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23. The applicant further maintained that States have positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. Since, in the present case, the Hungarian authorities had not needed to collect the impugned information, because it had been ready and available, their only obligation would have been not to bar access to it. The disclosure of public information on request in fact falls within the notion of the right “to receive”, as understood by Article 10 § 1. This provision protects not only those who wish to inform others but also those who seek to receive such information. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of expression is no more than the absence of censorship, which would be incompatible with the above-mentioned positive obligations. | 0 |
38. The applicant complained that the refusals by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to allow him to cross the “green line” in order to participate in bi-communal meetings had prevented him from exercising his right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and ideas and to receive and impart information, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
19. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against them under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and their subsequent conviction, had constituted a violation of their right to freedom of expression. Referring, in particular, to the Court’s judgments in Gül and Others v. Turkey (no. 4870/02, 8 June 2010) and Faruk Temel v. Turkey (no. 16853/05, 1 February 2011), the applicants claimed that their conviction was not necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
49. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.’s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any parts of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident of 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially in this type of case where the person concerned had been a defendant in a high-profile criminal case. Moreover, the information in the articles had been correct in every respect. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in this case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very substantial damages in the case. | 0 |
34. The Government further maintained that even if it were to be accepted that there had been interference with the applicant company’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, such interference had been prescribed by the domestic legislation, namely Article 15 § 2 of the Constitution, Article 3 § 1 (c) of Law No. 2328/1995, Articles 7 and 9 of Regulation 1/1991 and Article 2 § 3 of Regulation 2/1991 of the National Radio and Television Council, and Article 2 (b) and (f) of the Code on Journalistic Ethics (issued by the journalists’ union). Additionally, the Government asserted that any interference with the applicant company’s right to impart information had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and reputation of others – specifically A.C.’s right to private life, as protected under Article 8 of the Convention. | 0 |
48. The Government did not contest that the decision by which the domestic court had ordered the applicant to pay non-pecuniary damage to N.C.I. represented an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression. They further submitted that the interference was based on Articles 998-999 of the Romanian Civil Code, as in force at the material time. The legitimate aim pursued by the domestic authorities was the protection of the reputation and dignity of others, as provided for by the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
50. The applicants then observed that the present case did not require an examination of any interference by the State with the exercise of their freedom of expression, but rather an analysis of its positive obligation under the Convention. They took the view that the national authorities, in the present case, had a positive obligation to provide them with a system that enabled them to obtain the performance of an undertaking from an individual and that the authorities had a duty to act with the requisite diligence to assist them in enforcing the judicial decision given in their favour on 6 December 2002, as a result of which they would have been able to exercise their profession as radio journalists. They pointed out that the Court had already noted the existence of such an obligation, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in cases concerning individuals’ obligations to act. In their view, the transposition of such an obligation to the subject-matter of Article <mask> of the Convention would be consistent with the principle of proportionality between the general interest and the interest of individuals and would not represent an impossible or disproportionate burden for the State, given that no new obligations would be imposed on it. Lastly, the applicants took the view that, in determining the positive obligation in the present case, it had to be taken into account that freedom of expression was exercised by professional journalists and that the de facto obstacles complained of affected the diversity and plurality of means of expression. In addition, it was also necessary to take into account the situation of the press in Romania in the relevant period (2002-2004), as described in a number of reports by various national and international organisations. | 0 |
96. The applicant companies complained that their right to freedom of expression protected by paragraph 1 of Article <mask> of the Convention had been interfered with in a manner which was not justified under its second paragraph. The collection of taxation information was not illegal as such and the information collected and published was in the public domain. Individual privacy rights were not violated. | 0 |
28. The applicant complained that her right to freedom of expression had been violated. She insisted that she was free to express her opinion as a journalist, and that, by ruling against her, the domestic courts had criticised her for her professional activity and had unjustifiably limited her freedom of speech. The applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads: | 0 |
14. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that there had been an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression on account of, inter alia, the national courts' failure to state by which laws the continued confiscation was justified. He submitted that, by virtue of the lack of certainty, neither the accessibility nor the foreseeability requirements of that provision had been satisfied. Article 10 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 0 |
203. The Government submitted that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carried with it duties and responsibilities and could be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety. According to the Court’s case‑law, the disclosure of the State’s interest in a given weapon and that of the corresponding technical knowledge, which may give some indication of the state of progress in its manufacture, were capable of causing considerable damage to national security (they referred to Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, 16 December 1992, § 45, Series A no. 252). The conviction of an individual for such a disclosure could not be seen as a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The State had not violated Article 10 by holding the applicant criminally liable for disclosure of State secrets of a military nature to a foreign intelligence service. The circumstances of the case, as established by the domestic courts, showed that the applicant had used his research skills to damage Russia’s external security for the purpose of obtaining financial compensation. The fact that he had not had access to State secrets did not relieve him of criminal liability for divulging classified data to a foreign state. The classified information could have been received by any means. Through his education and the post he occupied at the Institute of the USA and Canada, the applicant had professional contacts with a number of officials in the Ministry of Defence, who had had access to State secrets. He had been purposefully eliciting classified information from them. In his videoed statements to FSB officials, which were used as evidence at the trial, the applicant had repeatedly affirmed that he had realised that his interlocutors were agents of foreign intelligence services; however, he had continued to transmit information to them because of his difficult financial situation. As an educated person and a scientist, the applicant could and should have known of the restrictions on his right to impart information. His argument that the relevant information had been publicly available was untenable. It had been established at the trial that the information could not have been received from open sources and its divulgence had damaged Russia’s security and defence. | 0 |
28. The applicant association asserted that Article <mask> of the Convention required States, to a certain extent, to make information available to the public. In its view the decisions of judicial bodies such as the Commission should be publicly accessible. Given the possibilities of electronic data processing, the authorities could easily create an online information system providing access to the decisions of the Commission, while making provision for the protection of confidential data where necessary. Such a system, namely the Federal Legal Information System (Rechtsinformations-system des Bundes), existed at federal level and made decisions of the highest courts and various other courts and authorities available. Where such a system did not exist, the State should at least provide anonymised paper copies of decisions upon request. Regarding the Government’s argument that Austrian administrative law did not make provision for unrestricted access to files, the applicant association submitted that it had not requested access to files but rather the provision of decisions in anonymised form. | 0 |
