that are supported in JWE for the Encryption-only ESData Security Class. Table 8.5.3.2-4: Payload encryption algorithms that are supported in JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for Encryption-only ESData Security Class Payload Encryption Algorithm "enc":".." AES GCM with 128-bit key A128GCM 192-bit key A192GCM 256-bit key A256GCM The output generated by JWE conforms to either the JWE JSON Serialization or a URI-safe JWE Compact Serialization. The JWE JSON Serialization may be transported "plain" - with no encoding, or may be encoded in base64. ETSI TS 118 104 [4] defines the datatype m2m:e2eCompactJWE for the JWE Compact Serialization. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.3.3 Signature-Only ESData Security Class Protocol Details | To maintain consistency, signature types are provided which are available in both XML-Signature [52] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [51]. • HMAC using SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. • RSA signature using PKCS1-v1.5 or PSS and MGF1 with SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. • ECDSA signature using P-256, P-384 or P-512 with SHA-256, SHA-284 or SHA-512 respectively. • ECDSA signature using FRP256v1 and brainpoolP256r1 curves [74] with SHA-256 for both curves. Table 8.5.3.3-1 identifies the algorithms that are supported in XML-SIG for Signature-only ESData Security Class. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 166 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.5.3.3-1: Algorithms that are supported in XML-Signature for Signature-only ESData Security Class Signature Type Algorithm <SignatureMethod Algorithm=".."> HMAC SHA-256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha256 SHA-384 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha384 SHA-512 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#hmacsha512 RSA RSA PKCS1- v1.5 or PSS and MGF1 with: SHA-256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha256 SHA-384 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha384 SHA-512 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#rsasha512 ECDSA P-256 and SHA-256 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha256 P-384and SHA-384 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha384 P-512 and SHA-512 http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsigmore#ecdsasha512 FRP256v1 and SHA-256 See [74] brainpoolP256r1 and SHA- 256 See [75] The XML-Signature object may be transported "plain" - with no encoding, or may be encoded in base64. Table 8.5.3.3-2 identifies the algorithms that are supported in JWS for Signature-only ESData Security Class. Table 8.5.3.3-2: Algorithms that are supported in JSON Web Signature (JWS) for Signature-only ESData Security Class Signature Type Algorithm "alg":".." HMAC SHA-256 HS256 SHA-384 HS384 SHA-512 HS512 RSA RSA PKCS1- v1.5 or PSS and MGF1 with: SHA-256 RS256 SHA-384 RS384 SHA-512 RS512 ECDSA P-256 and SHA-256 ES256 P-384and SHA-384 ES384 P-512 and SHA-512 ES512 The output generated by JWS conforms to either the JWS JSON Serialization or a URI-safe JWS Compact Serialization. The JWS JSON Serialization may be transported "plain" – with no encoding, or may be encoded in base64. ETSI TS 118 104 [4] defines the datatype m2m:e2eCompactJWS for the JWS Compact Serialization. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.5.3.4 Nested-Sign-then-Encrypt ESData Security Class Protocol Details | The high level steps for the Nested-Sign-then-Encrypt ESData Security Class are described in clause 8.5.2.4. The inner Envelope shall be generated and processed according to one or more RSA or ECDSA signature types specified in clause 8.5.3.3. The inner Envelope shall be generated and processed according to any combination of one or more key management algorithms specified in clause 8.5.3.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.6 Remote Security Frameworks for End-to-End Security | 8.6.1 Overview on Remote Provisioning and Registration of Credentials for End-to-End Security |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.6.1.1 Introduction | The Remote Provisioning Framework for End-to-End Security shall involve the ability for an entity to register and provision end-to-end credentials by means of a Trust Enabling Function for end-to-end security. An M2M Enrolment Function, M2M Authentication Function or a MN-CSE that is equipped with the ability to register and provision end-to- end security credentials may act as a Trust Enabling Function for end-to-end security. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 167 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The End-to-End Security Credentials derived may be used for providing the following security protection mechanisms: • Message (primitive) integrity and authenticity using a Message Integrity Code (MIC). • Message (primitive) confidentiality. • Integrity and authenticity of the data (attributes) using Data Integrity Tag (DIT). • Confidentiality of data (attributes). Security protected messages and data (attributes) may be enveloped using ESPrim and ESData respectively using mechanisms described in clause 8.4 and 8.5. Message authenticity/integrity and confidentiality are provided using ESPrim, while integrity and confidentiality of application Data (attributes) are provided by using ESData Objects. End-to-End Security may be provided using: 1) Leveraging Remote Security Provisioning process based on clause 8.3 and described in clause 8.6.2. 2) Using Source-generated Credentials described in clause 8.6.3. 8.6.1.2 Overall Description of Registration and Remote Provisioning for End-to-End Security This clause provides description of mechanisms that may be employed for generation, registration and provisioning of credential(s) that shall be used for end-to-end security. Based on security requirements or security profile associated with an Entity (e.g. AE) and indicated within the <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource described in clause 9.6.1.3.2 in ETSI TS 118 101 [1], appropriate end-to-end security credentials shall be generated. The remote provisioning mechanisms leverages the mechanisms described in clause 8.3 on the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks and extends the mechanism in order that end-to-end Security credentials may be registered and shall be provisioned for entities that are more than one-hop away from one another. Figure 8.6.1.2-1 provides a sequence of high-level steps that may be followed for remote registration and provisioning of end-to-end credentials. The steps involved in end-to-end security protection involve: 1) A Source ESP End-Point identifying the right set of security mechanisms and generating appropriate credentials. 2) Registering the credentials with a Trust Enabling Function. 3) The TEF provisions end-to-end credentials to a Target ESP End-Point. 4) Processing of ESData/ESPrim using the end-to-end credentials. When a Remote Security Provisioning process is used, then steps 1) and 2) shall be primarily performed by a TEF. In the case, where Source-generated end-to-end security credentials are used, then steps 1) and 2) shall be performed by the Source ESF End-Point. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 168 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.6.1.2-1: High-level summary of Credential Registration and Provisioning Process The end-to-end credential registration and provisioning process for providing ESData/ESPrim involves the following steps: • Creation of ESData/ESPrim by the Source ESF End-Point Process involves: a) Identification of security protection mechanisms based on the security requirements associated with the application data. b) Based upon the security requirements, appropriate security credentials and associated parameters are generated. c) The application data is then protected using the security credential(s) and associated parameters in order to generate the ESData/ESPrim. NOTE 1: In the case of Remote Security Provisioning process, these steps a) and b) are performed by a Trust Enabling Function. Whereas in the case of Source-generated, the above described steps are followed by the Source. • Credential Registration Process: a) The Source ESF End-Point registers the credential(s) and associated parameters with a Trust Enabling Function. b) The Source ESP End-Point shall provide the identity of the Target ESF End-Point(s) that is authorized to be provisioned with the end-to-end credentials and associated parameters. NOTE 2: In the case of Remote Security Provisioning process, the Credential Registration process is performed by a Trust Enabling Function. Whereas in the case of Source-generated, the above described steps are followed by the Source. • Credential Provisioning/Requisition Process: a) A Target ESF End-Point may request ESData/ESPrim credentials by using a Credential-Id that was obtained as part of the ESData/ESPrim. b) Based on the authorization information provided as part of the Credential Registration Process and using the Credential-Id, the Trust Enabling Function provisions the appropriate credentials and associated cryptographic parameters to the authenticated and authorized Target ESF End-Point. • Process the ESData/ESPrim: a) The Target ESF End-Point uses the credentials provisioned by the Trust Enabling Function in order to process the ESData/ESPrim. ESF Security Layer Processing Trust Enabler Function (e.g. MEF, MAF, MN-CSE) Source ESF End-Point Target ESF End-Point ESF Security Layer Processing 1. ESData / ESPrim Creation Process: - Identify ESData Security Protections, - Generate credentials and parameters - Apply ESData / ESPrim 2. Credential Registration Process 3. Credential Provisioning Process 4. Process ESData / ESPrim: - Validate Intergity and / or decrypt ESData / ESPrim ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 169 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 b) Processing of ESData/ESPrim would involve the integrity verification/authentication of the application data and/or decryption of the data and messages respectively. 8.6.2 Remote Security Provisioning Process for End-to-End Security Credentials This clause describes the Remote Provisioning of Symmetric End-to-End Security credentials. The end-to-end security credentials shall be generated after having completed the Remote Provisioning of symmetric credentials using the Provisioned Symmetric Key or the MAF-based Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Processes as described in clause 8.3. Based on the higher-level requirements, appropriate end-to-end credentials may be generated using Remote Security Provisioning process by using pre-provisioned credentials. Illustrated in figure 8.6.2-1 is a high-level key generation process. As part of the "End-to-End Key Generation" mechanism, the enrolee and the enrolment target generate end-to-end credentials using the Kpsa as the master key in order to generate the end-to-end master key. If the Enrolee is an AE (Source ESF End-Point), and the Enrolment Target is a CSE (Target ESF End-Point), then an end-to-end master credential, Ke2e_master is generated. An Example of end-to-end key generation using IETF RFC 5869 [48] is provided below. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 170 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 End-to-End Key Generation Phase Enrolment Key Generation Bootstrap Credential Configuration GBA-Based Remote Provisioning Framework (Enrolee= UE, MEF = GBA BSF) Certificate-Based Remote Provisioning Framework Bootstrap Instruction Configuration Bootstrap Enrolment Handshake Enrolee Ke:=Ks, KeID:=B-TID UN specific Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Provisioning Framework Ke, KeID Enrolment Target ID MEF Enrolee (UE) MEF (BSF) KpmID Kpm, KpmID Enrolee MEF Enrolee Cert+ (O) Chain MEF Cert+ Chain Enrolment Phase KeID (Clause 8.2.3). Salt, Content Info (optional), Label (optional) KeID Km/Kpsa, Enrolee’s assigned CSE-ID or AE-ID, (in USS), Send Content info, label for Key Extraction and Expansion Communication of [parameters] Mutual authentication Key [parameter] Internal generation of [parameters] [parameter] Ke:=Ks, KeID:=B-TID Ke, KeID Ke, KeID Ke, KeID Enrolee MEF/BSF Derive Km/Kpsa (Ks..NAF) from Ke (Ks) and Enrolment Target Identity Enrolment Target ID In UNSP (in GBA USS): Enrolee-ID, Enrolment Target-ID Enrolment Target-ID, Enrolee-ID Kpm, KpmID, MEF URI MEF – Enrolment Target authn is not shown UE- BSF authn is out of scope. Providing MEF URI (BSF URI ) to UE is also out of scope. MAF-BSF authn is out of scope Enrolee Private Key, Enrolee Cert +(O)Chain MEF Private Key, MEF Cert +(O)Chain Enrolment Target-ID, MEF URI, MEF, TrustAnchorCert, Enrolment Target-ID, Enrolee-ID, Enrolee Cert Info, Derive Km/Kpsa (Ks..NAF) from Ke (Ks) and Enrolment Target Identity Mutual Authentication using Km/Kpsa Set KmID/KpsaID=KeID Set KmID/KpsaId=KeID Mutual Authentication – details elsewhere Enrolment Target (MAF/ Enrolee B) Derive Ke2e credentials from Kpsa/Km using the Salt and Label by means of key extraction and expansion as per RFC 5869 Derive Ke2e credentials from Kpsa/Km using the Salt and Label by means of key extraction and expansion as per RFC 5869 Figure 8.6.2-1: High-level summary of the E2E Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Bootstrap Credential Configuration: The Bootstrap Credential Configuration may be based upon the type of Remote Provisioning Framework that is used. When using Symmetric Key Remote Provisioning, the Enrolee, which could be the Source ESF End-Point and the Enrolment targets (Target ESF End-Point) are each pre-provisioned with the Symmetric Enrolee Key (Kpm) and the corresponding Pre-provisioned Symmetric Key Identifier, denoted KpmID. In addition the Source ESF End-Point is provisioned with the Trust Enabling Function address (TEF URI). The mechanism follows the procedures as described in clause 8.3.2.1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 171 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration: The Source ESF End-Point (Enrolee) and the Trust Enabling Function are configured with the information needed for authorizing the remote provisioning: • The Source ESF End-Point (Enrolee) is configured with the following arguments to initiate remote provisioning: a) The Target ESF End-Point's security profile: The Target ESF End-Point's security profile and the associated security capabilities as described in <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource may be used to identify the types of security protection mechanisms that shall be used for end-to-end security. b) The Target ESF End-Point identity: Identifying the Target ESF End-Point for which the Source ESF End-Point is to provision end-to-end security credentials. c) The Target ESF End-Point's security profile: The Target ESF End-Point's security profile and the associated security capabilities as described in <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource can be used to identify the types of security protection mechanisms that shall be used for end-to-end security. d) The Source ESF End-Point associates these arguments with the Trust Enabling Function (TEF). The Trust Enabling Function can be identified to the Source ESF End-Point using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Identifier (KpmID) and Trust Enabling Function URI. • M2M Enrolment or Trust Enabling Function is configured with the following arguments to authorize the M2M Enrolment or Trust Enabling Function to remotely provision the Source ESF End-Point for a Target ESF End-Point: a) The Target ESF End-Point Identity: Identifying the Target ESF End-Point for which the Source ESF End-Point is to be provisioned. b) Source ESF End-Point's assigned CSE-ID or AE-ID (Source ESF End-Point-ID). The Trust Enabling Function is to provide this entity identity for the Source ESF End-Point with the Km or Kpsa to the Target ESF End-Point, when requested by the Target ESF End-Point. c) Source ESF End-Point's Security Profile: The security profile of the Source ESF End-Point provides the expected security level described within the <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource (see clause 9.6.3 of ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) associated with the Source ESF End-Point. d) Target ESF End-Point's Security Profile: The security profile of the Target ESF End-Point provides the expected security level described within the <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource associated with the Target ESF End-Point. e) The Trust Enabling Function shall provide detailed key extraction and expansion parameters that are to be used when deriving the end-to-end credentials from the Km or Kpsa to the Source ESF End-Point and the Target ESF End-Point. f) The Trust Enabling Function shall provide the scope and associated security parameters to the Source ESF End-Point and Target ESF End-Point that determines the protocols and the cryptographic algorithms that shall be used for performing end-to-end security. • Bootstrap Security Handshake: The Source ESF End-Point and Trust Enabling Function shall perform a (D)TLS-PSK handshake [15] to establish a secure session. The mechanisms follow the process detailed in clause 8.3.2. • End-to-End Key Generation: a) The Enrolment Key (Ke) and RelativeKeID is generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Source ESF End-Point and Trust Enabling Function using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. Similarly, the Enrolment Key Identifier (KeID) is generated from the RelativeKeID and the Trust Enabling Function's FQDN by the Source ESF End-Point and Trust Enabling Function, as described in clause 10.3.4. The Source ESF End-Point and the Trust Enabling Function store the Ke and the associated KeID. b) The end-to-end master key (Ke2e_master) and the E2EKeyId are generated in a similar manner as the Kpsa and the associated KpsaID. If the Source ESF End-Point requests the provisioning of end-to-end keys, then a key extraction based on Kpsa/Km shall be performed. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 172 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 c) The End-to-End master Key (Ke2e_master) is used to generate specific security protection keys, such as, end-to-end authentication key, end-to-end confidentiality key and other keys depending upon the key extraction and expansion parameters that were provided. The key extraction and expansion are based upon IETF RFC 5869 [48]. NOTE: The End-to-End Key Generation for the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework is identical to the End-to-End Key Generation for the Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.6.3 Detailed Description on Source-Generated End-to-End Credentials | This clause describes the Generation and Registration of Symmetric End-to-End Security credentials by a Source ESF End-Point. The end-to-end security credentials that were self-generated by a Source shall be registered with the Trust Enabling Function. Such a mechanism is particularly useful when data (attribute) as well messages targeted for more than one Target are required. In cases, where securing of <contentInstance> resource that is consumed by multiple end entities is required, then Source-Generated credentials shall be used. A Source that generates data consumed by one or more end entities may generate the appropriate credentials so that either a single attribute (e.g. content attribute value of a <contentInstance> resource or customAttribute of a <flexContainer> resource) or a single addressable element within the attribute may be protected for integrity and confidentiality by means of ESData/ESPrim. In the case of dynamic authorization, all or part of a single primitive parameter value (e.g. a signed, self-contained access token communicated in a request primitive to obtain dynamic authorization) may also be protected using ESData/ESPrim. The entity that generated the ESData/ESPrim then registers the credentials with a Trust Enabling Function. Figure 8.6.3-1: High-level summary of using a TEF for distribution of source-generated credentials Bootstrap Credential Configuration: It is assumed that the Source ESF End-Point is provisioned with the Ke/KeID that was generated as part of the Remote Provisioning Framework with a Trust Enabling Function (e.g. M2M Enrolment Function) as described in clause 8.2. The Source ESF End-Point may be provisioned with the Km/KmID that was generated as part of the Remote Provisioning Framework with a Trust Enabling Function as described in clause 8.3. The Target ESF End-Point may be provisioned with the Ke/KeID if the Trust Enabling Function is an M2M Enrolment Function, or with the Km/KmID if the security association was established with an M2M Authentication Function. ESF Security Layer Processing TEF (e.g. MEF, MAF, MN-CSE) 2.c Register Target EEP Parameters (E.g. cryptographic parameters) Source ESF End-Point 2.a Select keAlgSet & psAlgSet 2.b Apply keAlgSet for source authentication and encryption 4. Apply psAlgSet to target data using established keys, producing ESF-treated target data 1. Target data, Target data security profile, Target EEP Identity(ies) 6. The security envelope is either sent directly to the Target ESP End- Point or is fetched by the Target ESF End-Point from a Hosting CSE 5. Serialize AlgSets, key params and secured payload in envelope 7. Extract AlgSets, key params and ESF-treated target data from envelope 8.a (o) Retrieve Source EEP Parameters 9. Apply psAlgSet to ESF-treated target data using established keys, producing ESF-treated target data 3. Register the credentials 10. verified /decrypt target data, Source EEP Identity 8.c Apply keAlgSet to obtain source verification, AlgSet verification & key establishment Target ESF End-Point ESF Security Layer Processing 8. b Perform Access Control Check ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 173 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration: The Source ESF End-Point as well as the Target ESF End-Points are provisioned with those Trust Enabling Function's URI that support end-to-end security credential provisioning and registration. • The Source ESF End-Point is configured with the following arguments to initiate remote provisioning: a) The identity of the Target ESF End-Point that has to be provided with the ESData/ESPrim and associated End-to-End security credentials. b) The security requirement associated with the Data (attributes): This is pre-configured and provided by the application. Based on the security protection mechanisms, appropriate security technologies shall be used for protection. c) Pre-configured with a table listing the security requirement and how that security requirement can be achieved using the appropriate security protection mechanisms (e.g. security protocols, algorithms for integrity, confidentiality, key generation). d) The Target ESF End-Point Security Profile (optional): The Target ESF End-Point's security profile and the associated security capabilities of the Target ESF End-Point as described in <e2ESecurityCapabilities> resource can be used to identify the types of security protection mechanisms that shall be used for providing ESData/ESPrim. • The Trust Enabling Function is configured with the following arguments to register the ESData/ESPrim security credentials from the Source ESF End-Point and to authorize the Trust Enabling Function to provision only a set of authorized Target ESF End-Point(s) with the relevant ESData/ESPrim security cryptographic parameters: a) Cryptographic Parameters: A list of end-to-end cryptographic parameters that is identified by a Credential-Id and having associated cryptographic values such as the credential(s), cryptographic algorithm(s), label(s) and random value(s) (e.g. nonce, IV). These parameters are provided by the Source ESF End-Point during the credential registration process. There may be one or more credentials that are associated with one or more security protection mechanisms (e.g. data integrity, data confidentiality). The list may also include scope and usage of the end-to-end security parameters so that the Target ESF End-Point is able to process ESData/ESPrim (e.g. verify the integrity and/or decrypt the ESData/ESPrim). b) Identity of Target ESF End-Point: Identity of the Target ESF End-Points that shall be provisioned with the requested credentials identified by a Credential-Id. The authorization may be provided and enforced by means of ACPs. • The Target ESF End-Point is configured with the following arguments: a) ESData/ESPrim: The Target ESF End-Point is either sent the ESData/ESPrim directly from a Source ESF End-Point, or the Target ESF End-Point fetches the ESData/ESPrim from a hosting entity (e.g. Hosting CSE). b) Credential-Id: The Target ESF End-Point is provisioned with the Credential-Id, which may be included as part of the ESData/ESPrim. c) Cryptographic Parameters: The Cryptographic Parameters are provisioned by the Trust Enabling Function after the Trust Enabling Function verifies the access control policies associated with the request from the Source ESF End-Point. • Security Handshake: a) The Source ESF End-Point and the Trust Enabling Function perform a (D)TLS handshake [15] to establish a secure session. The mechanisms follow the process detailed in clause 8.3.2. All communications between the Source ESF End-Point and the Trust Enabling Function are secured by means of the established (D)TLS connection. b) The Target ESF End-Point and the Trust Enabling Function performs a (D)TLS handshake [15] to establish a secure session. The mechanisms follow the process detailed in clause 8.3.2. All communications between the Source ESF End-Point and the Trust Enabling Function are secured by means of the established (D)TLS connection. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 174 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • End-to-End Key Generation: a) The Source ESF End-Point generates credentials that may be based upon: Credentials that have been generated using the Enrolment Key, Ke/KeID that has been generated using the Bootstrapped Remote Credential Provisioning Process. Credentials generated in a random manner by the Source ESF End-Point and registered with the Trust Enabling Function. 8.7 End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment (ESCertKE) |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.7.1 Purpose of ESCertKE | End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment (ESCertKE) provides an interoperable framework for two end-points to use certificates for establishing a secret symmetric key called pairwiseE2EKey from which symmetric keys are derived for use in other end-to-end security frameworks such as End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) or End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim). Applicable use cases and requirements are discussed in ETSI TR 118 512 [i.16]. The present document specifies the ESCertKE messages and associated processing for ESCertKE. The transport of ESCertKE messages is specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.7.2 ESCertKE Architecture | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.7.2.1 ESCertKE Reference Model | The entities in the ESCertKE reference model are the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point which initiates the procedure and the single ESCertKE Terminating End-Point with which the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point intends to establish a pairwiseE2EKey. NOTE: Within the scope of clause 8.7, terms including the word "ESCertKE" can be shortened by removing "ESCertKE" to facilitate readability. For example, "ESCertKE Initiating End-Point" is often shortened to "Initiating End-Point". The ESCertKE Procedure consists of the Initiating End-Point and Terminating End-Point exchanging a sequence of ESCertKE Messages and apply processing based on those ESCertKE Messages. If the ESCertKE Procedure is successful, then the Initiating End-Point and Terminating End-Point export a pairwiseE2EKey based on the parameters exchanged in the ESCertKE Messages. There is no inherent restriction on which entities may be an Initiating End-point; these end-points may be entities inside a oneM2M system (that is, AEs and CSEs) or entities outside of a oneM2M system (for example, entities which are part of a system that interworks with oneM2M). The only restriction on entities which may be Terminating End-Points is that the Terminating End-Point shall be able to receive the unsolicited ESCertKE Message initiating the ESCertKE Procedure. Since ETSI TS 118 101 [1] specifies the transport of ESCertKE messages, ETSI TS 118 101 also specifies which entities may be Terminating End-Points. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.7.2.2 ESCertKE Procedure Message Flow | The ESCertKE Messages shall be transported as specified in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]; for example, the <e2EKeyCSE> resource may be used. The ESCertKE Messages shall contain the TLS v1.2 [5] messages defined in table 8.7.2.2-1 "ESCertKE Message definitions". The ESCertKE Procedure message flow is shown in figure 8.7.2.2-1, and described in the following text. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 175 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Figure 8.7.2.2-1: ESCertKE Procedure message flow A. Provisioning Certificates: The ESCertKE endpoints shall be provisioned with private key and certificates described in clause 8.1.2.3. The certificates of the Initiating End-Point and terminating End-Points shall conform to clause 10.1. B. Triggering: The Initiating End-Point and Terminating End-Point shall be configured with the information needed for the authentication and identification of the Terminating End-Point and Initiating End-Point respectively: The Initiating End-Point is commanded to initiate the ESCertKE Procedure, and the command shall include the following arguments: - The Terminating End-Point's certificate information: as described in clause 8.1.2.4. - The Terminating End-Point's identity. This identity is used for: Determining where ESCertKE Message 1 is sent; and Associating with the established pairwiseE2EKey. The Terminating End-Point shall be configured with the following arguments describing Initiating Entity authorized to perform the ESCertKE Procedure: - The Initiating End-Point's certificate information: as described in clause 8.1.2.4: In the case where the Initiating End-Point's certificate is a raw public key certificate, the Terminating End-Point shall also be configured with an identity to associate with the established pairwiseE2EKey. The End-Points may be configured in any order. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 176 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 C. Establishing pairwiseE2EKey: C.1 The Initiating End-Point and Terminating End-Point exchange the sequence of four ESCertKE Messages. The ESCertKE Messages shall be generated and processed according to the handshake protocol of TLS v1.2 [5]. The TLS ciphersuites used for the ESCertKE Procedure shall conform to clause 10.2.3: C.1.a The Initiating End-Point shall generate ESCertKE Message 1. C.1.b The Initiating End-Point shall send ESCertKE Message 1 to the Terminating End-Point identified in step 2. C.1.c The Terminating End-Point shall process ESCertKE Message 1, and generate ESCertKE Message 2. C.1.d The Terminating End-Point shall send ESCertKE Message 2 to the Initiating End-Point. C.1.e The Initiating End-Point shall process ESCertKE Message 2, and generate ESCertKE Message 3. C.1.f The Initiating End-Point shall send ESCertKE Message 3 to the Terminating End-Point. C.1.g The Terminating End-Point shall process ESCertKE Message 3, and generate ESCertKE Message 4. C.1.h The Terminating End-Point shall send ESCertKE Message 4 to the Initiating End-Point. C.1.i The Initiating End-Point shall process ESCertKE Message 4. C.2 If the TLS handshake protocol is successful, then the Initiating and Terminating End-Points shall export and cache the pairwiseE2EKey using TLS Exporter specification (IETF RFC 5705 [18]) as described in clause 10.3.1. Table 8.7.2.2-1: ESCertKE Message definitions ESCertKE Message Sending End-Point Possible TLS v1.2 Messages (success case) [5] Informative Description (normative description is in TLS v1.2 specification [5]) 1 Initiating ClientHello List of allowed ciphersuites, random value, and indicator to export pairwiseE2EKey. 2 Terminating ServerHello Selected ciphersuite, random value, indicator to export pairwiseE2EKey. Certificate* Terminating End-Point's certificate (and optionally certificate chain). ServerKeyExchange* Key exchange parameters generated by the Terminating End-Point. The content of this parameter is dependent on selected ciphersuite. CertificateRequest* Instructs the Initiating End-Point to authenticate itself with a certificate. ServerHelloDone Indicates the end of the message. 