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a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.3 Trusted timestamping | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.3.1 General | Trusted time stamping enables all amenities to share the same trusted source of time. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.3.2 TD_GetTrustedTimestamping | TD_GetTrustedTimestamping requests the MTD to timestamp some data. TD_GetTrustedTimestamping (Session-Id, DATA) Returns an Object-Id and a status code. Table 21: TD_GetTrustedTimestamping command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 DATA M See clause 6.3 Table 22: TD_GetTrus... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.4 Secure archive | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.4.1 General | This interface enables data to be archived in the MTD. This is a write only service. Predefined Container-Id in the MTD can be used as global containers across LTD. The MTD Container shall be identified by its Resource-Id. EXAMPLE: In Cloud or NFV context, log files can be stored by default in the MTD. ETSI ETSI TS 103... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.4.2 TD_CreateArchive | TD_CreateArchive creates a container for archival purpose. TD_CreateArchive shall only create a PERMANENT container. This container shall be preserved beyond the end of the session (TD_CloseSession). TD_CreateArchive is a write only function. The LTD shall not be able to destroy this archive. The LTD delegates the resp... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.4.3 TD_Archive | TD_Archive writes data to the Container-Id. TD_Archive is a write-only function. TD_CreateArchive shall be executed prior to call this function. TD_Archive (Session-Id, Container-Id, Data) Returns a status code. The MTD shall append the data to the content of the container. Table 25: TD_Archive command Command paramete... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.4.4 TD_CloseArchive | TD_CloseArchive closes the archive, no further write access is allowed. TD_CloseArchive (Session-Id, Container-Id) Returns a status code. Table 27: TD_CloseArchive command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Container-Id M See clause 6.3 Table 28: TD_CloseArchive response C... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5 Secure storage | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5.1 General | This interface enables data to be stored in the MTD and retrieved from the MTD. This is a read/write service. The secure storage in the MTD Container shall be identified by its Container-Id and permanent containers shall enable concurrent access by all the LTD entities. |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5.2 TD_CreateStorage | TD_CreateStorage creates a new storage container in the MTD. TD_CreateStorage (Session-Id, Container-Name, Container-Type) Returns a Container-Id and a status code. Table 29: TD_CreateStorage command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Container-Name M See clause 6.3 Contai... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5.3 TD_DeleteStorage | The function TD_DeleteStorage enables the LTD to request the deletion of a container created by the function CreateStorage and referenced by its Container-Id. The MTD should delete container, the Container-Id and the Object-Id of the data stored in that container. TD_DeleteStorage (Session-Id, Container-Id) Returns a s... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5.4 TD_StoreData | The function TD_StoreData enables to store data in a container. The data shall remain accessible thanks to the returned Object-Id. This Object-Id is not deleted at the end of the session but will be deleted along with the function DeleteStorage. The container is viewed as a collection of objects addressable by their re... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.4.5.5 TD_GetStorageValue | TD_GetStorageValue allows returning an Object-Id value fetch from the Container-Id. This value can either be a DATA or a DB_KeyValue. TD_GetStorageValue (Session-Id, Container-Id, Object-Id) Returns a value and a status code. Table 35: TD_GetStorageValue command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Ses... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.6 Search capabilities | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.6.1 Container search | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.6.1.1 General | This interface enables searching in a container, hosted in the MTD. ETSI ETSI TS 103 457 V1.2.1 (2023-03) 25 |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.6.1.2 TD_GetStorage | TD_GetStorage requests the MTD to find the Container-Id of a named container. TD_GetStorage (Session-Id, Container-Name) Returns a Container-Id and a status code. Table 37: TD_GetStorage command Command parameter Status Description and Requirements Session-Id M See clause 6.3 Container-Name M See clause 6.3 Table 38: T... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 5.6.1.3 TD_Search | TD_Search searches for a value or an event in a container referenced by its Container-Id. An event is a pair (subject, context) where the search is performed on the Subject enriched with added Context information. TD_Search (Session-Id, Container-Id, DB_KeyValue|Event) Returns an Object-Id and a status code. Table 39: ... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 6 Encoding | |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 6.1 Message identifiers | These codes shall be used to identify the messages in the protocol. Table 41 Message Type Code Description TD_OpenConnection Command 0x01 Requests a connection with the MTD Response 0x02 TD_CloseConnection Command 0x03 Request the termination of the connection with the MTD Response 0x04 TD_CreateSession Command 0x10 Re... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 6.2 Type (TTLV) codes | Table 42 Type Code Length Symbol 0x1 1 byte ByteString 0x2 Variable Unicode String 0x3 Variable Integer 0x4 8 bytes Short Integer 0x5 2 bytes Pair 0x6 Variable UUID 0x7 16 bytes |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 6.3 Tag (TTLV) codes | Table 43 TAG Type TAG Code Description and requirements LTD-Id Unicode String 0x01 LTD identifier generated by the MTD LTD-Role Unicode String 0x02 Information about the LTD entity in the untrusted domain to the MTD enabling the MTD to behave accordingly at application level. CN Unicode String 0x03 Certificate common N... |