51. The applicant association submitted that it was still the victim of a violation of the Convention because section 14 of the Law of 1881, as amended, placed it under a permanent threat – a kind of sword of Damocles hanging over its right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. On that point, it observed that its aim was to inform as broad a target audience as possible, in various countries and at international level, about human rights and the rights of peoples and in particular about the right of peoples to decide on their own future and exercise self-determination. Its goal therefore was to disseminate ideas which, in the Minister of the Interior’s view, were apt to encourage separatism and hence were liable to ministerial censorship. Furthermore, these books had been drafted jointly by French and Spanish authors and were written in French, Spanish, Basque, German, Italian and English. The applicant association had already undergone a continuous violation of its right to freedom of expression for over nine years. In the final analysis, the law amounted to an extremely grave threat to freedom of expression since it established a set of preventive rules which were exempt from the general rules on freedom of the press, in other words an administrative system in which the courts carried out an ex post facto review without being able to order the suspension of the impugned measure. The Minister had very broad powers of discretion to assess the reasons for a ban and bans were general and absolute in their geographical and temporal scope and could not be tailored to fit particular situations. | 0 |
42. The applicants also argued that the Court’s constant approach under Article <mask> of the Convention had been to protect not only information and ideas that were favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that offended, shocked or disturbed the State or any segment of the population. It had also consistently held that journalistic freedom also covered possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. The applicants also pointed out that Article 10 protected the content of the ideas as well as the form in which those ideas were expressed. | 0 |
19. The applicant complained that the District Court judgment of 29 November 2012, in respect of which leave to appeal was refused by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2013, entailed an interference with his right to freedom of expression that was not necessary in a democratic society and thus violated Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
187. The Government submitted that there had been an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ freedom of peaceful assembly within the meaning of Article 11 and their freedom of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, but that the interference had been in accordance with the law, in particular Article 71 of the Criminal Code. They submitted that the interference had been in the interests of public safety. They also argued that it had been necessary in a democratic society, particularly because the applicants’ actions during the events of 9 March 2001 had gone beyond the range allowed to be committed by an individual in exercising his rights under the Convention, as they had been accompanied by riotous damage, destruction of property and resistance towards the authorities. Their rally had therefore not been of a peaceful character. | 0 |
23. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Sovetskiy District Court’s judgment of 22 May 2006, which had been upheld on appeal by the Bryanskiy Regional Court on 29 June 2006, had violated his freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the Convention. He submitted that the domestic courts had failed to draw a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments and had held him responsible for a failure to prove the truth of value judgments. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: | 0 |
26. The Government did not dispute that the libel proceedings and the sanctions imposed on the applicants constituted an interference with their freedom of expression. They argued that the interference was necessitated by a pressing social need, namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others, and that the sanction imposed was proportionate. The domestic courts had complied with the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention, considered the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments, and concluded that the statements of the second applicant were devoid of any factual basis. Referring to the Court’s judgments in the cases of Krasulya v. Russia (no. 12365/03, 22 February 2007), and Kudeshkina v. Russia (no. 29492/05, 26 February 2009), the Government contended that even if the paragraphs in question were expressing a value judgment the second applicant lacked “good faith” in the exercise of his journalistic duties by failing to rely on any facts. | 0 |
100. The Government of Cyprus submitted that the applicant’s abduction, detention and beating had been motivated by her activity of speaking out on behalf of the enclaved population of Greek Cypriots against the Turkish occupation. The respondent Government admitted that the applicant was seen as a protagonist for the “cause of the enclaved”. The material taken from the applicant – and which had not been produced before the Court – had been confiscated as part of a programme of censorship of documents which persons sought to bring into the occupied areas. The Turkish Government had indeed confined themselves to saying that they “believed” that the confiscated material was “anti-Turkish, racist and defamatory”. This amounted to a clear violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
34. The applicant considered that her conviction for the above‑mentioned statements had amounted to an unlawful interference with her right to freedom of expression. Referring to the Court’s case-law, she considered that the domestic courts had failed to address the substance of the impugned statements in the light of Article <mask> of the Convention. If they had done so, they would not have qualified them as mere value judgments. Value judgments were only excessive if they were not linked to facts, whereas her incriminated statements had been based on facts. The applicant stressed that by stating that Muhammad had had sexual intercourse with a nine-year-old, she had quoted a historically proven fact and raised the question whether this could be regarded as paedophilia; thus, she had based her value judgment on facts, which was always permissible under Article 10 of the Convention. Furthermore, through the impugned statements she had expressed criticism concerning Islam and the unreflecting imitation of Muhammad, in the framework of an objective and lively discussion, which the domestic courts had failed to take into account. Against that background, this had been an objective criticism of religion, had contributed to a public debate and had not been aimed at defaming the Prophet of Islam. Consequently, contrary to the domestic courts’ reasoning, a sufficient factual basis had existed for her assessment that Muhammad’s behaviour had amounted to paedophilia. She added that she had held a seminar extending over a number of days with an overall duration of twelve hours, and therefore a few “individual statements” had to be tolerated in order to allow for a lively discussion, which was a necessary part of such a seminar. | 0 |
61. The Government considered that, should the Court find a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, the aforementioned claim would be excessive. Whereas the applicant should be reimbursed the sums she had been ordered to pay in the Supreme Court's judgment, there could be no causal link between the other alleged pecuniary damage and any violation of Article 10. | 0 |
88. The applicant also appeared to suggest that the BBC, acting under Royal Charter, was a public authority as was Anglia Television which acted under the authority of the ITC constituted under the Broadcasting Act 1990. Even assuming that those media could rely on their rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, their broadcasts, he argued, also constituted unjustified interferences with his private life. The Government did not consider that the applicant had, in fact, made that submission and, in any event, denied that either the BBC or Anglia Television could be regarded as State bodies or public authorities within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. They relied, inter alia, on relevant domestic provisions and the conclusions to be drawn from the inclusion in Article 10 of the Convention of the phrase concerning the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. | 0 |
23. The Government suggested that, since the applicant had been acquitted in 2005, he could no longer be considered a victim. They further contended that the applicant's complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; since he had not at any stage in the domestic proceedings relied on the provisions of the Convention. | 0 |
18. The applicant complained that his dismissal from the State television company on the ground of publishing a book including internal documents of his employer amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression and in particular his right to impart information and ideas to third parties. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
