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2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.4 Mercurial signatures | Mercurial signatures [i.74] cater for privacy preserving schemes, such as anonymous credentials, delegatable anonymous credentials, and related applications. They allow a signature s0 on a message m0 under a public key pk0 to be transformed into a signature s1 on an equivalent message m1 under an equivalent public key ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.5 Pointcheval-Sanders Multi-Signatures (PS-MS) | Pointcheval-Sanders Multi-Signatures (PS-MS) [i.223] is another multi-message signature scheme based on Bilinear Pairings with efficient Zero Knowledge Proofs. Its construction has some properties that make it preferable to alternatives like BBS+ in some special settings like for example threshold signing. PS-MS signat... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.6 ISO standardisation of multi-message signature schemes | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.6.1 ISO/IEC 20008 - Anonymous digital signatures | The ISO/IEC 20008 series [i.184] specify anonymous digital signature mechanisms (algorithms) as follows: • ISO/IEC 20008-1 [i.184] specifies a general model with principles, entities, processes, and requirements for anonymous digital signature mechanisms. • ISO/IEC 20008-2 [i.184] specifies anonymous digital signature ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.6.2 ISO/IEC 24843 - Privacy-preserving attribute-based credentials | The ISO/IEC Preliminary Work Item (PWI) 24843 [i.185] was approved in March 2025 and a new project on Attribute- Based Credentials has been launched (ISO/IEC 24843 [i.185]). This future standard will specify several attribute-based credential (ABC) mechanisms including those of the PS and BBS/BBS+ families. In other wo... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.6.3 ISO/IEC CD 27565 - Guidelines on privacy preservation based on ZKP | In addition to the aforementioned ISO standards on anonymous digital signatures and the PWI on privacy-preserving attribute-based credentials, ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 are also working on the common draft ISO/IEC CD 27565 [i.191] "Guidelines on privacy preservation based on zero knowledge proofs". This draft document provid... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.4.7 Extensions of multi-messages signature schemes | The multi-messages signature schemes described in clauses 4.4.1 to 4.4.5 are based on the classic approach for building (Q)EAAs from a set of advanced cryptographic mechanisms such as BBS+, CL or PS-MS signatures. While this approach does support selective disclosure, it comes with the cost of concealing the undisclose... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5 Proofs for arithmetic circuits (programmable ZKPs) | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.1 General | 4. |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.1 General | Arithmetic circuits can represent any computational logic. Consequently, proofs for arithmetic circuits are "programmable ZKPs": As every statement can be translated into an arithmetic circuit, a ZKP for any statement can be constructed. The programmable ZKPs are often designed and implemented as zk-SNARKs, which are f... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2 zk-SNARKs | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.1 Introduction to zk-SNARKs | The abbreviation zk-SNARK stands for "Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge", and is a collaborative term for a specific category of ZKP protocols. At the time of writing (in August 2025), eighteen zk- SNARK protocols have been published by cryptographic researchers; see clause A.4 for a list of... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.2 Trusted setup of zk-SNARKs | The trusted setup of a zk-SNARK involves three algorithms KeyGen, CP, CV as illustrated in Figure 8. Figure 8: Overview of zk-SNARK with trusted setup The key generator KeyGen takes a secret parameter sd (secret data), also called "toxic waste", and the program C for which correct execution should be proven (the statem... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.3 Transparent setup zk-SNARKs | In a transparent (public) setup of zk-SNARK there is no need for a trusted setup. Yet, to achieve succinctness, a computationally and memory-intensive preprocessing step is still required. EXAMPLE: zk-SNARK protocols with transparent (public) setups are SuperSonic [i.198], Hyrax [i.250] and Halo [i.31]. For a complete ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.4 Cryptography behind zk-SNARKs | The cryptography that underpin the zk-SNARK schemes is highly complex and differs from protocol to protocol. ETSI ETSI TR 119 476-1 V1.3.1 (2025-08) 65 In brief, the zk-SNARK protocols can be constructed based on the following cryptographic building blocks [i.222]: • Fiat-Shamir Heuristics, which in turn can be broken ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.5 Implementations | As regards to implementations, zk-SNARK was implemented in 2016 for the blockchain protocol ZeroCash for cryptocurrency ZCash, for which zk-SNARK caters for four different transaction types: private, shielding, deshielding, and public. Hence, zk-SNARK allows the users to determine how much data to be shared with the pu... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.2.6 Cryptographic analysis | Whether a zk-SNARK protocol is quantum-safe or not depends on the underlying cryptographic algorithms, as described in table A.4. The zk-SNARK protocols Aurora [i.20], Ligero [i.7], Spartan [i.200], and Virgo [i.273] are considered as plausible quantum-safe (related to soundness), whilst the others in table A.4 are not... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3 zk-STARKs | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3.1 Introduction to zk-STARK | The abbreviation zk-STARK stands for "Zero-Knowledge Succinct Transparent Arguments of Knowledge", and is a collaborative term for a specific category of Zero-Knowledge Proof protocols. The zk-STARK protocols fulfil the criteria of a Zero-Knowledge Proof system, which enables one party (the prover) to prove to another ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3.2 Setup of zk-STARK | Unlike the zk-SNARK frameworks, which in several cases require a trusted setup, the zk-STARK protocols are designed to be used without a trusted setup. Hence, the zk-STARK protocols are considered to be both transparent and universal: a transparent protocol is defined as it does not require any trusted setup and uses p... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3.3 Cryptography behind zk-STARK | The cryptography behind the zk-STARK schemes is based on Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOP) with scalable proofs. A Zero-Knowledge system based on IOP (ZK-IOP) [i.17] is a common generalization of the Interactive Proofs (IP), Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCP) and Interactive PCP (IPCP) models that were previously i... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3.4 Implementations | While the zk-STARKs developed by StarkWare are a prominent instantiation, they have been criticised for relatively low security (Starkware's construction amplifies security by a proof of work [i.241]) - among other reasons because the concrete choice of security level is based on an additional unproven conjecture to al... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.3.5 Cryptographic analysis | It makes sense to consider zk-STARKs as a special category of zk-SNARKs because they fulfil the same fundamental purpose - namely, enabling succinct ("scalable"), non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs - but with a distinct set of design trade-offs, particularly in terms of cryptographic assumptions, proof system archit... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 4.5.4 ZK Bulletproofs | In their paper, "Bulletproofs: Short Proofs for Confidential Transactions and More" [i.38], Bünz et al. (2017) introduce a non-interactive ZKP protocol aimed to address the issue of transaction size and verification time in existing privacy preserving protocols. Specifically aiming to improve upon proposals for confide... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5 (Q)EAA formats with selective disclosure | 5.1 General The present clause provides an analysis of a set of formats for selective disclosure. The topics for the analysis of each selective disclosure (Q)EAA formats are: • Signature scheme(s) used for selective disclosure and optionally unlinkability, when applicable with references to clause 4. ETSI ETSI TR 119 4... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.2 Atomic (Q)EAA formats | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.2.1 Introduction to atomic (Q)EAA formats | The concept of atomic (Q)EAAs was introduced in clause 4.2. There are numerous (Q)EAA formats that can be issued with a single claim, so in principle a selective disclosure scheme based on atomic claims can be designed for a variety of types of (Q)EAA formats (ICAO DTCs, IETF JWTs, W3C Verifiable Credentials, X.509 cer... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.2.2 PKIX X.509 attribute certificate with atomic attribute | The PKIX X.509 Attribute Certificate (AC) profile is specified in IETF RFC 5755 [i.158]. An attribute certificate may contain attributes that specify group membership, role, security clearance, or other authorization attributes associated with the user. The attribute certificate is a signed set of attributes, although ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.2.3 W3C Verifiable Credential with atomic attribute | As a preparation for enrolment of W3C Verifiable Credentials with atomic attributes, the EUDI Wallet would need to be equipped with Credential templates for the W3C Verifiable Credentials. The W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1 [i.264] distinguishes between a Credential as "a set of one or more claims made by a... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3 Formats of (Q)EAAs with salted attribute hashes | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3.1 General | The general concept of selective disclosure based on salted attribute hashes is described in clause 4.3. As regards to credentials within this category, there are several noteworthy formats. The formats that are described more in-depth in the present document are: • IETF SD-JWT, which is further described in clause 5.3... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3.2 IETF SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3.2.1 IETF SD-JWT | To support selective disclosure in JWT or JWS, IETF has specified Selective Disclosure JSON Web Token (SD-JWT) [i.155]. The specification introduces two primary data formats, an SD-JWT which is a composite structure consisting of a JWS plus optionally disclosures, and an SD-JWT+KB which is a composite structure of an S... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3.2.2 IETF SD-JWT VC | While SD-JWT defines the general container format, SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC) defines a data format and validation rules to express JSON based Credentials based on SD-JWT. This is a usual pattern where a general container format is defined (e.g. JWT) and based on that container format concrete data... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.3.3 ISO/IEC 18013-5 Mobile Security Object (MSO) | The Mobile Security Object (MSO) is specified in clause 9.1.2.4 of ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] and contains the following attributes encoded in a CDDL [i.170] structure: • digestAlgorithm: Message digest algorithm • valueDigests: Array of digests of all data elements • deviceKey: Device key in COSE_Key as defined in IETF R... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4 Multi-message signature (Q)EAA formats | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.1 W3C VC Data Model with ZKP | The W3C Verifiable Credentials (VC) Data Model v1.1 [i.264] contains clause 5.8 "Zero-Knowledge Proofs", which describes a data model that supports selective disclosure with the use of Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) mechanisms. The W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model states two requirements for Verifiable Credentials whe... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.2 W3C VC Data Integrity with BBS Cryptosuite | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.2.1 W3C BBS Cryptosuite v2023 | W3C BBS Cryptosuite v2023 [i.267] is an experimental draft specification, which defines a set of cryptographic suites for the purpose of creating, verifying and deriving proofs for the IRTF CFRG BBS [i.177] draft signature scheme that specifies BBS+ (see clause 4.4.2.4). The BBS+ signatures are compatible with any pair... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.2.2 W3C VC Data Integrity with ISO standardized BBS04/BBS+ | In the present clause it is analysed whether the ISO/IEC standardization efforts of BBS04/BBS+ (see ISO/IEC 20008-2 [i.184], ISO/IEC 24843 [i.185] and ISO/IEC CD 27565 [i.191], clause 4.4.6) are compatible with W3C BBS Cryptosuite v2023 and W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Integrity v1.1. ETSI ETSI TR 119 476-1 V1.3.1 (... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.3 W3C Data Integrity ECDSA Cryptosuites v1.0 | The W3C "Data Integrity ECDSA Cryptosuites v1.0" [i.256] specification describes a data integrity cryptosuite for use when generating a digital signature using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The data integrity cryptosuites are in conformance with the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Integrity [i... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.4 Hyperledger AnonCreds (format) | The Hyperledger AnonCreds [i.131] credentials are JSON-formatted according to public AnonCreds objects, which in turn are defined by Schemas, CredDefs, Revocation Registry Definitions and Rev_Reg_Entrys. These objects are published by the issuers to repositories called Verifiable Data Registries (VDRs), which are acces... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.4.5 Cryptographic analysis | The maturity of W3C Verifiable Credentials can be considered as high, given the wide deployment of issued W3C Verifiable Credentials. However, BBS+, CL signatures and ECDSA are not secure against quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms [i.244] (see also clause 9), and they are additionally not standardized by NIST in the... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.5 JSON container formats | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.5.1 IETF JSON WebProof (JWP) | The JOSE [i.152] standard is a widely adopted container format for JSON-formatted Keys (JWK), Signatures (JWS), and Encryption (JWE). For example, JWTs with JOSE-containers are used by the OpenID Connect standard and by W3C's Verifiable Credentials. However, JOSE is not designed to cater for the growing number of selec... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.5.2 W3C JSON Web Proofs For Binary Merkle Trees | In hash-based cryptography, the Merkle signature scheme is a digital signature scheme based on Merkle trees and one-time signatures such as the Lamport signature scheme. It was developed by Ralph Merkle in the late 1970s and is an alternative to traditional digital signatures such as DSA or RSA. An advantage of the Mer... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 5.5.3 JSON Web Zero Knowledge (JWZ) | JSON Web Zero-knowledge (JWZ) [i.141] is an open standard for representing messages proven by zero-knowledge technology. A JWZ message consists of three parts: • Header - defines the features of the JWZ token. • Payload message - contains the message that will be shared with the relying party (verifier). • Signature - ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6 Selective disclosure systems and protocols | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.1 General | The present clause provides an analysis of a set of systems and protocols for selective disclosure. The topics for the analysis of each selective disclosure protocol are: • Signature scheme(s) used for selective disclosure and optionally Zero-Knowledge Proofs, when applicable with references to clause 4. • (Q)EAA forma... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.2 Atomic attribute (Q)EAA presentation protocols | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.2.1 PKIX X.509 attribute certificates with single attributes | An access control system based on PKIX X.509 certificates with atomic attributes is illustrated in Figure 10. ETSI ETSI TR 119 476-1 V1.3.1 (2025-08) 79 Figure 10: Overview of attribute certificate authorization First, the system is configured by a Certification Authority (CA) that issues a PKIX X.509 public key certif... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.2.2 VC-FIDO for atomic (Q)EAAs | Another example of a protocol for selective disclosure based on atomic (Q)EAAs is the VC-FIDO [i.56] integration that was invented at Kent University. The used atomic (Q)EAA format is W3C Verifiable Credential, which is described in clause 5.2.3. In order to issue the atomic W3C Verifiable Credentials to an EUDI Wallet... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.3 Salted attribute hashes protocols | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.3.1 OpenAttestation (Singapore's Smart Nation) | OpenAttestation, which is part of Singapore's Smart Nation initiative and developed within the GovTech's Government Digital Services, is an open source framework for verifiable documents and transferable records. OpenAttestation allows a user to prove the existence and authenticity of a digital document. It makes use o... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.4 Multi-message signature protocols and solutions | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.4.1 Hyperledger AnonCreds (protocols) | The Hyperledger AnonCreds (Anonymous Credentials) specification [i.131] is based on the open source verifiable credential implementation of Hyperledger AnonCreds that has been in use since 2017. The Hyperledger AnonCreds software stack was initially implemented as a combination of the Hyperledger Aries [i.132] protocol... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.4.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) used with TPMs | Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic protocol which enables remote authentication of a trusted computer yet preserving the privacy of the user. ISO/IEC has standardized the DAA protocol in ISO/IEC 20008 [i.184]. The DAA protocol has been adopted by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in the Trusted Platf... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5 Proofs for arithmetic circuits solutions | 6.5.1 Anonymous (Q)EAAs from programmable ZKPs and existing digital identities |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.1.1 Overview | This category is based on the principle of deriving anonymous (Q)EAAs by combining existing digital identities (such as X.509 certificates) with zero-knowledge proofs generated by general-purpose ZKP schemes (such as zk-SNARKs). A generalized model of such systems is described in the paper "Bringing data minimization t... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.1.2 Setup phase | In the setup phase, the issuer generates the issuance key. This could for example be a PKIX CA that issues X.509 certificates, or a PKD compliant CA that issues ICAO eMRTDs. The credential format, revocation scheme, etc., are typically also specified and implemented in this phase. The digital wallet is provided with a ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.1.3 Issuance phase | During the issuance phase the digital wallet generates a key-pair and submits the public key in a credential request to the issuer. The issuer creates and signs the credential, for example an X.509 certificate, and returns it to the digital wallet where it is installed. The issuance phase can for example be performed a... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.1.4 Proof phase | The proof phase is initiated by the verifier, who submits a proof request (including a nonce) to the digital wallet. The user selects the credentials to be used for verification, and the digital wallet runs the verification algorithm using the locally stored credentials. The verification algorithm depends on the creden... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.2 Cinderella: zk-SNARKs to verify the validity of X.509 certificates | The Cinderella project is described in the paper "Cinderella: Turning Shabby X.509 Certificates into Elegant Anonymous Credentials with the Magic of Verifiable Computation" [i.77] by Delignat-Lavaud et al. As indicated by the title, the project is an implementation of how to validate X.509 certificates locally at the d... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.3 zk-creds: zk-SNARKs used with ICAO passports | The zk-creds protocol was introduced in the paper "zk-creds: Flexible Anonymous Credentials from zkSNARKs and Existing Identity Infrastructure" [i.231] by Rosenberg et al. The zk-creds protocol uses programmable ZKPs in the form of zk-SNARKs to: • Remove the need for credential issuers to hold persistent signing keys. ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.4 Anonymous credentials from ECDSA | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.4.1 Overview of the research paper | Similar to the Cinderella research paper by Delignat-Lavaud [i.77], Matteo Frigo and Abhi Shelat have designed circuit-based (general-purpose) zero-knowledge proofs to construct proofs for the correct verification of digital certificates compatible with legacy formats and hardware-based key storage. Frigo's and Shelat'... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.4.2 Implementation and standardization | The results in the publication "Anonymous credentials from ECDSA" [i.113] can be applied on the ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] mobile driving license (ISO mDL). The ISO mDL presentation protocol is modified so that the user instead produces a zero-knowledge proof, which proves that their mdoc verifies with respect to the requ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.5 Crescent: Stronger Privacy for Existing Credentials | Similar to the work by Frigo and Shelat [i.113], Paquin et al. [i.219] argue that compatibility with legacy credentials is essential for fast adoption, that circuit-based ZKPs can achieve such compatibility, and that proving time remains the key challenge of circuit-based ZKPs, particularly on mobile phones. This work ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.5.6 Analysis of systems based on programmable ZKPs | The protocols that combine general-purpose ZKP schemes and digital identities provide some valuable characteristics: • The existing digital identity infrastructures can be re-used as is, more specifically the eIDAS2 framework of X.509 certificates. This covers secure hardware for issuers' signing keys, secure hardware ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6 Anonymous attribute based credentials systems | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6.1 Idemix (Identity Mixer) | The Idemix (Identity Mixer) technology [i.136] was invented by IBM® Research in 2008. The Idemix system caters for strong authentication that is privacy preserving based on Attribute Based Credentials (ABC). In summary, the Idemix scheme contains two protocols: Issuing the credential to a user and presenting it when ac... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6.2 U-Prove | The U-Prove scheme is based on Attribute Based Credentials (ABC), which in turn relies upon Stefan Brand's cryptographic research on selective disclosure and blinded signature schemes in the book ''Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Certificates; Building in Privacy'' from 2000 [i.33]. Brands founded a c... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6.3 ISO/IEC 18370 (blind digital signatures) | The ISO/IEC 18370 series [i.183] standardize blind digital signature protocols. Whereas, ISO/IEC 18370-1:2016 describes an overview of blind digital signature solutions, ISO/IEC 18370-2:2016 specifies discrete logarithm based mechanisms. More specifically, section 8 of ISO/IEC 18370-2:2016 specifies a DLP-based blind s... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6.4 Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials (KVAC) | The anonymous credentials systems Idemix (clause 6.6.1) and U-Prove (clause 6.6.2) are based on public key primitives. A different approach, that is based on algebraic Message Authentication Codes (MACs) in prime-order groups, was proposed by Chase et al. in the paper "Algebraic MACs and keyed-verification anonymous cr... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.6.5 Fast IDentity Online with Anonymous Credentials (FIDO-AC) | The anonymous credential approaches presented above, with the exception of BBS#, are usually motivated by first considering anonymous credentials and then devising mechanisms to make them compatible with legacy credential formats and hardware, particularly for holder binding. Yeoh et al. have published the research pap... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7 ISO mobile driving license (ISO mDL) | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7.1 Introduction to ISO/IEC 18013-5 (ISO mDL) | The ISO mobile driving license (ISO mDL) is specified in the ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] standard, which on a high level can be divided in the device retrieval flow (see clause 6.7.2) and the server retrieval flows (see clause 6.7.3) for selective disclosure of the user's mdoc. ETSI ETSI TR 119 476-1 V1.3.1 (2025-08) 91 IS... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7.2 ISO/IEC 18013-5 (device retrieval flow) | The device retrieval flow is described in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181], clauses 6.3.2, 6.3.2.1 (as flow 1) and 6.3.2.4. The credential format is the mdoc, which contains the attributes about the user, in conjunction with the Mobile Security Object (MSO). The MSO is a signed object that contains a list of salted attribute ha... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7.3 ISO/IEC 18013-5 (server retrieval flows) | The server retrieval flows are described in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181], clause 9.2. The server retrieval flow can be initialized as a hybrid device/server process (see annex D.2.2) or as a server process (see annex D.2.3). Once the server retrieval flow has been initialized, it continues with either the WebAPI flow or the... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7.4 ISO/IEC 18013-7 (unattended flow) | ISO/IEC CD 18013-7 [i.182] draft standard extends ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] with the unattended flow, i.e. the online flow whereby an mdoc app connects directly to an mdoc reader that is hosted as a web server application. ISO/IEC CD 18013-7 [i.182] is backward compatible with the protocols specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.7.5 ISO/IEC 23220-4 (operational protocols) | ISO/IEC CD 23220-4 [i.187] is a draft specification describing operational (presentation) protocols for a digital wallet. The specification expands on ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] with reader engagement, internet online connections to a reader, and bridges to additional standards for user authorization such as OID4VP [i.214... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.8 OpenID for Verifiable Credentials (OpenID4VC) | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.8.1 OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI / OID4VCI) | OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance specifies an OAuth-protected API for the issuance of Verifiable Credentials of different formats. To enable secure digital credential issuance and provisioning across different platforms and providers, a standardized protocol is essential. The protocol provides support for diff... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.8.2 OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OpenID4VP / OID4VP) | OpenID for Verifiable Presentations is a mechanism to request and deliver presentations of digital credentials of different credential formats. OID4VP is built on top of OAuth2.0 and extends it by introducing a new return type called VP Token that serves as a container holding one or more presentations that a Wallet pr... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.8.3 OpenID4VC High Assurance Interoperability Profile (HAIP) | The OpenID4VC High Assurance Interoperability Profile (HAIP) defines a profile of the OID4VCI and OID4VP protocols and mdoc and SD-JWT VC credential formats. The aim of the profile is to define a subset of features and a set of mandatory requirements for those specifications to create interoperable implementations for ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.9 The Iden3 protocol | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.9.1 Introduction to the Iden3 protocol | Iden3 [i.139] has its origin in the development of Circom [i.68], which is a language to implement constraint systems for ZKPs, and SnarkJS, a library for generating and verifying zk-SNARKs based on the Groth16 proof system. Circom has been benchmarked in the report "Benchmarking ZK-Friendly Hash Functions and SNARK Pr... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.9.2 Cryptography behind the Iden3 protocol | The Iden3 protocol uses zk-SNARKs to conduct efficient verification for regular and blockchain (smart contract) applications completely removing the need for verifier to communicate with issuer to perform verification of zero-knowledge proofs of predicates and selective disclosure, as well as verification of credential... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 6.9.3 Implementation aspects of the Iden3 protocol | The implementation of PrivadoID / Billions Network leverages the tooling that was originally developed for a blockchain-based rollup, which also includes optimizations of the Rapidsnark assembly prover that has been extended from servers to mobile phone instruction sets to improve client-side proof generation performan... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.1 General implications | The purpose of clause 7 is to analyse the implications of selective disclosure and unlinkability on ETSI standards for (Q)EAAs and PIDs. More specifically, the (Q)EAA/PID credentials discussed in the following clauses 7.2 and 7.3 are scoped to ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] mdoc and SD-JWT, because these formats are explicitl... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2 Implications for mdoc with selective disclosure | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1 QTSP/PIDP issuing mdoc | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.1 General | The mdoc, as specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181], is composed by the the user's elements, the authentication key, and the Mobile Security Object (MSO) with a signed list of salted hash values of these elements. The MSO is a CBOR-encoded [i.170] object, which is signed by the issuer with a COSE-formatted signature [i.1... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.2 Certificate profiles | The IACA's trust anchor is a DER-encoded X.509 certificate that should be issued according to the certificate profile in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181], Annex B.1. ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181], Annex B.1.1 declares that all X.509 certificates are DER-encoded and specifies the generic certificate requirements on certificate extensi... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.3 Trusted Lists | According to article 22(1) of eIDAS [i.104], each EU Member State is required to publish a Trusted List (TL) with all QTSPs in that EU Member State. All information referred to in eIDAS article 22(3), including the location and signing certificates of the TLs, is compiled in the EU List Of Trusted Lists (LOTL). Further... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.4 Issuance of mdocs | An mdoc, which has been issued to the user's EUDI Wallet on a device, is essentially composed of the user's data elements and the MSO, which are associated with the mdoc authentication key (see clause 7.2.2). The data elements inside an mdoc consist of an unsigned list of the user's elements belonging to the nameSpace ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.5 Comparison with ETSI certificate profiles for Open Banking (PSD2) | ETSI TC ESI has specified certificate profiles and TSP policy requirements for Open Banking in the sector specific ETSI TS 119 495 [i.93]. The scope of ETSI TS 119 495 [i.93] is: • Specifies requirements for qualified certificates for electronic seals and website authentication, to be used by payment service providers ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.1.6 Mapping of mdoc and eIDAS2 terms | As discussed in clauses 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.5, there are several equivalences between the terms in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181] and the terms in eIDAS2 [i.103] and the ARF [i.71]. Table 1 provides a mapping of eIDAS2 and ARF terms with the syntax used in ISO/IEC 18013-5 [i.181]. Table 1: Mapping of eIDAS2/ARF and ISO/IEC 18013... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.2 EUDI Wallet mdoc authentication key | The mdoc authentication key is used to prevent cloning of the mdoc and to mitigate man in the middle attacks. The mdoc authentication key pair consists of a public and a private key denoted as (SDeviceKey.Priv, SDeviceKey.Pub). The mdoc authentication public key is stored as the DeviceKey element in the MSO, and the co... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.2.3 EUDI Wallet used with ISO mDL flows | How the EUDI Wallet can be used with the different types of ISO mDL flows is described in Annex D. ETSI ETSI TR 119 476-1 V1.3.1 (2025-08) 101 |
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