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41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.2.2.5 Security Association Renegotiation | Renegotiation or rekeying of an IKE Security Association (SA) is triggered by the end of its lifetime as measured in elapsed time or number of kilobytes of data protected by the SA. Each peer should transition from the old SA to the new SA the same way to avoid interoperability problems. After successful IKE phase 1 IS... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.3 SNMPv3 | Any mention of SNMP in the present document without a specific reference to the SNMP protocol version must be interpreted as SNMPv3. IPCablecom supports use of SNMPv2c coexistence for network management operations for devices provisioned under the Basic Flow or the Hybrid Flow. It also supports the SNMPv3/v2c coexisten... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.3.1 SNMPv3 Transform Identifiers | The SNMPv3 Transform Identifier (1 byte) is used by Kerberized key management to negotiate an encryption algorithm for use by SNMPv3. For IPCablecom, the following SNMPv3 Transform Identifiers are supported. Table 4: SNMPv3 Transform Identifiers Transform ID Value (Hex) Key Size (in bits) Must be Supported Description ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.3.2 SNMPv3 Authentication Algorithms | SNMPv3 Authentication Algorithm (1 byte) is used by Kerberized key management to negotiate an SNMPv3 message authentication algorithm. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 39 For IPCablecom, the following SNMPv3 Authentication Algorithms are supported (both of which are specified in [28]). Table 5: SNMPv3 Authentica... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4 Kerberos / PKINIT | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.1 Overview | IPCablecom utilizes the concept of Kerberized IPsec for signalling between an Application Server, such as the CMS, and the MTA. This refers to the ability to create IPsec Security Associations using keys derived from the subkeys exchanged using the Kerberos AP Request/AP Reply messages. On this interface, Kerberos (ann... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.1.1 Kerberos Ticket Storage | Kerberos clients that store tickets in persistent storage will be able to re-use the same Kerberos ticket after a reboot. In the event that PKINIT is used, this avoids the need to perform public key operations. A Kerberos client must not obtain a new TGT upon reboot if it possesses a valid service ticket. An MTA must s... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2 PKINIT Exchange | Figure 5 illustrates how a client may use PKINIT to either obtain a TGT (phase 1) or a Kerberos ticket for an Application Server (phase 2). The PKINIT Request is carried as a Kerberos pre-authenticator field inside an AS Request and the PKINIT Reply is a pre-authenticator inside the AS Reply. The syntax of the Kerberos... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.1 PKINIT Profile for IPCablecom | A particular MTA implementation must utilize the PKINIT exchange to either obtain Application Server tickets directly, or obtain a TGT first and then use the TGT to obtain Application Server tickets. An MTA implementation may also support both uses of PKINIT, where the decision to get a TGT first or not is local to the... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.1.1 PKINIT Request | The PKINIT Request message (PA-PK-AS-REQ) in annex C is defined as: PA-PK-AS-REQ ::= SEQUENCE { signedAuthPack [0] ContentInfo, trustedCertifiers [1] SEQUENCE OF TrustedCas OPTIONAL, kdcCert [2] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL, encryptionCert [3] IssuerAndSerialNumber OPTIONAL } The following fields must be present in P... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.1.2 PKINIT Reply | The PKINIT Reply message (PA-PK-AS-REP) in annex C is defined as follows: PA-PK-AS-REP ::= CHOICE { dhSignedData [0] ContentInfo, encKeyPack [1] ContentInfo } IPCablecom must use only the dhSignedData choice, which is needed for a Diffie-Hellman exchange. The value of the Kerberos session key is not present in PA-PK-AS... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.1.3 Pre-Authenticator for Provisioning Server Location | An AS Request sent by the MTA must include this PROV-SRV-LOCATION pre-authenticator that the KDC can use to locate the Provisioning Server. The pre-authenticator type must be -1 (according to annex B, the negative type is used for application-specific pre- authenticators). Its ASN.1 encoding is specified as: PROV-SRV-L... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.2 Profile for the Kerberos AS Request / AS Reply Messages | As mentioned earlier, the PKINIT Request and Reply are pre-authenticator fields embedded into the AS Request / AS Reply messages. The IPCablecom-specific PROV-SRV-LOCATION pre-authenticator must be used in combination with PKINIT. All other pre-authenticators must not be used in combination with PKINIT. The optional fi... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.2.3 Profile for Kerberos Tickets | In Kerberos Tickets, authorization-data, starttime and renew-till optional fields must not be present. The optional caddr field must be present when requested in an AS-REQUEST or when present in a TGT of a TGS Request (see annex B). The only ticket flags that are supported within IPCablecom are the INITIAL, PRE-AUTHENT... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.3 Symmetric Key AS Request / AS Reply Exchange | In IPCablecom, a Kerberos client may use standard symmetric-key authentication (with a client key) during the AS Request / AS Reply exchange. Also, in IPCablecom, a client not utilizing PKINIT is, at the same time, an Application Server for which other clients might obtain tickets. This means that an IPCablecom entity ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.3.1 Profile for the Symmetric Key AS Request / AS Reply Exchanges | The content of the AS Request / AS Reply messages is the same as in the case of the PKINIT preauthentication (see clause 6.4.2.1) with the exception of the type of the preauthenticator that is used. In general, clients using a symmetric-key form of the AS Request / AS Reply exchange are not required to always possess a... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.4 Kerberos TGS Request / TGS Reply Exchange | In the cases where a client obtained a TGT, that TGT is then used in the TGS Request / TGS Reply exchange to obtain a specific Application Server ticket. This is part of the Kerberos standard, as it is specified in annex B. A TGS Request includes a KRB_AP_REQ data structure (the same structure used in an AP Request: se... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.4.1 TGS Request Profile | The optional padata element in the KDC-REQ data structure must consist of exactly one element - a preauthenticator of type PA-TGS-REQ. The value of this preauthenticator is the KRB_AP_REQ data structure. Within KRB_AP_REQ: 1) Options in the ap-options field must not be present. 2) The ticket is the TGT. 3) The encrypte... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.4.2 TGS Reply Profile | In the TGS Reply, key-expiration, starttime and renew-till optional fields must not be present. The encrypted part of the TGS Reply must be encrypted with the encryption type set to des3-cbc-md5, using the same procedure as described in clause 6.4.2.2. Upon receipt of a TGS Reply, the client must: 1) use the value of t... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.4.3 Error Reply | If the KDC is able to successfully parse the TGS Request and the TGT that is inside of it, but the TGS Request is rejected, it must return a Kerberos error message of type KRB_ERROR, as defined in annex B. The error message must include the optional e-cksum member, which is the keyed hash over the KRB_ERROR message. Th... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5 Kerberos Server Locations and Naming Conventions | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5.1 Kerberos Realms | A realm name may use the same syntax as a domain name, however Kerberos Realms must be in all capitals. For a full specification of Kerberos realms, refer to annex B. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5.2 KDC | Kerberos principal identifier for the local KDC when it is in a role of issuing tickets is always: krbtgt/<realm>@<realm>, where <realm> is the Kerberos realm corresponding to the particular IPCablecom zone. This is the service name listed inside a TGT. A Kerberos client must query KDC FQDNs for a particular realm name... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5.3 CMS | A CMS Kerberos principal identifier must be constructed from the CMS FQDN as follows: cms/<FQDN>@<realm> where <FQDN> is the CMS's FQDN (in lower case) and <realm> is its Kerberos realm. For example, a CMS with an FQDN 'iptel-cms1.company1.com' and with a realm name 'COMPANY1.COM' would have the principal identifier: c... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5.4 Provisioning Server | When an IPCablecom MTA Provisioning Server is acting in the role of an SNMP manager, it must use a principal name of type NT-SRV-HST (3) with the following two components: 1) "mtaprovsrvr" (without quotes) 2) the FQDN of the Provisioning Server (in lower case) In ASCII representation, the Provisioning Server's principa... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.5.5 Names of Other Kerberized Services | All Kerberized services within IPCablecom, except for the KDC krbtgt service (see 6.4.5.2), must be assigned a service principal name of type KRB_NT_SRV_HST (Value=3), which has the following form according to the Kerberos specification: <service name>/<FQDN> This means that the first component of the service principal... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.6 MTA Principal Names | An MTA principal name must be of type NT-SRV-HST with exactly two components, where the first component must be the string "mta" (not including the quotes) and the second component must be the FQDN of the MTA: mta/<MTA FQDN> where <MTA FQDN> is the FQDN of the MTA in lower case. For example, if an MTA FQDN is "mta12345... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.7 Mapping of MTA MAC Address to MTA FQDN | The MTA authenticates itself with the MTA Device Certificate in the AS Request, where the certificate contains the MTA MAC address but not its FQDN. In order to authenticate the MTA principal name (containing the FQDN), the KDC must map the MTA MAC address (from the MTA Device certificate) to the MTA FQDN, in order to ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.7.1 MTA FQDN Request | The KDC must first verify the digital signature and certificate chain in the PKINIT Request, before sending out an MTA FQDN Request message to determine the MTA MAC address to FQDN mapping. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 57 In the case where the PKINIT Request and certificate signatures are all valid but the m... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.7.2 MTA FQDN Reply | The MTA FQDN Reply must be formatted as follows. Table 8: MTA FQDN Format Field Name Length Description KRB_AP_REP Variable DER-encoded, the length is in the ASN.1 header KRB_SAFE Variable DER-encoded The encrypted part of the KRB_AP_REP must contain the following field, which is optional in Kerberos: • seq-number - ec... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.7.3 MTA FQDN Error | If the Provisioning Server is able to successfully parse the KRB_AP_REQ and the ticket that is inside of it, but the MTA FQDN Request is rejected, it must return an error message. All errors must be returned as a KRB_ERROR message, as specified in annex B. It must include typed-data of REQ- SEQ to bind the error messag... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.8 Server Key Management Time Out Procedure | The Kerberos client must implement a retransmission strategy using exponential back-off with configurable initial and maximum retransmission timer values for any KDC or application server requests that have not been acknowledged by the server. The Kerberos client must update the client timestamp field with the current ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.4.9 Service Key Versioning | The service key that is shared between a KDC and an application server, to encrypt/decrypt service tickets, is a versioned key (refer to annex B). This key may be changed either due to a routine key refresh, or because it was compromised. When the Service key is changed, the application server must retain the older key... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5 Kerberized Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.1 Overview | This clause specifies how Kerberos tickets are used to perform key management between a client and an Application Server, where a client is able to get a Kerberos ticket for the server but not the other way around. The same protocol described here applies in a symmetric case - where both sides of a key management inter... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2 Kerberized Key Management Messages | Figure 8 illustrates an AP Request / AP Reply exchange. secure session MTA Application Server Ticket, Session Key subkey security parameters Service Key { } { } { { } } subkey security parameters (3) AP Reply: time + subkey encrypted with session key Application Specific Data (e.g., SPI for IPsec) selected ciphersuite ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.1 Rekey Messages | The Rekey message replaces the Wake Up message and provides better performance, whenever a receiver (Application Server) wants to trigger the establishment of a Security Parameter with a specified Client. The Rekey message requires the availability of the shared Server Authentication Key, which is not always available.... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.2 IPCablecom Profile for KRB_AP_REQ / KRB_AP_REP Messages | In the KRB_AP_REQ, only the following option is supported: • MUTUAL-REQUIRED - mutual authentication required. When this option is set, the server must respond with an AP Reply message. When this option is not set, the AP Reply message must not be sent in reply. All other options must not be set. If an application serv... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.3 Error Handling | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.3.1 Error Reply | If the Application Server is able to successfully parse the AP Request and the ticket that is inside of it, but the AP Request is rejected, it must return an error message. This error message must be formatted as the concatenation of the following fields: • Key Management Message ID - 1 byte value. Always set to 0x06. ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.3.2 Clock Skew Error | When the Application Server clock and the client clock are off by more than the limit for a clock skew, an error code KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW must be returned. The value for the maximum clock skew allowed by the Application Server must not exceed 5 minutes. The optional client's time in the KRB_ERROR must be filled out, and th... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.2.3.3 Handling Ticket Errors After a Wake Up | 6.5.2.3.3.1 KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER after a Wake Up This clause addresses a scenario when an application server sends a Wake Up to a client and subsequently receives an AP Request that contains a ticket that is encrypted using an obsolete service key (results in the KRB_AP_ERR_BADKEYVER error code). This error normally re... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3 Kerberized IPsec | This clause specifies the Kerberized key management profile specific to IPsec ESP in transport mode. IPsec uses the term Security Association (SA) to refer to a set of security parameters. IPsec Security Associations are always uni- directional and they must always be established in pairs within IPCablecom. An MTA must... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.1 Derivation of IPsec Keys | After the Application Server sends out an AP Reply message, it is ready to derive a new set of IPsec keys. Similarly, after the Client receives this AP Reply, it is ready to derive the same set of keys for IPsec. This clause specifies how the IPsec keys are derived from the Kerberos subkey. The size of the Kerberos sub... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.2 Periodic Re-establishment of IPsec Security Associations | An IPsec SA is defined with an expiration time TEXP and a grace period GPIPsec. The clauses below specify how both the Client and the Application Server handle the re-establishment of IPsec Security Associations (re-establish flag was TRUE in the AP Reply). When the re-establishment of IPsec SAs is required there must ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.2.1 Periodic Re-establishment of IPsec SAs at the Client | If the re-establish flag is set, the Client must attempt to establish a new set of IPsec SAs (one for each direction) starting at the time TEXP - GPIPsec. At this time, the Client must send an AP Request as specified in clause 6.5. The destination IP Address of the AP Request message must be the destination IP Address ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.2.2 Periodic Re-establishment of IPsec SAs at the Application Server | When an AP Request message is received with re-establish flag set, the Application Server must perform the applicable processing steps in clause 6.5.2. If the client is an MTA, the Application Server must also verify that the source IP address in the received datagram of the AP Request message is the same IP address as... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.3 Expiration of IPsec SAs | An IPsec SA is defined with an expiration time TEXP and a grace period GPIPsec. This clause specifies how both the Client and the Application Server must handle the expiration of IPsec Security Associations (re-establish flag was FALSE in the AP Reply). At the Client: • Outgoing SA expires at TEXP • Incoming SA expires... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.4 Initial Establishment of IPsec SAs | When a Client is rebooted, it does not have any current IPsec SAs established with the Application Server, since IPsec SAs are not saved in non-volatile memory. In order to re-establish them, it must go through the recovery procedure that is described in clause 6.5.3.5. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 74 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.5 On-demand Establishment of IPsec SAs | This clause describes the recovery steps that must be taken in the case that an IPsec SA is somehow lost and needs to be re-established. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.5.1 Client Loses an Outgoing IPsec SA | If a client attempts to send a Signalling message to the Application Server without a valid IPsec SA, the IPsec layer in the Client will realize the SA is missing and return an error back to the Signalling application. In this case, the following recovery steps must be taken at the key management layer: 1) The Client f... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.5.2 Client Loses an Incoming IPsec SA | When the Client receives an IP packet from an Application Server on an unrecognized IPsec SA, the Client must ignore this error and the packet must be dropped. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.5.3 Application Server Loses an Outgoing IPsec SA | When an Application Server attempts to send a Signalling message to the Client, and the IPsec layer in the Application Server realizes a valid SA is missing, the IPsec layer must return an error back to the Signalling application. NOTE: In this case, there are no actual messages exchanged between the MTA and the CMS or... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.5.4 Application Server Loses an Incoming IPsec SA | When the Application Server receives an IP packet from a Client on an unrecognized IPsec SA, the Application Server must ignore this error and the packet must be dropped. In this case, any attempt at recovery (e.g. establishing a new SA) is prone to denial-of-service attacks. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.3.6 IPsec-Specific Errors Returned in KRB_ERROR | Inside AppSpecificTypedData the oid field must be set to: enterprises (1.3.6.1.4.1) cableLabs (4491) clabProjects (2) clabProjPacketCable (2) pktcSecurity (4) errorCodes (1) ipSec (1). The data-value field must correspond to the following typed-data value: PktcKrbIpsecError ::= SEQUENCE { e-code [0] INTEGER, e-text [1]... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4 Kerberized SNMPv3 | This clause specifies the Kerberized key management profile specific to SNMPv3, see [28]. In the case of SNMPv3, the security parameters are associated with the usmUserName (SNMPv3 user name), the agent's usmUserEngineID (SNMPv3 engine ID) and the manager's usmUserEngineID. Multiple SNMP managers on different hosts but... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.1 Derivation of SNMPv3 Keys | After the server sends out an AP Reply message, it is ready to derive a new set of SNMPv3 keys. Similarly, after the client receives this AP Reply, it is ready to derive the same set of keys for SNMPv3. This clause specifies how the SNMPv3 keys are derived from the Kerberos subkey. The size of the Kerberos subkey must ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.2 Periodic Re-establishment of SNMPv3 Keys | Periodic re-establishment of SNMPv3 keys, where the next set of keys is created before the old one expired, is currently not supported by IPCablecom. The re-establish flag in the AP Reply key management message must be set to FALSE. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.3 Expiration of SNMPv3 Keys | Expiration of SNMPv3 keys is currently not supported by IPCablecom. The values of the Security Parameters Lifetime and Grace Period fields in the AP Reply must be set to 0. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.4 Initial Establishment of SNMPv3 Keys | When a client is rebooted, it may not have any saved SNMPv3 keys established with the SNMP Manager. In order to re-establish them, it goes through the recovery procedure that is described in clause 6.5.4.5.1. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.5 Error Recovery | This clause describes the recovery steps that must be taken in the case that SNMPv3 keys are somehow lost and need to be re-established. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.5.1 SNMP Agent Wishes to Send with Missing SNMPv3 Keys. | In the case of SNMP, an SNMP agent is not responsible for re-establishing SNMPv3 keys because it does not send unsolicited requests to the Provisioning Server after the initial provisioning is done. Still, an SNMP agent could attempt to re-establish SNMPv3 keys after it gets an SNMPv3 authentication error back from the... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.5.2 SNMP Agent Receives with Missing SNMPv3 Keys | If SNMP agent receives a request from SNMP manager and is unable to find SNMPv3 keys for the specified USM User Name, the agent must process the SNMP message according to [28] and [38]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.5.3 SNMP Manager Wishes to Send with Missing SNMPv3 Keys | SNMP manager attempts to send a message to the agent and does not find the desired user's SNMPv3 keys (or considers the existing SNMPv3 keys invalid or compromised). In this case, the following recovery steps must be taken at the key management layer: 1) Manager sends a Wake Up message to the agent. ETSI ETSI TS 103 16... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.5.4.6 SNMPv3-Specific Errors Returned in KRB_ERROR | Inside AppSpecificTypedData the oid field must be set to: enterprises (1.3.6.1.4.1) cableLabs (4491) clabProjects (2) clabProjPacketCable (2) pktcSecurity (4) errorCodes (1) snmpv3 (2). The data-value field must correspond to the following typed-data value: PktcKrbSnmpv3Error ::= SEQUENCE { e-code [0] INTEGER, e-text [... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.6 End-to-End Security for RTP | RTP security is currently fully specified in clause 7.6.2.1. Key Management for RTP requires that both the (encryption) Transform ID and the Authentication Algorithm are specified, analogous to the IPsec key management. This clause lists the Transform IDs and Authentication Algorithms that are available for RTP securit... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.7 End-to-End Security for RTCP | RTCP security is currently fully specified in clause 7.6.2.2. Key Management for RTCP requires that both the (encryption) Transform ID and the Authentication Algorithm be specified. This clause lists the Transform IDs and Authentication Algorithms that are available for RTCP security. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (201... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.8 BPI+ | All E-MTAs and S-MTAs must use DOCSIS® 1.1 compliant cable modems that implement BPI+ [9]. Baseline Privacy Plus (BPI+) provides security services to the DOCSIS® 1.1 data link layer traffic flows running across the cable access network, i.e. between CM and CMTS. These services are message confidentiality and access con... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9 TLS | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.1 Overview | The TLS protocol [17] provides privacy and data integrity over a reliable transport layer protocol such as TCP. The protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol is used to securely encapsulate upper layer protocols, while the TLS Handshake Protocol ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.2 IPCablecom Profile for TLS with SIP | Unless specified within the present document, IPCablecom SIP interfaces requiring TLS must be compliant with the TLS specification [17] and any requirements specified in [40] relating to its usage in SIP. TLS [17] supports the negotiation and use of compression methods. However, since these methods are not specified wi... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.2.1 TLS Ciphersuites | In TLS, the ciphersuite includes the authenticated key agreement (AKE) method used in the TLS handshake, as well as encryption and authentication ciphers used to secure the record layer. Ciphersuites are negotiated with the TLS client presenting a list of supported ciphersuites in the Client Hello message, and the serv... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.2.2 IPCablecom TLS Certificates | TLS is a client-server based protocol with optional client authentication. However, in IPCablecom, mutual authentication using RSA based certificates must be used. The TLS server must send a Certificate Request to the client. Both the TLS client and server certificates must conform to the IPCablecom Server Certificate ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.2.3 Connection Persistence and Re-Use | Since TCP connection and TLS session establishment (which relies on TCP) can be quite costly both in terms of performance and network latency, they are not suited for on-demand SIP signalling. As such, TLS sessions should be kept persistent as much as possible and SIP connection re-use should be supported. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 6.9.2.4 Session Caching | In TLS, it is possible to resume a previous session if it has been cached on both the TLS client and server. Resuming sessions drastically speeds up the session establishment, as fewer messages are exchanged and authentication is based on symmetric key cryptography. In IPCablecom, TLS session caching should be supporte... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7 Security Profile | The IPCablecom architecture defines over half a dozen networked components and the protocol interfaces between them. These networked components include the media terminal adapter (MTA), call management server (CMS), signalling gateway (SG), media gateway (MG) and a variety of OSS systems (DHCP, TFTP and DNS servers, ne... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1 Device and Service Provisioning | Device provisioning is the process by which an MTA is configured to support voice communications service. The MTA provisioning process is specified in [4]. Figure 10 illustrates only the flows involved with the Secure provisioning processes. The provisioning specification lays out in detail these Secure Provisioning fl... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1 Device Provisioning | Device provisioning occurs when an MTA device is inserted into the network. A provisioned MTA device that is not yet associated with a billing record may have minimal voice communications service available. Device provisioning involves the MTA making itself visible to the network, obtaining its IP configuration and dow... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.1 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.1.1 MTA-DHCP Server | Authentication and Message Integrity is desirable on this interface, in order to prevent denial-of-service attacks that cause an MTA to be improperly configured. Securing DHCP is considered an operational issue to be evaluated by each network operator. It is possible to use access control through the local DHCP relay i... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.1.2 MTA-SNMP Manager | This clause applies to all SNMPv3 messages between the MTA and an SNMPv3 Manager. Within the IPCablecom architecture, the Provisioning Server includes the SNMPv3 Manager function, although SNMPv3 traffic occurs both during and after the provisioning phase. Authentication: the identity of the MTA that is sending configu... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.1.3 MTA-Provisioning Server, via TFTP Server | Authentication: required to prevent denial-of-service attacks that cause an MTA to be improperly configured. Message Integrity: required to prevent denial-of-service attacks that cause an MTA to be either improperly configured or configured with old configuration data that was replayed. Confidentiality: optional, it is... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.2 Cryptographic Mechanisms | 7.1.1.2.1 Call Flows MTA-15, 16, 17: MTA-SNMP Manager: SNMP Inform/Get Requests/Responses All SNMP traffic between the MTA and the SNMP Manager in both directions is protected with SNMPv3 security [28] during the Secure Provisioning process. IPCablecom requires that SNMPv3 message authentication is always turned on wit... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.2.2 Call Flow MTA-18: Provisioning Server-TFTP Server: Create MTA Config File | This clause describes the MTA Config file creation in the Secure Provisioning Flow. In this flow, the Provisioning Server builds an MTA device configuration file. This file must contain the following configuration info for each endpoint (port) in the MTA: • CMS name (FQDN format) • Kerberos Realm for this CMS • Telepho... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.2.3 Call Flows MTA-19, 20 and 21: Establish TFTP Server Location | This set of call flows is used to establish the IP address of the TFTP server from where the MTA will retrieve its configuration file. Although flow MTA-19 is authenticated via SNMPv3, MTA-20 and 21 are not authenticated. Flow MTA-21 allows for denial-of-service attacks, where the MTA is pointed to a wrong TFTP server ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.2.4 Call Flows MTA-22, 23: MTA-TFTP Server: TFTP Get/Get Response | The TFTP get request is not authenticated and thus anyone can request an MTA configuration file. This file does not contain any sensitive data and may be encrypted with the Provisioning Server-MTA shared key if the Provisioning Server chooses to. In this case no one except the MTA can make use of this file. This flow i... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.2.5 Security Flows | For each CMS specified in the pktcMtaDevCmsTable table with pktcMtaDevCmsIpsecCtrl value set to true and assigned to a provisioned MTA endpoint, the MTA must perform the following security flows after the provisioning process and prior to any NCS message exchange. For each CMS specified in pktcMtaDevCmsTable with pktcM... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.3 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.3.1 MTA - SNMP Manager | Key Management for the MTA-Provisioning SNMPv3 user must use the Kerberized key management protocol as it is specified in clause 6.5.4. The MTA and the Provisioning Server must support this key management protocol. Additional SNMPv3 users may be created with the standard SNMPv3 cloning method [28] or with the same Kerb... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.3.2 MTA - TFTP Server | The optional encryption key for the MTA configuration file is passed to the MTA with an SNMP Set command (by the Provisioning Server) shown in the provisioning flow MTA-19. SNMPv3 security is utilized to provide message integrity and privacy. In the event that SNMPv3 privacy is not enabled, the MTA configuration file m... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.4 MTA Embedded Keys | The MTA device must be manufactured with a public/private RSA key pair and an X.509 device certificate that must be different from the BPI+ device certificate. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.1.5 Summary Security Profile Matrix - Device Provisioning | The following matrix applies only to the Secure Provisioning Flow and SNMPv3. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 92 Table 22: Security Profile Matrix - MTA Device Provisioning SNMP TFTP (MTA - TFTP server) authentication Yes Yes: authentication of source of configuration data. access control Yes: write access to M... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.1.2 Subscriber Enrolment | The subscriber enrolment process establishes a permanent customer billing account that uniquely identifies the MTA to the CMS via the endpoint ID, which contains the MTA's FQDN. The billing account is also used to identify the services subscribed to by the customer for the MTA. Subscriber enrolment may occur in-band or... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2 Quality of Service (QoS) Signalling | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1 Dynamic Quality of Service (DQoS) | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.1 Reference architecture for embedded MTAs | CMS/Gate Controller pkt-q3 CM CM MTA Record Keeping Server Record Keeping Server CMTS CMTS CMS/Gate Controller pkt-q5 pkt-q5 pkt-q4 pkt-q2 pkt-q7 pkt-q3 pkt-q1 pkt-q2 pkt-q4 pkt-q1 pkt-q6 pkt-q6 MTA Figure 11: QoS Signalling Interfaces in IPCablecom Network |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.2 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.2.1 CM-CMTS DOCSIS® 1.1 QoS Messages | Refer to the DOCSIS® 1.1 RFI specification [8]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.2.2 Gate Controller - CMTS COPS Messages | Authentication, Access Control and Message Integrity: required to prevent QoS theft and denial-of-service attacks. Confidentiality: required to keep customer information private. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms |
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