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41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.1 Version | The Version of the certificates must be V3. All certificates must comply with [34] except where the non-compliance with the RFC is explicitly stated in this clause of the present document. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.2 Public Key Type | RSA Public Keys are used throughout the hierarchy. The subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm.algorithm Object Identifier (OID) used must be 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption). The public exponent for all RSA IPCablecom keys must be F4 - 65537. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.3 Extensions | The following four extensions must be used as specified in the clauses below. Any other certificate extensions may also be included but must be marked as non-critical. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.3.1 subjectKeyIdentifier | The subjectKeyIdentifier extension included in all IPCablecom CA certificates as required by [34] (e.g. all certificates except the device and ancillary certificates) must include the keyIdentifier value composed of the 160-bit SHA1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, length and num... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.3.2 authorityKeyIdentifier | The authorityKeyIdentifier extension must be included in all IPCablecom certificates, with the exception of root certificates, and must include a keyIdentifier value that is identical to the subjectKeyIdentifier in the CA certificate. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.3.3 KeyUsage | The KeyUsage extension must be used for all IPCablecom CA certificates and must be marked as critical with a value of keyCertSign and cRLSign. A KeyUsage extension may be included in end-entity certificates and should be marked as critical if included as specified in [34]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.3.4 BasicConstraints | The basicConstraints extension must be used for all IPCablecom CA certificates and must be marked as critical. The values for each certificate for basicConstraints must be marked as specified in each of the certificate description tables (tables 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40). |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.4 Signature Algorithm | The signature mechanism used must be SHA-1 with RSA Encryption. The specific OID is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.5 SubjectName and IssuerName | If a string cannot be encoded as a PrintableString it must be encoded as a UTF8String (tag [UNIVERSAL 12]). ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 131 When encoding an X.500 Name: 1) Each RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN) must contain only a single element in the set of X.500 attributes. 2) The order of the RDNs in an X... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.1.6 Certificate Profile Notation | The tables below use the following notation: • Extension details are specified by [c:critical, n:non-critical; m:mandatory, o:optional]. • Optional subject naming attributes are surrounded by square brackets (e.g. [L = <city>]). • Variable naming attribute values are surrounded by angle brackets. (e.g. CN = <Company Na... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2 Certificate Trust Hierarchy | There are two distinct certificate hierarchies used in IPCablecom. J.170_F25 MTA Root MTA IP Telephony Root MTA Manufacturer Telephony Service Provider Local System Operator KDC DF IPCablecomTelephony Hierarchy MTA Device Hierarchy Figure 23: IPCablecom Certificate Hierarchy |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.1 Certificate Validation | Within IPCablecom certificate validation in general involves validation of a whole chain of certificates. As an example, when the Provisioning Server validates an MTA Device certificate, the actual chain of three certificates is validated: MTA Root Certificate + MTA Manufacturer Certificate + MTA Device Certificate. ET... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.2 MTA Device Certificate Hierarchy | The device certificate hierarchy exactly mirrors that of the DOCSIS® 1.1/BPI+ hierarchy. It is rooted in an IPCablecom MTA Root certificate, which is used as the issuing certificate of a set of manufacturer's certificates. The manufacturer's certificates are used to sign the individual device certificates. The informat... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.2.1 MTA Root Certificate | This certificate must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the MTA Root Certificate, MTA Manufacturer Certificate and the MTA Device Certificate. Table 31: MTA Root Certificate MTA Root Certificate Subject Name Form C=US O=CableLabs OU=PacketCable CN=PacketCable Root Device Certificate Authority Intend... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.2.2 MTA Manufacturer Certificate | This certificate must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the MTA Root Certificate, MTA Manufacturer Certificate and the MTA Device Certificate. The state/province, city and manufacturer's facility are optional attributes. A manufacturer may have more than one manufacturer's certificate, and there may... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.2.3 MTA Device Certificate | This certificate must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the MTA Root Certificate, MTA Manufacturer Certificate and the MTA Device Certificate. The state/province, city and manufacturer's facility are optional attributes. The Manufacturer's Facility OU field, (if present) may be different from the Ma... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3 IPCablecom Telephony Certificate Hierarchy | The Service Provider Certificate Hierarchy is rooted in an IP Telephony Root certificate. That certificate is used as the issuing certificate of a set of service provider's certificates. The service provider's certificates are used to sign an optional local system certificate. If the local system certificate exists the... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.1 IP Telephony Root Certificate | Before any Kerberos key management can be performed, an MTA and a KDC need to perform mutual authentication using the PKINIT extension to the Kerberos protocol. An MTA authenticates a KDC after it receives a PKINIT Reply message containing a KDC certificate chain. In authenticating the KDC, the MTA verifies the KDC cer... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.2 Service Provider CA Certificate | This is the certificate (see table 35) held by the telephony service provider, signed by the IP Telephony Root CA. It is verified as part of a certificate chain that includes the IP Telephony Root Certificate, Telephony Service Provider Certificate, optional Local System Certificate and an end-entity server certificate... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.3 Local System CA Certificate | This is the certificate (see table 36) held by the local system. The existence of this certificate is optional, as the Telephony Service Provider CA may be used to directly sign all network server end-entity certificates. A certificate chain with a Local System Certificate MUST consist of the IP Telephony Root CA Certi... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.4 Operational Ancillary Certificates | All of these are signed by the either the Local System CA or by the Service Provider CA. Other ancillary certificates may be added to the present document at a later time. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.4.1 Key Distribution Centre Certificate | This certificate must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the IP Telephony Provider Root Certificate, Service Provider CA Certificate and the Ancillary Device Certificates. The PKINIT specification in annex C requires the KDC certificate to include the subjectAltName v.3 certificate extension, the val... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.4.2 Delivery Function (DF) | This certificate must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the IP Telephony Root Certificate, Service Provider CA Certificate and the Ancillary Device Certificates. This certificate is used to sign phase 1 IKE intra-domain exchanges between DFs (which are used in Lawful Interception, referred to in tab... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.4.3 IPCablecom Server Certificates | These certificates must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the Service Provider Root Certificate, Service Provider Certificate, Local System Operator Certificate (if used) and the Ancillary Device Certificates. These certificates are used to identify various servers in the IPCablecom system. For exam... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.3.4.4 TLS Certificates | These certificates must be verified as part of a certificate chain containing the Service Provider Root Certificate, Service Provider Certificate, Local System Operator Certificate (if used) and the Ancillary Device Certificates. These certificates are used to authenticate TLS handshake exchanges (and encrypt when usin... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 8.2.4 Certificate Revocation | Out of scope for IPCablecom at this time. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9 Cryptographic Algorithms | This clause describes the cryptographic algorithms used in the IPCablecom security specification. When a particular algorithm is used, the algorithm must follow the corresponding specification. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.1 AES | AES-128 is a 128-bit block cipher that must be implemented according to the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) proposed submission specified in [35]. AES-128 is used in CBC mode with a 128-bit block size in IPCablecom. AES- 128 requires 10 rounds of cryptographic operations in encryption or decryption. The Initializati... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.2 DES | The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is specified in [31] For Media Stream encryption, IPCablecom does not require error checking on the DES key, and the full 64-bits of key provided to the DES algorithm will be generated according to clause 7.6.2.3.3.1. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 140 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.2.1 XDESX | An option for the encryption of RTP packets is DESX-XEX, XDESX, or DESX, has been proven as a viable method for overcoming the weaknesses in DES while not greatly adding to the implementation complexity. The strength of DESX against key search attacks is presented in [45]. The CBC mode of DESX-XEX is shown a figure bel... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.2.2 DES-CBC-PAD | This variant of DES is also based on the analysis of DESX presented in [45]. When using DESX in CBC mode, an optimized architecture is possible. It can be described in terms of the DES-CBC configuration plus the application of a random pad on the final DES-CBC output blocks. This configuration uses 128-bits of keying m... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.2.3 3DES-EDE | Another option for the encryption of RTP packets for IPCablecom, is 3DES-EDE-CBC. The CBC mode of 3DES-EDE is shown in a figure below, where 3DES-EDE is executed within the block called "block cipher." Inside the block, 3DES-EDE is performed as shown in a figure below using a 128-bit key. K1 is the first 8-bytes of the... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.3 Block Termination | If block ciphers are supported, a short block (n bits < block size depending on the cipher algorithms) must be terminated by residual block termination as shown in the figure below. Residual block termination (RBT) is executed as follows: Given a final block having n bits, where n is less than block size, the n bits ar... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.4 RSA Signature | All public key signatures for IPCablecom must be generated and verified using the RSA signature algorithm described in [16]. The format for all IPCablecom signatures must be compliant with the Cryptographic Message Syntax [12]. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.5 HMAC-SHA1 | The keyed hash employed by the HMAC-Digest Attribute must use the HMAC message authentication method [11] with the SHA-1 hash algorithm [15]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 146 |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.6 Key Derivation | Key derivation clauses in the present document refer to a function F(S, seed), where S is a shared secret from which keying material is derived, and seed is a constant string of bytes. Below is the specification of F(S, seed), borrowed from TLS [17]: A() is defined as: A(0) = seed A(i) = HMAC_SHA-1(S, A(i-1)) F(S, seed... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7 The MMH-MAC | In this clause the MMH Function and the MMH Message Authentication Code (MAC) are described. The MMH-MAC is the message authentication code option for the media flows. As discussed in clause 7.6.2, the MMH-MAC is computed over the RTP header and the payload is generated by the codec. The MMH Function will be described ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.1 The MMH Function | The Multilinear Modular Hash (MMH) Function described below is a variant of the MMH Function described in [18]. Some of the computations described below use signed arithmetic whereas the computations in [18] use unsigned arithmetic. The signed arithmetic variant described here was selected for its computational efficie... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.1.1 MMH[16,s,1] | For the remainder of this clause 9.7, MMH[16,s,1] is denoted by H. In addition to s words of input, H also takes as input a key of s words. When H is used in computing the MMH-MAC, the key is randomly generated and remains fixed for several inputs as described in clause 9.7.2. The key is denoted by k and the ith word o... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.1.2 MMH[16,s,2] | This clause describes the MMH Function with an output length of two words, which in this case is 32 bits. For convenience, let H' = MMH[16,s,2]. H' takes a key of s + 1 words. Let k = k1,…,ks+1. Furthermore, define k(1) to be the s words of k starting with k1, i.e. k(1) = k1,…,ks. Define k(2) to be the s words of k, st... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.2 The MMH-MAC | This clause describes the MMH-MAC. The MMH-MAC has three parameters; the word size, the number of words of input, and the number of words of output. MMH-MAC[ω,s,t] specifies the message authentication code with word size ω, s input words and t output words. For IPCablecom the wordsize is fixed to 16 bits: ω = 16. The n... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.2.1 MMH-MAC When Using a Block Cipher | When calculating the MMH-MAC when encryption is performed by one of the available block ciphers, the block cipher is used to calculate the t words of r (i) key stream (pad) as defined in clause 7.6.2.1.2.2.3. |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.7.2.2 Handling Variable-Size Data | In order to handle data of all possible sizes up to a maximum value, the following rules must be followed for computing an MMH function: • If the data is not a multiple of the word size, pad the data up to a multiple of the word size (16-bits) with zero- bytes. In other words, if the length of message m is not a multip... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 9.8 Random Number Generation | Good random number generation is vital to most cryptographic mechanisms. Implementations should do their best to produce true-random seeds; they should also use cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generation algorithms. RFC 1750 [44] gives some suggestions; other possibilities include use of a per-MTA secret ... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 10 Physical Security | |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 10.1 Protection for MTA Key Storage | An MTA must maintain in permanent write-once memory an RSA key pair. An MTA should deter unauthorized physical access to this keying material. The level of physical protection of keying material required by the IPCablecom security specification for an MTA is specified in terms of the security levels defined in the FIPS... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 10.2 MTA Key Encapsulation | As stated in the previous clause, FIPS PUB 140-2 Security Level 1 specifies very little actual physical security and that an MTA must deter unauthorized "physical" access to its keying material. This restricted access also includes any ability to directly read the keying material using any of the MTA interfaces. One of... |
41b093398e2e7aee960c21fae8726a84 | 103 161-9 | 11 Secure Software Download | IPCablecom 1.5 includes only Embedded MTAs. E-MTAs are embedded with DOCSIS® 1.1 cable modems (including BPI+). E-MTAs must have their software upgraded by the Cable Modem according to the DOCSIS® 1.1 requirements as specified in [8] and [9]. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-9 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 152 Annex A (informative): IPCablecom... |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 1 Scope | The present document describes the IPCablecom Signalling (SIG) MIB requirements. |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar... |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ETSI TS 103 161-4: "Access, Terminals, Transmission and Multiplexing (ATTM); Integrated Broadband Cable and Television Networks; IPCablecom 1.5; Part 4: Network Call Signalling Protocol". [2] ETSI TS 103 161-3: "Access, Te... |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. Not applicable. |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations | Void. ETSI ETSI TS 103 161-8 V1.1.1 (2011-10) 7 |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 4 Void | |
