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45. The applicants complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, that their family life had been compromised by the prosecutor’s order to deport the first applicant and to ban him from Romania for ten years; they had been forced to leave Romania in order to be able to continue a family life and had had to leave their respective families behind. The relevant parts of Article 8 of the Convention read as follows: | 11 |
83. The Government submitted that the first applicant had had an effective remedy to raise his complaint about the alleged violation of his right to a family life, as required by Article 13. He could have challenged the deportation and detention orders and the revocation of his residence permit before the Supreme Court by way of administrative recourse under Article 146(1) of the Constitution (M.A. v. Cyprus, cited above, §§ 67-72). Although a recourse did not have automatic suspensive effect under domestic law, upon such an application, the Supreme Court had the power to issue provisional orders suspending the enforcement of a decision taken by an administrative authority, pending the case being heard on the merits (ibid., § 79). In the context of such a recourse and an application for a provisional order, the applicant could have raised his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention and under Article 15 of the Constitution, which also protects private and family life. In cases involving deportation and the right to respect for family life, the Supreme Court took into account the Court’s case-law on Article 8 of the Convention and examined whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, deportation would be in breach of the provision. The first applicant could have challenged those decisions before or after his deportation within seventy-five days of their being issued (referring to Abbasi v. Cyprus (dec.), no. 21713/06, 5 July 2007 with regard to challenging such a decision in that manner after deportation). | 11 |
59. The Government objected that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as he had not formally requested, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, that the Constitutional Court determine whether or not there had been a violation of Article 8 as a result of the length of the proceedings in issue. The applicant could have requested that the District Court issue an injunction pending the determination of his claim. There was no need to examine separately the complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention which, in any event, was manifestly ill-founded. | 11 |
53. The Government observed that detention entailed inherent limitations on private and family life. They did not contest that the second applicant’s inability to receive an MP3 player from J.G. had interfered with his right to respect for private life under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, the Government was of the view that that interference had been in accordance with the law (see paragraphs 24 and 27 above) and had pursued the legitimate aim of motivating inmates to work, to communicate with their relatives and to enhance their social ties, as well as the aim of preventing the possession of items acquired by criminal means. | 11 |
46. The Government asserted that the domestic authorities had taken all the necessary steps that they could reasonably have been expected to take to enforce the judgment of 25 June 2014. However, their efforts had been unsuccessful. They considered that the applicant had prevented the enforcement herself as, despite having been duly notified of the scheduled enforcement dates, she had repeatedly failed to attend. The removal of the children and their transfer could not take place in her absence. The Government concluded that the State had complied with its positive obligation to ensure the applicant’s right to respect for her family life under Article <mask> of the Convention and that there had therefore been no violation of that Convention provision. | 11 |
43. The applicants complained that, to the detriment of the children’s best interests, they were unable to obtain recognition in France of the legal parent-child relationship lawfully established abroad between the first two applicants and the third and fourth applicants born abroad as the result of a surrogacy agreement. They complained of a violation of the right to respect for their private and family life guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention as follows: | 11 |
90. The Government submitted that decisions concerning the carrying out of abortions belonged to the sphere of private, not family, life. Hence, solely women were able to make the relevant decisions, within the limits set by the national legal framework. They referred to the case of Boso v. Italy, where the Court had held that Article <mask> of the Convention did not give a potential father any right to participate in the decision-making as to whether or not to carry out an abortion (see Boso v. Italy (dec.), no. 50490/99, 5 September 2002). Therefore this provision could not be regarded as conferring such a right on the mother of the woman seeking an abortion. | 11 |
43. The Government argued that the present case concerned a dispute between two private parties and not an interference by the State authorities with any of the applicant's rights protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant herself had agreed to conversion of a part of the house to a bar and therefore must have known that she would have to suffer a certain level of noise, even at night since it was common knowledge that bars were generally open at night. The competent administrative authorities had conducted the relevant proceedings and in the end secured that the applicant was no longer exposed to excessive noise. Furthermore, the applicant herself had contributed to the obstruction of the administrative proceedings because although she had been invited to indicate the time of measurements of noise as early as 17 March 2008 she had submitted her answer as late as 15 December 2008. | 11 |
38. The Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued, firstly, that the applicant could have claimed redress in the ordinary courts under the Civil Code by way of an action for the protection of her personal integrity, but had failed to do so. The mechanism for the protection of personal integrity was to be construed and applied in the context of the right to protection of privacy under Article 19 and in accordance with Article 154 (c) of the Constitution. This mechanism thus afforded the applicant guarantees identical to those provided under Article <mask> of the Convention, including the possibility of claiming just satisfaction in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. | 11 |
82. The Government argued that the domestic decisions and judgments, while interfering with the applicant’s family life, were in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim – the protection of the health and development of the children – and had been proportionate to the aim pursued. There had thus been no violation of the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 11 |
45. The Government indicated that fourteen families had lived in the hostel. They had all belonged to socially unprotected groups of the population, for example, G., a single mother. The Government noted that Article <mask> of the Convention imposed positive obligations on the State, that is to say to take measures to protect an individual’s rights to respect for private life and in particular housing (the Government cited mutatis mutandis, Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, and Menteş and Others v. Turkey, 28 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII). The applicants had tried to create unsuitable living conditions in the hostel (for example, by cutting off the electricity) in order to evict the occupants. The prosecutor’s office had concluded that the applicants had breached the occupants’ right to respect for their homes, as indicated in its complaint to the court and its appeal against the decision of 23 January 2006. By having awarded the applicants adequate compensation, the courts had balanced their rights against the public interest. The Government further noted that the applicants had been deprived of their property in accordance with the law. | 11 |
40. The applicant complained of his personal and family situation since 26 September 1997, the date of the judgment in which the Court had found that there had been a disproportionate interference with his right to private and family life as a result of both the permanent exclusion order made against him on 4 July 1991 and enforced on 28 February 1995 and the dismissal of his subsequent application to have it lifted. He expressly relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 11 |
33. The applicant submitted in reply that the right to respect for private life also covered the right to one’s surname and forename (referring to, among other authorities, Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004‑VI; Mentzen v. Latvia (dec.), no. 71074/01, ECHR 2004‑XII; and Burghartz v. Switzerland, 22 February 1994, Series A no. 280‑B). Article <mask> of the Convention was thus indisputably applicable to the present case. | 11 |