92. The Government considered that in the event that a violation was found, such a finding should constitute sufficient compensation for the applicant company. In addition, the Government contested the causal link between the fine imposed on the applicant company pursuant to the domestic legislation and the alleged violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the applicant company could have lodged an application with the domestic courts for the reimbursement of the amount they had paid as a fine under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code governing compensation in cases of an illegal act or an omission on the part of the State. In any event, the Government submitted certificates from the relevant fiscal authorities attesting to the fact that the applicant company had paid EUR 100,000 and not EUR 200,000 as they had erroneously maintained. | 0 |
120. The Government further noted that the ECJ had held that it was not necessary to examine whether there had been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. Furthermore, in judgments nos. 242/2009 and 243/2009 the Consiglio di Stato had held that national television was not a transfrontier service and that the applicant company, as a licence holder, was entitled to take part in competitive, non-discriminatory procedures for the allocation of frequencies from 1 January 2008. This result had been achieved with the ministerial decree of 11 December 2008 (see paragraph 16 above), in which the applicant company had been allocated channel 8 on the VHF III frequency band, which had become available as a result of the transition to digital broadcasting. | 0 |
20. The applicant company complained about the authorities’ refusal to allow it to film, inside a prison, an interview with a detainee serving a sentence for murder. The company alleged that as a result of that refusal it had not been able to broadcast the interview as planned in the “Rundschau” programme about the trial of a person accused in the same murder case. It considered that this was a violation of its right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
214. The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention concerning an interference with his right to freedom of expression. The Court notes, however, that the Government did not provide any arguments whatsoever in support of their claim. Nor did they indicate any remedies which could have been used by the applicant. There are therefore no grounds to allow the Government’s claim and it must be dismissed. | 0 |
53. The applicant further maintained his complaint under Article <mask> of the Convention. He insisted that the authorities had persecuted him for his journalistic activity and his publication of articles on serious environmental issues. He also contended that the impugned information could have been found in public sources, and in particular in reports by various environmental organisations, that it was of minor importance and that it could not therefore be regarded as a State secret. | 0 |
65. The Government submitted that Article 10 was not applicable in the present case. In any event they stated that the application of the KGB Act to the applicants served the legitimate purpose of the protection of national security and was necessary in a democratic society in view of the applicants’ lack of loyalty to the State. The applicants had not been punished for their views, be they views which they hold at present or views that they might have held in the past. The KGB Act had not imposed a collective responsibility on all former KGB officers without exception. The fact that the applicants were not entitled to benefit from any of the exceptions provided for in section 3 of the KGB Act showed that there had been a well-founded suspicion that the applicants had been lacking in loyalty to the Lithuanian State. Accordingly, there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14. | 0 |
1. The applicants, the director of a local news portal and two of its journalists, were convicted of illegally accessing radio channels used by the police during the latter’s activities, as the information so obtained by the journalists was considered confidential under the Italian Criminal Code. The Court finds no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. I concur in the judgment. However, I am writing separately as I consider the reasoning adopted by the Court to be somewhat too broad in substance. | 0 |
34. The Government contended that there had been no interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression in the present case. They underlined in this connection the wording of the disclaimer and apologies ordered by the domestic courts, according to which those had been “the editorial office and the author”, who had to provide them. Given the fact that, on one hand, the applicant had never admitted authorship of the impugned statement, and, on the other hand, that the author of the compilation which had contained the disclaimed statement, was the newspaper's journalist Mr L., the Government considered that the court order had not affected the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
34. The applicant complained that by concluding that he had committed defamation and by imposing an administrative fine and non-pecuniary damages on him, the County Court had infringed his right to freedom of expression. He also claimed that in order to present his defence and bring proof of the validity of his statements (proba verităţii), he was constrained to reveal his sources, that is, the two witnesses who were heard by the first‑instance court, which amounted to an additional interference with his freedom of expression. He relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 0 |
28. The Government contested the complaint. They agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression, but considered it in compliance with the terms of paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, as regards the “necessary in a democratic society” requirement, they pointed out that the applicant had not been held criminally responsible but had only had an administrative penalty imposed on him, that the fine he had to pay – EUR 510 – had not been significant and the damages to be paid to B.K. and G.C. – EUR 2,551 for each of them – had been “moderate”, and that prosecutors such as the two complainants in the criminal proceedings had to be seen as enjoying a higher degree of protection against criticism “compared to other public officials”. Moreover, in his interview the applicant had not presented any facts or evidence in support of his allegations, which meant that his statements had gone “far beyond the acceptable threshold of constructive criticism”. The Government pointed out also that Trud was the leading daily newspaper in Bulgaria, which meant that the applicant’s interview had reached “a particularly large audience”. They contended that the applicant’s impugned statements had clearly been directed against specific individuals, including B.K. and G.C., whom he had insulted, calling them in particular “trash”, and did not amount to general criticism against the work of the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office. This meant that the applicant’s statements did not contribute towards any legitimate public debate related most notably to the work of the prosecution in Bulgaria. | 0 |
21. The Government contended that the injunction issued against the applicant constituted an interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention which was, however, justified under § 2 of this provision. It had a legal basis, namely Section 1330 of the Civil Code, and pursued the legitimate aim of protection of the reputation of others. As to the necessity of the interference, they argued that the Austrian courts classified the applicant's statements as statements of facts. An essential element for this classification was that the applicant had not given any explanation for his statements which was thus not discernible as a value judgment. There was no factual basis to enable the reader to evaluate himself why the applicant had come to his conclusions. Therefore, it appeared legitimate that the Austrian courts attributed to the statements at issue the meaning usually conveyed by similar reproaches, namely that the plaintiffs had been guided by improper and unlawful motives. The applicant himself had endorsed this interpretation as, in his appeal with the Regional Court, he had argued why the teachers' conduct had allegedly been unlawful. However, the Austrian courts, after comprehensive evaluation of all evidence, came to the conclusion that these accusations were factually incorrect. The measures taken by the Austrian courts were proportionate, as the applicant was merely ordered to refrain from making further such statements which did not hinder him to express his opinion in other less defamatory or insulting words. The Government finally argued that, even assuming that the statements at issue were value judgments, the interference was proportionate as the applicant's statements were unsubstantiated and the details of the underlying conflict were not known to the public. Such extremely harsh, excessive and generalising criticism was not justified by the applicant's interest in several-day excursions abroad. | 0 |
57. The applicant essentially submits that the Government are under a positive obligation to provide effective protection for the rights guaranteed by the Convention. Given the terms of Article <mask> of the Convention, the absence of an effective domestic remedy as regards invasions of privacy by the press constitutes a failure to effectively respect her right to respect for her private life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see Earl and Countess Spencer v. the United Kingdom, nos. 28851/95 and 28852/95, Commission decision of 16 January 1998, Decisions and Reports 92-A, p. 56). | 0 |
