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29. The applicant newspaper also considered that the wording of its article had been accurate and moderate. No information about the private life of V.S. had been discussed, and the information about allegations of his use of public funds had not been presented to the reader as an established fact. Moreover, the press was allowed a certain degree of exaggeration. The domestic courts had not analysed any of the above-mentioned elements in their judgments. They apparently simply insisted on the strict application of Article 16 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 21 above): that the applicant newspaper had to prove the truth of what they had published. The law was thus so inflexible as to leave the courts no choice but to adopt judgments contrary to Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
33. The applicant maintained that although it could be argued that some of the remarks published were statements of fact rather than value judgments, it was clear that this was not a sufficient reason for restricting her freedom of expression as a journalist under Article <mask> of the Convention. She had acted in good faith and her intention had not been to damage Mr Y’s reputation but to contribute to an on-going social debate on the operation of strip clubs. The article had concerned a matter of serious public concern. By prohibiting dissemination of the information in question, the Supreme Court’s judgment had entailed an unreasonable restriction on the applicant’s journalistic freedom as protected by Article 10 that could not be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. By having been required to adduce solid evidence as proof of Mrs Z’s statements, the applicant had been faced with an unreasonable, if not an impossible, task (Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 65, Series A no. 239). | 0 |
28. The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on its right to freedom of expression in its case had not been prescribed by law as the Penal Code provision applied had not defined adequately the scope of private life. Nor had the restrictions been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. B. had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest, especially since the case had been very newsworthy. Moreover, the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. | 0 |
24. The applicant company argued that the open letter of Mr Heller fell under the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. It was part of a debate in the media concerning cultural and educational policy which included fundamental political aspects, included true statements of fact and value-judgments based on a factual basis and addressed, inter alia, Mr Westenthaler as leading politician of the FPÖ party. Consequently, the quotation of parts of this letter also enjoyed the protection of Article 10. In addition, the applicant company did not make the objectionable statements itself but restricted itself to a careful quotation. As criminal proceedings against Mr Heller were at that time pending, this information was of public interest. The structure and wording of the article at issue were neutral. Reporting about pending court proceedings could only be informative if also the subject of these proceedings was mentioned. The domestic courts had interpreted the article at issue and the applicant company's possibility of justifying the quotation of the impugned statements narrowly and in breach with Article 10 of the Convention. The mere fact that a statement had to be considered as an offence within the meaning of the relevant legislation did not imply that a report about such a statement amounted ipso iure to an offence against a person's honour. The wording of section 33 of the Media Act was not in conformity with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention as it did not provide for protection of a correct quotation. The measure at issue constituted a punishment which nature remained unchanged irrespective of the severity of its consequences. It had suffered material damage from the order of forfeiture. | 0 |
47. The Government argued that according to the Court’s case-law (they cited Mladina d.d. Ljubljana v. Slovenia, no. 20981/10, 17 April 2014) offensive language enjoyed the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention only if its purpose was stylistic, whereas that protection was excluded if the sole purpose of such language was to insult. Since, in the Government’s view, the impugned article consisted almost exclusively of insults (the headline itself represented an insult) that had no basis in fact (in respect of the allegations concerning the alleged unlawfulness of the search, breach of judicial ethics or conflict of interest) or wider context, they argued that the insults in question had not had any stylistic purpose. The Government thus considered that the article in question had constituted a gratuitous personal attack on Judge B.B., which was not protected under Article 10 of the Convention. | 0 |
52. The applicant complained, under Article <mask> of the Convention, about the breach of her freedom of expression suffered due to her criminal conviction, the subsequent civil defamation judgment rendered against her, and, also, the way in which the latter was enforced domestically, causing her, as it did, extreme financial hardship, numerous health problems and even endangering her very life. The applicant additionally referred to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in this context, as well as to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. | 0 |
19. The Government agreed that in the present case the refusals to register the titles of periodicals amounted to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. As to the compatibility of this interference with the restrictions laid down by the second paragraph of that Article in that it should be “prescribed by law”, the Government disagreed with the conclusion of the Commission that the domestic law at issue, the Press Act and the ordinance, had not been formulated with sufficient precision for the applicant to be able to regulate his conduct. In their view, the legislation in question was clear, comprehensible, precise and accessible. | 0 |
43. The applicants complained about the Vienna Court of Appeal’s judgment of 13 December 2007 and the Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 March 2009 in the main proceedings under the Copyright Act. They asserted that the injunction prohibiting them from further publishing Mr Küchl’s picture in the context of specific statements had violated their right to impart information as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
63. The applicant complained that the real reason for her repatriation was the quarrel that she had had with the commander of Police Precinct no. 19, in violation of her right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention the applicant complained that she had been expelled from Romania although she had been granted a temporary visa valid from 5 to 12 May 2000 and that her expulsion had taken place before she had had the opportunity to challenge the measure. | 0 |
22. The Government acknowledged that the finding against the applicant in defamation proceedings had constituted an interference with his freedom of expression. They maintained that the interference had been justified under paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it had been based on foreseeable and accessible legal provisions and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation of a civil servant. In addition to that, the interference had not been disproportionate to the aim pursued. The disputed statements had contained numerous factual allegations, the accuracy of which the applicant had been unable to prove during the domestic proceedings. Those statements had therefore been defamatory. Accordingly, it had fallen to the applicant to verify their accuracy before disclosing the content of the letter at a public meeting. The applicant had not known the identities of all the authors of the disputed letter, and those identities could also not be discerned during the meeting. Accordingly, the domestic courts had correctly classified the letter as an anonymous application by citizens, which the applicant had had no right to read publicly, especially without verifying the facts. In view of the applicant’s conduct, the defamatory statements had been widely disseminated in the small village where G.Sh. lived with his family. Thus, he had experienced considerable emotional distress, and his reputation as a civil servant had been negatively affected. In these circumstances, the symbolic fine imposed on the applicant had been justified and not disproportionate. | 0 |
42. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention of a violation of their right to freedom of expression, on the ground that they had been ordered to pay damages for reporting on pending criminal proceedings which dealt with a matter of general interest. Their intention had not been to reveal any information about X’s private life. Article 10, in its relevant parts, reads as follows: | 0 |
37. The applicant complained that the domestic courts failed to apply the case law of the Strasbourg Court concerning Article <mask> of the Convention, in particular the case of Lingens v. Austria (judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103), in the assessment of their value judgments. The applicant also complained that the domestic courts found that the publications at issue did not correspond to the truth. It maintained that the courts were not able to distinguish between the “value judgments” and “facts” contained in the impugned publications of 19 August 1999 and 14 September 1999. The applicant also alleged that the court decisions interfered with its right to impart information freely. The applicant invoked Article 10 of the Convention, which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows: | 0 |
186. The applicant complained that the decisions of the CRTA finding that it had violated the provisions of Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations, and the imposition of a fine, constituted a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. First, the applicant submitted that the provisions of the above Law and regulations had not been formulated with sufficient precision and clarity for the applicant to be able to regulate its conduct. They were drafted in general terms and covered all types of broadcasts, without taking into account their different nature and the need to apply varied standards depending on the particular broadcast. They were also excessively rigid and did not keep pace with changing circumstances and evolving societal attitudes. | 0 |
27. The applicant submitted that his trial, which had lasted for more than seven years and which had resulted in his being convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, had amounted to an interference with his right guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. He also claimed that the interference in question had not been necessary in a democratic society. In that respect, he submitted that the book in question was like an historical novel and that, read in its entirety, it did not incite violence. | 0 |
75. The applicant submitted that the refusal to publish a paid advertisement by Rzeczpospolita, which had subsequently been endorsed by the courts, had breached his right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. His book concerned issues of public concern and interest, given that Gazeta Wyborcza was a powerful newspaper which played an important role in shaping the political views and attitudes of its numerous readers. The book aimed to present the general public with significant facts concerning the manner in which that newspaper had been created and how it had risen to its position of significance and power. No reviews of his book had ever been published in the printed media. The applicant was of the view that this was most likely to be because the book had been embarrassing for the publishers of Gazeta Wyborcza, who had been sufficiently feared and respected to be able to prevent anything hostile to it being published in the press. For an effective exercise of the freedom of expression and for a genuine political debate among citizens it was important that views and facts ignored or silenced by the mainstream media would be allowed to see the light of day. The applicant had been prevented from publishing the advertisement in Rzeczpospolita and also in a number of other newspapers. The fact that he had been silenced in that way breached both the Constitution and the Convention. | 0 |
31. The Government agreed that Article <mask> of the Convention was applicable to the present case and that the criminal conviction of the applicants constituted an interference with their right to freedom of expression as prescribed under the second section of that Article. However, the Government submitted that the criminal conviction and the sentence imposed were proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and thus necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
123. The applicant complained that his mandate as President of the Supreme Court had been terminated as a result of the views he had expressed publicly in his capacity as President of the Supreme Court and the National Council of Justice, concerning legislative reforms affecting the judiciary. He alleged that there had been a breach of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: | 0 |
21. The applicants complained that the judgment against them did not meet a pressing social need and had therefore breached their right to freedom of expression. The fact that the case had not been initiated by the public prosecutor was proof of this, in their view. The applicants further claimed that the offending book had caused no prejudice to G.M.'s presumption of innocence, it being publicly known that he was under judicial investigation. In this connection they invoked their right to impart information in the context of an affair of state and argued that this public debate concerned the exercise of power, with its excesses and its checks and balances, and that the debate pre-dated the book's publication, the purpose of which was not to impede the investigation. The applicants relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, of which the relevant part reads as follows: | 0 |
14. The Government rejected this complaint as manifestly ill-founded. In his interview the prosecutor had not asserted that the applicant had been or would be found guilty. He had spoken only about the applicant’s complicity in the crimes. Article <mask> of the Convention guarantees the freedom of speech, and newspapers carry only authors’ personal opinions, which the courts can choose to ignore. Article 6 § 2 may not stop the authorities from reporting on ongoing criminal investigations (see Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 38, Series A no. 308). The prosecutor had told the interviewer merely about facts found by the investigation. The article had not been an official statement; it merely continued a series of the newspaper’s own reports on crime in the town. The prosecutor had been discreet and tactful. Such interviews had proven successful against violent crime. | 0 |
55. The Government argued that Article <mask> of the Convention was inapplicable in the present case because the applicant had not been punished by the domestic court for his ideas or the information which he had been imparting but for his behaviour. The content of the applicant’s statements had been, in the Government’s view, irrelevant for the assessment of whether he had deserved disciplinary punishment. He had in fact received disciplinary punishment for breaching the dignity of the court and for hampering its work. | 0 |
64. The applicant argued that the purely formal notion of secrecy, on which Article 293 of the Criminal Code was based and which had been confirmed by the Federal Court, had adverse consequences for freedom of expression. According to that provision, the publishing by an official of any document, regardless of its content, which had been declared secret or confidential had to be punished, without it being possible to review the compatibility of the penalty imposed with Article <mask> of the Convention. In the applicant’s view, such a definition of secrecy was clearly at odds with the requirements of the Convention. | 0 |
51. The Government argued that the domestic courts’ decisions were intended to protect Mr and Mrs Aubrac from defamation in a case in which the damage to their reputation was considerable given the accusation of treachery that had been levelled against them. The decisions were thus aimed at “the protection of the reputation or rights of others” and the interference had pursued a legitimate aim for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
23. The applicant maintained that her conviction for criminal insult because of the article she had written and published in Politika on 7 September 2003 had been a clear interference with her right of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. She accepted that it was “in accordance with law” as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, and that it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others. However, she maintained that her criminal conviction, although it had entailed a judicial warning, had been disproportionate under the circumstances of the case, in particular since it had caused her later dismissal from Politika, and represented a threat and warning to all Serbian journalists. | 0 |
37. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had participated actively in the incident of 4 December 1996. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the articles had in every respect been correct. The restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages. | 0 |
23. The applicant insisted that he had checked the accuracy of facts with a reasonable degree of care, as might be required from a journalist. He had obtained and submitted to the domestic courts medical reports noting Mr S.’s injuries, the records of the confessions made by Mr S. and Mr M. at the police station and copies of Mr S.’s and Mr M.’s complaints about ill-treatment. Mr S. and Mr M. had confirmed the accuracy of the information contained in the article. However, the domestic courts had dismissed that evidence as untrustworthy without explaining the reasons for that finding. The fact that the authorities had refused to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of the allegations of ill-treatment had not, in itself, proved that the information published by the applicant had been untrue. The applicant had mentioned in his article that the authorities had refused to initiate criminal proceedings and had criticised them for that. The purpose of the article had been to denounce the authorities’ failure to investigate the allegations of police brutality. The applicant maintained that there existed a sufficient factual basis for his statement. Although he had failed to prove in court that his description of the events at the police station had been true in all its particulars, he was still under the protection of Article <mask> of the Convention. Even harsh criticism in strong, polemical language published “on a slim factual basis” was protected under Article 10 (see Dichand and Others v. Austria, no. 29271/95, § 52, 26 February 2002). | 0 |
33. The applicants, who are members of the executive committee of the trade union Nueva Alternativa Asamblearia (NAA), complained that they had been dismissed on account of the content of the union’s newsletter of March 2002. They claimed that the company P. had not verified their individual level of participation and personal responsibility. They alleged that they had been dismissed by way of reprisal for the union’s demands and that the allegedly offensive content of the newsletter had served as a pretext. They took the view that the cartoons and two articles in question had not overstepped the limits of admissible criticism under Article <mask> of the Convention, because the impugned expressions had been used in a jocular spirit and not with any intent to insult. | 0 |
188. The applicant claimed that as a result of the premature termination of his mandate as President of the Supreme Court and the entry into force of retroactive legislation concerning the remuneration of his post (see paragraph 52 above), he had lost his salary as President, other benefits attached to that position as well as the post-term benefits (severance allowance for six months and pension supplement for life) to which he would have been entitled as former President of the Supreme Court. He provided a detailed calculation of his claim for pecuniary damage, which amounted to 742,520 euros (EUR). The applicant argued that there was a clear causal connection between the pecuniary damage claimed and the violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
33. The applicant submitted that he had been an active journalist for many years and had often participated in public debates on issues relating to the recent history of Poland. The radio debate from which the present case originated was one of a series of public discussions on a range of political issues, including lustration. He had, therefore, been fulfilling his rightful mission to inform the public about an important matter relating to a public figure. The applicant had become aware that Mr J.M. had been a collaborator with the secret services after having consulted all the available documents and other sources which he needed to protect. He had not intended to offend Mr J.M. but only to contribute to a debate about the importance of lustration, which J.M had criticised. Taking into account all those elements the applicant considered that his statement did not overstep the limits of protection afforded to him by Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
29. The applicant submitted that the injunction issued by the Austrian courts was not necessary in a democratic society. In particular, the Austrian courts wrongly qualified the impugned statement as a statement of fact, when it was a political value judgment criticising the plaintiff in the injunction proceedings and contributing to a political debate on a question of general importance. It was in the public interest to point out the dangerousness of a politician like Mr Haider who had proposed contemptible measures in an opinion poll against immigration (“Österreich zuerst” – “Austria first”). As a value judgment and not a statement of fact, its truth did not require proof. To require proof of a value judgment would itself be a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
19. The applicant contested the submission that there had been relevant and sufficient grounds to justify the impugned interference with his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. Mr Köck had entered the public arena as he had been commissioned as an expert by the regional government and had, furthermore, repeatedly expressed his views on this subject in public. He had done so in an exceptionally provocative manner and the applicant had merely responded to those views. Given the nature of his commission, Mr Köck should have been required to exercise particular restraint until the study was completed in order to avoid anticipating and forestalling its conclusions. Any expert who stated the direction his findings would take before he had concluded his report left himself open to a high degree of legitimate criticism. The applicant's statements had been value judgments with a sufficient factual basis, namely Mr Köck's provocative public comments and his general conduct. The matter at issue was of the greatest public interest and the applicant had relied upon information which was already within the public domain. The applicant had also explained his principal reasons for concern, namely Mr Köck's involvement in the creation of a private hospital management company with an abbreviated name (KABAG) confusingly similar to that of the holding company which operated Carinthia's regional hospitals (Landeskrankenanstalten–Betriebsgesellschaft, KABEG). The statement that Mr Köck intended to smash the Carinthian health system had to be seen in the whole context of all the statements. Obviously every reader would understand that Mr Köck was not accused of smashing the system himself but of recommending measures to that effect. The mere reference to another expert who had failed and had been pursued by the criminal justice could not be understood as an implied accusation of Mr Köck. The applicant contended finally that the courts' decisions ordering him not only to refrain from further similar statements, but also to retract his comments had not been proportionate either. | 0 |
47. The Government found it uncontested that the applicant’s conviction for defamation and the liability to pay damages had amounted to an interference with her right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The impugned measures had had a basis in domestic law, namely in Article 12 of the Constitution and Chapter 24, section 9, of the Penal Code. The interference had thus been “prescribed by law”. The impugned measures had also pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the private life and reputation of the child’s father. | 0 |
57. The Government acknowledged that advertisements and other forms of commercial expression may fall within the scope of Article <mask> of the Convention. However, this provision was not applicable to the circumstances of the present case because it concerned a dispute between private parties, whereas the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention were of a vertical nature, in that they concerned relations between the State and individuals. | 0 |
52. The Government argued that section 10 of the 1981 Act, as applied in the applicants' case, was compatible with Article <mask> of the Convention. They further argued that the domestic courts were entitled to make the findings they did on the basis of the evidence and to take those findings into account in making the delivery up order. As to the harm suffered by Interbrew, the Government pointed to the drop in its share price and the rise in SAB's share price. The Government also considered that the court was justified in reaching its conclusion as to X's purpose given, inter alia, the anonymity, the lack of any attempt by X to justify the leak and the absence of any evidence to contradict Interbrew's assertion that the leaked documents had been manipulated. Finally, the Government argued that the applicants' contention regarding the adequacy of Interbrew's investigation into the leak was an attempt to appeal against the Court of Appeal's judgment, which had rationally concluded that as much as possible had been done to track down the source of the leak. | 0 |