55. The Government maintained that the Chamber, in applying the necessity test under Article <mask> of the Convention, had exceeded its power of review and had substituted its own evaluation for that of the domestic courts. Although stricter scrutiny was called for as regards restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of access, it was nevertheless for them to establish the relevant facts, that is to take and assess the evidence, as they had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned. | 11 |
30. The applicants submitted that they were treated differently in respect of their enjoyment of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention from other persons – and the spouses of those persons – with temporary leave to remain in the United Kingdom. In particular, they relied on the example of students and workers, both of whom had been entitled to be joined in the United Kingdom by their spouses, regardless of whether the marriage took place before or after they were granted leave to remain. | 11 |
270. The Government submitted that Mr Tolumov’s correspondence was not being monitored by the prison authorities. The applicable rule – regulation 75 of the implementing regulations of the 2009 Act – was fully in line with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention. The prison stamps on the envelopes submitted by Mr Tolumov merely showed that those envelopes had been opened and closed in the presence of a prison officer, as required under that regulation, not that the content of the letters inside them had been checked. | 11 |
164. The Government argued that the applicant could have brought legal proceedings to challenge the police retention of the caution or its inclusion in any criminal record certificate. Such an action could have proceeded by way of judicial review or by way of a complaint to the Information Commissioner under the Data Protection Act. In support of their submissions, the Government have referred to a number of cases decided by the domestic courts as illustrative of the courts’ jurisdiction and willingness to assess compliance of retention or disclosure of criminal record data with Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraphs 77-121 above). | 11 |
35. The applicant took the view that the interference with the exercise of his freedom to manifest his religion did not correspond to any of the aims listed in Article 9 § 2. The Government maintained, for their part, that the impugned measure pursued two legitimate aims: to protect the rights and freedoms of others; and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court notes that the second paragraph of Article 9 does not refer expressly to the second of those aims. As regards the first of the aims invoked – to ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of others – the Government referred to the principle of secularism and the need to promote tolerance in a post-conflict society. The Court has already held that secularism is a belief protected by Article <mask> of the Convention (see Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, § 58, ECHR 2011) and that an aim to uphold secular and democratic values can be linked to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 99, ECHR 2005‑XI, and Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, no. 41135/98, § 43, 23 February 2010). There is no reason to decide otherwise in the present case. | 12 |
34. The applicant submitted that under Article <mask> of the Convention the State was obliged to respect and support the individual's freedom to practice his or her religion. Any limitations could be set only in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. In the applicant's opinion observing vegetarianism could not be described as a threat to public safety, health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others. | 12 |
2. The Government submitted that section 16 § 5 of the Religions Act, interpreted in conjunction with section 7 § 1 of the Public Gatherings Act, required the organisers of religious assemblies in non-residential premises to notify the local authorities, in writing and in advance. Moreover, the Government claimed that section 5 § 1 of the Education Act prohibited religious assemblies from being held in educational establishments. Both justifications are unfounded, and have already being rejected by this Court in Kuznetsov and Others[3]. More specifically, in that seminal case the Court found a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the disruption of an indoor religious meeting. The Court found that the State’s interference was not even prescribed by law, since the Government neither specified the nature of the allegedly missing documents in accordance with the Religions Act, nor produced any documents relating to the official powers of the commissioner and two senior police officers to interrupt and disperse the indoor religious meeting. In addition, the fact of holding the religious meeting on college premises outside normal college hours had not been contrary to the Education Act. In that same judgment, the Court referred to the case-law of the Russian Supreme Court, dating from at least 1999, to the effect that religious assemblies do not require any prior authorisation from, or notification to, the public authorities[4]. There is no valid reason to change this precedent[5]. On the contrary, as will be shown, the subsequent practice of the respondent State justifies insistence on this case-law[6]. | 12 |
84. The applicants submitted that the status of a registered religious community was inferior to that of a religious society and insufficient. They contended that the first applicant was subject to State control in respect of its religious doctrine, its rules on membership and the administration of its assets pursuant to sections 3-5 and 11 of the 1998 Religious Communities Act. They repeated in essence their above complaints. In particular, the applicants disputed the necessity of the ten-year waiting period, as the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox Church by a specific law in 2003 (see paragraph 45(e) above) proved the contrary. The Coptic Orthodox Church had only existed in Austria since 1976 and had been registered as a religious community in 1998. The applicants argued that most of the registered religious communities and even most of the recognised religious societies did not fulfil the criterion for the minimum number of adherents, which showed that this requirement was unnecessary for the observance of public duties, contrary to what the Government maintained. Since the first applicant, which was the fifth largest religious community in Austria and was thus even bigger than most recognised religious societies, also complied with the necessary number of adherents, it should have been recognised a long time ago. Further, the requirement of the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including charity activities, was discriminatory as it interfered in an unjustified way with the first applicant’s internal administration and organisation, in breach of both Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 15 of the Basic Law 1867. The prerequisite of a positive attitude towards society and the State was discriminatory as it was not required in respect of any other natural or legal personality in Austria. Further, it did not meet the “prescribed by law” requirement under Article 9 § 2 of the Convention. The same applied to the criterion of non-interference with other religious societies. Moreover, under Austrian law, recognised religious societies enjoyed privileged treatment in various fields which did not extend to religious communities. | 12 |
150. The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained however that the measure was prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim, that is, the protection of public order and the rights of others. It was also proportionate, taking into account that the applicant was a teacher of religion by profession, who could have exercised his religion without the church attendances in question. | 12 |
60. The Government further maintained that freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs under Article 9 did not confer on the applicant communities or their members any entitlement to secure additional funding from the State budget. Nor did it entail a right to receive the State subsidies that were due to Churches as such. Therefore, the loss of such subsidies could not be regarded as interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
67. The Government also stressed that religious autonomy enjoyed special protection under Article <mask> of the Convention and that the States had a wide margin of appreciation in regulating matters concerning their relationship with religious communities. The Catholic Church’s autonomy in its relationship with the State on matters of religious education had been established in the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs. This Agreement essentially resembled other treaties regulating the relationship of the Catholic Church with a number of other European countries. Relying on the Court’s case-law in Fernández Martínez (cited above), Obst (cited above) and Siebenhaar (cited above), the Government contended that the Court had recognised the importance of religious communities’ autonomy to choose persons suitable to teach their doctrine. Thus, in the Croatian legal system, although the State formally acted as the employer of teachers of Catholic religious education in the State education system, the decision as to the suitability of persons for that post and the substance of their teaching always remained in the hands of the Catholic Church. The Church’s autonomy was exercised through its right to assess the circumstances in which a canonical mandate could be issued. This undoubtedly included the right to assess whether the person to whom a mandate had been issued was living his or her life in accordance with the Church’s teachings. Accordingly, if the person was living in circumstances contrary to the Church’s doctrine, this could undermine the credibility of that religious community. From this perspective, the “duty of allegiance” referred to in the Fernández Martínez case was equally binding for a layman and a priest teaching religious education. | 12 |
