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b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 6.7 ValidityRestriction | struct { ValidityRestrictionType type; select(type){ case time_end: Time32 end_validity; case time_start_and_end: Time32 start_validity; Time32 end_validity; case time_start_and_duration: Time32 start_validity; Duration duration; case region: GeographicRegion region; unknown: opaque data<var>; } } ValidityRestriction; ... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 6.8 ValidityRestrictionType | enum { time_end(0), time_start_and_end(1), time_start_and_duration(2), region(3), (2^8-1) } ValidityRestrictionType; This enumeration lists the possible types of restrictions to a certificate's validity. NOTE: This definition is not available in IEEE 1609.2 Draft D12 [i.2]. |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 6.9 ItsAidSsp | struct { IntX its_aid; opaque service_specific_permissions<var>; } ItsAidSsp; This structure defines how to encode an ITS-AID with associated Service Specific Permissions (SSP). service_specific_permissions shall have a maximum length of 31 octets. The definition of SSPs is out of scope of the present document. NOTE: T... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7 Security profiles | |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.1 Security profile for CAMs | This clause defines which fields shall be included in the SecuredMessage structure for Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) as well as the scope of application of cryptographic features applied to the header. These HeaderField elements shall be included in all CAMs. With the exception of signer_info, which is encoded ... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.2 Security profile for DENMs | This clause defines which fields shall always be included in the SecuredMessage structure for Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages (DENMs) as well as the scope of application of cryptographic features applied to the header. These HeaderField elements shall be included in all DENMs. With the exception of si... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.3 Generic security profile for other signed messages | This clause defines which fields shall always be included in the SecuredMessage structure for other signed messages as well as the scope of application of cryptographic features applied to the header. These HeaderField elements shall be included. With the exception of signer_info, which is encoded first, all header_fie... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.4 Profiles for certificates | |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.4.1 Introduction | Clause 7.4 defines which types of variable fields shall always be included in certificates. The version field of a certificate shall be set according to clause 6.1. The following SubjectAttribute elements shall be included: • verification_key: this field shall contain the public key of the key pair that is used to sign... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.4.2 Authorization tickets (pseudonymous certificates) | This clause defines additional aspects of authorization tickets (i.e. pseudonymous certificates) as defined in ETSI TS 102 940 [6]. For the field signer_info, exactly one of the following types shall be included: • certificate_digest_with_sha256. The SubjectInfo field of the authorization ticket shall be set to these v... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.4.3 Enrolment credential (long-term certificates) | This clause defines additional aspects of enrolment credentials (i.e. long-term certificates) as defined in ETSI TS 102 940 [6]. For the field signer_info, exactly one of the following types shall be included: • certificate_digest_with_sha256. In the SubjectInfo field of the enrolment credential, subject_type shall be ... |
b59c289c5793ee073de017c39c1aebc8 | 103 097 | 7.4.4 Certificate authority certificates | This clause defines additional aspects of certificate authority certificates. The following SignerInfo fields shall be included: • For root certificate authority certificates, the signer_info field shall be set to self. • For other certificate authorities, the signer_info field shall be set to certificate_digest_with_s... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 1 Scope and Introduction | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 1.1 Scope | The scope of the present document is to define the IPCablecom security architecture, protocols, algorithms, associated functional requirements and any technological requirements that can provide for the security of the system for the IPCablecom network. Authentication, access control, signalling and media content integ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 1.2 Goals | The present document describes the security relationships between the elements on the IPCablecom network. The general goals of the IPCablecom network security specification and any implementations that encompass the requirements defined herein should be: • Secure network communications - The IPCablecom network security... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 1.2.1 Assumptions | The following assumptions are made relative to the current scope of the present document: • Embedded Multimedia Terminal Adapters (E-MTAs) and Standalone Multimedia Terminal Adapters (S-MTAs) are within the scope of the present document. • NCS is the only call signalling method, on the access network, addressed in the ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 1.2.2 Requirements | The following requirement is made relative to the current scope of the IPCablecom Security Specification: • All E-MTAs are to use DOCSIS® (1.1 or later) compliant cable modems and implement BPI+ [9]. Any references to DOCSIS®, including specific references to DOCSIS® versions 1.1 or 2.0, are understood to refer to DOCS... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 161-2: "Access, Terminals, Transmission and Multiplexing (ATTM); Integrated Broadband Cable and Television Networks; IPCablecom 1.5; Part 2: Architectural framework for the delivery of time critical services ov... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. Not applicable. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: access control: limiting the flow of information from the resources of a system only to authorized persons, programs, processes, or other system resources on a network audio server: plays informational announcements in IPCablecom netwo... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard AH Authentication header AKE Authenticated Key Agreement AP Access Point AS Authentication Server ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASD Application-Specific Data ASN Access Service Networ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 4 Void | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5 Architectural Overview of IPCablecom Security | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1 IPCablecom Reference Architecture | Security requirements have been defined for every signalling and media link within the IPCablecom IP network. In order to understand the security requirements and specifications for IPCablecom, one must first understand the overall architecture. This clause presents a brief overview of the IPCablecom architecture. For ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.1 HFC Network | In figure 1, the Access Network between the MTAs and the CMTS is an HFC network, which employs DOCSIS® 1.1 physical layer and MAC layer protocols [8]. DOCSIS® BPI+ [9] and QoS protocols are enabled over this link. Managed IP Network PSTN Call Management Server (CMS ) Media Gateway Controller (MGC) OSS Backoffice Announ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.2 Call Management Server | In the context of voice communications applications, a central component of the system is the Call Management Server (CMS). It is involved in both call signalling and the establishment of Dynamic Quality of Service (DQoS). The CMS also performs queries at the PSTN Gateway for LNP (Local Number Portability) and other se... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3 Functional Categories | The IPCablecom Architecture Framework identifies the following functional categories within the architecture: • MTA device provisioning • Quality of Service (HFC access network and managed IP backbone) • Billing interface security • Security (specified herein) • Network call signalling (NCS) • PSTN interconnectivity • ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.1 Device and Service Provisioning | During MTA provisioning, the MTA gets its configuration with the help of the DHCP and TFTP servers, as well as the OSS. Provisioning interfaces need to be secured and have to configure the MTA with the appropriate security parameters (e.g. customer X.509 certificate signed by the Service Provider). The present document... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.2 Dynamic Quality of Service | IPCablecom provides guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS) for each voice communication within a single zone with Dynamic QoS (DQoS) [3]. DQoS is controlled by the Gate Controller function within the CMS and can guarantee Quality of Service within a single administrative domain. The Gate Controller utilizes the COPS proto... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.3 Billing System Interfaces | The CMS, CMTS and the PSTN Gateway are all required to send out billing event messages to the Record Keeping Server (RKS). This interface is currently specified to be RADIUS. Billing information should be checked for integrity and authenticity as well as kept private. The present document defines security requirements ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.4 Call Signalling | The call signalling architecture defined within IPCablecom is Network Based Call Signalling (NCS). The CMS is used to control call setup, termination and most other call signalling functions. In the NCS architecture [2], the Call Agent function within the CMS is used in call signalling and utilizes the MGCP protocol. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.5 PSTN Interconnectivity | The PSTN interface to the voice communications capabilities of the IPCablecom network is through the Signalling and Media Gateways (SG and MG). Both of these gateways are controlled with the MGC (Media Gateway Controller). The MGC may be standalone or combined with a CMS. For further detail on PSTN Gateways, refer to [... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.6 CODEC Functionality and Media Stream Mapping | The media stream between two MTAs or between an MTA and a PSTN Gateway utilizes the RTP protocol. Although BPI+ provides privacy over the HFC network, the potential threats within the rest of the voice communications network require that the RTP packets be encrypted end-to-end. NOTE 1: In general, it is possible for an... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.7 Audio Server Services | Audio Server interfaces provide a suite of signalling protocols for providing announcement and audio services in an IPCablecom network. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.7.1 Media Player Controller (MPC) | The Media Player Controller (MPC) initiates and manages all announcement services provided by the Media Player. The MPC accepts requests from the CMS and arranges for the MP to provide the announcement in the appropriate stream so that the user hears the announcement. The MPC also serves as the termination for certain ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.7.2 Media Player (MP) | The Media Player (MP) is a media resource server. It is responsible for receiving and interpreting commands from the MPC and for delivering the appropriate announcement(s) to the MTA. The MP provides the media stream with the announcement contents. The MP also is responsible for accepting and reporting user inputs (e.g... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.1.3.8 Lawful Interception | The event interface between the CMS and the DF provides descriptions of calls, necessary to perform wiretapping. This information includes the media stream encryption key and the corresponding encryption algorithm. This event interface uses RADIUS and is similar to the CMS-RKS interface. The COPS interface between the ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2 Threats | Figure 2 contains the interfaces that were analysed for security. There are additional interfaces identified in IPCablecom but for which protocols are not specified. In those cases, the corresponding security protocols are also not specified, and those interfaces are not listed in the figure 2. The interfaces for which... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1 Theft of Network Services | In the context of voice communications, the main services that may be stolen are: • Long distance service • Local (subscription) voice communications service • Video conferencing • Network-based three-way calling • Quality of Service |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.1 MTA Clones | One or more MTAs can masquerade as another MTA by duplicating its permanent identity and keys. The secret cryptographic keys may be obtained by either breaking the physical security of the MTA or by employing cryptanalysis. When an MTA is broken into the perpetrator can steal voice communications service and charge it ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.2 Other Clones | It is conceivable that the cryptographic identity of another network element, such as a CMTS or a CMS, may be cloned. Such an attack is most likely to be mounted by an insider such as a corrupt or disgruntled employee. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.3 Subscription Fraud | A customer sets up an account under false information. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.4 Non-Payment for Voice Communications Services | A customer stops paying his or her bill, but continues to use the MTA for voice communications service. This can happen if the network does not have an automated method to revoke the customer's access to the network. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.5 Protocol Attacks against an MTA | A weakness in the protocol can be manipulated to allow an MTA to authenticate to a network server with a false identity or hijack an existing voice communication. This includes replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 24 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.6 Protocol Attacks against Other Network Elements | A perpetrator might employ similar protocol attacks to masquerade as a different Network Element, such as a CMTS or a CMS. Such an attack may be used in collaboration with cooperating MTAs to steal service. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.7 Theft of Services Provided by the MTA | Services such as the support for multiple MTA ports, 3-way calling and call waiting may be implemented entirely in the MTA, without any required interaction with the network. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.7.1 Attacks | MTA code to support these services may be downloaded illegally by an MTA clone, in which case the clone has to interact with the network to get the download. In that case, this threat is no different from the network service theft described in clause 5.2.1.7. Alternatively, downloading an illegal code image using some ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.1.8 MTA Moved to Another Network | A leased MTA may be reconfigured and registered with another network, contrary to the intent and property rights of the leasing company. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.2 Bearer Channel Information Threats | This class of threats is concerned with the breaking of privacy of voice communications over the IP bearer channel. Threats against non-VoIP communications are not considered here and assumed to require additional security at the application layer. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.2.1 Attacks | Clones of MTAs and other Network Elements, as well as protocol manipulation attacks, also apply in the case of Bearer Channel Information threats. These attacks are already described under the Service Theft threats. MTA cloning attacks mounted by the actual owner of the MTA are less likely in this case, but not inconce... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.2.1.1 Off-line Cryptanalysis | Bearer channel information may be recorded and then analysed over a period of time, until the encryption keys are discovered through cryptanalysis. The discovered information may be of value even after a relatively long time has passed. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.3 Signalling Channel Information Threats | Signalling information, such as the caller identity and the services to which each customer subscribes may be collected for marketing purposes. The caller identity may also be used illegally to locate a customer that wishes to keep his or her location private. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.3.1 Attacks | Clones of MTAs and other Network Elements, as well as protocol manipulation attacks, also apply in the case of the Signalling Channel Information threats. These attacks were already described under the Service Theft threats. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 25 MTA cloning attacks mounted by the actual owner of t... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.3.1.1 Caller ID | A number of a party initiating a voice communication is revealed, even though a number is not generally available (i.e. is "unlisted") and the owner of that number enabled ID blocking. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.3.1.2 Information with Marketing Value | Dialled numbers and the type of service customer's use may be gathered for marketing purposes by other corporations. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.4 Service Disruption Threats | This class of threats is aimed at disrupting the normal operation of voice communications. The motives for denial-of- service attacks may be malicious intent against a particular individual or against the service provider. Or, perhaps a competitor wishes to degrade the performance of another service provider and use th... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.4.1 Attacks | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.4.1.1 Remote Interference | A perpetrator is able to manipulate the protocol to close down on-going voice communications. This might be achieved by masquerading as an MTA involved in such an on-going communication. The same effect may be achieved if the perpetrator impersonates another Network Element, such as a Gate Controller or an Edge Router ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.5 Repudiation | In a network where masquerading (using the above-mentioned cloning and protocol manipulation techniques) is common or easily achievable, a customer may repudiate a particular communication (and, thus deny responsibility for paying for it) on that basis. In addition, unless public key-based digital signatures are employ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.6 Threat Summary | This clause provides a summary of the above of threats and attacks and a brief assessment of their relative importance. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.6.1 Primary Threats | Theft of Service. Attacks are: • Subscription Fraud. This attack is prevalent in today's telephony systems (i.e. the PSTN) and requires little economic investment. It can only be addressed with a Fraud Management system. • Non-payment for services. Within the PSTN, telecommunications carriers usually do not prosecute t... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.2.6.2 Secondary Threats. | • Theft of MTA-based services. Based on the voice communications services that are planned for the near future, this threat does not appear to have potential for significant economic damage. This could possibly change with the introduction of new value-added services in the future. • Illegally registering a leased MTA ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3 Security Architecture | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.1 Overview of Security Interfaces | Figure 3 summarizes all of the IPCablecom security interfaces, including key management. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 28 pkt-s4: : RTCP (Cipher + HM AC / CM S-based KM ) pkt-s4: : RTCP (Cipher + HM AC / CM S-based KM ) pkt-s3: RTP (Cipher + HM AC / CM S-based KM ) pkt-s3: RTP (Cipher + HM AC / CM S-based KM ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.2 Security Assumptions | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.2.1 BPI+ CMTS Downstream Messages Are Trusted | As mentioned previously, it is assumed that CMTS downstream messages cannot be easily modified in transit and a CMTS can be impersonated only at great expense. Most messages secured in the present document either move over the shared IP network in addition to the DOCSIS® path, or do not go over DOCSIS® at all. In one c... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.2.2 Non-Repudiation Not Supported | Non-repudiation, in the present document, means that an originator of a message cannot deny that he or she sent that message. In this voice communications architecture, non-repudiation is not supported for most messages, with the exception of the top key management layer. This decision was based on the performance pena... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.2.3 Root Private Key Compromise Protection | The cryptographic mechanisms defined in the present document are based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). As is the case with most other architectures that are based on a PKI, there is no automated recovery path from a compromise of a Root Private Key. However, with proper safeguards, the probability of this happeni... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.2.4 Limited Prevention of Denial-of-Service Attacks | The present document does not attempt to address all or even most denial-of-service attacks. The cryptographic mechanisms defined in the present document prevent some denial-of-service attacks that are particularly easy to mount and are hard to detect. For example, they will prevent a compromised MTA from masquerading ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3 Susceptibility of Network Elements to Attack | This clause describes the amount and the type of trust that can be assumed for each element of the voice communications network. It also describes the specific threats that are possible if each network component is compromised. These threats are based on the functionality specified for each component. The general categ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.1 Managed IP Network | It is assumed that the same IP network may be shared between multiple, possibly competing service providers. It is also assumed that the service provider may provide multiple services on the same IP network, e.g. Internet connectivity. No assumptions can be made about the physical security of each link in this IP netwo... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.2 MTA | The MTA is considered to be an untrusted network element. It is operating inside customer premises, considered to be a hostile environment. It is assumed that a hostile adversary has the ability to open up the MTA and make software and even hardware modifications to fit his or her needs. This would be done in the priva... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.3 CMTS | The CMTS communicates both over the DOCSIS® path and over the shared IP network. When the CMTS sends downstream messages over the DOCSIS® path, it is assumed that a perpetrator cannot modify them or impersonate the CMTS. BPI+ over that path provides privacy. However, when the CMTS is communicating over the shared IP ne... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.4 Voice Communications Network Servers are Untrusted Network Elements | Application servers used for voice communications (e.g. CMS, RKS, Provisioning, OSS, DHCP and TFTP Servers) reside on the network and can potentially be impersonated or subjected to insider attacks. The main difference would be in the damage that can be incurred in the case a particular server is impersonated or compro... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.4.1 CMS | The Call Management Server is responsible for: • Authorizing individual voice communications by subscribers • QoS allocation ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 33 • Initializing the billing information in the CMTS • Distributing per communication keys for MTA-MTA signalling, bearer channel, and DQoS messages on th... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.4.2 RKS | The RKS is responsible for collecting billing events and reporting them to the billing system. A compromised RKS may result in: • Free or reduced-rate service due to improper reporting of statistics • Billing to a wrong account • Billing customers for communications that were never made, i.e. fabricating communications... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.4.3 OSS, DHCP and TFTP Servers | The OSS system is responsible for: • MTA and service provisioning • MTA code downloads and upgrades • Handling service change requests and dynamic reconfiguration of MTAs A compromise of the OSS, DHCP or TFTP server can result in: • MTAs running illegal code, which may: - Intentionally introduce bugs or render the MTA ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.5 PSTN Gateways | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.5.1 Media Gateway | The MG is responsible for: • Passing media packets between the IPCablecom network and the PSTN • Reporting statistics to the RKS A compromise of the MG may result in: • Service theft by reporting invalid information to the RKS • Loss of privacy on communications to/from the PSTN |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 5.3.3.5.2 Signalling Gateway | The SG is responsible for translating call signalling between the IPCablecom network and the PSTN. A compromise of the SG may result in: • Incorrect MTA identity reported to the PSTN • Unauthorized services enabled within the PSTN • Loss of PSTN connectivity • Unauthorized disclosure of customer identity, location (e.g... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6 Security Mechanisms | Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the following requirements apply to messages described by the present document: 1) ASN.1 encoded messages and objects must conform to the Distinguished Encoding Rules [36]. 2) FQDNs used as components of principal names and principal identifiers must be rendered in lower case. 3) FQD... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1 IPsec | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.1 Overview | IPsec provides network-layer security that runs immediately above the IP layer in the protocol stack. It provides security for the TCP or UDP layer and above. It consists of two protocols, IPsec ESP and IPsec AH, as specified in [19]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 35 IPsec ESP provides confidentiality and mes... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.2 IPCablecom Profile for IPsec ESP (Transport Mode) | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.2.1 IPsec ESP Transform Identifiers | IPsec Transform Identifier (1 byte) is used by IKE to negotiate an encryption algorithm that is used by IPsec. A list of available IPsec Transform Identifiers is specified in [21]. Within IPCablecom, the same Transform Identifiers are used by all IPsec key management protocols: IKE, Kerberos and application layer (embe... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.2.2 IPsec ESP Authentication Algorithms | The IPsec Authentication Algorithm (1-byte) is used by IKE to negotiate a packet-authentication algorithm that is used by IPsec. A list of available IPsec Authentication Algorithms is specified in [21]. Within IPCablecom, the same Authentication Algorithms are used by all IPsec key management protocols: IKE, Kerberos a... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.2.3 Replay Protection | In general, IPsec provides an optional replay-protection service (anti-replay service). An IPsec sequence number outside of the current anti-replay window is flagged as a replay and the packet is rejected. When the anti-replay service is turned on, an IPsec sequence number cannot overflow and roll over to 0. Before tha... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.1.2.4 Key Management Requirements | Within IPCablecom, IPsec is used on a number of different interfaces with different security and performance requirements. Because of this, several different key management protocols have been chosen for different IPCablecom interfaces. On some interfaces it is IKE (see clause 6.2), on other interfaces it is Kerberos/P... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.1 Overview | IPCablecom utilizes IKE as one of the key management protocols for IPsec [24]. It is utilized on interfaces where: • There is not a very large number of connections • The endpoints on each connection know about each other's identity in advance Within IPCablecom, IKE key management is completely asynchronous to call sig... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2 IPCablecom Profile for IKE | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.1 First IKE Phase | There are several modes defined for authentication during the first IKE phase. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.1.1 IKE Authentication with Signatures | In this mode, both peers must be authenticated with X.509 certificates and digital signatures. IPCablecom utilizes this IKE authentication mode on some IPsec interfaces. Whenever this mode is utilized, both sides must exchange X.509 certificates (although this is optional in [24]). |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.1.2 IKE Authentication with Public-Key Encryption | IPCablecom must not utilize this IKE authentication with public key encryption. In order to perform this mode of IKE authentication, the initiator must already have the responder's public key, which is not supported by IPCablecom. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.1.3 IKE Authentication with Pre-Shared Keys | A key derived by some out-of-band (e.g. manual) mechanism is used to authenticate the exchange. IPCablecom utilizes this IKE authentication mode on some IPsec interfaces. IPCablecom does not specify the out-of-band method for deriving pre-shared keys. When using pre-shared keys, the strength of the system is dependent ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.2 Second IKE Phase | In the second IKE phase, an IPsec ESP SA is established, including the IPsec ESP keys and ciphersuites. It is possible to establish multiple Security Associations with a single second-phase IKE exchange. First, a shared second phase secret is established, and then all the IPsec keying material is derived from it using ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.3 Encryption Algorithms for IKE Exchanges | Both phase 1 and phase 2 IKE exchanges include some symmetrically-encrypted messages. The encryption algorithms supported as part of the IPCablecom Profile for IKE must be the same algorithms identified in the IPCablecom profile for IPsec ESP in table 2 of clause 6.1.2.1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 38 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.4 Diffie-Hellman Groups | IKE defines specific sets of Diffie-Hellman parameters (i.e. prime and generator) that may be used for the phase 1 IKE exchanges. These are called groups in [24]. The use of Diffie-Hellman groups within IPCablecom IKE is identical to that specified in [24]: the first group must be supported and the remaining groups sho... |
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