69. The Government argued that the interference was prescribed by law. Section 38(1) of the 1881 Act was an integral part of the published and accessible legislation. Moreover, case-law had established that the impugned prohibition applied to all documents from criminal case files and had set its scope, which included extracts from such documents (they cited Tourancheau and July, cited above, § 26). Lastly, the domestic courts had examined the relevant publications in the light of Article <mask> of the Convention (see paragraph 47 above). | 0 |
91. The Government maintained that the Court had only a limited role in reviewing the compatibility of the national electoral systems with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. The Government also referred to the interrelation between the guarantees of Article <mask> of the Convention (freedom of expression) and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, and to the States’ wide margin of appreciation in establishing a fair balance between these two guarantees. | 0 |
40. The applicant complained that there had been an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression, in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. In addition, in the application form, the applicant made lengthy and detailed submissions criticising the manner in which the proceedings had been conducted before the first-instance court, especially the appointment of experts and admission of evidence and the manner in which the first‑instance court and the Court of Cassation had assessed the evidence and the applicable procedural rules. In this connection, the applicant emphasised what he described as the inappropriate way in which the domestic courts had praised the plaintiff in their decisions. In his view these flaws in the proceedings demonstrated that the domestic courts lacked the requisite impartiality vis-à-vis the plaintiff, and that they had been unduly influenced by his status. He claimed a violation of his rights under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention. | 0 |
61. The applicant association further complained about having been discriminated against vis-à-vis the journalist M. and other animal rights activists who had been allowed to continue the publication of the impugned material. It submitted, in particular, that there was no reason to treat the applicant association any differently from the other animal rights activists. It furthermore referred to the proceedings in Switzerland (see paragraph 28, above). It relied on Article 14 in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention. Article 14 of the Convention provides: | 0 |
122. The Government pointed out that, according to the Court’s case-law, regulation of the activities of television companies was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention, which did not prevent States from examining the technical aspects, the rights and needs of a specific audience, the nature and objectives of channels, their potential audience at national and local level, and the obligations deriving from international undertakings (see Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276). | 0 |
73. The Government maintained that Article <mask> of the Convention was not applicable, since the findings in the case of Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (no. 37374/05, § 14, April 2009, hereinafter referred to as “Társaság”) could not be decisive in the present application. In that case, in the absence of an objection from the Government, the Court had not been required to examine the applicability of Article 10. They added that their concession with regard to the applicability of Article 10 in the Társaság case had been based exclusively on domestic-law considerations and could not serve as a basis for expansion of the Convention into areas which it had not been intended to cover. | 0 |
105. The Government disputed the existence of a causal link between these costs and expenses and the events now found by the Court to have violated the Convention. They assumed that any violation which the Court might find, if violation there were, would relate to the lack of procedural safeguards. In their view, the seizure of the journalistic materials as such was a distinct issue; the decisions of the domestic authorities had not in themselves been contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention and could therefore not give rise to an award of the sums claimed by the applicant company. | 0 |
94. The applicants argued that their detention had violated both their freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention and their freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 of the Convention. The interference with those rights by their detention had not been justified. It had not been “prescribed by law” and had not pursued a legitimate aim for the reasons they set out in relation to Article 5 § 1 (see paragraph 57 above). In particular, it had been uncertain if, when and where the applicants would display the banners “Freedom for prisoners” and “Free all now”. Doing so would, furthermore, not have been an offence under the Criminal Code. The slogans could not have been understood as an incitement to a very uncommon crime but had had a different, more obvious meaning. With more than 1,000 demonstrators having been detained in connection with the G8 summit but only 100 detentions having been approved by the courts, there had been more than enough reason to criticise the deprivations of liberty that had taken place in connection with the summit. | 0 |
36. The applicant further argued that it was of no relevance for the assessment of whether the facts of the case amounted to a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal case against the applicant had been instituted by J.K., bringing a private prosecution in the local court. The only relevant fact was that the applicant had been convicted and that this conviction had been by a court acting in the name of the respondent State, whose responsibility was thereby engaged. | 0 |
31. The applicant complained that he had been fined and ordered to pay damages in relation to the complaints he had made to various competent public authorities, as well as for expressing his concerns and his own opinion on posters in his shop. He claimed that that was in breach of his right to freedom of expression as provided for in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, insofar as relevant, as follows: | 0 |
47. The Government argued that Article 10 was not applicable in the current case. In their opinion, the acts for which the applicant had been convicted could not be considered as journalistic investigation because they had not resulted in the publication of the information in question. The Government therefore raised an objection of incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
33. The Government agreed that the applicants’ conviction, the fines imposed on them and the obligation to pay costs and damages to K.U. constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government agreed with the applicants that the impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code. The interference had also had a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the private life of others. | 0 |
40. The applicant complained that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic source to be identified, in violation of her right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In her submission, the interference with her freedom of expression was not prescribed by law, did not pursue a legitimate aim and was not necessary in a democratic society. The applicant further asked the Court to clarify the duties of the State under this provision in these circumstances. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: | 0 |
69. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention had not been violated. According to them it is of essential importance that the freedom of expression not only stipulates the right to hold opinions, but also imposes duties and responsibilities, and therefore cannot be interpreted as allowing the promotion or dissemination of the ideas of ethnic hatred, hostility and the superiority of one nation vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The Government admitted that by imposing an administrative punishment there was interference with the applicant's freedom of expression; however it had been justified by the necessity to protect the democratic values on the basis of which Lithuanian society is based. Stressing the sensitivity of the questions related to national minorities and territorial integrity after the re-establishment of independence on 11 March 1990, the Government submitted that “Lithuanian calendar 2000” was clearly promoting the extreme ideology of nationalism, which rejected the idea of the integration of civil society, incited ethnic hatred and intolerance, and questioned territorial integrity and promoted national superiority, which had been proved by the notes sent by the embassies of the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation. By withdrawing the publication from distribution and imposing an administrative warning on the applicant, the authorities had sought to prevent the spreading of ideas which might violate the rights of ethnic minorities living in Lithuania as well as endanger Lithuania's relations with its neighbouring countries. In view of the clear threat to these legitimate interests posed by the publication, as well as the minor nature of the penalty ordered against the applicant, the Government considered that the interference had been compatible with the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. | 0 |
35. The Government argued that the freedom of expression enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention was not absolute. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 formulated certain conditions and restrictions concerning its exercise. Journalists, in order to comply with the duties and responsibilities referred to in that provision, were obliged to act in good faith and to provide accurate and reliable information to the public. | 0 |