148. The Government maintained, in line with their arguments under Article 3, that there had been no interference on the part of the State authorities in the exercise by the applicants of their various rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. The alleged incidents of violence had been committed by private individuals and the Government had reacted adequately, inter alia, by instituting criminal proceedings. They noted in this connection that between 1999 and 2003, fifty-three cases of religious incidents had been brought to the attention of the prosecutor’s office and the bodies of the Ministry of the Interior. Only eight of those cases had been discontinued, while criminal proceedings had been brought in a further forty cases and a preliminary investigation was under way in another three. Nine prosecutions had been referred to the courts. | 12 |
42. The Government submitted further that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the applicant’s submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete interference with his rights under Article 9. | 12 |
26. The applicants complained of a violation of their rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention as a result of the failure to issue them with a document necessary for the registration of their religious denomination. They submitted, inter alia, that the interference with their rights had not been prescribed by law because it had been contrary to the domestic courts’ judgments ordering the issuance of the relevant document. | 12 |
74. The applicant organisation was the official body representing and managing the Muslim religious community in Bulgaria between February 1995 and October 1997. It complained about alleged arbitrary interference by the State with the organisation and leadership of that community. An ecclesiastical or religious body may, as such, exercise on behalf of its adherents the rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention (see, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 72, ECHR 2000-VII). | 12 |
74. The Government disagreed with the view implied by the applicants that the alleged lack of proportion could give rise to an issue under Article <mask> of the Convention or Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. First of all, teaching pupils knowledge of Christianity could not in itself raise an issue under the Convention, as long as the instruction was carried out in an objective, pluralistic and neutral manner. Secondly, in current Norwegian society there were legitimate reasons for devoting more time to the knowledge of Christianity than to other religions and philosophies of life. These reasons had been set out in the travaux préparatoires documents, in the Curriculum and in the subsequent evaluation of the KRL subject. | 12 |
25. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the measures taken against her, namely her questioning by the police, the search and seizure and the warning order, interfered with her right to worship collectively with like-minded adherents of the Evangelical faith in a home environment. In addition, the denial of legal registration to her church was done is a spirit which lacked any semblance of State neutrality. At all stages, the State authorities acted on the basis of discriminatory value judgments rather than evidence. The applicant considered that the measures were not prescribed by law, since they were arbitrary and based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the executive. Finally, the measures were not necessary in a democratic society. There was no evidence that that the religious beliefs of the members of the applicant’s church were responsible for family separation, isolation and suicide. The action of the state authorities failed to respect the need for true religious pluralism, which is inherent in the concept of a democratic society. | 12 |
41. The Government referred to their observations in the case of Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria ((dec.), no. 40825/98 5 July 2005). They maintained in particular that the first applicant, even before it had become a publicly registered religious community on 11 July 1998, had had legal personality as a registered association since 24 August 1945. The status conferred on the first applicant as a registered religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act complied with the requirements of Article 9; it only provided a legal status and in no way restricted the exercise or enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. In conclusion, there was no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
63. The Government submitted that the first applicant could not claim to be a direct victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention as he had neither personally been charged the special church fee nor been liable to pay it. It had only been his wife who had been liable to pay the special church fee as she had been the recipient of the respective tax bill. | 12 |
59. The Government further submitted that the present case was to be distinguished from the Bayatyan case, since the applicants in the present case had had the possibility of substituting military service with alternative service of a civilian nature. Nevertheless, taking into account the shift in the case-law brought about by the Bayatyan judgment and a number of opinions and recommendations of various international bodies, including the Venice Commission, the domestic law had been amended on 2 May 2013 in order to provide a possibility for those who objected not only to the carrying of arms or performing other military activities but also to serving under any type of military command in general. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion and there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
30. The applicant’s complaint concerns the rating status of its temple in Preston. This building is considered by the members of the applicant Church to constitute its most sacred centre. It is used as a place of congregational religious worship by those who have established their devotion and been accorded a “recommend” (see paragraphs 6-7 above). In the domestic proceedings, the opinion of the majority of the House of Lords was that the subject-matter of complaint did not come within the ambit of Article <mask> of the Convention, with the consequence that Article 14 did not apply, since the refusal of the tax exemption did not prevent Mormons from manifesting their religion and since the tax exemption rules were applied neutrally to all religious groups and not directed specifically at the applicant Church (see paragraph 11 above). The Court can well understand such an assessment by the national courts of the facts of the present case, although it may be that in certain circumstances issues concerning the operation of religious buildings, including expenses incurred as a result of the taxation status of such buildings, are capable of having an impact on the exercise of the right of members of religious groups to manifest religious belief (see, mutatis mutandis, Association Les Témoins de Jéhovah v. France, no. 8916/05, §§ 48-54, 30 June 2011). The Court does not, however, need to decide whether, in the particular circumstances, the applicant’s complaint about the application to it of the tax exemption legislation falls within the ambit of Article 9, so that Article 14 applies, since for the reasons given below it has come to the conclusion that the claim of discrimination is unfounded on its merits. | 12 |
78. The applicant further complained that the failure of the domestic authorities adequately to protect him from the demonstrators and properly to investigate the incident amounted to a violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. This was because, in his submission, the domestic authorities’ failures prevented him from exercising his Article 9 right to peacefully practice his beliefs in the company of fellow worshippers. Article 9 provides: | 12 |
35. The applicant further submitted that religious groups had to be regarded as public institutions and therefore had to tolerate even severe criticism. Referring, inter alia, to the Court’s judgments in Aydın Tatlav, Giniewski (both cited above) and Gündüz v. Turkey (no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003‑XI), the applicant alleged that improper attacks on religious groups had to be tolerated even if they were based on untrue facts, as long as they did not incite to violence. Moreover, the rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention did not imply a ban on the propagation by others of a doctrine which was hostile to other people’s faiths. Only expressions that were gratuitously offensive to others and thus an infringement of their rights, and which therefore did not contribute to any form of public debate should be prohibited by law, whereas blasphemy laws providing for a criminal sanction should be avoided according to international law standards. She contrasted her case with the Court’s judgment in İ.A. v. Turkey (cited above), as the impugned statement at issue in İ.A. had not been linked to facts. | 12 |