26. The Government submitted that the interference had been necessary in a democratic society and thus compatible with Article 10 § 2. The disclosure of the identities of the former Chief Security Director and his deputy in an obvious manner had made them possible targets of terrorist attacks as it had been suggested several times in the article that the two officials should be eliminated. The article could just as well have been published without disclosing the identities of the two officials concerned. The interference was therefore proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it were relevant and sufficient. The national authorities had applied standards which conformed with the principles embodied in Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
69. The applicant was convicted for speech which, as the domestic courts adjudged, incited hatred and violence rather than being merely insulting (compare and contrast Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, § 32, ECHR 1999‑I) or defamatory (compare and contrast Bartnik v. Poland (dec.), no. 53628/10, § 28, 11 March 2014) in respect of police officers. The Court stresses that not every remark which may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular individuals or their groups justifies a criminal conviction in the form of imprisonment. Whilst such sentiments are understandable, they alone cannot set the limits of freedom of expression. It is only by a careful examination of the context in which the offending, insulting or aggressive words appear that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is protected by Article <mask> of the Convention and that which forfeits its right to tolerance in a democratic society (see, for a similar approach, Vajnai v. Hungary, no. 33629/06, §§ 53 and 57, ECHR 2008). The key issue in the present case is thus whether the applicant’s statements, when read as a whole and in their context, could be seen as promoting violence, hatred or intolerance (see Perinçek, cited above, § 240). | 0 |
60. The applicants maintained that nor had the interference been “necessary in a democratic society”. The press had the right and obligation to distribute information and thoughts about all issues of public interest and concern. A journalist was entitled to the protection safeguarded by Article <mask> of the Convention at least in circumstances in which the journalist was distributing public information that was both correct and reliable. Journalistic ethics required a journalist to tell readers what was going on in society. This requirement was of particular significance with regard to the reporting of trials as trial accounts fostered the openness of court proceedings and was at the very core of the freedom of expression. Trials, and especially the already delivered court decisions, had to be reportable in the media. | 0 |
67. The Government contested the applicability of Article <mask> of the Convention to the applicant NGO’s complaint and invited the Court to declare the application inadmissible as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In their view, Article 10 of the Convention covered only the freedom to receive and impart information, while any reference to “freedom to seek” information had been deliberately omitted from Article 10 during the drafting process, in contrast to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. | 0 |
42. The applicant complained that the Supreme Court’s decision of 30 September 2011, rejecting her appeal against the judicial order requiring her to give evidence about her contacts with Mr X, had given rise to an unjustified interference with her right not to be compelled to disclose her journalistic sources as inherent in Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
24. The Government relied in substance on the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in the matter. They argued that the applicant’s statement had exceeded the limits of freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. They endorsed the domestic courts’ arguments that the impugned statements had injured the plaintiff’s reputation, and deliberately so. The Hungarian courts had duly balanced the applicant’s Convention rights and the plaintiff’s right to his good reputation, and had justifiably concluded that the latter outweighed the former in the particular circumstances of the case. They stressed that the sanctioning of statements capable of damaging a person’s good reputation should not be regarded as a breach of the Convention. Lastly, in the Government’s view, the sanction imposed had not been disproportionate, especially as it was of a civil rather than a criminal character. | 0 |
62. The Government submitted that the sums claimed in respect of pecuniary damage had been awarded to V.K. by the domestic courts as fair compensation for the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained, and that no award should be made to the applicants under the head of pecuniary damage. They further submitted that, in the absence of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage should be made. | 0 |
53. The applicant complained that the existence of Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code interfered with his right to freedom of expression. He maintained that the mere fact that an investigation could potentially be brought against him under this provision for his scholarly work on the Armenian issue caused him great stress, apprehension and fear of prosecution and thus constituted a continuous and direct violation of his rights under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
16. The applicant complained that the measures of fining him and banning his interpellations infringed his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention, since they did not serve a legitimate aim and were disproportionate. He claimed that declaring interpellations inadmissible for the protection of Parliament’s prestige constituted censorship and deprived the Members of Parliament of the possibility to express their opinion on issues of public interest. | 0 |
37. The Government noted that before the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court, the applicant had maintained that he was not the author of the statements for which he had been ordered to pay damages, and that they had been made up by the journalist who had interviewed him. They therefore concluded that, by insisting that the disputed statements were not his, the applicant had admitted that he had not actually imparted any ideas or information within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. In other words, the applicant in the present case could not have enjoyed the protection of that Article because he had not exercised his right to freedom of expression. If the Court were to hold otherwise and find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, that would have led to an absurd situation, as it would have found a violation of the applicant’s right which the applicant himself claimed he had not exercised. | 0 |
30. The Government argued that the Commission’s refusal to provide anonymised paper copies of all decisions issued since 1 January 2000 could not be regarded as an interference with the applicant association’s rights under Article 10. According to the Court’s case-law, Article <mask> of the Convention prohibited Contracting States from interfering with the receipt of information that someone wished to impart. However, it did not impose a positive obligation on the State to collect and disseminate information itself. Although the State had to set up its information system in such a way that an individual could obtain generally accessible information, it was not obliged to provide access to confidential information. | 0 |
35. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on his right to freedom of expression had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s pictures and the facts mentioned in the articles had not fallen within the protection of private life. She had not been an innocent bystander but had actively participated in the incident of 4 December 1996. A conviction was public information that could not fall within the scope of private life. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest. The applicant had only written the articles, and he had had no say in the manner in which they had been published. No intent had been shown. Moreover, the information in the articles had been in every respect correct. The courts had failed to strike a proper balance between the protection of private life and freedom of expression in the manner required by the Convention. | 0 |