a13926dd9b404853ce5e5697d149890a | 103 457 | 6.4 Status Codes | Status Codes shall reflect the success of the function execution or the reason why the function failed. In order to do so, the status code is defined as a constant and specified in table 44. ETSI ETSI TS 103 457 V1.2.1 (2023-03) 29 Table 44 Constant Value Reason TDSC_SUCCESS 0x00 Function succeeded For TD_ functions, r... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 1 Scope | The present document presents the engineering and operational requirements for the application of the IPv6 transition technology 464XPAT as defined by ETSI TS 101 569-1 [1] (IPv6 Transition Requirements) implemented within an integrated broadband cable network end to end across its network domains. The present document... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 2 References | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: 4in6: encapsulation of IPv4 packets within IPv6 packet format NAT44: network address translation from an IPv4 address to another IPv4 address P Router: label switching router acting as a transit router in the core network of an MPLS ne... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 6PE IPv6 Provider Edge 6RD IPv6 Rapid Deployment AAAA Quad-A Resource Record ALG Application Layer Gateway AMPS Amplifiers ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASIC Application Specific Integrated Circuit B4 Basic Bridging ... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 4 General Considerations | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 4.1 Background | The present document is part of a series of ETSI technical specifications specifying requirements to engineer and operate the 464XPAT transition technology end to end across a cable operator's network. Its implementation would ensure the network provider can continue to provide business continuity throughout the deplet... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 4.2 General Overview | An objective of deploying the IPv6 transition technology is to provide a seamless experience to users accessing IPv6 network services through legacy IPv4 only networks and to enable current and new content to be delivered seamlessly to IPv4 users by deploying network address translation IPv4 to IPv6 (464XLAT). It shoul... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5 Domain Functionality | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.1 End-to-End Network Domains | In order to operate the IPv6 transition technology it has to be engineered and verified end to end across the cable broadband network addressing each of the domains as illustrated in figure 2. ETSI ETSI TS 103 443-5 V1.1.1 (2016-08) 12 Figure 2: Illustration of the Cable Broadband Network Domains |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.2 CPE Home Network Domain | 464XLAT enables a customer's device that is V4 to be supported across the Cable network when communicating to a V4 service. A device that is V4 only cannot communicate with a V6 service using 464XLAT. Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • The cable residential gateway device shall implement the CLAT fu... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.3 Access Network Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • The cable headend CMTS shall be capable of IPv6 connectivity for customer traffic. • The DOCSIS management between the Cable Modem and CMTS may be IPv4 or IPv6. NOTE: There are no additional requirements on the HFC distribution network i.e. AMPS, taps, etc. |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.4 Core Network Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • The core network routers shall support IPv6 routing and forwarding capabilities • NAT64 gateway shall be implemented as specified by IETF RFC 6146 [22] for further information on its operation refer also to IETF RFC 7269 [23]. Operation: A v6 client communicating w... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.5 Data Centre Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • The DNS64 shall be implemented when operating IPv6 transition technology NAT64. The requirements for DNS64 shall be in accordance with IETF RFC 6147 [24]. • The DSN64 functionality replaces the exiting DNS caching server within the cable network. Operation: For an ... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.6 DMZ Service Domain | Functionality required: • There are no specific operational requirements for the DMZ however it is strongly recommended that all services within the DMZ are IPv6 capable either by dual stack configuration or the use of V6/V4 load balancing. ETSI ETSI TS 103 443-5 V1.1.1 (2016-08) 14 • V6/V4 load balancers allow V6 acce... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.7 Transit and Peering Service Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: There are no changes to be engineered when considering the transit and peering domain since the transmit and peering links are dual stack and support both IPv6 and IPv4 packets simultaneously and therefore no specific additional requirements are needed to be defined ... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.8 Management and Monitoring Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • DOCSIS management between the CMTS and Cable Modem may remain deployed either using IPv4 or IPv6 addresses. • There is the additional functionality to monitor and manage the CLAT within the RG and monitor and manage the NAT64 gateway and DNS64 server in order to pr... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 5.9 Security Domain | Functionality to be engineered in the cable network: • The cable modem packet classifiers shall be updated to support IPv6 filtering. • The continuity of the security of the end to end service shall be maintained when operating NAT64, however the operational implications from NAT64 shall be minimized as specified in IE... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 6 Topologies | This clause explains the potential XLAT domain topologies. At the time of writing, two topologies are possible, the integrated topology and the hairpin topology; however, depending on future hardware and software developments, additional topologies may be introduced. Use of the integrated topology would provide the mos... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 7 Technical Considerations | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 7.1 General | The XLAT mechanism is used to access the IPv4-only content in the operator's network and to use 464XLAT IPv4 traffic to enable IPv4-only applications to work on IPv6-only networks. The 464XLAT architecture is a combination of stateless translation on the customer-side translator (CLAT) and stateful translation on the p... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 7.2 MTU and fragmentation | 464XLAT is an address family translation technology and has less MTU issues than tunnelling technologies. But this does not imply that MSS clamping, IPv4 fragmentation and IPv6 fragmentation are not required in order to avoid ICMP blocking. Fragmentation resends and general PMTU control can have performance effects on ... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 7.3 Reliability Considerations | To increase reliability and robustness or to distribute the load, network operators may decide to deploy multiple BNGs, to share load across a large network footprint. In the case of having multiple BNGs deployed, the IPv6 destination prefixes should be Anycast based if stateless and the client should hold a primary an... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 7.4 Quality of Service | The QoS policies defined by the cable operator for their network shall be engineered to operate properly with the new 464XLAT environment. QoS considerations are relative with PLAT deployments unlike XLAT. The QoS capabilities for 464XLAT are comparable to NAT64, see clause 9.5 of ETSI TS 103 443-2 [i.3]. A XLAT stream... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8 Technical Requirements | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.1 General | The client uses a SIIT translator to convert IPv4 packets into IPv6 to send (over an IPv6-only network) to a NAT64 translator which translates them back into IPv4 to send (over an IPv4-capable network) to an IPv4-only server. The SIIT translator (CLAT) may be implemented on the client itself or an intermediate IPv4-cap... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2 High Level Requirements | |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2.1 General | The requirements of the XLAT implementation are based on enabling seamless XLAT connections without degradation in service, access, functionality or speed. Two network components are involved in the end-to-end XLAT approach; the BNG and the CPE. Requirement considerations for both are given in the following clauses. |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2.2 BNG | The LSN device placed in the edge of the network (IXPE) as the IPv4 gateway to perform de-capsulation on the egress from a 4in6 packet to a pure IPv4 packet. Requirement considerations for BNG are: • Hardware Topology • Logical Topology • Software/Hardware Features • Scalability • Resilience and Redundancy • IP Allocat... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2.3 CPE | The CPE is a device in customer's home to encapsulate the traffic on egress from a pure IPv4 packet to a 4in6 packet. Requirement considerations for XLAT CPE are: • Hardware Topology • Logical Topology • Software/Hardware Features • Scalability • Stability • IP Allocation/DHCP (v4 & v6) • Forwarding performance |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2.4 Scalability | The details of the scalability are structured below showing the requirements for delivery in any single case/footprint. An XLAT solution can actually have lower scaling and performance capabilities than other transition technologies due to the address embedding and ALG requirement. So a minimum of 100 000 CPE addresses... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 8.2.5 Performance | To increase reliability and robustness or to distribute the load, cable operators may decide to deploy multiple LSNs, to share load across a large footprint. In the case of having multiple LSN's deployed, the IPv6 destination prefixes shall be Anycast based if stateless and the client should hold a primary and secondar... |