3 Initiating Certificate* Initiating End-Point's certificate (and optionally certificate chain). ClientKeyExchange* Key exchange parameters generated by the Initiating End-Point. The content of this parameter is dependent on selected ciphersuite. CertificateVerify Provides explicit verification of an Initiating End-Point's certificate. [ChangeCipherSpec] Notifies the Receiving End-Point that subsequent records will be protected under the newly negotiated CipherSpec and keys. Finished MIC on all preceding parameters exchanged in the procedure. The MIC is generated using session secrets established using the preceding parameters. 4 Terminating [ChangeCipherSpec] See above. Finished MIC on all preceding parameters exchanged in the procedure. The MIC is generated using session secrets. NOTE: The inclusion of the TLS messages marked with "*" is dependent on the chosen ciphersuite. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 177 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8 MAF Security Framework Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.1 Introduction to the MAF Security Framework Details | Clause 8.8 describes the common details and procedures used in the MAF-based Security Frameworks; in the present document these frameworks include: • The MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework (SAEF). • The MAF-Based End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Framework. • The MAF-based End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Framework. These frameworks use a MAF to provide authentication and distribution of symmetric key for use by a Source End- Point initiating establishing the symmetric key, and one or more Target End-Points. Table 8.8.1-1 MAF Clients can retrieve the output symmetric key from the MAF. The MAF provides its services on behalf of administrating stakeholders such as M2M SPs or third party M2M Trust Enablers (MTE). An administrating stakeholder authorizes the MAF to provide services to MAF clients, and oversees authorizing the distribution of symmetric keys. Table 8.8.1-1 describes the mapping of Source MAF Client and Target MAF Client to roles in the specific MAF-Based Frameworks, and the allowed number of Target MAF Clients. Table 8.8.1-1: Mapping to specific MAF-based Security Frameworks MAF-Based Security Framework Source MAF Client Target MAF Client Number of Target MAF Clients Output Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework (SAEF) Entity A Entity B 1 M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Originator Receiver 1 pairwiseESPrimKey End-to-End Security of Data (ESData) Source ESData End-Point Target ESData End-Point 1..n ESData Key This clause 8.8 specifies MAF Procedures between the MAF Clients and associated messages. The operation and management of the MAF, beyond the details provided for the MAF Procedures, are not specified in the present document. The general sequence for using the MAF procedures is shown in figure 8.8.1-1 and described as follows: 1. Each MAF Client shall separately establish credentials for mutual authentication with the MAF as described in MAF Client Credential Configuration (clause 8.8.3.1). 2. Each MAF client shall be separately configured to register on the MAF with a specific administrating stakeholder. MAF Client Registration Configuration (clause 8.8.3.2) provides the necessary parameters. 3. Each MAF Client shall perform a MAF Client Registration procedure with the MAF. This provides confirmation that the MAF Client is willing to use the services of the MAF, under the authorization of the administrating stakeholder. The MAF client shall register separately for each administrating stakeholder, even when registering via a single MAF. If the MAF Client is remotely provisioned for mutual authentication with the MAF, then the MAF shall provide the MAF Client with the KmID to be used for subsequently authentication with the MAF. At a later time independent of this sequence of events, the MAF Client Registration Update procedure may be performed to confirm that the MAF Client is willing to use the services of the MAF and / or establish a new Km and KmID, and the MAF Client De- Registration procedure may be performed to signal that the MAF Client is ceasing to use the services of the MAF. 4. The Source MAF client shall be configured to establish secure communication using a security feature (SAEF, ESPrim or ESData) with symmetric keys established via the MAF. The details of this configuration is specific to the security feature being invoked, but shall include the MAF Key Registration Configuration (clause 8.8.3.3). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 178 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 5. The Source MAF Client shall perform a MAF Key Registration procedure to establish a symmetric key and corresponding identifier. The Source MAF Client shall also provide the Security Usage Identifier (SUID) limiting the scope of the credential by identifying the security feature (SAEF, ESPrim or ESData). This procedure shall include the MAF Handshake procedure for mutual authentication of the Source MAF Client and MAF. At a later time independent of this sequence of events, the MAF Key Registration Update procedure may be performed to update the expiration of the registered key or update the list of Target MAF Clients, and the MAF Key De-Registration procedure may be performed to delete the key registration from the MAF. 6. The Source MAF Client shall provide, to the Target MAF Client(s), the symmetric key identifier established in the MAF Key Registration procedure. The details of this step depend on the security feature as identified by the SUID. 7. The Target MAF Client shall perform the MAF Key Retrieval procedure, to retrieve the symmetric key and corresponding information. This procedure shall include the MAF Handshake procedure for mutual authentication of the Target MAF Client and MAF. 8. The symmetric key shall be used in the security protocol between the Source MAF Client and Target MAF Client. If the security protocol requires a single symmetric key, then the first half of the distributed symmetric key shall be used. If the security protocol requires two symmetric keys (for example, an encryption key and a separate integrity key), then the two halves of the distributed symmetric key shall be used as the two security protocol symmetric keys. The details of this step depend on the security feature. Figure 8.8.1-1: The sequence of events when using the MAF Security Framework as part of a security feature Clause 8.8 is organized as follows. Clause 8.8.2 describes the processing and information flows of the MAF Procedures. Clause 8.8.3 describes the information in the MAF Client Credential Configuration, MAF Client Registration Configuration and MAF Key Registration Configuration. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2 MAF Security Framework Processing and Information Flows | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.1 Introduction | Clause 8.8.2 specifies the processing and information flows of the MAF procedures. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.2 MAF Handshake Procedure | Purpose: A MAF Handshake procedure establishes a mutually authenticated TLS or DTLS session for protecting the communication between an MAF Client and MAF. In the case of the MAF Key Registration procedure, the TLS or DTLS session may be used by the Source MAF Client and MAF to establish the Key Value. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 179 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Pre-Conditions: One of the following conditions shall hold: • The MAF Client and MAF have been provisioned with certificates as described in the MAF Client Credential Configuration details in clause 8.8.3.1, and configured with CA certificates for validating certificates as described in the MAF Client Registration Configuration details in clause 8.8.3.2. • The MAF Client and MAF have established a symmetric Master Credential (Km) with corresponding Master Credential Identifier (KmID). The Km and KmID may be pre-provisioned, or Km may be established using Remote Security Provisioning Framework with KmID established using the MAF Client Registration procedure. NOTE: In the case of establishing Km via remote provisioning, MAF Handshake cannot be performed during MAF Client Registration because (a) the MAF does not know Km prior to MAF Client Registration and (b) KmID has not been assigned prior to MAF Client Registration. Procedure description: • If the MAF Client and MAF have established a symmetric Master Credential (Km) with corresponding Master Credential Identifier (KmID), then the MAF Client and MAF shall establish the TLS or DTLS session using the TLS-PSK handshake according to clause 10.2.2, with the following details: - The "psk_identity" parameter [15] shall be set to the value of the Master Credential Identifier (KmID). - The "psk" parameter [15] shall be set to the value of the Master Credential (Km). • If the MAF Client and MAF are to authenticate using certificates, then the MAF Client and MAF shall establish the TLS or DTLS session using the certificate-based TLS handshake according to clause 10.2.2, with the following details: - The TLS server certificate shall be the MAF's certificate. The MAF Client shall verify the MAF's certificate against the set of provisioned MAF certificate trust anchors as described in clause 8.1.2.5. - The TLS client certificate shall be the 'MAF Client's certificate. The MAF shall verify the 'MAF Client's certificate against the provisioned MAF Client Certificate Information as described in clause 8.1.2.5. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.3 MAF Client Registration Procedure | Purpose: The MAF Client registers with the MAF to confirm that it is willing to use the services of the MAF, under the authorization of the administrating stakeholder. If remote provisioning is used to establish a symmetric key between an MAF Client and the MAF, then the MAF Client triggers the MAF (in the TLS handshake) to retrieve Km from the MEF, and the MAF provides the MAF Client with the Master Credential Id (KmID) to use in subsequent MAF Handshake Procedures. NOTE: The MAF Client Registration procedure is equivalent to CSE or AE registration, but in this case the MAF Client is "registering" to the MAF, and not the registrar CSE. Pre-Conditions: The MAF Client, MAF, and (where applicable) MEF have been provisioned with the parameters described in clause 8.8.3.1 and 8.8.3.2. Procedure description: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF. - If remote provisioning is used, then steps (b) onwards in the "Use of Provisioned Credential" in clause 8.3.2.1 shall be performed by the MAF Client (assuming the role of Enrolee), MEF and MAF (assuming the role of Registration Target). The SUID of the remotely-provisioned key shall be '21' "A symmetric key, provisioned via a Remote Security Provisioning Framework (RSPF), and intended to be shared with a MAF" as specified in ETSI TS 118 104 [4]. The MAF retrieves Km from the MEF as part of this process. - Otherwise, the MAF Client and MAF shall perform the MAF Handshake Procedures (clause 8.8.2.2). This provides the MAF with an authenticated identity for the MAF Client. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 180 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2. The MAF Client shall send a MAF Client Registration request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.3-1. Table 8.8.2.3-1: MAF Client Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the registration shall expire. 1 labels Labels to aid discovery the record of the MAF Client's registration 0..1 adminFQDN FQDN of the administrating stakeholder, provided in the MAF Client Registration Configuration 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. The MAF may assign different values for parameters received from the MAF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall compose a MAF Client Registration response request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.3-2. Table 8.8.2.3-2: MAF Client Registration Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity mafClientRegID An identifier for the new MAF Client Registration record 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the MAF Client Registration record 0..1 expirationTime Time when the MAF Client Registration record shall expire 1 MAF Client ID Identifier of the MAF Client 1 adminFQDN FQDN of the administrating stakeholder 1 assignedSymmKeyID MAF-Assigned Master Credential ID (KmID), in cases where the Km is remotely provisioned 0..1 The MAF shall send the response to the MAF Client. 4. The MAF Client and MAF shall store the parameters. If assignedSymmKeyID was included, then the MAF Client shall use this as Master Credential ID (KmID) hereafter when establishing TLS (or DTLS) sessions with the MAF. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.4 MAF Client Configuration Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MAF Client to retrieve MAF Client Configurations provided by the administrating stakeholder to the MAF. Pre-Conditions: • The MAF Client has previously performed the MAF Client Registration procedure to create the MAF Client Registration record. • The MAF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF as described in step 1 of clause 8.8.2.3. 2. The MAF Client shall send a MAF Client Configuration Retrieval request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.4-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 181 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.8.2.4-1: MAF Client Configuration Retrieval Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 mafClientRegID Identifier for the MAF Client registration record being updated 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, including if there is no MAF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MAF Client registration record, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall attempt to retrieve the MAF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MAF Client registration record. 4. The MAF shall compose a MAF Client Configuration Retrieval response a containing the following parameters. Table 8.8.2.4-2: MAF Client Configuration Retrieval Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity mafClientCfg MAF Client Configuration currently associated with the identified MAF Client registration record 1 The MAF shall send the response to the MAF Client. 5. The MAF Client shall apply the MAF Client Configuration. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.5 MAF Client Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MAF Client to update the MAF Client registration by any combination of extending the expirationTime of the MAF Client Registration record, updating the labels or establish a new Km and KmID. Pre-Conditions: • The MAF Client has previously performed the MAF Client Registration procedure to create the MAF Client Registration record. • The MAF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF as described in step 1 of clause 8.8.2.3. 2. The MAF Client shall send a MAF Client Registration Update request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.5-1. Table 8.8.2.5-1: MAF Client Registration Update Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 mafClientRegID Identifier for the MAF Client registration record being updated 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the MAF Client registration record shall expire. 0..1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the MAF Client registration record 0..1 NOTE: At least one of expirationTime and labels shall be included. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 182 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 3. Upon receiving the request, the MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall update the MAF Client Registration record with the proposed values if authorized by the administrating stakeholder. The MAF may assign different values for parameters received from the MAF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 4. The MAF shall compose a MAF Client Registration Update response a containing the following parameters. Table 8.8.2.5-2: MAF Client Registration Update Response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Updated time when the MAF Client Registration record shall expire. 0..1 labels Updated labels to aid discovery of the MAF Client Registration record. 0..1 assignedSymmKeyID MAF-Assigned Master Credential ID (KmID), in cases where a new Km is remotely provisioned. 0..1 NOTE: The response only includes expirationTime and/or labels if those parameters were present in the corresponding request. The MAF shall send the response to the MAF Client. 