65. The Government argued that their approach was in conformity with the case-law of the Convention, notably in cases where the Court had relied on the position of the domestic authorities in defining “religion” for the purposes of registration (they referred to Kimlya and Others v. Russia, nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, § 79, ECHR 2009). Therefore, the definition of religious activities by the 2011 Church Act and the assessment of the religious nature of an organisation by the State authorities were not contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. The 2011 Church Act complied with the requirements of neutrality and impartiality since it was not based on the specific characteristics of one particular religion and was apt to ensure the recognition of a number of Churches representing a wide range of religions and religious beliefs. | 12 |
188. The applicant failed to make submissions as to the applicability of Article 9 to the case. On the basis of the material before it, the Court finds that he has not shown that his belief met the necessary requirements of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Bayatyan, cited above, § 110; and Eweida and Others, cited above, § 81). This complaint must accordingly be declared inadmissible as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4. | 12 |
27. The Government submitted further that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the applicant’s submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete interference with his rights under Article 9. | 12 |
59. The applicant has complained that the events at the Banya Bashi mosque 20 May 2011 and the domestic authorities’ response to those events amounted to violations of Articles 3 and Article <mask> of the Convention, in each case either taken alone or taken in conjunction of the Article 14. He has further complained that the same events amounted to a violation of Article 8 also either taken alone or taken in conjunction with Article 14. The Government contested these arguments. They also raised two preliminary objections as to the admissibility of the application, which applied to all of these complaints. Accordingly, it is appropriate for the Court first to consider whether these preliminary objections are well-founded and, if not, to proceed to consider each of the applicant’s substantive complaints in turn. | 12 |
30. The Government conceded that an assembly could not be prohibited solely on the ground of a certain likelihood of tensions and confrontations between opposing groups. However, in the particular circumstances of the case, the prohibition had been justified in order to protect the rights of others as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. All Saints’ Day was traditionally devoted to commemorating the dead and the prohibition of the assembly, a measure aimed at avoiding loud disputes unbefitting the peace and quiet of a cemetery, had been necessary to ensure that visitors could manifest their religious beliefs without disturbance. | 12 |
108. The applicants complained that their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention had been violated as the Certificate of Approval scheme prevented them from marrying unless they married in the Anglican Church. Relying on Article 14 of the Convention, read together with Article 9, they further complained that they were discriminated against in securing the enjoyment of this right. | 12 |
37. The applicant in the present case brought a claim for damages in respect of the actions of the police which she claimed breached her right to freedom of religion and freedom of assembly. Her claim was finally dismissed on the ground that the police had acted in implementation of the orders of the prosecution authorities, which, in their turn, could not be held liable under domestic law for the specific decisions at issue (see paragraph 14 above). The Government have not demonstrated to the Court that the applicant had at her disposal another remedy which would have provided her with effective relief in respect of her complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention (see Krasimir Yordanov, cited above, §§ 50-55; see also Boychev and Others, cited above, § 56). | 12 |
58. The Government contested that there had been an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion. Since the entry into force of the 1919 Treaty of St Germain, all Austrian inhabitants had been allowed to practise publicly and privately their thought, religion and beliefs, irrespective of whether their religious society, community or church was recognised or had legal status. The right to autonomous administration of the entity’s internal organisation was likewise guaranteed. Referring to a judgment of the Constitutional Court (VfSlg. 10.915/1986), the Government contended that the refusal of recognition did not impede the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of religion within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. Against this background, they contested that the first applicant had no legal personality in Austria, was legally non-existent and could not acquire assets or enter into legal relations, because these allegations concerned the first applicant’s situation before it had obtained legal personality as a registered religious community on 11 July 1998. Even before the entry into force of the 1998 Religious Communities Act, the first applicant had had the possibility of setting up an association with a religious purpose under the Associations Act, as the Federation of Evangelical Municipalities in Austria (Bund Evangelikaler Gemeinden in Österreich) had on 21 March 1992, and the Church of Scientology in Austria (Scientology Kirche Österreich) on 20 May 1984. However, the applicants did not appear to have made any efforts to that end. | 12 |
40. The Government further observed that in any event the requirements laid down in the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention were met. In particular, under Article 109 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences it was not obligatory to grant a special diet in accordance with a prisoner's religious beliefs. However, they agreed that in a situation where it was possible for a custodial institution to provide for a special diet it should have granted such a diet to the prisoner. | 12 |
32. The applicants complained under Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention about the refusal to register the applicant group as a legal entity. The Court reiterates that, in the absence of a European consensus on the religious nature of Scientology teachings, and being mindful of the subsidiary nature of its role, it must rely on the position of the domestic authorities in the matter and determine the applicable Convention provision in the light of it (see Kimlya and Others v. Russia, nos. 76836/01 and 32782/03, § 79, ECHR 2009, and Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, no. 18147/02, § 64, 5 April 2007). The Court need not determine whether or not Scientology is a religion because it can defer to the judgment of the Russian authorities on that matter. In contrast to the Kimlya and Church of Scientology Moscow cases, in which the Russian authorities explicitly concurred regarding the religious nature of the applicant Scientology organisations, the religious study in the instant case concluded that the nature of the applicant group was non-religious. Alleged legal defects in the study, including the manner in which it had been prepared, were a matter of controversy in the domestic proceedings. What is decisive for the Court, however, is that the reason for refusing the registration of the applicant group – which had ultimately been endorsed by the Russian courts – was the legal provision establishing a special fifteen-year waiting period that applies only to religious organisations. In these circumstances, the Court sees no need to distinguish the present case from the Kimlya case, which concerned the same reason for refusing registration. It therefore considers that the complaint must be examined from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 11 (see Kimlya, cited above, § 81). These provisions read: | 12 |
184. The applicant, by deliberately and consistently appearing naked in very public places such as urban centres, courtrooms and the communal parts of prisons, was intent on making a public statement of his belief in the inoffensive nature of the human body. The Court has found that his conduct amounted to a form of expression protected by Article 10 (see paragraph 150). It has previously indicated that a distinction must be drawn between carrying out an activity for personal fulfilment and carrying out the same activity for a public purpose, where one cannot be said to be acting for personal fulfilment alone (see Friend and Others, cited above, § 42). Furthermore, as concerns in particular an individual’s personal choices as to his desired appearance in public (as referred to in S.A.S., cited above), on analogy with the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to religious beliefs (text of Article 9 cited below at paragraph 185), Article 8 cannot be taken to protect every conceivable personal choice in that domain: there must presumably be a de minimis level of seriousness as to the choice of desired appearance in question (see, mutatis mutandis, in relation to Article 9, Bayatyan, cited above, § 110; and Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 48420/10, § 81, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Whether the requisite level of seriousness has been reached in relation to the applicant’s choice to appear fully naked on all occasions in all public places without distinction may be doubted, having regard to the absence of support for such a choice in any known democratic society in the world. In any event, however, even if Article 8 were to be taken to be applicable to the circumstances of the present case, the Court is satisfied that those circumstances are not such as to disclose a violation of that provision on the part of the public authorities in Scotland. In sum, any interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life was justified under Article 8 § 2 for essentially the same reasons given by the Court in the context of its analysis of the applicant’s complaint under Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraphs 171-176 above). | 12 |