42. The Government acknowledged that the applicant’s conviction for defamation constituted interference with his rights guaranteed under Article <mask> of the Convention. They maintained, however, that this interference was in accordance with the law, pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of Mrs P.’s reputation, and was necessary in a democratic society. In this regard they submitted that the applicant had overstepped the limits of permissible criticism of a civil servant, in particular, as he had directly accused Mrs P. of having committed serious criminal offences, thereby undermining her right to presumption of innocence. Furthermore, the financial penalties imposed on the applicant had not been disproportionate to his income, and the prison sentence was not long and in any case the applicant had not served it. | 0 |
25. The applicants complained that their freedom to receive information had been breached because the restrictions imposed on them either had not been prescribed by law or had been more far-reaching than necessary in a democratic society. Moreover, they claimed that the consequences – the eviction from their flat and the move to another town – had been disproportionate to the aims pursued. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
21. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the criminal proceedings brought against him pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, and his conviction under that section, had constituted a violation of his right to freedom of expression. He further complained under the same Article about the seizure of copies of the book on 30 September 2003. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: | 0 |
46. The Government acknowledged that there had been an interference with the first applicant’s right to freedom of expression. They further submitted that that interference had been based on Article 484 of the Civil Code. The legitimate aim pursued by the authorities had been the protection of the reputation of others and the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, as provided by the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
70. The applicant company complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the ordinary courts had (i) incorrectly required its legal predecessor to prove the absolute truthfulness of the published information, (ii) failed to assess the situation under the established criteria, (iii) found arbitrarily against the applicant’s legal predecessor, and (iv) awarded an excessive amount of damages. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: | 0 |
34. The Government submitted that the applicants could not claim to be victims of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention, as the interference with their right to freedom of expression had been based on the decisions of the domestic courts. The applicants did not complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the impugned court proceedings had been unfair, and there had been no irregularities in those proceedings and the Court had limited jurisdiction regarding the assessment of facts and the application of law by domestic courts. On these grounds, they invited the Court to declare the application incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. | 0 |
53. The Government submitted that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression was compatible with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention. The Government pointed out that the interference in question was based on Article 8 § 2 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and that it pursued a legitimate aim. They contended that the expression of an opinion of a kind which incites and provokes people to commit crimes cannot be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. In this connection, they referred to Article 17 of the Convention. | 0 |
22. The Government argued that the Austrian courts' injunction did not constitute an interference with the applicant association's rights within the meaning of Article <mask> of the Convention. They submitted in that regard that Article 10 did not protect artistic freedom as such but only provided protection to artists who intended to contribute through their work to a public discussion of political or cultural matters. The present reproduction of public figures in “group sexual situations” could, however, hardly be regarded as a statement of opinion contributing to a cultural or political debate. | 0 |
35. The Government agreed that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention but regarded this interference as justified to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or the rights of others and to prevent the dissemination of confidential information. Referring widely to the arguments of the Federal Labour Court and the subsequent judgment of the Labour Court of Appeal of 16 November 2004, the Government stressed that the applicant’s primary motivation was to defame the mayor personally. They argued that the applicant could not use the term “perverting the course of justice” without distinction as a lay person not working in a legal area might do. | 0 |
77. The Government submitted that the finding against the applicant in the defamation proceedings constituted a legitimate restriction of his rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. In particular, it pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of M.L.’s reputation, and had been based on provisions of the domestic law which were accessible and foreseeable. They submitted that the interference was also “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the aim pursued. In particular, the domestic case-law at the material time had been well-equipped to differentiate between value judgments and statements of fact. The applicant in the present case had been held liable not for expressing a value judgment, but for having made false factual allegations accusing M.L. of serious misconduct. He himself had treated those allegations as factual in both the domestic and the Convention proceedings in his case, and had sought to have documentary and other evidence examined in support of his position. The domestic courts had thoroughly examined the evidence presented by both parties and had dismissed the applicant’s arguments as speculative and unsubstantiated in their reasoned judgments. | 0 |
52. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the court proceedings had been unfair on account of the unlawful order that it offer apologies to the claimant. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds and must, therefore, be declared admissible. In view of the Court’s finding in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention, there is no need to examine the issue again in the context of Article 6 (see Karman, cited above, § 47). | 0 |
177. The applicant complained before the Chamber, under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article <mask> of the Convention, that he had been deprived of an effective domestic remedy in relation to the premature termination of his mandate as President of the Supreme Court. The applicant did not explicitly raise this complaint before the Grand Chamber. Article 13 reads as follows: | 0 |
18. The applicant submitted that his statements about a local politician were true. He reported on the criminal proceedings against the deputy mayor of Ostóda and expressed his opinions about him. The applicant complained that he had been found guilty for having made statements such as “stormy and lucrative career in local government” that were value judgments, the truth of which could not be proved. He argued that under Article <mask> of the Convention he had the right to give his opinions. Unfortunately, the Polish judiciary did not understand the Convention standards as regards the right to freedom of expression. | 0 |
31. The applicant also complained under Article <mask> of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. The Court observes in this connection that the impugned statement was not made by the applicant but by his political opponent. It follows that – the applicant’s own freedom of speech not having been at stake – the facts of the case do not give rise to any issue under Article 10 from the applicant’s perspective. This complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. | 0 |