62. The applicant further complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a breach of the right to information and dignity. The Court notes that the applicant failed to elaborate any further and to substantiate the violation complained of. As a result, this complaint must be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. | 0 |
13. The applicant complained that the French courts had convicted him of aiding and abetting public defamation of a civil servant on account of statements he had made during a television programme called Tout le monde en parle, broadcast on France 2 during the night of 23 to 24 October 1999. He complained of a violation of his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention, which is worded as follows: | 0 |
59. The Government maintained their argument stated above (see paragraph 40) that the present case essentially concerned a labour dispute governed by the provisions of private law. They reiterated that the applicant had been dismissed after having addressed an email to the Rector of the University which contained illegal requests as well as threats and blackmail. They considered that a distinction should be drawn between the expression of criticism that might disturb or offend other persons, on the one hand, and incitement to perform unlawful activities that infringed individuals’ honour and dignity on the other. The latter was at issue in the present case, as the applicant’s behaviour constituted a particularly grave infringement of the principles of ethics and breached the University’s staff regulations and the provisions of the Labour Law. Therefore the content of the email written by the applicant – an incitement to perform illegal activities – did not enjoy the protection afforded by Article <mask> of the Convention. Moreover, the Government asserted that the applicant had failed to substantiate which prior public remarks had formed the alleged basis for his dismissal, and pointed out that the Rector had not made any statements to the effect that the applicant should be dismissed from the University because of his criticism towards it. | 0 |
24. The applicant association argued that the public exhibition of a painting contributed to a debate between the artist, the exhibitor and the public and was therefore protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. It accepted that the impugned interference was prescribed by law, but maintained that the interference had been neither necessary nor proportionate. It submitted that the Government's submissions as regards the protection of morals were irrelevant as in the present case the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on Mr Meischberger's prevailing personal interests as protected under section 78 of the Copyright Act. Mr Meischberger could not, however, claim any personal interest worth protecting as the painting obviously did not state or suggest that the way in which he was portrayed corresponded to his actual behaviour. The painting presented the artist's personal history in an allegorical way and depicted, among several other well-known persons, the painter himself and some of his friends and benefactors. All these persons were depicted engaging in sexual acts, reflecting the painter's conception of the interrelation between power and sexuality. Mr Meischberger had been one of the figures who had characterised the history of the FPÖ party in the past few years, and he had been portrayed with the other three members as an allegory of that party, which had always strongly criticised the painter's work. Furthermore, Mr Meischberger and, in any event, the actions he considered libellous were not recognisable after the painting had been partly damaged. In the applicant association's view, the fact that he had instituted proceedings only after the painting had been partly damaged demonstrated that rather than protecting his personal interests he was aiming to discredit the painter's work. | 0 |
38. The applicant complained of the impossibility of accessing his Internet site as a result of a measure ordered in the context of criminal proceedings which were wholly unrelated to his site. In his view, the measure amounted to an infringement of his freedom to receive and impart information and ideas, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
24. The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the interference with her right to freedom of expression had been based on the decisions of the domestic courts. As the applicant did not complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the impugned court proceedings were unfair, and as the Court had limited jurisdiction regarding the assessment of the facts and the application of the law by the domestic courts, the Government invited the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. | 0 |
34. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention, inter alia, that there had been a lack of intent, which was a necessary requirement for any criminal conviction. Even though the applicant has not lodged any complaint specifically under Article 7 of the Convention, the Court considered that his above-mentioned complaint under Article 10 fell to be examined also under Article 7 and for that reason communicated the complaint from the standpoint of the legality principle. | 0 |
110. The Government considered these claims unfounded. They submitted that some of the costs incurred in the domestic proceedings were not related to the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention (in connection with the Ombudsman’s review and other discussions between the applicant and her lawyer). They also considered that the applicant had not adduced adequate details of the breakdown of the work carried out in relation to the domestic and Strasbourg proceedings. Lastly, the Government argued that the amount claimed for legal services was unreasonably high. | 0 |
35. The applicants also pointed out that the District Court, when dismissing the charges against the first applicant, had found that his criticism had not overstepped the limits of propriety. When doing so, the District Court had not referred at all to Article <mask> of the Convention, including, in particular, the “necessity” requirement in Article 10 § 2. It had found that neither the first applicant nor the complainant had made a false statement. The complainant could himself be criticised for having used similar expressions in his programme. Moreover, both parties had had the opportunity to state their opposing views in Seura magazine. | 0 |
50. The applicant argued (see paragraphs 31-32 above) that she had made the impugned media statements in the exercise of her constitutionally guaranteed right of reply. She added that she had acted primarily with a view to responding to what she had seen as groundless criticism of her in the same newspaper by another officer of the same company, namely the chairman of its General Meeting, who had also been the municipal mayor. In that connection the Court reiterates that the right of rectification or of reply, as an important element of freedom of expression, falls within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention (see Kaperzyński v. Poland, no. 43206/07, § 66, 3 April 2012, and Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, ECHR 2005-IX). This flows from the need not only to be able to contest untruthful information, but also to ensure a plurality of opinions, especially in matters of general interest (ibid.). At the same time, the restrictions and limitations of the second paragraph of Article 10 are equally pertinent to the exercise of that right (see Melnychuk, cited above). | 0 |
223. The Government argued that the taking of Mr Savchenko to the police station and, indirectly, the termination of his solo demonstration were related to his use of foul language in a public place rather than to the fact that he was holding a demonstration. While the applicant has not argued that use of foul language was protected under Article <mask> of the Convention, he has contested that during his demonstration he used any utterances that could be perceived as foul language. Indeed, it remains unclear what exact words were allegedly uttered by and held against the applicant. The domestic decisions, in particular those issued by the courts, do not contain an adequate assessment as to whether the words concerned could be reasonably classified as “foul language”. | 0 |
31. The applicant concluded that the authorities had overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them. Moreover, the national courts’ findings had been based on an assessment of the relevant facts which could not be considered reasonable and justified and failed to interpret the matter in the light of the principles set forth in Article <mask> of the Convention. Thus, punishing the applicant for having published the interview in question was a disproportionate interference with his right to freedom of expression and constituted a violation of the Convention. | 0 |
110. The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression, and especially its freedom to impart information and ideas. It complained in particular that for a period of almost ten years the Government had not allocated it any frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting. It submitted that the failure to apply Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraphs 56-61 above), the failure to enforce the Constitutional Court’s judgments nos. 420/1994 and 466/2002 (see paragraphs 54-55 and 62 above) and the duopoly existing in the Italian television market were in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 0 |
33. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant company’s rights had been compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. There was no doubt that it had had a basis in law and had served the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. As to whether the interference had been necessary in a democratic society, the Government averred that the statements contained in the impugned article had for the most part been statements of fact. It had been stated that the then Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General were tolerating a prosecutor who was a drug dealer. Furthermore, it had been stated as a fact that the claimant had been present at the scene of the drug transaction as a guarantee of security. Although the claimant had not been referred to by her full name, a detailed description had made her identity obvious to local legal circles, in particular as her position as spokesperson for the Appellate Prosecutor’s Office had been mentioned. One of the witnesses had confirmed this. The claimant had suffered negative consequences immediately after the article had been published. | 0 |
63. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation had been biased, because they had wrongly assessed the evidence, had grossly misconstrued the applicable law, including Article <mask> of the Convention, and had not approached the case as neutral adjudicators, instead seeking to justify her dismissal. | 0 |
47. The applicant argued that the trial court had not taken all reasonable measures to ensure the attendance of I.B. and Še.A. at the hearing. Firstly, the trial court could have used the international legal assistance available under the “Treaty between Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia concerning Legal Aid in Civil and Criminal Matters” to request that I.B. and Še.A. be questioned by a court of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with the participation of the applicant and counsel (see paragraph 41 above). Secondly, the Slovenian judge, the defendants and counsel could have travelled to the relevant country to examine the two witnesses. Thirdly, under section 244a of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 39 above), the witnesses could have been questioned by video-conference. Moreover, the trial court could have requested assistance from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the European Convention on Mutual assistance in Criminal Matters and, in particular, Article 9 of the Second Additional Protocol to that Convention (see paragraphs 42 and 43 above). With respect to Italy, the Slovenian authorities could have relied on Article <mask> of the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (see paragraph 44 above). The applicant further argued that if any of those measures had been used then the length of the proceedings would not have become unreasonable and the criminal offence would not have become time-barred. | 0 |
41. The applicant companies maintained that the interference with their right to impart information had not been necessary in a democratic society as there had been an overriding public interest in reporting in every detail on the case in issue. The applicant companies’ reporting concentrated on the perpetrators of the crime, but in view of the very nature of the criminal offence – violence and sexual abuse within the family – this meant that reporting on the offenders, that is the parents, and the criminal proceedings against them, necessarily revealed the identity of the victim C. The press must be allowed to report in an identifying manner on crimes of sexual abuse of minors within the family revealing the identity of the offender, as accurate and detailed reporting also served to protect and help the victims of such crimes. A restriction on detailed reporting and on revealing the identity of the offenders was not only in contradiction to Article <mask> of the Convention but also against the principle of victim protection as it would protect the offenders from public attention but not the victim. | 0 |
48. The Government observed that the nature and severity of the punishment was also to be taken into account in assessing the proportionality of the interference under Article <mask> of the Convention. In the De Diego Nafría judgment, cited above, the Court had considered that, even though a dismissal had serious consequences for the employment relationship of a worker who had overstepped the acceptable limits of criticism, in assessing the proportionality of the interference it was necessary to take into account all the circumstances of the particular case. In the present case, the Spanish courts had assessed the direct damage caused to the reputation of the persons mentioned in the union newsletter, through coarse and insulting comments and images. Even if the applicants’ opinions could be regarded as legitimate, they had been expressed in a gratuitously offensive manner, being in written form and deliberate. | 0 |
33. The Government maintained that the applicants’ dismissal from their posts, following their statement of 24 February 2008, was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. Their dismissal was prescribed by law as it had been based, in particular, on section 40, subsection 1, point (j), of the Diplomatic Service Act which provided that a diplomat should be dismissed from office if he violated any of the restrictions prescribed in section 44 of the Act. One of those restrictions was that a diplomat had no right to use his official capacity and work facilities for the benefit of political parties or non‑governmental organisations, or in order to carry out other political or religious activity. Contrary to what the applicants claimed, at the relevant time the existence of a single element made the provision applicable. This Act was both accessible and foreseeable and the notions used in it were sufficiently clear. The Act had been designed to cover relations within the diplomatic service and it was thus designed for professionals. The applicants had had from 11 to 15 years’ professional experience as members of diplomatic corps. Had they been uncertain about the content of the Act, they could have sought advice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Taking into consideration the applicants’ positions and professional experience, they had to be aware of the legal framework regulating their service, including the restrictions. They had also been well aware of the political situation in Armenia, the character of their public statement and its possible impact. The applicants could, and must, have foreseen the consequences of their statement, especially as the ambassadors who had issued the original statement had been dismissed from their posts the day before and their dismissal had been widely reported in the media. | 0 |
45. The applicant submitted that her dismissal had been the result of the airing in her show of the results of journalistic investigations that revealed unpleasant facts about the then ruling political party. There had been a direct causal link between her show and the ensuing disciplinary measures against her. Those measures had infringed her freedom of expression. She had had the right to select the persons who were to take part in the show, and had not breached the technical rules or the weekly schedule, because she had obtained the agreement of the editor in charge, who had approved the show’s script, topics and participants. Her disciplinary dismissal had had nothing to do with the breaches set out in the order of the BNR director general, and the ensuing dispute had been an employment one only ostensibly, while in reality having a deeply political subtext. That assessment had been shared by the entire journalistic guild, and had been reflected in declarations made by the Union of Bulgarian Journalists and other organisations. Even the Supreme Court of Cassation had, by saying in its judgment in the applicant’s case that Article <mask> of the Convention allowed limitations on the exercise of freedom of expression, acknowledged that the applicant’s dismissal had related to the exercise of her freedom of expression. That dismissal had been a direct result of the exercise of the applicant’s profession as a journalist and of the disclosure of unpleasant facts about the then ruling political party. | 0 |
31. The applicant considered that the ban on his accessing the websites of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn, the Chancellor of Justice and the Riigikogu violated his right to receive information and was in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. He submitted that he had been engaged in a number of court proceedings against the Estonian prison system. The information available on the websites in question was relied on by the Estonian courts; thus, the applicant also needed access to this information in order to be able to protect his rights. | 0 |
27. The Government submitted that the domestic courts had found that the impugned passages constituted not the opinions of or speculations by the authors of the article but statements of fact which had presented the plaintiff in a negative light. The newspaper had failed to verify the veracity of those statements prior to publication. Accordingly the domestic courts were right to rule in favour of the plaintiff and the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was justified in terms of Article <mask> of the Convention. In the Government’s view, there had been no violation of this Convention provision. | 0 |
26. The applicant complained that the decision of the Disciplinary Appeals Tribunal implied that, during trial proceedings, a lawyer was not allowed to conclude from facts known to him that unacceptable pressure had been exerted on his client. He alleged a violation of his right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides as follows: | 0 |
18. The applicant complained that his conviction in criminal proceedings for the protest of 29 January 2013 amounted to a breach of his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention and his right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint should be examined from the standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention alone, which reads as follows: | 0 |