56. The applicants complained that the refusal of the Austrian authorities to grant legal personality to the first applicant by conferring on it the status of a religious society under the Recognition Act violated their right to freedom of religion. They further submitted that the legal personality conferred on the first applicant under the Religious Communities Act was limited and insufficient for the purposes of Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicants also relied on Article 11 of the Convention. These provisions read as follows: | 12 |
75. The Government maintained their position that no agent of the State had taken part in the incidents alleged by the applicants. That had been unambiguously established by the domestic courts in the course of the examination of the relevant complaints. They noted in that respect that the applicants had failed to furnish, either at the domestic level or before the Court, any evidence to the contrary. According to the Government, the applicants had failed in the course of the domestic proceedings to name the police officers whose action or inaction had damaged their interests and violated their rights. Along the same line of reasoning, they argued that the State had maintained its neutral role in the relationship between various religious groups. The fact that the national courts had found against the applicants was not indicative of a violation of their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
42. The applicant organisation complained under Articles 9, 11 and 14 of the Convention about the restriction on its right to teach its followers and the decision on its dissolution. The Court considers that the complaint about the dissolution of a religious organisation must be examined from the standpoint of Article <mask> of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 11 (see Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, no. 302/02, § 103, 10 June 2010). Article 9 provides as follows: | 12 |
84. The applicants complained that in 2003 and the following years the State had interfered in an arbitrary fashion in the internal dispute in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church with the aim of forcing all clergy and believers under the leadership of the person favoured by the authorities, Patriarch Maxim. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 12 |
15. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal as the Supreme Military Administrative Court had been composed of military judges and officers. He further maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the decision of the Turkish General Staff to ban his access to the army's social facilities had infringed his freedom of conscience and religion. | 12 |
2. The applicant assumed the function of a preacher and an elder in the community of Jehovah’s Witnesses. He was called up to perform military service, as the authorities found that exemption from the obligation to perform military service applied only to members of recognized religious societies and not to members of registered religious communities such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. So far, the applicant was in the same situation as the applicants in the Löffelmann and Gütl cases, in which the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. However, and contrary to the applicants in these two cases, on 26 August 2003 Mr Lang requested the Federal Ministry for Defence to take no action until the European Court of Human Rights had decided on his application. The applicant was informed that an instruction had been issued to the relevant Military Authority not to call him up until further notice. Thus, he has never been required to perform any kind of military service (see paragraph 12 of the judgment). | 12 |
94. The applicant churches also complained that the fact that they had not been allowed to provide religious education in public schools and nurseries, to provide pastoral care to their members in hospitals, social-welfare institutions, prisons and penitentiaries, or to have religious marriages they celebrated recognised by the State as equal to civil marriages, amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
76. The applicants rejected the Government’s arguments. They claimed that the domestic courts had simply ignored the extensive witness and documentary evidence concerning various violations of their religious rights. They noted the case of Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, (no. 184/02, 11 January 2007), where the Court, in finding a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, had relied on evidence that had been dismissed by the domestic courts (ibid., §§ 58-59). The applicants submitted that the Government had failed to rebut their arguments and that the domestic decisions in this respect had been wholly biased and unsubstantiated. That was particularly evident in view of the various international governmental and non-governmental reports concerning increasing religious violence in Georgia at the material time and the inadequate response of the authorities (see paragraph 60 above). | 12 |
59. The Government maintained that the status conferred on the first applicant as a registered religious community under the 1998 Religious Communities Act complied with the requirements of Article 9; it only provided a legal status and in no way restricted the exercise or enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. In conclusion, there had been no interference with the applicants’ rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
54. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the authorities' refusal to grant Glas Nadezhda EOOD a broadcasting licence had substantially restricted their possibility to communicate their religious ideas to others and had thus infringed their freedom to manifest their religion. In their view, this refusal had not been justified under the second paragraph of that Article for the same reasons as the ones indicated under paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. | 12 |
85. The applicants stated that the Religious Denominations Act 2002 in itself constituted an arbitrary interference with their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. They characterised as misleading and inappropriate the Government’s argument that the new legal regime resembled the rules governing the status of the predominant religions in other European countries, such as Denmark and Italy. The crucial difference in the present case was, in the applicants’ view, that the ex lege recognition of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church had been introduced in the Religious Denominations Act 2002 in the context of an ongoing dispute between two leaderships and had, moreover, been aimed at putting an end to this dispute by favouring one of the two leaderships to the exclusion of the other. The applicants referred to the Court’s case-law, according to which the use of legislation and decrees to place a religious community under a single leadership and the removal of the opposing group from places of worship or other property constituted arbitrary State interference with the internal organisation of the religious community. The applicants considered that the heavy-handedness and discriminatory intent of the Bulgarian Government in the present case not only mirrored their approach criticised by the Court in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 30985/96, ECHR 2000‑XI), but far surpassed it in gravity. | 12 |
22. The applicant alleged that she had been subjected to unjustified treatment on account of her religion, in violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. In support of her allegation she submitted that she had been expelled from Turkey after having protested against the film The Last Temptation of Christ and after her protests had been given media coverage. Under the same Article, she further alleged that expressing opinions on Kurdish and Armenian issues at a university, where freedom of expression should be unlimited, could not be used as a justification for any sanctions, such as the ban on her re-entry into Turkey. | 12 |
22. The Government further submitted that, as the Contracting States were under no obligation to accept a refusal to perform military service for religious reasons, non-exemption of a person from military or alternative civilian service did not raise any concerns under Article <mask> of the Convention. In any event, the applicant's submissions did not indicate that the obligation to perform military or alternative civilian service entailed any concrete interference with his rights under Article 9. | 12 |