36. The Government in turn reiterated the above position in their observations before the Court, acknowledging that part of the applicant’s actions, namely his complaints to various authorities, were protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they emphasised that the applicant’s conduct had also involved the public dissemination of damaging statements in respect of a third party. Such action was not covered by the protection of Article 10 and the sanctions that had been imposed were justified as they fell within the permissible limitations on the right to freedom of expression, had pursued a legitimate aim, namely protection of the rights of others, and had been proportionate to the applicant’s conduct in the circumstances of the case. | 0 |
53. The applicant drew attention to the chronology of the events and contended that the impugned email of 20 March 2010 had merely been used as a pretext to dismiss him and that the real reason for his dismissal was his persistent criticism of the University. He dismissed the Government’s argument that he had not been prevented from exercising his right to freedom of expression and considered that his dismissal constituted interference with his rights protected under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
30. The applicant complained, relying on Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, about the defamation proceedings brought by judge B., alleging that the proceedings had been unfair, that his letter to the relevant authorities could not be regarded as disseminating defamatory information, and that the award in the case had been disproportionate and arbitrary. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: | 0 |
183. The Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. First of all, they submitted that the interference complained of had been prescribed by law. It had been based on Law 7(I)/1998 and the relevant regulations. The relevant provisions were clear and their effects reasonably foreseeable, especially with the assistance of a lawyer. Secondly, the Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s right pursued legitimate aims and in particular the protection of the rights of others. In this respect, they emphasised the need to safeguard the rights and interests of viewers, including children, who were vulnerable, and to protect them from abusive practices. The Government relied on the reasoning given by the CRTA in its decisions concerning the broadcasts in question. They further highlighted the need to regulate the mass media in view of the significant influence they had on people and society at large. The measures taken by the CRTA had been necessary in securing compliance with the relevant legal provisions and regulations. | 0 |
66. The applicant maintained his complaint. In particular, he submitted that he had been attacked because of articles he had written criticising the activities of the Ministry of Defence. He pointed out that the domestic authorities’ failure to investigate the attack on him had amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression. Relying on the Court’s judgment in the case of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (no. 23144/93, 16 March 2000), the applicant also argued that the Government had failed to comply with their positive obligations under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
32. The Government accepted that the decision complained of by the applicant constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention. Nevertheless, they argued that the interference was prescribed by law, namely by Articles 998-1000 of the Civil Code in force at the time. Furthermore, the interference aimed at the protection of the reputation of a third party, and was thus legitimate. | 0 |
56. The applicants pointed out that the Government had not put forward any arguments showing that restrictions on freedom of expression had been necessary in the present case for a pressing social need or for any other reason. Neither had the District Court nor the Court of Appeal taken into account Article <mask> of the Convention or considered the necessity requirement under that Article in their judgments. While it was true that X. had been publicly criticised in the media over the years, this could not be attributed to the applicants. Bearing in mind that the applicants had been obliged to pay not only the fines but also close to EUR 26,000 in compensation and costs, they maintained that Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. | 0 |
21. The applicants complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the restrictions on their right to freedom of expression had not been prescribed by law and had not been necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The disclosure of B.'s name had not fallen within the protection of private life as the national courts had not declared any part of her criminal case file secret. She had been an active participant in the incident on 4 December 1996 and had subsequently been sentenced to a fine. The public had a right to know about issues of public interest and the information in the article had in every respect been correct. The Appeal Court had not even tried to indicate on what grounds freedom of expression could have been restricted in the present case. In any event, the restrictions imposed on the applicants had been grossly disproportionate, especially in view of their obligation to pay very considerable damages | 0 |
54. The applicant complained that the decision of the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow to bar her from holding judicial office in view of her critical public statements was incompatible with the principles enshrined in Article <mask> of the Convention. She contended that judges, like other persons, enjoy the protection of Article 10 and that the interference with her freedom of expression was not “prescribed by law”, did not pursue a legitimate aim and, finally, was not necessary in a democratic society. Her submissions under these heads may be summarised as follows. | 0 |
40. The Government alleged that the applicant’s complaint did not fall under Article <mask> of the Convention as it essentially concerned an employment dispute as to whether the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful under domestic law; it therefore concerned a labour dispute of a private-law nature. They noted that the reasons for the applicant’s dismissal had been gross infringements of the staff regulation and of ethical and behavioural norms which affected the University. Moreover, the Government emphasised that in his civil claim of 11 May 2010 the applicant had not made any allegations that the University had acted in violation of his freedom of speech. | 0 |
21. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that the Bryanskiy District Court's judgment of 31 May 2004, upheld on appeal by the Bryanskiy Regional Court on 1 July 2004, had violated his right to express his opinion protected by Article 10 of the Convention. He submitted that the domestic courts had failed to draw a distinction between statements of fact and value judgments and held him responsible for failing to prove the truth of value judgments. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: | 0 |
28. The applicants contested that the Austrian courts' judgments had been necessary in a democratic society. They contended that the impugned statements constituted value judgments which had a factual basis, namely the reasoning of the judgment concerned. This factual basis was also known to the readers because it had been published on several occasions, including by “Der Standard” in its issue of 1 September and another article on 2 September 1998 which explicitly referred to the commentary at issue on page 32. Further, the domestic courts as well as the Government had disregarded that the article was earmarked as a “commentary”, thus, indicating to any knowledgeable reader that it contained a critical assessment by the author. In the applicants' view, the courts had also ignored that the impugned statement only concerned the judgment of the private prosecutor and not the way in which he had conducted the proceedings. Therefore the applicants did not share the argument of the Government and the findings of the domestic courts that they had reproached the judge with not having observed the principle of an adversarial hearing or with having been partial. Moreover, they considered the Government's view to be inconclusive and overstepping the requirements of this Court's case-law in respect of Article <mask> of the Convention that their critical remarks should have contained the fact that the proceedings had been (otherwise) conducted in a fair manner. In conclusion, the applicants' convictions were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
