hash stringlengths 32 32 | doc_id stringlengths 7 13 | section stringlengths 3 121 | content stringlengths 0 2.2M |
|---|---|---|---|
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.3.1 CM-CMTS DOCSIS® 1.1 QoS Messages | The DOCSIS® 1.1 QoS messages are specified in the DOCSIS® 1.1 RFI specification [8]. 7.2.1.3.1.1 QoS Service Flow A Service Flow is a DOCSIS® MAC-layer transport service that provides unidirectional transport of packets either to upstream packets transmitted by the CM or to downstream packets transmitted by the CMTS. A... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.3.2 Gate Controller - CMTS COPS Messages | To download a QoS policy for a particular communications connection, the Gate Controller function in the CMS must send COPS messages to the CMTS. These COPS messages must be both authenticated and encrypted with IPsec ESP. Refer to clause 6.1.2 on the details of how IPsec ESP is used within IPCablecom and for the list ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.4 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.4.1 Gate Controller - CMTS COPS Messages | Key management for this COPS interface is either IKE or Kerberos. Implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys. Implementations may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys. For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2. For more informat... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.2.1.4.2 Security Profile Matrix Summary | Table 23: Security Profile Matrix - DQoS COPS (CMTS-CMS) Authentication Yes access control Yes Integrity Yes Confidentiality yes non-repudiation No security mechanisms IPsec with encryption and message integrity IKE or Kerberos ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 95 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3 Billing System Interfaces | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.1 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.1.1 CMS-RKS Interface | Authentication, Access Control and Message Integrity: required to prevent service theft and denial-of-service attacks. Want to insure that the billing events reported to the RKS are not falsified. Confidentiality: required to protect subscriber information and communication patterns. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.1.2 CMTS-RKS Interface | Authentication, Access Control and Message Integrity: required to prevent service theft and denial-of-service attacks. Want to insure that the billing events reported to the RKS are not falsified. Confidentiality: required to protect subscriber information and communication patterns. Also, effective QoS information and... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.1.3 MGC - RKS Interface | Authentication, Access Control and Message Integrity: required to prevent service theft and denial-of-service attacks. Want to insure that the billing events reported to the RKS are not falsified. Confidentiality: required to protect subscriber information and communication patterns. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.2 Cryptographic Mechanisms | Both message integrity and privacy must be provided by IPsec ESP, using any of the ciphersuites that are listed in clause 6.1.2. RADIUS itself defines MD5-based keyed MAC for message integrity at the application layer. And, there does not appear to be a way to turn off this additional integrity check at the application... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.2.1 RADIUS Server Chaining | RADIUS servers may be chained. This means that when the local RADIUS server that is directly talking to the CMS or CMTS client is not able to process a message, it forwards it to the next server in the chain. IPCablecom specifies security mechanisms only on the links to the local RADIUS server. IPCablecom also requires... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.3 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.3.1 Key CMS - RKS Interface | The CMS and the RKS must negotiate a shared secret (CMS-RKS Secret) using IKE or Kerberos with symmetric keys (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.3.2 CMTS - RKS Interface | The CMTS and the RKS must negotiate a shared secret (CMTS-RKS Secret) using IKE or Kerberos (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2. ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.3.3 MGC - RKS Interface | The MGC and the RKS must negotiate a shared secret (MGC-RKS Secret) using IKE or Kerberos (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using pre-shared keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2. F... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.3.4 Billing System Summary Security Profile Matrix | Table 24: Security Profile Matrix - RADIUS RADIUS Accounting (CMS - RADIUS Server/RKS) RADIUS Accounting (CMTS - RADIUS Server/RKS) RADIUS Accounting (MGC - RADIUS Server/RKS) authentication yes yes yes access control yes yes yes integrity yes yes yes confidentiality yes yes yes non-repudiation no no no security mechan... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4 Call Signalling | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1 Network Call Signalling (NCS) | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.1 Reference Architecture | Figure 12 shows the network components and the various interfaces to be discussed in this clause. Remote MTA CMS a CMS b (Call Agent Cluster) Remote CMS MTA pkt-s3: RTP pkt-s4: RTCP pkt-s5: NCS pkt-s16: CMSS Figure 12: NCS Reference Architecture Figure 12 shows a CMS containing a cluster of Call Agents, which are ident... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.2 Security Services | The same set of requirements applies to both CMS-MTA and CMS-CMS signalling interfaces. Authentication: signalling messages should be authenticated, in order to prevent a third party masquerading as either an authorized MTA, CMS, MGC, or SIP Proxy. Confidentiality: NCS messages carry dialled numbers and other customer ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms | IPsec ESP must be used to secure the NCS signalling between the CMS and MTA. IPsec keys must be derived using the mechanism described in clause 6.5.3.1. TLS must be used to secure the SIP signalling (CMSS) between CMSs and between CMSs and SIP proxies (EBPs). The first SIP signalling roundtrip between the initiating an... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.3.1 MTA-CMS Interface | Each signalling message coming from the MTA and containing the MTA domain name (included in the NCS endpoint ID field) must be authenticated by the CMS. This domain name is an application-level NCS identifier that will be used by the Call Agent to associate the communication with a paying subscriber. In order to perfor... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.3.2 CMS-CMS, CMS-MGC, CMS-SIP Proxy and SIP Proxy - SIP Proxy Interfaces | When a CMS or MGC or a SIP Proxy receives a SIP signalling message, it should map the source IP address to the identity (FQDN) of the CMS or SIP Proxy and to the local policy associated with that FQDN. This lookup would utilize an IP address to FQDN map for all MGCs and SIP Proxies that have current TLS sessions with t... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.4 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.4.1 MTA-CMS Key Management | The MTA must use Kerberos with PKINIT to obtain a CMS service ticket (see clause 6.4.3). The MTA should first obtain a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) via the AS Request/AS Reply exchange with the KDC (authenticated with PKINIT). In the case that the MTA obtained a TGT, it performs a TGS Request/TGS Reply exchange to obta... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.1.4.2 CMS-CMS, CMS-MGC, CMS-SIP Proxy, SIP Proxy-SIP Proxy Key Management | When a CMS, MGC, or a SIP Proxy has data to send to another CMS, MGC, or SIP Proxy and does not already have a TLS Session with that host, it must first establish a TLS session with the other CMS, MGC, or SIP Proxy (see clause 6.9). A CMS or a SIP Proxy should create TLS sessions ahead of time (before they are needed) ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.4.2 Call Signalling Security Profile Matrix | Table 25: Security Profile Matrix - Network Call Signalling MTA-CMS CMS-CMS CMS-SIP Proxy / SIP Proxy-SIP Proxy authentication optional yes yes access control optional yes yes integrity optional yes yes confidentiality optional yes yes non-repudiation no no no security mechanisms IPsec ESP with encryption and message i... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5 PSTN Gateway Interface | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.1 Reference Architecture | An IPCablecom PSTN Gateway consists of three functional components: • a Media Gateway Controller (MGC) which may or may not be part of the CMS; • a Media Gateway (MG); and • a Signalling Gateway (SG). These components are described in detail in [5]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.1.1 Media Gateway Controller | The Media Gateway Controller (MGC) is the PSTN gateway's overall controller. The MGC receives and mediates call- signalling information between the IPCablecom and the PSTN domains (from the SG), and it maintains and controls the overall state for all communications. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.1.2 Media Gateway | Media Gateways (MG) provide the bearer connectivity between the PSTN and the IPCablecom IP network. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.1.3 Signalling Gateway | IPCablecom provides support for SS7 signalling gateways. The SG contains the SG to MGC interface. Refer to [5] for more detail on signalling gateways. The SS7 Signalling Gateway performs the following security-related functions: • Isolates the SS7 network from the IP network. Guards the SS7 network from threats such as... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.2 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.2.1 MGC - MG Interface | Authentication: Both the MG and the MGC must be authenticated, in order to prevent a third party masquerading as either an authorized MGC or MG. Access Control: MG resources should be made available only to authorized users - thus access control is required at the MG. Integrity: must be assured in order to prevent tamp... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.3.1 MGC - MG Interface | IPsec ESP must be used to both authenticate and encrypt the messages from MGC to MG and vice versa. Refer to clause 6.1.2 for details of how IPsec ESP is used within IPCablecom and for the list of available ciphersuites. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 104 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.4 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.4.1 MGC - MG Interface | Key management for the MGC-MG interface is either IKE or Kerberos. Implementations must support IKE with pre- shared keys. Implementations may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys. For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2. For more inform... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.5.5 MGC-MG Summary Security Profile Matrix | Table 26: Security Profile Matrix - TGCP TGCP (MG - MGC) authentication yes access control yes integrity yes confidentiality yes non-repudiation no security mechanisms IPsec IKE or Kerberos |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6 Media Stream | This security specification allows for end-to-end ciphersuite negotiation, so that the communicating parties can choose their preferred encryption and authentication algorithms for the particular communication. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.1 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.1.1 RTP | Authentication: End-to-end authentication cannot be required, because the initiating party may want to keep their identity private. Optional end-to-end exchanges for both authentication and additional key negotiation are possible but are outside of the scope for IPCablecom. Encryption: The media stream between MTAs and... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.1.2 RTCP | Authentication: see the above clause. Encryption: within IPCablecom, RTCP messages are not permitted to contain the identity of the RTCP termination endpoint. Snooping on RTCP messages, therefore, does not reveal any subscriber-specific information but may reveal network usage and reliability statistics. RTCP encryptio... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2 Cryptographic Mechanisms | MTAs and MGs must have an ability to negotiate a particular encryption and authentication algorithm. If media security parameters are negotiated and RTP encryption is on (Transform ID is not RTP_ENCR_NULL), each media RTP packet must be encrypted for privacy. If RTP encryption is on, encryption must be applied to the R... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.1 RTP Messages | Figure 15 shows the format of an encoded RTP packet. IPCablecom must adhere to the RTP packet format as defined by RFC 1889 [10] and RFC 1890 [42] after being authenticated and decrypted (where the MAC bytes, if included, are stripped off as part of the authentication). The packet's header consists of 12 or more octets... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.1.1 RTP Timestamp | According to RFC1889 [10], the timestamp field is a 32-bit value initially chosen at random. to IPCablecom, the timestamp must increment according to the codec sampling frequency. The timestamp in the RTP header must reflect the sampling instant of the first octet in each RTP packet presented as offset from the initial... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.1.2 Packet Encoding Requirements | Prior to encoding the packets of an RTP stream, the sending MTA must derive the keys and parameters from the End- End Secret it shares with the receiving MTA, as specified in clause 7.6.2.3.3. An MTA must derive two distinct sets of these quantities, one set for processing outgoing packets and another set for processin... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.1.3 Packet Decoding Requirements | Prior to decoding the packets of an RTP stream, the receiving MTA must derive the keys and parameters from the End- End Secret it shares with the sending MTA, as specified in clause 7.6.2.3.3. The derived quantities must match the corresponding quantities at the sending MTA. 7.6.2.1.3.1 Timestamp Tolerance Check Before... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2 RTCP Messages | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.1 RTCP Format | RFC 1889 [10] defines the packet format of RTCP messages. v=2 p count pkt type length SSRC Figure 18: RTCP Packet Format The RTCP packet type could be SR (sender reports), RR (receiver reports), SDES (source description), BYE (leaving conference), and APP (application specific function). The length varies depending on ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.2 RTCP Encryption | RTCP messages must always be encrypted in their entirety when the negotiated encryption algorithm is a block cipher in CBC mode. RTCP messages must not be encrypted when the negotiated encryption algorithm is RTCP_ENCR_NULL. However, the encoded RTCP messages must still be formatted according to clause 7.6.2.2.2 when R... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.3 Sequence Numbers | The receiver of RTCP messages should keep a sliding window of the RTCP sequence numbers. The size of the sliding window WRTCP depends on the reliability of the UDP transport and is locally configured at each endpoint. WRTCP should be 32 or 64. The sliding window is most efficiently implemented with a bit mask and bit s... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.4 Block Termination | Residual block termination (RBT) must be used to terminate RTCP messages that end with less than a full block of data to encrypt (see clause 9.3). |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.5 RTCP Message Encoding | Each RTCP message must be encoded using the following procedure: 1) A random IV is generated. 2) The entire RTCP message is encrypted with the selected block cipher and the just generated IV. 3) The current sequence number, IV and the encrypted RTCP message are concatenated in that order. 4) The MAC is computed (using ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.2.6 RTCP Message Decoding | Each RTCP message must be decoded using the following procedure: 1) Regenerate the MAC code and compare to the received value. If the two do not match, the message is dropped. 2) The sequence number is verified based on the sliding window approach specified in clause 7.6.2.2.3. If the sequence number is rejected, the m... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.3 Key Management | The key management specified here for end-to-end communication is identical in the cases of the MTA-to-PSTN and MTA-to-MTA communications. In the case of the MTA-to-PSTN communications, one of the MTAs is replaced by a MG (Media Gateway). The descriptions below refer to MTA-to-MTA communications only for simplicity. In... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.3.1 Key Management over NCS | Figure 20 shows the actual NCS messages that are used to carry out the distribution of end-to-end keys. Each NCS message that is involved in the end-to-end key management is labelled with a number of the corresponding key management interface. The name of each NCS message is in bold. Below the NCS message name is the i... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.3.2 Ciphersuite Format | Each ciphersuite for both RTP security and RTCP security must be represented as follows: Authentication Algorithm (1 byte) - represented by 2 ASCII hex characters (using characters 0-9, A-F). Encryption Transform ID (1 byte) - represented by 2 ASCII hex characters (using characters 0-9, A-F). For the list of available ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.3.3 Derivation of End-to-End Keys | 7.6.2.3.3.1 Initial Key Derivation The End-End Secrets must be 46 bytes long. The Pad parameters must be 46 bytes long. Keys are independently derived by each MTA from either just the End-End Secret or from the End-End Secret and Pad concatenated together. The Pad may or may not be available - see the call flow details... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.6.2.4 RTP-RTCP Summary Security Profile Matrix | Table 27: Security Profile Matrix - RTP and RTCP RTP (MTA - MTA, MTA - MG) RTCP (MTA - MTA, MTA - MG, MG - MG) authentication optional (indirect) (see note) optional (indirect) access control optional optional integrity optional optional confidentiality optional optional non-repudiation no no security mechanisms Applic... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7 Audio Server Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.1 Reference Architecture | Figure 21 shows the network components and the various interfaces to be discussed in this clause, see [27]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 123 Media Player (MP) Media Player Controller (MPC) Audio Server (AS) PSTN Ann-4 Ann-4 Ann-3 Ann-1 Ann-3 Ann-2 Media Gateway (MG) Media Gateway Controller (MGC) Ann-1 CMS M... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.2 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.2.1 MTA-CMS NCS Signalling (Ann-1) | Refer to the security services in the NCS signalling clause 7.4.1.2 of the present document. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 124 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.2.2 MPC-MP Signalling (Ann-2) | Authentication: all signalling messages must be authenticated, in order to prevent a third party masquerading as either an authorized MPC or MP. A rogue MPC could configure the MP to play obscene or inappropriate messages. A rogue MP could likewise play obscene or inappropriate messages that the MPC did not intend it t... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.2.3 MTA-MP (Ann-4) | Security services on this media packet interface are listed in clause 7.6.1. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.3.1 MTA-CMS NCS Signalling (Ann-1) | Refer to the cryptographic mechanisms in the NCS signalling clause 7.4.1.3 of the present document. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.3.2 MPC-MP Signalling (Ann-2) | IPsec ESP must be used to both authenticate and encrypt the messages from MPC to MP and vice versa. Refer to clause 6.1.2 for details of how IPsec ESP is used within IPCablecom and for the list of available ciphersuites. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.3.3 MTA-MP (Ann-4) | Cryptographic mechanisms on this media packet interface are specified in clause 7.6.2. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.4 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.4.1 MTA-CMS NCS Signalling (Ann-1) | Refer to the key management in the NCS signalling clause 7.4.1. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.4.2 MPC-MP Signalling (Ann-2) | The MPC and the MP negotiate a shared secret (MPC-MP Secret) using IKE or Kerberos (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2. For more ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.4.3 MTA-MP (Ann-4) | Key Management on the media packet interface is specified in clause 7.6.2.3. This case is very similar to the key management for the MTA-MG media interface. The flow of signalling messages and the syntax of carrying keys and ciphersuites must be the same, except that here MG is replaced with the MP and MGC (which deliv... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.7.5 MPC-MP Summary Security Profile Matrix | The CMS to MPC protocol is not defined in IPCablecom and thus is outside the scope of the present document. The corresponding column in the following matrix provides only the security requirements on that interface. Security specifications on that interface will be added in future revisions of the present document. Tab... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8 Lawful Interception Interfaces | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.1 Reference Architecture | The IPCablecom system for Lawful Interception (see [30]) consists of the following elements and interfaces: COPS TGCP Content Content Content Events Events Events Events Signaling CMTS Delivery Function Delivery Function MG CMS CMS MGC Signaling Events Figure 22: Lawful Interception Security Interfaces The DF (Delivery... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.2 Security Services | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.2.1 Event Interfaces CMS-DF, MGC-DF, CMTS-DF and DF-DF | Authentication, Access Control and Message Integrity: required to prevent service theft and denial-of-service attacks. Want to insure that the DF (law enforcement) has the right parameters for wiretapping (prevent denial-of- service). Also, want to authenticate the DF, to make sure that the copy of the media stream is ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.2.2 Call Content Interfaces CMTS-DF, MG-DF, MG-DF and DF-DF | Authentication and Access Control: already performed during the phase of key management for protection of event messages - see the above clause. In order to protect privacy, a party that is not properly authorized should not receive the call content decryption key. Message Integrity: optional for voice packets, since i... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.3.1 Interface between CMS and DF | This interface must be protected with IPsec ESP in transport mode, where each packet is both encrypted and authenticated - identical to the security for the CMS-RKS interface specified in clause 7.3.3.1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 127 As with the CMS-RKS interface, the MAC value normally used to authentica... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.3.2 Interface between CMTS and DF for Event Messages | This interface must be protected with IPsec ESP in transport mode, where each packet is both encrypted and authenticated - identical to the security for the CMTS-RKS interface specified in clause 7.3.3.2. As with the CMTS-RKS interface, the MAC value normally used to authenticate RADIUS messages is not used (message in... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.3.3 Interface between DF and DF for Event Messages | This interface must be protected with IPsec ESP in transport mode, where each packet is both encrypted and authenticated - identical to the security for the CMS-RKS interface specified in clause 7.3.3.1. As with the CMS-RKS interface, the MAC value normally used to authenticate RADIUS messages is not used (message inte... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.3.4 Interface between MGC and DF | This interface must be protected with IPsec ESP in transport mode, where each packet is both encrypted and authenticated - identical to the security for the MGC-RKS interface specified in clause 7.3.3.3. As with the MGC-RKS interface, the MAC value normally used to authenticate RADIUS messages is not used (message inte... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.4 Key Management | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.4.1 Interface between CMS and DF | The CMS and the DF must negotiate a pair of IPsec Security Associations (inbound and outbound) using IKE or Kerberos (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.4.2 Interface between CMTS and DF | The CMTS and the DF must negotiate a pair of Security Associations (inbound and outbound) using IKE or Kerberos (implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys; they may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys). For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, ref... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.4.3 Interface between DF and DF | The two DF hosts must negotiate a shared secret (DF-DF Secret) using IKE with certificates. The IPCablecom profile for IKE with certificates is specified in clause 6.2.2. IKE will be running asynchronous to the event message generation. In the case where an event message needs to be sent to a DF with which there is not... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.4.4 INTERFACE BETWEEN MGC AND DF | MGC and the DF must negotiate a pair of IPsec SAs (inbound and outbound) using IKE with pre-shared keys. IKE will be running asynchronous to the event message generation and will guarantee that there is always a valid, non- expired pair of SAs. At the DF, MGC Element IDs must somehow be associated with the correspondin... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.8.5 Lawful Interception Security Profile Matrix | Table 29: Security Profile Matrix - Lawful Interception CMS-DF Events, MGC-DF Events and CMTS-DF Events DF-DF Events CMTS-DF Content and MG-DF Content DF-DF Content Authentication yes yes yes (indirect) yes (indirect) Access control yes yes optional optional Integrity yes yes optional optional Confidentiality yes yes y... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9 CMS Provisioning | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9.1 Reference Architecture | Provisioning is defined as the operations necessary to provide a specified service to a customer. IPCablecom service provisioning can be viewed as two distinct operations: MTA provisioning and CMS subscriber provisioning. CMS provisioning refers to the interface between the Provisioning Server and the CMS. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9.2 Security Services | Authentication: Provisioning Server needs to be authenticated to prevent a third party from masquerading as a provisioning server to enable services for unauthorized MTAs. CMS needs to be authenticated to prevent someone from impersonating the CMS to receiving provisioning messages, thereby compromising privacy and den... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9.3 Cryptographic Mechanisms | IPsec ESP must be used to both authenticate and encrypt the messages from CMS to Provisioning Server and vice versa. Refer to clause 6.1.2 for details of how IPsec ESP is used within IPCablecom and for the list of available ciphersuites. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9.4 Key Management | Key management for the CMS-Provisioning Server interface is either IKE or Kerberos. Implementations must support IKE with pre-shared keys. Implementations may support IKE with X.509 certificates and they may support Kerberos using symmetric keys. For more information on the IPCablecom use of IKE, refer to clause 6.2.2.... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 7.9.5 Provisioning Server-CMS Summary Security Profile Matrix | Table 30: Security Profile Matrix - CMS Provisioning CMS - Provisioning Server Authentication yes Access control yes Integrity yes Confidentiality yes Non-repudiation no Security Mechanisms IPsec IKE or Kerberos ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 130 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8 IPCablecom Certificates | IPCablecom uses digital certificates, which comply with the X.509 specification [33] and the IETF PKIX specification [34]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1 Generic Structure |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.