120. The applicant association stated that its right to change religious orientation, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, had been interfered with. There had been interference with its freedom of religion as the State had refused to register the changes and amendments to its statute for no legitimate reason as all the conditions for making the changes and amendments were met. Furthermore, the applicant association had been prevented from using the church premises it had built for its religious ceremonies and even from using its chosen name. | 12 |
34. The Government acknowledged that the restrictions imposed on the applicant regarding wearing the Islamic headscarf at school amounted to an interference with the exercise of her right to manifest her religion. They submitted, however, that as in the case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, ECHR 2005-XI) the requirements of legality, legitimacy and proportionality stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention were satisfied. | 12 |
169. The Government pointed out firstly that the Constitution of Georgia condemned any kind of discrimination (Article 14). They maintained that there had been no violation of the applicants’ rights under Articles 3 and 9 of the Convention on grounds of their faith. The Georgian authorities and senior civil servants had repeatedly denounced attacks by individuals on Jehovah’s Witnesses. Several sessions of the State Security Council had been dedicated to that matter. The relevant instructions had been issued to the investigating bodies of the GPO and of the Ministry of the Interior with a view to punishing the acts of violence committed against the applicants and ensuring that they were able to exercise their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. The pre-trial detention of Father Basil had been ordered by a court so as to prevent attacks on the applicants by his religious group. All the perpetrators of the other offences committed against the applicants had been placed under investigation. The Government guaranteed that each guilty party would be punished in accordance with the seriousness of the offences committed. | 12 |
28. The Government contended that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable in the present case. In their view, the fact that the premises of a political party had been chosen for a ceremony held following the death of members of a terrorist organisation and the decision to display symbols of that organisation clearly showed that the participants were pursuing a political and not a religious aim. | 12 |
79. The Government agreed that the Convention was a “living instrument”. However, the question of whether Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable to the present case was to be considered from the point of view of the interpretation of the Convention existing at the material time. The applicant had been convicted in the years 2001-02 and his conviction at that time had been in line with the approach of the international community and was considered to be lawful and justified under the Convention as interpreted by the Commission and the Court. In particular, the Commission had found in Peters v. the Netherlands (no. 22793/93, Commission decision of 30 November 1994, unreported) and Heudens v. Belgium (no. 24630/94, Commission decision of 22 May 1995, unreported), which were the latest decisions on the matter, that the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by Article 9 did not concern exemption from compulsory military service on religious or political grounds. The Court had not even recognised the applicability of Article 9 in its more recent judgments, where it had not found it necessary to examine the issue (see, for example, Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 43, ECHR 2000-IV, and Ülke v. Turkey, no. 39437/98, §§ 53-54, 24 January 2006). The Armenian authorities had therefore acted in compliance with the requirements of the Convention. Given the established case-law on this matter, they could not have foreseen the possibility of a new interpretation of Article 9 by the Court and consequently could not have made their actions comply with that possible “new approach”. | 12 |
28. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of assembly was prescribed by law, namely by section 6 of the Assembly Act. It served a legitimate aim, as its purpose was to maintain public order and to protect the rights and freedoms of others, namely the undisturbed worship of all those visiting the cemetery on All Saints’ Day, an activity which was itself protected by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 12 |
113. The Government acknowledged that the right to practise a religion in accordance with the Osho teaching fell within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. They also did not deny that from 8 May 2003 the applicant had been held at Vilnius Psychiatric Hospital unlawfully, as established by both the Vilnius Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. | 12 |
187. The Government noted that the applicant had not elaborated on his claim under Article <mask> of the Convention and contended in particular that he had not presented his views as a “belief” which attracted Article 9 protection. They challenged whether his views satisfied the requirements of cogency and seriousness. Even if there was a belief, there was no manifestation attracting the protection of Article 9. | 12 |
42. The applicants alleged that their beliefs prohibited them from permitting their children to take part in mixed swimming lessons. They added that, although the Koran laid down the precept that the female body was to be covered only from puberty, their faith instructed them to prepare their daughters for the precepts that would be applied to them from puberty onwards. The Court considers that the case concerns a situation in which the applicants’ right to manifest their religion is in issue. The applicants exercised parental authority and could decide, under Article 303 al. 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 23 above), on the religious education of their children. In consequence, they are entitled to rely on this aspect of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court considers, furthermore, that the applicants indeed suffered an interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of religion as protected by that provision. | 12 |
30. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention did not cover any dietary prescriptions and asked the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione materiae. As a subsidiary contention, relying on the case of Ionescu v. Romania ((dec.), no. 36659/04, 1 June 2010), they asserted that the applicant had not suffered any significant disadvantage, and asked the Court to declare the application inadmissible. | 12 |
79. The applicants submitted that because the second and third applicants had been exposed to the crucifixes displayed in the classrooms of the State school they attended, all three of them, not being Catholics, had suffered a discriminatory difference in treatment in relation to Catholic parents and their children. Arguing that “the principles enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 are reinforced by the provisions of Article 14 de la Convention”, they complained of a violation of the latter Article, which provides: | 12 |
123. The applicants also alleged that their conviction amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (freedom of conscience), Article 10 (freedom of expression), Article 11 (freedom of association) and Article 14 (the prohibition on discrimination). After the events in Moscow in August 1991, the CPL/CPSU was banned, and its leaders convicted of crimes against the State. However, the Convention guarantees the rights of political parties without discrimination. The applicants claimed that the domestic court assessment of the facts and law in their case had been wrong, that the CPL/CPSU had been a party upholding the principles of democracy, and that their activities within the CPL/CPSU and its subsidiary organisations could not have been foreseen as constituting criminal offences at the material time. The applicants stated that they had thus been unjustly punished in the exercise of their beliefs as communists, their legitimate work as journalists, their right of association with other individuals, and their support for the idea of Lithuania’s continuing membership of the USSR during politically turbulent times. | 12 |
68. The Government submitted that the circumstances of the case gave no indication of any interference with the third applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention on account of the fact that no ethics class had been organised for him in State schools. There were no indications that the third applicant had been in any way indoctrinated or subjected to any form of pressure as to his personal beliefs. Article 9 of the Convention did not deal with States' obligations regarding the content of school curricula. | 12 |
177. The applicants’ grievance under Article <mask> of the Convention being arguable, the Court finds that Article 13 is applicable in the present case. It reiterates, however, that this provision does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State’s laws as such to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, §§ 105-108, ECHR 2005‑IX, and Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community, cited above, §§ 107-109). | 12 |