30. The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. In that regard they relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary (dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007; Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008; Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus, no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008; and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia, no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013). | 0 |
99. The applicants reiterated that, compared to the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case, the present jury had even less guidance and the Supreme Court did not exercise a more stringent review. Accordingly, if the law in that case violated Article <mask> of the Convention, so did the domestic law at issue in the present case. They accepted that a State enjoyed a margin of appreciation as regards how it complied with Article 10 of the Convention: however, it was much reduced given the press and political speech context. In addition, while that margin meant that a State could choose how to develop the safeguards and, notably, could develop them differently to the Court of Appeal in the above-described Rantzen and John v. M.G.N. cases, this did not change the fact that, as domestic law stood at the relevant time, it was in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. | 0 |
56. The Government finally observed that by publishing the material concerning the telephone interceptions, the press exercised its right, guaranteed by Article <mask> of the Convention, to impart information to the public. It is true that the press should not overstep the bounds imposed by the protection of the reputation of others; however the Government observed that the applicant had failed to produce any document showing that the persons involved in the telephone interceptions had availed themselves of the domestic remedies protecting their right to enjoy a good reputation, such as an action for damages before the civil judge or a request for the opening of criminal proceedings. | 0 |
45. The applicants stressed that the content of the impugned article had mainly been political and that it had concerned the Finnish presidential election campaign. The article had aimed to have an impact on public discussion and the information contained in it had been of public interest. The journalists had acted in good faith and the information had been correct and in accordance with the ethics of journalism. There had been no compelling reasons to interfere with the applicant's freedom of expression. No just balance between the freedom of expression of the applicants and the protection of private life had been found. The actions of the national courts had been conducive to preventing the free flow of information and free discussion of issues relating to political activity. There had thus been a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
43. The applicant further complained under Article 6 § 1 and Article <mask> of the Convention that the judgments of the domestic courts had been unfair and unfavourable. He further mentioned, with respect to the proceedings against Komsomolska Pravda, Argumenty i Fakti and Fakty i Kommentari that the domestic courts did not assess the facts of the cases correctly and have misapplied domestic procedural and substantive law. However, it is not the task of the Court to act as a court of appeal or, as is sometimes stated, as a court of fourth instance, in respect of the decisions taken by domestic courts (see Melnychuk v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 28743/03, ECHR 2005-IX). | 0 |
26. The applicants complained that the judgments given in the case were in breach of freedom of expression. In particular, they claimed that the amount awarded to the plaintiff as compensation for non-pecuniary damage was disproportionate and had had a chilling effect on the exercise of freedom of opinion. They relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which reads as follows: | 0 |
28. The applicant submitted that the refusals to register the titles of the periodicals, Germany – A thousand-year-old enemy of Poland and The Social and Political Monthly – A European Moral Tribunal by the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court and the Katowice Court of Appeal had undoubtedly violated Article <mask> of the Convention. The decisions of the courts were in contravention of the Polish Constitution in so far as it guaranteed freedom of expression and also in breach of the applicable provisions of Polish law. | 0 |
49. The Government argued that the present case differed crucially from the case Juppala v. Finland. In the latter case the applicant had clearly seen the child’s bruised body, she had acted in good faith and was thus entitled to use the reporting system without any potential “chilling effect” of a criminal prosecution, whereas in the present case the applicant had already used the reporting system and a careful pre-trial investigation had been concluded in the matter with no results. The Government maintained that the applicant could not be considered as having acted in the same kind of good faith as the applicant in the Juppala case, as there were no veritable signs or symptoms supporting her allegations. Moreover, the Appeal Court had examined the case as a whole and taken into account the applicant’s particular status in sentencing. The national authorities were thus entitled, in the circumstances of the case, to interfere with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and that interference was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. There was thus no violation under Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
63. The applicant considered that when examining the question of “necessity” it was necessary to take into account the role played by lawyers – the specificity of which the Court had highlighted in the context of Article <mask> of the Convention – as well as the importance of confidentiality in the practice of their profession, which was what protected the confidence that existed between them and their clients, as well as individual freedom and the smooth functioning of justice. In his opinion, requiring lawyers to report their suspicions was asking them to take action that was in contradiction with the social purpose of their profession and shed doubt on the traditional role they played. | 0 |
18. The applicant company complained that its right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention had been infringed by the Austrian courts' injunction in so far as it prohibited the comparison of sales prices of the Neue Kronenzeitung and the Salzburger Nachrichten without indicating the differences in their reporting styles as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law. Article 10 provides as follows: | 0 |
29. The applicants contested that assertion. They contended that the second applicant had been subject to an order to pay compensation for something which had been written by her husband. Given the situation, one could not fail to consider that the freedom of expression of the first applicant encompassed that of his spouse, given that she had been considered jointly responsible for it. Therefore, the second applicant had been the victim of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention for the purposes of Article 34. | 0 |
42. The Government contested the applicants’ arguments. They reiterated their argument that the applicants’ complaint was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. In their submission, the applicants could not be said to have been directly affected by the facts allegedly constituting the interference. In any event, they had not substantiated their allegation of a violation of Article <mask> of the Convention. | 0 |
43. The Government noted that the contested article was published by the applicant company during the mayoral elections in which Mr Y. was one of the main candidates. Therefore, there had been an important public interest in holding fair elections. Furthermore, the domestic courts had been protecting the rights and reputation of Mr Y. which was not only a permissible ground for interference under the second paragraph of Article <mask> of the Convention but also protected one of the rights guaranteed by Article 8. | 0 |
18. The Government did not contest that there had been an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they emphasised that paragraph 2 of that provision allowed the Contracting States to restrict this right in certain circumstances. According to the Court’s case-law, States have a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether or not a restriction on the rights protected by Article 10 is necessary. | 0 |
