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2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. ETSI ETSI TR 104 410 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 7 |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: ACME CSE: open source CSE Middleware for Education connected product: item that obtains, generates or collects data concerning its use or environment and that is able to communicate product data via an electronic communications service, physical conne... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AI Artificial Intelligence API Application Programming Interface CEN European Committee for Standardization CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization CR Change Request DCAT Data CATalogue vocabulary DCAT-AP Data CATalogue... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 4 oneM2M | |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 4.1 Introduction | The present clause gives a summary of the findings highlighted in ETSI TR 104 409 [i.1] about how oneM2M fulfils the EU Data Act [i.2] with particular reference to Article 33 and the EU Standardisation Request [i.3]. The summary guides the content of the remaining sub-clauses. |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 4.2 Use as it is to fulfil the EU Data Act and the SReq | oneM2M as it is does satisfy a substantial part of the SReq [i.3], especially in the following areas: • General Framework and Architecture: - oneM2M provides a comprehensive interoperability framework designed for seamless communication across various protocols and data models. - It supports a service layer that can be... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 4.3 Potential improvements | There are areas where oneM2M allows some room for potential improvements (work may be already being done to address some of said improvements): • Master Catalogue: - oneM2M does not provide a single master catalogue for listing available data. Considering the potential dimensions and the tremendous diversity of service... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 4.4 Additional guidelines | Clauses 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of ETSI TR 104 409 [i.1] explain that oneM2M is more that the specification of an IoT platform, stating it is well suited to support Data Spaces. These capabilities, however, are not currently advertised on the oneM2M.org website. A possible improvement is to augment the website content to refle... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 5 SAREF | |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 5.1 Introduction | ETSI TR 104 409 [i.1] provides an analysis about how the SAREF methodology fulfils the EU Data Act [i.2], with particular reference to the Article 33 and the EU Standardisation Request [i.3]. There have been two main aspects making SAREF well positioned compared to the EU Data Act [i.2]. The first one is that the SAREF... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 5.2 Use of SAREF to fulfil the EU Data Act and the SReq | The content of the present clause refers to the version of SAREF published at the date in which the present document is written. Any subsequent updates of SAREF may affect the validity of the content provided below. ETSI ETSI TR 104 410 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 12 The SAREF methodology is described in ETSI EN 303 760 [i.5] whe... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 5.3 Potential improvements | The present clause provides a set of actions that should be considered to improve the SAREF methodology, and a mention to possible assets that would make the SAREF ecosystem fully compliant with the EU Data Act [i.2] and the SReq [i.3]. Particularly, three feasible actions can be implemented to enhance the fulfilment o... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 6 NGSI-LD | |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 6.1 Introduction | ETSI TR 104 409 [i.1] provides an analysis about which components of NGSI-LD fulfils the EU Data Act [i.2], with particular reference to the Article 33 and the EU Standardisation Request [i.3]. NGSI-LD [i.6] is information model and API for publishing, querying and subscribing to context information. It enables structu... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 6.2 Use of NGSI-LD to fulfil the EU Data Act and the SReq | The content of this clause refers to the version of NGSI-LD published at the date in which the present document is written. Any subsequent updates of NGSI-LD may affect the validity of the content provided below. The NGSI-LD specifications are described in [i.6] where there are provided the good practices about how NGS... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 6.3 Potential improvements | This Clause provides a set of actions that should be considered to improve NGSI-LD, and a mention to possible assets that would make NGSI-LD fully compliant with the EU Data Act [i.2] and the SReq [i.3]. In the previous clause, it has been mentioned that NGSI-LD satisfies the accessibility requirement by including info... |
2dcee41e2baaaa33138eef97ae9b5cc3 | 104 410 | 8 Conclusions | The present document provides a set of guidelines that may drive future activities on oneM2M, SAREF and NGSI-LD in the context of their usage concerning the implementation of data spaces that intend to be compliant with the EU Data Act [i.2]. For each asset, there are reported which points of the SReq [i.3] are already... |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 1 Scope | The present document provides a mapping between the Critical Security Controls and DORA provisions. |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 2 References | |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 3.1 Terms | Void. |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AAA Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting COTS Commercial Off The Shelf CSC Critical Security Controls CSF Computer Security Framework DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol DORA Digital Operational Resilience Act ERM Enterprise Risk... |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 4.1 Methodology and use | Methodology The methodology used to create the mapping can be useful to anyone attempting to understand the relationships between the Critical Security Controls and DORA. The overall goal for Control mappings is to be as specific as possible, leaning towards under-mapping versus over-mapping. The general strategy used ... |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 4.2 Applicability Overview | Table 4.2-1 below provides a mapping by the Critical Security Controls community to the DORA provisions to support the indicated requirements [i.9]. Table 4.2-1: Applicability of the Critical Security Controls to DORA Control Safeguard Title Applicability 1 Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets 1 of 5 2 Inventory ... |