23. The applicant community complained under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention that the domestic authorities’ refusal to issue a declaratory decision under the Employment of Aliens Act (“the EA Act”) that the employment of G.V. and V.T. by the applicant community was exempt from the provisions of that Act on the grounds that the applicant community was not a recognised religious society had violated its rights under these provisions. | 12 |
94. The applicants alleged that the Moldovan authorities’ refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia infringed their freedom of religion, since only religions recognised by the government could be practised in Moldova. They asserted in particular that their freedom to manifest their religion in community with others was frustrated by the fact that they were prohibited from gathering together for religious purposes and by the complete absence of judicial protection of the applicant Church’s assets. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 12 |
36. The Government contended that Article 11 did not impose any positive obligation to enact legislation of the kind suggested by the applicant. They submitted that in assessing the extent, if any, of the State’s positive obligation, the Court should consider whether the nature of the interference struck at the “very substance” of the right or freedom concerned (Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 55, Series A no. 44, Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark [GC], nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, § 54, ECHR 2006‑I). However, it did not necessarily follow from the fact that someone was dismissed from their employment as a consequence of manifesting certain political views that there would be an interference with their rights under Article 11 which struck at the very substance of the right so as to engage the State’s positive obligation. In this regard the Government relied, by analogy, on Stedman v the United Kingdom, application no. 29107/95, decision of 9 April 1997, in which the Commission rejected as inadmissible a complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention by a Christian applicant who had been dismissed because she refused to work on Sundays. The Commission noted that there had been no pressure on the applicant to change her religious views or to prevent her from manifesting her religion or beliefs. It followed that the Government could not be expected “to have legislation that would protect employees against such dismissals by private employers”. | 12 |
25. The Government argued that according to the “quotation case-law” of the Austrian courts, the publication of a statement which satisfies the definition of an offence may lead to sanctions against the medium concerned unless there is any objective reason, such as e.g. the protection by a basic right, justifying such statement. In the present case, having carefully weighed the freedom of expression against the protection of the reputation of others, the second instance court set out comprehensively the arguments in favour of the application of section 33 of the Media Act. It rightly considered that the statement “spiritually depraved” amounted to an offence and violated the concerned person's right to reputation. Referring to case-law of the Court of Appeal, the Government asserted that the correct quotation of an insult of one person by another person was protected by Article <mask> of the Convention and did not justify forfeiture. In the present case, however, the applicant company had not reported about the pending defamation proceedings in a neutral way but had identified itself with the content of the quoted statements. The Government referred in this regard to the Court of Appeal's findings as regards the structure and style of the article and, furthermore, to the article's subtitle which wording between the lines in their opinion called the rejection of the reproach of being “spiritually depraved” into question. A victim's right would be almost completely void without an adequate protection against abuse of quotations, if a medium was free to publish and add to defamation by third persons. The applicant company had not been deprived of the possibility to inform the public about the fact that criminal proceedings against Mr Heller were pending. Finally, the forfeiture was principally a safeguarding measure containing elements of minor punishment. It appeared proportionate as most of the issues of the weekly magazine had, in any way, already been published. The applicant company had not sufficiently substantiated the alleged damage resulting from the forfeiture. | 0 |
25. The applicant also complained of the following: under Article <mask> of the Convention that he had not been informed promptly about the charges against him, under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 that the police had seized some of his possessions, under Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 that he had been convicted twice for the same offence, and under Article 13 that he had not had an effective remedy in respect of breaches of his Convention rights. However, none of these complaints were substantiated and the Court does not discern any signs of a violation in respect of them. Accordingly, they must be declared inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. | 0 |
50. The applicant firstly submitted that Article <mask> of the Convention provided that everyone had the right to receive and impart information. Notwithstanding that general right, the applicant argued that he had acted in his capacity as a journalist with the intention of publishing information which he believed was of public interest. He maintained that the acts for which he had been investigated and sanctioned were part of a journalistic investigation that he had undertaken in order to determine whether the information brought to his attention was true and of public interest. As soon as he had verified the said information, he had contacted the central office of his newspaper and subsequently entered into contact with his colleague, O.O. The manner in which his colleague from the central office and the newspaper where he was employed had chosen to publish the information had not depended on him. Moreover, his statements as well as the witness statements given by other journalists during the investigation were meant to protect their sources and their colleagues. Under those circumstances, the applicant submitted that his arrest and the criminal sanctions imposed on him constituted an interference with his right to freedom of expression. | 0 |
63. The applicant complained under Articles 6, 10 and 13 of the Convention that each of his criminal convictions for the statements he had made in the newspaper articles and Internet forums had amounted to an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression and that, in this connection, his rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy had also been infringed in the relevant criminal proceedings. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined solely under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
26. The applicant complained under Articles 6, 7, 10 and 13 of the Convention that his conviction by the domestic courts for aggravated defamation had infringed his right to freedom of expression. The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will consider this complaint solely under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
38. The applicant rejoined that B. was a company that had been going through denationalisation (see paragraph 6 above), that at the relevant time it was still partly owned by the State, that the process of denationalisation in Slovakia was in general tainted with various suspicions and irregularities, and that A. had at one time been associated with a major party of government. The article thus clearly bore on a matter of public concern. Moreover, the applicant submitted that D. and his partners had been directly striving to bring B. into their operation. In such circumstances, the applicant could not see that a fair balance had been struck between, on the one hand his rights, and on the other hand his duties and obligations, within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
31. The applicant political party submitted that the voters’ posting photographs showing their participation in the referendum and the way they had cast their votes had constituted the expression of opinions on political matters, as protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. It also maintained that providing a forum for voters to express their opinions, in the form of using a mobile telephone application, fell under the scope of the right to freedom of expression. Thus, the restriction on, and penalisation of, the use of the application had constituted an interference with its right to freedom of expression, which had neither been prescribed by law nor had pursued a legitimate aim. | 0 |
28. The Government contested that argument. They pointed out that the applicant had been a prosecutor and the applicable law had allowed the mass media to publish information concerning his income as part of anti‑corruption measures. The national courts had verified the accuracy of the information concerning the applicant. Relying on the findings of the domestic courts (see paragraph 14 above), the Government considered that the national judicial authorities had conducted a thorough balancing exercise between the applicant’s rights and the journalist’s right to freedom of expression and had given priority to the rights set out in Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