5. The MAF Client and MAF shall store the parameters. If assignedSymmKeyID was included, then the MAF Client shall use this as Master Credential ID hereafter when establishing TLS (or DTLS) sessions with the MAF. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.6 MAF Client De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a MAF Client to end its registration with the MAF. Pre-Conditions: • The MAF Client has previously performed the MAF Client Registration procedure to create the MAF Client Registration record. • The MAF Client Registration record is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF as described in step 1 of clause 8.8.2.3. 2. The MAF Client shall send a MAF Client De-Registration request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.6-1. Table 8.8.2.6-1: MAF Client De-Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 mafClientRegID Identifier for the MAF Client Registration record being ended 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall delete the information associated with the identified MAF Client Registration record. 4. The MAF shall compose a MAF Client Registration Update response indicating the success of the operation. The MAF shall send the response to the MAF Client. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 183 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.7 MAF Key Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MAF Client to establish a symmetric key with the MAF which can be retrieved for use by one or more Target MAF Clients. This procedure is performed between the Source MAF Client and the MAF. Pre-Conditions: • The Source MAF Client is provided with (or has otherwise determined) the information in the MAF Key Registration Configuration (clause 8.8.3.3). • The Source MAF Client has performed the MAF Client Registration Procedure (clause 8.8.2.3) with the MAF for the administrating stakeholder identified in the MAF Key Registration Configuration. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The Source MAF Client shall establish a TLS or DTLS session with the MAF using the MAF Handshake procedure, described in clause 8.8.2.2. A by-product of the MAF Handshake procedure is that the MAF establishes an authenticated identity for the Source MAF Client. 2. The Source MAF Client selects the value of the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) to be distributed by the MAF. The value shall be one of the following: - The Source MAF Client generates the output symmetric key value from the (D)TLS session secrets using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. - The output symmetric key value is self-generated by the Source MAF Client, independently of the (D)TLS session secrets. 3. The Source MAF Client shall compose a list of Target MAF Clients to whom the MAF is authorized to provide the output symmetric key value: - In the case of MAF-Based SAEF or MAF-Based ESPrim: The list shall contain exactly one Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-ID. - In the case of MAF-Based ESData: The list shall contain any non-zero number of Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-IDs. NOTE 1: How the Source MAF Client selects the list of Target MAF Clients is application dependent. 4. The Source MAF Client shall send a MAF Key Registration request, including the information shown in table 8.8.2.7-1. If the Key Value is not present in the request, the MAF client shall generate Key Value from the (D)TLS session using the TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. Table 8.8.2.7-1: MAF Key Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the Key Registration shall expire 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used. 1 targetIDs (Optional) list of identifiers for the initial set of Target MAF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key 0..1 Key Value (Optional) If present, this parameter contains an output symmetric key value which is self-generated by the Source MAF Client. If this parameter is not present, then the Source MAF Client and MAF will generate the output symmetric key value using TLS Exporter 0..1 5. The MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall authorize establishing a Key Value, based on the authenticated identity for the Source MAF Client. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 184 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 NOTE 2: The present document provides no details for the authorization of this request. 6. If the request included a value in the Key Value parameter, then the MAF shall store this value. Otherwise, the MAF shall generate Key Value from the (D)TLS session using TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]), as described in clause 10.3.1. 7. The MAF shall initialize the list of authorized Target MAF Clients (those MAF Clients which may retrieve this credential) to the list provided in the request: - In the case of MAF-Based ESData: This list may be further updated by administrating stakeholders during or after the MAF Key Registration procedure. NOTE 3: The present document does not provide any details about administrating stakeholders updating the list of authorized Target MAF Clients on the MAF. The MAF could provide its own logic and interface allowing administrating stakeholders to manage this list. 8. The MAF shall select a previously-unused value of RelativeKeyID. 9. The MAF may assign different values for parameters received from the MAF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 10. The MAF shall send a response, to the Source MAF Client, including the information shown in table 8.8.2.7-2. Table 8.8.2.7-2: MAF Key Registration response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration. 1 expirationTime Time when the Key Registration shall expire. 1 Source MAF Client ID Identifier of the Source MAF Client. 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration. 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder. 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used. 1 targetIDs List of identifiers for the initial set of Target MAF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. This list may have been modified from the list provided by the MAF Client, or created by the MAF (if the MAF Client did not provide a list). 1 11. The Source MAF Client and MAF shall store the output symmetric key value and corresponding Key Identifier: - The Key Identifier is generated from the RelativeKeyID and the M2M Authentication Function's FQDN by the Source MAF Client and MAF, as described in clause 10.3.5. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.8 MAF Key Retrieval Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Target MAF Client to retrieve the Key Value from a MAF corresponding to a RelativeKeyID received by the Target MAF Client. Pre-Conditions: • The Target MAF Client has performed the MAF Client Credential Configuration (clause 8.8.2.1) with the MAF, including configuration of the MAF Key Retrieval URI. • The Source MAF Client has performed the MAF Key Registration Procedure (clause 8.8.2.2) with the MAF, resulting in a registered Key Value and assigned RelativeKeyID for a specific administrating stakeholder and Security Usage Identifier (SUID). • The Target MAF Client received a Key Identifier from the Initiating-MAF Client in a security feature with the SUID which the Source MAF Client provided to the MAF during the MAF Key Registration Procedure (clause 8.8.2.7). The Key Identifier shall be composed of the FQDN of the MAF and the RelativeKeyID assigned to the registered key. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 185 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • The Target MAF Client may expect that it is authorized to obtain the corresponding output symmetric key value. NOTE: The Target MAF Client does not have to repeat this procedure if the Target MAF Client is already in possession of the corresponding Key Value. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The Target MAF Client shall establish a TLS or DTLS session with the MAF using the MAF Handshake procedure, described in clause 8.8.2.2. A by-product of the MAF Handshake procedures is that the MAF establishes an authenticated identity for the Target MAF Client. 2. The Target MAF Client shall send a MAF Key Retrieval request to the MAF including the information shown in table 8.8.2.8-1. Table 8.8.2.8-1: MAF Key Retrieval Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier received from the Source MAF Client in a security feature 1 3. The MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall identify the key registration using the RelativeKeyID. 4. The MAF shall determine if the Target MAF Client is authorized to retrieve the registered key and metadata by comparing the authenticated identifier for Target MAF Client against the list of identifiers for authorized Target MAF Clients. If the Target MAF Client is not authorized, then the MAF shall send, to the Target MAF Client, an error message. Otherwise, the MAF shall proceed to the next step. 5. The MAF shall send a response, to the Target MAF Client, including the information shown in table 8.8.2.8-2. Table 8.8.2.8-2: MAF Key Retrieval response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Time when the Key Registration shall expire 1 Source MAF Client ID Identifier of the Source MAF Client 1 labels Labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration 0..1 adminFQDN Identifier for the administrating stakeholder 1 SUID The Security Usage Identifier limiting the security feature in which the symmetric key may be used 1 Key Value The registered value of the output symmetric key 1 6. The Target MAF Client shall associate the parameters with the key identifier. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.9 MAF Key Registration Update Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MAF Client to update the metadata associated with a registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MAF Client and the MAF. Pre-Conditions: • The MAF Client has previously performed the MAF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key registration is not expired. Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF as described in step 1 of clause 8.8.2.7. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 186 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 2. The Source MAF Client shall compose a list of Target MAF Clients to whom the MAF is authorized to provide Kc: - In the case of MAF-Based SAEF or MAF-Based ESPrim: The list shall contain exactly one Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-ID. - In the case of MAF-Based ESData: The list shall contain any non-zero number of Absolute AE-ID or Absolute CSE-IDs. NOTE: The present document does not provide any details about how the Source MAF Client selects the list of Target MAF Clients. 3. The Source MAF Client shall send a MAF Key Registration Update request, including the updated information shown in table 8.8.2.9-1. Table 8.8.2.9-1: MAF Key Registration Update Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration 1 expirationTime Proposed time when the Key Registration shall expire. 0..1 labels Proposed Labels to aid discovery of the registered key 0..1 targetIDs (Optional) proposed list of identifiers for the set of Target MAF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. 0..1 NOTE: At least one of expirationTime, labels or targetIDs shall be provided. 4. The MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an appropriate error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall update the metadata with the proposed values if authorized by the administrating stakeholder. The MAF may assign different values for parameters received from the MAF Client, based on instruction from the administrating stakeholder. 5. The MAF shall send a response, to the Source MAF Client, including the information shown in table 8.8.2.9-2. Table 8.8.2.9-2: MAF Key Registration Update response message information Parameter Description Multiplicity expirationTime Current time when the key registration shall expire, if changed since the last time the MAF Client was provided with the expiration time. 0..1 labels Updated list of labels to aid discovery of the Key Registration, if any. 0..1 targetIDs Current list of identifiers for the initial set of Target MAF Clients authorized to retrieve the symmetric key. This list may have been modified from the list provided by the MAF Client. 0..1 NOTE: The response includes only those parameters that were present in the corresponding request. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.2.10 MAF Key De-Registration Procedure | Purpose: This procedure enables a Source MAF Client to request the MAF to stop distributing the registered key. This procedure is performed between the Source MAF Client and the MAF. Pre-Conditions: • The MAF Client has previously performed the MAF Key Registration procedure to create the key registration. • The key registration is not expired. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 187 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Procedure Description. The procedure comprises the following steps: 1. The MAF Client shall establish a TLS (or DTLS) connection with the MAF as described in step 1 of clause 8.8.2.7. 2. The MAF Client shall send MAF Key De-Registration request including the information shown in table 8.8.2.10-1. Table 8.8.2.10-1: MAF Client De-Registration Request message information Parameter Description Multiplicity MAF-FQDN FQDN of the MAF, from MAF Instruction Configuration 1 RelativeKeyID The relative part of the Key Identifier associated with the Key Registration 1 3. Upon receiving the request, the MAF shall process the request. If error cases are encountered, then the MAF shall send an error response. If the request is processed successfully, then the MAF shall delete the information associated with the identified key registration. 4. The MAF shall compose MAF Client De-Registration response indicating the success of the operation. The MEF shall send the response to the MAF Client. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.3 MAF Client Configuration Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.3.1 MAF Client Credential Configuration Details | The MAF Client and MAF shall be configured with credentials for mutual authentication of the MAF Client and MAF. The credentials for mutual authentication shall be either pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned thanks to Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks. Either symmetric key credentials or certificate credentials maybe provisioned. Symmetric key credentials may be used for authenticating some MAF Clients and certificate credentials may be used for authenticating other MAF Clients. The selection may be based on the capabilities of the MAF Client. The details depend on the type of credential (symmetric key or certificates) and, in the case of symmetric keys, the type of provisioning (pre-provisioning or remote provisioning). 1) Details specific to Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Keys (PPSKs): the Master Credential (Km) and corresponding Master Credential Identifier (KmID) shall be provisioned to the MAF Client (assuming the role of Enrolee) and the MAF. The format of KmID is defined in clause 10.6. 2) Details specific to Remotely-Provisioned Symmetric Keys (RPSKs): The MAF Client and an M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) shall be provisioned with credentials for performing a Remote Security Provisioning (RSPF) Framework. The MAF Client shall be authorized to use the services of the MEF. For more details, see clause 8.3. NOTE 1: In this case, the Master Credential (Km) and Master Credential Identifier (KmID) are established during the MAF Client Registration procedure. 3) Details specific to Certificates (whether pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned): The MAF Client shall be provisioned with an MAF Client certificate with optional certificate chain. The MAF Client certificate shall be a device certificate, Node-ID certificate, AE-ID certificate or CSE-ID certificate. NOTE 2: The configuration of MAF trust anchor CA certificates is addressed in MAF Client Registration Configuration, and can occur separately from MAF Client Credential Configuration. The oneM2M Device Configuration specification ETSI TS 118 122 [57] provides a set of <mgmtObj> specializations that shall be used for MAF Client Credential Configuration when the MAF Client supports device management (either remotely or via manual input). The present document does not specify how the MAF Client Credential Configuration is represented when the MAF Client does not support device management. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 188 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.3.2 MAF Client Registration Configuration Details | Purpose: The MAF Client Registration Configuration describes the information provisioned to a MAF Client to enable it to perform MAF procedures authorized by an administrating stakeholder. The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MAF Client Registration Configuration to be provided to the MAF Client. Pre-conditions: • The MAF Client and MAF have been configured with credentials which can be used for mutual authentication: see MAF Client Credential Configuration in clause 8.8.3.1. • If the MAF Client and MAF will use certificates for mutual authentication, then: - The administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder) possesses a copy of the MAF Client's Certificate Information as defined in clause 8.1.2.4. The MAF is provided with a copy of the MAF Client's Certificate Information. The present document does not specify how this information is provided to the MAF by the administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder). - The administrating stakeholder (or another stakeholder acting on behalf of the administrating stakeholder) possesses a copy of the MAF Trust Anchor CA Certificates. The MAF Client is provided with a copy of the MAF Trust Anchor CA Certificates. • The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MAF to allow the MAF Client to perform MAF Client Registration. This could involve pre-authorization or real-time authorization. Details: The MAF Client Registration Configuration (mafClientRegCfg) includes the information shown in table 8.8.3.2-1, and has data type sec:clientRegCfg (see clause 12.4.2). Table 8.8.3.2-1: Information in the MAF Client Registration Configuration Element name Multiplicity Notes expirationTime 0..1 Time when the configuration expires labels 0..1 List of labels to enable discovery of the MAF Client registration record fqdn 1 MAF-FQDN (also known as MAF-ID) adminFQDN 1 FQDN of the administrating stakeholder httpPort 0..1 Port number when using HTTP [i.20] coapPort 0..1 Port number when using CoAP [i.21] websocketPort 0..1 Port number when using WebSocket [i.19] |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 8.8.3.3 MAF Key Registration Configuration Details | Purpose: The MAF Key Registration Configuration describes the information provisioned to a MAF Client to enable it to perform MAF procedures authorized by an administrating stakeholder. The administrating stakeholder arranges for the MAF Client Registration Configuration to be provided to the MAF Client. Pre-conditions: • The MAF Client has performed the MAF Client Registration procedure with the MAF for the administrating stakeholder. • The MAF Client has currently-valid credentials for mutual authentication with the MAF. Details: The MAF Key Registration Configuration (mafKeyRegCfg) includes the information shown in table 8.8.3.3-1, and has data type sec:keyRegCfg (see clause 12.4.3). ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 189 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 8.8.3.3-1: Information in the MAF Key Registration Configuration Element Name Multiplicity Notes expirationTime 0..1 Expiration time labels 0..1 List of labels to enable discovery of the key registration adminFQDN 1 FQDN of the administrating stakeholder SUID 1 SUID constraining the usage of the Key Value established during the MAF Key Registration procedure. targetIDs 0..1 List of identifiers for authorized target MAF Clients |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9 Security Framework Procedures and Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.0 Introduction | This clause specifies procedures and parameters of the phases of Security Association Establishment Frameworks (clause 8.2) and Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks (clause 8.3). 9.1 Security Association Establishment Framework Procedures and Parameters |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.1 Credential Configuration Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.1.0 Introduction | The following Credential Configuration procedures are described in the present clause: • Credential Configuration of Entity A and Entity B, see clause 9.1.1.1. • Credential Configuration of M2M Authentication Functions, see clause 9.1.1.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.1.1 Credential Configuration of Entity A and Entity B | Table 9.1.1.1-1 lists the parameters that may be configured to Entity A during the Credential Configuration phase and which are common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks. Table 9.1.1.1-1: Parameters that may be configured to Entity A during the Credential Configuration phase and which are common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks Parameter common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks (If Entity A is a CSE) Entity A's CSE-ID Table 9.1.1.1-2 lists the parameters configured to a Field-Domain Security Association End-Points in the Credential Configuration phase and which are specific to the Security Association Establishment Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 190 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 9.1.1.1-2: Parameters configured to a Field Domain Security Association end-point during the Credential Configuration phase and which are specific to a Security Association Establishment Framework Security Association Establishment Framework Parameter Provisioned Symmetric Key Kpsa KpsaID Certificate Based Entity authenticates itself using a Raw Public Key Certificate Entity's Private Key Entity's Raw Public Key Certificate Entity authenticates itself using a Device Certificate Entity's Private Key Entity's Certificate and Chain Entity authenticates itself using a CSE-ID Certificate Entity's CSE-ID Entity's Private Key Entity's Certificate and Chain Entity authenticates itself using an AE-ID Certificate Entity's AE-ID Entity's Private Key Entity's Certificate and Chain Entity authenticates itself using a Node-ID Certificate Entity's Node-ID Entity's Private Key Entity's Certificate and Chain MAF- Based Entity A MAF Identifier (MAF-ID) Master Credential (KmID) Master Credential Identifier (KmID) Entity B Entity B and MAF shall be able to establish mutually- authenticated secure communication. The details are not specified in the present document. The Credential Configuration of Entity A and Entity B for the Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework, or the MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework is achieved through either: • Pre-provisioning via mechanisms which are not specified in the present document. • Remote provisioning via one of the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks in clause 8.3. The Credential Configuration of Entity A and Entity B for the Certificate Security Association Establishment Frameworks is performed by pre-provisioning via mechanisms which are not specified in the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.1.2 Credential Configuration of M2M Authentication Functions | Table 9.1.1.2-1 lists the parameters configured to M2M Authentication Functions in the Credential Configuration phase. The M2M Authentication Function's identifier (MAF-ID) is presumed to have been configured prior to the Credential Configuration phase. Table 9.1.1.2-1: Parameters configured to a M2M Authentication Functions during the Credential Configuration phase Security Association Establishment Framework Parameter MAF-Based A-to-MAF Authentication Master Credential (Km) Master Credential Identifier (KmID) B-to-MAF Authentication Entity B and MAF shall be able to establish mutually-authenticated secure communication. The details are not specified in the present document. The Credential Configuration of M2M Authentication Framework shall be achieved through either: • Business logic of the Stakeholder operating the M2M Authentication Function, and the details are not described in the present document. • Remote provisioning via one of the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks in clause 8.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 191 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.2 Association Configuration Procedures and Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.2.0 Introduction | The following Association Configuration procedures are described in this clause: • Association Configuration of Entity A, see clause 9.1.2.1.1. • Association Configuration of Entity B, see clause 9.1.2.1.2. • Association Configuration of M2M Authentication Functions, see clause 9.1.2.2. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.2.1 Association Configuration of Entity A and Entity B | 9.1.2.1.1 Association Configuration of Entity A Table 9.1.2.1.1-1 lists the parameters configured to Entity A in the Association Configuration phase and which are common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks. Table 9.1.2.1.1-1: Parameters configured to Entity A during the Association Configuration phase and which are common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks Parameter common to all Security Association Establishment Frameworks Entity B's CSE-ID Table 9.1.2.1.1-2 lists the parameters configured to Entity A in the Association Configuration phase which are specific to the Security Association Establishment Framework. Table 9.1.2.1.1-2: Parameters configured to Entity A during the Association Configuration phase which are specific to a Security Association Establishment Framework Security Association Establishment Framework Parameters specific to the Security Association Establishment Frameworks Provisioned Symmetric Key None Certificate Based Entity B is authenticated using Raw Public Key Certificate Entity B's Public key identifier Entity B is authenticated using Device Certificate Entity B's globally unique hardware instance identifier Entity B's trust anchor information Entity B is authenticated using CSE-ID Certificate Entity B's trust anchor information Entity B is authenticated using AE-ID Certificate Entity B's trust anchor information Entity B is authenticated using Node-ID Certificate Entity B's trust anchor information MAF-Based None Mechanisms for Association Configuration of Entity A shall authenticate the configuration source and provide integrity protection for the configured information communicated from the configuration source to the entity. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 192 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.2.1.2 Association Configuration of Entity B | Table 9.1.2.1.2-1 lists the parameters configured to the Registrar (Entity B) in the Association Configuration phase. Table 9.1.2.1.2-1: Parameters configured to Entity B during the Association Configuration phase Security Association Establishment Framework Parameters specific to the Security Association Establishment Frameworks Provisioned Symmetric Key None Certificate Based Entity A is authenticated using Raw Public Key Certificate None Entity A is authenticated using Device Certificate, CSE-ID Certificate, Node-ID Certificate or AE-ID Certificate Entity A's trust anchor information MAF-Based None Mechanisms for Association Configuration of Entity B shall authenticate the configuration source and provide integrity protection for the configured information communicated from the configuration source to the entity. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.1.2.2 Association Configuration of M2M Authentication Functions | Table 9.1.2.2-1 lists the parameters configured to M2M Authentication Functions in the Association Configuration phase. Table 9.1.2.2-1: Parameters configured to a M2M Authentication Functions during the Association Configuration phase Security Association Establishment Framework Parameter MAF-Based A-to-MAF Authentication Entity B's CSE-ID or AE-ID (IdB) The present document assumes that Association Configuration of the M2M Authentication Functions will utilize business logic of the Stakeholder that operates the M2M Authentication Function, and the details are not described in the present document. 9.2 Remote Security Provisioning Framework Procedures and Parameters |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.1 Bootstrap Credential Configuration Procedures and Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.1.0 Introduction | The following Bootstrap Credential Configuration procedures are described in this clause: • Bootstrap Credential Configuration of Enrolees and Enrolment Targets (except for the GBA-Based case as discussed below), see clause 9.2.1.1. • Bootstrap Credential Configuration of M2M Enrolment Functions (except for the GBA-Based case as discussed above), see clause 9.2.1.2. The following Bootstrap Credential Configuration procedures are specified by other organizations: • Bootstrap Credential Configuration of Underlying Network Service Provider authentication servers (e.g. HLR, HSS or AAA) for the GBA-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. These details are specified by ETSI TS 133 220 [13] and TIA TIA-1098 [14]. • Bootstrap Credential Configuration of Enrolees for the GBA-Based Security Association Establishment Framework. These details are specified by ETSI TS 133 220 [13] and TIA TIA-1098 [14]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 193 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.1.1 Bootstrap Credential Configuration of Enrolee | Table 9.2.1.1-1 lists the parameters configured to Enrolees in the Bootstrap Credential Configuration phase for authentication with the M2M Enrolment Function in the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Table 9.2.1.1-1: Parameters configured to Enrolees during the Bootstrap Credential Configuration phase Remote Security Provisioning Framework Parameter Pre-Provisioned M2M Secure Connection Key authentication. Not applicable to MAF. Kpm KpmID MEF URI Certificate-Based authentication Enrolee authenticates itself using a raw public key Enrolee's Private Key Enrolee's Raw Public Key Certificate Enrolee authenticates itself using a device certificate Enrolee's Private Key Enrolee's Certificate and Chain Enrolee authenticates itself using a CSE-ID, Node-ID or AE-ID certificate Enrolee's Private Key Enrolee's Certificate and Chain The Bootstrap Credential Configuration of an Enrolee for the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework shall authenticate the configuration source and shall provide confidentiality and integrity protection of the configured information communicated from the configuration source to the secured environment of the Enrolee. The present document does not specify any such mechanisms. The Bootstrap Credential Configuration of an Infrastructure Domain Enrolment Target (including an M2M Authentication Functions) expected to use business logic of the Stakeholder operating the Infrastructure Domain Enrolment, and the details are not described in the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.1.2 Bootstrap Credential Configuration of M2M Enrolment Functions | It is assumed that an M2M Enrolment Function already knows its FQDN. Table 9.2.1.2-1 lists the parameters configured to M2M Enrolment Functions in the Bootstrap Credential Configuration phase for mutual authentication with Enrolees and Enrolment Targets using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Table 9.2.1.2-1: Parameters configured to the M2M Enrolment Function during the Bootstrap Credential Configuration phase for mutual authentication with Enrolees and Enrolment Targets using the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Remote Security Provisioning Framework Parameters specific to the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolment Key authentication of Enrolee or Enrolment Target Kpm KpmID Certificate Based authentication of Enrolee or Enrolment Target MEF Private Key MEF Certificate and Chain The Bootstrap Credential Configuration of M2M Enrolment Functions is expected to use business logic of the stakeholder operating the M2M Enrolment Function, and the details are not described in the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 194 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration Procedures and Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2.0 Introduction | The following Bootstrap Instruction Configuration procedures are described in this clause: • Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of Enrolees, see clause 9.2.2.1. • Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of M2M Enrolment Functions, see clause 9.2.2.3. • Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of Underlying Network Service Provider authentication servers (e.g. HLR, HSS or AAA), see clause 9.2.2.4. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2.1 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of Enrolees | Table 9.2.2.1-1 lists the parameters configured to an Enrolee during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase which are common to all Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks. Table 9.2.2.1-1: Parameters configured to an Enrolee during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase of which are common to all Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Parameter common to all Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Enrolment Target Identifier (Enrolee B's AE-ID or CSE-ID, or MAF-ID) Table 9.2.2.1-2 lists the Remote Security Provisioning Framework-specific parameters configured an Enrolee in the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase of the Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Table 9.2.2.1-2: Remote Security Provisioning Framework - specific parameters configured to an Enrolee during the Instruction Configuration phase of the Remote Security Provisioning Framework Remote Security Provisioning Framework Remote Security Provisioning Framework-specific Parameters Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolment Key Enrolment Expiry Certificate Based MEF URI MEF Trust Anchor Information GBA-Based None Mechanisms for Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of Enrolees shall authenticate the configuration source and shall provide at least integrity protection of the configured information communicated from the configuration source to the Enrolee. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2.2 Void | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2.3 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of M2M Enrolment Functions | Table 9.2.2.3-1 lists the parameters configured to an M2M Enrolment Function during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase which are common to the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 195 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 9.2.2.3-1: Parameters configured to M2M Enrolment Functions during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase which are common to the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Parameter common to all Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Enrolment Target Identity (Enrolee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID, or MAF-ID) Table 9.2.2.3-2 lists the Remote Security Provisioning Framework-specific parameters configured to an M2M Enrolment Functions in the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase of the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Table 9.2.2.3-2: Remote Security Provisioning Framework-specific parameters configured to an M2M Enrolment Function during the Instruction Configuration phase of the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolee Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework and Certificate-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Remote Security Provisioning Framework Remote Security Provisioning Framework-specific Parameters Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolment Key Enrolment Expiry Certificate Based Enrolee is authenticated using a raw public key certificate Enrolee's Public key identifier Enrolee is authenticated using a device certificate Enrolee's M2M Device ID Enrolee's Trust Anchor Information Enrolee is authenticated using a CSE-ID, Node-ID or AE-ID certificate Enrolee's Trust Anchor Information The present document assumes that Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of the M2M Enrolment Functions utilizes business logic of the Stakeholder that operates the M2M Enrolment Function, and the details are not described in the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.2.4 Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of UNSP Authentication Server | Table 9.2.2.4-1 lists the parameters configured to an Underlying Network Service Provider authentication server (e.g. HLR, HSS or AAA) during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase of the GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework. Table 9.2.2.4-1: Parameters configured to M2M Enrolment Functions during the Bootstrap Instruction Configuration phase of the GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework Parameter Mandatory/Optional for all Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks Enrolment Target Identifier (Enrolee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID, or MAF-ID) Mandatory The Bootstrap Instruction Configuration of the Underlying Network Service Provider authentication server is achieved by updating the GBA User Security Settings (GUSS) (ETSI TS 133 220 [13]) of the User Equipment (UE) upon which the Enrolee is executed. The present document assumes that this Bootstrap Instruction Configuration utilizes business logic of the Underlying Network Service Provider, and the details are not described in the present document. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.3 End-to-End Credential Configuration Procedures and Parameters | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.3.0 Introduction | The following End-to-End Credential Configuration procedures are described in this clause: • End-to-End Credential Configuration of Source ESF End-Points and Target ESF End-Points, see clause 9.2.3.1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 196 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • End-to-End Credential Configuration of Trust Enabling Functions, see clause 9.2.3.2. • Configuration parameters for enabling End-to-End Security at Source ESF End-Points and Target ESF End-Points, see clause 9.2.3.3. 9.2.3.1 End-to-End Credential Configuration of Source ESF End-Points and Target ESF End-Points It is assumed that the Source ESF End-Point and the Target ESF End-Points are configured with the URI of the Trust Enabling Function and have been configured with the appropriate parameters specific to the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks as described in clause 9.2. In addition, the end-to-end credentials are provisioned and appropriate security parameters are provisioned to the Target ESF End-Points while the Source ESF End-Point can derive the end-to-end credentials on its own using the relevant security parameters that have been provisioned. Table 9.2.3.1-1 provides a list of the parameters. Table 9.2.3.1-1: Security Credentials and parameters provisioned to the Target ESF End-Points and Source ESF End-Points Security Protection End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters Description End-to-End Security Credentials KpsaID This is the provisioned credential-Id of the M2M Provisioned Symmetric Key. Kpsa This is the M2M Provisioned Symmetric Key. This is used to derive the end-to-end master secret, Ke2e_master as described in clause 10.3.6. TEF URI The URI of the trusted-third-party (TEF) entity that is used as the credential generator/registry and enables the registration and generation of end-to-end security credentials. Cryptographic Parameters Salt The salt used for generating the end-to-end credentials. Optional parameter. Key Extraction Algorithm: HMAC-Hash The Key extraction algorithm that is used for generating the various keys shall follow the mechanisms described in [48]. Cryptographic Labels The labels that are used by the cryptographic algorithms. The labels shall be used according to clause 10.3.6.1. Types of Credentials Message Authenticity (Primitive) The key used for message authentication and integrity of oneM2M primitives. If the keying material is provided then it is generated by the ESF Target End-Point. Message Confidentiality (Primitive) The key that is used for message confidentiality of oneM2M primitives. If the keying material is provided then it is generated by the Target ESF End-Point. Integrity of Data (Attribute) Key used for providing integrity of data/attribute. If the keying material is provided then it is generated by the Target ESF End-Point. Confidentiality of Data (Attribute) Key used for providing confidentiality of data/attributes. If the keying material is provided then it is generated by the Target ESF End-Point. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 9.2.3.2 End-to-End Credential Configuration at the M2M Trust Enabling Functions | It is assumed that the Trust Enabling Function is configured with the identities of the entities (ESF Source and Target End-Points) and appropriate parameters specific to the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks as described in clause 9.2. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 197 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 In addition, the Trust Enabling Function is provisioned with the appropriate security parameters, so that the End-to-End security credentials can be derived and the set of the cryptographic parameters can be provisioned to the Target ESF End-Points once the Target ESF End-Point has been authenticated. Table 9.2.3.2-1 provides a list of the parameters. Table 9.2.3.2-1: Security Parameters provisioned at the M2M Enrolment or Trust Enabling Function and Source ESF End-Point End-to-End Security Protection End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters Description End-to-End Security Credentials Kpm Pre-provisioned credentials between the Source ESF End-Point and TEF KpmID The credential identity of the pre-provisioned credentials Source ESF End-Point identity (AE-ID/CSE- ID) Target ESF End-Point identity (CSE-ID) The entity identity that is pre-provisioned with the end-to-end security credentials List of required Security Protection and Strength Message Authentication: (Low - High) Provides a level of the required strength of the message authentication mechanism Message Confidentiality: (Low - High) Provides a level of the required strength for providing message confidentiality mechanism Attribute Integrity: (Low - High) Provides a level of the required strength for providing attribute integrity Attribute Confidentiality: (Low - High) Provides a level of the required strength for providing attribute confidentiality 9.2.3.3 Configuration parameters for enabling End-to-End Security at Source ESF End-Points and Target ESF End-Points The Source ESF End-Points and the Target ESF End-Points are provisioned with the cryptographic parameters that are used to enable and verify end-to-end security protection. In the case of the Target ESF End-Point, the Trust Enabling Function provisions the parameters to it after a successful authentication and derivation of the Secure Connection Key (Kpsa). In the case of the Source ESF End-Point, the parameters may have been pre-configured or provisioned in a similar manner as the Target ESF End-Point, that is, once the derivation of the Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) is done, and shared between the Source ESF End-Point and the Target ESF End-Point. Table 9.2.3.3-1 provides a list of the parameters. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 198 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 9.2.3.3-1: Security Parameters provisioned to the Target ESF End-Point and the Source ESF End-Point End-to-End Security Protection End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters Description End-to-End Security Credentials e2e_master The End-to-End master credential E2EKeyId End-to-End Master credential identity Target ESF End-Point Identity (CSE-ID) Source ESF End-Point Id (AE-ID/CSE-ID) The identity of the end entity with which the end-to-end credential is associated with Cryptographic Parameters Protocol: JWS/JWE, XML Sec The type of encoding and representation that is used Class of cryptographic algorithms: AEAD (single key) or non-AEAD Defines the class of cryptographic algorithms that shall be used Message Authenticity Algorithm/Size: HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512 Indicates the message authentication algorithm and key size Message Confidentiality Algorithm/Size: AES-192/256 Indicates the message confidentiality algorithm and key size Attribute Confidentiality Algorithm: AES- 192/256 Attribute confidentiality algorithm and key size Attribute Authenticity Algorithm/Size: HMAC- SHA-256 Attribute authenticity and integrity algorithm and key size Cryptographic Usage Message/Attribute Authenticity: Nonce The random value that was used for providing freshness. This is only stored temporarily associated with an expiration time and communicated to the other end Message/Attribute Confidentiality: Initialization Vector This random value that is used as the initialization vector for the confidentiality algorithm NOTE: For AEAD class of algorithms where only a single key is used, then only a single key would be generated and an associated cryptographic algorithm (e.g. AES-GCM or AES-CCM) identified. In addition, for AEAD class of algorithms, both an IV and a Nonce would not be generated, rather only a single random value, Nonce, would be generated. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10 Protocol and Algorithm Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1 Certificate-Based Security Framework Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1 Certificate Profiles | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.0 General | NOTE: These certificate profiles are compliant with the CoAP specification IETF RFC 7252 [i.21]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.1 Common Certificate Details | All certificates shall conform to the following profile: • Certificates shall conform to IETF RFC 5280 [34]. • The certificate shall include a SubjectPublicKeyInfo that indicates an algorithm of id-ecPublicKey with namedCurves secp256r1 [34]; this curve is equivalent to the NIST P-256 curve [39]. • The public key format shall be uncompressed [46]. • The hash algorithm shall be SHA-256. • The key usage extension shall be included and shall indicate at least digitalSignature. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 199 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.2 Raw Public Key Certificate Profile | Raw public key certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.1 and IETF RFC 7250 [37]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.3 Details Common to Certificates with Certificate Chains | Certificates with Certificate Chains shall conform to the following description: • These certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.1. • Certificates shall be signed with ECDSA using secp256r1 or optionally RSA using at least 2048 key length, and the signature shall use SHA-256. • Certificate chains should limit the number of intermediate CA certificates to avoid having a negative impact in constrained environments. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.4 Profile for Device Certificates and their Certificate Chains | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.4.1 Profile for Device Certificates | Device certificates shall conform to the following description: • Device certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. • The subjectAltName extension of device certificates shall include one or more globally unique hardware instance identifiers. EXAMPLE: Annex H "Object Identifier Based M2M Device Identifier" ETSI TS 118 101 [1] defines an object identifier -based M2M Device ID that can be used for providing a one or more globally unique hardware instance identifier. An object identifier -based M2M Device ID can be representing in an otherName field in the subjectAltName extension, where: otherName "type-ID" component is set to the M2M Device Indication ID (clause H.2.1 ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) arc of the object identifier M2M Device ID; and the otherName "value" component is set to the remainder of the object identifier M2M Device ID: Manufacturer ID arc, Model ID arc, Serial Number ID arc and optional Expanded ID arc (see clause H.2 ETSI TS 118 101 [1]). NOTE: Providing the Model ID as part of the M2M Device ID can have privacy implications in some scenarios. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.4.2 Profile for Certificate Authority Certificates for Device Certificates | Certificate Authority Certificates in the certificate chain for a device certificate shall conform to the following description: • These certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. • Certificate Authority Certificates for device certificates are recommended to use the name constraints extension (see clause 4.2.1.10 of IETF RFC 5280 [34]) to constrain the globally unique hardware instance identifiers in subsequent device certificates in a certification path. EXAMPLE: Name constraints are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name subtrees. Subtrees of an object identifier based M2M Device ID name space are represented by an otherName field with: "type-ID" set to the M2M Device Indication ID (clause H.2.1 ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) arc of the applicable object identifier M2M Device ID name space; and "value" set to set to the remainder of the object identifier identifying the subtree. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.5 Profile for AE-ID Certificates and their Certificate Chains | AE-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 200 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The full URI representation of the AE-ID shall be included in the subjectAltName extension. The certificate used to sign the AE-ID certificate shall include nameConstraints satisfied by the hostname part of the full URI representation of the AE-ID. AE-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.6 Profile for FQDN Certificates and their Certificate Chains | FQDN Certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. An FQDN Certificate shall include the FQDN of the subject M2M Enrolment Function in the subjectAltName extension. FQDN Certificates shall not include wildcards. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.7 Profile for CSE-ID Certificates and their Certificate Chains | CSE-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. The subjectAltName extension shall include the public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. CSE-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.1.8 Profile for Node-ID Certificates and their Certificate Chains | Node-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3. The subjectAltName extension shall include the Node-ID as defined in ETSI TS 118 101 [1]. Node-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.2 Public Key Identifiers | The public key identifier for a raw public key certificate shall calculated as described in section 2 of IETF RFC 6920 [40] using the SHA-256 hash algorithm. The public key identifier shall be generated using one of the sha-256-120, sha-256-128 or sha-256 hash algorithms specified in IETF RFC 6920 [40]. It is recommended that the public key identifier be as long as practical within the deployment constraints. The trusted public key identifier (received during Association Configuration or Bootstrap Instruction Configuration) is matched against the raw public key certificate (received during the Security Handshake) using the following procedure: 1) A check digest value is computed according to section 2 of IETF RFC 6920 [40] using the hash algorithm identified in the trusted public key identifier. 2) The check digest value is compared against the digest value encoded in the trusted public key identifier. If the values are identical then the raw public key certificate matches the trusted public key identifier. Otherwise, the raw public key certificate does not match the trusted public key identifier. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.3 Support Requirements for each Public Key Certificate Flavour | Table 10.1.3-1 lists, for each of the various types of entity (Field Domain CSE, Field Domain AE, IN-CSE, IN-AE, M2M Authentication Function and M2M Enrolment Function), the flavour of certificate that may be issued to the entity and the flavour of other entity's certificates that the entity is required to be able to process. In this table "O" indicates optional, "M" indicates Mandatory, "CA" indicates that the option is required if the entity supports the certificate-based security association establishment framework, "CB" indicates conditional on the entity supporting certificate-based Remote Security Provisioning framework. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 201 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 10.1.3-1: Applicability of certificate flavours issued to an entity and flavours of other entity's certificates that the entity is required to be able to process Entity Flavour of certificate may be issued to entity Flavour of other entity's certificates that the entity is recommended to be able to process. Ra w Devic e CSE- ID AE-ID Node -ID FQDN Raw Devic e CSE- ID AE-ID Node-ID FQDN Field Domain CSE O O O - O - CA CA CA CA CA CB Field Domain AE O O - O O - CA CA CA - CA CB IN-CSE O - O - - - CA CA CA CA CA - IN-AE O - - O - - CA - CA - - - MAF - - - - - M - - - - - M MEF - - - - - M CB CB - - CB M Mutual authentication between remote management servers and remote management clients is not considered in the present document. Where supported, Remote Security Administration may be used to provision the certificates. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.1.4 Certificate Signing Request Profile | A Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is a signed object provided to the Certificate Provisioning server (EST Server or SCEP Server) to request the issuing of a certificate. Certificate Provisioning as specified in clause 8.3.6 may be used to issue a certificate to an Node, CSE or AE. The certificate signing request shall include: • the subjectPublicKeyInfo: the public key and the algorithm with which key is used; • extensions: - subjectAltName: This field shall contain the AE-ID, CSE-ID or Node-ID using the name type defined for each type of certificate in clauses 10.1.1.5, 10.1.1.7 and 10.1.1.8. The certificate signing request may include additional fields and extensions provided by the Certificate Provisioning server, for example using the EST Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attributes Request described in section 2.6 of IETF RFC 7030 [59]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.2 TLS and DTLS Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.2.1 TLS and DTLS Versions | Where TCP payloads are to be secured, TLS v1.2 [5] shall be used. Where UDP payloads are to be secured, DTLS v1.2 [6] shall be used, noting that the DTLS v1.2 ciphersuites are identical to the TLS v1.2 ciphersuites. All implementations shall support the Server Name Indication (SNI) to indicate their authority in the SNI HostName field as defined in section 3 of IETF RFC 6066 [44]. This is needed so that when a host that acts as a virtual server for multiple Authorities receives a new TLS or DTLS connection, it knows which keys to use for the TLS or DTLS session. (D)TLS Clients on any Node and (D)TLS Servers on MNs shall support at least one of the TLS ciphersuites indicated in clause 10.2.2 or clause 10.2.3. NOTE: (D)TLS Servers on MN need to support the TLS ciphersuites for those (D)TLS clients they are expected to interact with. (D)TLS Servers on INs shall support all of the TLS ciphersuites indicated in clauses 10.2.2 and 10.2.3. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 202 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 10.2.2 TLS and DTLS Ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-Based Security Frameworks The following Security Frameworks: • Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework; • MAF-Based Security Association Establishment Framework; • Pre-Shared Key Remote Security Provisioning Framework; • GBA-Based Remote Security Provisioning Framework; shall use one of the key exchange algorithms defined in IETF RFC 4279 [15]. TLS implementations in entities supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following TLS ciphersuite: • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (IETF RFC 5487 [42]). DTLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following ciphersuites • TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 (IETF RFC 6655 [31]). The security considerations of section 7 of IETF RFC 4279 [15] apply. In particular, applications should carefully weigh whether or not they need Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and select an appropriate ciphersuite (section 7.1 of IETF RFC 4279 [15]). 10.2.3 TLS and DTLS Ciphersuites for Certificate-Based Security Frameworks The following Security Frameworks: • Certificate-Based Security Association Establishment Framework; • Certificate-Based Security Bootstrap Framework; shall use the standard TLS handshake (IETF RFC 5246 [5]) with the ECDHE_ECDSA Key Exchange (IETF RFC 8422 [43]). TLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following ciphersuite: • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, IETF RFC 5289 [32]. TLS implementations may support RSA keys (2048 bits or more): • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, IETF RFC 5289 [32]. DTLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following TLS ciphersuite: • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, IETF RFC 7251 [45]. DTLS implementations may support RSA keys (2048 bits or more): • TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, IETF RFC 7525 [80]. Implementations supporting these security frameworks shall support authenticating other entities using all available public key certificate flavours (see clause 8.1.2.1): • Raw public key certificate: using the mechanism specified in IETF RFC 7250 [37], Implementation shall support receiving and processing raw public keys compliant with section 9.1.3.2 in IETF RFC 7252 [i.21]. • All other certificates: X.509 certificates including device hardware identifier. Implementation shall support receiving and processing raw public keys compliant with section 9.1.3.3 in IETF RFC 7252 [i.21]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 203 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3 Key Export and Key Derivation Details | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.1 TLS Key Export Details | TLS Key Export Details for Enrolment Key Following successful TLS authentication between the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function, see clause 8.3.1.2, the Enrolment Key (Ke) and RelativeKeID are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function by applying TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M- Bootstrap" and length 48. The Enrolment Key (Ke) is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while RelativeKeID is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. TLS Key Export Details for M2M Secure Connection Key Following successful TLS authentication between the Entity A and the M2M Authentication Function (MAF), see clause 8.8.2.7, the M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) and the M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier (KcID) are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Entity A and the MAF by applying TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M-Connection" and length 48. The M2M Secure Connection Key (Kc) is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier (KcID) is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. TLS Key Export Details for pairwiseE2EKey Following successful TLS authentication between the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point and ESCertKE Terminating End- Point, see clause 8.7.2.2, the pairwiseE2EKey and pairwiseE2EKeyID are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Enrolee and M2M Enrolment Function by applying TLS Key Export (IETF RFC 5705 [18]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M-ESCertKE" and length 48. The pairwiseE2EKey is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while pairwiseE2EKeyID is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.2 Derivation of Master Credential from Enrolment Key | This clause describes the details when generating a Master Credential (Km) from an Enrolment Key (Ke) in Security Bootstrap Frameworks. The following information shall be used when generating Km from Ke: • the value of the Enrolment Key (Ke); • the M2M Authentication Function Identifier (MAF-ID) shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19] and apply Normalization Form KC (NFKC) as specified in [20]. The value of Km shall be generated as: Km:= HMAC-SHA-256(Ke, "oneM2M Enrolment Key to Master Credential derivation" || MAF-ID), where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in IETF RFC 2104 [33]. 10.3.3 Derivation of Provisioned Secure Connection Key from Enrolment Key This clause describes the details when generating a Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa) from an Enrolment Key (Ke) in Remote Provisioning Frameworks. The following information shall be used when generating Kpsa from Ke: • The value of the Enrolment Key (Ke). • Enrolee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID (Enrolee-B-ID), which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19] and apply Normalization Form KC (NFKC) as specified in [20]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 204 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 The value of Kpsa shall be generated as: • Kpsa:= HMAC-SHA-256(Ke, "oneM2M Enrolment Key to Provisioned Secure Connection Key derivation" || Enrolee-B-ID); where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in IETF RFC 2104 [33]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.4 Generating KeID | The KeID value shall be formed as: • KeID = hexBinary(RelativeKeID)@MEF-FQDN: where: • hexBinary(RelativeKeID) denotes the hexadecimal representation of the binary value of RelativeKeID; and • MEF-FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M Enrolment Function. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.5 Generating Key Identifier for the MAF Security Framework | The Key Identifier value shall be formed as: • Key Identifier = RelativeKeyID@MAF-FQDN; where: • RelativeKeyID = hexBinary(KcID) denotes the hexadecimal representation of the binary value of KcID; and • MAF-FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M Authentication Function. 10.3.6 Derivation of End-to-End Master Key from Provisioned Secure Connection Key |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.6.1 Introduction | This clause describes the details when generating an End-to-End Master Key (Ke2e_master) based on a successful establishment of security association between a Source ESF End-Point and Target ESF End-Point using a Remote Security Provisioning Framework as described in clause 8.3. The mechanisms to generate the End-to-End Master Key then uses a key extraction process using the Provisioned Secure Connection Key, (Kpsa). The following information shall be used when generating Ke2e from Kpsa: • The value of the Provisioned Secure Connection Key (Kpsa). • Source ESF End-Point B's CSE-ID or AE-ID (Source ESF End-Point-B-ID), which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19] and applying Normalization Form KC (NFKC) as specified in [20]. The value of Ke2e_master shall be generated as: • Ke2e_master = HMAC-Hash (Salt, Kpsa). NOTE: In the case of Source-generated credentials, a random value generated by the Source ESF End-Point is used instead of the Kpsa in order to generate the Ke2e_master. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.6.2 Key Extraction and Expansion of End-to-End Master Key | The End-to-End Master Key (Ke2e_master) is used to generate the security protection-specific keys. The Key Extraction and Expansion parameters along with the scope are used to generate the various keys. The Key extraction and expansion is performed according to the specifications defined in IETF RFC 5869 [48]. A list of possible End-to- End keys are shown in table 10.3.6.2-1. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 205 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Table 10.3.6.2-1: End-to-End Security Keys Security Protection Symmetric Keys Generated Message Authenticity (Primitive) Ke2e_msg_auth Message Confidentiality (Primitive) Ke2e_msg_conf Integrity of Data (Attribute) Ke2e_att_auth Confidentiality of Data (Attribute) Ke2e_att_conf The End-to-End security protection keys that are generated by performing a key expansion of the Ke2e_master using mechanisms specified in IETF RFC 5869 [48]. Using the generated end-to-end master key, the associated end-to-end message authentication and or end-to-end message confidentiality keys and attribute keys are generated in the following manner: • T(0) = empty string (zero length) • End-to-End Message Authenticity Key (Ke2e_msg_auth) = T(1) = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e_master, T(0) | "E2E Message Authentication Key"| 0x01) • End-to-End Message Confidentiality Key (Ke2e_msg_conf) = T(2) = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e_master, T(1)| "E2E Message Confidentiality Key"|0x02) • End-to-End Attribute Authenticity Key (Ke2e_att_auth) = T(3) = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e_master, T(2)| "E2E Attribute Authenticity Key"|0x03) • End-to-End Attribute Confidentiality Key (Ke2e_att_conf) = T(4) = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e_master, T(3)| "E2E Attribute Confidentiality Key"|0x04) NOTE 1: If AEAD algorithms are used, where only a single key is used, then either the Ke2e_msg_auth or the Ke2e_msg_conf key may be derived and used for both message authenticity as well as message confidentiality. NOTE 2: The Target ESF End-Point can be provisioned with all the required keys or can be provisioned only with the Master End-to-End key (Ke2e_master) and the associated cryptographic parameters (e.g. labels, random values) which are then used by the Target ESF End-Point in order to generate the keys required for ESPrim and ESData. 10.3.7 Derivation of Usage-Constrained Symmetric Keys from Enrolment Key This clause describes the details when generating a usage-constrained symmetric key from an Enrolment Key (Ke) in Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks. The following information shall be used: • The value of the Enrolment Key (Ke). • The Security Usage Identifier (SUID) applicable for the usage of the symmetric key. • Enrolee Target's Identifier (Enrolment-Target-ID), which is an FQDN which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in IETF RFC 3629 [19] and apply Normalization Form KC (NFKC) as specified in [20]: - If the Enrolment Target is a CSE or AE, then the FQDN representation of the Absolute CSE-ID or Absolute AE-ID shall be used. The value of the usage-constrained symmetric key shall be generated as: • HMAC-SHA-256(Ke, "oneM2M Enrolment Key to Usage-Constrained Symmetric Key derivation" || SUID || Enrolment-Target-ID); where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in IETF RFC 2104 [33]. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 206 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.8 sessionESPrimKey Derivation Algorithms | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.8.1 Introduction | The sessionESPrimKey is used in End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim), and derived from pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject, originatorESPrimRandObject, see clause 8.4.2. Clause 10.3.8 specifies the algorithms used for derivation of the sessionESPrimKey used in ESPrim. The available algorithms are listed in table 10.3.8.1-1. Table 10.3.8.1-1: sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithms Algorithm Mandatory/Optional Clause HMAC-SHA256 M 10.3.8.2 |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.3.8.2 HMAC-SHA256 sessionESPrimKey Derivation Algorithm | The sessionESPrimkey is derived as sessionESPrimKey = HMAC-SHA256 (pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject || originatorESPrimRandObject || "oneM2M HMAC-SHA256 sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithm"), where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in IETF RFC 2104 [33]. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.4 Credential-ID Details | The Credential-ID has two parts: • A type-ID part. The type-ID part is a positive integer defined by datatype sec:credIDTypeID. • A value part which contains a globally-unique identifier for the entity's credential. The value part may use the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '_', '-', and '@'. The Credential-ID is formed by concatenating the type part, the character '-' and the value part. NOTE: A Credential-ID is a globally unique identifier used to identify serviceSubscribedAppRule resources (ETSI TS 118 101 [1]) and identify credentials in security configuration information. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.5 KpsaID | The KpsaID shall be of the form: • KpsaID = Issuer_Relative_KpsaID@Issuer-FQDN; where: • Issuer_Relative_KpsaID is composed of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '_' and '-' characters. The issuer of KpsaID shall ensure that no two Kpsa have identical Issuer_Relative_KpsaID. • Issuer-FQDN is an FQDN representing the stakeholder that provisioned Kpsa. NOTE: This format for KpsaID allows the identity of the Issuer to be extracted from KpsaID. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.6 KmID Format | The KmID shall be of the form: • KmID = MAF_RELATIVE_KmID@MAF-FQDN; ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 207 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 where: • MAF_RELATIVE_KmID is composed of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '_' and '-' characters. The MAF_RELATIVE_KmID is not case sensitive. The MAF shall ensure that no two Km have identical MAF_RELATIVE_KmID. • MAF-FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M Authentication Function. NOTE: This format for KmID allows the identity of the M2M Authentication Function to be extracted from KmID. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 10.7 Enrolment Expiry | Enrolment Expiry is the life time to be applied for the key generated, i.e. Ke as part of the Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Key Remote Security Provisioning. Keys that are generated for establishing security associations between Enrolees and the Enrolment Targets (i.e. Km or Kpsa) based upon the enrolment key Ke will not be valid after the lifetime expiration of the enrolment credential Ke. Therefore at the maximum, the lifetime of Km or Kpsa should be set to the lifetime associated with Ke. Once the Enrolment Expiry is exceeded, the Enrolee has to re-initiate remote provisioning to re- generate keys as described in the Remote Security Provisioning Frameworks as described in clause 8.3.2.1. 11 Privacy Protection Architecture using Privacy Policy Manager（PPM) |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.1 Introduction | This clause provides an architecture for the Privacy Policy Manager (PPM). PPM is a distributed authorization privacy protection architecture using M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference and service's privacy policy. The PPM is a personal data management framework based on the M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preferences and creates access control information from policies agreed by a M2M Service Subscriber. The PPM protects M2M Service Subscriber's personal data from unauthorized parties and unauthorized collection. The PPM may be operated by the M2M Service Provider itself or another entity on behalf of the M2M Service Provider. If the M2M Service Provider provides M2M Service Subscriber's personal data to any third party, the M2M Service Provider needs to get the M2M Service Subscriber's consent. In case that the M2M Service Subscriber accepted a privacy policy which indicates provision to third party, the Service Provider could provide the personal data to third party. However, if the privacy policy did not include provision to third party, the Service Provider needs to update the privacy policy and get the M2M Service Subscriber's consent to it. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.2 Components of PPM | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.2.1 Privacy Preference and Privacy Policy | The PPM shall manage privacy preferences and privacy policies. • Privacy preference: - Privacy preference is M2M Service Subscriber's preference regarding the provision of his own personal data to third parties. - M2M Service Subscriber creates a M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference and registers it to the PPM. - List of privacy attributes is described in annex J. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 208 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 • Privacy policy: - Privacy policy describes a required personal data to provide a service to an M2M Service Subscriber by a M2M Service Provider. - A M2M Service Provider creates a privacy policy and registers it to the PPM. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.2.2 Functions of PPM | The PPM may comprise the following functions. • Sophisticated consent mechanism for matching a M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference with the ASP's privacy policy: - Privacy policy describes required personal data to provide a service to a M2M Service Subscriber by a M2M Service Provider. - When the M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to a service which is provided by a M2M Service Provider, the M2M Service Provider needs to get the M2M Service Subscriber's consent to the service's privacy policy. The PPM provides friendly consent mechanism for M2M Service Subscriber by comparing the privacy preference and the privacy policy. - This function is described in clause 11.4.1.2. • Functions of the Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Retrieval Point (PRP) for Distributed Authorization, management of AccessControlPolicy resources and Dynamic Authorization System (DAS) Server. - PDP: When an Originator requests personal data from a Hosting CSE which acts as PEP, the Hosting CSE requests access control decision from the PPM which acts as PDP. The PPM creates <authorizationDecision> from access control information that is created from policies agreed by M2M Service Subscriber and respond <authorizationDecision> to the Hosting CSE. Details of PDP and <authorizationDecision> are described in the present document, clause 7.5.2 and ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 9.6.42, respectively. - PRP: When an Originator requests personal data from a Hosting CSE which acts as PDP, the Hosting CSE requests access control policies from the PPM which acts as PRP. The PPM creates <authorizationPolicy> based on policies agreed by M2M Service Subscribers and respond <authorizationPolicy> to the Hosting CSE. Details of PRP and <authorizationPolicy> are described in the present document, clause 7.5.3 and ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 9.6.43, respectively. - Management of <accessControlPolicy> resources hosted by CSEs: When an Originator requests personal data from a Hosting CSE, and this CSE uses locally stored <accessControlPolicy> resource to derive the access control decision using the mechanism described in clause 7.1, the PPM may act as an IN-AE which generates and deploys the required <accessControlPolicy> resources on the respective CSE and assigns appropriate accessControlPolicyID attributes to resources created by the M2M Service Subscriber. - Dynamic Authorization System: Direct Dynamic Authorization When an Originator requests personal data from an Hosting CSE, the Hosting CSE requests dynamicACPInfo or <token> from the PPM. The PPM creates dynamicACPInfo or <token> based on policies agreed by M2M Service Subscribers and respond dynamicACPInfo or <token> to the Hosting CSE. Detail of Direct Dynamic Authorization is described in the present document, clause 7.3.2.2. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 209 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 Details of dynamicACPInfo and <token> are described in ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clauses 9.6.40 and clause 9.6.39, respectively. Indirect Dynamic Authorization: Before an Originator requests personal data from a Hosting CSE, the Originator requests <token> or tokenID from the PPM. The PPM creates <token> based on policies agreed by M2M Service Subscribers and respond <token> or tokenID to the Originator. Then, the Originator requests personal data from Hosting CSE with <token> or tokenID. Detail of Indirect Dynamic Authorization is described in the present document, clause 7.3.2.3 - Traceability of personal data usage: - PPM shall store the access log that records which Originator accessed which kind of collected data. - This function is for further study of oneM2M, but this function can be implemented using components that are defined in oneM2M. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3 Privacy Policy Management Architecture | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.1 Introduction | The PPM manages M2M Service Subscriber's preference and service's privacy policy of an M2M Application Service Provider. Basically, one M2M Application Service Provider have one PPM in infrastructure domain and manage status of M2M Service Subscriber consent in the PPM. There are four procedures in the use of the PPM. This clause explains relationships between steps in the PPM scenario and components of oneM2M: 1) A M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to services provided by the M2M Service Provider. 2) The M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to a service offered by an ASP. This may happen concurrently with step 1. 3) An AE (IN-AE or field domain AE) requests personal data that are stored in a Hosting CSE. 4) The M2M Service Subscriber checks the access log of his/her own personal data and requests the deletion of the collected personal data from the Hosting CSE. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.2 Involved Entities | • M2M Service Subscriber: - An M2M Service Subscriber can make use of M2M services by subscribing to a service of an ASP which provides functions that control access to information handled by the M2M Service Provider. - When an M2M Service Subscriber subscribes to service provided by an ASP, the M2M Service Subscriber becomes a data subject. • Personal Data: - Personal data is information that can be used on its own, or with other information to identify an individual to form Personally Identifiable Information (PII). - A Hosting CSE collects and stores personal data. - Examples of personal data: Sensor data, Electrical power consumption, Operating state of air conditioner, etc. • ADN-AE, ASN-AE: - An ADN-AE or ASN-AE produces various kinds of data, such as sensor data. An ADN-AE or ASN-AE may also request data from resource hosting CSEs. ETSI ETSI TS 118 103 V4.7.1 (2026-03) 210 oneM2M TS-0003 version 4.7.1 Release 4 - The ADN-AE or ASN-AE sends the data to a Hosting CSE such as ASN-CSE, MN-CSE or IN-CSE • Hosting CSE: - If the Hosting CSE use the PPM as PDP, the Hosting CSE should act as Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). - If the Hosting CSE use the PPM as PRP, the Hosting CSE should act as PDP. - If the Hosting CSE use the PPM as DAS, the Hosting CSE should configure <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> resources linked to the requested resource: <dynamicAuthorizationConsultation> resource is described in ETSI TS 118 101 [1], clause 9.6.40. • Application Service Provider: - An Application Service Provider provides services to an M2M Service Subscriber who joins the M2M Service Provider. - An Application Service Provide requests personal data from an M2M Service Provider in order to provide services. • M2M Service Provider: - M2M Portal: An M2M portal provides a M2M Service Subscriber Interface through which services provided by an M2M Platform may be managed. A M2M Service Subscriber accesses the M2M portal to subscribe to a service offered by an ASP. • PPM: - The PPM may include functionality for an automated procedure (not defined by oneM2M) to create access control policies and to deploy these on CSEs according to the policies and the preferences agreed by a M2M Service Subscriber. - If the PPM acts as PDP or PRP, it requires CSE functionality. If the PPM acts as DAS Server, the PPM requires AE functionality. - The PPM may provide a M2M Service Subscriber Interface via a PPM portal. A M2M Service Subscriber may access the PPM portal to configure the M2M Service Subscriber's privacy preference. The PPM portal is out of scope of oneM2M. |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3 Management Flow in PPM Architecture | |
e3770a6fad9f83b929c514a00b43c6fd | 118 103 | 11.3.3.0 Introduction | This clause describes the case where a M2M Service Provider stores personal data. |
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