122385d04a1b332a77d6ba9f00ee6a59 | 103 443-5 | 9 XLAT Feature requirements | The XLAT technology feature is summarized in table x detailing for each function the requirement as required or optional with a brief description of each of the named functions. Table 1: Summary of 464XLAT Features Requirements Functional Name Requirement Description IETF RFC 6877 [18] Required 464XLAT: Combination of ... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 1 Scope | The present document is the first part of the Middlebox Security Protocol (MSP) series [i.22]. It is intended to be used by MSP profile developers, MSP profile implementors and MSP specification writers to create MSP profiles and analyse their security. The present document does not specify an MSP profile itself. The p... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 2 References | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks i... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 3.1 Terms | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply: access: legitimate addition into a connection NOTE: A middlebox can have legitimately-granted access to a connection, but still have insufficient middlebox permissions to modify data. (See also: authorized, permissions). application: software designed... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 3.2 Symbols | Void. |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 3.3 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: 5G 5th Generation AC Access Control (Principle) ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit CDN Content Delivery Network CIS® Center for Internet Security DDoS Distributed Denial of Service DP Data Protection (Principle) E Endpoint (Objective... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4 The Middlebox Security Protocol (MSP) Series | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.1 Introduction | Middleboxes, often referred to as proxies, are vital in modern networks - from new 5G deployments, with ever-faster networks that need performance management, to resisting new cyber attacks with evolved threat defence that copes with encrypted traffic, to VPN provision. Annex A of the present document describes the var... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.2 Introduction to the Middlebox Security Protocol (MSP) | Outside of the MSP series, the term "middlebox" refers to a variety of devices, use cases and functions: see Annex A. However, in the MSP series, a middlebox means a device that perform functions higher up the stack, at the security layer or for security-specific functions. (The term "proxy" is also commonly used outsi... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3 MSP architecture | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.1 Flexibility and extensibility | The range of architectures permitted by MSP is broad and open-ended: the entire MSP series is deliberately not limited to any architect. This is important to span a variety of use cases, to provide for the range of stakeholders and technologies that exist. Clauses 4.3.2 to 4.3.7 describe a non-exhaustive list of archit... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.2 Generic in-band MSP middlebox | The architecture depicted in Figure 4.1 shows a generic in-band middlebox setup, where the MSP middlebox shown is in an arbitrary in-band network position. NOTE: This is commonly called "on-path". Many use cases, such as performance functionality described in Clause A.4 and the architectures in Clauses 4.3.4 to 4.3.7, ... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.3 Generic out-of-band MSP middlebox | The architecture depicted in Figure 4.2 shows a generic out-of-band middlebox setup, where the MSP middlebox shown is in an arbitrary out-of-band position. NOTE: This is commonly called "off-path". This setup often uses a selective middlebox that forwards (on a separate traffic path) or stores data for further, slower ... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.4 Multiple clients per MSP middlebox | The architecture depicted in Figure 4.3 shows multiple clients connecting to one in-band MSP middlebox. This is often used for VPN provision or anonymization, and in home or enterprise firewalls for defence and filtering purposes. Figure 4.3: MSP architecture with multiple clients per MSP middlebox |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.5 Multiple servers per MSP middlebox | The architecture depicted in Figure 4.4 shows multiple servers connecting to one in-band MSP middlebox. This is a common deployment model for CDNs. These middleboxes often go by a different name, such as TLS-terminating "reverse proxies" or "client-facing server" [i.24]. Figure 4.4: MSP architecture with multiple serve... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.6 Multiple MSP middleboxes per connection | The architecture depicted in Figure 4.5 shows multiple in-band middleboxes in a connection, as well as one example out-of-band middlebox for logging. Such architectures often occur when both the client and server have a middlebox deployment; some middleboxes are within a client's network and some are within the server'... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 4.3.7 MSP middlebox locations | The architectures depicted in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 describe the location of MSP middleboxes in relation to the endpoints. This not does necessarily refer to geographical location but can hint to ownership of the MSP middlebox, its expected capabilities and capacities, and its common use cases. In Figure 4.6, the M... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5 MSP Framework | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.1 Introduction | Creating a new generation of middlebox security protocols brings an opportunity to set a new high standard of security and privacy for middlebox deployments. This new high standard is set through the MSP Framework described in Clause 5.4.2. The MSP Framework is formed from four principles, described fully in Clause 5.3... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.2 Motivation | The MSP Framework formed of four principles, which are driven by two top level objectives (for endpoints (E) and middleboxes (M) respectively) that are vital for middlebox deployments: E: Endpoints are able to access middlebox services securely; M: Middleboxes are able to provide services to endpoints securely. These t... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.3 Principles | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.3.1 Data Protection | The Data Protection principle refers to the well-understood concept of applying communications security to traffic carried by an MSP profile. Data Protection: Sensitive data is protected by endpoints and middleboxes. The Data Protection principle relates to two threats in the STRIDE methodology [i.23]: Information Disc... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.3.2 Transparency | The Transparency principle refers to participants having appropriate information about middleboxes and endpoints in an MSP connection. Transparency: Endpoints and middleboxes have suitable knowledge of other endpoints and middleboxes. The Transparency principle relates to one aspect of the STRIDE methodology [i.23]: Sp... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.3.3 Access Control | The Access Control principle refers to participants' ability to opt-out but also to opt-in to an MSP connection, without abuse of the participants. Access Control: Endpoints are in control of middlebox service provision. The Access Control principle relates to one aspect of the STRIDE methodology [i.23]: Elevation of P... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.3.4 Good Citizen | The Good Citizen principle is perhaps the least obvious principle; it means an MSP protocol cannot be used to attack other network entities, which typically manifests as traffic amplification in a DDoS attack [i.21]. This principle means MSP does not create significant amplification attacks on processing resources or n... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.4 Structure | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.4.1 Labels and hierarchy | The MSP Framework is hierarchical; each of the four principles is subdivided and forms a 'tree'. The level of detail increases through the 'branches' and 'sub-branches', until reaching detail where it is reasonably easy to judge whether each property is met ('leaves'). This results in the MSP Framework having different... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 5.4.2 MSP Framework contents | The MSP Framework is outlined in the present clause in Figure 5.3. The Template Requirements that fall within it are listed in full in Clauses 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5; their usage is described in Clause 6.1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 523-1 V1.1.1 (2020-12) 20 E: Endpoints are able to access middlebox services securely • E.DP: Dat... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6 MSP Template Requirements | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1 Usage | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.1 Overview | MSP Template Requirements, taken from the MSP Framework defined in Clause 5.4.2, are exhaustively listed in Clauses 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The MSP Template Requirements should be used by MSP profile developers, MSP profile implementors and MSP specification writers to write an MSP profile specification, analyse the sec... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.2 Stage 1: Selection Process | |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.2.1 Purpose | The MSP Template Requirements provide a template from which MSP profile developers, MSP profile implementors and MSP specification writers can select Profile Requirements that are particular to their use case and threat model. The procedure to transform MSP Template Requirements into Profile Requirements is the Selecti... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.2.2 Input: MSP Template Requirements | The MSP Framework, defined in Clause 5.4.2, was designed for flexibility and to respect a wide variety of use cases. This results in a breadth of optional MSP Template Requirements available for MSP profile developers, MSP profile implementors and MSP specification writers to select or not select during the Selection P... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.2.3 Output: Creating Profile Requirements | The Selection Process transforms MSP Template Requirements into Profile Requirements. The Selection Process assigns to each MSP Template Requirement one of five labels: 1) MSP-Mandatory (MM) 2) Profile-Mandatory (PM) 3) Profile-Optional (PO) 4) Profile-Not-Applicable (PNA) 5) Profile-Rejected (PR) The present clause co... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.3 Stage 2: Conformance Analysis | Conformance Analysis shall verify that MSP-Mandatory and Profile-Mandatory Profile Requirements are always met by any specification-compliant implementation. Conformance Analysis shall verify that Profile-Optional Profile Requirements are provided by the profile to be used when desired. A Conformance Analysis shall be ... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.4 Stage 3: Further analysis (optional) | An individual profile specification may include more security analysis specific to the profile that depends on its features and use case. The process of creating an MSP profile and writing an MSP profile specification is in practice iterative, but ultimately is presented in the profile specification as linear: analysin... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.1.5 Attacks external to MSP profiles (optional) | The attacks in the present clause are relate to factors outside of MSP profiles, so are out of scope for the security analysis in the present document; however, these factors and attacks still can be considered by MSP profile developers, MSP profile implementors and MSP specification writers when writing, using or crea... |
d4b7455827b6f3224f1fd9945f742ae1 | 103 523-1 | 6.2 MSP Template Requirements - Data Protection | The present clause defines the Data Protection Template Requirements, based on the principle defined in Clause 5.3.2. Table 6.2: Data Protection Template Requirements Ref Data Protection Template Requirement Mandatory / Optional E.DP.1 Endpoints shall protect confidentiality of sensitive data that they send. Mandatory ... |
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