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e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.1 Introduction | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.1.1 Scenario | Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) are increasingly ubiquitous: with the growing number of smart mobile devices, users are willing to have access to the Internet everywhere. A solution for crowded cellular networks is to offload traffic, typically to WLANs. In this scenario, federated WLANs allow mobile users to acce... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.1.2 Preliminary considerations | Traditional WLAN network access relies on the following methods: 1) open (i.e. unencrypted) WLAN network in which typically the user is redirected to a splash-page for authentication; 2) WPA2-PSK secured WLAN network, in which all the legitimate users know the pre-shared secret (PSK). Security hence relies on the fact ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.2 High level requirements | The present document specifies the following high level requirements (table 5.1) for federated WLANs use case. Table 5.1: Requirements derived from the "Federated WLANs" use case ID Requirement FW#1 The solution shall support an authentication mechanism preserving the privacy of the users. In particular, the federated ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3 Use case | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.1 Stakeholders | An IEEE 802.11 [i.23] architecture is assumed (see figure 5.1), with additional actors and roles. In particular, the following roles are defined: • Station (STA): is the mobile user device which connects to an Access Point. • Access Point (AP): is managed by a WLAN provider. One or more STA can connect to the same AP. ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.2 Preconditions | The WP has received the public ABE parameters from the IAs. The WP has defined an access policy. The access policy alongside with the public ABE parameters have been transferred to the AP. The AP has generated a random WPA2-PSK and has encrypted it using the provided policy. The STA has received ABE secret keys from th... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.3 Trigger | A user instructs a STA to connect to an AP. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.4 Flow of events | The AP broadcasts chunks of the encrypted WPA2-PSK secret in the generated IEEE 802.11 beacons. The STA collects the chunks in the beacons and reconstructs the encrypted WPA2-PSK secret. If the attributes in the ABE secret keys satisfy the access policy of the AP, the STA can decrypt the WPA2-PSK secret. The STA random... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.5 Exit condition | The STA connects successfully to the AP. After this event, the AP generates a new random WPA2-PSK secret and encrypts it according to the access policy. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 5.3.6 Recommended ABE scheme | The CCA-secure CP-ABE with CP-FAME-KEM [i.21] ABE scheme should be used. STA AP IA policy interface attribute interface (SK + attributes) data interface WP public parameters ETSI ETSI TS 103 458 V1.1.1 (2018-06) 19 |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6 Internet of Things use cases | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.1 Overview | The present clause describes several use cases related to the Internet of Things and progressively illustrates the capabilities to be supported by a cryptosystem providing access control. In a first use case, the use of asymmetric encryption in order to export data to untrusted storage is introduced. Then, scenarios wh... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.2 High level requirements | The present document specifies the following high level requirements (table 6.1) for the "Securing and exporting data to untrusted storage" use case (clause 6.3.1): Table 6.1: Requirements derived from "Securing and exporting data to untrusted storage" ID Requirement Comment IoT#1 The solution shall be designed in such... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3 Use cases | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1 Securing and exporting data to untrusted storage | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1.1 General use case description | The present use case illustrates a device that uses irreversible (from the point of view of the device) encryption in order to ensure a high level of confidentiality assurance of Operational Data and Static Data of a Data Subject. The Untrusted Storage can be local or remote. By doing so, the device can achieve higher ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1.2 Stakeholders | User: the user can be a data subject (if the data in question refers to the user) or not. In this scenario the user is a passive stakeholder which benefits from the functionality. ETSI ETSI TS 103 458 V1.1.1 (2018-06) 23 Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder respons... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1.3 Scenario(s) | When data is located on a user device, technical countermeasures can be used to address threats against the confidentiality of the data. This includes the use of a trusted execution environment (within a secure element or a hardware enclave) providing memory isolation, full-disk encryption providing data-at-rest protec... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: operational data and/or static data (hereunder referred to as data) reside in secure memory. Post-conditions: • Success: the data is stored in encrypted form in untrusted storage, and the secure memory is freed. • Failure: the data remains in secure memory. Further data capture or generation can be impo... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.1.5 Operational constraints | For the normal flow, efficiency constraints exist on the encryption scheme, in particular processing effort (CPU cycles and power consumption), processing memory footprint, ciphertext size and public key size, so that the encryption algorithm can be executed by an embedded device with limited capabilities. ETSI ETSI TS... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.2.1 General use case description | This use case illustrates that once data has been encrypted, the enforcement of access control policies remains so that legitimate subjects can access the data. In a variant, access control is leveraged in order to perform device and user authentication. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.2.2 Stakeholders | User: the user can be a data subject (if the data in question refers to the user) or not. The user can configure access control policies for the data. Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.2.3 Scenario(s) | Once data has been encrypted as described in clause 6.3.1, the access control policies that have been defined for the data (static data, operational data, and generated data) in plaintext also apply to data in ciphertext form and are handled by the cryptosystem itself when the ciphertext is requested by a third-party. ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.2.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: there is data residing in secure memory. The system is configured with access control policies for the data. ETSI ETSI TS 103 458 V1.1.1 (2018-06) 25 Post-conditions: • Success: access control policies are applicable to ciphertext, which can only be decrypted with a key that matches an access control po... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.3 Assigning new access control policies to already encrypted data | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.3.1 General use case description | The present use case illustrates the allocation of new access control policies in order to allow a data consumer access to operational data that is already in ciphertext form. Examples are given with the management of location data. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.3.2 Stakeholders | User: the user is a data subject. Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder. Data consumer: the consumer can be a data processor or not. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.3.3 Scenario(s) | Due to their sensitive nature, personal data in the sense of the GDPR [i.19] benefit from privacy-by-design/privacy-by- default measures. Retention and disclosure of personal data to a third-party is governed by strict legal and contractual rules that protect the privacy of the data subject. This includes in particular... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.3.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: there exists Operational Data in ciphertext form, pertaining to the data subject. Post-conditions: • Success: the request for accessing the Operational Data is evaluated. When it is rejected, no access control policy is provided and the processor cannot access the data. When it is accepted, an access co... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.4 Applicability of access policies to processed data | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.4.1 General use case description | The present use case illustrates the situation where data is processed by a third-party (the processor) into a new dataset on behalf of a data subject. The data subject can issue access control policies on the generated data. ETSI ETSI TS 103 458 V1.1.1 (2018-06) 27 |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.4.2 Stakeholders | User: the user is a data subject. Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder. Data consumer: the consumer is a data processor. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.4.3 Scenarios | One purpose of data collection is to process the data into information (such as statistics) and new datasets. The uses of location information described in clause 6.3.3 are examples of such data processing. In some cases, the data subject retains control over the result of the processed data. For example, by using loca... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.4.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: a cryptosystem for access control is configured for a set of devices, users and policies. Post-conditions: • Minimal success: the data subject retains control over the collected data. • Success: the data subject retains control over the collected and generated data. • Failure: N/A. Begin triggers: a dat... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5 Offline access control in constrained operational environments | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5.1 General use case description | The present use case illustrates the application of access control between two devices in an industrial context, without support of a network infrastructure and with minimal performance and provisioning overhead. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5.2 Stakeholders | Users: the users can be data subject or not. Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5.3 Scenario(s) | In the Industrial IoT domain, data caps and costs on the communication links between the device and the infrastructure strongly limits the use of the communication link for resolution of requests that involve a centralized infrastructure. This includes access control requests as well as management of access control pol... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: a cryptosystem for access control is configured for a set of devices, users and policies. Post-conditions: • Success: a new subject (device or user) is successfully integrated in the access control system without interaction of the network. Access control operates as expected. • Failure: the new subject... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.5.5 Operational constraints | Use of a data link to the infrastructure is heavily restricted, if existent at all: an offline mode of operation is expected. Communication latencies between devices in an industrial context are kept to a minimum in order to match operational constraints of the industrial process (in particular to avoid incidents). |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.6 Direct and indirect data access | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.6.1 General use case description | The present use case illustrates a situation where data to be accessed exists partly in plaintext and partly in ciphertext form. However, the access control policies that have been defined by the data subject are applicable to both the plaintext and ciphertext. Thus, the system can properly enforce access control in bo... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.6.2 Stakeholders | Data consumer: the consumer can be a data processor or not. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.6.3 Scenario(s) | Referring to the use case described in clause 6.3.1, it is possible that personal data is available in both plaintext and ciphertext form. Namely, the freshest data resides in the device's secure execution environment, whereas the older data has been exported in ciphertext form to untrusted storage. Hence, a subject re... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.6.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: a cryptosystem for access control is configured for a set of devices, users and policies. Post-conditions: • Success: access control operates as expected and the data consumer receives the requested data as plaintext (direct access) or the data consumer receives the requested data as ciphertext (indirec... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.7 Access control examples in the Industrial Internet of Things | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.7.1 General use case description | The present use case provides several examples of data access control based on the characteristics of the data and of the data subject, in particular relative to: time, absolute position or relative position against one person and/or one machine, origin, data type, clearance level, subject role, and service tier. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.7.2 Stakeholders | User: the user is a data subject. Device manager: the device manager can coincide with the user or be a different stakeholder. Data consumer: the consumer is a data processor. Device: the device takes decisions on the ciphertext annotation based on the data characteristics and operating conditions. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.7.3 Scenario(s) | In the scenarios below a basic configuration is considered where a device (such as a worker wearable or an industrial equipment) is able to associate operational data with a position and/or a timestamp. Alternatively, a third-party service provider is considered which can process operational data into generated data an... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.7.4 Information Flows | Pre-conditions: a cryptosystem for access control is configured for a set of devices, users and policies. Post-conditions: • Success: access control operates based on one or more characteristics of the data. • Failure: some characteristic of the data is not supported as an access control criterion. Begin triggers: the ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 6.3.8 Recommended ABE schema | Depending on the required properties, either CCA-secure KP-ABE with KP-FAME-KEM (faster decryption) ABE scheme or KP-GPSW-KEM (slower decryption but allowing more complex policies and attribute repetition) ABE scheme [i.21] should be used. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7 Cloud use case | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.1 Introduction | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.1.1 Scenario | On the basis of indications provided by the European Digital Agenda, Italy has defined its own national strategy drawn up together with the Ministries and in collaboration with the Conference of Regions and Autonomous Provinces. The Italian national strategy for ICT [i.1] leverages on the development of a number of ena... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.1.2 Preliminary considerations | A recent trend for SOA services is to evolve and become part of an ecosystem, i.e. an architecture where a Platform provider offers identity services and API to access its services to a high number of loosely coupled third party stakeholders. These stakeholders act as service partners, building their own applications b... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.2 High level requirements | The present document specifies the following high level requirements (table 7.1) for the Cloud use case. Table 7.1: Requirements derived from the "Cloud" use case ID Requirement CL#1 To protect the confidentiality of data, the solution shall use a cryptographic scheme supporting attributes, discouraging disclosure to u... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3 Use case | |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.1 Stakeholders | A Service Oriented Architecture running on a standard Cloud infrastructure [1] is assumed. Cloud Platform Provider (PP): is a Cloud Service Provider providing identity management services and interfaces for third party applications using the platform services. Cloud Service Partner (CSPa): provides support to the provi... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.2 Preconditions | The PP and the CSPa act as PII processor and provides processing of PII. In addition, the PP and the CSPa can act as PII controller, determining the purposes and means for processing PII. The PP has received the ABE master public key (and ABE attributes) from the TA. The CSPa is identified by a CSPa identifier. It has ... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.4 Trigger | A client application issues a data request to the PP. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.5 Flow of events | The CSPa generates an assertion (e.g. a SAML assertion) for the client application. The assertion contains: the CSPa identifier, the public ABE attributes assigned to the client application, and the CSPa certificate. By this request, the CSPa can formally assert data use statements. The CSPa signs the assertion. The as... |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.6 Exit condition | The client application decrypts the ciphertext using its ABE keys. |
e17efbe6bcd60372b406ce35b2ebc2c9 | 103 458 | 7.3.7 Recommended ABE scheme | CCA-secure CP-ABE with CP-WATERS-KEM and/or CCA-secure KP-ABE with KP-GPSW-KEM [i.21] ABE schemes should be used. ETSI ETSI TS 103 458 V1.1.1 (2018-06) 39 Annex A (informative): Attribute Based Encryption A.1 Early ABE constructions Traditional public-key encryption uses a public key to target ciphertexts to a specific... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 1 Scope | The present document specifies a high-level service-oriented interface, as an application layer with a set of mandatory functions, to access secured services provided by, and executed in a More Trusted Domain. The transport layer is out of scope and left to the architecture implementation. This interface is not conside... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 2 References | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: domain: set of domain services trusted cross domain interface: domain service with a set of dedicated domain interface functions for communication between domain services of different domains (inter-domain communication) trusted cross domain interface... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AC Access Control AES Advanced Encryption Standard CN Common Name FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard FW FireWall HSM Hardware Security Module IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity IT Information Technology KMIP Key Management... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4 General | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.1 TCDI functional requirements | TCDI provides services to the application layer. MTD implements, exposes and delivers the required services. TCDI provides the following high-level services: • Key Management: TCDI allows symmetric and asymmetric keys to be requested and received. • Cryptographic operations: TCDI allows basic cryptographic operation to... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2 TCDI life cycle | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2.1 Life cycle Diagram | The interface allows a LTD entity to establish a trusted connection to a server in the MTD to execute sensitive operations and compose results within a TCO guaranteed by the MTD server (illustrated in figure 1). Only one connection per LTD entity shall be accepted. ETSI ETSI TS 103 457 V1.2.1 (2023-03) 11 Figure 1: Int... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2.2 Connection between LTD and MTD | The use of TCDI is initiated by one LTD with the establishment of a connection to one MTD service. The MTD may close the connection after some period of inactivity (see Good Practice section for recommendations). The MTD shall support two modes of operation depending on the LTD trust level: • Trusted mode enables the M... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2.3 Session | A session describes a set of transactions between the LTD and MTD for which an ephemeral TCO is created to secure all the sensitive data generated or managed, either simple objects or containers. The MTD generates and associates a unique identifier to sensitive data and guarantees their unicity: • Session-Id to each se... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2.4 Keep the trusted connection between the LTD and the MTD | Depending on the deployment scenario, the MTD may have different requirements for the acceptable interval between re-attestations. The MTD may take different actions depending on the attestation state of the LTD. EXAMPLE: The MTD can give access to certain resources only when certain pre-conditions are met by an LTD at... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 4.2.5 Releasing and erasing | When a LTD entity has finished offloading SFs or decides to request the erasing of the trusted context, the LTD entity may close the current session. The MTD shall securely erase the trusted context of the session upon closure initiated by the LTD entity or when the connection's lifetime expires. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5 Interface Elementary Functions | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.1 General provisions | Elementary functions are achieved using simple communication command/response pattern where the MTD executes and returns response on the solicitation of the LTD entity. Responses have the form of an optional result data value or a reference Object-id to that value and a status error code of the operation. Every functio... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2 Connection and session management | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.1 General | The MTD is responsible for storing a configuration of database type for LTD entities based on their LTD-Role. A Container-Id reference to the configuration of the MTD is returned at connection opening. The configuration shall be read-only. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.2 TD_OpenConnection | TD_OpenConnection opens a connection between the LTD and the MTD. TD_OpenConnection (LTD-Id, LTD-Role, CN, Nonce, DATA) Returns a Container-Id and status code. Table 1: TD_OpenConnection command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements LTD-Id M Identifier of the requesting entity. LTD-Role M Role of the re... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.3 TD_CloseConnection | TD_CloseConnection closes the connection between the LTD and the MTD. TD_CloseConnection () Returns a status code. Table 3: TD_CloseConnection command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements none - - Table 4: TD_CloseConnection response Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Status code M I... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.4 TD_CreateSession | TD_CreateSession creates a session between the LTD and the MTD. TD_CreateSession () Returns Session-Id and a status code. Table 5: TD_CreateSession command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements none - - Table 6: TD_CreateSession response Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id C... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.5 TD_CloseSession | TD_CloseSession closes a session between the LTD and the MTD. TD_CloseSession (Session-Id) Returns a status code. Table 7: TD_CloseSession command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Table 8: TD_CloseSession response Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Sta... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.2.6 TD_TrustRenewal | TD_TrustRenewal is used to verify that the LTD entity execution context has not been modified. The MTD shall have a database of authorized RSA Public keys indexed by CN reference measurements indexed to LTD-Role. The provisioning of this CN is out of scope, and it is assumed that it is trustworthy. It is used to regain... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.3 Data and value management | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.3.1 TD_CreateObject | TD_CreateObject returns the Object-Id that has been created. TD_CreateObject (Session-Id) Returns the Object-Id and a status code. Table 11: TD_CreateObject command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Table 12: TD_CreateObject response Command parameter Status Description a... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.3.2 TD_GetObjectValue | TD_GetObjectValue returns the value associated with an Object-Id. TD_GetObjectValue (Session-Id, Object-Id) Returns the object content/value referenced by Object-Id and a status code. ETSI ETSI TS 103 457 V1.2.1 (2023-03) 18 Table 13: TD_GetObjectValue command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Sessi... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.3.3 TD_PutObjectValue | TD_PutObjectValue modifies the value of the object referenced by Object-id in the MTD. TD_PutObjectValue (Session-Id, Object-Id, DATA) Returns a status code. Table 15: TD_PutObjectValue command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Object-Id M See clause 6.3 DATA M See clause... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4 Transferring cryptographic functionality | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.1 Entropy request | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.1.1 General | Accessing a trusted source of entropy and random number generation is fundamental in cryptographic environment. This interface delivers access to the MTD considered as a trusted and quality random source provider. EXAMPLE: In cloud or NFV context, it enables the virtual machines to start with initialized RNG, avoiding ... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.1.2 TD_GetRandom | TD_GetRandom allows the LTD to request a random number to the MTD. TD_GetRandom (Session-Id, SizeInBytes) Returns an Object-Id and a status code. Table 17: TD_GetRandom command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 SizeInBytes M See clause 6.3 Table 18: TD_GetRandom response ... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.2 Encryption keys request | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.2.1 General | A MTD provides long term key management and storage. EXAMPLE: Some providers encrypt their VNF, and keys are dynamically delivered by a server in the MTD. Thus, a VNF can be copied but not run without accessing the encryption key. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.2.2 TD_GenerateEncryptionKey | TD_GenerateEncryptionKey requests the MTD to generate a key which will be used by the LTD. TD_GenerateEncryptionKey (Session-Id, Key_Type) Returns an Object-Id and a status code. Table 19: TD_GenerateEncryptionKey command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Key_Type M See c... |
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