0c8f7f1383dcfe6feb41d60378cba0ba | 103 161-8 | 5 Requirements | The IPCablecom NCS MIB must be implemented as defined below, using the references [1] and [2]. PKTC-SIG-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, Integer32, IpAddress, BITS FROM SNMPv2-SMI TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, RowStatus, TruthValue FROM SNMPv2-TC OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE FROM SNMPv2-CONF Snm... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the key ladder and cryptographic requirements for security functionality to be embedded within a television receiver's chipset (e.g. SOC). The use of a standard key ladder ensures that any television receiving device may receive television content from any television distribution network re... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 2 References | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which ar... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 2.1 Normative references | The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. [1] ISO/IEC 13818-1 (2007): Information technology - Generic coding of moving pictures and associated audio information: Systems". [2] ETSI ETR 289: "Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB); Support for use of scrambling and Conditio... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 2.2 Informative references | The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. [i.1] DVB-CSA - DVB BlueBook A125 (2008)/(Document a125_CSA3_dTR101289.v1.2.1): "Support for use of the DVB Scrambling Algorithm version 3 within digital br... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: Authentication key (A): a 16-byte key derived from K2 that is used by the challenge-response mechanism NOTE: A can be used either to authenticate the sink device through a traditional challenge-response, or used by the sink device to a... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard CPU Central Processing Unit CW Control Word DES Data Encryption Security DVB-CSA2 Digital Video Broadcasting-Common Scrambling Algorithm ILA Industry Licensing Authority MPEG Motion Picture Equipment Group OTP ... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 4 Introduction | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 4.1 Overview | The present document is a specification for enabling and securing the delivery of content descrambling keys from a source device to a sink device. The basis of the present document is a three-step key ladder and challenge-response authentication scheme in which the base key derivation inputs are protected within the on... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 4.2 Descrambling Algorithm Requirements | The present document defines the key ladder, authentication mechanism, and cryptographic requirements of a compliant chipset implementation. ETSI ETSI TS 103 162 V1.1.1 (2010-10) 8 Except where explicitly noted, the following requirements are specific to Version 1 of the present document. To be backwards compatible, fu... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 5 Functional Diagram | Figure 1 presents the functional design of the Version 1 key ladder embedded within the transport processor/descrambler chipset of the sink device, and depicts the key ladder's relationship with the drivers and dependent applications executed by the Main CPU, the content descrambler, and the other sink device functions... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6 Functional Requirements | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.1 Key Ladder Functions | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.1.1 CA Key Ladder | 1. Each compliant chipset shall have a unique pair: a. A unique 64-bit CPU readable identification number (Public-ID). b. A unique secret 128-bit key (SCK). 2. Each compliant chipset shall have a mechanism for securely deriving an operator-specific 16-byte K3 to serve as the root key of the key ladder. See clause Root ... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.1.2 Challenge Response | The compliant chipset shall support a specific cryptographic challenge/response. The specifics of the challenge/response modes are described in the four following points: 1. The compliant chipset shall receive the Vendor ID, Ek3(K2), and a 128-bit nonce via the driver API interface. 2. The compliant chipset shall produ... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.1.3 Key Ladder Ciphers | The chipset shall support performing all decryptions in the key ladder and challenge-response mechanism using both: • AES-128; and • Triple DES (TDES). The selection of which cipher to use will be controlled by the driver API interface. Only AES-128 or TDES will be used for a root key to CW derivation chain. However, t... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.1.4 CW Alignment | When the CW is only 64 bits, the value of the CW will reside in the 64 left-most (highest) bits of the decrypted Ek1(CW). This is true whether the key ladder is operating in AES or TDES mode. |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.2 Time Constraints | The time from loading the entire key ladder (loading Vendor ID, Ekn(Kn-1), …, Ek3(K2), Ek2(K1), Ek1(CW)) to the beginning of decryption of video shall be less than 1 ms. |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.3 Driver API | The drivers executing within the main CPU of the sink device are not specified in the present document because they are platform and industry-specific. The specific driver API may be obtained from the Trusted Authority upon request. |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 6.4 Secret Chipset Key Obfuscation | The value physically stored in the OTP shall not be SCK itself. Rather, it should be the result of performing an invertible secret function on the ESCK, the value physically stored in the chipset's OTP. Where feasible, this function should be different in every chipset model. An ILA could provide a secret function upon... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 7 Root Key Derivations | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 7.1 Introduction | In this clause, the word 'vendor' may refer to either a network operator, device manufacturer, CA provider, or other entity that may wish to utilize the compliant chipset. ETSI ETSI TS 103 162 V1.1.1 (2010-10) 12 In order to facilitate future improvements and to increase portability of compliant chipsets between multip... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 7.2 Functional Requirements | 1. The compliant chipset shall contain a Preliminary SCK Manipulation Function that accepts as inputs the 16-byte SCK and a Vendor ID of at least 8-bits via software. The output shall be 16-bytes and shall be denoted SCKv. 2. The compliant chipset shall contain a Vendor Separation Function that accepts as inputs a secr... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 8 Extensions | |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 8.1 Introduction | This clause describes various extensions to the basic functionality described above which compliant chipset vendors may implement. |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 8.2 Additional Key Levels | The key ladder described above is referred to as a three-level key ladder composed of three Ki = Dki-1(EKi) operations. The compliant chipset vendor is permitted to build a ladder with more than three levels as long as the time constraints of Clause 6.2 Time Constraints, and certain security requirements detailed below... |
813e89567a39cbcfbd741b28432ad7de | 103 162 | 8.3 Additional Security Operations | It may be desirable for some chipsets to perform additional operations with keys or values derived from SCK, Kn, or other approved key ladder keys. Approval of such uses will be determined solely by Industry Licensing Authority (ILAs) and their specific security and robustness requirements. In general, a safe approach ... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 1 Scope | The present document defines the system architecture for the use of spectrum by White Space Devices (WSDs), specifically in the UHF TV Bands. The architecture stems from ETSI TS 102 946 [1]. The scope of the present document is to define the architecture of a system which can allow operation of WSDs based on informatio... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 2 References | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 2.1 Normative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which a... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 2.2 Informative references | References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks in... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 3 Definitions and abbreviations | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 3.1 Definitions | For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: coexistence: situation in which one radio system operates in an environment where another radio system having potentially different characteristics (e.g. RAT) may be using the same or different channels, and both radio systems are able... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 3.2 Abbreviations | For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: ACLR Adjacent Channel Leakage Ratio BC Branch Condition Com-SAP Communication Service Access Point CR Cognitive Radio CRS Cogitative Radio System C-SAP Control Service Access Point CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access DB-SAP DataBase-Service Acc... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4 Functional Architecture | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.1 Overview of Functional Architecture | Figure 4.1 shows the high level functional architecture of a white space system. All the system requirements specified in ETSI TS 102 946 [1] shall be supported. Figure 4.1: Overview of TV white spaces system The TV white space system has three entities: • Cognitive Radio System (CRS); • Spectrum Coordinator (SC); • Ge... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2 Coordinated Usage of White Spaces | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2.1 Spectrum coordination | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2.1.1 Overview | Spectrum coordination is the mechanism with which an SC serves CRSs so that they can operate efficiently in available spectrum resources of white spaces. The SC coordinates how to manage radio resources among a set of CRSs that are potentially interfering with each other (coexistence) and allows for channel assignment ... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2.1.2 Information service | For CRSs that are subscribed to the information service, an SC provides information about useful operational parameters (e.g. the operational parameters of other CRS in the available spectrum resources). In the information service, an SC does not make decision on the operational parameters to be used by those CRSs, but... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2.1.3 Management service | For CRSs that are subscribed to the management service, a SC provides the operational parameters to be used by a CRS based on its requests and, potentially, certain QoS and usage time requirements. A CRS does not make any decision for its operational parameters (e.g. channel and transmit power) but they are determined ... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.2.2 High level operation sequence | An overview of coordinated usage of white spaces is shown in figure 4.2. Figure 4.2: Overview of coordinated usage of white spaces system ETSI ETSI TS 103 145 V1.1.1 (2015-01) 11 A CRS consists of a master WSD and one or more slave WSDs. The master WSD sends device parameters to a GLDB via the SC. The SC shall act as r... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.3 Uncoordinated Usage of White Spaces | |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 4.3.1 High level operation sequence | An overview of uncoordinated usage of white spaces is shown in figure 4.3. Figure 4.3: Overview of uncoordinated usage of white spaces system A CRS consists of a master WSD and one or more slave WSDs. The master WSD shall communicate with a GLDB to obtain its operational parameters in white spaces. A GLDB shall receive... |
9e15b7676569b64d8a45258be2eed974 | 103 145 | 5 Detailed Functional Architecture |
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