138. The applicant placed particular emphasis on the deficiencies of the reasoning adduced by the domestic authorities. Both parties have asked the Court to re-examine the proportionality of the “interference”, although they disagree about certain circumstances having significance for such an assessment. The Court, for its part, is not satisfied that the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the “interference” under Article <mask> of the Convention were sufficient for sentencing the applicant to two days’ detention. Faced with the domestic courts’ failure to give reasons that would be both relevant and sufficient to justify the interference, the Court finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 or to have based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, for a similar approach, Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, § 24, 26 January 2017, and Annenkov and Others v. Russia, no. 31475/10, § 139, 25 July 2017). | 0 |
39. The applicants also complained that the loss of their former jobs and the subsequent employment restrictions under Article 2 of the Act also breached Article <mask> of the Convention (which guarantees freedom of expression), and constituted discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention. The Court observes however that in the Sidabras and Džiautas case it found no scope for the application of Article 10 of the Convention, either alone or taken together with Article 14 of the Convention (loc. cit., §§ 64-73). The Court finds no basis on which to distinguish the present cases from that conclusion. | 0 |
48. The applicant complained that there was an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression in that his right to impart information and ideas guaranteed by the Convention was undermined by his convictions for his role in the publication of all the above-mentioned books. He relied under Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides insofar as relevant as follows: | 0 |
39. The Government, after summarising the principles of the Court’s relevant case-law on Article <mask> of the Convention, pointed out that whilst the Court had established the right of the general public to receive information, it had also imposed on journalists an obligation of “good faith”, requiring that they provide “reliable and precise information in accordance with the obligations of journalism”. Citing the Grand Chamber cases of 17 December 2004 of Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania ([GC], no. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI) and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark ([GC], no. 49017/99, ECHR 2004-XI), the Government referred to the Court’s finding that the stronger the criticism, the stricter the obligation of scrutiny had to be. In assessing the necessity of a limit to freedom of expression, the Court had also taken into account the scope of the debate referred to in the article in question and the capacity of the victim. On that point, it was necessary, according to the case-law (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, and Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, ECHR 2001-III), to make a distinction between politicians, who inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and civil servants, who should not be treated on an equal footing with politicians when it came to criticism of their conduct. | 0 |
37. The Government further argued that the domestic courts had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention and the plaintiff’s rights protected under Article 8. They relied, inter alia, on Keller v. Hungary (dec.), no. 33352/02, 4 April 2006; Lindon, Otchakovsky‑Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, ECHR 2007‑IV; Pfeifer v. Austria, no. 12556/03, 15 November 2007; Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008; Alithia Publishing Company Ltd and Constantinides v. Cyprus, no. 17550/03, § 49, 22 May 2008; and OOO ‘Vesti’ and Ukhov v. Russia, no. 21724/03, § 62, 30 May 2013). | 0 |
40. The applicant complained under Article <mask> of the Convention that her disciplinary dismissal, ostensibly on technical grounds, had in reality been a sanction for the way in which she had exposed corrupt practices during her radio show on 9 October 1998. She submitted that that dismissal had been unlawful, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. | 0 |
10. The applicant complained that the disciplinary punishment imposed on him for using “Kürt Halk Önderi” (the leader of Kurdish people) when referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK in his letter, had constituted an unjustified interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. The applicant, based on the same facts, also invoked Article 9 of the Convention. The Court will examine these complaints solely under Article 10 of the Convention. | 0 |
146. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies either expressly or in substance. The grounds of appeal that had been filed and subsequently argued by the applicant before the Supreme Court had not included any allegation of a violation of the provisions of Article <mask> of the Convention, which, to all intents and purposes, was reproduced in Article 19 of the Cyprus Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court had had no opportunity to consider the matter and adjudicate on it. | 0 |
40. The applicants complained that the ban imposed by the governor on 1 December 1997 on the distribution of the daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem in the state of emergency region constituted an unjustified interference in the exercise of their right to impart information or ideas. They relied in that connection on Article <mask> of the Convention, the relevant part of which provides: | 0 |
35. The Government conceded that there was an interference with the applicant’s rights under Article <mask> of the Convention. However, they considered that this measure was lawful, having its basis in Article 124 of the Criminal Code, Article 47 of the Law on Information and Article 26 of the Printed Media Act and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others. | 0 |
71. The applicant complained that during his detention on remand his letters had been monitored by officials at the detention centre. He further complained that he had been punished for having sent a letter bypassing the detention centre’s official channels. In both cases the applicant relied on Article <mask> of the Convention. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, will examine these issues under Article 8 of the Convention, which is the relevant provision and which reads as follows: | 0 |
25. The applicants argued that the judgments given by the domestic courts had violated Article <mask> of the Convention. They were accused of defamation for having published critical articles about a local councillor in which they had exposed his reprehensible behaviour. Despite the fact that all of the information presented by the first applicant in her articles was true, the applicants were sentenced for having used the term “offending activities” which did not have a precise meaning in the Polish language. Furthermore, the legal meaning of the word “offender” was different from its meaning in the ordinary language. | 0 |
102. The Government reiterated that the applicant, acting as a representative of another presidential candidate, had imparted false information about the death of the latter's rival. He had thus participated in a dishonest electoral campaign and had damaged the interests of Ukrainian society in having fair elections. By convicting the applicant of the offence provided for in Article 127 of the CC (see paragraph 41 above), the Ukrainian courts had acted strictly within their margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the applicant had been given a probationary sentence, which could not be considered disproportionate in the circumstances of the case. They concluded that there had been no violation of Article <mask> of the Convention in respect of the interference with the applicant's right to disseminate information in the course of the elections. | 0 |
31. The applicant’s conviction and sentence (see paragraphs 12 and 14 above) constituted an “interference”, in the form of a “penalty”, with his right to freedom of expression under Article <mask> of the Convention. Such interference will only be compatible with that Article if it was “prescribed by law” and was “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the aims set out in its second paragraph. | 0 |
21. The applicant company alleged a violation of its right to freedom of expression. It submitted that the domestic courts' injunctions prohibiting it from distributing the book Le Grand Secret had not been prescribed by law, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been “necessary in a democratic society”; it further complained that the “exorbitant” award of damages which it had also been ordered to pay had not been proportionate to the aim pursued. It relied on Article <mask> of the Convention, which provides: | 0 |
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