f960b0d45a0b4ade0630eb1df8c4dec1 | 104 169 | 4.3 Applying the Critical Security Controls and Safeguards | Table 4.3-1 CIS Safeguard Control Asset Type Safeguard Security Function Control / Safeguard Title IG1 IG2 IG3 DORA Relationship DORA Provision DORA Category DORA Requirement Description 1 Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets 1.1 Devices Identify Establish and Maintain Detailed Enterprise Asset Inventory x x x Su... |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 1 Scope | The present document item provides a mapping between the Critical Security Controls and NIS2 provisions. |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 2 References | |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 3.1 Terms | Void. |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: COTS Commercial Off The Shelf CSC Critical Security Controls CSF Computer Security Framework DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol ERM Enterprise Risk Management IG1 Implementation Group 1 IG2 Implementation Group 2 IG3 Implementation Group... |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 4.1 Methodology and Use | Methodology The methodology used to create the mapping can be useful to anyone attempting to understand the relationships between the Critical Security Controls and NIS2. The overall goal for Control mappings is to be as specific as possible, leaning towards under-mapping versus over-mapping. The general strategy used ... |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 4.2 Applicability Overview | Table 4.2-1: Applicability of the Critical Security Controls to the NIS2 Directive Control Safeguard Title Applicability 1 Inventory and Control of Enterprise Assets 1 of 5 2 Inventory and Control of Software Assets 1 of 7 3 Data Protection 9 of 14 4 Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software 4 of 12 5 Acco... |
e20ec0e4001149cdfbd49276229c67c8 | 104 168 | 4.3 Applying the Critical Security Controls and Safeguards | Table 4.3-1 below provides a mapping by the Critical Security Controls community to the NIS2 provisions to support the indicated requirements [i.9]. Table 4.3-1 Control Safeguard Control Asset Type Safeguard Security Function Control / Safeguard Title IG1 IG2 IG3 NIS2 Relationship NIS 2 Provision NIS 2 Requirement Cate... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 1 Scope | The present document will focus on presenting the results, observations and lessons learnt from the ERATOSTHENES and CERTIFY projects that tackle the complex security challenges of the Internet of Things (IoT) with a focus on managing the entire lifecycle of these networks, with a specific focus on distributed trust ma... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 2 References | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 2.1 Normative references | Normative references are not applicable in the present document. |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: commissioning: process in which the device boots and connects to the target security context, establishing the necessary security verifications and materials for operating within the context cyber intelligence: information gathering and analysis activ... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting ACL Access Control Lists ETSI ETSI TR 104 160 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 10 API Application Programming Interface ARM Advanced RISC Machines CA Certification Authority CAV Connected and Automated Vehicle ... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 4 Introduction | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 4.1 Key IoT Security Challenges | The widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) devices has introduced a complex security landscape. With a vast number of interconnected devices, the attack surface expands significantly, demanding robust security on both individual devices and the entire network. However, many IoT devices have limited processing ... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5 ERATOSTHENES | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5.1 Overview | The ERATOSTHENES project tackles the complex security challenges of the IoT with a focus on managing the entire lifecycle of these networks through distributed trust management and digital identity solutions. The focal point is the development of a Trust and Identity Management Framework for IoT devices, distributed an... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5.2.0 Introduction | Figure 2: ERATOSTHENES architecture The ERATOSTHENES architecture and concept have been carefully developed to be adaptable across multiple industrial domains. The architecture is designed to accommodate different use cases, specific requirements, and unique characteristics of each application environment. This flexibi... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5.2.1 Pre-provisioning | The device undergoes initial configuration and security material installation during its first boot at the manufacturer's premises. This process has three key outcomes. First, the device receives and securely stores its root identity material, which serves as a foundation for authentication. This material can range fro... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5.2.2 Commissioning | The next phase begins when the device first boots and connects to the target security context. To interact with the domain infrastructure, the device should perform a bootstrapping process that authenticates its root identity. The domain should have a trust relationship with the manufacturer, either directly through it... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 5.2.3 Operational Phase | Once the enrolment has been completed, devices are ready to interact with other entities in the security context. The framework defined in ERATOSTHENES follows the principles of self-sovereignty. That is, devices are in control of their identity materials, and no other parties should play an active role during an authe... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6 CERTIFY | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.1 Overview | The Horizon Europe project CERTIFY (active security for connected device lifecycles) aims to provide a methodological, technological, and organizational framework that ensures security throughout the lifecycle of connected devices. These efforts align with current EU regulations, particularly the CRA, positioning the p... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2 CERTIFY Framework | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.0 Introduction | The CERTIFY architecture, as depicted in Figure 8, is organized into six "domains" or "planes" with dedicated functionalities. The embedded device plane provides security services built on top of hardware functionalities to instantiate and maintain a secure environment. It characterizes the IoT platform through the CER... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.1 Pre-provisioning | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.1.1 Design Phase | In this phase, the device is designed, developed, programmed, and tested, establishing its initial security posture. All actors in the supply chain - component designers, integrators, and software developers - are involved, while the manufacturer conducts the initial security evaluation. However, as new threats and vul... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.1.2 Pre-provisioning of security material | While security assessment results are typically used only for device certification, CERTIFY leverages this information to enhance device deployment and operation. Specifically, the evaluation results are embedded into a behavioural profile that maps different security levels to recommended operational policies. This pr... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.2 Commissioning | The commissioning phase starts when the device is installed and configured in a certain context. This usually consists of a set of procedures in which a device joins a network in a certain security domain. During the process, the cryptographic material installed during the previous phase is used to derive dynamic crede... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.3 Operational Phase | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.3.0 General | In the operational phase, continuous monitoring of the device is essential due to evolving security threats and vulnerabilities that were not anticipated at design time. As a device's security posture evolves, it may require reassessment and even recertification. Within the CERTIFY framework, monitoring components coll... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.3.1 Updating | Over-The-Air (OTA) software updates are vital for maintaining the long-term security of IoT devices. This need is underscored by standards and recommendations from organizations such as the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), which highlights regular updates as key to improving the security and reliability... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 6.2.3.2 Decommissioning & Repurposing | The decommissioning phase in the CERTIFY lifecycle marks the final stage of a connected device's life, where it is either retired from operations or repurposed. This phase is crucial to ensuring that devices no longer in service do not pose residual security risks. Proper decommissioning protects the network by securel... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.1 Introduction | In both projects, two technologies rise as a key cornerstone for achieving the continuous cybersecurity posture and certification goals. ETSI ETSI TR 104 160 V1.1.1 (2025-10) 23 |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2 Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.0 General | To achieve effective detection and mitigation of security threats in specific IoT environments, it is useful and sometimes necessary to know the expected behaviour of devices beforehand. However, the heterogeneity of IoT environments (from critical infrastructures to home) and of devices themselves, based on various te... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.1 Key Components of MUD | • MUD File: This file, created by the manufacturer, contains a detailed set of instructions that define the anticipated network behaviour of the device. It serves as a blueprint for the device's network interactions and security posture. • MUD Manager: This component acts as the network administrator. It is responsible... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.2 Extended MUD | The MUD standard [i.50] presents a few limitations to its capabilities and applicability in practice, such as reduced expressivity focused only on networking, insufficient security in the MUD retrieval process, or supporting efficient updates for security information. Both ERATOSTHENES and CERTIFY go beyond the standar... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.3 MUD management in ERATOSTHENES | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.3.0 General | Figure 9: Instantiation of MUD components in ERATOSTHENES As a detailed example of the described tools and processes, Figure 9 shows the instantiation of the MUD components in the ERATOSTHENES architecture. Note that the MUD management module in ERATOSTHENES is an aggregation of subcomponents, including the functionali... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.3.1 MUD Manager / Threat MUD Manager | The central components of the MUD Management Module architecture. The MUD Manager oversees the retrieval of MUD files associated to devices that enrol in an ERATOSTHENES domain. The threat MUD manager carries out the equivalent functionality for threat MUD files. |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.3.2 Policy Translator | For inter-component communications, ERATOSTHENES introduces a service to translate MUD files into intermediate security policies. ERATOSTHENES currently utilizes Medium-level Security Policy Language (MSPL) [i.13], a security policy language with medium level of abstraction, that provides a set of actions suitable by t... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.2.3.3 MUD File Servers | The source for all MUD/Threat MUD files. MUD file servers are located outside the ERATOSTHENES deployment, belonging instead to the device manufacturers. MUD components from all domains may communicate with them to retrieve MUD files. Threat MUD file servers, on the other hand, are controlled by threat intelligence act... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.3 Continuous Assessment | In today's interconnected digital landscape, cybersecurity is no longer an afterthought; it is a strategic imperative. Organizations should proactively defend against cyber threats, adapt to evolving attack vectors, and ensure the resilience of their systems. This is critical to achieving cybersecurity resilience in th... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4 Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.1 General | Cyber intelligence is an information gathering and analysis activity aimed at identifying, tracking/predicting capabilities, and intentions/activities of hostile actors in the cybersecurity domain. Cyber-Threat Intelligence (CTI) can be defined as evidence-based knowledge (including context, mechanisms, indicators, imp... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.2 CTI in ERATOSTHENES | One of the key business challenges for IoT scenarios is the need for increased cybersecurity, as security events incur in many direct and indirect losses. The components developed in ERATOSTHENES and CERTIFY aim to provide a platform for inter-domain Cyber-Threat Intelligence (CTI) sharing, compliant with the guideline... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.3 CTI Sharing Agent Components | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.3.1 CTI Agent Connector | This component handles communication with other components of the TMB by subscribing to the broker's threat sharing MQTT topic. The CTI Agent Connector receives threat alerts coming from the Monitoring IDS component. It also retrieves events from the MISP instance for later forwarding them to TMB components through the... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.3.2 Anonymizer | Receives a threat-related event coming from the CTI Agent Connector and applies anonymization techniques that are specified in the privacy policy file related to that type of event. After the anonymization process the resultant event is published on the MISP domain's instance, and additionally, the DLT is used for audi... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 7.4.3.3 MISP | An instance of the MISP platform for publishing and sharing security events. It acts as the repository of threat events received. Its synchronization capabilities are useful to keep instances within a domain synchronized (i.e. from the multiple instantiations of the distributed TMB). What is more, it can be synchronize... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 8.1 Introduction | The ERATOSTHENES and CERTIFY solutions are of interest in many scenarios where heterogeneous IoT devices play a key role. The various technologies and procedures for managing devices' lifecycles in such scenarios have been displayed through piloting activities in several scenarios in both projects. In this clause, this... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 8.2 Example 1: Connected Vehicles | The number of connected devices in the automotive industry has grown over the years, and this increase comes along with the evolution of the HW and SW that is integrated into vehicles and infrastructures. Over the last years, the electronic architecture of vehicles has been continuously developed to adapt to the new re... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 8.3 Example 2: Smart Health | Tellu is an IoT application provider in the eHealth market with an Edge-based SaaS for remote patient monitoring and assistance product. The Tellu Health Gateway, which is deployed in every patient's home, is at the core of the service and is responsible for collecting data from various medical sensors and sending them... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 8.4 Example 3: Industry 4.0 | Digital Worx (DWG) is a provider for Industry 4.0 solutions with a focus on integration IoT into customized shop floor and productivity systems. DWG provides solutions for retrofitting sensor and cloud interfaces in machining, tracking production assets, and mobile solutions to optimize human workflows in industrial pr... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 8.5 Example 4: Connected Cabin System | Next-generation aircraft are expected to use many IoT-connected devices supporting new and improved services in the cabin. The shift promises: i) personalized experience for passengers, e.g. through customized In-Flight-Entertainment (IFE); ii) new revenue streams for airlines, such as delivering targeted retail offers... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9 Gap Analysis and Recommendations | |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.1 Introduction | The rapid growth of the IoT has drastically increased the number of connected devices, bringing significant security and privacy challenges across various industries. As these devices become deeply integrated into critical systems and everyday life, their vulnerabilities can have widespread consequences. To address the... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.2.0 Introduction | There exist several desirable properties that are discussed in relevant IoT standards, regulations and best practices documents, and particularly the CRA. Achieving these principles presents challenges derived from the inherent requirements of such properties and the characteristics of IoT environments such as heteroge... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.2.1 Security by Design | Security by design approaches aim to make cybersecurity a primary perspective in the design, development, and production of products, in contrast to the addition of security characteristics at later stages. The CRA aims to apply this notion to products with digital elements. This sentiment is also reflected in multiple... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.2.2 Identity Generation and Management | To achieve cybersecurity notions such as confidentiality, integrity and authenticity it is paramount to establish robust identity management mechanisms. The CRA and other IoT security regulations highlight the needs for strong access control mechanisms that ultimately should also be based on authentication and identity... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.2.3 Secure Deployment | The CRA emphasizes the importance of a Secure by Default Configuration, ensuring that products with digital elements are designed to be secure from the moment they are deployed, without requiring users to apply additional security measures. This means manufacturers should provide default settings that prioritize securi... |
2ba1876e0259e748d226a329803049d9 | 104 160 | 9.2.4 Vulnerability Handling | Part of the CRA essential requirements insist on processes and not only on products: they call for the vulnerability handling processes put in place by manufacturers to ensure the cybersecurity of products with digital elements during the time the product is expected to be in use. In particular, there should be clear p... |
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