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2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.3 Implications for SD-JWT selective disclosure | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.3.1 Analysis of using SD-JWT as (Q)EAA format applied to eIDAS2 | An analysis of the IETF SD-JWT formats applied to an eIDAS2 context results in the following observations and recommendations: • The present document recommends using SD-JWT VC as a standalone attestation format where selective disclosure is required. When verifier unlinkability is required, it is possible to rely on a... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4 Feasibility of BBS+ and BBS# applied to eIDAS2 | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.1 General | The present clause provides an analysis of the feasibility of BBS+ and BBS# applied to eIDAS2. The BBS+ and BBS# schemes are of interest since they cater for issuer and verifier unlinkability, which could support privacy for a user's EUDI Wallet that shares selectively disclosed attributes. The BBS# scheme is of intere... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.2 Standardization of BBS+ and BBS# | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.2.1 Standardization of BBS+ | In order for BBS+ to be considered for the EUDI Wallet, it would have to be standardized by CEN, ETSI or ISO as declared in the EU regulation 1025/2012 [i.105]. As described in clause 4.4.6.1, a set of anonymous digital signatures schemes are specified in the ISO/IEC 20008 series [i.184]. More specifically, ISO/IEC 200... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.2.2 Standardization of BBS# | BBS# is currently being standardized by AFNOR (the French Standardization Association). Also note that a new standard on Attribute-Based Credentials has been launched by ISO/IEC SC 27 (ISO/IEC AWI 24843 - Information security - Attribute-Based Credentials). Orange and Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT) will be the ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.3 Feasibility of using BBS+ or BBS# with W3C VCDM and mdoc | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.3.1 BBS+ applied to W3C VCDM | The analysis in clause 5.4.2.2 concludes that if ISO/IEC 24843 [i.185] and/or ISO/IEC CD 27565 [i.191] will standardize BBS+ according to IRTF CFRG BBS, then W3C BBS Cryptosuite v2023 [i.267] can be enhanced to reference such an ISO standard. In such a scenario, the W3C Verifiable Credential Data Integrity 1.0 specific... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.3.2 BBS# applied to mdoc | BBS# can be made compatible with the ISO mDL device retrieval flow, for which selective disclosure is based on salted attribute digests. The use of BBS# on mdoc requires slight modifications to the BBS# issuance and selective disclosure protocols described in clause 4.4.3. A summary of how BBS# can be applied toMSO is ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.3.3 BBS# applied to W3C VCDM | BBS# is considered to be compatible with W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model (VCDM) v2.0, given the following requisites: • W3C VCDM v2.0 is compatible with BBS/BBS+ as declared in clause 7.4.3.1, and the credentials format can be preserved for BBS#. • W3C VCDM v2.0 leverages Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuite for proofs... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.4 Post-quantum considerations for BBS+ and BBS# | As discussed in clause 4.4.2.6, and as further elaborated on in clause 9, BBS+ multi-message signatures and disclosures that are generated in a pre-quantum world will remain confidential in a post-quantum world. As regards to BBS#, and as discussed in clause 4.4.3.4, the (Gap) q-SDH assumption is not quantum-safe, so a... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.5 Conclusions of using BBS+ and BBS# applied to eIDAS2 | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.5.1 Conclusions of applying BBS+ to eIDAS2 | An analysis of the BBS+ scheme applied to an eIDAS2 context results in the following observations and recommendations: • The BBS+ algorithm would need to be standardized according to ISO/IEC 24843 [i.185] in order to comply with the EU regulation 1025/2012 [i.105] on standardization. • A standardized profile of W3C BBS... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.4.5.2 Conclusions of applying BBS# to eIDAS2 | An analysis of the BBS# scheme applied to an eIDAS2 context results in the following observations and recommendations: • The BBS# algorithm would need to be standardized in order to comply with the EU regulation 1025/2012 [i.105] on standardization. • BBS# could be made compatible with the mdoc and SD-JWT formats, and ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.5.1 Background and existing solutions | As discussed in clause 6.5, there exist two implementations of ZKP schemes (zk-SNARKs) that are utilized for sharing selectively disclosed attributes and revocation status information. The Cinderella project (see clause 6.5.2) has integrated support for zk-SNARKs in TLS software libraries, which allows for Cinderella p... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.5.2 Extensions to EUDI Wallets, relying parties and protocols | In order for an EUDI Wallet to use zk-SNARKs with existing credentials (such as X.509 certificates), a circuit compiler (such as the Geppetto compiler) is needed to integrate the zk-SNARK client circuits into the EUDI Wallet. Furthermore, the authentication protocol (such as TLS) needs to be enhanced in order to genera... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.5.3 Conclusions of programmable ZKPs applied to eIDAS2 (Q)EAAs | An analysis of the ZKP scheme applied to (Q)EAAs, QCs or PIDs in an eIDAS2 context results in the following observations and recommendations: • The EUDI Wallets would need to be extended with programmable ZKP circuits and policy templates in order to generate pseudo-credentials with selected attributes of (Q)EAAs, QCs ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.6 Secure storage of PID/(Q)EAA keys in EUDI Wallet | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.6.1 General | The mdoc authentication key and SD-JWT holder binding keys should be protected in the device's Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or a Secure Element (SE). The user should be able to access the mdoc authentication key and SD-JWT holder binding key by authentication with a PIN-code or the use of biometrics. There exist... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.6.2 Key splitting technique (relevant for BBS#) | The theory behind the BBS# key splitting technique is described in clause 5.2 of "Making BBS Anonymous Credentials eIDAS 2.0 Compliant" [i.78]. The present clause analyzes how BBS# key splitting can be applied to the EUDI Wallet. The splitting technique of BBS# is similar to SECDSA except that the "blinded"/"randomized... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.7 The proportionality of privacy goals | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.7.1 General | The present clause examines the complexity costs and practical implications of key privacy goals, structured around the two principal events where privacy preservation is most relevant: issuance and presentation. It focuses on core privacy objectives (issuer and verifier unlinkability, selective disclosure, pseudonymit... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.7.2 Issuance | Issuance requires identity verification and Proof of Possession (PoP) of a hardware-protected key (the hardware protection is especially burdensome at LoA High). The PoP inherently links the attestation to the user's identity as the issuer knows who receives which attestation and when. Issuer unlinkability (assuming is... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.7.3 Presentation | Presentation differs from issuance in two main ways that impact privacy. First, user authentication does not necessarily reveal an identity to the verifier (in contrast to issuance where the issuer identifies the user prior to issuance). Second, presentation occurs in the context of service access, which can expose beh... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 7.7.4 Prioritizing privacy goals given the costs | Verifier unlinkability is achievable today at reasonable complexity both at LoA High and Substantial with conventional cryptography, making the presentation phase the primary point for enforcing privacy in a digital identity system. This shifts some burden to issuance, which has to ensure unique salts, signatures, and ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8 Privacy aspects of revocation and validity checks | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.1 Introduction to revocation and validity checks | Given that eIDAS2 article 5a.16(a) as well as recitals 14, 15, and 59 require that selective disclosures and unlinkability are done in ways that prevent data linkability, then the data unlinkability requirement has to be extended to validity status checks. Herein, the focus includes only options that fall under "state ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.2 Online certificate status protocol (OCSP) | The online certificate status protocol (OCSP) is an internet protocol specified in IETF RFC 6960 [i.160] that is designed to obtain and check the current validity status of a digital X.509 PKIX certificate. However, OCSP was not designed with privacy in mind and therefore it lacks certain privacy aspects. The OCSP prot... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.3 Revocation lists | A Revocation List (RL) is a mature and widely utilized validity status check mechanism. For detailed examples see IETF RFC 5280 [i.156] that specifies the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) profile for PKIX X.509 certificates and IETF RFC 6818 [i.161] that updates IETF RFC 5280 [i.156]. Commonly, a RL is a signed list o... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.4 Validity status lists | A validity Status List (SL) is a bit vector that is issued and signed by an issuer (QTSP in eIDAS2 terms). The validity status of a (Q)EAA is represented using either a single bit or multiple bits in the SL bit vector. The (Q)EAA identifier is mapped to an index in the status list. The validity status check of the (Q)E... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.5 Cryptographic accumulators | A cryptographic accumulator allows the aggregation of many values into a fixed-length digest called the accumulator value. Furthermore, and in contrast to cryptographic hash functions, it is possible to verify whether an element is accumulated or not. Asymmetric accumulators rely on a so-called (non-)membership witness... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.6 Using programmable ZKP schemes for revocation checks | As described in clause 6.5.1, it is possible to design anonymous credentials from programmable ZKPs (typically zk- SNARKs) and existing digital identities (such as X.509 certificates). Furthermore, the revocation and validity status can be performed at the digital wallet, whilst the validation results, selected attribu... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 8.7 Conclusions on validity status checks | The present clause introduces the topic of revocation and validity status checks in the context of selective disclosure capable and unlinkable (Q)EAAs. If explicit (and short) validity periods are not used as an alternative, then it is recommended that the validity status check employed does not introduce a correlation... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9 Post-quantum considerations | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.1 General remarks | The recent years have witnessed significant advances in the area of quantum computing, which led to reconsider the threats posed by quantum algorithms such as the one devised by Shor [i.235] in 1994. The latter algorithm could indeed be used to attack the mathematical problems underlying most of the current asymmetric ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.2 Post-quantum computing threats | A quantum computer capable of cryptanalysis remains a speculative prospect for a remote future despite the current level of trepidation. While a remote risk, the emergence of one with the computational power to execute algorithms like Shor [i.235] or Grover [i.126] could significantly affect the proposed solutions. To ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.3 Post-quantum computing solutions | Although (Q)EAA systems are not immediately threatened by quantum computing, as explained in clause 9.2, they will eventually have to migrate to post-quantum cryptography, at least before the Q-day. In the case of salted attributes hashes, the main component vulnerable to quantum computers is the signature scheme used ... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.4 Lattice-based anonymous credentials schemes | |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.4.1 Background | The transition to post-quantum cryptography is an enormous challenge for cryptographers and the IT-security industry as a whole. There have been significant enhancements such as the future NIST standards on Post-Quantum Safe (PQS) cryptography. However, these NIST standards have so far only been focusing on general cry... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 9.4.2 Research on effective lattice-based anonymous credentials | In order to address the issues with large sized signatures, cryptographic research is currently being performed on PQS anonymous credentials with small signature sizes. In 2022, Jeudy et al. published the cryptographic research paper "Lattice Signature with Efficient Protocols, Application to Anonymous Credentials" [i.... |
2084e280c44b7014f2db1d54699ca172 | 119 476-1 | 10 Conclusions | The eIDAS2 regulation and the Architecture and Reference Framework (ARF) define regulatory requirements on selective disclosure and unlinkability for the EUDI Wallet. The present document provides a comprehensive analysis of signature schemes, credential formats and protocols that cater for selective disclosure, unlink... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the use of EU Digital Identity Wallets, and advanced or qualified electronic signatures and seals conforming to the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.3], amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014, (referred as eIDAS hereinafter in the present document). The advanced or qualified ele... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 2 References | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TR 119 540 [i.1] apply. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ASiC Associated Signature Container CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax EAA Electronic Attestation of Attributes eIDAS electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services NOTE: As in Regulation 910/2014 amended by Regulation 2024/1183 [i... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5 AdES signatures profiles | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.1 Introduction | Clauses 6, 9, and 10 include digitally signing one or more data objects as an identification means. In cases where the number of data objects to be signed is higher than 1 and they are detached from the digital signatures, then ASiC-E containers including CAdES or XAdES signatures shall be used, signing the mentioned d... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.2 Tables for defining AdES profiles | In order to minimize its size, the present document defines a format for tables that are able to define one profile for CAdES [3], one profile for JAdES [6], and one profile for XAdES [2] signatures. These tables shall contain the following columns: 1) At least one column whose header shall be <AdES signature type> com... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.3 Profiles for standalone (C/J/X)AdES-B-B | Table 1 defines one profile for CAdES-B-B signatures, one profile for JAdES-B-B signatures, and one profile for XAdES-B-B signatures, which shall be used when the digital signature is standalone, i.e. is not included within an ASiC-E container. In column "XAdES Components/Services", names of XML elements in the namespa... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.4 Profiles for standalone (C/J/X)AdES-B-LTA | Table 2 defines requirements for components that have to be added to the (C/J/X)AdES-B-B signatures specified in clause 5.3 to become (C/J/X)AdES-B-LTA standalone signatures. NOTE: This is for keeping the size of the table to its minimum size. In column "XAdES Components/Services", names of XML elements in the namespac... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.5 Profiles for (C/X)AdES-B-B signatures included in an ASiC-E container | Table 3 defines one profile for CAdES-B-B signatures, and one profile for XAdES-B-B signatures, which shall be included within an ASiC-E container for signing several detached data objects. N is equal to the number of detached signed data objects in "Cardinality" column. In column "XAdES Components/Services", names of ... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 5.6 Profile for XAdES-B-LTA long-term signatures included in an ASiC-E container | Table 4 defines a profile for XAdES-B-LTA long-term signatures, which shall be included within an ASiC-E container for signing several detached data objects. In column "XAdES Components/Services", names of XML elements in the namespace whose URI is http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig# are preceded by prefix ds. Table 4: ... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6 ASiC containers profiles | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.1 Introduction | In cases where the number of data objects to be signed is higher than 1 and they are detached from the digital signatures, then ASiC-E containers including CAdES or XAdES signatures shall be used, signing the mentioned data objects. The present clause specifies general requirements for ASiC-E containers that the other ... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2 Profile for ASiC-E containers for short-term signatures | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.1 General requirements | The ASiC container shall be an ASiC-E, as specified in ETSI EN 319 162-1 [1], with one of the following types of AdES signatures: CAdES or XAdES. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.2 Signing with XAdES | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.2.1 Requirements for signature file | The ASiC-E container shall contain one file called "signatures.xml" within its META-INF folder. The "signatures.xml" file shall contain the asic:XAdESSignatures root element as specified in clause A.5 of ETSI EN 319 162-1 [1]. The asic:XAdESSignatures root element shall contain one ds:Signature containing a XAdES signa... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.2.2 Specific requirements for the XAdES signature | The XAdES signature shall be a non-distributed XAdES signature. The XAdES signature shall contain as many ds:Reference children of ds:SignedInfo as files forming the SC package within the SC-"<SCP Identifier> folder. Each ds:Reference child shall reference one of the mentioned signed files forming the SC package as spe... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.3 Signing with CAdES | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.3.1 Requirements for ASICManifest file | The ASiC-E container shall contain the file named "signature.p7s", which shall contain the CAdES signature on the SC Package, within its META-INF folder. The ASiC-E container shall contain within the file named "ASiCManifest.xml" an ASiCManifest, within its META-INF folder. Within the "ASiCManifest.xml" file, its ASiCM... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.2.3.2 Specific requirements for the CAdES signature | The SignerInfos set shall contain only one instance of SignerInfo type. The CAdES signature shall be a CAdES-B-B signature as specified in Table 3 of clause 5.5 of the present document. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.3 Profile for ASiC-E containers for long-term signatures | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.3.1 General requirements | For ensuring the collective signature present within the ASiC-E containers specified in clause 6.2 of the present document in the long term, they shall either: 1) be preserved by a preservation trust service preserving electronic seals and electronic signatures; or EXAMPLE: A preservation trust services in eIDAS [i.3].... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.3.2 Signing with XAdES | When ASiC-E contains XAdES signatures, the long term availability and integrity shall be achieved by incorporating to the XAdES signatures unsigned qualifying properties, as required by clause 4.4.5 of ETSI EN 319 162-1 [1]. The XAdES signature shall be a XAdES-B-LTA signature as specified in Table 4 in clause 5.6. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 6.3.3 Signing with CAdES | When ASiC-E contains CAdES signatures, the long term availability and integrity shall be achieved by adding to the ASiC container one ASiCArchiveManifest file for each time-stamp token added to the ASiC container. ETSI ETSI TS 119 542 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 17 |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7 Requirements on identity validation | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7.1 Introduction | The present document requires the validation of electronic identities during the lifecycle of a Smart Contract. The validation of electronic identities may be carried out either by: 1) validating standalone AdES signatures or ASiC-E containers generated by a certain entity; or 2) using the EUDI Wallet complying with Ar... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7.2 Validation of electronic identities based on digital signatures | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7.2.1 Requirements on validation of digital signatures | The validation of standalone AdES signatures or ASiC-E containers shall be carried out as specified in ETSI EN 319 102-1 [4]. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7.2.2 Requirements on generation of signed validation reports | The entities validating standalone AdES signatures and ASiC-E container should generate validation reports as specified in ETSI TS 119 102-2 [5] and sign them with a standalone AdES-B-B signature as specified in clause 5.3 of the present document. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 7.3 Validation of electronic identities based on EUDI Wallet | The present clause specifies requirements for the validation of an electronic identity based on the EUDI Wallet complying with Article 5a of [i.3]. The entities involved in the process, one of which may be an EAA/PID validation service, should use the protocol specified in ETSI TS 119 472-2 [i.4] for requesting and pre... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8 Requirements for Production phase | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.1 Introduction | The present clause defines requirements for identification by means of their digital signatures, of the entities that, according to clause 4 of the present document, act during the SC provision phase. 8.2 Identification of SC Languages, SC Compilers and SC Virtual Machines providers |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.2.1 General requirements | During the SC Production phase, the providers of SC language(s), SC Compiler(s) and SC Virtual Machine(s), respectively, shall identify themselves by signing the products that they provide. Therefore, the present clause specifies profiles for signing: 1) The SC Language Specification and the SC Language Specification P... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.2.2 Identifying the SC Language Publisher by its signatures | The SC Language Publisher shall sign the SC language specification and the SC Language Specification Policy data objects. If the SC Language Publisher generates an ASiC-E container for collectively signing these two data objects, the ASiC-E shall have one child folder of the root folder whose name shall follow the patt... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.2.3 Identifying the SC Compiler Publisher by its signatures | The SC Compiler Publisher shall sign the SC Compiler and the SC Compiler policy data objects. If the SC Compiler Publisher generates an ASiC-E container for collectively signing these two data objects, the ASiC-E shall have one child folder of the root folder whose name shall follow the pattern "SCC-"<SC Compiler Publi... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.2.4 Identifying the SC Virtual Machine Publisher by its signatures | The SC Virtual Machine Publisher shall sign the SC Virtual Machine and the SC Virtual Machine policy data objects. If the SC Virtual Machine Publisher generates an ASiC-E container for collectively signing these two data objects, the ASiC-E shall have one child folder of the root folder whose name shall follow the patt... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.3 Identification of SC Publisher | The SC Publisher shall generate an ASiC-E container as specified in clause 6.2 of the present document, enclosing the SC package. This ASiC-E container shall have one child folder of the root folder whose name shall follow the pattern "SC-"<SC Identifier>, where <SC Identifier> shall be an identifier of the Smart Contr... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 8.4 Identification of SC parties | During the SC Production phase, the parties agreeing the Smart Contract shall identify themselves by signing an evidence that they accept the terms and conditions of the Smart Contract, and by signing an evidence that they accept the terms and conditions of the SC Provider. Each party agreeing the Smart Contract shall ... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9 Requirements for Deployment phase | 9.1 Validation of the ASiC-E enclosing the SC package by the SC Deployer As it has been mentioned in clause 4 of the present document, the first action of this phase shall be the validation of the ASiC-E container enclosing the SC package by the SC Deployer, as specified in clause 7.2.1 of the present document. After t... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2 Evidence of SC Deployment signed by the SC Deployer | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2.1 Signature on deployed Smart Contract | If the validation of the ASiC-E container enclosing the SC package succeeds, then the SC Deployer shall deploy the Smart Contract on the Electronic Ledger. After the SC deployment, the SC Deployer generates the SC Deployment Evidence, which shall be a digital signature on the Smart Contract deployed on the Electronic L... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2.2 SC Package binding file | The file that allows binding with a SC Package shall be a Multipart MIME object with as many parts as files that form the SC Package signed in the ASiC-E container enclosing the SC package, specified in clause 8.3 of the present document. All these parts shall have type Text/Plain. The Content-Description header of the... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2.3 Signing with CAdES signature | The member encapContentInfo.eContentType shall have as value the following OID: id-aa-ets-sc-package-signature OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) deliverable-domain (128) smart-contract-signatures (19542) 1 } This OID identifies the signed object as a multipart MIME object that includes... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2.4 Signing with JAdES signature | The JAdES signature Payload shall have the multipart MIME object that has been defined as content of the encapContentInfo.eContent of a CAdES signature in clause 9.2.3 of the present document, base64url-encoded. |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 9.2.5 Signing with XAdES signature | The XAdES signature shall have 3 ds:Reference elements. One of them shall be the one referencing the ds:Object containing the signed qualifying properties. Its contents shall be as specified in ETSI EN 319 132-1 [2]. Another ds:Reference element shall reference the Smart Contract file as deployed by the SC Deployer. Th... |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 10 Requirements for the SC Execution phase | |
5c79c53615d8d7d5c287ce9900540e26 | 119 542 | 10.1 Introduction | As it has been mentioned in clause 4 of the present document, the first action of this phase shall be the validation by the SC Provider of the evidence of the Smart Contract deployment signed by the SC Deployer (see clause 10.2 of the present document) before starting the first execution of the SC. During this phase, b... |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies the policy and security requirements for Smart Contracts using Electronic Ledgers as defined in Regulation (EU) 910/2014 amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 [i.3], and with other trustworthy tools, taking into account the framework of requirements identified in ETSI TR 119 540 [i.1]. NOT... |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 2 References | |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in the Data Act [i.13], ETSI EN 319 401 [1], ETSI TR 119 540 [i.1] and the following apply: governance: action or manner of governing the Smart Contract and its stakeholders policy: course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organization or individu... |
d9b34bebbd5b99b1a7697f54e884bafe | 119 541 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
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