67. The Government did not accept that the interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression lacked an adequate legal basis for the purpose of Article <mask> of the Convention. Media companies in Ireland were familiar with the domestic rules on defamation and damages. The applicant company should have expected that the level of damages might be very high if the jury found that it had acted in a reprehensible manner against the plaintiff. Moreover, in the Independent News and Media case the Court had considered that the criterion of lawfulness was satisfied; there was no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. | 0 |
56. The Government emphasised that the applicants had not been convicted for expressing strong criticism of the police, but exclusively for having taken it upon themselves to make the very specific, unsubstantiated and extremely serious accusation against the named chief superintendent that he had intentionally suppressed evidence in the murder case. The Danish Supreme Court had fully recognised that the present case involved a conflict between the right to impart ideas and the right to freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of others, and it had properly balanced the various interests involved in the case in conformity with the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
23. The Government denied that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, they argued that the domestic authorities had not had the information sought by the applicant. According to the Government, Russian law required information centres to prepare crime statistics reports by processing statistical data cards. Data cards differed in type and covered a wide range of information related to a specific crime committed. The data processing carried out by the information centres was predominantly manual and not all information from the data cards was processed. Only selected types of crimes and parameters were included in crime statistics reports. | 0 |
85. The Government did not contest that the impugned judgments constituted an interference with the applicant company’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and submitted that it had been prescribed by law, in particular by the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, that it had followed the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others and that it had been necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
28. The Government did not dispute that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable and that there had been an interference with the applicants’ rights under that provision. In their view, that interference had been “prescribed by law” – sections 45 and 49 of the Obligations and Contracts Act 1951 –, and had been intended to protect the reputation and rights of others. | 0 |
15. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, and his subsequent conviction, had constituted a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Referring in particular to the Court’s judgments in Savgın v. Turkey (no. 13304/03, 2 February 2010) and Gül and Others v. Turkey (no. 4870/02, 8 June 2010), the applicant claimed that his conviction had not been necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
80. The Government submitted that the disciplinary action against the applicant, followed by his removal from the position of chief prosecutor on account of the manner in which he had presented to the press information concerning the pending criminal investigation, could be considered as interference with the applicant’s right under Article <mask> of the Convention. They pointed out that such interference was provided for by law. The disciplinary offences of which the applicant had been accused and the sanction imposed on him were defined in Law 303/2004. Moreover, in his capacity as the staff member assigned to impart information to the press, the applicant should have complied with the practice guidelines regulating cooperation by the courts and prosecutors with the media adopted by the SCM (Decision no. 277/2006) and with the provisions of Order no. 116/2007 of the General Prosecutor. | 0 |
24. The Government contended that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. The third sentence of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention specifically envisaged the power of States to require broadcasting licences. This requirement applied not only to technical aspects but also, as the Court had pointed out in Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, to other conditions, such as “the nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, [and] the rights and needs of a specific audience” (see judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276, p. 14, § 32). In Switzerland, there was no audiovisual monopoly. Rather, the mixed system set up by the RTA provided for a plurality of media. Access thereto was nevertheless subject to a licence which was granted if certain conditions were met; the fact that no right was conferred did not contradict the Convention. | 0 |
22. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not been tried by an independent and impartial court on account of the presence of a military judge on the bench of the Adana State Security Court which convicted him. He further maintained under Article <mask> of the Convention that his criminal conviction and sentence had infringed his right to freedom of expression. | 0 |
21. The applicant complained that the domestic courts’ decisions imposing sanctions on him for expressing his views concerning a demonstration, which had been organised by the trade union of which he was the chairman, had violated his right to freedom of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. This provision in so far as relevant reads as follows: | 0 |
78. The Government contested the existence of a causal link between the pecuniary damage suffered and the alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the event of a violation being found under Article <mask> of the Convention, the Government conceded that the applicant company was entitled to compensation. However, no calculation of the interest paid had been provided. The Government left it to the Court's discretion whether the applicant company had submitted sufficient documentation to support its claims. | 0 |
103. The applicant also complained under Articles 6 §§ 1-3 (a)-(d) and 8 of the Convention about the police putting pressure on him and, in particular, tapping his telephone. With a reference to Article <mask> of the Convention, the applicant complained that he was unable to vote in the election of the Russian President on 2 March 2008 because of persecution by the police. | 0 |
83. The Government submitted that both Article <mask> of the Convention (in referring to “duties and responsibilities” as well as to formalities, conditions and penalties) and the domestic law permitted the State to put in place a framework containing the procedure of and conditions of the information flow. While Article 10 of the Convention included the freedom to impart information, Russian law provided for constitutional “freedom of mass information” along with the freedom of expression and freedom of thought. The Constitutional Court also recognised a higher degree of responsibility relating to the exercise of the freedom of mass information on a professional scale. | 0 |
40. The applicants’ request for information on public defenders in criminal proceedings was rejected by the domestic courts on the basis of the Hungarian Data Act (see paragraph 32 of the judgment), which provides that “personal data”, held by public authorities is not amenable to public access unless very limited exceptions are found to apply, which was not considered to be the case at domestic level. Thus, the Data Act prevented the domestic courts from examining the potential public-interest nature of the information (see paragraph 176 of the judgment), and this is an important element in the Court’s reasoning in finding a violation of Article 10 on the facts of the case (see paragraph 199). In other words, the practical consequences of the Court’s judgment is that member States of the Council of Europe may now have to change fundamentally their national freedom‑of‑information laws in order to take account of the requirements of Article <mask> of the Convention that logically flow from today’s judgment. They will also, where relevant, have to reconcile those requirements with national and EU data-protection legislation. | 0 |
19. The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. They contented, however, that it was prescribed by law and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of § 2 of Article 10. They argued in the first place that the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicant company's submissions and set out clearly why, in the present case, Mr Kabas' interest in protection of presumption of his innocence continued beyond the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings against him. Furthermore, the interpretation of section 7b of the Media Act in conformity with Article 6 § 2 of the Convention called for an extensive understanding of the protection of the presumption of innocence. While there was certainly public interest in the discussion of the “police information affair”, Mr Kabas' right in the presumption of his innocence outweighed the applicant company's right to freedom of expression. In the impugned article the applicant company depicted Mr Kabas as already convicted and did not inform the reader that the charges against him had already thoroughly been examined by the Public Prosecutor's Office which had closed his file months ago. When weighing the respective interests, the domestic courts had furthermore had regard to the fact that Mr Kabas was not given the opportunity to comment. Moreover, the ex-post appraisal of the present case confirmed that the court's assessment was correct. As Mr Kreiβl and Mr Kleindienst were finally both acquitted, the alleged assistance of Mr Kabas in their criminal acts was impossible. The Government further argued that the measures taken by the Austria courts were also proportionate. | 0 |