33. The applicants complained that their right to freedom of expression had been violated in that the courts had allowed G. T.’s claim concerning content published in Pravoye Delo on 19 September 2003. They stated that the interference had neither been in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
35. The Government submitted that they had asked the Prosecutor General in January 2017 to inform them about the prospects of reopening the criminal proceedings against the applicant at the domestic level. They had referred in their request to the Court’s judgment in the case of Marinova and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 33502/07, 30599/10, 8241/11 and 61863/11, 12 July 2016). The Prosecutor General had replied in February 2017 that there were no grounds for reopening the applicant’s case, in particular because his conduct had consisted not only of making complaints to the competent authorities, in respect of which he could claim protection under Article <mask> of the Convention, but also of public dissemination of injurious statements, which was not covered by the protection of that Convention provision. | 0 |
46. The applicant company reiterated that the freedom of the press was strongly protected under Article <mask> of the Convention; the press could have recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation (it cited Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, § 38, Series A no. 313). It was allowed to use sarcastic, satirical or inelegant language (referring to Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, no. 5266/03, §§ 25-26, 22 February 2007). It was the right of the press to be shocking, offensive and disturbing and the test of proportionality should focus on whether a proper balance had been struck between the legal interests involved. That had not been the case in the proceedings concerned in the present case. The press could be expected to be unbiased and neutral in the forms of expression (it cited, for example, Standard Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria (no. 2), no. 37464/02, § 40, 22 February 2007). The magazine published by the applicant company was of a generally satirical character and, consequently, the article concerned had also been couched in satirical terms. Satirical statements concerning matters of public interest were by their very nature exaggerated and distorting and as such they enjoyed a wider margin of tolerance (it cited, for example Alves da Silva v. Portugal, no. 41665/07, § 27, 20 October 2009). | 0 |
33. The applicant complained of an infringement of his right to freedom of expression, both because of the Italian courts’ decisions on the merits and because of their procedural decisions, which had prevented him from proving that the offending article was an example of the right to report and comment on current events within the context of the freedom of the press. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 0 |
33. The Government concluded that the interference complained of had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and thus necessary in a democratic society to protect the reputation of others. The penalty, a symbolic payment to a charity and an order to apologise to A.W., was a lenient one and did not constitute a conviction. Although a notice of the proceedings against the applicant is revealed in the National Crime Record, the information is removed after a successful expiry of the probation period. They submitted that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
19. The applicants alleged under Article <mask> of the Convention that the suspension of the publication and distribution of Yedinci Gün and Toplumsal Demokrasi, which had been based on section 6(5) of Law no. 3713, constituted an unjustified interference with their freedom of expression. They claimed in particular that the banning, for such lengthy periods, of the publication of the newspapers as a whole, whose future content was unknown at the time of the national courts' decisions, amounted to censorship. | 0 |
36. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They argued that neither the Estonian Constitution nor the Convention prescribed that everyone should be entitled to obtain through the Internet information such as that in issue in the present case. The State had a discretion to restrict the right of specific groups of people (such as prisoners) to access information through specific channels. According to the Government, prisoners were not in a position comparable to that of persons at liberty. | 0 |
65. The Government considered that, should the Court find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicants should be awarded as pecuniary damages the sums paid by them. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that the first applicant should be awarded reasonable compensation for non-pecuniary damage which in the circumstances of the present case should not exceed EUR 1,500. | 0 |
27. The applicant complained of a violation of his rights under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. He submitted that, in choosing to become a member of the BNP and to stand for election, he was engaging both his right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to freedom of assembly and association pursuant to Article 11 and that his dismissal had disproportionately interfered with his exercise of those rights. | 0 |
64. The applicant disagreed. It considered that the interference was not necessary because the articles referred not to facts, but to value judgments, which were not susceptible of proof. The courts' decisions were in fact a form of political censorship of the opinion of the journalist and were aimed at removing it from the political discussion of persons in public life. Furthermore, the sanctions imposed were aimed at preventing it from acting as a source of information and a control mechanism over public power. The applicant maintained that the assessment of the personal and managerial qualities of the candidates for presidency and of their ability to form a team of like-minded persons, to deliver what they had promised and to provide moral and intellectual leadership for the benefit of the nation, was at the core of the issues discussed in the impugned publications. Furthermore, open criticism of politicians and discussion of their qualities were necessary preconditions for the holding of free and democratic elections. It therefore concluded that the fundamental guarantees enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed. | 0 |
218. The Government agreed with the Chamber that no causal link had been established between the damage claimed and the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nor had any causal link been established between the damage claimed and the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. According to the Government, no compensation should thus be awarded under this head. Were the Court to consider that pecuniary damage was due, the application of Article 41 of the Convention should be reserved. | 0 |
47. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the alleged reprisals against him as a result of the publication of his letter. He submitted that the sealing off of his office, the search effected therein, the fact that he had been prevented from having access to his office, and the deceptive manner in which he had been discharged from his duties had all been in retaliation for the publication of his letter. In his view, these measures had been unlawful and unnecessary. | 0 |
16. The applicants contended that the offending statement concerned a fictitious, but nevertheless conceivable and humanly understandable thought by Mr Eberharter, which was clearly discernable as such even by the hastiest of readers. The domestic authorities' reference to a reader who perused the text in such a quick or unfocused manner that he failed to understand its content was inadmissible. The applicants were not responsible for such readers and the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention was not restricted by the fact that a reader might misunderstand the ideas expressed. Any reader who honestly believed that Mr Eberharter had in fact uttered the impugned statement before the press was simply ignorant. | 0 |
62. The applicant submitted that the relevant criminal and civil judgments undoubtedly constituted an interference “by a public authority” with his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. This interference, however, was not “in accordance with the law” because the domestic criminal courts had refused to treat all of the applicant's statements as an acceptable expression of his political opinion and the final civil court judgment had itself been based on his criminal conviction. In the alternative, however, the applicant argued that the said interference was disproportionate. | 0 |
36. The Government acknowledged that the conviction of the first applicant and the ordering of both applicants to pay damages and costs had amounted to an interference with the exercise of their freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, in their submission the impugned measures had had a basis in Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code and in Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act which fulfilled both the requirements of precision and clarity. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law”. In addition, it had pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. | 0 |
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