147. The applicant argued that public nudity was a clear form of expression within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. The term “expression” had been widely construed by the Court to cover various different forms of expression, including expression in words, in pictures, by video and through conduct intended to convey an idea or information. In his case, the decision not to wear clothes was a direct expression of his principled views on the human body. His complaint therefore fell within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention. | 0 |
103. The applicants argued that the order to surrender the original documents, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring the documents to the AIVD, had in fact been intended to make possible the positive identification of the journalistic source. The applicants alleged a violation of their freedom, as purveyors of news, to impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
76. The applicant company submitted that the advance viewing of the programme in issue by the Brussels Court of Appeal in order to monitor its content before it was broadcast, and the subsequent banning of the programme as a preventive measure, had infringed freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom to impart information, all of which were guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 0 |
176. The applicant’s case is troubling, since his intransigence has led to his spending a substantial period of time in prison for what is – in itself – usually a relatively trivial offence (see paragraph 100 above). However, the applicant’s imprisonment is the consequence of his repeated violation of the criminal law in full knowledge of the consequences, through conduct which he knew full well not only goes against the standards of accepted public behaviour in any modern democratic society but also is liable to be alarming and morally and otherwise offensive to other, unwarned members of the public going about their ordinary business. Having regard to the considerations set out above and to the wide margin of appreciation, the Court finds that the reasons for the measures adopted by the police, the prosecuting authorities and the courts, and in particular those adopted in respect of his arrest in 2011, were “relevant and sufficient” and that the measures met a pressing social need in response to repeated anti-social conduct by the applicant. It cannot be said that the repressive measures taken in reaction to the particular, repeated form of expression chosen by the applicant to communicate his opinion on nudity were, even if considered cumulatively, disproportionate to the legitimate aim being pursued, namely the prevention of disorder and crime. In particular, Article 10 does not go so far as to enable individuals, even those sincerely convinced of the virtue of their own beliefs, to repeatedly impose their antisocial conduct on other, unwilling members of society and then to claim a disproportionate interference with the exercise of their freedom of expression when the State, in the performance of its duty to protect the public from public nuisances, enforces the law in respect of such deliberately repetitive antisocial conduct. Even though, cumulatively, the penalties imposed on the applicant undoubtedly did entail serious consequences for him, the Court cannot find in the circumstances of his case, having regard in particular to his own responsibility for his plight, that the public authorities in Scotland unjustifiably interfered with his exercise of freedom of expression. Accordingly, no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention has been established. | 0 |
26. The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. In that regard they relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary ((dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006); Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France ([GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV); Pfeifer v. Austria (no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007); Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine ((dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008); Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus (no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008); and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia (no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013). | 0 |
28. The applicant disagreed. He maintained that the domestic courts had held him liable for inability to prove the truth of value judgments whereas the veracity of the underlying statements of fact had not even been contested. In particular, it had not been contested either that there had been significant financial contributions to the educational system, or that many boarding school pupils become social misfits. However, he was held liable for failure to prove the existence of a link between the two phenomena. Likewise, it had not been contested that Mr Geraschenko was the head of the entity responsible for the assessment of teachers. However, the applicant was found liable for expressing his opinion that given the situation teachers might have been afraid to voice their concerns. As for the last statement, the passage concerning purchases without tenders had been based on the earlier publication in Rossiyskaya Gazeta. The issue had also been discussed in the Bryanskoy Vremya issue of 16-22 September 2004. The misappropriation of funds had been subject to investigation by two commissions instituted by the Bryansk Administration. The passage concerning the “dismissal of uncooperative members of staff” was based on the fact that one of the authors, S.F., had been dismissed without any reasons for the dismissal having been provided to him. In the applicant’s view, in the present case the domestic courts had overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them for restriction on debates of public interest in breach of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
45. The applicant alleged that his right to freedom of expression had been breached as a result of the administrative sanction applied to him. He contended that there had been an interference with his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention, but conceded that it had been “prescribed by law”. He doubted that the real aim of the sanction had been to protect the reputation of I.M. rather than to punish him for making many complaints against the region's leadership. | 0 |
49. The applicants began by arguing that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable in the present case. They observed that in spite of their numerous endeavours they could not gain access to the radio station’s studios and equipment, thus finding it impossible to secure the enforcement of the decision of 6 December 2002 and, consequently, being unable to exercise their profession of radio journalist. They mentioned that before and after the partnership agreement they had run the newsroom of Radio M Plus. In their submission, and contrary to what the Government had claimed, the radio station had continued to broadcast even after October 2002 when they were first refused access to the newsroom, the work of which had then been taken over by other journalists from the company Tele M. The applicants asserted that this situation was the result of a conflict between the first applicant and the local representatives of a major political party, who were annoyed by the first applicant’s independent journalism. In this connection, the applicants referred to the Court’s case-law to the effect that dismissal from employment following “a course of action made up of an indeterminate number of acts of communication or expression that [the applicants] had committed over a period of several months, in the particular context of a labour dispute between them and their employer” represented a breach of their right to freedom of expression (Cârstea and Grecu v. Romania (dec.), no. 56326/00, 21 September 2004). In their opinion, even though the present case did not concern a dismissal, in several aspects their situation was tantamount to a de facto dismissal, with similar effects: the inability for the applicants to exercise their profession as radio journalists. Moreover, they observed that the Court had previously examined, under Article 10 of the Convention, the impact of unlawful actions by third parties which were perceived as de facto obstacles to freedom of expression. | 0 |
76. The applicant complains that the refusal to publish a paid advertisement by Rzeczpospolita, breached his right to the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court observes that the applicant could not publish an advertisement in the Rzeczpospolita newspaper, owned by a limited liability company, as the publisher refused to publish that advertisement. Subsequently, the civil courts examined the applicant’s claim for a decision ordering that newspaper to publish the advertisement. The courts found against him. | 0 |
50. The Government submitted that the applicant could not be considered the victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention because the domestic proceedings in question had been concerned with statements made by her late father and not by the applicant herself. The Government argued that, since the applicant had complained that she should not have been the defendant in the domestic proceedings, she could not at the same time complain that those proceedings had affected her freedom of expression. | 0 |
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